Abstract

This thesis examines Kant’s distinction between appearances and things in themselves within the framework of transcendental idealism, focusing on how this distinction is meant to secure objective validity while respecting the limits of possible experience. It critically evaluates two influential contemporary interpretations: Henry Allison’s epistemological reading, which understands the distinction as marking different ways of considering the same object, and Lucy Allais’s metaphysical reading, which attributes a grounding role to things in themselves. The thesis argues that while Allison’s reinterpretation successfully avoids noumenal causation by construing affection epistemically, it generates a structural epistemic circularity concerning the role of receptivity and dependence on what is given, whereas Allais’s proposal addresses this difficulty at the cost of reintroducing metaphysical commitments that Kant’s critical project seeks to constrain. The conclusion clarifies the philosophical stakes of this tension and assesses the extent to which Kant’s framework can accommodate receptivity without undermining its epistemic limits.

School

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Department

Philosophy Department

Degree Name

MA in Philosophy

Graduation Date

Spring 5-20-2026

Submission Date

2-9-2026

First Advisor

Addison Ellis

Committee Member 1

Alessandro Topa

Committee Member 2

Euan Metz

Extent

49 p.

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

Approval has been obtained for this item

Disclosure of AI Use

Thesis text drafting; Study/research methodology development; Other

Other use of AI

Polishing/ Conversational tool

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