Abstract

This thesis examines the 2007 Israeli bombing on Syria's Al-Kibar nuclear reactor through the lens of securitization theory, concluding that intelligence served as crucial audiences in legitimizing the operation. Building on the Copenhagen School's paradigm, which defines securitization as the process by which actors build issues as existential threats necessitating extreme measures, this study fills a critical theoretical gap: the underdeveloped role of the audience. While classic formulations focus on public approval, this study suggests a more sophisticated notion of the Political Intelligence Audience: intelligence agencies that validate and operationalize securitization moves. The concept contends that groups such as the CIA and Mossad serve not just as vehicles of state power, but also as engaged audiences whose perception of a threat converts discourse into policy and covert action. Using Israel's 2007 strike as a case study, the analysis shows how the securitizing actors: IDF and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert securitized Syria's reactor, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency's judgment of no imminent nuclear threat. In addition, the paper discusses the international community's quiet response to the strikes. The operation elicited minimal criticism or discussion at the United Nations or during following nonproliferation discussions. This silence, exacerbated by Israeli media restrictions, demonstrates how strategic concealment and intelligence framing influenced foreign perceptions of legitimacy.

School

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Department

Political Science Department

Degree Name

MA in Political Science

Graduation Date

Fall 2-15-2026

Submission Date

1-22-2026

First Advisor

Sarah Smierciak

Committee Member 1

Bahgat Korany

Committee Member 2

Mohamed Soffar

Extent

138p.

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval

Not necessary for this item

Disclosure of AI Use

Thesis editing and/or reviewing; Translation

Share

COinS