The Female Judge “Hunch” in Family Court; Does Female Judgment Differ from Male Judgment?

Authors

Kareem M. Rashed, American University in CairoFollow

Abstract

This paper offers an in-depth theoretical review of the differences in moral judgments between genders, particularly emphasizing their manifestation in the context of family court. Based on Carol Gilligan's critique of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory about moral development, there are distinct differences in moral reasoning approaches between men and women. Gilligan's work challenged the universality of Kohlberg's framework and instead suggested that gendered perspectives on moral reasoning commonly prioritize care and relationships over abstract principles. Complementing this theoretical foundation, the paper incorporates findings from a number of practical studies and surveys, providing non-theoretical evidence of these differences in real-world contexts. Moreover, this research also connects Gilligan's work with Diana Richards' idea of "Hunches" and investigates intuitive insights into decision-making in the family court setting. The paper argues that family court serves as a pivotal environment where the theoretical differences in moral judgment are practically met, as it uniquely intertwines the demands of care, connectedness, and legal principles in shaping decision-making processes.

Document Type

FYRE Place

Department

Rhetoric and Composition Department

Recommended Citation

Rashed, Kareem M. (2025) "The Female Judge “Hunch” in Family Court; Does Female Judgment Differ from Male Judgment?," The Undergraduate Research Journal: Vol. 10, Article 2.
Available at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/urje/vol10/iss1/2

Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

Not necessary for this item