Political militaries in popular uprisings: A comparative perspective on the Arab Spring

Author's Department

Political Science Department

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https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512116639746

Document Type

Research Article

Publication Title

International Political Science Review

Publication Date

6-1-2017

doi

10.1177/0192512116639746

Abstract

© 2016, © The Author(s) 2016. What determines whether militaries will defect from authoritarian incumbents during regime crises? Variance in military behavior in the Arab Spring has given rise to a debate around this issue. This article highlights weaknesses of the dominant explanation and develops an alternative account of military behavior in ‘endgame scenarios’. If militaries are politicized institutions that play a major role in regulating access to power under authoritarianism, they are more likely to intervene during normal times, but less likely to defect during mass uprisings. I quantitatively test this argument against data on military coups between 1975 and 2000 drawing on a new variable that allows me to explicitly model the impact of major regime crises. I illustrate the emergence of different forms of political–military relations and their consequences in the Arab Spring by drawing on evidence from Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia.

First Page

363

Last Page

377

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