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REMITTANCES TO TRANSIT COUNTRIES: THE IMPACT ON SUDANESE REFUGEE LIVELIHOODS IN CAIRO

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In collaboration with FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER

The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS)

The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) is an interdisciplinary center of The American University in Cairo (AUC). Situated at the heart of the Middle East and North Africa, it aims at furthering the scientific knowledge of the large, long-standing and more recent, refugee and migration movements witnessed in this region. But it also is concerned with questions of refugees and migration in the international system as a whole, both at the theoretical and practical levels.

CMRS functions include instruction, research, training and outreach. It offers a Master of Arts in migration and refugee studies and a graduate diploma in forced migration and refugee studies working with other AUC departments to offer diversified courses to its students. Its research bears on issues of interest to the region and beyond. In carrying it out, it collaborates with reputable regional and international academic institutions. The training activities CMRS organizes are attended by researchers, policy makers, bureaucrats and civil society activists from a great number of countries. It also provides tailor-made training programs on demand. CMRS outreach involves working with its environment, disseminating knowledge and sensitization to refugee and migration issues. It also provides services to the refugee community in Cairo and transfers its expertise in this respect to other international institutions.

FEINSTEIN INTERNATIONAL CENTER

The Feinstein International Center at Tufts University is a multidisciplinary organization that conducts research and teaching about crisis-affected communities and the humanitarian industry. The Center's focus is on people affected by violent conflict, disasters, malnutrition, and serious human rights violations, and our research seeks to develop and promote operational and policy responses that protect and strengthen their lives, livelihoods and dignity. Much of our work is based on long-term partnerships with humanitarian and human rights agencies and with local research institutions and universities in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
Through publications, seminars, and confidential evidence-based briefings, the Feinstein International Center seeks to influence the making and application of humanitarian policy. We work globally in partnership with national and international organizations to bring about institutional changes that enhance effective policy reform and promote best practice.

Preface

One important gap in the literature on refugees' and international migrants' remittances concerns flows between developing countries. 'South-South' flows, particularly those to and from transit countries in the vicinity of conflict zones have not been researched. Transit countries are those that become way stations or stopping points in the journey from origin to intended destination countries. In the east of the African continent, Egypt and Kenya are countries of first asylum for Sudanese and Somalis, but also transit settings for refugees and other migrants seeking to migrate to Europe, North America or the Gulf. The migration flows originating from a particular conflict-affected country are mixed. They usually include groups and individuals fleeing, or having been displaced by, the conflict and who seek asylum or resettlement in third countries. They also encompass others in pursuit of work or family reunification also in third countries. These migrants can be 'stuck' in transit countries, often for years, while they try to gather the funds needed to proceed with their journeys; they may also be blocked by visa requirements or policy shifts.

In an attempt to fill this gap, the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) teamed up with the Feinstein International Center, (FIC) Tufts University to conduct a three years research project on Sudanese refugees and migrants in Cairo and their transnational linkages with other Sudanese both in the Diaspora and in Sudan. Egypt being a country of first asylum for the Sudanese, as mentioned above, Cairo was selected to undertake a case study on their transnational linkages. The project, funded by the International Development Research Center (IDRC) represents the second phase of an earlier study conducted by FIC on transnational linkages between the Darfuris in Maine, USA and their families in Darfur, Sudan.

This study represents the first attempt by the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies (CMRS) to map the distribution of Sudanese refugees and migrants in Cairo with a view to identifying the main areas where they lived before administrating the survey. Forty-two sub-districts known for their high concentration of the Sudanese community were mapped so as to identify Sudanese households. Another important contribution of this study relates to the dissemination of research findings. The research team conducted a series of organizational and community workshops to disseminate the project's findings and to receive feedback from both the Sudanese refugee organizations and community. Public dissemination of the findings greatly benefited from these workshops. The community appreciated this endeavor, which made it an active participant in the research effort. Importantly, while the findings of the study are specific to Sudanese refugees in Cairo, the research tools, mapping approach and methods developed, are replicable in other cities. They can also be used in the future to study the experience of other refugee populations in Cairo. The bases for a comparative study of the transnational linkages of different national groups of refugees and migrants in Cairo will have thus been established.

With the Cairo Studies on Migration and Refugees, CMRS aims at publishing innovative research on migration and refugees in the Middle East, Africa and globally. We invite you to read this new study, which represents an important addition to the series. The series is open to well established as well as to young researchers from AUC and from the national, regional and international research community.

Ibrahim Awad, Ph.D. Director

Abstract

Transit countries are way stations or stopping points in the journey of migrants and refugees from their countries of origin to their intended destination countries. Many migrants and refugees become 'stuck', often for years, unable to either move onward or to return to their home countries. They may be blocked by the inability to gather the funds needed for travel, or by hazardous travel conditions or by immigration policy shifts (such as resettlement policy).

This study sought to fill gaps in our knowledge about the livelihoods of refugees in the urban centers of transit countries. 'Stuck' migrants engage in a range of social and economic activities that have implications both for their host countries, and, through their transnational links, for their home countries. Migrants in transit cities are linked into wider diaspora networks that help support them and their families and communities back home. Our study explored the significance of these transnational linkages, particularly remittances, for Sudanese migrants in Egypt.

Acknowledgement

First and foremost the authors would like to thank all the research participants who dedicated time to participate in our survey and focus group discussions. We would also like to express our appreciation to representatives of international, local and community-based organizations who, despite their busy schedules, gave their time to participate in our research.

We would like to acknowledge the tremendous effort of the research assistants: Zakaria Yahia, Ismail Yacoub, and Abdoul Raouf Osman, whose contribution to the study was invaluable. The study would not have been possible without the continuous guidance by Zakaria and Ismail on how to reach and deal with different sections of the Sudanese community in Greater Cairo.

Special thanks go to Dr. Ibrahim Awad, CMRS director, for his valuable comments and edits and to Dr. Ray Jureidini, CMRS's former director, who provided guidance in the earlier stages of the research.

Last but not least, we are very grateful to the International Development Research Center (IDRC) for funding this study. Our special thanks go to Eileen Alma, our program officer at IDRC, for her continuous support, guidance, and advice throughout the different stages of the project.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The international humanitarian community places much emphasis on the role played by aid agencies both in peace processes and in the recovery and reconstruction of conflict-affected areas, but relatively little attention goes to the role of refugees in these processes. By contrast, development agencies like the World Bank pay increasing attention to migrants' contribution, through remittances, to their home countries' development but relatively little attention to the role of remittances to conflict zones or the reconstruction of these conflict zones. One significant gap in the remittance literature concerns migration between developing countries, so-called 'South-South' flows[1], and particularly the remittance flows to and from the transit countries that neighbor conflict zones.[2] Transit countries are way stations or stopping points in the journey of migrants and refugees from their countries of origin to their intended destination countries. For example, Egypt or Kenya are countries of first asylum for refugees from Somalia and Sudan, but many of these refugees hope and eventually seek to move to countries further afield. Most migrant populations include refugees (those fleeing conflict or persecution in neighboring countries), and other migrants (those pursuing work, education or family reunification). Not all of them view their situation as being in transit: for some the country they are living in was their target destination. However, many migrants become 'stuck', often for years, unable to either move onward or to return to their home countries. They may be blocked by the inability to gather the funds needed for travel, or by hazardous travel conditions or by immigration policy shifts (such as resettlement policy). 'Stuck' migrants engage in a range of social and economic activities that have implications both for their host countries, and, through their transnational links, for the conflicts and poverty that drive them from their home countries.

Migrants in transit cities are linked into wider diaspora networks that help support them and their families and communities back home. In this study we explored the significance of these transnational linkages, particularly remittances, for Sudanese migrants in Egypt. Many of the thousands of refugees and other migrants in Egypt regard themselves as being in transit, and Sudanese nationals, a large and longstanding population, are fairly typical of those who are unable to move to other countries, or to return to Sudan.

Remittances and Refugees in Cairo: knowledge and gaps

Recent scholarly interest in the role of remittances to conflict zones has sought to understand how Diasporas help their families survive. However, as Fagen and Bump point out, while there are a number of case studies, there is relatively little quantitative research and many gaps exist in our understanding about remittances to refugees.[3] Much of the existing research is focused on the diaspora in the US or Europe, and few studies focus on south-south transfers, even though much remittance activity

1 Bump, Micah and Fagen, Patricia "Remittances in Conflict and Crisis: How Remittances Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crisis, and Transitions to Peace", Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, 2006

2 According to a 2007 World Bank report, national data on bilateral remittances are not widely available, and when they are tend not to be accurate, because funds channeled through international banks may be attributed to a country other than the actual source country. See Ratha, D. and W. Shaw (2007). South-South Migration and Remittances Washington D.C., World Bank, Development Prospects Group

3 Fagen and Bum 2006: 4. Their report also provides a synthesis of this research. For case studies, on Sri Lanka, see Gunaratna, Rohan. 2003. "Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers." In Ballentine and Sherman,The Political Economy of Armed Conflict; on Somaliland, see II Ahmed, "Remittances and Their Economic Impact in Post-war Somaliland," Disasters, 2000

takes place in transit countries. Since most studies do not compare the experiences of senders and non-senders or receivers and non-receivers, we do not know the relative importance of remittances. In addition, little is known about the macro impact of remittances on the refugee community as a whole, receivers and non-receivers together. This is an important gap, because much has been claimed about the importance of remittances for survival during conflict, reconstruction, and the conflict itself.

In general, the research on refugee in transit countries lacks quantitative evidence about the impact of transnational linkages—how these linkages affect the financial and social capital of refugees and their livelihood strategies. Furthermore, we have only anecdotal information about the scale and scope of their transnational networks, and what channels and mechanisms they use to transmit remittances. Recognizing the need for more of this empirical knowledge, we conducted an in-depth study of one such group, the Sudanese in Cairo. We selected Egypt as a case study of a transit, 'near' diaspora country because it is a primary destination of both Sudanese migrants and refugees, and a key refugee host country for the region.

The study presented here was conceived as the second phase of a larger study of remittances to Darfur, conducted by the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. In 2006, we explored remittance patterns amongst internally displaced people in and around the urban centers of Darfur, and we wished to extend the research to explore remittance patterns of Sudanese refugees and migrants in neighboring countries.

2. The selection of Cairo as a case study

We selected Cairo as a case study because Egypt is a good example of a country of first asylum with significant 'south-south' migration flows. Cairo has been home to many refugee populations including Armenians and Palestinians. However, these groups were never perceived (by themselves or by others) as being refugees in Egypt. They were mostly middle class, educated families who contributed to the Egyptian economy and became integrated, including by marrying Egyptians. During the oil boom of the 1970s, Egypt, like Sudan, became a major labor supply country to the Gulf States. With the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1990, large numbers of Egyptians and Sudanese returned from Iraq (Egyptians), Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Sudanese). This period of return migration during the 1990s coincided with a mass influx of refugees to Egypt resulting from the wars in Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.[4] Unlike the older refugee groups who had settled in the middle class areas or established districts of Cairo, these new refugees moved into the low-income slum areas or the newer satellite cities like 6th October city (See more under Methodology).

Our focus in this study was on Sudanese migrants and refugees in Cairo. However, defining and describing this population is difficult, as today the Sudanese population in Cairo is a complex mix of groups. There is the older, more integrated population, many of whom have lived in Cairo for decades, and who came when there was free movement of people between Egypt and Sudan. While not all of this population is well off, they are economically, socially and politically integrated - many have dual nationality and even voted in the recent (2012) Parliamentary election. This population would not consider themselves to be refugees. Then there is another stratum of poorer,

4 Grabska, K "Living on the Margins: The Analysis of the Livelihoods Strategies of Sudanese Refugees with Closed Files in Egypt ", FMRS Working Paper no. 6, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, 2005

more recent arrivals most of whom could be considered refugees of some kind, and who often identify themselves as refugees. Not all have formal refugee status, but most fled Sudan since the wars there broke out, and cite insecurity or persecution as their reasons for departure.

The total number of Sudanese in Cairo has always been debated. Estimates in previous years ranged between 500 thousand and three million. However, these estimates were crude and lacking a sound methodological base. A recent study by the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies estimated the number of Sudanese in Egypt to be 55-65,000.[5] This new estimate includes both refugees and migrants. According to the most recent figures of UNHCR Egypt, as of February 2012, there were some 24,850 Sudanese refugee and asylum seekers in Egypt (Table 1) or 57% of the total 43,598 refugees and asylum seekers in Egypt. Taken together, the new estimate of all Sudanese in Egypt and the number of refugees cited by UNHCR, suggest that less than half of the Sudanese population in Egypt comprises refugees and asylum seekers.

The Sudanese community in Cairo is probably growing, partly because Gulf States have tightened conditions of entry[6] and the route to Europe through Libya has been blocked, but also because refugee resettlement has become more difficult, and the price of being smuggled to Europe has increased.[7] For these reasons, more refugees and migrants are 'stuck' - spending longer periods of time in Cairo.

Table 1: Changes in refugee and asylum seeker numbers, December 2010 - February 2012

Nationality	December 2010	April 2011	February 2012	% Change btw 2011 2012
Sudan	22,647	23,138	24,850	6.9%
Iraq	6,802	7,122	7,629	6.6%
Somalia	6,599	6,758	7,367	8.3%
Eritrea	1,646	1,727	2,048	15.7%
Ethiopia	1,021	1,156	1,704	32.2%
Total	38,715	39,901	43,598	8.5%

Source: UNHCR Egypt. 2012. The table shows UNHCR registration numbers, which include new arrivals as well as those already residing in Egypt but who had not approached UNHCR before. See also: 2012 UNHCR country operations profile Egypt http://www.unhcr.org/cgi bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486356
Accessed April 22, 2012)

5 Ayman Zohary, (2012) Estimating number of refugees and migrants in urban areas: The Case of Sudanese in Cairo, forthcoming

6 Shane MacGinley, "Kuwait Visa curbs tip of the iceberg for Gulf", Arabian Bussiness.com, August 2011

7 UNODC, "Smuggling of Migrants into, through, and from North America", May 2010

3. Study Objectives

Our study's goals were to fill some of the empirical gaps in our knowledge and understanding about the livelihoods of refugees and migrants in the urban centers of countries neighboring conflict zones, and specifically the relationship between remittances, livelihoods and vulnerability of refugees.

Our first objective was to map the distribution of Sudanese refugees and migrants in Cairo, and determine the main areas where they lived. Then, based on this map, we sought to conduct a survey of Sudanese that would allow us to gather information on Sudanese migration routes and their livelihoods in Cairo, transnational linkages and remittance patterns both with the diaspora in other countries, and with 'home' communities in Sudan. This information would allow us to explore how transnational linkages support livelihoods.

The study's objectives could be summarized as follows:

1. To map the distribution of Sudanese refugees and migrants in Cairo, and determine the main areas where they lived.
2. To understand the extent of transnational linkages and remittance patterns of Sudanese in Cairo with both the diaspora in other countries, and with 'home' communities in Sudan.
3. To explore and understand how transnational linkages and remittances support the livelihoods of Sudanese in Cairo.

Another objective – to explore whether and how remittance sending and receiving influence the political capital, mobilization and activities of Sudanese refugees with respect to the various conflicts in Sudan – was jettisoned early on (See Annex 2).

4. Background to the Study

As mentioned earlier, Egypt has been home to many refugee populations. The largest and most longstanding is the Palestinians, estimated at over 70,000.[8] Beginning of the 1990s, the wars in the Horn of Africa led to a refugee influx to Egypt from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia as well as the new waves of Sudanese after 1983 and 2003 conflicts.[9] As of January 2012, UNHCR has registered 44,670 asylum seekers and refugees in Egypt, most of them living in Cairo. The breakdown by nationality is as follows:[10]

Sudan	24,934	56%
Iraq	7,439	17%
Somalia	7,284	16%
Eritrea	1,987	4%
Ethiopia	1,6 12	3%
Other	1,414	3%

8 Kagan, Michael, "Shared responsibility in a new Egypt" A strategy for refugee protection. Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo

9 Grabska, K "Living on the Margins: The Analysis of the Livelihoods Strategies of Sudanese Refugees with Closed Files in Egypt", FMRS Working Paper no.6, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, 2005

10 UNCHR fact sheet, January 2012

In recent years, migration patterns of asylum-seekers have changed as many enter Egypt on their way to Israel or Europe using smuggling routes. In 2008, for example, 8,373 people applied for asylum in Israel, nearly all of them traveling through Egypt without applying for asylum there. As such UNHCR's numbers are misleading as transiting asylum seekers might enter and stay in Egypt for a while without applying to UNHCR. In addition, many 'closed files' (asylum seekers who have been rejected for refugee status) stay in Egypt and do not leave although they have been removed from UNHCR records.[11] (See more under Egypt refugee's law and policy)

4.1 Sudanese migration to Egypt

Sudanese refugee movements to Egypt are part of the long history of migration and trade between Sudan and Egypt, dating back thousands of years. The forty days road (Darb el Arbaein) from North Darfur to Egypt traversed nearly 1100 miles of desert and took camel caravans 40 days to complete. This route was used initially by slave, ivory and salt traders from Chad and Darfur, and also by camel traders and migrants in recent years. The first wave of Sudanese refugees occurred in 1955 with the start of Sudan's first civil war. The second wave began in 1983 with the imposition of Islamic law in Southern Sudan and the outbreak of the second civil war. This wave of refugees included opponents of the Nimeiri regime. After the outbreak of renewed conflict in Darfur in 2003, many Darfuri refugees began coming to Egypt.[12]

Sudanese migration to Egypt was facilitated by the 1976 Wadi El Nil Treaty. Until 1995 this treaty allowed Sudanese to enter Egypt without a visa, and granted them the right of residency, work, education, health services, and ownership of property in Egypt. It meant that Sudanese who fled the 1983 civil war did not need to apply for refugee status. With the growing number of Sudanese, however, in March 1994 the Egyptian government requested UNHCR to be fully responsible for screening Sudanese asylum seekers. Then in June 1995, after an assassination attempt on President Mubarak in Addis Ababa that was attributed to Sudanese Islamists, the 1976 Wadi El Nil Treaty was revoked. The revoke dramatically changed the situation of both the Sudanese entering Egypt and those residing in Egypt. Visa and residence permit requirements was imposed on Sudanese who entered the country after that date, while those resident in Egypt were subjected to increased security checks. Sudanese nationals were treated as foreigners and Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees found themselves to be in the same position as those from any other country and thus must go through the asylum channels. [13]

In 2004, Egypt and Sudan signed the Four Freedoms Agreement. This agreement is thought of as a partial return to the Wadi El-Nil Treaty as it accords Sudanese a 'special status', exempts them from visa requirements and guarantees reciprocal rights of residence, work, movement, and ownership of property. However, our interviews with Sudanese in Cairo indicate that the Four Freedoms Agreement has yet to have any impact on their situation. Most Sudanese still apply through UNHCR channels despite the fact that they are exempted from visa requirements. It seems that the Egyptian government differentiates between Sudanese citizens and Sudanese asylum seekers.

11 Kagan, Michael, "Shared responsibility in a new Egypt" A strategy for refugee protection. Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo.

12 Hamood, S. "African Transit Migration Through Libya to Europe: The Human Cost", The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, 2006

13 Sperl, Stefan "Evaluation of UNHCR's Policy on refugees in urban areas: A case study Review of Cairo", June 2001

The former benefits from the agreement while the latter do not. This is apparent in the treatment of Sudanese refugees fleeing Libya as a result of the Libyan revolution in 2011. UNHCR's request that Sudanese should not be encamped and allowed entry was rejected on the basis that they are asylum seekers fleeing Sudan.[14]

Since the Libyan revolution, Egypt has witnessed an influx of Libyans, third country nationals, and African refugees residing in Libya. As of May 31, 2012, the total number of people of concern to UNHCR who have fled Libya to Egypt is 1,906. The majority (1,652) are Sudanese who are housed in temporary camps established by UNHCR in the 'no-man's land' between Egypt and Libya.[15] Countries of resettlement such as the U.S., Sweden, and Canada, among others, made slots available for these refugees, however, this may have created a pull factor for some asylum seekers who were not necessarily fleeing the crisis situation in Libya itself, but had other reasons to depart their countries of origin and headed towards Salloum. A cut-off date was set by UNHCR in October 2011 -- anyone arriving in Salloum after this date is not considered part of the 'Salloum caseload' and will be considered an asylum seeker who is to be protected but not eligible for a RSD interview and thus is not eligible for resettlement.[16] Among the 1,906 people currently living in the UNHCR's camps on the Egyptian-Libyan borders, 1,734 came before the cut-off date and 172 (all except 3 are Sudanese) came after the cut-off date.[17]

4.2 Egypt's refugee law and policy

Egypt is party to both the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol as well as to the 1969 OAU (Organization of African Unity) Convention. Accordingly, forced migrants fleeing persecution who enter Egypt are entitled to asylum and protection on a temporary basis. Egypt does not have a policy of encampment and refugees settle among the local population. Apart from the refugee camp along the border area near Salloum, Egyptian asylum policy has not changed since the Egyptian Revolution in January 2011.

As with many other host countries, the government sees the presence of refugees and asylum seekers as temporary, and even those with recognised refugee status are only guaranteed limited human rights protection. On acceding to the 1951 Convention, Egypt placed restrictions on five articles of the 1951 Convention: Articles 12(1), 20 and 22 (1) and 23 and 24. These concern personal status, rationing, access to primary education, access to public relief and assistance, and labor legislation and social security.[18] Refugees residing in Egypt are not able to acquire Egyptian nationality since citizenship is granted on the basis of descent (iussanguinis).

The government's reasons for these restrictions are worth exploring, because rather than seeking to deny refugees their rights, the restrictions could be motivated by

14 Interview with Mai Mahmoud, Assistant Protection Officer, UNHCR Cairo Office. The interview was conducted by phone on June 14, 2012 at 1pm

15 Ibid

16 Hafez, H. "The effect of the Arab Spring on Migration Flows in Egypt", The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, forthcoming

17 Interview with Mai Mahmoud, Assistant Protection Officer, UNHCR Cairo Office. The interview was conducted by phone on June 14, 2012 at 1pm It is not clear what will happen to the 172 who arrived after the October 2011 cut-off date as they will not resettled and they are in the 'no man's land' of the border crossing area, not on Egyptian soil. Many questions arise, including how their asylum determination will take place and what their future will be. These questions await resolution by the new elected president and government of Egypt

18 See reservations to the 1951 Convention found at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx search?page=search&docid=3d9abe177&query=1951%20Refugee%20Convention

the economic situation in Egypt and the lack of access to basic services for most of the population. Egypt's reservation on the education article of the 1951 Convention needs to be seen in the light of other conventions and bi-lateral agreements signed by Egypt, which give educational rights to refugees. Egypt has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which gives everyone under 18 the right to free primary education regardless of their nationalities. In addition, bi-lateral agreements with countries like Libya, Sudan, and Jordan give children of these countries the right to be enrolled in Egyptian school regardless of their residency status. Article 5 of Law 22 of 1992 states that any student funded by UNHCR (which is the case for many refugees in Egypt) is entitled to be enrolled in Egyptian schools.[19] However, while refugee children are technically allowed to enroll in public schools, the overcrowding of schools and deteriorated educational infrastructure obstruct their access –as it does for local children.[20]

A similar argument can be made regarding refugee employment. Egypt did not place a reservation on Article 17 concerning wage-earning employment, and Egyptian labour legislation applying to non-nationals also applies to refugees.[21] Article 53 of the Egyptian constitution says foreigners who have been granted political asylum may be eligible for work permits. The problem is that like all foreigners refugees must go through the process of obtaining work permits. Getting a work permit is difficult. First, it is costly, and the foreigner must find an employer to sponsor him/her, including the payment of fees.[22] Getting a work permit also requires a valid residence permit, however the temporary residence permits provided to refugees by the Ministry of Interior are not clear about permission to work. Sudanese, who have special status in Egypt because of the Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, do not need to get work permits before entering Egypt. The visa they get on arrival is a residency permit that allows them to apply for a work permit. All applicants must also prove that they are uniquely qualified, i.e. their work cannot be performed by a local. The latter condition is particularly challenging for most refugees as they are generally low skilled -- like poor Egyptians. There are also regulations about the ratio of foreigners to Egyptian nationals in any organization. In sum, while refugees can get work permits in practice doing so is complicated, and most refugees do not have work permits.

4.3 Refugee Assistance in Cairo: UNHCR and its implementing and operational partners

Egypt has not adopted national refugee legislation or established domestic asylum procedures. Responsibility for refugees is assigned to the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) by the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Egyptian government and UNHCR. According to UNHCR, the MOU has been useful in committing the Government to maintain "a liberal admission

19 Interview with Mai Mahmoud, Assistant Protection Officer, UNHCR Cairo Office, June 14, 2012, 1 pm

20 See Ensor, M. O. (2010). "Education and self-reliance in Egypt." Forced Migration Review 34: 25-26.Many refugee parents object to the Islamic curricula taught in Arabic in government schools. Unaccredited refugee schools, many of which offer classes in English, are the only realistic alternative for many refugee students in Egypt. Unable to obtain a recognised school certification, the majority of them are barred from pursuing a higher education

21 Labor Law No. 12 of 2003

22 The cost for a yearly work permit varies by nationality and is reciprocity-based. For Sudanese and Palestinians it is only 200 Egyptian pounds. For Somalis, Iraqis, Eritreans and Ethiopians the cost is 4,530.00 Egyptian pounds, or about US$900. Interview with the AUC Business Support Center, June 24, 2012.

policy" and to recognize the principle of non-refoulement. The MOU grants UNHCR unrestricted access to asylum seekers or refugees detained for illegal entry.[23]

As in all host countries, UNHCR's internationally mandated obligations are to provide protection and assistance to refugees in the form of registering asylum seekers, conducting refugee status determination, and finding durable solutions. Asylum seekers are required to register with UNHCR upon arrival to Cairo, when they receive the asylum- seeking card (the yellow card) which enables them to stay in Egypt under the protection of UNHCR until they are scheduled for a Refuge Status Determination (RSD) interview. The period between receiving the yellow card and the RSD interview varies, and can be years. If RSD is granted, the person becomes a recognized refugee and receives the blue card. Persons who are rejected after the RSD interview are entitled to appeal. If the appeal fails the file is considered closed by UNHCR, the person is no longer of concern to UNHCR, and is expected to leave Egypt. In practice, however, there is no mechanism by which either the Egyptian government or UNHCR makes 'closed file' people leave Egypt, and a large number of Sudanese (and other asylum seekers) live in Cairo in legal limbo, not entitled to any rights [24].

In terms of assistance to refugees, UNHCR has some nine partners including the Ministry of Health and Population, CARITAS, Refuge Egypt, CRS (Catholic Relief Services), Terre des Hommes, Egyptian Red Crescent, Islamic Relief Worldwide, TADAMON (the Egyptian Refugee Multicultural Council), and the Psycho-Social Training Institute in Cairo (PSTIC). In addition, UNHCR cooperates with community-based organizations to provide assistance to refugees, and cooperates with international organizations like IOM (International Organization for Migration), IRC (International Rescue Committee),UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) and UNV (United Nations Volunteers). 25

Caritas Egypt is responsible, in co-ordination with UNHCR, for assessing the needs of individual refugees (based on an interview) and providing cash assistance to the most needy (See more under External income: 7.2.6). Caritas along with Refuge Egypt also provides medical and health assistance. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is responsible for education and vocational training for refugees who are in a position to achieve self-reliance. The churches of St. Andrews and All Saints Cathedral provide individual education assistance to refugee children who are not able to enroll in special refugee schools. The Psycho-Social Institute of Cairo (PSTIC) provides counseling and psychosocial support. The United Nations Volunteer (UNV) programme provides support to UNHCR Cairo protection staff in a number of important areas: refugee status interviewing, identification of resettlement needs, and country of origin and legal research. IOM is responsible for providing assistance in processing the departure of refugees accepted for resettlement.[26]

Originally assistance was provided only to those who are recognized as refugees by UNHCR (blue card holders). However, with the suspension of RSD for Sudanese

23 UNHCR Egypt Country Profile 2004

24 Grabska, K "Living on the Margins: The Analysis of the Livelihoods Strategies of Sudanese Refugees with Closed Files in Egypt", FMRS Working Paper no.6, Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, 2005

25 UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet, January 2012

26 See UNHCR Country operations plan, 2004

asylum seekers in 2004 following the ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), all Sudanese (blue and yellow card-holders) became eligible for assistance. As of March 2011, UNHCR changed its policy, and all people of concern to UNHCR (blue and yellow cards holders) from all nationalities became eligible for assistance.[27]

4.4 Durable Solutions for Sudanese refugees in Cairo

The main difference between a recognized refugee (a blue card holder) and an asylum seeker (a yellow card holder) is that recognized refugees become eligible for UNHCR's durable solutions: Local integration, Repatriation, or Resettlement. A durable solution is one in which refugees regain the protection of a state and are no longer considered to be refugees. Egypt, like many countries in the Arab world, is not in favor of local integration. The MOU between UNHCR and the government of Egypt specifies voluntary repatriation and resettlement as the two durable solutions in Egypt.[28] De facto local integration for refugees is challenging and because of the difficulty of finding work and paying for housing, as we discuss in or Findings below.

4.4.1 Voluntary repatriation

Voluntary repatriation has become a possibility in recent years for Iraqis and Southern Sudanese.[29] The repatriation process for Southern Sudanese began with the signing of the peace agreement in 2005,30 and gained momentum after the referendum for the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Registering southern Sudanese for repatriation had started in November 2010, and demand for repatriation increased with the Egyptian revolution in January 25, 2011 and its aftermath of political unrest. In February 2011, 1500 Southern Sudanese were registered. There are four registration centers for southerners in Egypt: the SPLM office center, Hai Al-Nasser center, Southern Sudan Student's Association office and the Alexandria center. Two Southern Sudanese agencies are responsible for assisting the repatriation: The Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRC) and the Ministry of Humanitarian affairs in the newly established government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). The SSRC is particularly interested in repatriating youth who are vulnerable in Egypt. Many have tried crossing to Israel and got caught and others have become criminals. SSRC received 4.5 million Sudanese Pounds to start repatriating southern Sudanese in Egypt. Between February 2011 and January 2012, 1,931 Sudanese had been assisted by UNHCR for repatriation. [31] For Darfuris and those from the Nuba Mountains, return has not been an option, and as conflict intensifies in the Nuba Mountains area, new outflows there have led to new arrivals to Cairo (Table 1 indicates an increase of 6.9% of Sudanese entering Egypt between 2011 and 2012).

27 Interview with Sara Atwood, Head of Community service unit, UNHCR, June 24, 20012

28 Kagan, Michael, "Shared responsibility in a new Egypt" A strategy for refugee protection. Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo

29 Ibid

30 Some 517 Southern Sudanese were repatriated from September to October 2006. Roba Gibia, Sudan Tribune "Egypt- resumption of Sudanese refugee repatriation", November 2006

31 Relief Web, Briefing Kit for Egypt + Miraya FMCompiled on 28 Jun 2012

4.4.2 Resettlement

UNHCR's use of resettlement from Egypt has not been consistent. Resettlement reached its peak in 2004 when 4,110 refugees were resettled.[32] The increased rate of resettlement created a great expectation among refugees and UNHCR Cairo gained a reputation as a resettlement office. However, in June 2004, following the ceasefire between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), UNHCR suspended refugee status determination for all Sudanese (not only Southerners). UNHCR's rationale was that. given the potential peace in Sudan, providing asylum seekers with temporary protection against refoulement offered better protection than the risk of rejecting a large number of applicants on the basis of change of circumstances in the country of origin. The suspension of the RSD served to obstruct access to resettlement for new Sudanese arrivals, and the failure to meet expectations for resettlement was a key factor in the Sudanese protest of 2005.[33] In 2007 resettlement dropped to 443 and then fell below 200 in 2008. In 2009 it edged back up - UNHCR resettled 712 and 671 in 2010 (mostly Iraqis). UNHCR's online 2011 Country Operations Profile for Egypt listed an objective of identifying 950 refugees for resettlement.[34]

As fewer refugees are being resettled, more will be stranded in Cairo. They will have to make the decision to return to Sudan, try to survive in Cairo, or try to migrate elsewhere—often with the help of smugglers. The continued presence of Sudanese in Cairo will have implications for the new Egyptian government as it consolidates after the revolution of 2011.

4.5 Remittances to Egypt

Egypt is among the top 30 emigration and remittance-receiving countries. It ranks 11 among the top emigration countries with 3.7 millions Egyptians living abroad, and ranks 14 among the top 30 remittance-receiving countries. Official remittances sent by Egyptians living abroad were estimated at US$ 7.7 billion in 2010.[35] However, the true size of remittances, including those flowing through informal channels, is not known exactly and nothing is known about remittances sent by non- Egyptians (such as Sudanese) to their families living in Egypt.[36] We do not know, for example, whether non-Egyptian remittances are spent in Egypt or sent onward to family members in other countries.

A recent study on bank policies in Egypt concerning the transfer of money revealed that Bank Misr, one of the largest state banks in Egypt, facilitates transfers by lowering fees to beneficiaries (recipients) of 'Hewalat'. Bank Misr charges a flat rate of 2 dollars, whatever the amount transferred, in addition to $2 per thousand, with a minimum of

32 Kagan, Michael, "Shared responsibility in a new Egypt" A strategy for refugee protection. Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo

33 Azzam, F. "A Tragedy of Failure and False Expectations: Report on the Events Surrounding the Three-month Sit-in and Forced Removal of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo.", The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, 2005

34 Kagan, Michael, "Shared responsibility in a new Egypt" A strategy for refugee protection. Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo

35 Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011

36 Ghoneim, F. "Background Paper for Migrants' Opportunities for Investment in Egypt", A paper prepared for the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, 2009

$2 and maximum of $50.[37] The charge is removed if the recipient receives the money in Egyptian pounds. In addition, in an attempt to facilitate receiving remittances through banks, Bank Misr and the National Bank of Egypt (the second largest public bank) introduced a new system of cards where migrants deposit their transfers at the exchange bureau of cooperating banks and the recipient can withdraw the money in Egypt through another card.[38]

Recently, Egyptian post offices developed a new system where migrants can send money from their bank abroad to a person in Egypt who can then withdraw it in an Egyptian post office in Egyptian pounds against a fee. In addition, Bank Misr, Egypt Post, and the Commercial International Bank (one of the largest private banks in Egypt) formed a consortium to develop Egyptian post offices. The new consortium, known as Giro Nil, has launched a range of interbank payment products including salary and pension payments, bill payments, money orders and cash withdrawals. The consortium hopes that the introduction of these and similar products will promote the electronic flow of money and create a multiplier effect in Egypt. It is expected that by the year 2020 around 20 million Egyptian citizens will be using this facility. Households receiving remittances are seen as an important group that will be encouraged to open Giro accounts at local banks. [39]

Our research sought to investigate whether these new remittance policies affected non-Egyptians, including refugees who are sending and/or receiving remittances. Our interviews with bank officials in Cairo revealed that refugee identity cards (the blue and yellow cards issued by the UNHCR) are considered valid documents allowing refugees to cash cheques in their names. However, the ID cards do not allow refugees to open bank accounts, for this a valid passport is required. Accordingly, without a bank account, an individual cannot send or receive money through banks.[40] In line with this, our survey found that respondents rarely mentioned going to a bank; when banks were mentioned they were referring to the Western Union offices located within some bank branches.

5. Methodology of the Study

Data collection was carried out from July 2009 to July 2011, in two phases. The first phase from July 2009 to October 2010 focused on mapping the Sudanese population of Cairo, and then preparing to conduct a door-to-door survey of Sudanese households, based on random sampling. However, after a year of waiting, the Egyptian government ultimately refused permission for the door-to-door survey to be conducted. We were instructed that data collection could only take place on the AUC campus. So in the second phase from October 2010 to July 2011, we revised the methodology and began conducting survey interviews on the AUC campus. The mapping and sampling revision processes are described below.

37 Ibid

38 Ibid

39 Ibid

40 Interview with bank officials at Commercial Bank of Egypt (CIB) on July 4th, 2012

5.1 Mapping Sudanese in Greater Cairo

Greater Cairo[41] is the largest metropolitan area in Africa and the Middle East, and the eleventh-largest urban area in the world. It consists of three governorates: Cairo (located on the east bank of the Nile), Giza (on the west bank), and Qalyubia (to the north). Almost all the refugees and migrants coming to Egypt settle in Cairo and Giza, and our research focused on these governorates. Cairo governorate's total area is 453 square kilometers (175 sq mi), and its population according to the 2006 census was 6.76 million.[42] The 2006 census estimated there were 75 slum areas in Cairo, inhabited by millions who are unable to find suitable housing. Cairo is divided into four main regions: the eastern, western, southern, and northern regions. Each region includes 7 to 10 districts for a total of 34 districts. Giza Governorate (13,184 km2) is considered an agricultural area but in recent years, industries such as food, spinning and weaving, basic metals, engineering and electronics, and mining have started up. The governorate includes 10 Marakz, 12 cities, 7 districts, 51 rural local units annexed by 171 villages, and 636 hamlets. According to the 2006 census, Giza population is 6.3 million, of whom 58.6% live in urban areas.[43] In this report we refer to both these governorates as "Cairo".

The mapping process sought to identify the location and concentrations of Sudanese neighborhoods and households thoroughout Cairo. Our information drew on two main sources: key informant interviews and mapping tools from online software and satellite imagery. We began with a large map of Cairo, then worked with Sudanese key informants and community-based associations (i.e. people knowledgeable about the Sudanese community) to mark up the map according to the main areas of Sudanese density. Finally, we identified 20 relevant districts and 42 sub-districts, and we conducted field visits to most of the areas to verify this information. The main Cairo districts of Sudanese concentration were Ain Shams, Heliopolis, and Maddi, and another seven sub-districts of interest were: Abbassia, El Hey el Asher in Madinet Nasser, Hadayek Helwan, Hadayek el Maadi, Hadayek el Zaytoun, Helmiyat El Zaytoun, and Dir Malak. In Giza, the two main districts were Dokki and Boulak El Dakrour and five sub-districts: Agouza, Ard El Lewa, Barageel, El Marg, and Arba wa Nus. Four of the latter are slums areas. In addition, the new satellite cities of 6th October and Sheikh Zayed were also identified as areas of Sudanese concentration.

41 Egyptians often refer to Cairo as Masr (Arabic: مصر), the Arabic pronunciation of the name for Egypt itself.

42 adjusted after Helwan governorate was created on 17 April 2008, and removed from the population estimate

43 (Egypt State Information System: http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Story.aspx?sid=6)

The above is a screenshot of the map as created to plot out with the areas and districts of Sudanese concentration in Cairo. The red polygons are those districts ultimately sampled in the final data collection phase and who form the sample for this reports findings. The blue polygons are the districts we that were also mapped in the first field phase, and the yellow polygons are the districts used in the pilot testing the study. The size of the polygon represents geographic area distribution of the concentration, and does not represent levels of Sudanese population density in a given district. For example, the large red polygon in the lower left section of the map represents a district in Sixth October City, with a sample size of 82 households. The small polygons in the upper right corner of the map represent the districts of Ain Shams, with 136 households sampled in Phase Two of the data collection.

The district and sub-district sample breakdown from Phase One of the data collection is in Table 2. The districts vary greatly in geographical size, and for the purpose of sampling we sought out those parts of the district where Sudanese were most likely to be found. We determined this by asking local people on the street and in markets. The Research Coordinator and Field Supervisor conducted field visits to each of the 42 sub-districts in Phase One to identify individual residences of Sudanese.

Table 2: Sampling districts in Cairo- Phase One

District	No. Of Sub District	No. Of Household	% of Total Sample Pool
6th October	6	63	8%
Abassia	1	34	4%
Aguza	1	16	2%
Ain Shams	7	133	17%
Arba wa Nus	2	108	14%
Ard el Lewa	1	7	1%
Barageel	1	48	6%
Bulaq el Dakrur	2	34	4%
Dir Malak	1	32	4%
Dokki	1	12	2%
El Hay el Asher	3	69	9%
El Marg	2	13	2%
Hadayek Helwan	1	16	2%
Hadayek Maadi	3	72	9%
Hadayek Zeitun	1	20	3%
Helmiyat Zeitun	1	9	1%
Maadi Arab	2	49	6%
Maadi el Gedida	2	20	3%
Masr el Gedida	2	22	3%
Sheikh Zayed	2	11	1%
Total	42	788	100%

Each district and sub-district was plotted onto Google Earth map software, identifying all known streets visited in the sub-district and any other landmarks to help the enumerators find the identified households. The mapping of the site areas onto Google Earth was a laborious process without the benefit of GPS data from the field visits, as many of the sample sites were located on smaller side streets and alleys not listed in Google Earth. To identify correctly the borders of each sub-district, the research coordinator cross-referenced the field visits notes with the street-name data and satellite imagery in Google Earth and also the GPS mapping data of landmarks and satellite imagery in-put by individuals in various community mapping online websites, the most useful of these being www.wikimapia.org.

All sub-districts are identified as polygons in Google Earth, which serve as the visual basis upon which the survey data is mapped. The map data are kept at an aggregate level by district; no individual residence is identifiable on the map.

5. 2 Household survey of Sudanese

Our goal in the survey was to generate a representative and random sample of Sudanese living in Cairo, and then to obtain information through a survey. Since not all the information we wanted could be appropriately obtained through a survey, we used qualitative interviews to explore more sensitive or complicated issues.

The survey questionnaire was designed to capture household demographic, migration and livelihood information, and included a detailed module on remittances. The questionnaire was fully structured and coded, with space for a few descriptive comments. The initial questionnaire was designed by the research team, then tested and revised during the enumerator training (see below), before it was translated into Arabic, and back-translated. The final English version of the questionnaire is in Annex 3.

5.2.1 Selection and Training of Field Enumerators

The enumerator recruitment began in October 2009, focusing on Sudanese who were bilingual in Sudanese Arabic and English. Most of the 18 enumerators selected had previous experience or current jobs as teachers, interpreters, translators, and research assistants and field interviewers on other research studies conducted in Cairo.

We used the three-day enumerator training to fill out our map and revise our survey questionnaire. We also conducted a two-day field pilot of the survey in which we tested and revised the questionnaire, and experimented with enumerator deployment and communication in the field.

The enumerator training was led by the researcher team over two days (November 14-16, 2009) at AUC. We began by explaining how our survey was different from other studies in which the enumerators might have participated, particularly concerning the sampling strategy. We then reviewed the background to the Cairo study and our research objectives, and then focused on the draft questionnaire and sampling strategy. The training included group role-play on the second day, in which the enumerators went through the questionnaire by “interviewing” the Research Coordinator. This exercise helped clarify and revise the questionnaire, and it enabled the researchers to observe the enumerators and determine which ones to select as team supervisors for the field phase.

5.2.2 Field Pilot – and delay

Following the classroom training, we piloted the survey. Two teams tested the map, sampling strategy, and questionnaire in two sample areas. On the first day the teams visited the Sudanese houses identified during the mapping phase to obtain their consent to be interviewed the next day. We also added newly identified Sudanese houses by asking local people on the street if they knew more Sudanese locations. In this way our sampling was conducted in stages that increased the randomness and size of the final sample. We then added the newly identified sites to the master sample list.

By end-November 2009, we were ready to conduct data collection, but were unable to proceed without the approval of the Egyptian government through the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). After waiting a year, this approval did not come. In October 2010, under instruction from CAPMAS, we revised the research methodology so as to conduct our survey interviews on the AUC campus, which was permissible according to government regulations.

5.2.3 Data Collection

Preparation for the on-campus interviews started in October 2010. After consultation with the field researchers, we worked out a way to target the sample of 788 identified during the mapping process. Each week, the field researchers visited different districts, and with the help of local informants in the community, went to the homes of potential interviewees, explained the survey, and asked whether the head of household would come to AUC for the interview. If the respondent agreed, a time and date was agreed (one or two days later), and he/she was given a slip of paper with a code which the respondent handed to us when they arrived. This was to ensure anonymity and it enabled us to check whether the person who came was from the identified household. We also offered a small sum of money (EGP 50, or about $10) to cover transportation and time.

In this phase of the data collection, we worked from the originally mapped 20 districts to contact households to come to AUC for the study. We also added two new districts, Faisal and Abdeen. Of the now 22 districts mapped, we conducted field visits to 14 of them, contacting a total of 757 households to invite them to AUC for the study:

Table 3: Sampling districts in Cairo- Phase Two

	District	Contacted	% of Total
1	**Sixth October**	82	11%
2	**Ain Shams**	136	18%
3	**Arba wa Nus**	80	11%
4	**Ard el Lewa**	10	1%
5	**Barageel**	72	10%
6	**Bulaq dakrur**	31	4%
7	**Dir Malak**	54	7%
8	**El Hay el Asher**	78	10%
9	**El Marg**	12	2%
10	**Hedayek Maadi**	56	7%
11	**Masr el Gedida**	5	1%
12	**Faisal**	88	12%
13	**Abdeen**	38	5%
14	**Dokki-Agouza**	15	2%
	Total	757	100%

During this first contact, we asked a few questions about each family, including length of time in Cairo, place of origin in Sudan, number of people and children in household, number of people working, and whether they received any assistance. This information was then checked when the respondent came to AUC. Of the 757 households initially contacted, 565 respondents came to the AUC campus and completed the full interview, which is a response rate of approximately 74%.

5.2.4 Limitations of the survey

Our revised methodology did not allow us to generate a random sample, in that we had to individually identify – through community consultations – where Sudanese households lived. However in neighborhoods with high concentrations of Sudanese, there was a good likelihood that all Sudanese households had an equal chance of being selected. Our sample was somewhat biased in that we did not cover the whole of Cairo, only areas with Sudanese concentrations. We cannot guarantee that our sample did not miss pockets of Sudanese. However we did our best, at different stages of the survey, to ensure that we found as many Sudanese areas as possible, and we believe our sample is a good representation of the Sudanese population in Cairo, as demonstrated by the demographic and respondent origin of the sample, discussed below.

5.3 Qualitative methods

From December 2010- December 2011, we interviewed 24 key informants and seven focus groups, each containing four to five participants, for a total of 28-35 focus group respondents.

5.3.1 Focus Groups

The focus groups sought to understand Sudanese perceptions about remittances and their social support networks in Cairo, Sudan, and other countries. One set of focus groups comprised remittance senders and receivers, and another set consisted of individuals identified by other Sudanese as having "successful livelihood strategies" -they ran small businesses or community centers, were teachers, or were engaged in educational and vocational learning programs.

We used an adaptation of Participatory Rural Assessment (PRA) methods to elicit group discussion about livelihoods and success factors. Participants discussed and then distributed beans (or sugar cubes) in ratios among different livelihood strategies and also divvy out ratios of success in each strategy. This exercise served as a catalyst for discussion. The Field Coordinator and others from the research team took notes and entered them in the qualitative database.

For the remittance focus groups, we recruited participants from survey respondents who said they received or sent remittances. After the survey interview we asked whether they'd be willing to participate in a focus group. For the 'success' focus groups, we recruited from local Sudanese community associations, English language programs, and vocational education course to which refugees had access through support from UNHCR.

5.3.2 Key Informant Interviews

We conducted 24 one to two hour interviews with Sudanese community leaders and with individuals identified as having insight into particular issues, including migration to Israel, the use of hawala for money transfer, and the success of particular Sudanese migrants.

Finding and recruiting these informants took time as their consent to being interviewed required trust and a knowledge of who we were. It helped that we had members of the Sudanese community on our team, as they were themselves known to our informants or could arrange introductions from others who knew them.
We also conducted interviews with three financial institutions: the Western Union office in Garden City, the Arab-African Bank in Garden City, and CIB (Commercial Industrial Bank). With these interviews we sought to gain an understanding of the institutional constraints and enablers involved in facilitating money transfer.

5.4 Difficulties encountered with the research

The outbreak of the Egyptian Revolution on January 25th 2011 stopped AUC campus interviews until April 2011, and after that we experienced intermittent interruptions due to unrest and instability. The post-revolution insecurity meant that it was more difficult for refugees to move safely across the city from their neighborhoods to the AUC campus. Cairo is known for being a relatively safe city, but after the revolution field visits were less safe due to the lack of police presence and a sharp increase in private individuals illegally possessing guns against potential crime. In general there was heightened suspicion of strangers in the different neighborhoods. However, our original target had been 600 on-campus interviews, and in spite of these challenges we managed to collect 565 interviews.

The disruptions meant the research went on for longer than originally anticipated, and some team members were unable to stay to the end to the project. Our two Sudanese researchers had to leave the project in August 2011, as one was resettled and the other, the only Zaghawa-speaking trained interpreter in Egypt, was recruited by the UN for interpreting on the Libyan border. They missed the last phases of data entry and analysis, and the dissemination workshop. However, we have been able to consult with them via email in the analysis and dissemination phases.

6. The Cairo Survey – a representative sample of a sub-population

Our survey objective was to generate household data based on a random, representative sample of the Sudanese population in Cairo (including migrants and refugees). As discussed above, however, our sample actually reflects a cross-section of that stratum of the Sudanese population we refer to as the refugee population. That is, our sample was biased against inclusion of those Sudanese who are well integrated into Egyptian society, and who do not (and never did) consider themselves to be refugees. While not all of our sample have legal status as refugees, and while some might not consider themselves refugees (we did not ask people to identify themselves) our sample was biased towards the refugee population of Cairo both because of the way we constructed our sample and because of the limitations imposed by government restrictions.

Our sample was derived from our map of Cairo discussed above, and represented 565 households distributed across 14 districts of Cairo as found in Table 3.

6.1 Demographics

Our sample represented a cross-section of the Sudanese population, both in terms of where they lived in Cairo, demographics (age, sex, ethnicity, education), migration experience (region of origin in Sudan, length of time in Cairo), and legal (immigration) status.

6.1.1 Gender and Age

Half of our respondents (49.9%) were female, and there was a wide range of age groups (about a quarter were age 17-30, almost two thirds were age 30-49, and 9% were 50 or older). Women tended to be younger than men, with a third of women in the 17-29 age group, compared with a quarter of men.

6.1.2 Marital status and Number of children

Two thirds of our respondents were married, and half were living with their spouses in Cairo. A quarter were single, about four percent were divorced and another four percent widowed. About ten percent of our sample (56 respondents) had spouses living in Sudan, and another four percent did not know where their spouses were.

- Women were more likely to be married (76% of women were married vs. 59% of men), and men more likely to single (37% of men were single vs. 11% of women).
- Just over a third (36%) of our respondents either did not have children or did not have their children with them in Cairo. More than half of those without children (123) were single and most were male. Of our women respondents, almost 70% had their children (under 18) with them, compared with 48% of men respondents. The average household size was five people (5.01) and the modal size was 4.

6.1.3 Ethnicity and Languages

Sudan has hundreds of ethnic groups and these were well represented in our sample. The six largest ethnic groups, comprising 62% of our sample, were Nuba (including all sub-groups) 21%; Fur 17%; Beni Amer 6%; Dinka 6%, Masalit 5.5%; and Gaalin 3%. The other 38% representing over 75 ethnic groups and sub-groups. We asked about the main language spoken at home and then about additional languages. Of our respondents, 76% spoke Arabic as a first language at home. Just under ten percent said their main language was Fur, and another nine percent spoke another Sudanese language.

6.1.4 Education

Some 16% of our respondents had no school, a quarter (24%) had completed secondary school, and 8% had completed university (another 9.6% had "some" university). Of our women respondents, 13% had been to university (either completed or not) compared with 23% of male respondents. A significantly larger percentage of women had no school (25%) compared with men (8%).

6.2 Migration Experience

6.2.1 Place of birth

In order to check how representative our sample was across key Sudanese groups, we

divided place of birth into four regions of origin in Sudan as indicated in Chart 1:

- "The West" which included any of the three Darfur states (South Darfur, North Darfur and West Darfur). About a quarter (25%) or 144 of our respondents were born in one of these states;
- "The South" including all the states that now comprises the country of South Sudan. Of our respondents, 76 or 13.5% were born in southern Sudan;
- South Kordofan – this state is part of the so-called "Transitional Area" - a significant region of conflict over the past few decades, which includes the Nuba Mountains, a heavily conflict-affected region. Of our sample, 101 respondents (18%) were born in South Kordofan;
- The remainder of Sudan we referred to as "the North" including Khartoum and the states surrounding Khartoum. Just under a quarter (22%) or 127 of our respondents were born in Khartoum and another 112 (20%) were born in other parts of northern and eastern Sudan.

This division means about 42% or just under half of our sample were born in less conflict-affected areas of Sudan.

Chart 1: Place of birth



6.2.2 Legal (Immigration) status

In asking about immigration status, we could not verify responses, and given the sensitive nature of this question, it is possible that respondents might have withheld information.

Of our respondents, 79% had legal status of some kind. Just under half (46%) had yellow refugee cards, indicating they were asylum seekers. Almost a quarter (23%) had blue refugee cards, which meant they had formal refugee status.
Just under 20% of our respondents had no legal status. Either they were 'closed file' (8.6%), or they were new asylum seekers without a yellow card (2.4%), or they had a passport only (7%) or simply no documents (1%). Only 7% of Darfuris had no status, compared with 17% of those from the South, 25% of those from South Kordofan and Khartoum respectively, and 20% from the north.

Approximately ten percent of our respondents had legal status unrelated to refugee status, i.e. a passport with visa, or were exempted from residence requirements.

Chart 2: Immigration status (percentages of sample, n=572)



When it came to immigration status there were no significant gender differences, but there were significant differences depending on place of origin in Sudan. Most of our respondents born in Darfur had either blue
(26%) or yellow (60%) cards, as did 73% of those from the South. But slightly lower proportion of respondents from Khartoum (61%); the North (63%) or South Kordofan (65%) had blue or yellow cards. (See Chart 3)

Chart 3: Immigration status by region of origin



In sum, while our sample was not randomly selected, its diversity across demographics, place of origin and immigration status, allows us to be relatively confident about the extent to which it represents the overall profile of Sudanese refugees in Cairo.

7. Research Findings

In the rest of this report we focus on three sets of findings: the migration experience of Sudanese; their livelihood experience and the problems they face in Cairo, and the importance of remittances.

7.1 Migration to Cairo

Our survey found that respondents from South Sudan and South Kordofan tended to have been longer in Cairo - most had been in Cairo more than 8 years. Darfuris tended to be the most recent arrivals, with 27% having arrived within the two years prior to the survey (November 2010 – March 2011) The largest cohort of respondents had been in Cairo 5-8 years, with about 40% of each group except those from South Kordofan (See Chart 4).

Chart 4: Length of stay by place of birth



Length of stay is often seen as an indicator of migrants' increased ability to pursue livelihoods. Thus we might expect that southerners and those from South Kordofan are better integrated and perhaps with more secure livelihoods than more recent arrivals, including Darfuris.

7.1.1 Migration routes

We sought to trace the routes to Cairo taken by our respondents, including the different stages of their journey, by asking the following question:

> *Please tell me about your journey to Cairo, starting with the place where you had a problem and decided to leave Sudan. Please tell me all the places you stopped at before coming to Cairo and why you left those places.*

The most common starting point was Khartoum, which was named by a third of our respondents as the beginning of their journey, and by 64% of the 371 respondents who named a second place on their journey to Cairo. Since only 23% of our respondents were born in Khartoum, this suggests that most respondents passed through Khartoum en route to Cairo. Darfur was the starting point for 29% of our sample, the South for about six percent, South Kordofan for almost 13%, and the North for 17%. From Khartoum most traveled north to Halfa and Aswan.

Chart 5: Starting and second places for journey to Cairo



7.1.2 Reasons for migrating

First move

When asked why they left their first place of departure, most of our respondents gave reasons related to armed conflict, general insecurity or political persecution. As shown in Chart6, 90% of Darfuris gave these reasons, as did 64-66% of those born in Khartoum or the North, and 70% of those born in the South and 75% of those from South Kordofan. Other reasons for moving included:

- Family reasons (such as joining one's spouse or other family in Cairo), given by 16-13% of those from Khartoum or the North, 7-9% of those from the South or South Kordofan, and 2% of Darfuris.
- Seeking education – given by three percent of all groups except southerners, of whom 12% mentioned this reason.
- Seeking work – given by 10% of those from the North, 7% of those from Khartoum and less than five percent by the other groups
- Health reasons were given by less than five percent of all groups.

Chart 6 Reasons for first move, by place of birth



Second move

Of our respondents, 371 (66%) traveled to a second place before coming to Cairo. When asked why they left, a quarter (25%) said it was a stop route to Cairo, but another quarter (28%) said they left this second place to escape some from of violence, insecurity or persecution. Other reasons for leaving the second place were to join family (overall about 4%) or to find work (6%).

Chart 7: Reasons for second move, by place of birth



Third move

Overall, only a quarter of our respondents (140) stopped at a third place on their journey to Cairo, and of these half were en route to Cairo. Of our 144 Darfuris, however, 60 (42%) had made a third stop. Half were en route, but another third (22 respondents) said they left this third place because of violence, insecurity or persecution.

Chart 8: Reasons for moves on journey to Cairo



Why they came to Cairo

Our respondents' reasons for coming to Cairo differed from their reasons for being displaced, and varied a lot. Overall, about a third (224 respondents) said Cairo was the most convenient (or cheapest) destination. A quarter of our respondents did not give a reason ("missing" in the table). About 13% said they came to join family or friends or because a relative had arranged the trip for them. Some 7% said they were seeking resettlement. Other reasons mentioned were education or work (5%), health care (3%), because the UNHCR office was in Cairo (3%) or in search of security or protection (3%).

Chart 9: Reasons for coming to Cairo (in percentages, n=565)



7.2 Sudanese livelihoods in Cairo

Refugees'ability to pursue livelihoods in Egypt is constrained by many factors, including, as discussed in Section 4.2, obtaining an Egyptian work permit. Like many Egyptians, however, including more qualified and skilled ones, refugees mainly find work in the informal sector where work permits are not required. A much bigger problem - affecting everyone including refugees- is the problem of high unemployment in Egypt caused by the unstable political climate in Cairo following the revolution, and the economic contraction that followed. For refugees, xenophobic attitudes have contributed to the difficulty of pursuing livelihoods and these attitudes are also thought to have worsened since January 2011.

7.2.1 Economic Activities

As with many urban refugee populations, the Sudanese in Cairo face a range of vulnerabilities and risks compared with the urban poor and other migrants amongst whom they live. Studies of Sudanese livelihoods in Cairo have explored refugees' income generating strategies, including domestic work (Ahmed 2003), and brewing of liquor (Curley 2004).[44] Our own findings confirm that, like most urban poor, Sudanese migrants and refugees work largely in the informal sector, in highly insecure employment and at constant risk of being underpaid, unpaid, or laid off at the whim of employers. Some types of employment, such as maids, street cleaners, and vendors, expose people to increased risk of physical or sexual abuse, especially if they require work in private homes or travel to dangerous parts of the city, particularly at night. Many of our respondents spoke of their livelihood vulnerability, i.e. that they feared being raided by the police and having to pay bribes to keep their businesses and stay out of jail.

Our study found that 89% of our respondents were economically active, but their activities seldom yield enough for subsistence and many are barely above the level of begging.

44 Previous empirical research, almost all of it qualitative, has included studies of Ethiopians (Cooper 1992, 1993; Brown, Riordan and Sharpe 2004), of Somali refugees (Al Sharmani 2003), and on the livelihoods of Palestinian refugees (El-Abed 2003). Some studies have focused on a distinct group of refugees, for example northern Sudanese (Fabos 1999), or on specific aspects of the refugee experience, such as changing gender roles (Lejukole 2000), health and education issues (Dingemans 2002), and nutrition and diet patterns (Ainsworth 2004).

Most of our respondents worked in the informal sector, engaged in piecework or casual/day labor (68%) or subsistence trade (8.4%). Another 19% had regular salaried employment. Less than three percent said they had small businesses or engaged in translation or language tutoring activities.

Types of occupations mentioned in our survey and by our focus groups included the following.

- Housecleaners
- Factory workers
- Henna drawing / perfume making
- Simsars (i.e. acting as a broker, to help people find housing or jobs, or facilitate travel, or help find health care, including seeking organ donors)
- Child care
- Street vendors
- Store owners
- Coffee shop and restaurant owners
- Prostitution (women)
- Fraudsters/grifters[45]
- "Suitcase traders" between Egypt and Sudan (people either go themselves to Sudan, or they buy from a distributor who goes back and forth)
- Security guards
- Tourism in Sinai – cooks, waiters etc.

Some Sudanese are skilled or specialized in different trades or professions, but are unable to pursue those livelihood activities. One of our informants, from an organization that trains refugees in different vocations, noted that there are Sudanese in Cairo "who have certificates in specializations but are not able to work in their fields, and find themselves working in other more simple jobs."[46]

Other occupations mentioned by a few of our respondents, included:

- Employees in businesses (rare)
- Journalists
- Teachers
- Activists, volunteers in organizations that reflect the regions in Sudan
- Representatives of political entities or armed movements
- Bawabeen (plural of bowab – doormen, superintendent, responsible for cleaning and maintenance of building, set fee paid by collection from all residents, maintains accounts for water bill, electricity etc.

45 Swindling activities include providing fake traveling info, passport stealing/borrowing. Swindlers ask newcomers to give them their passports to be used in duty-free shops to buy anything they want as the new comers have the right to buy duty free up to 72 hours from their arrival. Then, instead of returning the passport the swindlers sell the passport to someone who will have the passport's picture changed, and use it as theirs.

46 Don Bosco FGD, 5/19/2011

Chart 10. Types of employment



7.2.2 Household Income earners

Household size relative to the number of employed individuals (the dependency ratio) is an important indicator of economic vulnerability. Households with high income-earner dependency ratios (the number of income earners divided by the total number of persons in the household) are likely to face greater vulnerability. Households with higher numbers of elderly, disabled people or children are likely to have higher health and education expenses, and be less able to generate income.

The number of income earners in the household ranged from none to 16, but most households – 331 or 61% of our sample – had just one income earner, who could be supporting just him or herself to as many as 11 household members (one respondent supported 14 people).

Chart 12: % sample supported by one earner



7.3 Household Income and Assets

In order to understand Sudanese livelihoods better, we asked about different forms of household income and assets. Below we discuss income generated by the work of household members and income from external sources, including remittances and cash assistance from government or aid agencies. Remittance and aid questions must be interpreted in the larger context of household income, assets, and employment. Taken alone they do not indicate that a household is better off. A household that depends on remittances and aid from external sources may be more vulnerable

because of its need for external income, or less vulnerable because it has access to such income. Similarly, sending remittances can indicate that the household is vulnerable because it loses a portion of its income, but it can also mean that the household is more financially secure and thus able to send disposable income. In this section we discuss household cash assistance from aid agencies, and then we discuss remittances more fully in the following section.

Income and asset questions are sensitive, and the response rate for these questions was lower: 34% of respondents either did not know or refused to answer our income questions.

7.3.1 Household income

We asked respondents to estimate the total income earned by members of the household in a month from all sources. Of our 572 respondents, only 376, or 65% responded to this survey question. Of these, five percent said they got no income and 14% said their income was between100-500 Egyptian pound per month.[47] Just under half, 46%, were in the 500-1000 EP range, and about just over a third, 35%, got between 1000- 3000 per month. Two respondents reported their household income above that, one claiming 4400 per month, and another 7500.The modal income was 600 Egyptian Pound ($107), and median income was 750 ($134). These ranges of reported monthly income are difficult to verify, and are likely to be inaccurate.

Chart 11: Level of Income



When broken down by region of origin, 8% of both Darfuris and southerners reported no household income, compared with 6% of those from the North, and 3% of those from Khartoum and South Kordofan. Of those in the highest income bracket, Darfuris and Northerners were the smallest groups, just 3% of those reporting monthly household income of 1500 or more, compared with 11% of those from Khartoum, and 7% of those from South Kordofan and the South respectively.

7.3.2 Household Assets

Another indication of financial status is the material assets owned by the household. We asked about six commonly owned household conveniences in Cairo: a mobile phone, a fan, internet connection, a computer, a TV, and a refrigerator.

47 At the time of the survey, 1 USD is equivalent to 5.6 Egyptian pounds.

- Connectivity:
  1. Computer and internet: Relatively few respondents had access to a computer 15.4%), and even fewer to the internet (5.8%).
  2. Cell phone: 92% of our respondents owned or had access to one.
  3. TV: Some 82% said they owned or had access to a TV.

- Dealing with the heat – In Cairo a refrigerator is essential for keeping food, and 87% of our respondents had access to one in their flat, while 63% had fans.

7.3.3 Assistance from Aid Agencies

Assistance to refugees is provided through UNHCR and its implementing partners (See 4.2). The main implementing partner is Caritas Egypt, with headquarters in Cairo and five branch offices in the governorates of Alexandria, Minia, Assiut, Sohag and Qena. Refugee assistance falls under Caritas's 'Emergency' program, and provides cash assistance and health services. Although all refugees are eligible to apply to the cash assistance program (based on individual needs assessment), usually only families receive it. The cash assistance is approximately 700 L.E provided every other month for a maximum of 6 months, after which the applicant can apply again but must go again through another assessment. [48]

In our survey, we listed the main refugee agencies and organizations and asked whether the respondent had been in contact with them and what if any help they had received (Table 4). Most of our respondents (87%) had been in contact with UNHCR when they registered as asylum seekers. More than 90% of Darfuris, Southerners and those from South Kordofan had contacted UNHCR, compared with 82% of those from Khartoum or the North.

Table 4. Contact with aid agencies

Agency		Main kinds of help received
UNHCR	87%	Asylum, refugee registration
AMERA	35%	Legal aid, psychosocial, financial assis
All Saints, Zamalek	45%	Health care
Caritas	64%	Financial assistance*
St Andrews	27%	Education
IOM	7%	Resettlement

Sixty four percent of the total sample reported being in contact with Caritas. Of these 32% are from Darfur, 20.4% from Khartoum, 16% from the North, 12.4% from South Sudan, and 18.7% from South Kordofan. Only thirteen percent (13%) reported receiving cash assistance from Caritas, two thirds of whom were women.

7.4 Remittances and Transnational Links

This section describes the linkages with the diaspora and with families back in Sudan. As we show, the number of respondents in touch with relatives or friends outside of Egypt was much higher than the number of those receiving assistance from them. However, as noted above, remittance question are sensitive and likely to be misrepresented. This was reflected in our focus group discussions, where there

was widespread agreement that most of the Sudanese in Cairo were in contact with people in Sudan and other countries, but much disagreement about how many people were receiving or sending remittances.

7.4.1 Transnational Links

Of our survey respondents, 72% (404) said they were in contact with friends or family in Sudan. Those who were not in contact, said it was because they did not know where their family was, or did not have the resources to contact them, or there was no way to contact them because their family was in a remote area or camp.

Just under half, 233 or 41%, of our respondents said they were in contact with family or friends in other countries. Additionally, 20% reported being in contact with both ties in Sudan and Sudanese abroad (112). As shown in Table 4, the main countries abroad included USA, Australia, Canada, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, with smaller numbers in other countries of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.

Table 5 Main countries of diaspora

Countries	Number in Contact	% Of total sample
USA	79	14
Australia	73	12.9
Canada	25	4.4
Israel	16	2.8
Saudi Arabia	13	2.3
Other Europe/West	16	2.9
Nordic (Fin, Nor, Swed)	8	1.4
UK	4	0.7
Gulf (Bahr, Jor, Qtr, UAE)	16	3.1
Chad	2	0.4
Libya	6	1.1
Total	234	41%

7.4.2 Remittances flows to and from Cairo

Our study explored both sending and receiving remittances, however the rates for sending remittances were too low (10 respondents send more than 4 times a year, 31 respondents send once or twice a year) to give us any statistical power. Hence we focus this report mostly on remittance receivers.

Receiving from Sudan or Abroad

Respondents were asked about remittance receiving in different questions, to counter under-reporting. There was some variation in responses; in one question, 143 respondents reported receiving help from Sudan or abroad. But in a later question about the type of help received, 153 respondents reported receiving some kind of goods or money. This variation could be due to respondents' reluctance to divulge

remittance patterns, or it could reflect uncertainty about whether receiving material goods as gifts during festivals or holidays actually qualifies as remittance "help."

Contact with Sudanese abroad and remittance returns

Of the 404 respondents who reported being in contact with people in Sudan, 59 reported receiving remittances from Sudan at least once. This represents 10% of the total sample of 565, and 15% of the 404 sub-sample who reported being in contact with ties in Sudan.

Of the 233 respondents who reported being in contact with Sudanese outside Sudan, 84 reported receiving remittances from abroad at least once. This represents 15% of the total study sample of 565, and 36% of the 233 sub-sample who reported being in contact with Sudanese abroad.

Table 6

Contact + Remits	# responded	% of N=565	% of those in contact
Contact + Remits from Sudan	59	10.4%	14.6%
Contact + Remits from abroad	84	14.9%	36.1%

Types of remittances received

The majority of remittances reported were in the form of money (133 respondents), only 16 said they received goods only and 4 respondents said they received both money and goods (Table 7).

Table 7

Type of Remittance Received	# responded	% of N=565	% of those in contact
Goods	16	2.8%	10.5%
Money	133	23.5%	86.9%
Goods and Money	4	0.7%	2.6%
Total reporting type of remittance	153	27.1%	100.0%

Frequency of Receiving Remittance

Of the 153 who reported frequency of receiving remittances, almost three-quarters (71%) said this happened only once or twice a year, on Eid (Muslim Feast) or upon request in an emergency. This means only one–fifth (19%) of the total sample received remittances during the year.

Only 21 respondents (4% of total) reported receiving remittances regularly on a monthly basis (Table 8).

Table 8

Reported Frequency of Receiving	# respond yes	% of N= 565	% sub-sample frequency
Goods	107	18.9%	71.3%
Money	22	3.9%	14.7%
Goods and Money	21	3.7%	14.0%
Total reporting type of remittance	150	26.5%	100.0%

Frequency of Receiving, by Region of Origin

When we broke down our respondents by region of origin, we found that people from Darfur had the lowest proportion of remittance receivers compared with other regions. Just 14% of Darfuri respondents received remittances occasionally, compared with 19-22% from all other regions (Table 9).

Table 9

Rcv'd Occasionally%	Respond yes	Region Total	% Receivers from Region
Darfur	20	144	14%
Khartoum	28	127	22%
North/East	25	112	22%
S Sudan	15	76	22%
S Kordofan	19	101	19%

Rcv'd Occasionally%	Respond yes	Region	% Receivers from Region
Darfur	9	144	6%
Khartoum	12	127	9%
North/East	14	112	13%
S Sudan	6	76	8%
S Kordofan	2	101	2%

The issue of receiving remittances proved to be controversial; as the research respondents did not necessarily answer all the remittance questions fully. And in the qualitative focus groups, there was no agreement among our Sudanese informants about either the number of Sudanese in Cairo receiving remittances, or the importance of remittances to households. When asked to estimate the number of those receiving remittances in Cairo, the range given was from 2% - 95%. Despite the heated debate most agreed on the following regarding the importance of remittances:

- Households that received remittances were better off than those who did not,
- Most receivers got only occasional remittances, very few could rely on regular installments

Our informants agreed that remittances are largely spent in Cairo, and not sent onwards to Sudan or other countries.

7.4.3 Remittance transfers mechanisms to/from Cairo

About half of receivers (72 out of 146 respondents for this question), reported receiving funds through Western Union (49.3%) of the sub-sample of responding receivers. About 15% reported receiving via hawala. "Hawala" has the rough equivalent meaning of "transfer" in Arabic, and is a general term referring to various informal systems of cash transfer made outside of "Western" conventional financial systems[49] (for more on the hawala system, see Annex 4).

By contrast, a third (49) reported receiving remittances hand carried by someone they knew.

Table 10

Transfer Method to Receive Remits	Respond yes	% of N=565	sub-sample transfer methodWestern
Western Union	72	12.7%	49.3%
Hawala	22	3.9%	15.1%
Hand carried by someone you know	49	8.7%	33.6%
Other	3	0.5%	2.1%
Total Methods Reported	146	25.8%	100.00%

In qualitative interviews, some respondents explained that Western Union was the preferred agency because it has less restrictive regulations, as indicated by one of our informants, "Money Gram won't give [the money] to you without a residency permit", and " they won't give it to you if there is a difference of even one letter in your name."[50]

Of our study respondents who reported sending or receiving remittances, 15% of the receivers (22 out of 146 receivers) reported receiving via hawala, and 18% of the senders (6 out of 33 senders) reported using hawala to send remittances.

7.5 Problems experienced in Cairo and coping strategies

Our study inquired about the problems experienced in Cairo and the strategies Sudanese employ to address such problems. We particularly asked about what people did when they could not pay the rent, and about harassment in the community. As shown in Table 11, the two most cited problems were inability to pay the rent (85%) and mistreatment from the local community (82.5%).

49 Passas, Nikos.Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them? Risk Management, Vol. 5, No. 2, Special Issue: Regulation, Risk and Corporate Crime in a 'Globalised' Era (2003), pp. 49-59

50 FGD, May 11, 2011

Table 11: Problems in Cairo

	Have you or your family experienced any of the following in the past year?	% saying yes (N-565)
1	Did not have enough to pay the rent	85%
2	Harassment from authorities	24%
3	Arrested or detained by police	18%
4	Harassment from local community	82.5%
5	Robbery	39.6%
6	Physical assault	35.9%
7	denied or unable to pay for health services	28%
8	couldn't send children to school	31%

Harassment from the community was widely reported both in our survey and in our qualitative research. However, our focus group discussions suggested that such treatment was often by strangers with whom the refugees have no relationship. Many of our informants spoke of positive relationships and a high level of cooperation with their Egyptian neighbors and between the Sudanese and Egyptian street vendors who sell in the same area. Sudanese street vendors reported that their Egyptian colleagues usually protect them from the harassment that they encounter in the street from strangers. One informant said harassment increased during and after the Egyptian revolution due to the lack of police presence and because of more Egyptians who try to encroach on the street space of the established vendors.[51]

7.5.1. Paying the Rent

We did not probe into our respondents' expenditures, but we did ask about rent, which in Cairo is considered the biggest and most challenging household expense. In the course of asking about household income, we asked how much rent the respondent paid, and then asked what their household did if their monthly income was not enough to cover the rent.

Our respondents' monthly rent fell out in the following quartiles: one quarter paid 400 or less, another quarter paid 400-500, another quarter paid 500-650, and the last quarter paid 650-2000 EP. The modal rent was 400 EP per month, which is high in relation to their monthly income (as described in 7.3, the modal income was 600 Egyptian Pound ($107), and median income was 750 ($134) and the rent range was 50-2000.

The rent paid by refugees is high for Cairo's poor neighborhoods, where most Egyptians pay rent according to rental contracts that were introduced during the 1960s.[52] According to these old contracts, Egyptians pay less than 100 L.E per month and are protected against eviction. Egyptians who pay according to the new law No. 4/1996 (amended by Law No. 137/2006) pay between L.E 200-300 with renewable contracts. Foreigners pay more under this new law because they rent furnished flats,

51 Based on interview conducted with Sudanese street vendors on July 4, 2012

52 During Nasser's period of Arab Socialism, Egypt's tenant law became protective of the interests of Egyptian tenants and members of their households. (See "Egypt's landlords are weakly protected by law", Global Property guide: http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Middle-East/Egypt/Landlord-and-Tenantsee)

whereas Egyptians can rent un-furnished flats. Foreigners are usually subjected to higher prices and less able to negotiate the rent.[53]

7.5.2 Coping Strategies

In order to explore coping strategies, we asked what households did if their monthly income was not enough to cover the rent.

Table 12: Strategies for self help

Strategies	Proportions
Borrow from people in Cairo	51%
Ask the landlord to wait for rent	10%
Perform additional work	10%
Reduce consumption of food or share from others	12%
Ask for food from religious agencies	4%
Ask for remittances	2%

As shown in Table 12, borrowing was the most widely used coping strategy, mentioned by more than half of our survey respondents. People borrow from their employers (who are usually Egyptians), as well as from family and shopkeepers. At first, we saw this as suggestive of a strong social network with Egyptians and others. But discussion during our dissemination workshops (see Section 9) revealed a different perspective. Members of the community dismissed the idea that borrowing was an adaptive coping strategy based on altruistic social support. They viewed borrowing rather as leading to debt that in most cases aggravated existing vulnerabilities. When we analyzed borrowing more carefully in our survey data, we found the four different kinds of borrowing:

- Borrowing from work as an advance that had to be paid off in free labor
- Borrowing as credit in local shops, that often wracked up un-payable debt
- Borrowing from Sudanese moneylenders at high interest rates
- Borrowing from friends in small amounts (a few pounds) as altruistic support

Our workshop participants also suggested that even when lending was done in mutual support, the act of lending among friends was not usually more than 20EGP at a time (about 3USD) and was often a kind of social insurance for the lender: if they ever were in need in the future, they could better ask for support, having provided it themselves in the past.

Another coping strategy expressed was if the landlord was willing to wait on rent. In our dissemination workshops, many participants acknowledged that this did happen, but it was rejected as a means of social support because it was argued that as many as 70-80% of refugees had been evicted from their flat at some point during their time in Cairo.

53 Interview with an Egyptian domestic worker who lives in a neighborhood with Sudanese. The interview was conducted on July 5, 2012

Borrowing and other coping strategies is an important topic for future livelihoods research.

8. Impact of the Egyptian Revolution

The Egyptian revolution brought widespread optimism about the future of Egypt, and scholars and practitioners were hopeful that the new government would be more responsive to people's needs and rights, including those of non-nationals.[54] Unfortunately, governance during the transitional period has been disappointing, not least for migrants and refugees living in Egypt. Our survey was designed and half of it implemented prior to the revolution. We conducted 257 interviews before January 2011 (pre-revolution) and 308 from February 2011. In the qualitative interviews and our dissemination workshops after the revolution people expressed their concerns about increased insecurity and xenophobia, and greater hardship for refugees living in Cairo.

During the eighteen days of the revolution, everyone in Cairo endured difficulties. For refugees employed largely in the informal sector, and living close to the margins of poverty, there was little in the way of safety nets. UNHCR and its implementing partner, Caritas, were closed, and could provide no assistance until February 12th, 2011, when UNHCR staff returned to Cairo. Some cash assistance and food bags were eventually made available for the most needy refugee families, but most refugees in Cairo struggled during February 2011. Rapid assessments by IOM and Tadamon found that the main issues facing refugees during the 18-day revolution period were personal insecurity, and lack of income from loss of employment, with women more likely to have lost employment. The assessment found that 80% of the migrants interviewed did not receive their payment for January.

The crime rate and violence increased in post-revolution Egypt. More than 80,000 guns, pistols, rifles, and machine guns were stolen from police stations in January 2011 and many of them are still in criminals' hands.[55] Hijackings and robberies became common in the street of Cairo. Some Egyptian citizens, witnessing the inability of the state to deal with this crime surge, took matters into their own hands and bought pistols or other weapons to protect themselves.[56]

Vulnerable groups usually suffer more during crises and refugees in Egypt are no exception. While there are no studies yet done, anecdotal evidence from social workers and agencies working with refugees, indicate that crime against refugees increased after the revolution. At this writing (June 2012) robbery and harassment are reported on a daily basis.[57] Refugees have difficulty or are reluctant to report incidents, and non-Arabic speaking refugees such as Eritreans and Ethiopians are less able to defend themselves against accusations or to report crimes or harassment. Refugees report that the police in post-revolution Egypt are less helpful than before. This insecurity is probably one factor explaining increased applications for resettlement, which have increased from 900 cases to 1550 cases per year after the revolution.[58]

54 Kagan, M. "Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A strategy for Refugee Protection", Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo, 2011

55 RefWorld Report. April 2012. "Egypt: Citizens take up arms amid insecurity."

56 Verdant Chronicals, "Egypt: One year afte the Revolution", http://verdantchronicles.com/text/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1629:egypt-one-year-after-the-revolution&catid=151:editorial&Itemid=562, accessed July 29, 3 pm

57 Reported during two workshops organized by the center for migration and refugee studies at the American University in Cairo. The first was a stakeholder workshop, March 18, 2012, and the second a meeting with the Psychosocial Training Institute's team in Cairo, March 20, 2012, both held at AUC Cairo (Tahrir campus).

58 See Sarah El-Rashidi. Friday 6 Apr 2012. "Refugees remain invisible in post-revolutionary Egypt", Ahram Online

9. Dissemination and sharing the results with the community

In March, April and May 2012, the research team conducted a series of organizational and community workshops in order to receive feedback from both refugee organizations and the Sudanese refugee community. We held four community workshops with a total of 61 participants, and four organization workshops, with a total of 50 participants, total 111 participants. Five of these workshops were conducted on location in Sudanese organizations, and three were held on AUC campus. Five of the workshops were led in Arabic, and three of the organizational workshops were led in English.

The purpose of the workshops was to inform stakeholders about the findings from the study, and to get their feedback on whether the findings resonated with their experience. The format of the workshops was usually a PowerPoint or flipchart presentation of key findings, followed by a validation exercise where participants discussed the findings. We asked:

1. To what extent the findings resonated with their experience;
2. Whether they were surprised by anything they heard, or heard new information;
3. If they thought the validity of the findings was questionable due to contextual factors;

In most workshops, the findings were put on the wall in a series of flipcharts and the participants were given color-coded sticky notes to go around to each finding and code it with their color feedback, and then discuss as a group. Then the group suggested specific issues to go back and analyze the data about again, and also suggested areas for future research, stemming from or not covered by this study.

9.1 Feedback from Workshops

The workshops varied in their views on the data, with different groups focusing on different findings relevant to their experience. The organizations tended to be very interested in the respondents' descriptions of help received from agencies. Community-based workshops focused more on respondents' descriptions of social ties within the community in Cairo and abroad. The following trends in feedback emerged:

9.1.1 Was this study sample representative of Sudanese in Cairo?

Most of the community workshops described a strict division between those Sudanese who are in Egypt for regular labor migration and those who are in Egypt based on refugee claims, citing that the two communities did not mix in general, and had very different types of livelihoods and social support. The study was both commended and criticized for trying to cover both sectors of the Sudanese population, but suggested that it muddied the data. Community workshop participants suggested that more regular remittance receivers were in fact not refugee claim asylum seekers, yet the overall sample was biased toward refugee population, which possibly skewed the data.

Many questioned the validity of the finding that 10% of the sample reported being UNHCR Closed Files, stating that in their experience the number was much higher. There was hot debate about whether 'closed files' were more vulnerable and therefore

more likely to interact with aid agencies, and thus perhaps the aid agencies example was biased toward closed files. One agency estimated that roughly 30% of clients in one of their programs were either non-registered or closed files.

A repeated critique of the study sample and methodology was that the interviews were conducted on campus and during the day, biasing against potential participation of those who could not get to AUC either because they were the most vulnerable, or because they were employed and less vulnerable. (If our sample was biased in this way, it means we have lost the 'tails' of the population distribution, lacking both the most and least vulnerable.)

There was lengthy discussion by the agencies of the difficulty of determining the actual number of refugees present in Cairo. It was widely questioned whether UNHCR's current figures are accurate. Many referenced an emergency cash distribution handed out to all refugees during the 18 days of the 2011 Revolution, in which only 25% of the people on the roster ever showed up to receive the cash. Discussion of statistics, individual headcount versus household headcounts went into great depth, clearly the issue of determining how many refugees are in Cairo was a topic of concern for the refugee agencies.

9.1.2 Coping Strategies and the Social Network

In the community feedback workshops, the participants discussed at length issues of social networks in Cairo among Sudanese, and discussed problems with UNHCR and lack of sufficient help from refugee agencies. The community workshops expressed repeatedly the frustration with research fatigue. In each workshop, participants reminded the researchers of the numerous studies conducted on refugees in Cairo over the years, and in which many workshop participants had participated, without being able to see a tangible outcome of difference for the refugee communities themselves.

Both organizational and community workshop participants discussed coping strategies, especially borrowing and landlord cooperation, at length. The researchers had originally suggested that borrowing strategies fit within a framework of social network support in Cairo, but workshop participants questioned this and brought new perspectives to coping strategies, as discussed above in 7.5.2.

9.1.3 Refugees and poor Egyptians had similar problems and strategies, and so building together in solidarity seemed like a good possibility.

This was a controversial conclusion among the different workshops, with some community groups supporting the idea and some rejecting it outright. The stakeholder workshops presented two main objections to this conclusion:

- While strategies for coping may be similar, resources for social support and buffer against vulnerability are different. Poor Egyptians have wider access to extended family, and as citizens, have greater access to the state's social solidarity services, schools, hospitals, etc
- Some believed that it would be very difficult to get poor Egyptians and Sudanese to work together in common development, due to the high level of discrimination that Sudanese report experiencing

One of the community workshops of South Sudanese participants noted that it would be a good idea to try and build mutual development programs with Egyptian civil society and refugee groups, but at the same time, some members of the group mentioned high levels of racist behavior against South Sudanese, and questioned if there was also discrimination in aid given based on skin color and religion (preferential to lighter skin and Muslim religion over Christian).

However other community workshops were much agitated at the suggestion, many stating that resettlement was the only solution, not integration.

9.1.4 Remittances play little role in livelihoods in Cairo, agency aid is not the main determining factor in their survival, and Sudanese survive through their own initiative.

These conclusions were widely validated by most groups. Most agreed that remittances were likely to be under-reported, but even so, it was generally agreed that most remittances were received only in emergencies, and only at the specific request of the receiver, not as a regular sending pattern. It was also generally validated that contact with Sudanese in Sudan was overall higher than contact with Sudanese abroad, but that Sudanese contacts in Sudan did not translate to money sending or receiving between Egypt and Sudan.

On the occasion when money was sent or received regularly from Sudan, the participants in the workshops attributed this to occurring among non-refugee labor migration Sudanese populations doing trade.

9.1.5 Sudanese economic activities

Our findings that almost 90% Sudanese refugees in Cairo engaged in some form of economic activity led to controversy in the different workshops. Many participants balked at the phrasing of "economic activity" among Sudanese in Cairo, with one participant stating that to say to say that 89% of Sudanese engaged in economic activity was "dangerous" without qualifying the level of activity. Another participant suggested that omitting discussion of the human risk and dignity factors associated with economic activity left out the context of vulnerability.

Most agreed that at least three-quarters of the refugee Sudanese population engaged in casual labor in the informal sector, usually in the form of one to three days per week vending or working in casual domestic labor. Some community workshops also validated the finding that approximately 18% of the Sudanese population had steady employment as teachers, factory workers, or domestic workers fixed in one household.

9.1.6 Harassment by Egyptians

Most workshop participants agreed with the finding that a majority of Sudanese (83%) had been harassed, and suggested that it was probably 100%. The most commonly noted types of harassment were name calling by strangers and youth on the street, throwing rocks from windows, dumping water on drying clothes, price gouging towards foreigners, forcibly taking street vendors wares, etc. The study questionnaire differentiated physical abuse from harassment, but participants commented that in reality the line between the two was not fixed.

Some in the community workshops said there was a difference between which Egyptians would harass and which not. They noted that harassment was more common by youth or strangers, and that some neighbors or shopkeepers develop positive relations over time. In one instance, a Sudanese community participant noted that her neighbors had gotten to know her over the last two years and they protected her family during the initial days of the revolution.

Many participants noted the importance of awareness-raising in Egyptian society about what refugees are and why there were refugees in Egypt, as a means to reduce hostility and increase understanding.

9.2 Workshop requests for further data analysis and research

The workshops requested the researchers to go back and further analyze data and provide more detail on:

- Findings by gender, region, and length of time in Cairo
- Differences in employment, coping, remittances pre- and post-revolution
- Borrowing as strategy
- Why children were missing school due to lack of money
- Those who receive agency stipends

Some of this additional data analysis was conducted and incorporated into this report, and we expect to do additional data analysis .
The workshops also suggested areas for future research that were of concern for the communities in Cairo:

- Organ trafficking, organ theft, human trafficking
- Traffic accident victims
- Supporting small enterprise development for Sudanese/refugees in Cairo - market analysis, business planning, and micro-fund support
- Role of media and of interpersonal relationships in reinforcing/reducing racial tensions between Egyptians and foreigners in Egypt (especially African-descent foreigners)

The issue of research fatigue without perception of tangible changes on the ground for refugee stakeholders was a dominant line of conversation throughout the workshops. It was recognized however, that CMRS does not have the capacity to be gatekeeper for all research conducted with refugee and migrant communities in Cairo.

10. Conclusion

Our study enlarged our knowledge and understanding of transnational linkages and how they affect the livelihoods of one group of urban refugees, Sudanese in Cairo. One clear finding is that many Sudanese survive on a very small income and struggle to make ends meet. Only a small minority can rely on remittances to help them out. While most of our respondents (72%) were in regular contact with their family and friends in Sudan and elsewhere, remittance transfers were relatively small and do not play an important part in their livelihoods. However, our sample was biased towards Sudanese refugees, and it is possible that non-refugee migrants, especially those with family members working abroad, receive higher levels of remittances. Our findings about refugees in Egypt place them in the lowest economic stratum, and most cannot remit cash to Sudan.

Our study indicates entry points for both the international community and the Sudanese diaspora to support livelihoods, but more research is needed to understand better what effects such support might have. Our research suggests that coping strategies based on borrowing lead to debt and greater vulnerability, but we do not have robust findings on this and more research is needed about the impact of debt. Mechanisms could be created that enable refugees to avoid borrowing, for example, providing emergency cash grants. While this was attempted through Caritas and was not successful, continued efforts should be made, and the implementation of the program improved.

We hope our study will be useful to the new government of Egypt and the municipality of Cairo. The presence of refugees can either support or undermine development efforts, and the more that is known about their livelihoods activities, the better these activities can be harnessed to support development initiatives. Refugees can act as either economic enablers or burdens, and they can be political thorns in the sides of host authorities. Rather than cast aspersions on refugees and migrants, more enlightened governments seek to understand how to harness their power and reduce their burdensome-like aspects. We believe our research has much to offer the Egyptian government along these lines.

While our findings are specific to Sudanese refugees in Egypt, the research tools, mapping approach and methods we developed, are replicable in other cities and in a future study could be used to compare the experience of other refugee populations in Cairo, such as the Iraqis and the Eritreans.

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ANNEX 1: Immigration Status Tables

Overall immigration status of sample

Immigration Status	**Number**	**%**
Blue refugee card	130	22.7%
Permanent residence	3	0.5%
Yellow refugee card	265	46.3%
Exempted from residence requirement	7	1.2%
Passport with visa (has legal status)	47	8.2%
Total with legal status	452	78.9%
Closed file	49	8.6
New comer (asylum seeker, no yellow card)	14	2.4
No documents	6	1
Passport only (no legal status)	41	7.2
Total without legal status	110	19.2%

Table XX Immigration status by region of origin

		Darfur	Khartoum	North/ east	South	South Kordofan	Total
Legal refugee status	**blue refugee card**	34	25	20	25	26	130
	by place origin	26.20%	19.20%	15.40%	19.20%	20.00%	100.00%
	by type of status	25.60%	19.50%	18.20%	26.90%	27.10%	23.00%
	yellow refugee card	83	54	45	43	38	265
	by place origin	31.30%	20.40%	17.00%	16.20%	14.30%	100.00%
	by type of status	62.40%	42.20%	40.90%	46.20%	39.60%	46.90%
Legal non-refugee status	**Exempted from residence requirement**	1	3	2	0	1	7
	by place origin	14.30%	42.90%	28.60%	0.00%	14.30%	100.00%
	by type of status	0.80%	2.30%	1.80%	0.00%	1.00%	1.20%
	passport with visa	5	15	13	8	4	47
	by place origin	10.60%	31.90%	27.70%	17.00%	8.50%	100.00%

	by type of status	3.80%	11.70%	11.80%	8.60%	4.20%	8.30%
	permanent residence	0	1	1	0	1	3
	by place origin	0.00%	33.30%	33.30%	0.00%	33.30%	100.00%
	by type of status	0.00%	0.80%	0.90%	0.00%	1.00%	0.50%
Out of status	**closed file**	2	11	8	9	18	49
	by place origin	4.10%	22.40%	16.30%	18.40%	36.70%	100.00%
	by type of status	1.50%	8.60%	7.30%	9.70%	18.80%	8.70%
	newcomer (asylum seeker, no yellow card)	2	5	4	2	1	14
	by place origin	14.30%	35.70%	28.60%	14.30%	7.10%	100.00%
	by type of status	1.50%	3.90%	3.60%	2.20%	1.00%	2.50%
	no documents	1	1	2	1	1	6
	by place origin	16.70%	16.70%	33.30%	16.70%	16.70%	100.00%
	by type of status	0.80%	0.80%	1.80%	1.10%	1.00%	1.10%
	passport only (no visa)	5	13	14	5	4	41
	by place origin	12.20%	31.70%	34.10%	12.20%	9.80%	100.00%
	by type of status	3.80%	10.20%	12.70%	5.40%	4.20%	7.30%
Total out of status		10	30	28	17	24	110
	pct from region	9%	27%	25%	15%	22%	19%
SAMPLE TOTAL		133	128	110	93	96	565
		23.50%	22.70%	19.50%	16.50%	17.00%	100.00%
		100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

ANNEX 2: Study Objective No. 5 suspended

The role played by Diasporas in fueling the conflict in their countries of origin or supporting peace agreements, is a well-established research area.[59] Some of this research has explored the factors influencing the mobilization of Diasporas around political outcomes in their countries of origin.[60]An early study objective was to explore whether and how remittance sending and receiving influences the political capital, mobilization and activities of Sudanese refugees with respect to the various conflicts in Sudan. In particular the political activities (formation of associations, interactions with larger institutions) that either promote Sudan peace processes (local, national or international), or contribute to warmongering and the war economy. Specifically, we sought to explore Sudanese political mobilization, and to understand whether and how remittances influence migrants' political, social and economic involvement in their home regions. Do remittances and other forms of transnational linkages influence conflict or peacemaking activities in the home region, and if so, how? Are remittances sent back to conflict zones specifically to assist with reconstruction or are they intended simply to enable the senders' families to survive? In this objective, we were unable to gather evidence. Prior to January 2011, when the Egyptian revolution occurred, the situation of the Sudanese in Cairo was already fairly tense and after initial exploration by the research team, it was clear that inquiry about political matters related to the conflict in Sudan was not going to be possible. The Sudanese had mobilized around matters pertaining to their immediate situation in Cairo, which had deteriorated in late 2004-early 2005. At that time, UNHCR suspended the Refugee Status Determination procedure for all Sudanese asylum seekers after the declaration of the ceasefire between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army in June 2004. Sudanese refugees organized a sit-in protest that began in September 2005 and was brutally disrupted by Egyptian security forces in December 2005 (Azzam 2006). Tensions remained after this incident, and it is likely that the government of Egypt viewed the Sudanese as a potentially disruptive presence in Cairo. Additionally, the governments of Sudan and Egypt were on good terms after the signing In May 2004 of the Four Freedoms Agreement. With the January 2011 revolution and consequent political turmoil in Cairo, the situation for Sudanese refugees became even more politically fraught, and asking questions about political activities was clearly an unwise course. We therefore suspended this line of investigation.

59 See: Smith H, Stares P. 2008. *Diasporas in Conflict:* United Nations University Press ;K Ballentine, J Sherman, The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance International Peace Academy 2003.

60 See most recently, Wald, K. D. (2008). "Homeland Interests, Hostland Politics: Politicized Ethnic Identity among Middle Eastern Heritage Groups in the United States " International Migration Review**42**(2): 273–301.. Also Shain, Y. (2002). "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution." SAIS Review**22**(2): 115-144.

Annex 3: Survey Questionnaire
AUC-TUFTS Cairo, 2010
Livelihoods, Migration and Remittances Study

Z01 Questionnaire Code _____

Z02 Date of Interview (*DD/MM/YY*) _____

Z03 Enumerator name _____

Z04 Cairo district _____ Z04a sub-district _____

Z05 Respondent's Sex 1 = male 2 = female

START INTERVIEW

1. How long have you lived in Cairo?

1	since birth
2	came as a child (before age 18)
3	more than 8 yrs
4	5-8 years
5	3-4 years
6	1-2 years
7	less than 1 yr

2. Where were you born? State: _____ Town:_____

3. What is your tribe? _____

4. Are you married?

1	married or engaged
2	single (never married)
3	divorced or separated
4	widowed

IF MARRIED: 4a. Is your (husband/wife) living with you here? Yes=1 No=2

If NO: 4b. Where is he/she? _____

5. Do you have your children living with you here in your flat?

Number children **under 18**: _____
Number children **over 18**: _____

6. Besides your spouse + children, do other people live in your flat? Yes=1 No=2
6a. What is the total number of people living in flat: _____

7. How many people in this flat are helping you with the rent?

Number helping with rent: _____

8. Please describe how you share things in the flat?

1	everyone pools all income (a family)
2	share rent, food, other costs, but keep rest of income separate (like roommates)
3	Different households/adults live in same space but do not share costs
9	Other

9. Are you **in contact with people in SUDAN:** Yes=1 No=2

IF NO: 9a Why not in contact? _____

Family member 1= Immed family 2= Extended family 3= friends, others	State + town	**How often in the past two years were you in contact?** 1=Every month 2=4xYr or more 3=Once or twice 4=not for past year	**How do you communicate?** 1=own mobile 2= skype or inst mesg 3=they call me 4=internet phone (VOIP) 5=email 6=facebook	Do you ever send them help? Yes=1 No = 2 They send me help=3

10. Are you in contact with family or friends <u>in other countries, for example in Australia, Canada, Israel</u>?

Yes=1 No=2

	Family member 1= Immed family 2= Extended family 3= friends, others	Country	How often in the past two years were you in contact? 1=Every month 2=4xYr or more 3=Once or twice 4=not for past year	How do you communicate? 1=own mobile 2= skype or inst mesg 3=they call me 4=internet phone (VOIP) 5=email 6=facebook	Do they ever send you help? Yes=1 No = 2 I send them help=3
a					
b					
c					

(FOR REMITTANCE RECEIVERS – from either Sudan or other country)

	1st person relationship:	**2nd person** relationship:	**3rd person** relationship:
RR1 Town, **RR2 Country**			
RR3. What kind of help do you get? 1=Money 2=Goods 3=Money + Goods			
RR4 How many times did they send the help this past year? 1=monthly 2= 4 x year 3= occasionally			
RR5. How much do you receive each time? **(in US dollars)**			
RR6. How do you receive the cash? 1=Hand carried by someone you know 2=hawala 3=Bank 4=Western Union			

RR7. What did you use the money for?

1	Daily Expenses (Household Expenses)
2	Education
3	Rent, housing
4	Pay loan, save or invest
5	Medical / Health Care
6	Special occasion
9	Other:

(FOR REMITTANCE SENDERS)

	1st person	**2nd person**	**3rd person**
RS1 Town where sent to **RS2 country where sent to**			
RS3. What kinds of help do you send? 1=Money 2=Goods 3=Money + Goods			
RS4. How many times did you send this past year? 1=monthly 2= 4 x year 3= occasionally			
RS5. On average, how much do you send each time? (in US **dollars**)			
RS5. How do you send the cash? 1=Hand carried by someone you know 2=hawala 3=Bank 4=Western Union			

11. Please tell me about your journey to Cairo, starting with the place where you had a problem and decided to leave Sudan. Please tell me all the places you stopped at before coming to Cairo and why you left those places.

Describe journey:

	state and town	year left	Reason for leaving
1st place			
2rd place			
3rd place			
4th place			

Reason for leaving codes:

1	general insecurity – No food, no livelihood
2	Armed conflict – escape from
3	escape government conscription
4	for work
5	political persecution
6	Family reasons
7	Education
8	Health reasons (own or children)
9	En route
0	Other (write in)

12. What year did you come to Cairo? **(*MM/YY*)** _____

13. Why did you come to Cairo and not another place?
Write in details:

1	for work
2	It was most convenient, cheapest
3	education
4	to join family or friends
5	for resettlement to the west
7	en route to another country
9	other _____

14. What is your immigration status in Egypt?

1	Blue refugee card
2	yellow refugee card (old asylum seeker)
3	new comer (asylum seeker, no yellow card)
4	closed file
5	passport only (no legal status)
6	passport w/ visa (has legal status)
7	exempted from residence requirement
8	permanent residence
9	**no documents**

15. Have you ever been in contact with any of these agencies? *Read the list:*

	Yes=1 No=2	IF YES, **what kinds of help did you receive?**
UNHCR		
AMERA		
All Saints, Zamalek		
Caritas		
St Andrews		
IOM		
Others?		

HOUSEHOLD INCOME + EXPENSES

16. How many income earners are sharing your flat _____

17. Please tell me all your household's income sources that are generated in Cairo? Including from Caritas, or other help you get?
(Describe, list all)

1	no income/unemployed
2	regular salaried employment (part-time or full-time)
3	piece work/casual wage/day labor
4	subsistence trade
5	small business (employs someone)
6	translation or language tutoring
7	Stipend from agency

18. About how much income does *your household* get from all these sources?

Household income per month (EGP): _____

19. How much do *you* get each month? or per day?

Individual income per month (EGP): _____

19a Individual income per day: _____

20. How much rent do you pay for your flat? Rent per month (EGP) _____

21. What do you do if your monthly income doesn't cover all your other expenses, after your rent?

22. Does any member of your household own the following items?

	1= Owned by you 2= In house but not owned 3=neither or No)
mobile	
fan	
internet connect	
computer	
TV	
refrigerator	
belong to a sanduk?	

22a. Do you participate in any Sudanese association here in Cairo, from your tribe or home area, or other etc? Or do you receive help from an association like this?

Write in the name of the association and the nature of the participation.
(regular participation 10egp/month, or as association leader, or as received help…)

23. Please tell me if you or anyone in your family has experienced any of the following in the past year?

		1=Yes 2=No	Describe:
1	did not have enough to pay the rent		
2	harassment from authorities		
3	arrested or detained by police		
4	harassment from local community		
5	robbery		
6	physical assault		
7	denied or unable to pay for health services		
8	couldn't send children to school		

24. What could you do to make you life better here? (Write on back of page if needed)

We are almost finished – just a few short questions:

25. What is your level of education?

1	no school
2	some primary
3	completed primary
4	some high school (secondary)
5	completed high school (secondary)
6	some university
7	finished university (certificate)
8	post-grad educ (MA, phd)
9	professional training
10	vocational training only
11	religious

26. What is your age? (In years) _____

27. What is the main language you speak in your household?

1	Arabic
2	Sudanese language (write in)
3	Fur
9	other

28. Do you have any Question or comments for me?

Annex 4: Hawala Systems of Informal Funds Transfer

Hawala is a general term used to refer to various forms of informal systems of cash or value transfer that are made outside of "Western" conventional financial systems[61]. The term "hawala" has the rough equivalent meaning of "transfer" in Arabic and similar language families[62]. Although studies on the hawala system do exist, they are not extensive, and studies have tended to focus more on the hawala transfer systems between South-East Asia (India in particular) and the Gulf States region.

According to Passas, hawala is a system of value transfer based on temporary exchanges of credit and debit between regions, involving a two-step process:[63]

1. retail clients sending or receiving physical cash from end-user hawala brokers in each country
2. settlement process between upper level brokers' consolidating and redistributing credits and debts along the transfer routes

In very simple terms, a sender in one country will physically hand money to a hawala broker in that country and the receiver in another country physically is given money by a hawala broker in his country. The transfer is reported to take from 1-2 days[64] or up to a week (from respondent qualitative interviews). The cash itself is usually not what is moved from one place to another, but rather the transaction involves a fairly complicated process of exchanging and redistributing accumulations and pooling of credits and debts between various brokers and traders in other business transactions between the two countries. Oftentimes hawala brokers may offer their services openly piggybacked with "regulated" businesses engaging in import-export or currency exchange. The profit in hawala is made from either charging the retail customers a small percentage of 2% to 5%[65] or also in leveraging currency exchange differentials between sending and receiving country locations[66].

It functions structurally similar to any wire transfer system such as would be found in Western Union, MoneyGram, or bank transfer systems themselves. The primary difference being that hawala systems are generally outside international financial regulatory monitoring systems. For this reason, hawala has at times been assumed to be associated with illegal uses of the funds transferred[67]. The myths and perceptions of hawala as a system are widespread; see Edwina Thompson's *Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala* for research on the connection of hawala practice with terrorist funding[68], and Nikos Passas for a treatise debunking hawala myths and calling for objective evidence-based study of the practice[69].

Hawala value transfer systems are often associated with being built on social and ethnic ties of firm trust, in particular at the customer end, although the transfer and settling of accounts may involve multiple inter-

61 Passas, Nikos.*Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them? Risk Management,* Vol. 5, No. 2, Special Issue: Regulation, Risk and Corporate Crime in a 'Globalised' Era (2003), pp. 49-59

62 *ibid*

63 *ibid*

64 Passas, Nikos. *Demystifying Hawala: A Look into its Social Organization and Mechanics.* Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention (2006) Vol 7, pp 46-62.

65 El Qorchi, M, Maimbo SM, Wilson JF; International Monetary Fund (2003). Informal funds transfer systems: an analysis of the informal Hawala system. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

66 Passas, Nikos. *Demystifying Hawala: A Look into its Social Organization and Mechanics.* Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention (2006) Vol 7, pp 46-62.

67 Medani, K. *Financing Terrorism or Survival? Informal Finance and State Collapse in Somalia and the US War on Terrorism,* Middle East Report 223 (2002)

68 Thompson, Edwina. *An Introduction to the Concept and Origins of Hawala*. Journal of the History of International Law 10 (2008) pp. 83-118.

69 Passas, Nikos. *Demystifying Hawala: A Look into its Social Organization and Mechanics.* Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention (2006) Vol 7, pp 46-62.

ethnic ties and transactions on the international trajectory.[70]

Passas explains the hawala brokerage hierarchy in three simplified categories:[71]

1. Couriers - lowest level, authorized to receive and deliver set upper-limits of money, they only carry out instructions and are usually less informed of the larger system transactions

2. Small business owners - in addition to the business's regular activity of import/export or money exchange, etc., the business owner may be a person from the migrant community offering to coordinate cash collection and arrange for the transactions, and coordinate deliveries with the larger back-end transaction system

3. Larger hawala brokers - may collect and pool funds received from the various small businesses, and are usually the decision makers in the settlement process of redistributing credits and debts in the transfer processes

End-client senders and receivers are likely to only interface with couriers and small business owners, and remain completely unaware of the inner transaction processes in getting cash value from country A to country B in under 24 hours. This is rather similar to the experience of any client wiring funds through Western Union or other money wire company, except that the client documentation required may be less and the rates charged to clients is usually perceived to be less, and the system overall is based on social ties of trust and accountability that are frequently built around ethnic ties at the retail level, although ethnic and social relations become less central in upper levels of bulk consolidation and redistribution of credit and debt accounts between upper level brokers.

The research team for this study was surprised to learn that of those respondents who claimed using hawala to transfer money, they used the Somali-run hawala system, and not a Sudanese-run hawala system. On the ground knowledge of the refugee and migrant communities in Cairo holds as common knowledge that the Somali community has a well-known hawala system, but it was less known that other ethnic groups had access to use the Somali-run system.

When asked why do Sudanese migrants use a Somali-run hawala system instead of a Sudanese-run system, the qualitative response from participants was fairly straightforward: a Sudanese hawala system does exist, but it was perceived as having fewer transaction connections than the Somali system, and the Somalis were able to get money to more locations faster. The study did not contain components to actually verify this perception as fact, but the Somali reputation for an efficient business system was widely noted.

One respondent in a qualitative interview explained that the way for different ethnic groups to access the Somali-run hawala system was by virtue of the local Somali-system having contact point persons, be they couriers or small businesses from different ethnic groups to interface with customers from that ethnic group. This would mean that Sudanese receivers or senders using Somali hawala may well interact with a Sudanese contact person on the front end, understanding that the back-end transaction transfers are handled by Somali networks.

70 Passas, Nikos.*Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them? Risk Management,* Vol. 5, No. 2, Special Issue: Regulation, Risk and Corporate Crime in a 'Globalised' Era (2003), pp. 49-59.

71 Passas, Nikos. *Demystifying Hawala: A Look into its Social Organization and Mechanics.* Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention (2006) Vol 7, pp 46-62.