The structure of the economy of developing countries and the political forces at play are different from their counterparts in developed countries. Therefore and theoretically, the adoption of antitrust policies in developing countries might not rely on the model of developed countries. Poverty and market size play a fundamental role in identifying the right formulation of competition law and policy. Small economies face different issues than large economies, such as productive efficiency, that may lead small economies to a higher level of industry concentration and allow the achievement of some market power. This paper argues that although monopoly is regarded as a necessary evil for small economies, given their high market concentration nature, it should be properly regulated not based on anticompetitive conduct or intent, but rather on high prices, restricted output, or other specified trading practices. Also, the political economy obstacles to antitrust should be considered when adapting competition policy for developing countries. Two obstacles are often confronted. First, those who address public policies do not always adopt policies that fulfill social desire but rather favor certain limited players. Second, institutional incompetence and dependency weaken the effectiveness of competition. This paper argues in particular that Egyptian law and policy as it relates to antitrust policy was not properly designed to meet the best possible practice for developing countries which have led to the emergence of a well-known monopoly in the steel industry. This monopoly has been blamed for being the major reason behind the ongoing increases in real estate prices and as a result an increase in the average age of marriage.


School of Global Affairs and Public Policy


Law Department

Degree Name

LLM in International and Comparative Law

Graduation Date

Spring 2011

Submission Date


First Advisor

Skouteris, Thomas

Committee Member 1

[not provided]

Committee Member 2

[not provided]


47 leaves

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

Not necessary for this item