In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the rule–following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism that is based on two philosophical schools: conventionalism and contextualism. Finally, we provide a sufficient condition – although hard to satisfy – for relieving a priori skepticism.


Philosophy Department

Degree Name

MA in Philosophy

Graduation Date


Submission Date

January 2017

First Advisor

Topa, Alessandro

Committee Member 1

Fincham, Richard

Committee Member 2

Pritchard, Duncan


89 p.

Document Type

Master's Thesis


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Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

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