Kant, Hume, and the ‘ontological arguments’

Author's Department

Philosophy Department

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https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2024.2400469

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Richard Fincham

Document Type

Research Article

Publication Title

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

Publication Date

1-1-2024

doi

10.1080/09608788.2024.2400469

Abstract

Kant’s Beweisgrund criticizes the Cartesian ontological argument while promoting another ontological argument–the ‘possibility proof’. It is widely recognized that Hume’s reflections on ‘existence’ are a precursor to the Beweisgrund’s objections to the Cartesian proof, but there is scepticism about whether the former influenced the latter. This is because it is believed that Hume reflects upon ‘existence’ only within the Treatise and not the Enquiry, and that Kant read only the latter and not the former. This paper argues that the objection that existence is not a predicate is contained within the Enquiry, that the Beweisgrund was influenced by the latter, and that the ‘possibility proof’ is intended to answer the Enquiry’s claims about the indemonstrability of existence.

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