In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the rule–following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism that is based on two philosophical schools: conventionalism and contextualism. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition – although hard to satisfy – for relieving a priori skepticism.
MA in Philosophy
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(2016).A priori skepticism, conventionalism and contextualism [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.
Salem, Sherif Mohamed Gamal. A priori skepticism, conventionalism and contextualism. 2016. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain.