Archived Theses and Dissertations

10-1996

A political economy of meaning in Gaza

Chris Parker
The American University in Cairo AUC

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds

Part of the International Relations Commons

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
MEANING IN GAZA:
TRAJECTORIES CONTINGENCIES
AND STRUCTURES OF
TRANSITIONAL PALESTINIAN
AUTONOMY

CHRIS PARKER

1996

The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
Department of Political Science

A Political Economy of Meaning in Gaza:
Trajectories, Contingencies and Structures of Transitional
Palestinian Autonomy

Chris Parker

A Thesis Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of Master of Arts in
Political Science

(October/1996)

Declaration to be signed by the author.

NAME..... *Chris Parker* ....

TITLE OF THESIS... *A Political Economy of Meaning in Gaza : Trajectories, Contingencies and Structures of Transitional Palestinian Autonomy.*

DEPARTMENT.. *Political Scien.* YEAR. *Oct 1996* [Library no..........]

Please sign and date ONE of the following paragraphs:

1. The thesis may be consulted in the Library and photocopied.

Signed...Date..................

OR

2. The thesis may be consulted in the Library, but may not be photo-
copied. The restriction on photocopying will cease two years after
the date below, unless I apply for, and am granted, its renewal.*

Signed ███████████████████.......Date. *10-16-96*

OR

3. The thesis may neither be consulted nor photocopied without
written permission from me, or from the appropriate Head of Depart-
ment if I cannot be contacted. This restriction will cease three years
after the date below, unless I apply for, and am granted, its renewal.*

Signed...Date..................

* Application for renewal of restrictions will be considered by the
Librarian, the appropriate Head of Department and the Chairman of the
Academic Board or his nominee.

The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
This Thesis for the Master of Arts Degree
in Political Science

BY

Christopher Robin Heltveit Parker

Has Been Approved

Dr. Dan Tschirgi
Thesis Supervisor

Dr. Ivan Ivekovic
Thesis Reader

Dr. Walid Kazziha
Thesis Reader

Dr. Earl L. Sullivan
Chair, Political Science
Department

Table of Contents

Chapter 4: The Economic Bedrock of Transition, p. 96.

Chapter 5: The Distribution of Powers Under Current Agreements and the Limitations on State-Building from Above, p. 130.

Chapter 6: Conclusion, p. 156.

Preface

More than just the rivers of coiled razor wire, or the asphalt tarmac that stretches for hundreds of meters between Israeli and Palestinian Authority checkpoints, separate Gaza from Israel. On the Israeli side, the grass grows up to meet the well sculpted edge of the highway and one can almost smell the watered, open space. Trash lines the pot-holed road on the Gaza side; dust hangs in the air above the dry soil. Gaza is separated from Israel by years of neglect and repression. It is a contrast that workers commuting from their homes in Gaza to jobs in Israel experienced daily, and it represents a gap that Gazans increasingly doubt the ability of their newly recognized political elites to close.

I arrived for my second stay in Gaza on January 21, 1996 -- the day after the first Palestinian national elections in the occupied territories. I was almost immediately confronted with anecdotal evidence of the tense relationship between Gazans and the PA. Omar Moktar Street is the main east-west thoroughfare linking the center of Gaza City and the beach-front. Most of the community improvements initiated since the signing of the Gaza-Jericho agreement seem to be located on or within a few blocks of this road. The work on and around Omar Moktar Street creates traffic chaos and frustration. Cab drivers try to avoid the attention of police who are struggling to maintain traffic order, a difficult task in a society which has been conditioned by occupation to resist manifestations of authority. My North-West European prejudices concerning traffic etiquette aside, such scenes -- being the most visible meeting point between manifestations of authority imposed from above, and expressions of the norms and forms of life as understood and organized from below -- offer clues as to how the relationship between organs of authority and society is emerging.

Starting two blocks below Palestine Square, and continuing about ten or fifteen blocks beyond, Omar Moktar was closed for repaving, forcing traffic into side streets, and creating an obstacle to North-South movement through the city on that section of the east-west axis. A Palestinian policeman directing traffic stood at the point where the street once again became usable. He was directing all traffic coming out of a side street to turn right (west) toward the beach front, and not allowing them to swerve a little to the left over the area under repair in order to get on a street that continued South. One cab driver, apparently intending to continue south, refused to make the right turn, and began to shout at the policeman, who responded in kind and stepped into the trajectory the car would have to use to continue southbound. Instead of turning right, the car drove at the policeman who was forced to jump on the hood. The car stopped and the policeman came down, putting his boot-heel through the front grill of the car before running around to reach into the car to

grab the driver. The driver got out of the car (only half out of his own volition) and a shoving match insued between the driver and the policeman until sever other Palestinian policemen ran over from nearby to intervene. A crowd began to gather, and a Palestinian armored vehicle (the same as were earlier used by the Israeli occupation forces) arrived on the scene. As the crowd grew bigger, and more police arrived, it became obvious that the crowd was rallying to the support of the cab driver, who was now being arrested. The arriving security forces began turning their attention from calming their offended colleague, to pushing back the increasingly hostile crowd. Finally, the driver was pushed into the armored vehicle and driven quickly off. With the object of frustration gone as quickly as it arrived, the crowd dispersed. A group of young men walking by and recognizing us as foreigners looked at us and said "fuck Arafat," accompanied by a gesture appropriate to the verbal sentiment.

Later that same afternoon, I entered a stationary shop in downtown Gaza to buy the day's local paper. The proprietor, an elderly man in coat and tie, was leaning close to his radio, pen and paper and hand, noting the latest election returns. After scribbling down the last number he rose to take my change for the paper. A conversation ensued. He was concerned about the fate of two extended family members who were standing in the polls; soon tea came down, then several members of the family, and then an invitation to join his family in the breaking of the fast, as this was the first day of Ramadan.

It turned out that my host was a lawyer who had fled from Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion in 1990. Together with his family, he had returned to live in the top floor of his sister's house in Rimal, one of the more pleasant quarters of Gaza City. As in an unbelievable number of the Palestinian homes I have visited, there was a picture with Arafat and the head of the household on the wall. One gets the impression that the *ra'ees* has shaken the hand of every grandfather in Gaza. After dinner, the woman of the house, veiled and in her fifties, left for her job as evening office manager of an international mail delivery company with offices in Gaza. The rooms and walls of the home, contrasted with the pictures on the wall, gave the impression of a once well off family who had fallen on hard times. Anyway, knowing that I had come to Gaza to observe the fallout from the elections, the discussion between my host, his third oldest son who was twenty-one, and I turned to politics.

Besides being a pleasant evening, the conversation was interesting in the way it revealed many of the issues brought up in this study -- the different expectations and perceptions of politics between a man in his sixties and a man in his early twenties, mixed emotions of each about participating in elections that they realized did not contest the power needed to address those issues of most concern to them, (elections have not overcome a

profound cynicism with politicians which is often openly expressed on the street in Gaza), and the feeling that the Oslo agreement offered something of benefit to everyone but the average Palestinian. Our host would occasionally become a little excited in his conversation -- speaking with the frustrated tone of so many Palestinians who feel that no matter how hard they try to explain the fundamentals of the Palestinian condition, no one is really willing to understand -- before catching himself with a big smile and welcoming us emphatically to more tea so sweet that it made coca cola seem bitter by comparison. The son would smile as his father shifted in and out of debating gear.

While the son felt that the elections were important in establishing a precedent, he felt that ultimately the exercise had been meaningless in terms of eventually executing any expression of the popular will. Whereas he had emphasized ideology in his choices at the polls and not voted for any family members at all, his father had voted for family members second only to Dr. Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi. Dr. 'Abd al-Shafi is perhaps the leading political figure in Gaza after Arafat ; he had far and away the most votes in Gaza in spite of the fact that he had spent not a single shekel on his campaign, and according to the talk on the street, his only campaign statement was that he would not make any promises since if elected, he would not have the power to keep them. In some ways, this probably explains my host's special concern for the fate of his family candidates; in a political situation with very little substantive content and where the rule of law is uncertain at best, one had best have contacts in visible and/or influential places.

Unsurprisingly, given the pressures on them at different stages of life, whereas the father had emphasized the politics of consensus and broad social unity, the son sympathized with a more dynamic political situation where immediate action was taken toward creating jobs and possibilities for the future. Interestingly too, while the son was much more sympathetic to adversarial elections, the father pointed to the near constitutional crisis in Turkey as leading parties could not come together to form a government to illustrate the potential pitfalls of such a system, arguing that regardless of shortcomings, the only feasible way to proceed was to unify under one banner even if its bearer had his shortcomings. However, the father noted that he wished he had the opportunity to vote for Hanan Ashrawi, which showed that his apparent traditionalism also could also had room to support a Christian woman whose credentials had been won through her activism and support for the democratic process and citizen's rights. But to oversimplify, the debate was one between traditional and adversarial party politics.

As our conversation was winding down, a friend of the son came by. Originally planning only to swing by and pick up the son to go and meet some other friends, he fell to the temptation of giving his versions of events. He had lived in Gaza all his life, and he

stated a refrain that I had heard on my earlier trip to Gaza and would hear again -- especially among young men: "We were all very excited when the agreement was signed, but...I hate to say it...the situation we have now is just a new occupation."

Walking into the United Nations Beach Club late in the evening in hopes of speaking with some of the election observers, I ended up talking with two EU hired contractors. They spoke of their own frustrations with the progress of their project. The Palestinian workers building the hospital were intentionally sabotaging work deadlines. The workers know, the contractors said, that if the work progresses quickly, they will be unemployed again sooner. The repackaging of Gaza's difficulties under autonomy has not disguised fundamental realities as they are seen from the ground in Gaza.

In contrast to election day in East Jerusalem, where potential voters had shied away from the polls in the face of Israeli intimidation and provocation, a high voter turnout had been reported for Gaza; and in spite of one or two minor incidents of violence in the polling areas, observers agreed that polling had been free and fair. Almost all of the international observers I spoke with seemed enthusiastic about the success of the polling.

Talking with Palestinians later on, however, many reported that they had been threatened by Palestinian security forces if they had obeyed calls for boycotting the elections. The threats had included harassment and the denial of official documents such as work-permits and travel identification. Furthermore, while others expressed happiness with their new right for some kind of political expression, most were very cynical about its practical implications. This is illustrated by the fact that the top vote getter in Gaza, Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi did not campaign beyond the issuing of a public statement that he was not going to make any promises because if elected neither he nor anyone else would have the power to keep any promises of the sort other candidates were proposing.

***

The focus of this monograph is a political sociology of transitional Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip, and not a discussion of the peace process itself or of Israeli policies toward the Palestinian population. However, the balance of power underlying the negotiations toward a "final status," and the implicit Israeli role in determining the boundaries of the exercise of authority in the self rule areas, indicate that Palestinian autonomy cannot be understood without an examination of Israel's strategic position vis-a-vis Palestinian self rule. This applies both for the immediate future and long term. Indeed, whether we evaluate the phenomena discussed below as short term or long term challenges, or, more accurately, how we analyze the long term impact of current conditions, depends to

a great extent on how and when outstanding issues are resolved. The responses of society to these conditions and structures cannot be predicted, but the if the lack of social integration and state society integration which is predicted turns out to be correct, the situation would be inherently unstable. The lack of predictability is in fact not only a problem for the political observer, but also for Palestinian society itself. Different groups are likely to form different responses, and the failure of these responses to coalesce into mass based movements for political and social accountability will be an obstical to the consolidation of an efficable and stable condition of self rule.

Since work on this study began, a regime change in Israel has threatened the trajectory of the peace process in ways which may have a decisive impact on the meanings of self rule. The Labor vision of the post-Oslo final status envisioned a separation of the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. In fact, the Hebrew term used to describe this separation was the same as that used to describe the South African system of Apartheid. It seems that the architects of the Labor vision of autonomy realized that for such a separation to be viable, Israel would have to give up at least some of its control over land and resources in the occupied territories. While we may never know what final status negotiations between a Labor government and the PLO/PA would have resulted in, but the agreements signed as of September 28, 1995 suggest that the final contours of autonomy would have encompassed the apparatus of a bureaucratic mini-state whose control over resources would have been carefully regulated through agreements with Israel. Sovereignty would have been undermined by Israel's ability to enforce such arrangements at the expense of the PA's ability to regulate and plan with regard solely to the interests of its population...the contours of Palestinian authority would probably have continued to be subject and accountable to many of Israel's fundamental strategic concerns.

Using tactics of delay and obfuscation, Netanyahu's policies seem to reaffirm Likud's strategic vision of a greater Israel. Delays in the peace process have served to induce Palestinian apathy toward the ineffectiveness of their autonomous institutions. Furthermore, the Likud government seems to be intentionally breaching both the letter and the spirit of the agreements, provoking instability in the territories in order to justify delays and intervention in Palestinian affairs. One of the gravest weaknesses of the agreements is that their ambiguity (an ambiguity that was probably intentional in order make them politically acceptable to both sides) also means that they were very dependent on the personal commitments of the personalities who signed them. This gives scope for the Likud government to argue that they do not represent binding contracts of state.

The already limited economic authority of the PA has been undermined by Israeli breaches of agreements -- often in the name of security -- and by gradually expanding the

number of permits for Palestinians working in Israel. The effect of this latter move is to undermine Arafat's ability to command loyalty using the PA ability to hire people in an economy otherwise almost void of employment opportunity. Israel thus sets itself up as a competitor to the PA in a struggle to command access over basic needs as a mechanism ensuring political compliance over the short term. Meanwhile, settlements expand while Israel de facto takes stronger control over existing resources, particularly water and land resources. This is in line with Likud strategy and tactics in the tradition of Begin and Sharon throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. The "proletarianization" of the Palestinian labor for wage labor inside Israel removes human obstacles to direct Israeli control over the land in the occupied territories. Assuming that the process is carried out gradually, and that Israel manages to keep a stranglehold on the provision of basic needs to Palestinians, they might be able to reverse the trajectory of the current peace process, but almost certainly they would have to pay a sustained and exacting price to maintain order if Palestinians rights and needs are once again snatched away.

The failure of the current peace process would almost certainly elicit a complex response from Palestinian society in Gaza. On the one hand, there might be relief that a process that seems increasingly unlikely to deliver the promises of national liberation and economic improvement -- and instead seemed merely to change the faces which reigned over hardship and repression -- has failed. On the other hand, there is a genuine desire in Gaza to end the decades of conflict, but only if issues of human, economic and legal rights are addressed. In lieu of such a development, the failure of the peace process would almost certainly provoke frustration, anger and despair.

Netanyahu seems to be bargaining that a reversal of the current trajectory is possible based on Israel's overwhelming material power, and on an electoral mandate that many Israeli right wingers would argue indicates a willingness by Israelis to pay the price of creating a "greater Israel." In any case, Gaza's future does not seem bright.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

While there is no shortage of self proclaimed "expert" opinion on the peace process in the world's new media, less attention has been paid to the character of the emerging relationship between Palestinians and the Palestinian authority. It seems that in the interest of maintaining the process, observers are willing to take it for granted that the Palestinian Authority will press its population into submission before the *fait accompli*. This study counters to this trend. It integrates information in the existing literature in order to create a comprehensive picture of the complex sets of forces which may affect the character and stability of the relationship between Palestinians in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority. Its

ambition is to set a stage for and indicate the significance of areas deserving of empirical research.

Stated in one rather long sentence, this work investigates the problem of consolidating a stable and efficacious institutional base of "self rule" in Gaza given: (i) the weak, limited and essentially coercive scope of power granted to the Palestinian Authority by the transitional agreements; (ii) the institutional and aspirational contradictions which underlie the "inside/outside" dichotomy in Palestinian politics; and, (iii) the worsening economic situation in Gaza.

Five reasons stand out as justifying the focus on Gaza. First, the Gaza Strip is less integregal than the West Bank to the ideology of a greater Israel, and economically marginal in terms of land and resources. This suggests less of a chance that Israel would reintroduce direct occupation in Gaza, although it seems that under Likud, further withdrawal is unlikely; a second reason is that Gaza's prolonged economic and political isolation have caused it to experience occupation in ways qualitatively different from the West Bank; accordingly, these trends may filter differently through the institutions of limited autonomy. Thirdly, attitudes towards resistance and authority seem to be different between Gaza and the West Bank, for example, a poll conducted in 1993 showed that 40% of Gazans saw violence as a legitimate method for effecting political change in certain circumstances, as compared to only 6% in the West Bank. Forthly, significant differences in the class structure and demographic profiles of Gazans and West Bankers have effected different political trajectories that, given their continued relative isolation from each other, may engender different experiences of self-rule. Finally, the contiguousness of the territorial boundaries of self rule in Gaza, as opposed to the patchwork of autonomous enclaves in the West Bank, seems to offer a more coherent and consistent laboratory in which to evaluate the Palestinian experience of self-rule.

Many questions are raised. What is the relationship between society and the structures and goals established by the agreement? What social, economic and political possibilities does it create and/or how might the agreement place limitations on such possibilities? Who wins and who loses in the new order? Will state and society reach mutual accommodation and create lasting, legitimate governing institutions? or will the new regime fail to co-opt segments of the society? If the latter scenario prevails, will violence and chronic unrest be the result? Are civil society organizations being integrated into the institutions of self rule and is society accommodating new political realities and relationships? Why or why not? What forces and social configurations influence patterns of integration and/or fragmentation in Gaza society? What new stresses has the transition placed on the fault lines of the social geology of Gaza? Will we see instability if people fall

ever more deeply into the gap created by the loss of resistance as a tool inspiring awareness of pursuing collective common goals and the inability of the state to erect a viable alternative political economy of meaning? Will the structures of self rule be able to transcend the poles of impassivity and militancy? These questions served as my starting point.

<div align="center">***</div>

There are three people who I would especially like to thank for the support and encouragement they have given me over the last eight months of reading and writing about Gaza. First, I would like to thank Dr. Dan Tschirgi for suggesting that I consider doing a study on the emerging politics of Palestinian self-rule. His comments helped me distinguish between what was merely interesting and what was pertinent to question under examination. Furthermore, his encouragement just when I was beginning to doubt my ability to do something interesting with the topic was an important source of sustenance.

Dr. Ivan Ivekovic's tips and insights were invaluable in helping me figure out how I would approach the topic in the beginning. Particularly his suggestions that notions of the inside outside conflict and of civil society be emphasized have proven useful. Working as Dr. Ivekovic's assistant, I was inspired by his insistence on the relevance of theory and comprehensive scope to understanding even local social phenomena.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Karin Voets. Those parts of this work which she had the time to read and comment on benefited from her insistence on clarity in thought and structure. Also, her patience in the face my irregular and sometimes nocturnal work habits deserves my appreciation: thanks Karin.

<div align="right">Chris Parker
October 5, 1996</div>

Chapter 1
Problems, Parameters and the Political Economy of Meaning

Thomas Hobbes wrote that "out of the past, we construct a future."[1] During the ongoing resolution of Palestinian "self rule" in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, rich possibilities and damning constraints suggested by past and future contribute to a crisis of authority in the present. This crisis arises from institutional, economic, ideological and psychological contradictions within the emerging dynamic of limited Palestinian autonomy,[2] and manifests itself in the increasingly unstable and inarticulate relationship between Palestinian authorities and Palestinian society.

This work explores the crisis of authority in Gaza -- its parameters, its inputs and its consequences -- set against the backdrop of a political economy of meaning. Its objectives are to present a survey of challenges facing the exercise of Palestinian autonomy and national political maintenance during the resolution of the current regime's provisional character, and to suggest the future character of "self rule" in the Gaza Strip given the current configuration of personalities, limitations and incentives. The response of Gaza's civil society to the demographic, economic and political transition implied by the new framework of power relations is investigated, as are limitations on the Palestinian Authority's (PA) ability to consolidate its position in Gaza through the execution of positive economic and social initiatives.

The conclusions raise serious doubts about the stability of socio-political and economic relationships as they are emerging within the current trajectory. These findings in turn raise questions concerning: (1) the future governability of Gaza given the limitations of the current regime; (2) the conditioning impact of these limitations on any future socio-political order in Gaza; and (3) the ability of the Oslo process to lead to a status quo that transcends the limitations of the provisional regime and thus encourage long term stability in the Palestinian/Israeli space. Contrary to declarations that recognize a basis for a Palestinian state and the arrival of peace in the region, the future remains uncertain.[3]

Issues and Context

It is out of what we experience and imagine to be significant about the past, and out of expectations and schemes for the future, that we evaluate the present. The ways in which these evaluations manifest themselves in terms of social mobilization and in the exercise of power are of interest to political scientists. By contrasting popular perceptions with empirical data, and evaluating popular expectations against who in fact gets "what, when and how", the political scientist hopes to suggest something about the structural

underpinnings of a particular socio-political condition and the ways in which the dynamic between power and society may impact the future.

Tension between current material realities, interpretations of past commitments and hardship, and future hopes and obligations represents a serious challenge to the governability of Gaza. The disparities between the expectations and dignity engendered in resistance on the one hand, and the prospects for the future on the other hand, remain great. The situation of urgency in Gaza reflects current economic contingencies, but it also reveals a deeper sense of socio-political uncertainty and in some cases even feelings of betrayal at the hands of nationalist elites. The success or failure of the PA will in no small measure depend on its ability to manage socio-economic despair with its limited political powers; and upon Fatah's ability to transcend its current tautological invocation of nationalist ideology to justify their authority. In fact, the nationalist ideology seems inapplicable to encouraging acceptance of the current status quo, and many Palestinians may find it increasingly irrelevant in their pursuit of basic needs and aspirations.[4]

Meanwhile, the media focuses attention on the progress of negotiations and on the movements of political elites. The attention of the major external actors influencing the process seems to focus ever more on a combination of advanced metal detectors, ritualistic elections and aid as inputs that will determine the boundaries within which despair may be expressed. The notion of eminent Palestinian "self rule" appears to be used to deflect the legitimacy of "rejectionist" claims that the agreement does not and cannot represent Palestinian historical, legal and human rights. In this context, it is necessary to question the impact of the broad framework of the agreement -- particularly its distribution of political powers and economic benefits -- on a society deeply scarred by occupation, resistance and economic hardship.

Responses to the ongoing transition of authority in Gaza include disorientation, despair, anger and indifference. At the same time, the current trajectory of self rule is revealing glaring contradictions within its own dynamic. The agreement which was supposed to stabilize the Palestinian human social and economic space does not seem to be achieving its goals, nor encouraging strong identification between emerging structures of authority and the Palestinian community. In an August 1996 interview with an Israeli newspaper, Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas) revealed that Palestinian frustration with the peace process had led to several attempts on Arafat's life.[5] Why is the transition toward greater "self rule" being accompanied by greater instability and despondency?

On the surface, the answers appear straightforward. While the Oslo agreement promised relief from a deteriorating relationship between earnings and living costs of Gazans, the economic situation has deteriorated drastically since the signing of the accords,

leaving unemployment at rates of above 60%.[6] "Self rule" has been accompanied by a constriction of economic space and possibilities for the average Gazan. Jobs and markets in Israel have been lost.[7] Delays in the movement of goods and produce over the borders often leave Gaza's agricultural production rotting in the sun before it has a chance to reach Israeli or third country markets.[8] Israel has pursued policies and practices hostile to economic development in Gaza, and at the same time refused to turn over to the PA many of the substantive powers that might allow Palestinians to create or pursue alternatives to Israel's continued economic stranglehold on the OT (still both a defacto and dejure stranglehold, although the balance has changed somewhat since Oslo).

While the agreement promised Gazans territorial autonomy, it left many ecological grievances unaddressed. Israelis remain in control of 30% of the most productive land area in the strip as well as approximately 80% of the water resources.[9] Over-utilization has left most of the water supply set aside for Palestinians unfit for human consumption. Even the crops of Palestinian farmers suffer due to the water's high saline content. Furthermore, historical grievances which sustained the nationalist movement in exile (essentially if not entirely a refugee movement) seem now, with the recent election of Likud, to be as far from resolution as ever.

On top of this, the PA seems to be using its security apparatus to pursue coercive strategies of compliance and control, creating a situation in which many Gazans see a mirror image of the Israeli occupation. The generally undisciplined and consistently repressive exercise of authority displayed by the various Palestinian security forces thus far has generated grave concern from within various sectors of Gazan society. Torture and severe beatings have been reported, and critics of the PA seem to have been systematically singled out for harassment by the security forces.[10] Several mass demonstrations against such police excesses have been put down with violence.[11] Palestinians spoken to by the author consistently reported mistrust of the security forces, sometimes referring to them as agents of a new occupation. Even assuming that such behavior is not absolutely endemic to the personalities and institutions which currently hold the monopoly of coercive force, there is a very real danger that it may be institutionalized over time. The apparent ignorance or lack of concern for human rights and due process shown by Palestinian security forces has led many Gazans to refer to self rule as merely a new occupation.[12] Psychologically, repression from the hand of the liberator, (even though it cannot be compared quantitatively with the "excesses" of Israeli occupation), is proving perhaps more difficult to accept and bear.[13]

The PA has been criticized for making appointments:

"more on the basis of favoritism and nepotism than on competence and performance. The leadership is thus accused of appointing to sensitive positions a number of individuals personally loyal to Arafat but whose nationalist credentials or general conduct are in doubt. (The preponderance of diaspora Fatah elites within the self rule institutions) has further stirred resentments among independent groups and supporters of oppositional organizations that have expressed a willingness to serve in apolitical positions. Fatah's perceived monopoly on power has hardly helped shore up national unity."[14]

But these facts alone do not explain how internal modes of resistance and accommodation to the exercise of PA authority[15] will influence the institutional character of Palestinian self rule over the long term. In and of themselves, they do not indicate how any future Palestinian state established in the trajectory of current negotiations will be conditioned by the responses various socio-political forces and actors utilize in the context of transitional autonomy, and the social networks that are set up to facilitate survival within it. How are the various institutions and ideologies which taken together comprise the rich but unstable tapestry of Palestinian nationalism being re-shaped to arbitrate between the traditional claims of Palestinian nationalism and the more limited task of limited autonomy over limited territories and populations in the Israeli occupied territories?

To answer this question, we must try to understand the ways in which the new arrangements of power and coercion established by the Oslo process have been shuffling political, social and economic relationships in the broader Palestinian social space with particular reference to Gaza. The variety of ideologies, social networks, factional groupings and power relations which Palestinians use to determine and pursue their interests must be investigated. At present, Gaza offers the most geographically integral territorial unit on which to carry out such a study.

The current process contains a bias which almost certainly affects the character of relationships in the self rule space. It puts an agreement between elites ahead of a social agenda that responds to the problems facing the Palestinian community in Gaza. The provisional regime emphasizes control -- the ability of elites to discipline and manipulate -- rather than a frontal attack on the structural roots of social instability. The process seems to emphasize the symbolic rather than the substantive features of political process, and seems to assume that self rule refers to a ritual, tautological exercise rather than a structural dynamic engaging individuals dialogically in the processes through which their lives are shaped by power. The process assumes a meaningfully new set of power relations -- even while there is little power, and increasingly questioned legitimacy -- just because internationally recognized name plates and titles face outward from the new desks of Palestinian officialdom. Concurrently, the fragmentation of civil society and lack of

economic integration in Gaza also tends to undermine the possibility that a concerted response from below might influence the character of self rule. The severe limitations on the scope of effective self rule powers might mean that the PA would be unable to pursue an integrated social and economic agenda even if it were more inclined to do so.

The hypothesis

Rather than leading to a stable consolidation of an autonomous Palestinian political entity in the OT, the framework for transition established by current agreements between the PLO and Israel may be serving to reinforce and even encourage negative tendencies within the PLO. Economic hardship may lead to the further fragmentation of the grassroots in Gaza, leaving society susceptible to manipulation based on new bases of factionalism. The situation seems to be encouraging withdrawal from socio-political activity, and resistance to current expressions of authority. This resistance, by virtue of the limitations on articulating viable alternatives from within the established paradigm of transition, are pushed into the camp of rejection. The broad based presence of features such as continued resistance to authority and/or withdrawal, and the current inability of the PA to articulate positive responses, may indicate that the conditions of a political economy of meaning have not been established by Oslo. The long implementation time of Oslo also means that these trends might condition and be institutionalized within any future Palestinian state-society relationship. New bases of factionalism may facilitate political control over the short term, but are unlikely to satisfy the expectations engendered by "self rule."

Political uncertainty and continued economic underdevelopment will likely exercise a decisive impact on the stability of Gaza into the foreseeable future. This may in turn impact the security and development of the region generally, and ultimately undermine the ability of the present course of events to secure peace and stability in the region. However, to paraphrase de Tocqueville, revolutions and civil wars do not seem to occur in times of increasing hardship and despair. While economic conditions are worsening in Gaza, and the resentment and mistrust Gazans are expressing toward the new authority is increasing, civil war or grassroots revolution is also unlikely in Gaza.

This appears in part due to the increasing ideological disorientation and fragmentation of society (abetting a sense of hopelessness and encouraging withdrawal), and also to the ability of the PA to establish a new basis of social factionalism which mediates between individuals or isolated groupings and authority (thus filtering and deflecting active dissent). It seems that future stability in Gaza will be based more on the will of external patrons and the ability of the PA exercise its coercive functions without provoking a mass response than on any efficacious and accountable relationship between

society and the PA, or in the PA's ability to encourage economic development and broad social integration. In all likelihood, the PA face a disorganized opposition inciting instability and low intensity but sustained violence.

At present, imbalances between the powers and demands of self rule seem to be generating an identity gap between the PA and significant social sectors and groupings in Gaza. Various social networks are being invoked to either close or bypass this identity gap, but the fragmentation of civil society makes it difficult for concerted action from "below" to influence the exercise of authority in Gaza. Strategies of accommodation and resistance to the new situation can both be identified from within Gaza society. They reflect the need to overcome the obstacles between people, a means for survival, and a sense of social fairness / trust. So far, self rule has not been accompanied by a sense of social empowerment, and resistance to the current character of rule by the PA has been uncoordinated and ineffectual. Tangled in a web of diplomatic demands and elitist nationalist politics, the inhabitants of Gaza are being rendered passive spectators to their own worsening situation.

Meanwhile, from "above," new institutions of authority and the personalities who occupy them work to consolidate their position and protect their interests within a society over which they have been granted limited power, but -- so it at times seems -- also unlimited responsibility. The PLO hierarchy's dispositions toward autocratic rule, corrupt patronage, and the lack of a clear social agenda -- plus the limited scope of effective PA authority -- suggest the preconditions for a dependent neopatrimonial political regime.

In a neopatrimonial regime, relationships of dependency are cultivated in order to offset the potential for instability created by the failure to alleviate pressures associated with economic development and accompanying structural changes in society. Neopatrimonial-ism personalizes political and economic relationships as opposed to institutionalizing them, thus facilitating cronyism and other forms of corruption. Neopatrimonialism is modern in the sense that it is associated with specific powers of the state such as the ability to redistribute aid, wealth and other privileges normally granted by the state (jobs, contracts, licenses, favoritism in arbitration, "looking the other way" from illegal or unethical practices, granting of titles or positions of influence).[16] Correspondence between traditional norms of deference and the introduction of the benefits of a mode of production offers neopatrimonialism a veneer of legitimacy -- it can at once be defended as either traditional or progressive, but also attacked as being neither. The stability of the order is based on patronage and coercion rather than on the ability of the new order to stimulate economic development or engage in impartial social arbitration.

In Gaza, the PA has accomplished a certain degree of compliance and loyalty by setting itself up as the only alternative to starvation. It is possible that the PA may be inclined by its own political interests to keep Gaza's civil society weak and fragmented over the near term in order to consolidate its organizational position with its external benefactors and "partners." The outcome of self rule may be a lethargic, pseudo-democratic[17] and coercive state which sustains itself on patronage. At the same time, limitations (practical and legal) on the fiscal autonomy of the PA will undermine its ability to design policies that could deal with the conditions contributing to the current economic malaise in the Gaza strip. The failure of the PA to respond effectively to developmental concerns and the failure to construct an agenda which addresses the need for a productive economic base integrated with social and political institutions and is thus capable of sustaining "self-rule" institutions will leave any future Palestinian state heavily dependent on external patrons. A pattern of institutional behavior driven by the external demands and limited powers of the transitional period may condition the fundamental character of any future Palestinian state. The specter of mass unemployment and popular disillusionment leaves stability balancing on a tightrope between revolt and withdrawn submissiveness.

Outline

By way of introduction, the current chapter presents a thumbnail sketch of the predicaments associated with Palestinian self rule until now, and presents the notion of a political economy of meaning as a backdrop against which to view the prospects for the establishment of stable and efficacious "self rule" in Gaza.

Chapter 2 introduces some of the historical forces and contingencies that shaped the networks reinforcing a Palestinian identity, and explores their impact on the unfolding situation in Gaza. A major focus of this chapter is revealing the pre-eminence of vertical rather than horizontal linkages in defining and maintaining specific forms of associational interaction among Gazans, and between Gazans and the factional structure of diaspora Palestinian nationalism. The reinforcement of vertical linkages with the outside factional leaderships seems to have complemented Israeli occupation policies which were designed to undermine civil society in the Gaza Strip rather than reinforce the social and economic conditions capable of promoting local horizontal linkages.[18] Furthermore, there is uncertainty in the process of transition as old nationalist factional networks are dismantled or rendered irrelevant while new networks are in a volatile formative stage.

The stress between "inside" and "outside" in Palestinian politics has been nurtured by the Palestinian experience of a variety of legal and economic conditions, awareness of

Israeli occupation, and access to international sources of patronage and funding. Chapter 2 elaborates on a framework of neopatriarchy as a phenomenon compensating--with a model of quasi-authenticity--for the lack of efficacious civil society in the normative sense and the failure of economic development and job producing growth. Neopatriarchy interacts with features which seem traditional to indigenous society (the *hamula* is defined in greater detail in Chapter 2 as an example of one possible network of neopatriarchal political consolidation and factional divide and rule). The efficacy of these relationships are ultimately questioned however as being unlikely to stand up to the demands currently placed upon them. This is particularly true of the problem of economic development and the economic viability and sustainability of "self rule" (see Chapter 4); and in terms of the coherence of current social/institutional networks given historical tensions between "inside and outside" in Palestinian society, as well as in light of newer more specific social ideologies and expectations within the OT themselves.

In a 1988 study, George Abed asked two questions which have become even more crucial since the initiation of the transition toward greater Palestinian autonomy:

> "how is cohesion maintained in a weak and vulnerable society under conditions of occupation, impoverishment and dispossession? How is the prolonged isolation of the Palestinian community to be prevented from degenerating into self destructive divisiveness and alienation?"[19]

This problem is exacerbated as the Palestinian social space in which that cohesion relates to a Palestinian exercise of authority is in transition. In spite of the advent of nominal self rule, the essential structural conditions which provoked these questions remain in place. They do not seem to be heading toward amelioration during the interim self rule period. Suggestions as to whether and how these conditions might be resolved by the current transition toward greater PA autonomy can only be given in the context of a comprehensive examination of the social forces which are being utilized to consolidate or challenge PA authority.

Social institutions in Gaza have evolved continuously and have occasionally been transformed to respond to changing circumstances and the contingencies of personal and group survival, but they have not always done so equally or with a conviction of a common local interest beyond the broad commitment to the overthrow of Israeli occupation. This means that the contact between Gazans and the outside nationalist institutions has had various meanings and uses for both parties. Naturally, these have the potential to come into conflict.[20] The present struggle to define meaning within the new networks of power emerging in autonomous Gaza can in many respects be read as a continuation of these

conflicts in a context of change. Particularly noteworthy is the challenge faced by the Fatah leadership of the PLO/PA as it attempts to rationalize and consolidate its control over populations within limited autonomy areas while sustaining the fundamental tenets of the nationalist ideology which legitimized its claims to authority in the first place.

Historically the challenge for the Palestinian nationalist elite has been to unite and promote national consciousness among various constituencies of a scattered national community. Now the challenge is to bring a huge exile bureaucracy to bear in governing a local population whose interests and demands might in key areas be different from -- and at times even seem threatening to -- those at the top. Challenge and confusion arise out of concurrent attempts to shape, to accommodate, and to resist new manifestations of power and authority. There is a struggle to command both the institutions and vocabulary which communicate and infer legitimacy. The failure of the PA leadership to appoint prominent figures from the local community to key positions in the new PA authority, and the removal of local activists from official election lists during the January 1996 elections, have contributed to a mistrust of the new authority.

Chapter 3 focuses on what might be seen as contradictions exposed in the ideology and social constituencies of Palestinian nationalism since the signing of the Oslo Agreement. Crucial to understanding the significance of these contradictions is an exploration of the apparent incongruity between the social spaces which have traditionally comprised Palestinian nationalism and the uncertain legal/territorial boundaries of proposed "self rule." Inevitably, political autonomy will be used as a base from which to represent sometimes competing claims and aspirations. Expectations in the OT of a new condition of liberty can only be unfavorably contrasted with the actual coercive tactics and limitations of PA rule. In the diaspora, the two state solution threatens the claims of 1948 refugees.

Arguments can (and are) being made that during the interim period, the content of occupation is being squeezed into the form of "self rule". The current situation has exacerbated some problems and disguised others. Self rule has been sold as the solution to these problems; hence, we might speak of the contradictions of self rule. Self rule is not an automatic, given, or organic political situation. It involves the consolidation of society around institutions which provide order and predictability, i.e. institutions that govern and create as well as live up to expectations. That many individuals and groups express feelings of alienation in relation to the nominal and effective makeup of emerging institutions indicates contradictions within the current assumptions of self rule. Social processes are being restructured to meet the challenges of survival and legitimacy within an unstable order. Within the outline identified by this study, some of the more politically significant "contradictions" are analyzed.

The economy of transitional autonomy is the subject of chapter four. The economic context of the interim period may in fact be undermining the long term economic position of Palestinians by encouraging internal and external relations of dependency and leaving unresolved issues such as: (1)the movement of Palestinian goods and labor; (2) the right of a Palestinian Authority to establish its own fiscal regime; and, (3) the final establishment of the ecological boundaries of Palestinian (pseudo?)-sovereignty. It is here that the imbalance of power between the two negotiating parties is most acutely and immediately felt by the "Palestinian in the street." Aid to the Palestinian Authority seems designed to cover up many of the fundamental imbalances of power embodied in the agreement -- imbalances which severely limit the options available to the PA. This facilitates the embodiment of such imbalances within any future status quo, in turn producing long term distortions that leave the Palestinian state aid dependent and thus negatively impact productive investment and employment opportunities for individual Palestinians. Emma Murphy has succinctly expressed the developmental concerns faced by Palestinians in Gaza:

> "No amount of international aid will sustain the Palestinian economy if Palestinian workers are denied employment in Israel over the short term. No amount of support for agriculture will help if the best land is being expropriated. But then this aid was never meant to stimulate economic development, but rather to sustain a political process in the short term."[21]

From the perspective of developing a domestic Palestinian political economy, the approach of giving aid to a regime which has few economic powers beyond the ability to distribute aid may in the end only serve to strengthen neopatrimonial relationships which undermine developmental incentives. Given the uphill struggle Gazans already face in terms of productive employment, this could prove disastrous. Such an approach might help donors buy time, but peace and stability may prove more elusive commodities -- at least in the near term on which this study concentrates. The donor approach has been to try and devise short term fixes for economic woes in Gaza while by-passing to structural and legal issues which, left unaddressed, only serve to effectively reinforce the underlying mechanisms strangling economic development while transferring the legal and popular responsibility to the PA. These supposedly half way steps represent partial solutions which in turn may create new problems and distortions. Thus far, the autonomy has only served to dramatize Gaza's economic dependence on the Israeli economy. Thus, as the deadline for the final status negotiations approaches, the donors buy short term stability for the ruling elites rather than encouraging negotiators to confront and deal directly with these

structural problems. In an extension of this process, the PA seems to be buying short term compliance from within by resurrecting traditional patriarchal networks to serve as structures that orient individual political affiliation through family structures.

The era of self rule has necessitated a fundamental re-orientation of economic coping strategies for individuals and families in Gaza. Given the massive reduction of the number of jobs available to Palestinians inside the "green line" and the continued ecological and legal restraints on development in the Gaza Strip -- not to mention the loss of employment opportunities in the Gulf States since 1990 -- factional and international patronage is playing an increasingly important role in individual survival. It has been a primary strategy of the PA to appropriate control over external sources of patronage in order to use it to consolidate its position in the "autonomous" areas.[22] The PA has been using donor funding to cultivate relationships of dependency with strategically located personalities and networks rather than to make investments in developmental infrastructure.[23] Not only does such a strategy fail to address the fundamental structural problems threatening the long term viability of the Gaza economy, it is also unlikely to satisfy short term needs. One over-riding concern addressed by this study is the way in which patterns of behavior established in the name of sustaining "a process" may condition socio-economic relationships within any future Palestinian state (although at present, the likelihood of any technically sovereign Palestinian political entity remains remote).

Chapter five explores the difficulty in identifying a true basis of a future PA "government" (as opposed to mere control and administration) given the limitations imposed by the agreements and the (so far) emptiness of rituals of legitimacy like the January 1996 Palestinian elections. The chapter centers in on the relationship between limited powers and limited legitimacy, as well as the PA strategies to undermine coordinated challenges emerging from below (from Gaza's somewhat shattered civil society). Conceptually, the chapter sets out to investigate the exercise of self rule with Samuel Huntington's premise that it is less the kind of government than the degree of government that determines the stability of a political order. Key concepts here are limitations on consolidation of a new political order from above and the consolidation of a neopatriarchal order to compensate for these weaknesses.

Since the current model of self rule is based on diplomatic arrangements orchestrated from "above" rather than arising out of grassroots structures or a socially integrated economic order, it also represents an attempted social mobilization from above. It is a social mobilization based in what on the surface seems to be a rather dramatic shift in the obligations and rights in a relatively specific if not permanently fixed territory. The PA

is in a position where it will have to legitimize its existence with something more than words or dramatic actions. The types of powers and privileges possessed by the PA will determine the strategies by which it will pursue legitimacy and the consolidation of its control over Gaza. Of course, the goal of any state is to encourage rather than enforce compliance, and to minimize the friction between individual obligations to (and restrictions of) the state and individual interests and aspirations. However, the insecurity and weakness of the PA has led them to engage in a strategy of reducing the availability of ideological and practical alternatives to itself, thereby in effect stifling opposition by destroying the viability of dissenting perspectives and the ability of alternative networks to deliver on promises of services or economic benefits. Dangerously, opposition to the current PA is thereby pushed into the camp of rejection. The nature of opposition is therefore likely to be articulated in terms outside the given order rather than as promoting change or reform within it, and is therefore perhaps more likely to be violent if it does coalesce and express itself as a viable force for change.

The political economy of meaning and "the specter of superfluous man"
Defining the Political economy of meaning

By suggesting complex interaction between a wide variety of socio-economic phenomena and the production of a stable political order, the notion of a political economy of meaning indicates a comprehensive framework for describing the dynamic of legitimacy operating within a society. Conceptually, it represents an attempt to go beyond reductionist approaches to legitimacy. In particular, it aims to look beyond technical and/or primordialistic factors -- ritualized elections, language, ethnicity, historical cartography and/or religion, for example -- as primary determinants of political legitimacy. By trying to offer a conception in which a given regime is held accountable to the norms and expectations of the society in which it operates, it offers a way around the normative tangles surrounding debates concerning phenomena such as civil society and development. The sustainability of stability in a politically non-coercive, effacable environment would suggest the political economy of meaning. The political economy of meaning identifies various phenomena which bind society into a stable configuration of rights and obligations, efficacy and acquiescence.

An overall evaluation of the way in which sources of authority are related to the forces which both positively and negatively impact people determines perceptions of the legitimacy of a given regime -- as does an understanding of where the given authority lies in relation to other potential options. "Systems of meaning shape, and are in turn shaped

by, the political and economic contexts in which they occur...in reality, (however), most studies assume rather than explore the complex and multi-dimensional relationships between the two."[24] Various sources inform an awareness of meaningful interaction in the broader social context.

Here, within the constraints presented by available data on Gaza, a basis for interpreting and drawing conclusions about such relationships is explored. According to Eikelman:

> "a fully developed 'political economy of meaning' contrives to achieve a balance between concern with the communication and development of complex belief systems and how these systems shape and in turn are shaped by configurations of political domination and economic variations among groups and classes in societies of different levels of complexity."[25]

Of critical interest is how notions of self and society are maintained within apparent historical transformations, such as the current ongoing transition to a new political order in Gaza. How does the new order stand up against the previous épistème, (in the Foucaultian sense of knowledge revealing the conditions of possibility manifested within a history), and how will Palestinians derive meaning in the ongoing dialectic between objective chances and agents? How will political autonomy stand up against economic suffering? We would perhaps all prefer to be oppressed in our own language, but will the Palestinian people be satisfied with the mere transfer of authority to a nominal organ of "self rule?" The political economy of meaning is by definition founded in phenomenological experience as well as abstract legitimation. It represents a tri-alogue between these two phenomena and power. If any of these fail to fall fluidly into the experience of society, the political economy of meaning as a recognizable social bonding agent will be lacking. The failure of the dominant paradigm to rationalize social obedience and obligation, or to provide material sustenance, or both suggest the potential for instability. The challenge is to objectivize the distinction between stability based on coercion and manipulation from above and stability based on what wee try to identify as the political economy of meaning.

The significance of the political economy of meaning becomes apparent in the struggle to define the parameters of autonomy, and within the ability of the provisional regime to sustain the identifiable processes of "self rule." There are several factors and phenomena which must be considered in an evaluation of the emerging political economy of meaning in Palestine, and they overlap and intermingle throughout this text. Before going on, it would be useful to elaborate on a couple of themes against which the more specific themes of this text may be evaluated. First, civil society and neopatriarchy -- two models which have been used to describe and evaluate political society in the Arab world --

are defined and contrasted. These models assist in the evaluation of whether the state-society relationship might live up to the designation of a political economy of meaning. The second elaborates on the potential for instability associated with economic and political transformations and warns of "the specter of superfluous man."

The transition toward the establishment of a territorial base for Palestinian political and economic autonomy, and the potential transformation of broad economic and political trends and their consequences for specific social groups and classes, challenges the existing basis of the transmission and reproduction of systems of meaning in the context which has nurtured a distinct Palestinian social and political awareness with its own internal dynamic. Changing geographic and "legal" boundaries of authority, economic change and migrations of people, and geopolitical contingencies of power all affect how people understand and interpret the political environment in which they live.

Hopefully, this discussion does not end up either being the sum of reductionisms or fall prey to the normative whims of the author (even as it dodges more established normative judgments). The search is for a normative dynamic in Gaza. By trying to describe the interactive dynamic between various forces which shape the relationship between experience and political meaning, the political economy of meaning approach offers some powerful and broad suggestive implications.

Associational life and the political economy of meaning

The patterns and content of associational life comprise crucial signifiers of a political economy of meaning. By proposing an internal evaluative framework concerning the ability of associational forms to fulfill certain social functions and needs in relation to given power relations and economic contingencies, the political economy of meaning as a conceptual approach goes beyond debates over whether or not there is an identifiable civil society in Gaza (or the Arab world in general).[26] However, as a comparative concept buttressed by theoretical elaboration and case study, various models of civil society help shed light on phenomena associated with political and economic development/integration in Gaza.

Civil society is a concept used to describe the loose web of interests and groupings in society which are interconnected, consciously or not, in ways that mitigate and arbitrate, again consciously or not, between the power of the state and the individual. According to Edward Shil, civil society is that part of the public sphere that "lies beyond the boundaries of the family and clan and beyond the locality, (but that) lies short of the state."[27] Conceptually, it is historically linked with the development of the capitalist, democratic state in Europe and America. Marx saw civil society as intertwined with the development

of capitalist modes of production and the corresponding reorganization of political society: "Civil society only develops as such only develops with the bourgeoisie; the social organization evolving directly out of production and commerce."[28] Today, however, most observers expand the notion of civil society "to include all nonviolent associational activity between individuals and the state."[29] Whether or not we conceptualize civil society as intimately bound to economic development and integration has important implications for how the concept of civil society might be applied to the case of Gaza.

Some observers have noted a tendency of Arab states to co-opt and neutralize the potential of civil organizations and associations to mobilize in ways that might influence the exercise of authority.[30] A defensive reflex seems to exist within many regimes which puts the resources of the state into the protection of the statist status quo at the potential expense of individual groupings. The survival of these groupings in turn comes to depend on the goodwill or patronage of the state.

Is there a potential contradiction between social expectations and demands in Gaza and the political institutions which are (in theory) being set up to eventually service them? Hudson argues that "civil society interpreted in specifically Western (Lockean, Hegelian, Weberian of Marxist) terms is unlikely to emerge in the middle East, but this should not exclude the development of the kinds of inclusive solidarity communities." But how will these solidarity communities relate to the existence of a state and its given administration? Are the institutions of the state and its personalities one and the same in the PA? And if state-society relations in the Arab world have historically been problematic, what might we expect of societies relations with an authority that is not quite state, but no longer a movement with the fluidity and the ability to be all things to all people like the nationalist movement at least tried to be? Does the Palestinian experience promise to be an exception to the rule in state-society relations in the Arab world? Ultimately, these associations will be evaluated on their ability to "deliver the goods" of personal, group and economic security, and at the same time offer a feeling of extended belonging and obligation. Outside of pure coercion, few models exist which show how social stability and some form of economic sustainability might be culled out of the current conditions. Neopatriarchy and neopatrimonialism offer, however, offer ideas on how short term stability, (a sort of tactical rather than strategic stability), and predictability to a society currently lacking civic integration at the grassroots level, suffer from under- or even de-development, and whose elites lack the power and will to initiate social transformation from above.

Neopatriarchy,[31] and neopatrimonialism (which represents the networks of neopatrimonialism co-opted and serviced by the institutional resources of the state, offers a strategy for creating stability within a society without having to create and maintain

solidarity among disparate social actors. Indeed, in order to encourage dependency on the governing regime, vertical lines of authority are maintained. The neopatriarchal/neo-patrimonial state may be inclined to undermine and discourage linkage between various sectors and interests in society in order to ensure its control. Neopatriarchy as a societal formation lacks both the communal attribute of *gemeinschaft* and the modern features of *Gesellschaft*.[32] The presence or return to power of an actor conditioned by fundamentally neopatriarchal exercise of authority will attempt to reshape society in ways that might respond and reaffirm the power from above. Patriarchy is sustained by enforcing mechanisms of dependency -- by maintaining the fundamental equivalent of a monopoly on granting access to basic needs.[33] The independence of the nuclear family (*usrah*) undermines patriarchal authority by its removal from the relations of dependence on the extended family ('*ailah*), clan, (*hamula*), subtribe ('*ashirah*) or tribe (*qabilah*) for survival. Instead, the nuclear family might depend on wage labor or in urban areas on buying and selling for survival. The emergence of the nuclear family is related to urbanization and the development of industrialized modes of production. For Palestinians, labor migrations which divided nuclear families from immediate contact and dependency on extended families for economic security or as a check on certain types of behavior, as well as the greater independence of younger generations engaging in new types of employment, have encouraged the rise of the nuclear family as a more prominent social unit. "In this sense, the prevalence of the nuclear family, and the values on which it is based represent the most serious threat to the existing neopatriarchal formation."[34] Economic independence is the condition for the overthrow of neopatriarchy.[35]

The role of a shared conceptual discourse might be emphasized as a base of civil society -- it offers a code for civility and ensures that meanings are transferred across groups and institutions with a minimal of miscommunication or misunderstanding. The political economy of meaning ultimately expresses itself in a discourse of legitimacy. To a certain extent, the discursive paradigm determines and can be manipulated to satisfy expectations. Once broadly accepted, solutions are determined from within its framework; within its own *logos*, it finds its own answers. Hisham Sharabi notes that in traditional Arab societies, patriarchy reflected "a system of values and social practices belonging to a determinate economy and culture." However, by way of contrast with the efficacious, dialogical political economy of meaning for which a model is constructed here, patriarchy, and its contemporary step-child, neopatriarchy, is maintained by power relations of dependency and a monological assertion of the meaning of authority from above. It reduces to the maximum extent the claims of society to influence and interpret the exercise of authority from below. "Thus the world of objects and events tends to be reduced to

verbal presentations that possess their own system of validation."[36] This would seem to indicate an attempt to resolve sociological tensions (divergent dualisms in scope of power and problem, materialistic expectations and material realities) without direct reference to "facts on the ground." Neopatriarchy will struggle to delegitimize coping strategies not dependent on it or attempt to render impotent active oppositional coping strategies.

In a social order characterized by factionalism and underdevelopment, both of which are conditions associated with neopatriarchy, unresponsive organs of power seem likely to develop:

> "Monological speech, in daily practice, rarely produces good listeners, for it aims not to enlighten of inform, but to dominate. The listener or the recipient, the 'other' of the monological relationship (the son, the student, the citizen), is reduced to silence; he or she may outwardly acquiesce, but inwardly turn away...the world is inhabited by multiple single voices that command and legislate its life from above"[37] and it is the social structures which sustained such a neopatriarchal discourse in the past that current powers are attempting to re-empower to assert its control over society today.

This description seems almost hauntingly to reflect the experience of many Gazans in relation to self rule.

Gazans may have relied on authoritarian, neopatriarchal coping strategies to cope both psychologically and economically with the conditions under occupation.[38]

> "By its naive or utopian vision, (the dominant monological, neopatriarchal discourse) obscured the social context of material reality and helped to cover the tragedy and horror of everyday life. It is not surprising that social practice in the period of independence reflected not only a sharp divorce between ideology and practice but also an abandonment of the prescriptions of theory or ideology (now reduced to pure rhetoric or *realpolitik*) toward naked activism and, finally, after the collapse of the ideological political parties (beginning in the 1950s) and the rise of the modern sultanate state, toward pure Machiavellianism."[39]

According to Sharabi, neopatriarchy represents the distortion of traditional patriarchal relationships within new forms of dependency/patronage and half absorbed institutional structure and intellectual concepts which service them. To extend his argument, it might be said that neopatriarchy implies the attachment of traditional forms of patrimonialism to modern forms of dependency, and responds to and reshapes the flow of resources that can be accessed in the cause of self perpetuation. Sharabi goes so far as to say that:

> "neopatriarchal society as a dependent, nonmodern socio-economic structure represents the quintessentially underdeveloped society. Its most pervasive characteristic is a kind of generalized, persistent, and seemingly

insurmountable impotence: it is incapable of performing as an integrated social or political system, as an economy, or as a military structure. Possessing all the trappings of modernity, this society nevertheless lacks the inner force, organization, and consciousness which characterizes truly modern formations....Thus between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is the absolute will, mediated in both the society and the family by a forced consensus based on ritual and coercion."[40]

Neopatriarchal society is governed through manipulation and coercion. Power becomes suspicious of independent cleavages emerging from below and attempts to unite groups in society independently and separately to the apparatus of power. In Palestine today this is important to note as this is exactly what happened traditionally and this is what is being encouraged under the new regime. Sharabi notes that "the most advanced and functional aspect of the neopatriarchal state (in both conservative and 'progressive' regimes) is its internal security apparatus, the *mukhabarat*."[41] The repressive role of the PA's internal security apparatus in Gaza is certainly affecting how people recognize the face of the new order.

The very association between the symbolic reality of self rule and the idea that it possesses contradiction would appear oxymoronic and improbable given the singular and charismatic embodiment of power and people in the *ra'ees* -- a situation that represents a monological source of sovereignty, but which is nonetheless not really Hobbesian. The power function of the message can easily be grasped, it promises transcendence over the restraints which seem inauthentic, but it doesn't allow for criticism, and confusion results if there is no deflecting channel from it, a confusion that might lead to withdrawal or disorientation the resolution of which only seems possible through violence.

"The possibility of genuine *rebellion* is the product of the new age. Because modern individuals 'know how to think of, by and for themselves, they will demand a clear account of what their bosses and rulers are doing for them -- and doing to them -- and be ready to resist and rebel where they are getting nothing in return."[42]

The Specter of Superfluous Man

Of all the conditions describing the relationship of the individual to society, utter irrelevance is perhaps the one most unacceptable to the human psychology. Social irrelevance stands in contrast to the political economy of meaning. One important question is whether Gazans will be able to find the structures upon which the PA will attempt to influence society relevant to their needs and ideas of legitimacy. Will the former wage laborer adjust to the different forms of dependency implied by neopatrimonialism? In

precisely what ways does "self rule" offer a paradigm shift against which Gazans can reconsider the notion of legitimate authority? In the face of mass unemployment and a ruling elite without relevant powers or social agenda, how might the inhabitants of Gaza respond to the authority which presides over these conditions?

Ultimately, the political economy of meaning is about social relevance, whether it be through clan loyalties or as a citizen in the industrial or post-industrial nation state. It consists of ideas which afford comfort or promise eventual redress in, times of hardship mitigates social, it implies an acceptance of the economic rules of the game regardless of employment and social benefits, and offers one a feeling of being in a legal environment which is predictable and just. In short, it is all that gives rise to feelings of identification with one's community and institutions of political power.

The contrast is irrelevance. When this irrelevance is grounded in widespread unemployment and corresponding economic hardship, groups might form to interpret this condition of irrelevance and offer a counter explanation of the situation which once again gives them a meaningful place (and more importantly a potential survival niche) vis-a-vis the order which has rejected them or which seems no longer to have need for their input In the final chapter of his book Rethinking Development, David E. Apter makes a compelling case for analyzing "disjunctive moments" in the relationship between socially binding metaphors and metonymies, a changing political economy, and the institutional and lexical reality of the state-society co-incidence as crucial to understanding what might be described as developmental violence and/or instability; i.e., violence which seems to be a response to fundamental changes in the social and economic base of the state (or perhaps a crisis in the relations between civil society and the locus of power within the state). It is violence which results when the binding myths and structural logic which should (or could) integrate civil society fail to coincide. This model offers warnings potentially applicable to the situation in Gaza.

Disjunctions occur "when social polarization leads to conflict rather than mediation, government policy exacerbates rather than ameliorates, and differences over the script lead to random violence, extra-institutional protest, terrorism and ultimately revolution. Polarization in this sense involves states versus antistates in concrete struggles the object of which is to create or prevent a disjunctive moment."[43] Such changes challenge the myths by which we recognize the legitimacy of states, revealing what Plato described as "the noble lie." It is the competition testing the ability of competing potential elites to introduce legitimate authority in an atmosphere threatened with ideological dislocation and anarchy.

"A mytho-logic forms when those at the bottom conclude an alliance, linguistic and coalitional, with those at the top", and the gap between the functionally significant and the

functionally superfluous is overcome by myth.[44] The current transition from occupation to gradually increasing self rule, a transition based on a premise which shatters many socially unifying myths, constitutes just such a disjunctive moment for Gazan society. It challenges obligations defined by past sacrifices. It is one of the premises of this study that awareness of these obligations are primarily economically determined and that the manifestations of social violence are basically the result of a climate of economic despair.

In Apter's model, those negatively affected link economic transformations with the discrediting of the existing political order, or the paradigm through which the legitimacy of the regime was declared. Apter refers to a threat of violence as labor becomes increasingly less relevant as a political grouping in a post-industrial age, but the model applies in no small measure to the way a stroke of the pen seems to absolved Israel from responsibility for the fate of over a hundred thousand Palestinian laborers and their families. The severity of economic hardship and neglect in the Gaza Strip has been well documented and widely discussed.[45] Apter's model is adapted here to analyze the implications of the coinciding political and economic disorientation in terms of future stability and the potential for social violence.

O'Donnell and Shmitter argue that challenges from within civil society to the existing status quo might emerge from within "layers of an explosive society."[46] Pointing out even authoritarian societies contain professional associations, intelligentsia, religious groups and other social groupings, they argue that "exemplary individuals" capable of awakening civil society may arise and encourage these organizations to challenge and exert an active influence on state authority. Schwedler expands on their idea:

> "(the) idea of 'layers of an explosive society' suggests the existence of alternative layers of power, which O'Donnell and Schmitter explore only to the extent that they yield remarkable individuals who dare enter the public sphere.   The existence of these alternate systems, however, seems to contradict the claim that under authoritarianism, citizens withdraw from, or are forced out of, the public sphere. Instead, what seems to happen is that citizens withdraw from one particular system of power, namely, the public sphere regulated by the state.
>
> "Rather than view the public sphere as the only avenue to social mobilization, it is more useful to view it as one of many such channels or systems of power. Likewise, the individuals or groups that enter civil society do not simply emerge from thin air; instead, they emerge form these alternative systems of power. As Melucci argues, social movements (or "remarkable individuals") should not be treated as simply empirical phenomena to record. Social movements are action systems:
>
> "'Action *systems* in that they have structures...*action* systems in that their structures are built by aims, beliefs, decisions, and exchanges operating in a systematic field.'"[47]

Do action systems capable of channeling frustration into constructive (even if confrontational) and stable bases of dissent exist in Gaza? If so, are they in positions to offer alternatives? If not, the alternatives might be those outlined above: the specter of superfluous man or the withdrawal of society from what can readily be identified as conscious and collective attempts to influence the exercise of authority and other restrictions and privileges of the state on their lives. The latter possibility might resemble neopatriarchy as outlined above. In this model, individuals and small groups are allowed to jockey for advantage, and individual strategies might be devised to influence the impact of the regime on one's life, offering some ameliorating standoff with authority and the conditions in which it rules, but the potential for collective action is undermined. Being a system designed to protect the prevailing interests of an elitist status quo over those of society, neopatriarchy/neopatrimonialism *might* offer near term stability, but probably not usher in a stability based on a political economy of meaning.

Perhaps, as Sharabi notes, the specter of superfluous man might be sparked by a suppressed modernist impulse:

> "...the modernist impulse, simultaneously cultivated and frustrated over the last three generations, may revive and even take political form. And when one remembers that this impulse might not be as tightly bound to conventional revolutionary means as it was a generation ago, a fundamentalist advance may appear much less threatening and more manageable."[48]

This might prove especially true within a proletarianized society who have been exposed to many of the modernistic features of Israeli life.

Conclusion

The apparent resolution of a conflict "lowers the energy which guarantees the energy of the group; and the dissolving forces, which were always at work, gain hold....(opposition) allows us to prove our strength consciously and only thus gives vitality and reciprocity to conditions which, without such correctives, we would withdraw at any cost."[49] Fouad Ajami has observed that

> "the exhaustion of the nationalist fervor generally signals the coming to the fore of economic issues and demands, of problems that do not lend themselves to solo performances, to the magic touch of charisma, to the spectacular and psychologically gratifying performance of a Nasser, a Nkrumah, to the theatrics of a Sukarno, to the flair of a Nehru. Less colorful leaders whose links to the nationalist struggle are often tenuous are

the ones who have to satisfy the new needs. The romantic phase of nationalism is then over -- words and symbols lose some of their power as societies begin the infinitely more difficult search for ways of putting a domestic order together."[50]

While Arafat maintains a level of nationalist legitimacy, confusion is created as he has unilaterally announced a solution to the national question in a context where many people are suffering ever greater economic hardship and alienation from forces and ideas around which they could once organize coping strategies. People are groping to articulate responses to the new realities. On some levels, we may be witnessing the continuation of a "solo performance" by Arafat. However, Palestinian viewers seem less and less likely to interpret the story as being about them, and given the web of external interests alone (the directors of our solo performer?) which must be satisfied if self rule is to be consolidated with the current personalities staying on the stage, the script is becoming increasingly complicated -- (if not even creating schizophrenic demands on the soloist).

As Ajami implies, within changing politico-economic contexts, new demands and new expectations are created. Civil society should probably be expected to reorganize itself accordingly. Ajami's statement suggests what are perhaps the fundamental questions underlying this investigation of authority: how is civil society responding to the construction of a new political order? what phenomena can be identified within this new context? what are the material and psychological constraints facing the Palestinian order as Palestinian elites attempt to entrench themselves in a stable regime of "self rule?" how will individuals survive in this order? and how will authority and stability be defined in the new order? This study examines the tools, the machinery and the mechanics of the new basis of authority and finds them lacking.

Salah Abd-al Shafi argues that "if the PLO sets about creating genuine democratic structures in the new authority, structures which should be staffed by and utilize Palestinian expertise and professionals, then maybe something could be salvaged. If, on the other hand, its aim is to duplicate the structures that exist in Tunis or that existed in Lebanon, then the agreement will be a disaster."[51] Salim Tamari has noted the crux of the challenge: "the legitimacy of the Cairo and Oslo agreements, and the provisional regime that they gave rise to, are unavoidably linked to Arafat's ability to establish a political apparatus that can govern Palestine."[52] Will Palestinians accept a paradigm of administer and control -- as opposed to a civil discourse and execution of governing sovereignty -- as the boundaries of a new political economy of meaning?

At this point, the question is not so much whether there will be conflict in Gaza, but rather what the intensity and character of that conflict will be. Sara Roy has summed up Gaza's basic predicament:

> "The crux of the problem in Gaza is that people see less and less contrast with the political and economic order they fought so hard to dislodge. As a result, two seemingly contradictory trends have arisen: a simmering rage and an impenetrable passivity. The former could, over time, erupt into a rebellion against the authority that will be very violent if it occurs. The latter could diminish the possibility for constructive action at the individual and collective levels.
> Palestinian fear is profound. People cannot think clearly when they are hungry or when their children are hungry. In the continued absence of hope and future, there could very well be a popular retreat into violence as the only haven from confusion, loss and abandonment. Without meaningful change and real reform, the prospects are grim."[53]

---

[1] Hobbes, Thomas. Behomoth, or the Long Parliament; IV

[2] While this study attempts to isolate the internal components of this dynamic, or to discuss it from an internal perspective, the internal and external environments are inextricably linked in shaping the future possibilities of "self rule" Palestine.

[3] See for example, Whitbeck, John V. "The Palestinian state already exists" Middle East International no. 529 (July 15, 1996) pp. 19-20.

[4] Note in this context increasingly voiced arguments from within the Palestinian community for a bi-national solution; i.e. demanding full citizenship rights for all Palestinians within the existing Israeli state, which could ironically demographically turn Israel into a Palestinian state.

[5] The interview and accompanying commentary were reported in the Belgian newspaper De Standard of August 17,18 1996, p. 6. The original source is the Israeli paper Ydioth Achronoth.

[6] Unemployment trends are documented in World Bank Developing the Occupied Territories: An investment in peace p.; figure of 60% refers to (date and source needed). See also: Roy 1995b, p. 73.

[7] The relationship between security and economic protectionism is not often discussed. Israeli products still dominate the marketplace in Gaza. Under the Israeli Labor vision of the autonomy, hte trade imbalance in Israel's favor that used to be propped up by Labor migrations to Israel, Labor would allow foriegn aid to subsidize the trade imbalance while giving traditional Palestinian jobs to new immigrants. At the same time, Israel's ability to control borders means allows them to let Palestinian procuce to rot at the borders in the name of security checks.

[8] While the Paris Protocol called for free movement of Palestinian goods and produce between Gaza and the West Bank/Jordan, this was subject to Israel's security concerns. In practice, this has meant that all trucks leaving Gaza are subject to Israeli inspection. Rather than employing a reasonable number of soldiers to expedite these inspections, a small number of inspectors are given responsibility for a large number of vehicles. Furthermore these searches seem not to be conducted with reasonable speed. The result is a de facto constraint on Palestinian trade which undermines the spirit of and faith in the agreements.

[9] Interview with Ibrihim Shehada, case worker for the Palestinian Center for Human Rights and Law

[10] The Journal of Palestine Studies has included reprints of reports from Amnesty International, Bet'selem, and the U.S. Government.

[11] Land and Water Establishment (LAWE), a Palestinian legal and human rights NGO, has systematically documented such abuses. Their press releases are available on the internet.

[12] In an interview with the author, Ibrihim Shehada of the (Palestinian Center for Rights and Law) argued that Palestinian police had recieved their "human rights training" in Israeli prisons or in the factional wars of Lebanon. In other words, most of Arafat's new security cadres do not have any conception of what a human right might be. It is also worthy of note that many of the first troops to return to the occupied territories had recieved their training in Southern Egypt -- hardly an auspicious place for human rights

training. The author heard the PA referred to as a new occupation by a surprisingly high percentage of informants.

[13] For a study of the relationship between psychological resilience and nationalist ideologies, see Punamaki-Gitai. The present situation, by introducing the liberator as an apparent mechanism for imposing social restriction, perhaps undermines such ideological psychological strategies for coping with hardship and uncertainty.

[14] Abu-Amr, Z. "Report from Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 41.

[15] As will be shown, this authority is essentially coercive and manipulative given the lack of a strong structural foundation of PA rule in Gaza as well as teh lack of positive PA powers -- it is a rule of police and patronage.

[16] See Brynen, Rex. "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palesitnian Politics" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 95), pp. 23-36 (1995)...It is also modern in the sense that it represents a static and non-productive relationship with external economies utilizing capitalist methods of production...it implies modern mechanisms of economic and political association with the capitalist (or previously perhaps also socialist) political and economic order.

[17] Pseudo-democratic in the sense that it tries to resolve the notion of respnsive and accountable governance with references to ethno-national authenticity rather than on a strong participatory civil society. If the elections of January 1996 offer a model for the future, elections will essentially be a one party affair emphasizing this a needed condition of national unity (unity based on loyalty to a particular elite rather than based on a complex and vibrant relationship between civil society, economy and power). See Chapter 2 and the conclusion of this study.

[18] This is elaborated on and documented in Chapter 2 below.

[19] Abed, George T. The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development Under Prolonged Occupation. London: Routledge, 1988, p.11.

[20] While the middle 80s and especially the beginnings of the intifada offered hope for overcoming the social fragmentation and particularism of Gaza society, repressive Israeli measures, the lack of an integrated economic base on which to sustain civil society interaction, and the intrusion of diaspora political factionalism and patronage into the intifada tended to undermine that promise.

[21] Murphy, Emma. "Stacking the Deck: The Economics of the Israeli-PLO Accords" Middle East Report 194/195, May-June/July-August 1995, p. 38.

[22] It is important to note that the signing of the agreement gave the PLO access to new sources of patronage at a time when its traditional funding had dried up.

[23] See Brynen, 1995.

[24] Eikelman, Dale F. "Introduction: Self and Community in Middle Eastern Societies" Anthropological Quarterly Oct. 1985, 58:4. p. 135.

[25] ibid., p. 136.

[26] Schwedler offers a clear and useful overview of these debates in Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?.

[27] Quoted in Schwedler, p. 5.

[28] Quoted in ibid, p. 4.

[29] ibid, p. 5.

[30] Peter Mansfield quoted in ibid, p. 9.

[31] It should be noted that the concept of neopatriarchy is not an uncotraversial addition to the debate over the utility of "orientalist" approaches to studying Middle Eastern societies. The concept as used here is not intended to refer to any inherent cultural tendency or notion of mind in Arab societies. Rather, it is seen as important to understanding how elites secure their position in a relatively unproductive economy dominated by the daily struggle to meet basic needs. In other words, when elites have limited ability or will to encourage sustainable economic growth, and when society is characterized by few structures which might serve as a platform for integrated mas response, many of the features associated with Sharabi's conception of neopatriarchy have descriptive and perhaps predictive value as well. His setting up of dichotomies such as rational/irrational to contrast European and Arab societies is not relevant. It is argued here that neopatriarchy as it is relevant to the case of Palestinians in Gaza merely reflects the need of people to orient themselves toward some sort of structure to survive in and negotiate through everyday life. One takes what is available, and the contingencies seen here as promoting neopatriarchy are as much a result of systematic de-development of the Gaza economy under occupation as any inherent social feature of Arab society. In a

sense, I hope to de-orientalize the notion of neopatriarchy to make a specific point about tensions in the emerging political economy. Indeed, the problem is that the factionalism that is prone to neopatrimonial tactics of manipulation is *rational* given the social breakdown and lack of economic alternatives in Gaza today.

[32] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society p. 4.

[33] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society p. 35.

[34] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society p. 31.

[35] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society pp. 31 - 32.

[36] Hisham Sharabi. "The Neopatriarchal Discourse", p. 153.

[37] Hisham Sharabi. "The Neopatriarchal Discourse", p. 152.

[38] These themes are elaborated on in greater detail in chapter two. For an interesting discussion of the role of Nationalism or tradttionalism as psychological coping strategies in time of sociological stress, see Punamaki-Gitai, Raija-Leena. Political Violence and Psychological Responses: A Study of Palestinian Women, Children and Ex-Prisoners. Tampere Peace Research Institute: Research Reports No.41.1990.

[39] Hisham Sharabi. "The Neopatriarchal Discourse", p. 164.

[40] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society p. 7.

[41] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society p. 7.

[42] Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society p. 19.

[43] Apter, David, p. 298. In the context of the proposed study, I would include the need to manage or undermine the "disjunctive moment" which has been temporaly stretched out, and the inevitable fight over re-interpretation is drawn out.

[44] Apter, David, p.308.

[45] The work of Sara Roy is particularly poignent on this point.

[46] Schwedler, p. 22.

[47] ibid, pp. 22-23.

[48] Sharabi (book), pp. 13-14.

[49] See Simmel, Georg. "Conflict" from Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 98, 19.

[50] Ajami, pp. 146-147.

[51] Usher, Graham. "Interview with Salah Abd-al Shafi" p. 13.

[52] Tamari, Salim. "Fading Flags: The Crisis of Palestinian Legitimacy" Middle East Report no. 194/195 Vol. 25 No. 3 & 4. (May-June/July-August 1995), p. 10.

[53] Roy, Sarah. "Alienation or Accomodation" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 73-82.

Chapter 2
The PLO and Gaza:
Affiliational Contingencies and
Incongruities in Nationalist v. Local Trajectory

The roots of factionalism run deep in Palestinian society, and have been shaped and re-shaped by various experiences of power, patronage and immediate needs over the past fifty years. This chapter examines the historical contexts in which this dynamic of factionalism has been defined. The ways in which various occupying powers encouraged conditions conducive to factionalism to promote their own interests, and the question of whether conditions of underdevelopment encouraged the "grass roots" of society to resort to factional strategies and loyalties to meet basic needs, are of particular interest. Factional interests have also defined the relationship between those living in Gaza and the diaspora nationalist leadership. The character of this relationship is described and its consequences suggested. Ultimately, it is suggested that the PA is initiating new patronage structures based on its access to the resources implied with autonomy to create alternative, but still essentially factional, bases of control in Gaza.

Since the 1948 Arab-Jewish war and the flight of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the areas which were to become the newly established state of Israel,[1] Palestinians have experienced and been conditioned by a variety of political, legal and socio-economic factors. The old social, economic and political order was shattered by the establishment of the Israeli state and the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees from areas occupied by Zionist forces. The new situation demanded new responses. Attempts were made to reconstruct the social order in exile. Previously aware social formations were reconstituted, reinvented and often asserted in new ways. The new national structures which emerged necessarily took into account (consciously or not) many of the earlier forms of socio-political organization and control.

In Gaza, potentially one of the densest and most coherent bases of Palestinian nationalism (given its large refugee population and a seeming need for concerted collective action to deal with new economic and ecological stresses), political activity was repressed by Nasser's Egypt. The United Nations and other aid organizations ameliorated the harshest conditions of refugee life, but this may have undermined a need and basis for the articulation of political interests common to all those who found themselves in Gaza after 1948. Refugees tended to resist assimilation into their new environment.[2] Within the strip, economic and social interests of various groups, sectors and classes were kept un-integrated. Political accountability was out of reach for Gazans. Political and economic

pressures facing refugees in Gaza were in many ways different from the challenges facing refugees in Lebanon or Jordan, even though -- especially after the takeover of the PLO by the resistance movements *(fedayeen)* in the late 1960s -- the ideology of nationalism increasingly offered an analysis of and solution to the situation which united refugees in various locations and circumstances in identification with the PLO.

By the early 1970s, the PLO had to a large extent succeeded in integrating itself within various Palestinian communities and constituencies both in the diaspora and in the OT. There existed broad recognition among Palestinians that the PLO represented a legitimate representative and normative national leadership. However, while the PLO's control over the factional purse-strings allowed it to maintain its pre-eminent position across wide and varied constituencies in Palestinian political life, the un-integrated attachment of various groups within the same local community to the PLO bureaucracy also tended to undermine the development of locally integrated structures. A variety of factors have contributed to create linkages between the PLO leadership and socio-political formations in Gaza that were weak and largely lacking in any real civil or social content. The leadership tended to use factional patronage as a tool for entrenching their political position with groups in the OT rather than seeking legitimacy within a constituency by addressing real social issues or addressing fundamental social or economic concerns under occupation.

At present, the PA seems to be creating new bases of factionalism in order to mold the socio-political interests of Gazans in line with its own interests. In order to understand how this phenomenon fits in with Palestinian conceptions of politics, a broad overview is necessary. Factionalism has provided a dynamic that has, on the one hand, informed grassroots coping over many years; and that, on the other hand, has been manipulated by the leadership of the PLO to ensure its primacy in Palestinian political life on many levels. This chapter investigates socio-developmental trends in Gaza, contrasting them with concurrent structural developments within diaspora Palestinian institutions. A general concern of this work is the impact of "self rule" on the trajectory of affiliational life, and the ability of new affiliations and power relations to ameliorate and offer alternatives to current socio-economic limitations and hardship. This requires conceptual identification of specific social structures and trajectories, as well as historical perspectives.

Identifying a dynamic, structure and meaning in factionalism

Muhammad Muslih has neatly outlined some of the phenomena characterizing the complex relationship between the dynamic and content of social affiliation and manifestations of authority in Gaza:

"Although associational life among Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza has long been rich, critics have questioned whether the concept of civil society can be applied to their various associational forms. In this regard, two unique aspects of the Palestinian situation pose difficulties for studying civil society in relation to the state. First, the Palestinians have not had a national government in the twentieth century. Since 1967, the Israeli occupation apparatus has functioned as the de facto authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians consider the Israeli military regime illegitimate, and their goal is not simply to undermine its control or to temper its arbitrary effects, but to dismantle it altogether.

"Second, prior to the signing of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles (also known as the Oslo agreement), Palestinians in the occupied territories accepted an external actor, the PLO, as their 'state,' clandestinely cooperating with local PLO representatives to sustain a network of institutions through which the PLO sought to exercise political power in competition with the Israeli military regime. With the signing of the declaration and the exchange of PLO and Israeli letters of mutual recognition on 9 September 1993, the PLO has become an internal actor that aspires to replace the authority of the Israeli occupier in the West Bank and Gaza...many Palestinians were angered by the numerous concessions unilaterally accepted by PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat. *The behavior of the PLO toward its constituencies in the occupied territories will have an impact on the organs of civil society in these territories.*

"The characteristics of society in the occupied territories also influence Palestinian associational life. The essence of social organization is a network of *hamulat* (extended families) as well as village, neighborhood, and religious solidarities."[3]

These social characteristics outlined by Muslih have contributed to a lack of integration in Gaza society that obstructs the potential of civil society to work collectively to influence authority. The modes of social organization and attitudes toward authority that allowed people to cope and struggle to establish the boundaries between themselves and authority in one context might not serve as well under a new regime. External relations -- i.e., relationships with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), nationalist institutions, and an occupying military force -- have in many respects had a more determining impact on affiliational formation than immediate, on the ground possibilities for social mobilization in Gaza. Political and social organizations were more dependent on outside patronage for survival that on success in addressing immediate local concerns. The result is that groupings tended not to overlap or grow into each other, while an indigenous leadership that might have arisen to bridge several groupings was discouraged by both repressive Israeli occupation policies and by PLO practices. A history of occupation has undermined political and social mobilization generally.

Organization of the Palestinian political factions has generally been vertical. Thus, national institutions tended to reflect the structure if not necessarily the content of more

traditional patriarchal social organization and control. The result is a sort of dependent factionalism, or factionalized dependency. It borrows many features associated with neopatriarchy and neopatrimonialism, but should perhaps be seen more as a product of recent historical developments than as an absolute politico-cultural tendency. Dependency is vertical in the sense that separate groups or individuals are unlikely to find opportunities or coping strategies by seeking cooperation and collective action with other groups in society, but only by seeking the personalized arbitration of a patron. Indeed, given the extent of the imbalance of power and opportunity in society -- between Israel and the PA, and between the PA and Gaza's broken civil society -- it is perhaps difficult to see how collective action could produce positive alternatives. Partly therefore, collective activity is often driven toward undermining a current status quo rather than toward building alternatives. This dependent situation: (a) facilitates divide and rule by encouraging competition over access to a limited base of authority; (b) discourages horizontal linkages across sectors of society' and (c) offers a tactic for enforcing social "obligations" and providing basic needs without reference to developmental imperatives or broad based and integrated (complex) social organization or affiliation.

According to Sharabi:

> "Factionalism is a privative tendency; it first separates the Self from all Others, then, on a higher level, divides the world into opposing pairs...factional ethics are simple and reductive. Within the tribal dominated structure, obligations are strictly defined; outside it there are no clearly defined social obligations, except those contingently or contractually undertaken...*allegiance is not expressly ideological but rooted in basic needs.* The persistence of clan or sectarian allegiance in neopatriarchal society reveals how extensively modern patriarchy has been tied to primordial forms. Neither the city nor the society or state have succeeded in evolving social forms providing for genuine alternative structures. Kinship and religious affiliation remain the ultimate ground of loyalty and allegiance, stronger than abstract ideology."[4]

With due care to note the actual fluidity of factional affiliation (Sharabi's observation is a bit too categorical), including its ability to seemingly change the fundamental rationale of affiliation without changing its membership (not unlike the communists turned ethnocrats in Eastern Europe), an understanding of Palestinian political factionalism is important to understanding the implications of the current PA strategy of consolidation and the chances of this strategy producing long term stability. One need not look further than successive occupation regimes to be reminded that factionalism is not a necessarily organic phenomenon, but rather reflects conscious limits on social organization/mobilization imposed and manipulated from above. A society factionalized

and engaging in essentially non-productive competition with itself poses less of a threat to established power relations.[5]

A notable feature of the Palestinian movement has been the PLO leadership's success in the suppression or disenfranchisement of all political activity which did not take place within the established factional framework. Such a factionalized social base leaves society prone to coercion and manipulation from above. Individual actors are left with few alternative channels of meaningful social engagement (membership in many groups, while fluid, is still often something less than voluntary or ideologically based), and the groupings which elsewhere serve as the foundation of civil society don't engage political institutions in civil dialog either due to intimidation, extreme alienation, and/or dependency -- i.e., because they have become so dependent on the apparatus of the state for survival and privileges that constructive engagement seems either worthless or counterproductive to short term interests.

Factional politics has led to a chronic crisis in political representation within Palestinian groups, and undermined the role of social ideology in Palestinian politics.[6] The political leadership of the Palestinian left has always complained of the Fatah leadership's

> "individual(istic) and autocratic manner, (its domination) of (the PLO's) institutions, departments, and offices through the appointment of its own followers and of appropriating the bulk of its funds."[7]

Hilal adds that:

> "The partisan and patron-client relations within the (PLO) bureaucracy seriously interfered with the effective management of public services. This was combined with the incessant struggle between the factions, which intervened to determine administrative action at local and national level -- for example in the implementation of the political, organizational and financial resolutions of national bodies. Factionalism, which sometimes took the forms of 'clannishness' and 'localism', posed a serious problem, since it characterized administrative action at the highest level of the hierarchy as well as lower down. This factionalism found some nourishment in the geographically and socio-economically fragmented class structure.[8]

Each subordinate group has been willing to take the opportunity to enhance its political position even at the expense of other ostensibly like minded groups and this has allowed Fatah to play the subordinate groups off of each other and thereby keep potential opposition weak. Furthermore "the Fatah bureaucracy has no interest in changing a system that has ensured its control of the PLO."[9] Control over the PLO and control over civil society in Gaza, however, represent two different tasks. In the context of the autonomy, it appears that the factionalism that sustained the PLO is being substituted with a different model of social factionalism.

Azmi Bishara argues that Palestinian political society is collapsing in the territories with the ongoing implementation or the Gaza-Jericho formula:

> "If you look at the PLO factions, you will see an exodus of members from them. The Palestinian political map is changing...(the factions) are still acting as though the PLO exists and it doesn't. And unless they adapt to the changed circumstances brought about by Oslo they are going to disappear from the scene. (The vacuum created by their disappearance seems likely to be filled in the near term by) two alternatives. First, we are seeing the revival of the traditional tribal structures of Palestinian society, or what is known as the *hamula* or extended family structures....There are very real signs that the PA is reviving the old *hamula* structures to serve as its main political ally in the autonomy. (The second alternative seems to be) the institutional transformation of the PLO's remnants into the PA's police and security services."[10]

Bishara argues that these constitute reactionary bases of PA power and are likely to produce conditions of "archaic despotism plus an Islamic opposition."[11] They also suggest new bases of factionalism. If members are streaming out of the factions (and interviews conducted by the author in Gaza suggest this to be the case), where are they going? The options are withdrawal, which poses no immediate threat to the security of the regime, or the seeking of efficacy and promotion within the social structures which do exist. In the latter case, (according to the theory at least), security and possibility are defined within the obligations and possibilities outlined by dependent factionalism and may be easily recognized by individuals. In either case, political authority is not openly questioned or actively challenged.

Roy elaborates on these phenomena:

> "Politics has become irrelevant because it no longer is seen as serving any purpose -- political, economic, social, or humanitarian. Factions no longer play an organizing or catalytic role: they are no longer able to mobilize the population as they once did during the intifada; they are increasingly unable to mediate in disputes, and indeed often contribute to them. In a society where institutional recourse has largely been precluded, the loss of the faction's mediatory structure at a time of acute social stress and economic hardship is particularly serious...factions are now judged almost entirely on their ability to respond to personal and community needs."[12]

Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi argues that, "the political factions have lost credibility with the people and can no longer motivate them."[13] Authorities may also play on other social divisions to encourage a dependent factionalism.

> "Arafat is playing on the very pronounced social divisions and tensions that now exist between Gaza's refugee and indigenous communities. After decades of disparity and discrimination, the refugees feel that they are entitled to greater reward than their indigenous counterparts who are not

seen to have suffered as deeply or as consistently. (Refugees constitute the largest social class in Gaza, and unlike in the West Bank, in Gaza there is no strong middle class and few wealthy families from which the PA might draw support. Thus, refugees) constitute an important source of support and a perceived lever against future competitors....

"Many increasingly see a connection between emerging Palestinian authoritarianism and Israel's security led interpretation of autonomy. Gazans say they will resist. But how? What mechanisms of social and political mediation, other than violence, do Gazans really have at their disposal? Put differently, what does it mean to be a socially engaged person in Gaza today, in an environment characterized by continuing occupation, waning security, warring factions, a moribund economy, diminishing water and land, a traumatized population, and an uneducated generation of children?[14]

Unfortunately, Roy does not tell us how Arafat is playing on these divisions, but the quotes from Muslih, Sharabi and Bishara above offer some clues (see footnote 13), and the overviews of the *hamula* and security factionalism below suggest the basis of a new factional dynamic in Gaza.

Notes on the suggested new bases of factionalism
The Hamula

Earlier studies on the *hamula* seem to offer a precedent illustrating the group dynamic and power relations of dependent factionalism, and suggest how they might be manipulated in the new order. Traditionally, the *hamula* has been defined as "the network of patrilineal kinship ties,"[15] or even more vaguely, as "clan or lineage."[16] However, more recent research emphasizes the fluidity of the *hamula* structures in response to changing social and political imperatives. While typically conceived in terms of lineage, Abner Cohen

"referred to the *hamula* by the more appropriate term of *patronymic association* rather than *group* in order to emphasize better the flexibility inherent in the cultural principle of *hamula* and its frequent lack of sharp principles of exclusion in social practice...in practice, *hamula* identity was based on a complex web of patrilineal, affinal, and matrilineal ties, neighborliness (most *hamula* households were located in the same section of the village), and sustained cooperation in political, economic and ceremonial activities."[17]

"Due to a set of interconnected socioeconomic and political factors, Cohen argued, the role the hamula played in the political life of the village fluctuated from one period to the next."[18]

Significantly, *hamula* should not be seen as establishing the only basis for social networks: "friendship, patronage and common economic and political interests served equally as bases for unity and cooperation."[19] The apparent "authenticity" (a pre-existing awareness

which only needs to be defined according to the contexts in which it is invoked) of pseudo-primordial associations such as the *hamula* offers an attractive retreat for the individual in times of hardship, uncertainty, and reduced alternatives. Cossali and Robson observe that:

> "The conservatism of Gaza is rooted in the strength of the extended family and under occupation the family has become the major buffer between state and individual. Nobody in Gaza lives outside their family framework.... While the family provides and cares for its members, it can also apply powerful sanctions against anyone who would challenge its authority.... Certainly the family provides services which should be the government's responsibility, such as mental health care, unemployment benefit, educational grants and so on. But more than this, the preservation of the extended family reinforces the strict male dominated hierarchical nature of Gaza society.[20]

At the same time, we must not underestimate the impact on the Gazan family of widespread migration and immigration, a generation of Gazan youth who spent time in Israeli prisons, the inability of family structures to ensure safety from the intrusions of Israeli force, and the greater involvement of women in economic and resistance activities during the intifada on these family structures. Contact with wage labor for example has meant that "lots more young people are now (middle 1980s) independent of their parents financially which gives them the courage to stand up to their fathers."[21] This situation however has changed in the 1990s with greater unemployment and other factors which tend to extend or "string out" coping strategies, and Arafat has set himself up the "father" of all Gazans.[22] As a structure bound with patriarchal tendencies, the *hamula* can be mobilized through manipulations from above to serve the interests of power in keeping society divided.

> In a 1975 study, Nakleh, sought to explore:

> "the persistence of inter- and intra-hamula conflicts in Arab villages in spite of the political, cultural and economic threat generated by the new Israeli regime...(his researchable question was) "Why does the political behavior of Arab villagers in Israel manifest an almost total absence of a level of political consciousness higher than personal utility, the utility of the kinship group, or the utility of the sectarian organization?"

He concluded that:

> "Arabs are encouraged by various agencies of the government to maintain their struggles within the boundaries of the village, or to follow any principle, only so long as that principle does not unite them as a political collectivity vis-a-vis the government."[23]

But Nakleh falls short of discussing the ways in which the overall economic and political systems reinforce each other so as to facilitate these phenomena. Is the PA pursuing a similar strategy in Gaza today? How might relationships between local institutions in Gaza and the nationalist diaspora organizations have formed in ways which left Gaza society conditioned by and generally prone to ruling strategies which reinforce fragmented and factionalized social responses to authority? The historical overview which follows focuses not on evidence of the persistence of traditional patriarchal forms of affiliation as a phenomenon related to global economic exchange, but rather as reflecting the difficulties of maintaining a nationalist coalition across a variety of political environments and economic regimes, between individuals of various social class backgrounds spread out in space, and as reflecting a necessary local strategy to meet basic needs at different times.   To distinguish the idea from Sharabi's broad and somewhat categorical model, what we examine here is referred to as the cultivation of *dependent factionalism* as a method of keeping a confederative nationalist movement singularly dependent on a leadership distanced by exile from local contingencies and direct accountability.

A case study presented by Robinson notes that *hamula* oraginization often coincided with the organization of the popular committes and local self help structures which emerged during the intifada, and goes so far as to suggest that grassroots organization was more effective when it coincided with *hamula* configurations.[24] Thus, beneath the seemingly "modern" leadership base of much of the uprising, the politics of basic needs and "primary solidarities" still characterized society at the grassroots structural level. The resiliance of such forms of social organization and loyalty should not be surprising considering that conditions in the Gaza Palestinian space have responded to basically the same contingencies over the past fifty years, and alternatives have not arisen which promise security and a mode of existence which is not compelled to consider daily the tasks of meeting basic needs.[25]   Robinson argues that the intifada "modernized" the leadership of these movements and social structures, particularly at the local level, and as such represented a progressive step toward nation-state building mass integration.[26]

However, in spite of the apparent fluidity in terms of leadership and self-definition of these structures, the continuity and persistence of the form underlines the lack of substantive transformation at a structural level that might give meaning to new and dynamic patterns of social integration and identification within Palestinian society. In other words, there has been no fundamental shift in the political economic bedrock that might inform new patterns of social mobilization and affiliation. Changes in rhetoric and description have often mirrored changes in external patrons and immediate contingencies rather than any fundamental ideological and organizational shift. Thus, there may be more of a

continuity between the bases of social mobilization of the intifada and those currently seen under self-rule than is generally assumed. Studies which have focused on Palestinian leadership, particularly studies made during the intifada, seemed to have undervalued this situation. Old leaders may indeed have been discredited, but the conditions of economic hardship and institutional breakdown which had reinforced the recourse to primary solidarity structures, one of which could be the *hamula*, did not. Robinson's case study indicates that in many cases it merely tactically realigned itself. However, it did modify its tasks in line with ideas and pressures which arose under the intifada.

While these structures coalesce in response to immediate needs and a breakdown in the broad structures of arbitration and authority, they are also prone to manipulation from above, and as such may be rather easily manipulated in ways which undermines the development of alternative bases of social mobilization. External stimuli seem to be more effective in a situaiton characterized by internal constraints. Nation building and regime legitimation is thus stripped of its socio-economic or developmental character. Politics remains rooted in basic needs. Structures are factionalized and personalized. This problem is exacerbated by the insecurity of the PA, and the lack of alternatives available to Gaza society in general. A fundamental stability of function and structure within Palestinian political affiliation is suggested, and there no other basis in the current configuration of power, contingency and socio-economic base in which an alternative political economy of meaning might be recognized.

The security forces as a factional power base

The factional control of the security force become even more significant when one considers that it is this branch of authority that was most substantially endowed by the agreement.[27] The dynamic and implications of Arafat's factional control over the security forces are suggested by stitching together parts of a discussion by Graham Usher on the subject:

> "The myriad of forces gives Arafat enormous scope for political patronage. Since Fatah's Hawk and Panther wings were disbanded in September 1993, former cadres have been steadily absorbed into the PSF (Palestinian Security Forces), making for an increasingly nominal distinction between Fatah and the PSF....The same logic holds with Arafat's incorporation of the PLO's old diaspora military forces into the PA's new security structures....Prominant (diaspora) Fatah officials are likely to be appointed to leading posts in the PA's existing security apparatuses or, in the case of 'big chiefs' like Zaki and Hasan, via the establishment of new ones. This pays them a wage and affords them a satus commensurate with their former leadership roles. It also serves to erode any llingering political opposition they might harbor toward Oslo.

"(T)he absence of a clear chain of command between the police and the intelligence forces facilitates one of Arafat's oldest methods of rule....The various police forces compete and conflict with each other for the spoils of political, social and economic power....The fact that Arafat acts as arbiter in all disputes serves yet another end: by allowing tensions to simmer between the various forces, he fragments them and forestalls the coalescing of alternative power centers. This is important not just because of the dissensions Oslo threw up withn Fatah but because such tactics weld together the divergent class, regional, and generational constituencies from which Fatah's "non-ideological" brand of nationalism has evolved....Finally, the proliferation of forces has given Arafat maximum leverage in his dealings with Palestinian dissidents, since allows him to alternate between playing good cop and bad cop against them."[28]

Gaza's response

Perhaps ironically, while Gazans have been the subjects of a high degree of political authoritarianism from a variety of regimes, this seems to have created a situation where even the populist response was forced to depend on alternative authoritarian structures for sustenance and coordination. Grassroots mobilization was undermined by occupying authorities and by "external" nationalist priorities. This predicament continues to stifle the potential for collective civil action in Gaza today. As we analyze the situation from a political economy of meaning perspective, the implications of this authoritarianism must be carefully considered. The debate as framed from above may be one that is shaped in terms of vague, abstract legitimacy based on notions of "authenticity" and historic legitimacy earned by the Fatah elite rather than a legitimacy that is determined through evaluation of ongoing events and conditions. A political economy of meaning seeks ultimately to evaluate the balance and dynamic between the two, and to measure social efficacy and well being in terms of internal expectations and demands. In order to appreciate the constraints on a political economy of meaning in contemporary Gaza, we must indicate how socio-economic expectations have evolved in Gaza, how historical factors have shaped responses to various events and trends, the historic role of PLO institutions in Gaza, and the congruence of diaspora political interests and culture with those of Gaza.

Historical overview

While the experience of exile in refugee camps and the difficulties associated with social and economic integration into a new environment encouraged the reconstruction of "traditional" linkages among the Palestinians who had been forced to take flight following the 1948 war, most politically active Palestinians in the newly formed diaspora were soon drawn to the Arab Nationalist political movements which were emerging as a political force in the Arab world by the early 1950s. An insistence on the centrality of the liberation of

Palestine as a precondition for the modernization and transformation of Arab society in general, a society which they saw as reactionary, sclerotic and incapable of withstanding and resisting imperialist forces intent on keeping the Arab space divided and underdeveloped, was a general theme which unified the Palestinian branches of these movements. They deigned to influence the emerging agenda of Arab Nationalism to adopt the liberation of Palestine and the return of Palestinians to their land as a guiding historical mission, uniting Arab land and people. Their struggle was one to collectivize the tragedy, and they saw in the establishment of and western support for Israel an imperialist strategy for keeping the Arabs weak and economically irrelevant. While connected with the OT by personal and structural linkages of varying scope and strength, and while they successfully served the cause of generally uniting Palestinians around the liberation of Palestinian land as a national imperative, these political and social institutions which formed in the diaspora did not develop structures conditioned to the need to respond to broad constituencies with an accountable social agenda.

Before 1948, "the Gaza province included the districts of Gaza and Beer Sheba. In 1947, Gaza province covered 13,688,501 dunums and had a population of 303,500. After 1948, all but 2.5% of the province was lost. The Gaza Strip was isolated and 80% of its population lost their livelihoods."[29] Egypt occupied and administered Gaza after 1948. There were many social cleavages within the Gaza Strip: bedu-peasant; north-south (more conservative); city-farming; and most notably refugee-indigenous Gazan. With its large refugee population, the Gaza Strip was in many ways a natural constituency for the diaspora nationalist movements. The flight of refugees into the Strip during and after the 1948 war -- into an environment which was cut off from its economic hinterland, overcrowded, resource poor (water and land being the crucial resources in Gaza) and lacking in opportunities for employment -- resulted in the formation of two profoundly unintegrated socio-political groupings who were forced to share the same restricted space, the same limited job opportunities, and the same overburdened resource base. Competition for the employment and access to resources which would mean survival was especially acute between the poorest of both groups. In fact, the situation was worse for the "indigenous" poor as they lacked a claim to United Nations Refugee Works Agency (UNRWA) support. The distinction between the two groups was intensified by the refusal of the refugees to integrate -- mostly out of fear of losing their right of return.[30]

In Nasser's Egypt, political activity was harshly repressed, especially in the early and middle 1950s. Nasser cracked down on all forms of organized political activity in Gaza. By appointing Egyptians accountable only to Cairo to key administrative posts in Gaza, Egyptian rule furthermore stifled the development of a political culture founded in

mass based popular identification with indigenous leaders. In fact, "building political structures independent of Egypt wasn't a main priority for most Gazans during the Egyptian Administration because of the popular belief that Nasser's pan-Arab vision would eventually deliver Palestine from Zionist control."[31] However, after the Suez crisis, Palestinians increasingly agitated to be allowed to represent their cause. Egyptian authorities, although worried about upholding their truce agreements, finally consented and allowed elections and a National Union and a Legislative council were formed. The Egyptian Army also began organizing and training regiments of what was to become the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).

The structure and character of Egyptian control, and the primacy of UNRWA's accountability for the economic needs and aspirations of refugees, further inhibited the development of a political culture based on the inhabitation of a common space which collectively faced unique contingencies.[32] UNRWA took over many of the civil functions into which a colonial bureaucracy would have been funded, so co-optation -- or for that matter rebellion -- could not be initiated from within the structure of ruling institutions or the institutions of authority. The external determination and orientation of what little productive activity there was in Gaza discouraged the integration of economic sectors which in turn undermined incentives for local elites or organizations to conceive of socio-economic policy oriented towards the protection of the general social welfare of Gaza as a distinct and out of necessity whole social unit. There was economic change without corresponding social change because no single sector had relations or linkages with other sectors, but only with an external political and economic metropole. Such conditions (including the formation of a large lumpenproletariate beginning during the mandate period) tended to reinforce neopatriarchal economic organization and mechanisms of social control.[33]

Following the 1967 war, Israel occupied Gaza City and its surrounding area, the Gaza Strip.[34] The constraints on political activity during both Egyptian and Israeli occupation of Gaza, together with Gaza's lack of an economic base capable of absorbing the refugees who fled to the Strip after 1948, left Gaza without an integrated social, political or economic base, thus precluding the formation of a political class identifying with a mass constituency which cut across otherwise powerful social divisions in Gaza.[35]

The PLO, Gaza and occupation: repression, resistance and restructuring
The PLO was established by the Arab league in 1964. In practice, during this early phase it was a political organ manipulated by Arab states in pursuing their interests and intrigues.[36] Specifically, many observers saw the man chosen by Nasser to build the new

organization -- the "blustering and bombastic" Ahmad Shukayri -- as a mere puppet. In fact, however, he perhaps deserves some credit for establishing a degree of independent recognition for the organization. Arab leaders were eventually forced to give at least nominal recognition of Palestinian direct involvement in resolving the Palestinian question.[37] In as much as it appealed to a particular Palestinian constituency in its early phases (especially after 1967), the bases of support for the PLO were "to be found in precisely those places where Palestinians didn't have passports."[38] When viewed against the Arab military defeat in 1967, the fiery rhetoric of Shukayri only increased Palestinian despair at the inaction and inefficacy of existing political institutions to represent their claims and resolve their problems.

The Arab defeat in the Six Day War of 1967 discredited the PLO old guard. It was shown up as a tool of other states in the pursuit of intra-Arab state rivalries. In 1968, the PLO was taken over by the resistance movements (most notably Fatah) who "quickly proceeded to determine the movements affiliations, discourse and tactics; and as such it articulated not only the aims and the outlook of Palestinian nationalism, but also the history and contours of Palestinian identity"; an identity shaped not only in conflict with Israel, but increasingly in conflict with other Arab states as well.[39] The romanticized exploits of the *fedayeen* heightened grassroots appeal. Here seemed to be an elite committed to direct action. However, the banning of all political activity in Gaza after the occupation, and an initial post occupation period of militant resistance without social content and the deportation of many political leaders, left Gazans politically unanchored and imbued the building of institutions with a sense of urgency and futility which has yet to be overcome.

> "Political opposition (was) severely curtailed by the occupation. The United National Front, a coalition of groups from the Egyptian period, was systematically destroyed by arrests and deportations which it could not survive. It was left to the Red Crescent Society, the three professional associations of doctors, lawyers and engineers, and to some extent the municipal council (Israeli appointed), to provide a political leadership although this was a role they didn't necessarily seek."[40]

But the contours of the movement were hemmed in both by the general political situation in the Arab world, and by the personal inclinations of the Fatah leadership. As Migdal and Kimmerling suggest:

> "...the nature of dispersal and the disdain of Fatah's leaders for traditional party organization--cells, local committees and the like--made it difficult for the group to educate, recruit, or consistently mobilize the larger population. The committee succeeded in coordinating the organizations own actions, less so in infusing Fatah into the everyday lives of the Palestinians. When Fatah did create some rudimentary regional subgroups, it found itself

hemmed in by the governing Arab regimes [and of course after 1967 by Israel].

For all these organizational liabilities, the group did capture the Palestinian's imagination, but not in ways that could have been the basis for systems of control and mass mobilization. This remained true after the 1967 war when it built a complex central apparatus, covering areas from financial control to relations with Arab parties. Over the years, Arafat tried to make Fatah (and later the PLO which Fatah came to dominate) into what the Jewish Agency had been for the Jews during the Palestine mandate -- a 'state-in-the-making' -- but without the equivalent of political parties and the Histadrut, which had given the Jewish Agency a firm foundation in the Jewish population."[41]

On October 28, 1974, the Arab world unanimously declared the PLO the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.[42] This gave increased legitimacy and visibility to the PLO's integrative role of reconstituting the links which had been shattered after 1948,[43] and marked the increased independence of the organization at a time when the oil rich Gulf states had a surplus of donor potential. Many Palestinian elites in the OT, however, continued to perceive their interests in terms of political orientation towards Jordan and the Hashimite regime. This was especially true of the traditional landed elites who were concerned about the stability of their economic holdings and were not interested in provoking the Israelis and thereby risking the fate of so many of their fellows.

While most Palestinians accepted the right of the PLO to speak on their behalf, the structure of the PLO and the scattered nature of Palestinian society were such that consensus on that right was based on the PLO leadership's ability to speak in the broadest and most general terms about Palestinians' national interests and to take credit for activities which showed an ongoing level of commitment to the pursuit and attainment of those interests. The name of the game was consensus building, giving various groups within the society reason to conceive of their interests as being best pursued within the context of national self fulfillment, a political order that promised accountability to their demands. This is the same in any functioning nation state. However, while the PLO had a strong institutional base in many of the Palestinian communities in exile, most notably in Jordan in the early years and in Lebanon until 1982, Fatah, the leading faction within the PLO, had only a tenuous institutional base in the occupied territories. Cossali and Robson note before the outbreak of the intifada that:

"Although Fatah is the biggest faction within the PLO, we found it hard (in Gaza) to find someone who would defend the Fatah strategy and Yassir Arafat's style of leadership."[44]

According to some of their informants;

"Basically Fatah is not a force here. There are plenty of Fatah supporters, but they have no leader and they are split between personal ambitions and the needs of the actual situation. The PFLP (Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine), although it has fewer members, has more power because it is better organized."[45]

"There are so many different factions all saying: 'We support the PLO.' The result is that the PLO has no clear cut policy. There is total confusion and always will be while the PLO is trying to speak with so many voices"[46]

Fatah's attempts to be everything to everyone in some ways accounts for the apparent irony between the traditional broad based identification with the leaders of Fatah and its simultaneous failure to mobilize society effectively toward specific goals in Gaza.

The United Nations Refugee Works Association (UNRWA) and the occupation Civil Administration may have also undermined the PLO position by being able to offer services -- albeit limited services -- and more importantly provide jobs and aid that encouraged primary loyalties. (This becomes more apparent in the transitional context because the PA threatens the legitimacy of these institutions and their availability to Gazans who have become dependent upon them -- for example many refugees are afraid of effectively losing UNRWA services if they are turned over to the PA as is planned; and the twenty thousand Gazans who were employed by the Israeli civil administration are, in spite of guarantees within the agreements, afraid of being squeezed out as the PA is pressured to give administrative jobs to outsiders and to strategically located individuals within Gaza). Israeli censorship prevented the Fatah from openly naming representatives in the OT, but even two years after the signing of the DoP, the leadership has yet to recognize the contribution of local activists by giving them meaningful positions in the PA.[47] A combination of Israeli repression and Fatah's suspicion of anything that might lead to an alternative leadership in the OT combined to undermine the ability of grassroots organizations to sustain themselves over the long term. The isolation of the occupied territories, particularly the severe isolation of the Gaza Strip, further hindered the establishment of strong linkages between "inside" and "outside" Palestinian groupings.

However, the new influx of funds after 1974, and the relative lack of conditionality placed upon this external funding, granted PLO elites greater license to encourage specific resistance activities and political formations. The new activism afforded an increased feeling of efficacy all around, but the types of structures normally associated with a strong social base for eventual self rule were not established. While the idea of a Palestinian mini-state in the OT began to gain some ground among intellectuals and local notables, the PLO "had devoted little of its time to gathering support in the OT and had no desire to see locals challenge their right to represent the Palestinian people."[48] Furthermore, the combination

of high visibility activism and very real potential to distribute patronage encouraged identification with the PLO, which increasingly became an ultimate reference point coordinating activities and interests associated with the Palestinian experience.

The initial shift in strategy by the PLO after 1973 led it to call for a "transitional" solution based on recognition of UN resolutions 242 and 338 seemed to signal to the inhabitants of the OT that their interests were becoming more central to the aims of the Palestinian movement. This represented a shift from just a year earlier when 100 local notables from the West Bank and Gaza Strip had petitioned the UN for local sovereignty over the heads of PLO leaders. The PLO leadership had responded negatively to this local initiative and undermined any local negotiations oriented toward an alignment of OT notables with the Hashimite monarchy in Jordan, perhaps in part reflecting a fear of making irrelevant its claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people if an alternative leadership with a geographic base emerged in the OT.[49]

Increasingly aware of its own institutional interests, and in a position of strength with respect to external funding and general political influence, the PLO had little interest in recognizing the structural basis for an alternative leadership. In some ways however, this approach signaled the beginnings of a possible contradiction in the movement: were the occupied territories to be seen as playing a supportive role in the broader context of a national struggle or were they to be the central focus of struggle in a new strategy? If the latter, how would the interests of the diaspora Palestinians be represented in this new conception? But given the widespread popularity of the PLO throughout the 1970s, the realization that the current imbalance of power made immediate resolution of problems unlikely, and the PLO's geographical distance from accountability for conditions on the ground, such dilemmas were relatively easily dismissed at the time.

The PLO seemed to be seeking a territorial base which did not coincide with the current location or specific historical claim of its major constituency -- diaspora refugees. How seriously was the PLO basing its claim to territorial representation on representation of the specific concerns of those who were living in those territories? Projecting briefly ahead to a description of the PLO structure in the 1990s, Hilal suggests an answer. He notes an "absence" of representatives from the OT in the PLO's national institutions and their partial and ineffectual role in the decision making process characterize the situation.

> "It is thus that while true decision-making within the PLO does not take place within the national institutions, neither are these institutions as now constituted properly representative....(as of 1993), there are still no representatives from the occupied territories after nearly six years of the intifada and two years of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations."[50]

"There is not a single present or former (refugee) camp resident in the Palestinian authority's cabinet, whose composition has been explained in terms of a carefully calibrated balance among regions, factions, families and so on."[51]

While these quotes indicate the elitist diaspora conception of the Fatah leadership, the PLO's diplomatic and financial successes of the 1970s did in fact encourage broad social identification with the nationalist leadership and its vaguely articulated strategy. However, the actual politics of the PLO generally did not respond to trends in the OT and did not develop a strategy to face them.[52] Some observers note that many of those who now form the backbone of the diaspora based leadership acquired great wealth after the 1973 oil price rise. "But this new class is not really a Palestinian class. Their class identity is with the bourgeoisie of their host country--their power is not connected to forces in Palestine."[53]

In fact, some have argued that the current agreement reflects the interests of a conservative "bourgeoisie" both within the diaspora movement and in the OT -- a group for whom the costs of continued resistance were ever more dramatically exceeding the benefits. Edward Said noted with a certain sense of disgust that the Oslo Accords represented a "victory of the shopkeepers" in determining the content and boundaries of national liberation. While, "unlike classical patterns of colonialism, the Israeli occupation failed to win the sympathy or support of any meaningful sector of the occupied population,"[54] Salim Tamari notes that, before the resistance at least, neither did it meet with much active resistance from the indigenous bourgeoisie in the OT. A traditionally conservative social group, the merchant class had earlier maintained a pragmatic approach toward protecting its interests under occupation.[55] The conditions that pushed them into active involvement during the intifada included issues such as taxation without representation that have served to consolidate a bourgeoisie political identity elsewhere. In fact, before the intifada, the lack of an economic base for local political much less national integration was apparent within the social divisions of the urban petit bourgeoisie class. The strict division of even members of similar classes along the lines of social origin was reflected in elections in the municipalities and local chambers of commerce:

"where refugee and 'native' candidates had to be balanced delicately in each opposing slate....despite significant integration and intermarriage since the war of 1967, (divisions based on origin) continue to be a primary obstacle to the social homogeneity of the middle strata in Palestinian urban society. They contributed significantly to the relative withdrawal of town merchants from active participation in the national movement until the eruption of the uprising in December 1987. One outstanding achievement of the uprising has been a noticeable decline in the social impact of these divisions..."[56]

Tamari offers an excellent description of the crucial part the bourgeoisie played in the early effectiveness of the intifada and the forces which caused this class to identify with the situation of daily life for most Palestinians under occupation. However, caught between Israeli tactics aimed at the enforcement of occupation policies and the increasingly unprincipled, unorganized and unsustainable demands on the merchants by the Unified National Command of the Uprising (UNCU) -- which were in later stages enforced by the often overzealous "strike forces," the merchants gradually began to retreat from their role. The political grip which Israel still held on the territories combined with the need to keep up some levels of production and indigenous employment had encouraged uneven enforcement of the strike and tax boycott anyway, and merchants gradually began to resent their relative hardships.[57] Furthermore, the leadership and the factions were in disagreement about what tactics to pursue as the old ones were getting harder to sustain. Some emphasized continued adherence to civil disobedience and the empowerment of the popular networks which would offer a base of support for eventual alternatives to Israeli rule, others called for more active confrontation in the streets. The practical effect was to create organizational crisis within the united movement which opened the way to further factional influence which undermined the unity of the political committees and grassroots organizations.

While the limited social horizons of classes that might potentially have served as a base for national integration created a situation that was ripe for factionalism and particularism in Palestinian society, PLO institutions themselves added a new dimension and even legitimacy to these divisions. Hilal argues that the routinization of a well funded political bureaucracy operating outside any specific societal formation and without accountability for articulating a social agenda allowed the Fatah elite to manipulate the PLO institutional structure to ensure that Arafat and Fatah were the constant reference point of national unity.[58] Chief among the mechanisms that allowed this was the quota system.

> "The quota system (where each of the political groups has a specified number of seats in the PNC regardless of its size in the Executive committee) contained the seeds of the marginalization of national institutions. It gave power to the representatives of political factions, rather than to the representatives of Palestinian communities, associations and trade unions. In other words, decision-making remained in the hands of the leadership of those political groups affiliated to the PLO, with special powers for the controlling group. This was accentuated by the centralized command structure operating in all the groups of the PLO, reflecting its paramilitary origins and the varying emphases of its affiliated groups on armed struggle. Rivalries and differences in political outlook among left-wing groups, as well as the willingness of each to enter into direct deals with Fatah to enlarge its representation, were used by the leadership of

Fatah, along with other tactics, including the control of PLO funds and appointments, to maintain and entrench its control."[59]

It should be remembered that inasmuch as this dynamic was influencing political organization in the OT, it was largely covert and subject to Israeli reprisal. At the same time, one must not forget the relative wealth and diplomatic scope of the PLO which in many ways made dishing out positions in its affiliations around the world easier than developing a constituency in the OT.

At the same time, political changes in Israel were to have an impact on social development in the Gaza Strip, and the PLO was becoming increasingly irrelevant and excluded from influencing events in Gaza. In the mid 1970s, Menachem Begin assumed power in Israel and began to introduce the Milsonian strategy of trying to wean local elites from identification with the PLO using traditionalistic patriarchal patronage networks.[60] Menachem Milson, a right wing historian, first came to public attention after writing that the PLO had come to power in the OT municipal elections in 1976 through fraud, bribery and intimidation. He argued that it was possible to cultivate a pliable indigenous leadership to counter the PLO in the territories.[61] With what was known as operation "Iron Fist", the Likud regime repressed PLO sentiment in the OT with renewed vigor using tactics of physical violence reinforced by collective economic and social punishments. The population of the territories was increasingly economically and politically isolated, and conditions deteriorated. Begin is reported to have said, "we'll make the Arab workers work for 100 shekels and we'll make sure that they need to spend 150."[62] On Nov. 1 1981, Milson was appointed to head a new civil administration in the occupied territories.[63] In early 1982, authorities ousted the pro-PLO mayors and violence erupted in the territories. In a foreshadowing of things to come, Israeli soldiers had fired on stone-throwing youth, and Jewish settlers joined in the violence as well.

Meanwhile, the PLO was housed in a sprawl of offices on the Beirut waterfront and was "developing many of the appurtenances of a governmental bureaucracy, complete with an army of sorts, a finance ministry, and departments to deal with Palestinian internal and external affairs. It built hospitals and paid pensions to the families of Palestinian martyrs."[64] However, the presence of quasi-state institutions within another state had a destabilizing impact on the Lebanese political situation. This instability was exacerbated by lack of real accountability and the degree to which the institutions were used as a basis for patronage. Brynen asserts that "overall, the strong neopatrimonial dynamic of Lebanese politics reinforced this tendency within the Palestinian movement."[65] Arafat always sought

with his decisions to encompass the widest spectrum of Palestinian views even if this demanded vagueness.[66] Furthermore, the imperatives of national unity and international recognition meant that rather than responding to the needs of specific sectors in society, the PLO leadership responded to the demands of political factions and international possibilities. The leadership did not see the movement in terms of a socially committed agenda. This political strategy was at once traditionalistic and borne of the current situation. It is within the bureaucratic inertia of the Fatah organization as it attempted to respond to or survive in changing circumstances that the beginnings of the bureaucratic factionalism can be effectively understood.[67] The different institutions and components of the Palestinian national movement, rather than being used as a springboard for becoming effective social institutions/(structures) became "political fronts."[68] These organizations were furthermore set up so as to be financially dependent on the central leadership of the PLO. The PLO had great problems transforming itself from an organ of political mobilization to a bureaucracy with the task of organizing the provision of basic services.

By 1978, Arafat had found himself in the position of being responsible for reining in unruly elements in Lebanon.[69] At the same time, Arafat's tendency to appoint cronies and loyalists to influential positions in spite of charges of cowardice and incompetence added to growing confusion in the ranks, and created conditions which greatly undermined the ability of the PLO to respond to grassroots concerns.[70] The crisis is illustrated by the leadership's response to the criticism of PLO dissident Abu Musa, who accused the Fatah leadership of turning the PLO into "a rotten bureaucracy dedicated only to self preservation." They tried to pay him off.[71] The impact of successive defeats in Jordan in the early 1970s, in Lebanon during the civil war of the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s, and finally with the Israeli siege of Beirut and in 1982 and the subsequent flight of the PLO headquarters to Tunis, was increased factionalism within Fatah. Factionalism also flourished because of the incentives and restraints posed by the (above mentioned) quota system of the PNC and its central committee. Moreover, these changes and upheavals, most notably the PLO expulsion from Lebanon, reduced and in some cases obliterated the PLO's access to the socio-political space upon which it had once relied as a basis for social mobilization. The result was a shrinkage or a contraction of the effective spatial political geography of the Palestinian movement without any corresponding reform in the PLO's bureaucratic structure. By the mid-1980s, the PLO's presence and prestige in Gaza was under serious challenge.

By involving itself in the increasing chaos and factionalism of Lebanese politics, and through being undermined by opportunism and cronyism in its own ranks, the PLO was increasingly distracted from its mission of engaging Israel through focused military

and diplomatic initiatives. Concurrently, corruption and incompetence in the ranks of the PLO's factionalized bureaucracy was undermining the effectiveness of the services which they had been providing in the diaspora communities, particularly in Lebanon.[72] Meanwhile, activists in the occupied territories were generally more realistic about the challenges posed by Israel, but the PLO's reliance on external sources of funding insulated the leadership from changes within the various Palestinian communities. The PLO's factional base beneath a highly centralized command structure encouraged bureaucratic and factional battles over access to increased representation and patronage rather than responses to popular concerns.[73] The PLO was increasingly operating outside any real societal formation. It was becoming a political movement with increasingly little to offer or show its constituency. While the PLO concentrated more on empty sloganeering and patronage, political awareness and politico-economic structure in Gaza was responding to the institutions and lack of institutions of occupation.

The organizations which the PLO created and nurtured in the diaspora were not necessarily compatible with those which were developing in the OT. Hilal has argued that while the PLO was an initiator of structures and institutions that were designed to recreate a Palestinian identity in exile, the PLO was forced to adopt a more reactionary mode toward building its relationships in the OT, grafting itself onto pre-existing structures and distorting the sectoral character of embryonic institutions in a society already susceptible to factionalism.[74]

Grassroots movements in Gaza: factionalism and patronage v. constituency

By the late 1970s, the context of the Camp David accords signaled to elements within the PLO, specifically the left wing factions, the need for a new resistance strategy in the OT. The left wing PLO affiliated organizations began to establish grassroots and professional voluntary organizations in the territories; this had the impact of drawing wider social strata actively into the Palestinian movement as the new structures began to attract cadres and local leaders from the working and lower middle classes as well as from rural areas. Women and students played an increasingly visible role, and the democratic competitiveness of these organizations encouraged close contacts with the popular bases that these groups claimed to represent.[75]

The Israelis placed various obstacles to the effective formation and functioning of various professional and sectoral associations as bases for mass mobilization;[76] still, representatives of the left wing factions ruled the day in organizational elections in the late seventies. The inability of these organizations to be used as a effective bases for social mobilization pushed activists toward use of the humanitarian Palestinian Red Crescent

Society as an organizational core. Work committees arose to try and compensate for the lack of public services, to disseminate information, to support for education and health care, to lending labor to families whose houses had been destroyed, to organize women groups and more.[77] The relative success of the left wing reflected the changing definition and imperatives of Gaza society in general after occupation. Gazan labor was "proletarianized" by contact with the Israeli economy, creating new socio-economic demands and perspectives. These trends also changed the composition of the nationalist movement in Gaza by providing a base for greater lower class and working class participation and advancement in the structure of the movement.[78] But the emergence of a class structure has been "complicated by conflicting forces:"[79]

> "The original residents of Gaza still dominate the area politically and economically and the bulk of the refugee population work as laborers alongside Jewish workers. These Gazan workers, because of their national struggle with Israel, do not feel a class alliance with the Israeli workers, yet they still remain excluded from the political stage in Gaza and exploited by the capitalists of Gaza. The issue of class is subordinated to the need for national unity and opposition to Zionism. Also, the primary loyalty tends to be to the family, which is the provider and protector, rather than to a class."[80]

While the reference to "the capitalists of Gaza" sounds a bit exaggerated, Cossali and Robson's statement bears some points worth noting when we try and understand the failure of the popular committees and grassroots organizations to develop into integrated self sustaining structures rather than politicized patronage networks.

The leftist factions began in the late seventies to pursue a strategy which saw social reform as a prerequisite to liberation. They promoted neighborhood organizations, women's groups, built the trade unions and encouraged a system of home production and other tactics of economic nationalism to break the economic grip of the occupation. Fatah, on the other hand, played a much more conservative role in lending the support of its resources to mobilization, preferring instead to concentrate on connecting itself to traditional elements of localized authority in the OT.

> "Throughout this period (up through the early to mid 1980s), Fatah, the hegemonic movement within the PLO, maintained an uncomfortable working relationship with the Jordanian regime in an attempt to retain some of its influence in the West Bank,"[81] a relationship that was formalized under the auspices of the Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Committee (PJJC) which oversaw Arab funding in the OT.

Contrary to the grassroots approach of the leftist factions, Fatah's initiatives through the PJJC were directed toward the conservative and more traditional institutions such as the charitable societies, universities and municipalities.[82] Brynen reports that:

"By some estimates, as much as a half a billion dollars was injected by the PLO into the territories between 1977 and 1985. Although much went to support needed infrastructure projects in areas such as housing, agriculture, and education, this period saw 'a sizable amount of handouts in the form of patronage money to nationalist institutions and personalities.' Fatah -- which had the greatest access to funds -- was the primary beneficiary of this, using it to counter the grass-roots organizational challenge posed by the left."[83]

Much of this support was imperative for the daily functioning in Gaza as,

"according to Israeli military law, municipal governments had no legislative authority to generate revenue. They could not introduce new taxes, fees or rates without approval of the authorities, which was sometimes given. Consequently, municipal governments depended heavily n donations for capital and development expenditure."[84]

However, it can be argued that PLO funding of the municipalities in Gaza during the 70s absolved the Israelis of their responsibility to provide basic services, and served to deflect the purposiveness and urgency of popular action. As Locke and Stewart noted in 1985:

"Many people in Gaza were angered by seeing PLO money absolving the Israelis of their responsibilities.... (Also,) there is concern that money coming from the outside leadership is being used to buy and reward political supporters in the occupied territories, and that it is difficult to make political decisions without approval from outside. The situation has resulted in political paralysis. There is a growing feeling in Gaza...that the relationship between the outside leadership and the Palestinians inside should be redefined to allow the latter a greater say in forging a strategy for opposition to Zionism."[85]

Hilal notes that while Israeli oppression played an important part in the breaking apart of the popular committees that had sprung up in the early 1980, internal factors played a crucial role as well.

"While competition among the PLO groups was an important factor in building grass roots organizations, the fact that this competition was confined to political issues and that social issues were relegated to marginal positions hindered the process of building national institutions capable of functioning independently of political groups. In the place of the popular committees, factional committees were instituted that lacked two of the former's novel and vital features: their openness, and their democratic structure. In other words, those at the center of the political system could not adjust to a democratic and organizational innovation as represented by the popular committees."[86]

Social issues were pushed to the side in favor of political issues, thus hindering the development of social structures independently capable of providing for social needs. Factional committees replaced the popular ones and undermine the openness and democratic character of the earlier structures. Much of the factional conflict of the 1980s could be viewed on right-left lines (see the case of the attack on Red Crescent Society below).

> "There is also a great deal of money which is being poured by Saudi Arabia into the hands of people who are also fighting the Left. They are trying to buy people in every way -- by providing jobs and work. Money makes alot of difference and they have money."[87]

It seems that Fatah did not openly come down on one side or the other, but through its tendency to view its own interests in terms of its factional control and its alliances with traditional elements in the OT, its role undermined the effectiveness and appeal of the popular organizations and promoted factionalism. One Gazan woman activist argues that Fatah supports "the negative, sexist elements in Palestinian society because it suits them. They don't want anything more than small changes."[88] Other activists have noted the shortcomings of the PLO's tendency to frame the Palestinian movement in terms of the leaders against the Israelis rather than the Palestinian people against the Israelis, attacking Arafat's tendency to "try and grab headlines and excite people without really trying to start a popular movement at the level of ordinary people."[89] When factional coping strategies played such a strong role in determining short term interests in Gaza, the lack of unity on the "outside" made it difficult to promote unity on the "inside."[90] In the final analysis, these trends may have deadened the potential for collective action which seemed so promising at the beginning of the intifada. Together with Israeli arrests and repression, such tendencies certainly neutralized any sincere efforts of left wing and progressive forces towards broad based collective institution building. Tamari sums up the shortcomings:

> "Two main institutional failures which can be mentioned here were the inability of the 'popular education committees' to create a sustained alternative network to formal schooling (schools had been closed by the Israeli authorities) and the failure of the 'agricultural committees' and the 'domestic production committees' to create the much heralded system of home production, based on cottage industries."[91]

Tamari also comments on the effect of the PLO's increasing concern with enforcing its control over the events of the uprising and turning the focus away from the activities in the territories and into the international diplomatic arena:

"It was the inability of the popular committees to create this alternative power base that was now seen as essence of crisis in the leadership of the uprising. In effect, the diplomatic initiatives of the PLO to enter into a negotiated territorial settlement were seen as the new alternative strategy which would circumvent, rather than supplement, the political gains of the uprising."[92]

Recent analyses taking into account the PA's struggle to consolidate and legitimize its new position and powers in Gaza during the intifada question further the real strength of these "embryonic" structures, particularly in light of their apparent failure to translate the various structures associated with the intifada into stable self rule structures/institutions.[93] This might be related to the fact that PLO affiliated structures were finally sustained more on external patronage designed to co-opt rather than on the articulation of a strategy to deal with the issues of economic hardship and human rights that initially fueled the uprising. According to Moustafa Barghouti, "many leaders haven't faced this crisis. They are stuck in the past with unrealistic solutions to the current crisis, and many people are just tired."[94] Today, the PA is preoccupied with security issues (largely its own security) and still has no real coherent program for reconstruction and development.[95] Hilal asserts that,

"the PLO could not, given its oversized bureaucracy, adjust itself easily and quickly to the shift in the OT. Its bureaucratic elite, as well as the leaderships of its constituent organizations, saw in the emerging political reality a threat to their command and their privileges."[96]

Seven years earlier, Cossali and Robson had noted that:

"Much of the dissatisfaction and occasional disillusionment expressed (toward) the leadership outside Palestine (i.e.: the PLO, which is usually referred to in the interviews as the 'outside leadership') centers on the widespread belief that money is being sent into Gaza in an irresponsible way."[97]

Frustration with the status quo has been left to smolder in the face of the limited scope within which opposition might articulate alternatives, find meaningful direction, or produce tangible results.

At the outset, most of the grassroots movements were cross factional and represented specific sectors or interests such as women's rights and student's organizations. Within a few years, however, these broader affiliations broke into factionally controlled groupings. Fatah, with its leadership in control of the PLO patronage purse-strings, played a leading role in this factionalization. While the factions did perform valuable functions, the leadership locally and in Tunis ultimately "saw these activities and services as a means to a political end...in retrospect, (it is clear that) many of the mass

based NGOs were predominantly used as a means of recruitment for a particular faction."[98] The result was that there was competition between organizations which undercut their expressed aims of general grassroots development in favor of factional mobilization. The responsiveness of a professional staff to an external bureaucracy rather than community support further undermined the community efficacy potentially manifested by these organizations. As Israeli repression increasingly restricted the effective spheres of operation for these groups in the late 1980s, the local community became even further detached from the nominally active NGOs and popular social groupings.

> "By 1991, many of these formerly popularly based grass roots initiatives had become professionally based, foreign funded development centers which targeted clients as opposed to working with a constituency."[99]

Israel's closure of Universities in the OT exacerbated the tendency by pushing academics into the restricted job market.[100] The large number of unemployed law Graduates may have played a role in swelling the ranks of the NGO community in Gaza as well.[101] The proliferation of NGOs which seemed to have little real purpose or effect in the community encouraged the public to take a skeptical stance toward the effectiveness of these organizations.

At the same time, foreign donors were demanding that funded projects have a cross factional base and be tied to activities with measurable outcomes -- i.e. not political mobilization -- and as local NGOs responded to the changing and often narrow priorities of donors, the effect was inconsistency and a distancing between organizations and any specific constituency within the community. With Oslo, many local NGOs in Gaza were existentially threatened as the funding priorities of donors shifted from the local NGOs to the PA. According to Sarah Roy:

> "The result has been a strong tendency among donors to fund mainstream Fatah institutions over institutional bodies affiliated with the political opposition and the nonaligned movement, these last categories including a large percentage of indigenous NGOs."

Roy argues that this raises a number of issues:

> "First, if political affiliation is a key criteria of assistance, then development per se is subordinated to using such assistance as a means of promoting a specific kind of political order; development is not necessarily precluded but democratic practice is. Second, the funding of a party's political, economic and social infrastructure *prior* to elections could predetermine future events in a way that not only favors the chosen party, but the political and economic interests of the donor governments themselves. Thus, the donors, intentionally or otherwise, are playing on the contradictions between political parties in the Gaza Strip, fanning existing tensions and

fueling the fragmentation process. Third, if opposition groups are excluded from the funding calculus, then a significant segment of the Palestinian population will be cut off from the development process."[102]

In fact, it appears that Arafat is struggling to control the funding process not to promote development, but to control the character of the consolidation of the current PA regime.

The privileged "inside space" of local elites and activists was thus threatened by the transition.[103] The NGOs responded collectively, asserting themselves as the agents on behalf of civil society presenting a check against any possible undemocratic tendencies within the PA.[104] As Hammami points out,

> "...despite the fact that the Palestinians in the OT had always asserted the unity of the 'inside' and 'outside' and had actively thwarted all attempts by Israel and the US to nurture an alternative local leadership, the NGOs had a long experience of the Tunis leadership's authoritarian nature and its fear of independent initiatives. The impending arrival of the PNA and the seeming scramble of donors to support and strengthen it was, then, viewed in by many NGOs with outright suspicion....(The PNA) seemed to assume that most NGOs were its former clients, or were, at least, former loyalists who, now that the revolution had come home, would either join the PNA or simply whither away. What is clear is that the leadership from Tunis had little grasp of, or loyalty to, a group of institutions whose history was completely foreign to its own..."[105]

Hammami argues furthermore that the inability of the NGOs to mobilize broad based constituencies to collectively address crucial social and economic issues highlights the failure of the Palestinian left to stand up realistically to the challenges potential dangers posed by the Oslo agreement. The external nature of almost all material support for such groups encouraged would be civil society groupings in search of funding to take politically correct stances rather than grounding themselves in their relations to the needs of the communities in which they operated. With the notable exception of Hamas later, civic organizations became institutions more engaged in the fight over limited external funds rather than seeking legitimacy within the population.

The aid dependency of the Palestinian autonomy may force groups in society to respond to changing themes and slogans in the international aid establishment rather than dealing directly with problems on the ground. This tendency has led George Abed to comment that donors seem to be distributing aid without recognizing many of the complexities in Palestinian society.[106] Rather than organize to respond to pressures felt in the streets, aid dependent "grassroots" organizations may arise articulating needs so as to appeal to external sources of funding. Aid based affiliations could contribute to the isolation of various groups in society and deflect pressures for accountability from the new

Palestinian regime. If such a pattern emerges, it could condition civil society in such a way that it does not systematically engage authority in a constructive and socially defining dialogue. On the other hand, Arafat has been competing to control virtually all of the donor funding coming into the autonomous areas in order that he might be able to manipulate the incentives they provide for compliance within particular social configurations. Many observers have noted the shortcomings of Arafat's management style in this regard,[107] and the NGO community in Gaza has vehemently protested new legal restrictions on NGO activity put in place by the PA.[108]

Fischer et al note a high degree of duplication and waste among NGOs in the OT during the latter stages of full fledged Israeli occupation. There are many grant dependent organizations, each struggling to find its own niche in the local society. They compete for limited external resources, and face a limited scope for community mobilization. The result has been the factionalization of aid organizations and even such other structures such as chambers of commerce etc.[109] The authors go on to describe the composition of aid into the OT as "unusual;" (42% went into the health sector, 18% into education, and the rest of about $200 million annually went into "other developmental objectives)."[110] Not surprisingly, the report concludes that the aid structure which arose under occupation might no be appropriate for self rule.[111]

From integration to fragmentation: The refocusing of nationalist institutions toward the OT

The intifada brought home to the PLO leadership just how divorced they had become from events on the ground and the realities of life in the occupied territories. Long preoccupied with their position in Lebanon and with intra-Arab politics, the organization had ignored the possibilities for mass organization in the territories.[112] Hilal observes that:

> "The intifada [had] a paradoxical impact on the PLO. On the one hand, it strengthened its standing and influence, and as such, was an essential factor in persuading Israel to come to terms with the PLO. On the other hand, the intifada exposed the inflexibility of the PLO's organizational structure and bureaucratic style of leadership, thereby encouraging the rise of new political formations outside it, in direct challenge to its leadership in the OT."[113] (I think this observation becomes clearer if "Fatah" is substituted for "PLO." -- CP)

The leadership "outside" sought to invest the sympathy gathered for Palestinian autonomy in world opinion by the events of the intifada into pressure for a negotiated settlement recognizing the PLO as a basis for self rule in the territories. The PLO declared Palestinian independence in November of 1988. This move created considerable

controversy within the territories about how to proceed with the uprising. The PLO leadership sought to enforce its "monological," factionalized and top down control over Palestinian political activity using the carrot and stick combination of patronage and threats. The intifada introduced a threat of transforming listeners into positive actors.[114] While the intifada widened the popular base of participation in political activity and decision making at the grassroots level in the OT, the shrinkage of the PLO base in the diaspora had transformed the PLO structures into political fronts with little independence or popular organizational base.[115] Acting self interestedly, the grassroots organizations and other political structures in the Gaza were willingly manipulated from above by both the PLO and the changing agendas of the international NGO community in general. The networks implied by factional lines within the PLO often competed for control of the popular organizations emerging during the occupation distracting them from their social goals with the introduction of factional rivalries.[116] What these rivalries did not destroy, Rabin's policy of an "Iron Fist" in response to the uprising largely did. The mass arrests of social activists severely undermined the organizational continuity of the local institutions and ironically -- from the Israeli point of view -- probably made them more prone to penetration of outside forces than they might have been if they had been allowed to nurture structures of local accountability.

As the intifada brought attention to and increased international sympathy with the Palestinian struggle for human rights, it also seemed to offer a chance revitalize the PLO and give it a new and more meaningful territorial base -- its potentially most meaningful territorial base -- in which to influence the course of the Palestinian movement. The Unified National Command of the Uprising (UNCU), comprised of the four main factions of the PLO together with the Islamic Jihad, used communiqués to direct the daily activities of the intifada through a network of popular committees, strike committees, neighborhood committees, and merchant committees.[117] The withdrawal of financial assistance from the Gulf States in the summer of 1990 perhaps increased pressure on the bureaucratic survival instincts of the PLO, and the leadership, realizing its dependence on the legitimizing features of all the bureaucratic inertia and patronage, sought to find itself a new basis and paradigm within which to secure its external funding and its pre-eminence in defining the boundaries of the national struggle.[118] Between 1991 and 1996, there have been few convenings of the consultative national councils and committees as called for by the PLO charter, and Arafat has increasingly monopolized his control over the purse-strings of the movement and alienated in particular many of the leftist factions within the PLO -- the very factions which traditionally had the deepest roots in the OT. "The problem of who exercises authority and how has become particularly acute with the refusal of the majority

of the Palestinian political groups to take part in the PNA."[119] The PLO is charged with the double function of building viable state structures in the OT while at the same time representing the "unity, interests and aspirations of the Palestinians, as a people, in all their communities and gatherings."[120] While the PLO in 1991 was perhaps more visible in the OT than it had ever been, the local rank and file of the various factions held only tenuous links to their respective leaderships, a fact shown in the disillusionment of many younger activists since the encroaching of diaspora institutions and imperatives into the local scene.

The major redirection of PLO activity from the diaspora to the OT came after 1990.[121] Whether out of disillusionment with the squabbles which had been exacerbated as PLO factionalism had gradually succumbed to self interest and the maneuverings of different external patrons, or out of a positive attempt to revive the social base of the nationalist movement, Arafat turned his attention increasingly toward the Occupied Territories, charging one of the most widely respected Fatah leaders, Abu Jihad, with the task of organizing a Fatah base of participation and leadership within the intifada. "Wazir's word [was] law in the 400 towns, villages and hamlets in the OT. The people of the OT have very quickly transformed into a flexible mass movement with popular committees which could withstand arrests, pressure, etc." The PLO patronized student organizations and openly encouraged people under their umbrella, seeking to "provide infrastructure for the Palestinian movement at all levels." As Faisal Husseini noted, the Israelis were more afraid of peaceful demonstrations than they were of violent acts.[122] Fatah made a comeback in Gaza during the uprising, recruiting in particular economically and socially frustrated young males. The massive defection of these young activists and militants from the Fatah ranks since the autonomy suggest that while Fatah was able to mobilize through its patronage and mystique, they were not able to or willing to create self sustainable grassroots structures. In fact, many of these younger activists were stricken from Fatah preliminary election lists in favor of Arafat cronies in spite of overwhelming local support.[123] According to one local candidate, "The Fatah independents yearn for democracy more than the official Fatah candidates. If we win, it is a sign that we are the real Fatah representatives."[124]

Ultimately, however, PLO institutions fell victim to their own bulk. The PLO has its roots in constituencies which for the near term seem bypassed by current negotiations and in a era of Nationalist inspired Arab activism with which the leadership has severed its ties. According to Hilal,

> "An inertia ridden system is seen as having lost its dynamism. Criticism is leveled against the omniscient attitude of the organization's leadership, the personality cult, and the modes of conduct and styles of work these aspects

encouraged. Organizations are criticized for showing little or no interest in democratic practice, for turning a blind eye to public corruption, and for practicing favoritism, patronage, demagoguery, elitism and so on. Much has been said of the need to rid the intifada of unpopular and gangster like practices that have attached themselves to it through factionalism and unprincipled conduct. Yet little is done by the political organizations to stop such practices."[125]

By 1991, thoughtful commentators expressed open concern about the weak and increasingly irrelevant role of the PLO on Palestinian life. Hilal notes PLO ineffectualness and mentions the overall decline of support for the PLO in the period leading up to the Oslo agreement.[126] The fallout of the Gulf War had further exposed the PLO's dependence on external funding to keep its political front united. The loss of funds from the Gulf States "undermined (the PLO's) ability to function effectively...its position to defend Palestinian interests and perform 'government tasks' was considerably weakened."[127] Furthermore, Adoni argues that the assassinations of Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad proved "the extent to which the PLO in its present form depends on 'historic symbols' rather than institutions" to project identification and legitimacy with the PLO in the OT.[128] As late as June 1991, as many as 60% of the population of the West Bank favored a confederation with Jordan, perhaps reflecting doubts over the real governing potential of PLO institutions.[129] This situation might be connected with issues raised by leaflets and memoranda circulated in July and August of 1991 which accused the PLO of "corruption and inefficiency and personal aggrandizement at the expense of institutions."[130]

At the same time, however, centralizing tendencies within Fatah could be discerned as it sought ways of entrenching itself further in the OT, and by using the alternate "Oslo channel," assumed a pre-eminent role in the peace negotiations at the expense of many local leaders. Factional violence in June of 1992 may have been in response to the increasingly urgent scramble for influence.

"Members of the Palestinian People's Party (formerly the communists) led calls for the concentration of power in the OT. Concerns that this would lead to an alternative leadership were dismissed out of hand on the grounds that the alternative leadership slogan is an Israeli invention that had been seized upon as an excuse for not giving the occupied territories leadership its appropriate weight in Palestinian decision making."[131]

Kuttab documents the high-handedness of PLO leaders in their relationships with the non-PLO negotiators (mostly local leaders and activists).[132] At one point in the tenth round of the Madrid negotiations, the PLO insisted that the "inside" leaders who represented the PLO by proxy at the negotiations respond to a U.S. proposal which

insisted that any interim self-governing authority's jurisdiction cover "functional areas" rather than territory.[133] These "insiders" were outraged:

> "(Palestinian People's Party representative) Ghassan al-Khatib refused to attend the meeting with the U.S. official, noting that the PLO statement had been sprung on the delegation at the last minute and not even discussed....In an open letter to the Jerusalem daily *al-Quds* on 10 July (1992), Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi noted that, while he was not opposed to Chairman Arafat as the head of the collective leadership, he strongly believed that decisions should be made in a more collective and democratic fashion. And Hanan Ashrawi, generally supportive of the PLO position, stated that members of the delegation had a right to participate in the decision making process.
>
> Little information has been available to the Palestinians in the occupied territories as to the reasons for the PLO leadership's about faces, as when Tunis strongly denounces certain positions only to accept later the very positions it had publicly opposed. A number of explanatory hypothesis have been offered by analysts and even members of the delegation, including: U.S. pressure on the PLO via Arab countries, especially Egypt; the continuing delay in the Gulf countries' release of funds to the PLO; fear of Israeli assassination attempts on top PLO leaders if they refuse to soften their positions; and promises of PLO-Israeli meetings.[134]

Still, however, most people in the OT were willing to take the position that the PLO -- rotten though it might be -- was still the political leadership and the only party capable of representing collective Palestinian interests in negotiations. From some perspectives, it seemed that it was the PLO's willingness to "sell out" that encouraged Israel's sudden acceptance of the PLO as a negotiating partner.[135]

Graham Usher's observations on developments within the Palestinian Trade Union movement in recent years provide an interesting case study of the inside outside conflict in practice. The labor union movement in the OT -- eventually organized under the umbrella of the Palestinian General Trade Union Federation (GTUF) -- was organized according to faction rather than sector or district. This reflected the movements general attachment to outside sources of patronage rather than any specific internal contingency. Furthermore, "the GTUF has no definition of a member, no membership records, and no occupational base"[136] -- hardly conditions conducive to internal accountability. According to Moustafa Barghouti, "the union movement regressed because none of its leaders were even interested in their own union's constituency."[137] Such an observation would seem to justify Tamiri's concern for the superficial character of many of the supposed civil society structures that were supposed to inform the transition and guard against the repressiveness of the new institutions.

The signing of the Oslo accords presented the problem of superimposing the bureaucracy entrusted with representing Palestinian labor under the umbrella of the nationalist movement generally with the structures which supposedly represented labor interests in the OT. According to Usher,

> "there was the problem of amalgamating the GTUF with its counterpart in Tunis, the PLO's General Union of Palestinian workers (GUPW). For the GUPW's general secretary Haidar Ibrahim, Oslo necessitated the fusion of the two wings of Palestinian trade unionism. His notion of fusion, however, looks like a takeover. Of the GUPW's 19-seat executive, he allocated only two places for representatives from the occupied territories: one for Gaza's GTUF General Secretary Rasem Bayari and the other for West Bank General Secretary Shaher Said. Palestinian unions 'inside' flatly refused the deal. The Inter-national Labor Organization (ILO) insisted that it could only deal with 'elected' representatives from the territories, not appointees from Tunis. The result is an ongoing turf war between the 'outside' and the 'inside.'"[138]

As chairman of the PLO, Arafat has always sought to ensure that various players close to the PLO inner circle who felt themselves to be important, (and who did command some kind of constituency), were kept happy; and he often acted as a sponge for their complaints and dished out titles, entitlements and responsibilities to keep various diaspora elites mindful of the benefits of maintaining a front of unity under his authority.[139] In many respects, Arafat's inability to deal directly with the challenges confronting the population of the OT have led him into playing the old political games of finding connections between diaspora and local factional structures. The result is that

> "so far, the pattern of appointments from Tunis has not emphasized people who were at the forefront of resistance. Instead, you have people with significant economic or social weight -- old families, people with some commercial ties to the Israelis...Arafat feels the need to pay people off and feel that he is in control...he needs the support of people with clout...but more than a year or two and we're lost."[140]

Resentment is building as diaspora structures that are unresponsive to local concerns and sensibilities are imposed on the local scene.

PLO institutions were in obvious need of reform if they were to face the socio-economic contingencies of the OT. The very charter and fundamental ideology of the PLO -- the glue which pasted together a national identity in resistance -- was threatened by the new situation. In spite of the limitations of the agreement it signed in Oslo, the promises made by Fatah elites upon their arrival in Gaza show that they realized that their legitimacy was at least in part based on their ability to deliver economic improvements. However, evidence was now mounting that in the OT, and particularly in Gaza, identification with the

broad PLO cause, as well as some of its "heroic" figures, was always been stronger than faith in its institutions.[141] This lack of faith may be proving justified.

In this context, the PLO was threatened with increasing marginalization from the Palestinian public space and less material relevance in the lives of Palestinians.[142] At the time of the signing of the Oslo accords, the PLO was in the worst position financially and politically that it had ever been. One observer concludes that:

> "Israel rescued the PLO, gave it a *raison d'être*. After the Gulf war, the destiny of the PLO had appeared clear. It was a disintegrating bureaucracy in Tunis without money. Its only aim was survival, and its only claim was that it represented Palestinians...Israel's recognition re-conferred on the PLO the international status it had steadily lost since 1982 and particularly after the Gulf war."[143]

The PLO and many of the Palestinian national institutions at the time of the signing of the agreement were, according to Hilal, self interested factional bureaucracies resistant to reform and democratic initiatives.[144] While the PLO had changed its strategy, its institutions and structures were not reformed. Indeed the factionalism and bureaucratic structure of the PLO institutions had a very negative effect on the popular resistance councils of the intifada, onto which the PLO tried to graft its own structure and agenda. In the diaspora, the PLO had a history of initiating national institutions that collapsed as the organization was forced from areas in which it had previously operated freely (Lebanon after 1982, Jordan after 1970, 1971, the gulf after the second Gulf War). In the OT, on the other hand, an emergent base of civil society and new forms of local social integration began to emerge during the intifada. Resistance gained its special character from the common idea of actively resisting Israeli occupation and countering the structures and the limitations imposed by the occupation with alternative networks and possibilities.[145] The occupation strengthened some social identity bonds (bonds that in isolation were perhaps relatively easy targets for factional co-optation), but it also provided a model that was undemocratic, unstable and autocratic while encouraging anti-authority attitudes among the population. This general suspicion and hostility to existing expressions of authority would seem to reinforce inward looking guidelines for obligation and justification -- i.e. perspectives which reinforce localism and factionalism.

Political Islam in Gaza: An Alternative Basis of Civil Society in Gaza?

Perhaps the grassroots trend that would come to have the most profound impact on civil society in Gaza rose to prominence in 1988 bearing the banner of political Islam. Indeed, the rise of Islamism in Gaza can be seen in direct relation to frustration with the

ineffectualness of the nationalist elites at addressing issues of fundamental concern to the population of the territory. In the late 1970s, creeping disillusionment with the diaspora nationalist elites began to affect the population of the territories, leaving them amenable to ideological and strategic alternatives. Islamic revolution in Iran captured the popular imagination and while the Israelis were focusing on repressing the nationalist movements, the Islamists who at the time were not involved in active resistance were allowed to build their organizations.[146]

In a tactic akin to divide and rule, the Israelis had nurtured the Islamists as a counter to nationalist institutions and thus blunt the effectiveness of PLO related organizations in Gaza. After leftist successes in organizational elections in the late 1970, the "Israelis, Gazan rightists and the Muslim Brotherhood set about its destruction....In 1980, a mob marched from the Islamic University to the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (which, as a stronghold of the leftists, had been successful in organizing a variety of activities and mobilizing grassroots support) and set fire to the building" as Israeli troops stood by and watched.[147] The PLO suffered from repression at the hands of the Israelis while the Brotherhood was laying back and not taking an active role in resistance activities.[148]

> "PLO groups believe, and openly argue, that the Israeli authorities opened the door for the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood...so that they could compete with, oppose and undermine the PLO. Certain nationalist circles go so far as to claim that Ahmad Yassin, the leader of the Islamic Center in the Gaza Strip, swore on the Koran, before the Israeli investigators, that weapons seized in his possession in 1984 were meant to be used against the leftist factions."[149]

This legacy has meant that nationalist and Islamic trends continue to view each other with suspicion. Each accuses the other of working on behalf of Gulf regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood emphasizes the failures of the nationalists, and PLO will occasionally accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of collaboration with the occupation by attempting to divide and undermine nationalize unity. The Muslim Brotherhood view the PLO as the construction of failed, corrupt, illegitimate and morally bankrupt Arab regimes who created the PLO for its own manipulative purposes. The Muslim Brotherhood also attacks the PLO connections with liberal Israelis and outside powers (ironic given Hamas' pragmatic alliances with the secular nationalist opposition -- while the Brotherhood denounces all contact with the Israelis and the West, records exist showing that they have in fact at various times had such contacts).[150]

The PLO and the Muslim Brotherhood compete with each other in terms of taking credit for accomplishments and in uncovering contradictions between words and deeds. They each try to be seen as legitimate heirs to historical movements and figures.[151] Violent

factional clashes have occurred at the Universities, including competition for control of the agendas of the Islamic University in Gaza.[152] Clashes have not only been between the Islamic groups and Fatah, but also between some of the Islamic groups themselves.[153] The Islamic tendencies have in turn been affected by PLO/PA attempts at divide and control. "The PLO leaders made persistent attempts to co-opt the Islamic movement in the OT through coordination and offers of support."[154] Sometimes even at the expense of their own (notably the local) candidates. At present, the combination of repression and co-optation at the hands of the PA has blunted the effectiveness of independent Islamist social mobilization in Gaza as an alternative to PA authority. Using the resources of its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas began to develop real linkages in society during the intifada, largely unharrassed by the Israelis in the beginning as they were seen as a way of undermining the PLO's ability to establish a foothold in Gaza through the organization of Intifada activities. Also, Israeli authorities banned most political books and allowed only religious literature in the prisons,[155] which have been referred to as the "Palestinian Universities."[156] The appeal of Hamas lay in its militant and essentially nationalist stance at a time when the old nationalist institutions seemed increasingly inaccessible and/or irrelevant to many activists. Its access to external sources of patronage offered opportunities for professional activism at a time of increasing unemployment.

"Egyptian Islamic writer Dr. Hilmi Muhammad Qa'ud attributes the outbreak of the intifada to the disappointment of the Palestinian people in their outside organizations, after they had been disappointed in an effective support from other Arab nations."[157] The origins of the tilt in the balance of power in Gaza that has ended up making the Islamist an important political and social force can be found in both local and regional political factors. The most important of these factors include the PLO expulsions from Jordan and Lebanon that weakened the movement and highlighted internal problems such as emerging factionalism. These events brought into question the PLO's conduct, its efficacy, the quality of its leadership, and the soundness of its strategy, its tactics and its political program as a whole. The change in PLO strategy included more limited and short term goals. These often undercut the more sweeping rhetoric of liberation and triumph which had characterized its earlier discourse. Institutions as well as leaders were negatively affected in the minds of the masses. "The PLO seemed to be going nowhere," and the boundaries of its bureaucratic factionalism seemed to be "finalized."[158] Many younger potential activists sought alternatives in the Islamist movement. In turn, Hamas created an "active discrepancy" between old and young within the Muslim Brotherhood.[159]

Just prior to the outbreak of the intifada in 1987, support for the PLO had reached its lowest ebb.

"Apart from their growing alarm at the PLO's increasingly obvious military weakness, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were further alienated by the PLO's persistent attempts to bypass them politically and to abort what ever national gains they had made over the previous twenty years."[160]

Hamas, formed as an activist front for the Muslim Brotherhood in the early stages of the intifada, was the only Islamic movement to combine the activities of resistance with the building of a structurally significant social base. It drew its initial support from those who saw in the PLO's secularism the same rank materialism which they analyzed as the cause of much of the corruption and arrogance of regimes elsewhere in the Arab World. Hamas benefited from the social links and material resources of the Muslim Brotherhood. This infrastructure included(s) schools, universities and other social services networks as well as waqf resources.[161]

Where other Islamist groups proved dogmatic in their approach to using Islam as a tool and vision for political and social change, Hamas has been dynamic and active in the community in a variety of ways and in response to perceived needs of the population. They were "there", active in Gaza, when the PLO leaders in exile were not. Hamas, in spite of its being an organization containing many personalities and sometimes tensions, seems to have always perceived itself as a party which sought to compete politically for primacy in Palestinian internal politics. Al-Jarbawi writes,

"by means of this far reaching network in Palestinian society, many developing segments of that society grew into relationships of dependence upon Hamas. In turn, this was transformed by Hamas into a means for political mobilization...In open contrast to the excellent performance and clean reputation enjoyed by the organizational network connected to Hamas, the factionalized organizational structure of national powers within the occupied territories suffers from a poor record of performance and an even worse record for corruption, nepotism and political patronage".[162]

Abu-Amr adds:

"Hamas's rejection of the PLO's political platform and its call for the establishment of an Islamic society in Palestine and for the establishment of an Islamic leadership to spearhead the popular struggle are all manifestations of its rivalry with the PLO for leadership."[163]

Just as importantly, Hamas proved its ability to work with political and social delicacy under the "umbrella of what became known as 'national unity'." This was very important in a political arena which, with the relative demise of the PLO during the 80's, was fraught with differences.[164] It managed to achieve a structural base for legitimacy in

spite of its open rivalry with the PLO.[165] While many Fatah activities were militant in thrust, other Hamas activities were seen as responding to people's needs. While Hamas organized computer camps, Fatah organized camps where they dressed up boys in uniforms and marched them around a field.[166] The Muslim Brotherhood accuses the PLO of only wanting power for itself rather than in the interests of all the community -- "You should be the first to sacrifice if the goal was the liberation of your country and your people. But if their goal is to seize power, then there is no blame on you for not sacrificing yourself."[167] The leadership and organization of Hamas, while growing and becoming compartmentalized, is still small and unbureaucratic in relation to the PLO. The overall leadership is entrusted to consultative councils.[168] However, Hamas has repeatedly been plagued by losses in its ranks through deportations and imprisonment. The mass deportations left the OT seemingly bereft of major leaders. Abu-Amr argues that the arrests and deportations only open the door for more militant younger leaders who are less interested in social concerns.[169]

Sara Roy describes conditions at the outset of the autonomy which did nothing to endear Gaza's population to the new order.[170] She describes the PLO based leadership as being unable to deliver on its promises, as alienating the local population by placing unpopular and corrupt figures into the positions of power in spite of popular protest, Arafat has been seen as trying to break up the local Fatah structure in order to entrench his own individuals, Arafat's dependency on Israel and his own institutional interests encourage him to crack down on Hamas and other groups who enjoy grassroots support, not least b/c they have managed to set up institutions to care for basic needs, while the Fatah Hawk "gangs" are allowed to prey on citizens and opposition groups at will. At the same time they take advantage of the situation of chaos to use their access to coercive force to promote their personal interest in often criminal ways. The mediatory structure of Fateh institutions has broken down and it seems that it lacks the organizational discipline, incentives and will to pursue the objective of social order. Hamas is the only group judged as striving to provide for community needs and gains popular support accordingly. Basic survival needs have taken precident over any political or intellectual agenda, and the lack of order has even made many Gazans nostalgic for the pre-Intifada period.

> "Fateh, which is still the largest faction in the Gaza Strip, is increasingly seen as a reactonary force promoting social discord, not harmony....Feelings of Irreversibility have left the Population defeated, vulnerable and fearful."[171]

One of the conclusions of this article seems to be that the people of Gaza are at this point willing to support any regime which provides for jobs, security and social predictability.

Ideology is less important than the possibility to live a stable normal life, and the possibility to fulfil the promise of one's talents.[172] Furthermore, as of spring 1994, Israeli military prescence in Gaza was stronger than ever, giving a strong impression of Arafat collaboration with Israel.

Perhaps a high point in Hamas's visibility came after Israel deported 415 alleged Islamists at the turn of the year 1992-1993, depositing them in Southern Lebanon after a Hamas campaign in December had killed six Israeli soldiers. This was also the time when the Labor leadership began to openly advocate a policy of withdrawal from Gaza. In Shimon Perez's words, it was time to get "Gaza out of Tel-Aviv."[173]

"Hamas' rejection of the PLO political platform and its call for the establishment of an Islamic society in Palestine and for the establishment of an Islamic leadership to spearhead the popular struggle are all manifestations of its rivalry with the PLO for leadership."[174] It has also benefited from being able to act as the opposition, a situation which for awhile even allowed them to ally with Christian secular nationalist George Habbash.[175] Iyad Barghouti argues that Hamas finds its support more as a "nationalist alternative" than as an Islamic movement... Hamas is popular among young more because of disillusionment with nationalist generation than religious conviction.[176] In fact, Hamas's formal enlistment in the secular leftist based Palestinian Forces Alliance in January 1994 underlines the pragmatic political ambitions of at least one important part of its leadership. "Following their participation in the intifada, the Muslim Brotherhood began to realize that actual involvement in politics requires more than romantic stands."[177] Still, however, Hamas has not had to make difficult decisions or concessions, and was able to pick up the militant slogans of the PLO at a time when the nationalists were abandoning them -- a moment which also coincided with increasing disillusionment and economic hardship.[178]

While coercive measures against the Islamist groupings have left them down for now, they are certainly not out, and Arafat's "good cop, bad cop" attempts at co-opting them into the pro-Oslo camp have only been marginally successful.

> "Arafat cannot, as he can with the PLO opposition, keep the Islamists in line with his enormous powers of financial and political patronage, for the Islamists are not and never have been financially dependent on him. Hamas in particular represents a mass, indigenous, and authentic political constituency in the occupied territories by virtue of having its own finances, structures, organization, and, above all, ideology. It is because Hamas represents a genuinely independent force outside the PA's sway that it is perceived as the main internal threat, the most difficult of all Arafat's internal and external oppositions to 'tame.'"[179]

Ajami notes of the Arab Nationalist elites of the fifties and sixties that "the case they had made against the ancient regime was the standard case made by broadly middle-class nationalists against older, more narrowly based political regimes: that they were embarrassingly weak and compromised, prone to collaboration, disconnected from the aspiring social classes, and easily torn to shreds by outsiders. Today in Gaza, a variety of identities and affiliations of resistance are being mobilized, often in traditionalistic rhetoric (the traditions of culture and traditions of fifty years of resistance) as the claims of a proletarian, agrarian, superfluous mix of the population. There are similar claims being made against the new elites in Gaza. But the poorest in Gaza, those who are most threatened by the changing order, have little more with which to fight than their numbers, words and the identities which symbolize, nominalize or somehow make the features which characterize their existence visible and somehow politically recognizable, meaningful, and influential. Those who have few other options will often more easily accept the myths which promise to lift them from alienation and insignificance because it is the only choice; and in the absence of meaningful political choices, the call for authenticity, for loyalty to the perceived limitations and dictates of tradition, becomes an ever more potent force in political society. As it did throughout the occupation, society continues to improvise on traditions as a mode of resistance. Traditions are also inevitably used as modes for the disguise of power. As authority is in the process of reconstitution, tensions inevitably arise as symbols are squeezed for interpretations of structural realities and structuaral reality is squeezed to conform to the imagined significance of symbols.

Abu-Amr notes that the transitional objective of Hamas is ending the occupation and the strategic objective is that of establishing an Islamic state in Palestine.[180] As of 1993, Hamas began paying less attention to the enforcement of social codes and more to attacks on the Israeli Army. This probably reflects Hamas's success in attracting militant defectors from the mainstream nationalist movements and the context of acute economic hardship which made focus on the veil as an alternative to Arafat's Khafiyya as a symbol of the identity of resistance seem less immediately relevant.

Conclusion

This chapter has described some conditions conducive to factionalism and suggested that factionalism represents a strategy of political control that seeks to by-pass issues of development and social welfare. This failure is due either to the inability of elites (the regime lacks the power or competence to mobilize society on those lines), or their unwillingness (the regime does not see such developments as in its interests). On the other

hand, we have seen how Gaza's historical social fragmentation greatly complicates the task national reconstruction. Gaza society has been conditioned to respond to factional incentives as part of broader coping strategies in an environment which lacked political accountability. Fatah (now PA) elites have always utilized the PLO's factional base to ensure their control of the resources of the national movement. This has at times led them to subvert the potential for sustained local social mobilization. Presently, shortcomings in the real power of the PA are leaving the PA to resort to factional mechanisms of control during the transition period. As suggested below, the traditional clan based social structures seem to be informing the new bases of factionalism in Gaza. However, more research is needed to understand exactly how these relationships are working; i.e. how the social structures are connected to the quasi-institutions of autonomy and exactly how patronage flows are (re-)shaping social structures in the autonomy.

"The decline of armed struggle as a legitimizing source of authority for the PLO, originally an allure of resistance groups, has called for new forms of legitimacy."[181] However, as noted before, factioanlism does not base sustain itself on any institutionalized dynamic of legitimacy, but rather represents a strategy designed to control (and manipulate society based on that control) and/or procure (depending on ones position in the factional hierarchy) immediate basic needs. Given that it operates in an environment of economic hardship and unsustainability, it epitomizes relations of external dependency. It is therefore not accountable to its own internal dynamic and must be viewed suspiciously from the perspective of the political economy of meaning. Edward Said has made an observation that is worth bearing in mind.

> "To become a nation in the formal sense of the word, a people must make itself into something more than a collection of tribes or political organizations of the kind that, since the 1967 war, Palestinians have created and supported."[182]

The Fatah leadership has perhaps misunderstood the social basis for mass action in the territories. Or perhaps it refuses to acknowledge any alternative based on a local social agenda as that might present a challenge to the maintenance of a non-ideological consensus which has always rationalized Fatah's pre-eminence in Palestinian politics. The PLO has weakened its claim to represent the diaspora community and its mirror image -- the PA -- has yet to figure out how to create social cohesion in support of its authority in conditions of economic hardship now that the strategic anchor of nationalist resistance is all but traded away. If the new bases of factionalism in Gaza were indeed to consolidate and offer sustainable solidarity bonds, economic security, and trust in the relationship between authority and society, then we could perhaps identify within this a political economy of

meaning. However, resistance to and inconsistency within the autonomy indicate that this is not the case. Furthermore, the dependency of the PA on external funding and goodwill to sustain itself mean that the ultimate sources of the power that might hold such a socially fragmented autonomy are located external to the society itself. While no state society relationship exists in a vacuum, the degree of dependency here given the lack of PA power and the imbalance of power between the PLO and Israel is extreme. The particular institutions and boundaries of autonomy are diplomatic creations rather than a local expressions of political will.

The PLO/PA is torn between the old imperatives of maintaining nationalist unity and the need to address the concerns of those they suddenly govern. The dimensions of the territorial and social bases of Fatah are in a state of transitional disequilibrium, and leaders lack the scope of power and patronage to service both concerns at once. The division has also been made apparent in elections within the organization. In many cases, Arafat has simply voided election results which did not conform to his liking and replaced local Fatah activists who were elected in the local party structure with his cronies or with individuals he felt were better placed to maintain the types of connections that would allow Fatah to maintain its position as a nationalist front.[183] In spite of the grassroots rhetoric, this shows up Arafat's basically elitist conception of the movement.

At present, there are internal divisions as to whether Fatah should continue to operate as a front for national unity or as a traditional political party. In practice, the division runs along the line of the diaspora Fatah elites who seem intent on maintaining the broad front at the expense of articulating a clear socio-economic and developmental strategy for the OT, and younger local activists many of whom gained local visibility and respect during the intifada. The conflict between the two groups is generational and geographic: between one group who feels accountable within the traditional diaspora structures of the PLO and feels more personally the external pressures and constraints of the agreement itself; and the younger local group who is aware of the urgency of the economic crisis and who feel more immediately the need to represent and articulate the interests of locals, and especially of younger males who are the hardest hit by the economic crisis. The Fatah elites have imposed the structure and rationale of the diaspora nationalist movements onto a weak and fragmented civil society in Gaza. This is evident within the chaotic trade union structure, the disregard for local preferences as expressed in organizational elections in the OT, and in the appointment of perceived "corrupt and incompetent collaborators" to high positions within the new PA.

Many observers tended either to romanticize the structural character of Palestinian unity and national identity or deny it all together.[184] Both studies of the PLO institutions and emerging civil society structures in Gaza (particularly those with reference to the popular organizations) were prone to this tendency. A more sober analysis of the conditions informing identification with the specific bearers of the "national cause" offers some concrete structural and psycho-social reasons for challenges to identification when it actually comes to governing. Just as an awareness of historical factors in one context encouraged identification with the broad national movement, the new conditions created by more clearly defined space and responsibilities tend to heighten awareness of contradictions in the PA's expression and use of authority in Gaza. For instance, as a diaspora organization largely accountable to other Arab states for its funding, the PLO had few solid linkages and contacts with leaders or groups within the occupied territories but nonetheless long retained emotionally rooted prestige and legitimacy. However, the distinction between the demands of the nationalist movement and those of practical governance have proven difficult to cover up in practice. Governing, even in a limited way, largely involves determining who gets what, when and how.

As memory of the initial flurry of activity which sparked the instability of rebellion fades, and the commitment to the original principles are forgotten, activism has tended to turn to opportunistic efforts to manipulate a baser version of what the logic of resistance promised to all. By the last years of the intifada, the civil society structures which seemed to have such promise in the earlier stages of the uprising had turned to competition over the creation and capture of constituencies, many of which were responding to signals from above rather than reflecting social realities from below. This chapter has suggested that the fundamental conditions upon which neo-patriarchy and factionalism have rested were not transcended by the intifada, as many optimistic analyses of "a new, modern leadership" seemed to argue, but have persisted and been reconsolidated within the limited scope of self rule. Now once again people and power in Gaza are resorting to factionalism and listless acquiescence to cope in a changing order. Social formations have emerged to fight over the trickle of funds coming into the territory -- fighting over "what is left of society rather than trying to build it."[185]

---

[1] For interesting overviews of the circumstances and background of the refugee problem see for example, Childers, Erskin "The Wordless Wish"; Morris, Benny The Birth of the Arab Refugee Crisis.

[2] See for example Roy, Sara. The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development, Washington D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1995 p. 79.

[3] Muslih, Mohammad. "Palestinian Civil Society" in Schwedler, Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?, pp. 65, 66. (*emphasis added*)

[4] Sharabi, H. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, pp. 28-29. (*emphasis added*)

[5] The non-productive character of social competition distinguishes factional bickering from the positive sides of social competition which have been outlined by for example Georg Simmel.

[6] Hilal "PLO institutions: The Challenge Ahead", The Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), p. 54.

[7] ibid.

[8] Hilal, Jamil. "The PLO: Crisis in Legitimacy" The Journal of Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 October-December 1995, p. 9. The dynamic by which Fatah manipulated this situation is described on p. 14 below (quoted also from HIlal).

[9] Hilal (1993), p. 55.

[10] Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization of Bi-nationalism? An interview with Azmi Bishara" The Journal of Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 October-December 1995, p. 45-46.

[11] ibid, p. 46.

[12] Roy, Sara. "The Seeds of Chaos; and of Night: Gaza Since the Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies. XXIII, no. 3 (Spring 1994). p. 89. (Factions in the second sentence should be taken to refer to the traditional PLO factions.)

[13] El-Musa, Sherif and Linda Butler. "Moving beyond Oslo: An Interview with Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi" Journal of Palestine Studies. XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), p. 83.

[14] Roy, Sarah. "Civil Society in the Gaza Strip" in Schwedler, Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?, p. 68. It is important to note as well that the refugees are the class that had the most to lose from the agreement and were thus most likely to reject it out of hand. Arafat was thus forced to offer them concessions and positions in order to attach their interests increasingly to the agreement itself. Also, later on the same page, Roy notes that refugees have been given key positions in the PA. This contradicts what another sourse said regarding the fact that no one who had grown up in a refugee camp was now in any position of real authority within the PA. Need to check this potential contradiction or misunderstanding... perhaps Roy is refering to diaspora refugees, but if so, what influence do they have on the ground among the refugee population in Gaza? If she is referring to Gaza refugees, who are they and how are they able to link the interests ofthe PA to those of the refugee in the street so to speak. Roy does not explain how the appontment of a few figures is able to satisfy the claims and needs of over 600,000 refugees in the Gaza Strip.

[15] Nakleh, "Anthropological and Sociological Studies of Arabs in Israel: A Critique" Journal of Palestine Studies VI, no. 4 (Summer 1977, pp. 41-70), p. 52.

[16] Shirabi, H. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distrorted Change in Arab Society. p. 31.

[17] Eikelman (book), p. 155.

[18] Nakleh. "Studies of Arabs in Israel", p. 53.

[19] Eikelman (book), p. 156. Bourdieu "argues that anthropologists easily forget that geneologies are the product of multiple strategies and thus treat the meaning of kinship relations as a resolved question. Instead, anthropologists should seek to specify the types of situations in which the use of geneologies and relationships defined by them are particularly dominant...individuals who have something to gain by imposing hteir interpretation of geneologies upon the social order will strive to do so." ibid, p. 178. This might describe some of the maleability of even some of the more rigid features of factionalism for those trying to adapt (adapt to) the system from below.

[20] Cossali and Robson. Stateless in Gaza London: Zed Books, 1986, pp. 27, 46.

[21] ibid, p. 48.

[22] In an interview on Israeli television, Arafat said that the Palestinian people are his first wife. He said of Suha: "It is very difficult. I know she is suffering. Still, she is my second wife. My first wife is my people." Source - Al-Quds interfax, August 12, 1996 (alquds@palestine-net.com).

[23] Nakleh, "Studies of Arabs in Israel", p. 54.

[24] Robinson, Glenn E. Creating Space: Organization, Ideology, and Leadership in the Palestinian Intifada (unpublished ph.d. dessertation) University of California Berkeley, 1992.

[25] See Kandioti quote given in Conclusion of this thesis.

[26] Robinson, passim. See pp. 11 - 15 for his typology of "modern and traditional" leaders; his approach borrows from Jowitt.

[27] See chapter 5 of this thesis under sub-title: Coercion and administration: PA powers as defined by current agreements.

28 Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 28-30.

29 Abu-Amr, Ziad. "The Gaza Economy" in Abed, George T. The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development Under Prolonged Occupation. London: Routledge, 1988. p. 101

30 Summarizes Chapter 3 in Roy, Sara. The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development. Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995.

31 Cossali and Robson, p. 62.

32 See Cossali and Robson, p. 58.

33 See for example Owen, Roger in Abed, George T. The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development Under Prolonged Occupation. London: Routledge, 1988.

34 Throughout this manuscript, Gaza and the Gaza Strip are used interchangably. The city of Gaza is consistently refered to as Gaza City.

35 The above three Paragraphs paraphrase information and arguments adapted from Roy (1995book), Chapters 2 & 3.

36 See Hilal (1993), pp. 44-60.

37 See Migdal and Kimmerling. The Palestinians: The Making of a People Cambridge,Mass: Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 217.

38 Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization or bi-nationalism: an interview with Azmi Bishara" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (October- December 1995); p. 45.

39 Hilal, Jamil. "The PLO: crisis in legitimacy" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2. p. 1. (Hilal 1995)

40 Cossali and Robson, p. 102.

41 Migadal and Kimmerling, p. 216.

42 Gowers and Wlaker. The Man Behind the Myth: Yassir Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution London: W.H. Allen, 1990, p. 130.

43 Hilal (1995), p. 2.

44 Cossali and Robson. Stateless in Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1986. p. 118.

45 ibid, p. 111.

46 ibid, p. 112.

47 See Hilal (1995), p. 13.

48 Gowers and Walker, p. 112.

49 Gowers and Walker, p. 115.

50 Hilal (1993), p. 55.

51 Elmusa, Sherif S. "When the Well Springs of Identity Dry Up: Reflections on Fawzi Turki's Exile's Return" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), p. 98.

52 This is a general theme found throughout several sources, notably: Daoud Kuttab, Jamil Hilal, Azmi Bishara, Migdal and Kimmerling.

53 Cossali and Robson, pp. 56-57.

54 Abu-Amr, Ziad. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Jihad Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 52

55 Tamari, Salim. "The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeiosie" in ???, p. 25. It is important to distinguish between this grouping as it existed in the OT since 1967 and the conservative classes which often had to be cajoled and coerced into participation in the Arab Revolt of the late 1930s. As Tamari notes, "the political elite which led the 1936 rebellion -- acombinaiton of urban notables and the coastal commercial bourgeiosie -- was destroyed as a class by the war of 1948." See also chapter 5 of this study for a discussion of the changing basis of elite identification in Palestinian society.

56 Tamari (nd), p. 27.

57 Tamari (nd), p. 37.

58 Hilal (1995), pp. 10-11.

59 ibid, p. 12.

60 Gowers and Walker, p. 189.

61 Gowers and Walker, p. 203.

62 Cossali and Robson, p. 157.

63 Brynen, Rex. "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), p. 35

64 Gowers and Walker, p. 137.

65 Brynen (1995), p. 28.

66 Gowers and Walker, p. 154.

67 Hilal (1993), p. 52.

68 ibid, p. 53.

69 Gowers and Walker, p. 181.

70 see Gowers and Walker, pp. 181, 223, 228.

71 Gowers and Walker, p. 229. In a footnote (#16) Brynen, citing Schiff and Ya'ari, (1995) notes that "Compaints arose when Arafat appointed Colonel Ghazi 'Atallah and Colonel Hajj Isma'il to command Palestinian forces in Lebanon. Both had deserted their units during the Israeli invasion (the latter stopping only to commandeer and ambulance in which to carry his unit's funds), but both were loyal to the PLO leader."

72 For and overview of these services, see Rubenberg, Cheryl. The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Infrastructure Belmont, Mass: The Institute of Arab Studies Inc., 1983; and Cobban, Helena. The Palestine Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. For discussions of how these services were politicized and broken away from their original constiuencies, see Hilal (both 1993 and 1995), and Sayigh, esp. p. 31 for more recent detachment of the PLO from the refugee community i n Lebanon. Many sources touch on this theme.

73 Hilal (1995), pp. 10, 12.

74 See Hilal (1993), pp. 49-51.

75 Hilal (1995), pp. 7,12.

76 For an overview of the roles of and restrictions placed upon the Chambers of Commerce, professional associations and other public institutions, see Roy (1995book), p. 268-270.

77 Cossali and Robson, p. 150-158.

78 See for ex. Hilal (1995), p. 7.

79 Cossali and Robson, p. 55.

80 ibid, p. 55.

81 Hammami, Rema. "NGOs: the professionalisation of Politics" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 p. 54.

82 ibid. p. 54.

83 Brynen (1995), p. 28.

84 Roy (1995book), p. 269.

85 Locke and Stewart, Bantustan Gaza. pp. 13, 20.

86 Hilal (1993), p. 54.

87 Cossali and Robson, p. 105.

88 ibid, p. 155.

89 ibid, p. 149.

90 See ibid, p. 107.

91 Tamari (nd), p. 36.

92 Tamari (nd), p. 37.

93 see Tamari (1995).

94 Quoted in Connel, Dan. "Palestine on the edge: crisis in the national movement" Middle East Report no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4 p. 7.

95 Connel, p. 6.

96 Hilal (1993), p. 50.

97 Cossali and Robson. Stateless in Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1986. p. 101.

98 Hammami, p. 55.

99 Hammami, p. 55.

100 ibid, p. 55.

101 See Cossali and Robson, p. 72.

102 Roy, Sara. "The Seeds of Chaos; and of Night: Gaza Since the Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies. XXIII, no. 3 (Spring 1994). p. 94.

103 Hammami, p. 59.

104 See for example Barghouthi, M. "Palestinian NGOs and their role in building a civil society" (union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, n.d.) or Dr. Iyad al-Sarraj in PNGO Network Newsletter vol. 1, no.1; 1994.

105 Hammami, pp. 59, 60.

106 Abed, George T.(interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy", Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994), p. 46.

107 see ibid, p. 45.

108 See for example Palestinian Center for Human Rights. Critique of the Second Palestinian Draft Law Concerning Charitable Societies, Social Bodies and Private Institutions of 1995, Series Study 3, Gaza: 1995.

109 Fischer et al. Securing Peace in the Middle East: Project on Economic Transition. Cambridge, Mass.:The MIT Press, 1994. p. 102.

110 Fischer et al, p. (124?).

111 Fischer et al, p. 153.

112 see Gowers and Walker, pp. 273, 280.

113 Hilal 1995, p. 8.

114 See Sharabi "The Neopatriarchal Discourse: Language and Discourse in Contemporary Arab Society", p. 152

115 See Hilal 1995, p. 8.

116 Hilal 1995, p. 12.

117 Tamari (nd), p. 31.

118 (Later drafts might eventually use stuff from Ashrawi here) (Perhaps its eagerness to sign the agreement was an attempt to base its legitimacy on outside authority where its attempts to gain absolute control over the Palestinian movement within the territories had failed...the agreement made it the pre-eminent organization in the OT whereas before its support had been soft.)

119 Hilal 1995, p. 15.

120 ibid.

121 Gillen, Signe et al.Finding Ways: Palestinian Coping Strategies in Changing Environments. Forskningsstiftelsen FAFO: Oslo, Norway, 1994, p. 62.

122 Last sentence and directly preceeding qoutes, see Gowers and Walker, pp. 280-282.

123 See Kuttab, Daoud. "PA election: It's A Fatah Affair" The Jerusalem Post Jan. 5, 1996, p. 7.

124 Immanuel, Jon. "Independent candidates lend carnival air to elections" The Jerusalem Post (Jan. 1996 but I was stupid enough to forget to write down Page and date -- need to find.)

125 Hilal, p. 59.

126 Hilal, pp. 56-57.

127 Adoni, Lamis. "PLO at the Crossroads" The Journal of Palestine Studies. XXI, no. 1 p. 57.

128 ibid, p. 62.

129 ibid, p. 62.

130 ibid, p. 57.

131 Kuttab Daoud. "Current Developments and the Peace Process" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 1 (Autumn 1992), p. 103. Previous two sentences also based on observations from Kutab.

132 Kuttab, Daoud. "Report From the Occupied Territories" Journal of Palestine Studies. XXIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 80-90.

133 Kuttab (1993), p. 86.

134 ibid

135 Chomsky, Noam. "The Standard Colonial Pattern" p. 95. (***put some of the Ashrawi stuff here) (Note the bypasing of local activists in the organizational elections preceeding national elections in Jan. 1996).

136 Usher, Graham. "Palestinian Trade Unions and the Struggle for Independence" MER no. 194/195 Vol. 25 No. 3 & 4. 1995. p. 22.

137 ibid. p. 22.

138 ibid p. 22

139 See Hanan Asrawi's account of the events preceeding the Madrid conference in 1991 in This Side of Peace, Arafat's ability to deflect and absorb personal complaints is discused throughout the book.

140 This quote from Middle East Report Jan-feb. 1994, exact citation needs to be found.

141 Refer back to Adoni below. This is a recurring theme which recent events seem to bear out.

142 See Hilal 1995, pp. 5-6.

143 Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization or bi-nationalism: interview with Azmi Bishira" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (1995) p. 43.

144 Hilal 1995, passim.

145 See for example Hiltermann, Joost. Behind the Intifada Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991; and Hilal (1995)pp. 7-8. Roy also refers to variations on this theme in many of her articles and it is only in the more recent literature (for example Tamari (1995) and Hamami that one begins to get more critique of the actual social basis of these groups.

146 Abu-Amr, Ziad. "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993), p. 7; other sources also note the role Israel played in cultivating the Islamist position in Gaza to counter the influence of the PLO.

147 Locke and Stewart, Bantustan Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1985; p. 14. See also Stateless in Gaza p. 111, and, for a more graphic description of events, p. 134.

148 Abu-Amr (1994book), p. 14.

149 ibid, p. 35.

150 ibid, pp. 40-43.

151 ibid, pp.37-40.

152 ibid, p. 43.

153 ibid, pp. 44-46, 48

154 ibid, p. 48

155 Cossali and Robson, pp. 98, 144.

156 ibid, p. 103.

157 Abu-Amr (1994book), p. 61. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this quote is the admission that Palestinians experienced their institutions as being external, i.e. the crisis of internal authority forced by the loss of legitimacy of external patronage and support.

158 ibid, pp. 13, 14.

159 Abu-Amr (1993), p. 11.

160 Abu-Amr, (1994book), p. 56.

161 Abu-Amr (1993), ("Hamas: A Historical and Political Background" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993)), p. 14. The Muslim brotherhood was able to gain control of the Waqf, which controls 10% of all real estate in the occupied territories and "employed scores of people from clerics to gravediggers." ibid, p. 8.

162 Al-Jarbawi, p. 136.

163 Abu-Amr, (1993), p. 13.

164 Al-Jarbawi, Ali. "The Position of the Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord" The Muslim World Vol. LXXXIV, no. 1-2 Jan.-April, 1994, p. 136.

165 Al-Jarbawi, p. 137.

166 Discusion with UNRWA information officer Ron Wilkinson. Gaza City: Sept 29, 1995.

167 Abu-Amr (1994book), p. 37.

168 Abu-Amr (1993), p. 13.

169 ibid, p. 14.

170 This paraphrases the argument in Roy (1994).

171 ibid pp. 87-88

172 ibid, several revealing quotes are given on p. 91.

173 Usher, Graham. "What kind of nation? The rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 p. 65.

174 Abu-Amr (1993), p. 13.

175 Interview with Hamas affiliated journalist in Gaza who asked not to be named. See also for example: Hajjar (interview with Barghouti), p. 12; and, Al Jabarwi, p. 135.

176 Hajjar, Lisa. "The Islamist Movement in the Ossupied Territories: An interview with Iyad Barghouti" Middle East Report July-August 1993. p. 11.

177 Abu-Amr(1994book), p. 50.

178 Abu-Amr (1993), p. 17.

179 Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 30.

180 ibid, p. 17

181 Hilal (1993), p. 56.

182 Said, Edward. "The politics of memory" Al-Ahram Weekly: 26 September - 2 October, 1996, p. 13.

183 See again Kuttab, The Jerusalem Post, Jan. 5, p. 7. See also: Brown, Derrick. "Arafat Lambasted for Poll Meddling" The Guardian Weekly Jan. 7 p. 3. Before elections in January 1996, local elections were held to detemine candidates for the official Fatah slate. When many of Arafat's preferred choices were not elected, he voided the results and put his own favorites on the list. Usually, the replacements were diaspora figures or local notables. Arafat's stated reasons were to make sure that Fatah in elections still represented the broad national movement. However, many of these candidates were seen by locals as having not participated in the resistance (some I spoke with i Gaza even referred to them as collaborators) and were usually people with money or clan connections that Arafat might find usefull. This is based on the newpaper reports and personal conversations in Gaza, and is an area in which more field research needs to be done.

184 Brynen (1995) discusses this on p. 30.

185 Roy, Sara. "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration" Journal of Palestine Studies. XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993) p. 25.

Chapter 3
Defining Palestine:
The Spatial and Demographic Contradictions of
"Self Rule"

Oslo, What Now?

The signing of the Oslo accord in September 1993 announced a framework for transition toward Palestinian "self-rule" in the occupied territories. Less clear, however, was exactly what self rule would mean in terms of the institutional limits, demography and spatial dimensions of Palestinian autonomy, or the practical boundaries of limited/transitional sovereignty. The lack of clarity regarding jurisdiction and the effective scope of PA authority, the deteriorating economic situation for those living under Palestinian authority and the incongruities between the diaspora institutions of the PLO and the contingencies faced on the ground in Gaza may all contribute to situations that heighten rather than transcend points of tension and potential conflict in Palestinian society.

Rather than resolving the relationship between Palestinian national identity and any legal or political regime, the agreement has rendered the situation more complex. This was traditionally apparent in the various aspects of the "inside/outside" dichotomy. Palestinian society on the inside has "its own dynamics, norms and priorities" which might not coincide immediately and directly with those of diaspora nationalist leaders.[1] "For nearly two decades the PLO leadership has developed a style of work based on the logic of revolution and the diaspora, a logic that might be totally different than the logic of statebuilding and civil society. Reconciling the two logics represents a great challenge."[2] Now spatial and affinal cleavages are becoming more difficult to overlook within the OT, where a complex patchwork of varying jurisdictions and varying degrees of political autonomy mean that Palestinians are experiencing self rule differently even within the "autonomous areas." The uncertainty surrounding the final status of national boundaries and rights are a source of great Palestinian anxiety. As Khalil Shikaki has observed:

> "...the peace process has had a negative impact on national reconstruction by leaving unresolved major issues of the conflict, including the future of Arab Jerusalem, the Jewish settlements, and the Palestinian refugees, to say nothing of the question of sovereignty over the land and the nature of the Palestinian political entity. Deferral of these issues to future negotiations has created serious defects in the state building process and deepened Palestinian divisions regarding the Palestinian political order and the consensus on which it was built."[3]

A high level United Nations official told the author in January 1996 that in his opinion the process was leading toward the creation of a Palestinian state, but that realistically in the final status, Palestinians should not expect sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem.[4] But can there be a Palestinian state that does not include sovereignty over East Jerusalem? Perhaps the international community could recognize the autonomy of such a Palestinian entity and perhaps even the PA, but would the Palestinians themselves? To add to the confusion, the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem are hotly disputed.

The Palestinian leadership has put itself in the position of being responsible for the socio-economic situation and as such has increasingly become a target of discontent in the self rule areas. At the same time, the political leadership continues to operate under conditions of multiple accountability. The economic resources of the PLO must be used to service networks and pay off debts in the diaspora. Its right and ability to wield coercive authority within the Palestinian self rule areas reflects recent diplomatic successes and its historical claims more than relationships on the ground in the OT. Not surprisingly therefore, conflicts arise when prominent diaspora figures are awarded the privileges of the newfound PA power within the OT while local activists and business leaders are seemingly brushed aside. While promises of economic improvement legitimized the agreement in the eyes of many Palestinians in Gaza, the PA ultimately does not base its claim to authority on its ability to deal effectively with these problems.

Shikaki also notes the effect that nation building "on the inside" might have on the Palestinian community on the outside:

> "While replacing the PLO (in line with Israel's historic attempts to create an 'inside' alternative to the PLO) is no longer an issue, elections still serve a ralated Israeli goal: to focus Palestinian energies on the inside and its agendas, that is, independence, thus marginalizing Palestinian diaspora and its agendas, such as the right of return."[5]

Perhaps consciousness of the historic role played by the diaspora in legitimizing the PLO in ways which gave it the authority to come to the bargaining table has encouraged Arafat to absorb the Council created by recent elections into the larger Palestinian National Council. Or, disturbingly, it might also represent an opportunity for him to play the two groups off of each other.

Meanwhile, the imbalance of power embodied in the Oslo agreement and the inability of Palestinian authorities to address the needs and demands of the communities over which they have assumed direct political responsibility present further contradictions in the foundation of self rule as established by Oslo. The eventual ability of a Palestinian regime to act independently of and/or respond effectively to Israeli initiatives will determine

much about the characteristics of political economy in the Gaza space, as will the personalities and institutions of power in the Palestinian autonomous areas.

It is between the dynamics of an historical construction of legitimacy and the consolidation of narrower interests, between the real powers of the Israeli state and the implied powers of Palestinian autonomy, between the need for stability and the actual paradigm of repression, and in the contrast between the expected economic rights implied by the notion of national sovereignty and the economic realities of self rule that contradictions within the current transition process are manifest. The contradictions are not necessarily inherent within Palestinian society itself. While referring to the "contradictions of self rule," in no way does this work set out to discredit any awareness of Palestinian national identity. In moving beneath the surface, however, it does show up the ways in which the nationalist discourse often obscures issues of economic and class relations -- intra- as well as inter-national -- which determine the character and relative sovereignty associated by most observers with the existence of "legitimate" states. The nationalist discourse usually tends to assume a basis for political legitimacy which does not need to respond to more specific demands of accountability or operate with regard to real and effectively functioning institutions in society.

The diplomatic utility of "self rule" is apparent: it has the advantage of being one of those concepts that says everything and nothing at the same time. As a solution on paper, it allows an elite to assert a claim to political leadership without reference to the strength of specific linkages and without the need to legitimize themselves through the articulation of a social agenda -- it overlooks the internal bases of conflict (witness Chechnya or Afghanistan after Russian withdrawal). It perhaps makes unwarranted assumptions about the relationships between nationalist elites and the constituencies whose interests they claim to represent, but it certainly provides those elites with some of the tools to construct the order as suits their interests. This is particularly so with regard to the resources and diplomatic recognition of the "international community." The fragmentation of Palestinian society across vast spaces – and the different experiences that such physical separation engendered -- was obscured by an awareness of a shared past and the potential benefits of a unified face toward a common problem. Thus the contradictions are not inherently irreconcilable within the long term process of nation-state building, but rather reflect incongruities in the processes, structures and affiliations associated with the current provisional regime and its three faces -- PLO, Fatah, and PA -- and its two bodies -- inside and outside. This includes its specific personalities, the nature of linkages between a specific state-like authority and society, the distinctive features of political economy within

a given territory, and, finally, the ability to govern effectively and transform the national identity into an identification with a statist status quo.[6]

Jamil Hilal notes that "the historic irony entailed in the Oslo accord is that, while it acknowledged the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people...it rejected the Palestinian's right to self determination as defined by hundreds of UN resolutions."[7] Azmi Bishara argues that Oslo

> "inaugurates a process which sustains Israel's historic position of no withdrawal from and no annexation of the OT; (but the process also) addresses the problem (of the unacceptable status quo ante which had emerged with the intifada) by bringing in the PLO to solve it on Israel's behalf. This is the essence of autonomy."[8]

The present reality in Gaza is one of economic despair and widespread suspicion of authority, a situation contrary to the expectations associated with self rule. At the same time, there is probably no turning back. This is especially true for Gaza as it is unlikely that Israel would choose to re-occupy the territory militarily regardless of future political developments. As Haydar Abd-al Shafi notes: "As to some people's fears that a suspension could lead to Israel's return to Gaza, I think we can discount those. They were so eager to leave that I don't think they would come back even if invited."[9] This means that most of the problems brought up by this study must be addressed with reference to some form and degree of Palestinian autonomy.

> "The question now is not 'Oslo: yes or no?' The question is 'Oslo, now what?' This is the question people want addressed by their leaders. The PNA cannot answer it because the PNA is no longer the PLO. And the opposition can't answer it because they have yet to realize that the demise of the PLO is also their demise. They have to acknowledge this. They have to admit that they were complicit in a structure of politics that led to Oslo, no less than Arafat. But self-criticism that is not accompanied by constructive criticism as to what should now be done ceases to be self-criticism; it becomes self destruction."[10]

Self Rule Inside and Out

Several commentators have argued that with the signing of the agreement, the notion of resistance as a "philosophical and strategic anchor and an act of political will" has been lost.[11] There is no longer any clear object of resistance -- no authority with clear responsibility for economic and social hardships -- and thus an important tool for social mobilization and carving out the awareness of unity under a specific political regime has been blunted. Meanwhile, no other clear anchor encouraging social solidarity or an identification with PA institutions has emerged. The material and social hardships endured

by Gazans have not been ameliorated by those carrying the banner of a supposedly transcendent nationalism. The new face of coercive force, a face which has proven less a reflection of local social self recognition than originally expected, continues to operate in a context where restrictions on social and economic activities are not perceived as balanced by rights, liberties and economic security. Azmi Bishara, for instance, has argued that "autonomy means a form of Israeli control where Palestinians agree to define and police themselves as non-citizens."[12] While vestiges of recognition for the symbols and personalities of the nationalist struggle remain, people in Gaza have few reasons to identify strongly with the emerging politico-economic regime for which these elites have agreed to accept responsibility. Hanan Ashrawi has argued that "it is not who makes the agreement but what's in it" that determines its legitimacy.[13] Interestingly, this can refer to the human cartography of the agreement -- the people who are "in" the agreement and are most directly affected by it -- as well as to the diplomatic and legal content of the agreement. Ultimately relationships between people and institutionalized structures of rule are more stable than between people and personalities who defy the restrictions of institutionalization. Today, the limitations on the PA are the limitations of the Palestinians in Gaza. At the same time, the powers of the PA seem only to be the powers of the PA. The agreement puts the PA in the position of having to buy a constituency rather than being able to earn one.

Discussions over the fate of diaspora Palestinians -- the historical constituency of the PLO -- do not seem realistically addressed within the immediate context of Oslo. This has led many observers to note contradictions between the exclusionary tendencies indicated by the spatial restrictions of state-building and the inclusive PLO ideology which lacked a clear social agenda with which to respond to popular demands upon real governance. As Dan Connel argues, "new contradictions have arisen over the shape and structure of Palestinian society -- issues long delayed by a movement preoccupied by the confrontation with Israel."[14] Mahmoud Darwish asserts that rather than establishing a framework for peace, the agreement represents "a breakup of Palestinian society and its interests." He also exhorts the opposition to "demonstrate that the terms of the accords are not the limitations of the Palestinian cause, or of Palestinian rights."[15] In the context of the provisional regime, such sentiments -- while they do represent legitimate and pressing concerns -- inevitably create confusion.

The experiences of occupation and exile, and the feeling of having been deprived of an "authentic" destiny, encouraged Palestinians to reflect on the relationships between their national identities and social rights. Now, quite suddenly, in a move from above that society was in many important respects neither psychologically or practically prepared for, some of the socio-historical, political, and economic bases for this relationship have been

pulled out from under many Palestinians. The time has come when it is necessary to define what a Palestinian state might look like in practice. The result is that Palestinians are forced to deal with the differences in their experiences as they reflect different concerns and ideas about the exercise of power. They must do so within a given political arena and in a new framework for the recognition of certain national rights and responsibilities. At the same time, the act of governing demands a social agenda which does not supersede or undermine the foundations of broad identification with national institutions. According to the classical liberal-democratic paradigm at least, stability demands that individuals and groups be integrated into an economic and social order which provides reasonable stability, security and a sense of fundamental efficacy. In Gaza, however, one might argue that there is no economic base and that society is at present too fragmented for there to be a clear constituency broad enough to serve as a force for ongoing socio-economic legitimation of power relations.[16]

The PLO became recognized by most Palestinians as the primary expression and organ of national rights by maintaining and encouraging Palestinians everywhere to identify with the broad aims of the Palestinian liberation. But if the PLO's visionary grip on the mass national constituency was wide, in few areas was its institutional hold deep. In the early 1990s, PLO concerns that the track of negotiations sponsored by the United States might lead to an alternative leadership in the OT encouraged it to accept many concessions in secret talks under Norwegian auspices. According to Hanan Ashrawi, who like her fellow negotiators was unaware of the secret talks in Oslo, the Palestinian delegates to the Washington and Madrid negotiations advised Arafat to keep the same delegation once the PLO had achieved recognition at the talks in order to utilize their expertise and experience at dealing with the Israelis. "But that was not to be. With recognition later came a whole overhaul of the 'inside' Palestinians and an attempt at reinventing the negotiations wheel."[17] The underlying suggestion is that Arafat loyalists in Tunis were getting increasingly afraid that they would be bypassed if the Washington negotiations led to anything substantial. Rather than wait for eventual recognition under the formal process, they went underground and sought a deal that would recognize the PLO with its diaspora structure as the basis for a provisional authority in a new relationship between Israel and Palestinians.

Ashrawi states that when she first saw the Declaration of Principles that were at the heart of the Oslo accord, her "first reaction was one of shock. 'Its clear that the ones who signed this agreement have not lived under occupation.'"[18] The conclusion reached by many inside leaders was that the diaspora PLO elites had been naive, hasty and perhaps self interested in seeking to get something for themselves at the expense of the stated goals of

negotiations.   Many of the powers turned over to Palestinians had already been administered by Palestinians under the Civil Administration. Now, the functions might simply go from Palestinians on the inside to those from outside. The tactical imperative of forcing Israeli recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people seems to have been taken to the level of final strategy -- the point where PLO interests and the interests of Palestinian communities living in the OT were conflated in the abstract upper echelons of nationalist and, eventually, diplomatic thinking.

While recognizing the PLO leadership, the agreement does not recognize its fundamental basis in the diaspora or the imbalance of power between Israel and those representing other historic Palestinian claims. It distracts the PLO from its foundational purpose -- actively asserting and fighting on behalf of the historical claims of Palestinian refugees of 1948. The agreement takes an essentially diaspora movement and grants it authority over the very portion of the Palestinian community least represented in its upper echelons and at the same time threatens its claims to represent the interests of its traditional social base. For example, the Gaza Jericho agreement stipulates that the Palestinian police force shall number 9,000 personel of which 7,000 may come from outside the OT.[19] This proportional representation of the diaspora may, however, be moot, as at last count the numbers of the police force had swelled to over twenty thousand.

Given the lack of a clear social agenda and the present failure of the leftist factions to articulate an effective opposition strategy to the Fatah based PLO and PA leaderships, "the dangers confronting the Palestinian people (both in Palestine and in the diaspora) derive immediately from the rapid erosion of the PLO's mass based legitimacy and its integrative and identity forming functions."[20] The act of formally accepting the minimum aims of the movement -- thus contracting its social and ideological meaning -- have resulted in a situation where the PLO has alienated many in the diaspora. At the same time, the PLO seems unable to procure through negotiations the powers which would enable the PA to make the current transition a meaningful experience for Palestinians on the "inside" by consolidating national institutions and protecting basic economic and political rights. Thus, the agreement recognized the PLO while simultaneously undermining its claim to represent the interests of its traditional constituency (at least in the short term) and giving it responsibility for a geographical constituency within the Palestinian human geography with which it had weak institutional and economic links. In one sense, it might be argued that the PA's most important new constituency is the international community. But, as Hanan Ashrawi has stated, "what benefits a leader if he gains the whole world and loses credibility with his own people? Your own constituency is your source of legitimacy and strength."[21] It is precisely this problem of finding a Palestinian constituency which is visibly served --

or finding ways of servicing a particularly influential mass constituency -- within the context of the provisional regime which has been the most pressing challenge facing the PA. The lack of a clear PA constituency within Gaza is symptomatic of a malaise underlying the current provisional regime.

Meanwhile, the PLO has continued to try to resolve this contradiction by constructing a situation where it rationalizes its own authority by becoming its own constituency. As the PLO and the PA continue to keep up the distinction between themselves in order to confer upon each other mutual legitimacy, the Fatah leadership continues to base its appeal on neopatrimonial patronage networks which seek, through the co-optation and/or marginalization of various groups, to reconstruct a front of national unity rather than address social concerns. "The PLO continues to say that it is the reference point, but at the same time it is the government. In other words, it is its own reference. This is a juridical ruse which fools no one."[22] With the agreement, however, a new dynamic of inclusion and exclusion has emerged which is associated with concrete and territorially based institutions of limited autonomy. "With the agreement, factional hostilities have become more divisive: now there is something to fight about."[23] Issues which were once easily assimilated into the politics of national unity and resistance now engender different responses to the conditions -- the material and ideological implications -- of a new order.

One commentator has noted that since the signing of the agreement, the mediatory structure of Fatah has broken down and the movement seems to lack the organizational discipline, the incentives or the will to pursue the objectives of social order and economic development beyond what is needed to simply hold power.[24] The institutions that should regulate the transition are weak, inefficient or non-existent and there are real concerns about the readiness and ability of the PLO elites to build the kind of responsive governing institutions that are needed to develop a healthy economy and civil society.[25] This may reflect that the fact that civil society structures which emerged during the intifada, and PLO's linkages to them, were more tenuous than first thought, and at the very least had started responding more to pressures and incentives from above rather than the organizational potential of constituencies facing common pressures from below.

An indication of the seriousness of the Palestinian political crisis is the failure of an opposition to offer specific alternatives to the existing status quo. Its failure to articulate an alternative vision for governing and dealing directly with social issues reflects the lack of real options available to the Palestinian leadership. The left-wing factions also suffer from the lack of contestable powers and thus the inability to serve a constituency. Running as an independent candidate in the 1996 Palestinian national elections, Haydar Abd-el Shafi, the

leading vote getter in Gaza and one of the two or three most prominent political notables in the OT, noted in his only campaign statement that, "I refuse to make any promises since after the elections neither myself nor my colleagues will have the powers to keep them."[26]

It is not only the dimensions of territorial autonomy and issues associated with economic and political sovereignty that have been left unresolved. The same is true of the issues which united and informed the Palestinian movement in its broadest sense. Are the PLO and the PA one and the same? If not, what are the reasons and consequences of the formal distinctions in areas of authority and social pre-eminence? What constituency is the PA serving? And how does it define the issues of importance to that constituency without alienating other constituencies under the national umbrella? There seems to be an inertia of accountability to a politics which has its base outside the OT. This is exacerbated as the PA is handcuffed to external forces who possess more real influence in the regional political economy, and who through that power have the ability to greatly influence socio-economic conditions in the OT, conditions which in turn influence the choices demanded of and available to PA officials.

The overall effect of the above noted perceptions has given newfound meaning and urgency to the distinction between the "inside" and "outside" constituencies in Palestinian society and politics. The potential tension between "outside" diaspora Palestinian forces and those who lived under Israeli occupation -- the "inside" -- exposes the spatial contradictions between the nationalist movement and the goal of establishing a Palestinian state in part of mandate Palestine. As indicated above, the tension results at least in part from the fact that the PA and the PLO have yet to determine just who and what is represented from within the new territories. For example, even after the Palestinian national elections of January 20, 1996, it is still the PLO and not the PA who are officially in charge of the negotiations. It is the PLO and not the PA that is responsible for relations with other countries and international organizations. Furthermore, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) which was elected at that time still remains subsumed within the larger Palestinian National Council (PNC).

Thus Palestinians living within the OT could quickly find themselves hostage to diaspora interests, or, alternatively, the PLO could find itself irrelevant to the popular concerns of diaspora communities and gatherings while it is powerless to effect meaningful improvements in the quality of life in the OT using the framework of the Oslo accords. Conflicting "inside" and "outside" perceptions of what the provisional regime's makeup should represent were noticeable within the framework of the elections. As Arafat sought to replicate the nationalist front -- giving the most privileged positions to Fatah loyalists --

resentment was created as many local leaders and prominent activists were forced out of the running.[27] Fatah's tight control over the campaign process, including the task of formally announcing the results,[28] produced many irregularities and the people of Gaza were fully aware that the elections contested a limited array of symbols rather than substance.

A major question that remains is whether PA elites will be able to unite the Palestinian community around the legitimacy of the provisional regime established by the Oslo accords. To do this, these elites will have to transcend a basic political contradiction: they risk becoming an entrenched elite without a mass based political constituency...indeed, the PA's most important constituency during the provisional period is external to Palestinian society. By signing the Oslo accords, the Fatah elite has weakened its claim to represent the rights and aspirations of diaspora Palestinians and has at the same time taken responsibility for a population without being granted the powers to address most of the immediate challenges facing the Palestinian community under occupation. It now has a constituency to which it is legally bound, and can less afford to bounce around the various Palestinian communities to seek its alliances of the moment.

Palestinian economist George Abed, formerly with the World Bank, poignantly states that "a Palestinian leadership that has unilaterally reduced its mission of national liberation to that of limited self rule has no right to fail in this more limited endeavor. Such failure would be catastrophic for the Palestinian people."[29] He argues that there is a responsibility to succeed in the process as established so that success might provide the foundation for the next step and warns that it is perhaps better to make improvements in peoples lives than merely accept all the trappings of sovereignty in an environment and with effective situations which render them practically ineffectual or corrupt.[30]

Resolution of these problems is leading the PA toward divisive tactics of political consolidation over weak institutions of authority and fragmented and weak pillars of civil society; i.e. it seems to be pushing the creation of a political base which may be incongruous with demands for economic and social reconstruction and which attempts to avoid accountability for its own political impotence -- especially in relation to economic decision making. Simultaneously, the discontinuity of the Palestinian space, and the different conditions and claims for rights, recognition and representation existing in disparate and isolated Palestinian communities, may threaten rather than strengthen Palestinian national bonds, which will increasingly be evaluated by their material as well as their socio-psychological linkages.

The result may be an acute crisis of authority where an ineffectual neopatrimonial elite with an Islamist opposition reigns over an apathetic and fragmented civil society which has given up on politics as an avenue by which to address their concerns. Out of fear that

they might expose the real powerlessness of "self rule," currently reigning elites may try to repress or co-opt other political forces in society. The lack of any real options and powers will discourage a substantive political debate over alternatives within the given framework. The prospect remains, however, that a public increasingly squeezed between ineffectual elites and economic despair will resort to violence in an attempt to reshape the political economy of meaning in ways conducive to economic and social efficacy.

Intricacies of Identification and Transition: The Maintenance of National Unity and the Search for a Constituency

The study of national and international constitutive transition represents an underdeveloped area of political science. Cold War era analysis tended to interpret challenges to the international state system through a bi-polar filter, while state boundaries and the cartography of power which they represented were largely taken as given. Now, attention must necessarily turn toward explaining the nature of upheaval as communities and elites adjust and jockey for position and advantage given the new opportunities, constraints, and incentives of the transitional international political and economic regime. International patronage flows have changed direction and reflect different contingencies and strategies for reconfiguring interests in the post cold war era. Today nationalist movements are blossoming in spaces where central authority quite suddenly broke down, while elsewhere they have been relegated or have lost significance to their cold war patrons. The PLO has certainly been affected by these trends.

It is within such a context, a context which includes the imperatives of economic liberalization in Israel and the PLO's loss of its major international patrons, that the current transition toward Palestinian self rule must be placed. For Palestinians, the alleged advantages offered by the "new world order" came at the time when their institutions were most poorly prepared to take advantage of them. The PLO was an over-bloated and largely ineffectual bureaucracy which had been relegated to exile in Tunis. It was distanced from its traditional constituencies (a situation which left the diaspora communities more prone to fragmentation), and was increasingly ignoring its own national institutions in favor of micro-management of the movement by the charismatic figures who had come to personify the nationalist movement.[31] At the same time, the communities of the OT were being purged of their local activist leadership and becoming a less relevant part of the Israeli economy as the Israeli military cracked down harder in the OT. During the chaos of the early 1990s in Gaza, the PLO scrambled, using its diminishing ability to provide patronage to entrench itself in Gaza.[32] As we have seen, these initiatives failed from the point of view of creating real efficable social structures. However, they did give Fatah and the PLO

the appearance of solid and absolute support which eventually forced Israel to recognize that the PLO was the only viable negotiating partner in the Palestinian community.

Also crucial to understanding the current dynamic of self rule from a structural standpoint -- the perspective of formal and informal social networks and institutions as well as the boundaries of the natural environment within the given confines of the map and the exercise of Israeli force -- is the phenomenon of demographic transition generally, and the migration of institutions and individuals in the context of growing population pressures in specific. With the intifada came the realization that the OT might represent an increasingly dense, united and immobile demographic core of palestinianism. But while the PLO seems to have recognized the political potential of this, especially as it related to its own institutional revitalization, the leadership may have failed to recognize the degree to which its own ongoing legitimacy would be related to its ability to ameliorate the conditions which had deteriorated dramatically during the last ten years of occupation. As Roy notes, the nationalist leaders:

> "have not (during any time of the occupation) addressed the importance of development and its critical relationship to political change, let alone (articulate) development strategies...the Palestinians do not have a coherent development strategy for the occupied territories."[33]

Palestinian nationalism has always been conceived of in terms of political compliance rather than in terms of political economy. (Perhaps only this can explain why the Fatah elites seemed so genuinely pleased with the significance of the Oslo agreement.)

The Political Economy of Accommodation

It might be argued that current trends in Palestinian society reflect the redefinition of conflict and the reconstitution/rejustification of international patronage networks occurring in the post-Cold War international environment generally. The recent PLO-Israeli agreements are both product and reinforcments of these trends. The case of the transition to Palestinian self rule indicates that these trends rapidly trickle down in various ways to inform political and social relationships at the local level. This may be especially true in areas such as Gaza where people have been heavily dependent on national and international patronage for survival, and affected by the unaccountable intrusion of external authority upon social interaction. Developments in Gaza should be seen against the backdrop of similar constitutive transitions and redefinition of conflicts elsewhere on the globe.

Both Israel and the PLO were forced to respond to realigning global patronage flows and international economic incentives. In Gaza today, the meaningfulness of "autonomy" must be seen in light of an almost total economic dependence on Israel's

economic and security policies. Contrary to its intent, the new political and economic arrangements established with the signing of the Oslo accords have served to intensify a socio-economic crisis in Gaza that became apparent in the early to mid-1980s and which became particularly acute following the Israeli border closings during and after the 1991 Gulf War.[34] The situation has made grassroots dependency on sources of patronage, specifically PA patronage as the PA controls ever more of the donor pie, ever more acute.

This economic crisis was characterized by increasing unemployment and economic hardship, and accompanied by general social fragmentation and acts of resistance that were increasingly losing their political direction and social content to become acts of self-interested violence veiled in the politicized language of resistance. The symptoms were indicative of a general breakdown of authority, economic hardship, and deep-seeded social and psychological frustration.[35] In order to enforce the stability of its economic and political relationship with the OT, Israel incurred greater financial, social and political costs of expanding the role of the military in quelling unrest and imposing its economic and political control over the territories. On at least one level, the Israelis were brought to the negotiating table by the failure of their policies to deal with the unrest.

The expansion of the Israeli economy through the 1970s and 1980s encouraged an increasingly international economic outlook in that country. Concurrently, new immigration reduced Israeli capital's reliance upon its unstable access to a cheap Palestinian labor force and a captive market for Israeli goods in the OT. Accordingly, political and corporate strategists began to look for ways of restructuring dependent relations. In practice, this meant subcontracting in areas such as textiles and encouraging labor intensive agricultural such as ornamental plant production -- a market dominated by Israeli middle men anyway.[36] By turning the responsibility for security and stability over to Palestinian elites, Israel reduced the cost of occupation and diverted international attention by turning the crisis in Gaza from a component of the Israeli-Palestinian problem into a Palestinian problem. Thus far, they have managed to do so largely without giving the PA control over resources.

Having lost its historic patrons in the Soviet Bloc and the Arab World after 1991, the PLO's access to new patrons depended on reaching an accord with Israel. This has in turn affected the PLO/PA's client base -- changing its focus to be based more on events in the OT rather than on political maneuvering in the diaspora. The urgency of resolving inside/outside tensions and contradictions in Palestinian politics has therefore been made acute. With the traditional factions either alienated or reconstituting themselves to perform new functions under the umbrella of Fatah patronage and the neopatrimonial potential of the autonomy, new factional bases are being constructed in the OT. At the same time, changes

in the Israeli economy and the socio-economic implications of Israel's de-linking with the Palestinian population in the OT mean that many if not most Gazans are dependent in some way on the PA for contacts and opportunities to ensure survival over the short term.

Many argue that by signing the Oslo accord, the PLO was looking out for its own institutional survival more than the interests of the Palestinian people.[37] Cut off from its main sources of funding after the 1991 Gulf war, the PLO bureaucracy sought to replace the lost funds by usurping the role of NGOs in the OT and using that as a rationale and legitimized base for procuring the funding that would allow for bureaucratic survival. It sought new patrons and sought to reassert itself in the Palestinian community as the supreme force in nationalist politics by reaching an "historic" accommodation with the Israeli state. Supporting this argument is the fact that competition for funding between local NGOs and the PA reinforces the "inside" / "outside" dichotomy.[38] One commentator argued that peace signaled a new "era of hard core politicians, one in which slogans are the weapons of a struggle for power. Self interest produces clichés, not humanistic visions."[39] The concentration of aid in PA hands is clearly a payoff for concessions embodied within the Oslo accords, and patterns of patronage "established in exile have meant that public and private investment are benefiting Arafat's entourage rather than the people of the OT."[40] Thus the agreement was born not out of the strength of the local or international position of the PLO vis-a-vis Israel, but out of the desperation of a particular grouping in the diaspora. To this must be added the Israeli Labor Party vision of an economically restructured Israeli society and state which needed to reduce its economic and psychological investment in direct occupation -- an occupation that was also having increased diplomatic costs since the outbreak of the intifada.

Spatial Variations of Authority and the Human Geography of Meaning

Any future Palestinian body politic will have to deal with the criteria of citizenship. This demands definition of the spatial boundaries of the human and ecological geography of the political regime -- be it state or some other form of social and limited political autonomy. Ian Lustick has argued that "variation in the shape of states is politically consequential."[41] This insight is extremely valuable as we investigate the implications of the transition of the Palestinian nationalist movement from a vague conceptual and social space to a more specific but still restricted and uncertain territorial and institutional space in the OT. Lustick coins the phrase "regime threshold" to describe situations in which a sort of paradigm shift in the spatial identity or fundamental constituency of the state threatens not only specific governing administrations, but also the fundamental national institutions they inhabit. He also discusses the notion of ideological hegemony, referring to the

problem of resolving one's commitments to a particular constituency without undermining the national consensus upon which the state rests. Inevitably, socio-political clarity requires some sort of criteria for establishing boundaries. This seems true for both tribe and state as well as for the in-between notion of political autonomy. There will certainly be arguments over whether the current agreement meets the requirements of inclusion and exclusion that would fulfill the aspirations which many Palestinians have associated with the nationalist movement.

The state is defined by its inclusion and exclusion of ideas, spaces and peoples; and by the institutions, social dynamic and powers which shape, mediate and manipulate social phenomena within geographically defined boundaries. While the national movement (i.e. PLO) was reductive in terms of the criteria which determined identification with it (one need only be Palestinian) it was therefore more inclusive and easier to identify with. The PLO's survival demanded that it accept new responsibilities and change the focus of its mission. Thus it became the PA. The effective space of the PLO -- which could be said to extend in some material or symbolic way to almost every Palestinian constituency -- has now been reduced to part of the OT. The contraction of space implies a correspondingly greater specificity of political problem. The PLO's new found internationally supported authority implies increased scrutiny from those who are asked to identify with and accept the new regime. The territorial base has been bought at the price of sacrificing some of the PLO's claim to represent the diaspora community. Concurrently, the PLO has certainly weakened its credibility in the OT by continuing to prioritize the interests of a diaspora elite using the powers it has acquired with its new title.

The PLO seems to have become the PA. But the PLO is still the official partner in negotiations, and not the PA, which is responsible for administering the accords in the self rule areas. Still more confusingly, as we saw in the last chapter, many argue that the PLO no longer has an effective existence. One benefit of this is that the PLO can still reject the agreement and whatever status quo exists on the ground if its results fail to meet required demands. It can be the rejecting party and thus ironically disempower the PA which will almost certainly be left in Gaza as Israel is unlikely to re-occupy militarily. It would, however, leave any remaining Palestinian political authority more dependent on Israel than it is now. In the immediate term though, this only highlights once again the incongruity between Palestinian national institutions, new and old, and the territorial space in which it at present commands certain provisional powers associated with political autonomy.

The future existence of the PLO/PA now largely depends on securing the interests of and/or stabilizing a specific community. How authority defines itself in terms of a particular spatial and human geography will have a decisive impact on how an authority

understands itself and the way in which we might understand it. Self definition plays an important role in the construction of a particular political economy of meaning. If the objective remains some vision of absolute unity beneath the nationalist umbrella as represented by ideology and personalities rather than nation-state institutions, the PA must define its constituency in such a way that it does not simultaneously alienate others. It no longer seems to have the tools or the looseness of operation and responsibility that might allow them to do this, a task that would require the establishment of boundaries and effective institutions with consistent meanings throughout the Palestinian social space.

The sudden shift "from above" in the objective base -- the human and territorial geography -- of Palestinian politics created new tensions and suggested new interpretations of the structures and symbols which had determined awareness of a Palestinian politics. A corollary of this spatial variation thesis is that there should be one kind of consistency of meaning in the exercise of authority across space. If individuals in disparate areas are to identify with each other as subject to, and somehow united by this subjection, to the same authority, then there should also be a consistency in the functioning of institutions and attitudes of power towards the various areas. There must be some kind of common meaning derived from the exercise of economic and political rights and obligations. But at present, in spite of DoP assurances that the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit would be preserved, Israel continues to regularly restrict and prevent access between Gaza and the West Bank. In fact, while Gazan schools are focusing on the teaching of Egyptian history, West Bank schools are teaching Jordanian history.[42] All modern states have used the teaching of history to ingrain the symbols, institutions and ideology of the state on the population within its boundaries. The teaching of history might reinforce the cantonization of the exercise of power in the future Palestinian autonomous space. A further consolidation of this separation would force some serious rethinking as to how authority is to maintain the appearance of a nationally unifying phenomenon in the face of physical separation.

These contradictions are highlighted by the fact that the legislative council which was elected in the OT is in fact diluted by becoming an appendage to the much larger diaspora based Palestinian National Convention. The decisions made by the newly elected body will in fact reflect interests in the diaspora, which may further undermine the ability of the new institutions to address the concerns of those living in the OT and thus undermine identification by Gazans with the new institutions over the short term. In other words, the current configurations of Palestinian society toward the institutions which have historically acted as their advocates may in the end leave no one completely satisfied. How will inhabitants of Gaza take it if the electoral institutions which affect them are composed of

those with interests elsewhere? Right now, it is a moot question, as Arafat seems to by ignoring many of the institutions in favor of a personalistic and autocratic style of rule. Also, the elections did not contest the power to initiate fundamental social change or economic restructuring anyway.

Unless these contradictions are attributed to a specific leadership regime, this might also create tensions in the awareness of national unity. The fundamental problem remains that the decisions which most immediately affect the lives of the inhabitants of Gaza are still largely in the hands of people who have no direct experience of or immediate interest in local contingencies beyond the context of the agreement. Naturally, their interests also lie in maintaining a certain degree of compliance from the population, but the degree and character of this compliance count as well. Pacification might be more a sign of social resignation than legitimacy.

The Elite/Mass Dichotomy: Exchanging Fire Over the Baseline of Transition

Ironically, now that the nationalist elites have found their way to a reduced Palestine, they seem more remote and smug than they had appeared to many Gazans from a distance.[43] The contrast between the world of occupation and the world of self rule has not proven as great as had been imagined and/or promised, and this is inevitably raising questions about the inherent ability of the new elites to make political decisions informed by the interests and values of the local population. At the outset, people seemed willing to give Arafat the benefit of the doubt; but he paid for support with heavy promises that he has so far been unable to deliver. Rather than take positive steps toward addressing urgent social issues, the PA exhausts its limited resources in pursuit of entrenching its relative authority in society.

In analysis of the situation in Gaza soon after the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP), Sarah Roy identified a post agreement dynamic which manifested itself in the form of: (A) increased incidence and intensity of violence; and (B) the increasing disablement and impending breakdown of civil society in Gaza. The second situation was, according to Roy, itself a product of (i) widening societal divisions and (ii) "internal fragmentation to a degree never before seen in the territory."[44] The primary factor fueling this overall societal deterioration is, according to Roy, the state of economic crisis. Rather than ameliorating these conditions, the situation under PA rule is in many ways more desperate.

The repressive and patrimonial character of PA authority at present is therefore measured against the ideals of self rule: accountability, sovereignty together with strong efficient and recognizable institutions. The high-handedness of the PA elites has also been

measured against their seeming lack of authenticity and moral restraint from the street level perspective in Gaza. There is no small amount of resentment from Gazans towards the PA elites who are seen as having come in to reap the limited fruits sown in years street level resistance by Gazans against Israeli occupation. Among young men in Gaza, one meets a significant number of young men who describe themselves as ex-Fatah, now frustrated with all politics. While in Gaza, this writer often heard the PA referred to as the new occupiers.[45]

It might be argued that the absence of a previous experience of a Palestinian state has encouraged conflicting qualitative and quantitative understandings among Palestinians of what such a state should look like.[46] Certainly such an experience would have made it easier to reach a consensus over the spatial dimensions of any eventual national state and provide a precedent for the linking of various social structures and institutions to a state authority, but as every state once existed for the first time, the argument cannot explain the failure of the provisional political economy of meaning in and of itself. Interestingly, Fatah's vision of national identity took shape without apparent reference to any social or class agenda. Such an agenda helped to give form to bourgeois nationalism in Europe through the course of the 19th century, but it is lacking here. Now, in order to consolidate its position in Gaza, it is reconstituting structures of control by reconfiguring those elites which the PLO empowered in the diaspora, and seeking to co-opt new elites within the OT.

The result is that as the PA superimposes its diaspora bureaucratic structures on the societies of Gaza and the West Bank, it is ill prepared deal with the developmental and class crisis which informed a crucial part of the national awareness of the inhabitants of these territories -- particularly in Gaza. At the level of abstract analysis, two trends can be identified: one which is engaged in the attempt to remold Palestinian national identity; and another which attempts to define the tasks of civil society in relation to the provisional/transitional order.[47] The complaint against the former is that it fails to account for the socio-economic basis of legitimacy and the attack against the second is that civil society institutions in Gaza might not be strong enough to stand up to an authoritarian regime in a positive institution building and reinforcing way. In any case, the challenge of state building is in successfully arbitrating a society's access to power and its institutional resources and privileges.

---

[1] Abu-Amr, Ziad. "View from Palestine: In the Wake of the Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 2 (Winter 1994), p. 80.
[2] ibid, p. 80.
[3] Shikaki, Khalil. "The Transition to Democracy in Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996[a]), p. 8.
[4] UNSCO official who wished to remain anonymous on this point.

5 Shikaki (1996a), p. 17.

6 Also, the notion of a conflict between the construction of an order responding to sociological pressures v. the enforcement of a national personality.

7 Hilal, Jamil M. "The PLO: crisis in legitimacy" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), p. 1.

8 Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization or bi-nationalism: an interview with Azmi Bashara" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), p. 44.

9 Butler and Elmusa. "An Interview with Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), p. 80.

10 Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization or bi-nationalism: an interview with Azmi Bashara" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 1995), pp. 47-48.

11 Roy, 1994, p. 89.

12 Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization or bi-nationalism: an interview with Azmi Bashara" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2; p. 45.

13 Ashrawi, p. 261.

14 Connel, Dan. "Palestine on the edge: crisis in the national movement" Middle East Report no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4 (May-June/ July August 1994), p. 7.

15 Naim, Mona. "An interview with Mahmoud Darwish" Middle East Report no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4 (May-June/ July August 1994), p. 18.

16 See Sara Roy (1995book) for a discussion of the "de-development" of Gaza's socio-economic base (elaborated on in the next chapter). Her introduction provides a good overview. In general the evidence presented throughout this text seems to suggest -- especially considering the relative demise in the ability of the Islamist movement to influence trends in the streets -- that there is no coherent sectoral or ideological base that could in and of itself serve as the base for the legitimation of power relations. For example: there is no collective bourgeiosie identity, no truly coherent labor movement...the only possibility is that refugees could serve as this but given the boundaries of the agreement, it seems unlikely that anything but blunt patronage could gather their support for the current regime.

17 Ashrawi, p. 186.

18 Ashrawi, p. 260.

19 See Gaza-Jericho First, Annex I, Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4.

20 Hilal, Jamil. "The PLO: crisis in legitimacy" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2. (Oct.-Dec. 1995), p. 2.

21 Ashrawi, p. 282.

22 Naim, Mona. "An interview with Mahmoud Darwish" Middle East Report no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4 (May-June/ July August 1994), p. 18.

23 Roy. 1994, p. 88.

24 It is of course the premise of this study that many of these shortcomings are institutionalized within the agreement itself.

25 See for example 'Abd Al Shafi, Haydar (interview with). "The Oslo Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 14-19.

26 Several informants related this quote during my stay in Gaza at the time of the Jan. 20, 1996 elections.

27 See Usher, Graham. "Interview with Saleh 'Abd al-Shafi" Middle East Report, Jan-Feb. 1994, p. 13 (see also page 11 of the same issue where an Unknown speaker makes some good points on this). Abed, George (Interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no.4 (Summer 1994), p. 43. Kuttab, Daoud. "PA election: it's a Fatah affair" The Jerusalem Post Jan. 5, p. 7. Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, Roy and Hilal also make similar points in their discussions of exclusionalry and undemocratic tendencies of Arafat and Fatah.

28 To paraphrase Stalin, it is not who votes but who counts the votes that determines the outcome of an election.

29 Abed, George T.(interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy", Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994), p. 49.

30 ibid, p. 51.

31 See Hilal both 1993 and 1995.

32 See Gillen. Finding Ways: Palestinian Coping Strategies in Changing Environments Oslo: FAFO, 1994, p. 62.

33 Roy (1995book), p. 7.

34 Øvensen, Geir. Responding to Change: Trends in Palestinian Household Economy. Oslo: FAFO, 1994, p. 11. see also Roy, 1993 p. 21;

35 This is a consistent theme of reporting from Gaza in The Journal of Palestine Studies over the past couple of years. See also the reporting of Graham Usher.

36 Taylor, Mark. "The Economics of Defeat" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (Oct. - Dec., 1995) p. 100.

37 While seldom stated outright, this is a notion which can be found between the lines of many Palestinian observers. The work of Edward Said is perhaps the most fothright on this point, but it is implied in Bishara, Hilal, Ashrawi and Chomsky as well.

38 For an excellent overview, see Hammami, Rema. "NGOs: the profesisonalisation of politics" in Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2; pp. 51-64.

39 Unknown writer or speaker quoted in Ashrawi, Hanan. This Side of Peace p. 273.

40 Sayigh, Rosemary. "Palestinians in Lebanon: (dis)solution of the refugee problem" in Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2; p. 29.

41 Lustick, Ian S. Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza, Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 3.

42 De Standaard (newspaper, Dutch; Belgium), Monday May 26, 1996.

43 I base this sentence on discussions with many informants in (especially young men) in Gaza. However, a reading of almost any recent work by Sara Roy or almost any of the listed interviews with Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi and it is clear that they have come to a similar conclusion.

44 Roy 1993, p. 21

45 Some people in Gaza argue that if the PLO had returned to govern in Gaza in the early 80's, it would have been welcomed. Now, however, things have changed. The experience of the intifada and the experience of the less appealing and efficacious elements of Fateh and PLO tendencies has left a gap in the ability to identify with each other. Also "returnees" talked to by the author reported that they felt uncomfortable in Gaza.

46 This is a stretch of the argument of Musa Budieri as presented by Tamari in "Fading Flags" (1995) p. 11.

47 ibid., p. 11.

Chapter 4:
The Economic Bedrock of Transition

It has become a journalistic cliché to refer to the Gaza Strip as "squalid" and "one of the most densely populated areas on Earth."[1] Crucial to understanding the significance of these descriptions, however, is an awareness of the Gaza economy's political determination. The density of population constitutes a more decisive variable if constraints on the development of a territory's human and natural resources preclude indigenous investment and planning in agricultural inputs, variegated trade or sustainable industrial and service sectors. More important than the pressures that dense population places on the restricted environment of Gaza, the Palestinians in Gaza have had no authority that made economic decisions accountable to their interests, or that regulated resources and development in such a way as to encourage any form of development or economic growth in the territory.[2] Sara Roy has referred to the economic trajectory of Gaza under occupation as "de-development." Menachem Begin is reported to have said, "we'll make the Arab workers work for 100 shekels and we'll make sure that they need to spend 150."[3] Declarations of autonomy and the promises of international aid do not in themselves reverse this situation. That would require a fundamental restructuring of economic relations locally and generally, and the prospect that this might be accomplished within the framework of current agreements appears unlikely. While the agreements do grant the PA more control of trade for selected items relevant to ensuring that basic needs may be met, and while they have powers related to the import of Mercedes Benz-s,[4] the broad range of economic powers used by sovereign states to encourage economic development and shape the attachment of the local national economy to the global economy are well beyond the scope of autonomy as accepted by the PA.[5]

In their rush to ensure that they were granted political recognition, it can be argued that the Fatah-based PLO elites ignored the imperative of securing the powers necessary to affect the course of the restructuring of economic relations between Israel and Palestinians. Article 6, paragraph 2 of the declaration of principles state that:

> "With the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres -- education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism."

These hardly represent the tools most commonly associated with economic sovereignty and in fact represent domains which traditionally result from development rather than preceed it.

Article 7, paragraph 4 states that in order to promote economic growth, the Council will establish:

> "a Palestinian electricity authority, a Gaza sea port authority, a Palestinian export promotion board, a Palestinian environmental authority, a Palestinian land authority, a Palestinian water administration authority, and any other authorities agreed upon."

The only problems are that: Gazans are still dependent on the Israeli electricity grid;[6] they have no port,[7] they inherit a severly degraded environment, the most productive land in the strip is still under Israeli control and no new authority or administrative function was transferred to Palestinian hands by the May 4, 1994 accord,[8] Palestinian access to water resources are subject to commercial agreements with the Israeli water company Mekoroth,[9] and not many other "authorities" have been granted. But perhaps by creating new jobs, all these "authorities" might promote growth by stimulating flagging consumption.

> "Direct employment in the PA continues to grow significantly. Some 30,000 to 50,000 people are currently employed in the police, security forces and budding bureaucracy (the annual costs of a security force of 27,000 are estimated by the World Bank to cost $180 million, a heavy burden on an, as yet, unproductive economy). This issue, however, is political, and money seems to forthcoming for the tremedous costs involved: 'The PA does not need a 30,000 strong police force to facilitate the economic, social and political develoment of its 2.3 million people. A police force of that size is required only to keep the lid on the people in the absence of such development.'"[10]

The PLO/PA failed to negotiate for themselves the ability to influence fundamental economic policy -- i.e. create incentives and construct an empowering environment through powers to regulate the use of natural resources, set taxes and tariffs without reference to Israeli rates in many of the areas that might encourage investment and trade, or influence monetary policy. Everything about the new situation seems to reinforce the fact, apparently overlooked by those who place the blame for continued instability and resistance on the PA's shortcomings in the area of repression, that people do not live on slogans and expectations alone.

According to one source,

> "Terms such as autonomy and self government have no precise definition in international law with respect to either the political or economic responsibilities of a governing authority. Historically, 'autonomy' has referred to a wide variety of arrangements... among these, economic rights have always been the most precisely defined."[11]

The authors go on to emphasize the primacy of control over natural resources, trade, taxes and finances as paramount to the recognition of the autonomy of a particular spatial or human geography. The transition to self rule in economic terms can be recognized in the points of intersection along several lines between ideal situations of political economy: a line denoting the degree of the economy's accountability to internal political decision making -- i.e. taxing, the regulation of the use of common resources, and the ability of the government to ensure the safe and stable transport of goods and services across political boundaries; a line between the captive unidirectional market and a market in which actors can rationally choose the direction of imports and exports / inputs and outputs; and the general ability of the market to respond to and conform to internal abilities and constraints -- i.e. to make use of skills in the labor market within the given ecological constraints. The PA occupies a very low position on nearly all indicators of economic sovereignty. Within the model of a political economy of meaning, the social efficacy of sovereignty also becomes an issue. Rather than a tool to be manipulated to serve the interests of an elitist regime, sovereignty ideally leads to the construction of an empowering legal environment encouraging investment and job creation. However, as Raja Shehada notes, the chaos and confusion the Palestinian run areas are causing opportunities for industrial development and productive investment to be lost.[12]

The economic features of the limited and supposedly transitional Palestinian autonomy are regulated according to the terms of "Annex IV" of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (signed on April 9, 1994). This annex is also known as the "Paris Protocol" or "Protocol on Economic Relations." According to the agreement's preamble:

> "The two parties view the economic domain as one of the cornerstones in their mutual relations...(t)his protocol lays the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian side and for exercising its right of economic decision making in accordance with its own development plan and priorities."[13]

The actual powers granted at this stage of negotiation fall far short of this goal. From the Israeli point of view, the agreement is circumspect. The Palestinian economy, and the PA powers over economic decision making remain limited and highly regulated. No mention is made in the agreement of water issues, which obviously play a very important role in the development of an area whose indigenous economy is still premised on agriculture. Infrastructure standards for both private and public concerns are set at the "highest international standards," a conditionality that might increase start-up capital requirements for small businesses.[14] Fishing, a once important sector in the local economy that was severely restricted under occupation, is not mentioned in the protocol.[15] Since the

signing of the Paris Protocol, Israel has -- according to the U.S. State Department -- imposed new standards on Palestinian agricultural products which are higher than those required of Israeli producers.[16] Items which can be imported into the Palestinian self rule "areas" are limited to those on a detailed list, and a quota based on past consumption patterns -- as determined by a "panel of experts"[17] -- regulates the quantities of even those listed items allowed in under Palestinian jurisdiction.[18]

The PA can issue import licenses, but these licenses are effectively subject to standards and requirements in Israeli law.[19] This means that this power grants the PA a possibility to control a source of state based patronage, but no real powers to determine import priorities or quality standards associated with the granting of such licenses. The PA has few powers through which to counter Israeli policies with viable Palestinian altrenatives. Economic researcher Aisling Byrne observes that:

> "The lack of clear development and industrial strategies of the PA has created a vacuum which is rather rapidly being filled by 'private' entrepreneurs (with close links to the PA) and their families. The trade structure that is emerging, especially in Gaza, is of suppliers with exclusive rights, making deals with Israeli companies and sometimes dubious individuals, to be single suppliers to the captive Gazan market. Small and middle level (actors) and business cannot compete."[20]

The pricing of key items and taxes, tolls and duties are rigorously pegged in relation to existing prices and taxes inside Israel, and clauses concerning environmental degradation, disease prevention, and security give Israel broad veto powers over autonomous Palestinian economic planning.[21] While the potential for slightly lower prices on things like gasoline and a one to two percent lower VAT for the areas might offer some marginal relief to a small number of consumers in Gaza, they certainly don't offer the kind of price and tax incentives that might encourage outside investment in Gaza considering the other challenges facing the strip. Importantly, the imbalance of power between the two sides in the enforcement of this and other agreements means that the Israeli government's interpretation of various clauses tend to win the day. Israel has consistently delayed shipment of goods out of Gaza. No one who seriously wants to produce for foreign markets would reasonably invest in Gaza at this time.

While quotas concerning trade in traditional agricultural products between Israel and the PA controlled areas are set to be lifted in 1999, this delay will almost surely encourage farmers away from the production of such foodstuffs and toward the production of ornamental plants. This is in line with pre-agreement Israeli plans to forcibly restructure the Gaza economy.[22] While not necessary impeding sectoral growth, the situation does

illustrate the ways in which the agreement protects the interest of Israeli producers -- ostensibly over the short term -- but de facto over the long term as well.

To understand the meaning of these restrictions on the civil exercise of autonomy, the relationship between Gaza's economic trajectory and the economic expectations associated with the acceptance of self rule must be reviewed. In Gaza, the PA has inherited conditions of severe economic distress. Its strategies for consolidating its political control in such conditions will in no small measure be determined by the scope of economic powers it is able to negotiate for itself in the context of the Oslo process. Israel's continued control over 30% of the most productive land area of the Gaza Strip (land which houses about 1,200 settlers) and 80% of the available water resources offers a strong indication that those features of the occupation relationship relevant to a liberalizing and restructuring Israeli economy are still being enforced.[23]

Some commentators claimed to have observed in the PA's economic strategy an increased tendency to *seek* dependency on Israel. Aisling Byrne, for example, argues that:

> "Encapsulated in its response to the closure and to its emerging industrial and development policies, the impression one gets is that not only do current PA policies do nothing to lessen dependence on Israel, but, the direction they are headed is down a road taken by so many developing countries: a road of increased dependence (as if this was not the intention of Oslo); of debt (of the $2.6 billion promised to the Palestinians over the next five years, 2/3 is in the form of loans -- currently $760 million assuming no additional loans are taken - which with an interest rate of say 8% (the rate is reported to be less than 10%) means a doubling of debt within a ten year period); of unsustainability (with near term complete reliance on 'donor funds' for short term, emergency assistance projects) and of a developmental strategy with clear political underpinnings...far from being the cornerstone in the mutual relations between 'the Palestinian side' and Israel in the context of Oslo, the economic sector has not responded as expected, (private because they won't, and public because they can't)."[24]

This chapter characterizes the pieces of Gaza's shattered political economy, and evaluates the ability of the PA to pick up those pieces and assemble them into a meaningful configuration of self rule. It offers an historical overview of economic trends in Gaza, discusses the economic changes which encouraged both Israel and the PLO to go to the negotiating table, suggests the significance of economic factors in society's conception of meaningful self rule, broadly documents the direction of the economy since the signing of the agreement, and finally analyzes the importance of the relationship between economic development and the future of Gaza's political development.

From Occupation to Autonomy: Economic Meanings of the Transition

Nationalist movements have often sustained themselves by defining boundaries of economic rights in line with the aspirations and grievances of their potential constituency(ies). Although often submerged within the more romantic rhetoric of historic national rights, loyalties to particular ideologies and expressions of religious and ideological unity, it may be argued that contemporary Palestinian national awareness grew out of a unique experience of sudden and overwhelming economic alienation. At a psychological level, the sudden break with traditional modes of economic existence and options represented the destruction of an economic order which seemed in comparison with new realities to have been more humane and comfortingly authentic. At the material level, it represented the sudden loss of land, shops, trade links and resources upon which people drew to survive. Thus Palestinian nationalism grew as a united effort to confront an injustice which led to economic hardship, and more subtly, it grew into a complex web of linkages and patronage which could be accessed through expressions of loyalty to the various organs of the nationalist movement -- the nationalist movement promised a long term strategy to redress economic grievance and injustice, and offered short term possibilities of economic efficacy or at least survival. Although fragmented, tenuous and often ineffectual, a political economy of resistance and survival emerged in Gaza and elsewhere in the Palestinian community which gave a certain degree of meaning and security in an environment where people had very little control over or say in the way political power and economic forces were shaping their lives. The appearance of self rule has brought with it new realities which in turn create new interpretations of the relationships between economic conditions/possibilities and the exercise of power and authority.

In the wake of Oslo, the labor force in Gaza remains unusually dependent on outside political and economic contingencies. There is little internal accountability for the political generation and determination of economic alternatives. Many commentators, noting the pernicious influence of external force in perpetuating local conditions of unaccountable authority and in necessitating large migrations of local laborers to work in the politically dominant economy, have referred to the situation as "bantustanization."[25] Bantustanization refers to the capturing of a labor force and market through the manipulation of a monopoly on coercive force while "internal" mechanisms of administration are set up and recognized by the dominant state to lend an appearance of local accountability and legitimacy to a regime dependent on the dominant state. The South

African apartheid policy of tribal homelands offers the prototype of Bantustanization. In Gaza, however, the dramatic increase in border closings after 1987 (the beginning of the intifada) seems to indicate that the desire for pacification rather than exploitation has informed Israel's attitude toward the Palestinian population.

Noting these trends, Sarah Roy refers to the economic relationships that obtained in Gaza under occupation as "de-development." De-development is defined by Roy as:

> "the deliberate, systematic destruction of an indigenous economy by a dominant power. It is qualitatively different from underdevelopment, which by contrast allows for some form, albeit distorted, of economic development. De-development is an economic policy designed to ensure that there will be no economic base, even one that is malformed, to support an indigenous economic existence."[26]

The political policies that result in this phenomenon are intended not merely, or even mostly, toward the exploitation of a population, but rather to ensure that the dominant political power has unrestricted access to resources, especially land and water, as well labor surpluses at the expense of even the most uni-dimensional development in the colonized space.[27]

As we try to identify a departure point for the economy of Palestinian "self rule," and try to interpret the meanings of continued Israeli control over crucial components of the almost non-existent economic autonomy in the self rule areas, Roy's model offers some useful insights. De-development is characterized by the systematic dismantling of an indigenous economy by external, militarily backed political force. Political domination aims at the exploitation of land and resources rather than exploitation of the population, the latter being considered an inconvenient but for the short term unavoidable obstacle to securing the first objective. In order to maximize the benefits of the land and its resources (water being crucial), the population is alienated from the land both by physical force and by policies designed to minimize the benefits of indigenous production. The population is then left with no option but to work and produce for low wages in the occupier's economy (assisting the cause of direct control of the population) or to immigrate (the policy is designed to encourage attrition, the economic limitations encouraging indigenous inhabitants to seek opportunities elsewhere, but not promoting conditions so bad as to provoke unmanageable unrest -- furthermore, those who leave by apparent choice can be more easily be made to seem to have voluntarily given up their right to return and claim land or other property left behind).

The lack of an integrated economic base in the territory, and the political restrictions inhibiting the growth of one, allow the dominant political economy to cultivate separate

relations with different economic sectors -- i.e. each sector is dependent on Israel for inputs and the distribution and sale of outputs. Political policies imposed by Israel preclude alternatives to this dependency.[28] These isolated and vertical relationships in turn facilitate political control by ensuring that short term economic interests of each group are dependent on its compliance to the terms stipulated the occupying power. The isolation of economic interests in turn facilitates political fragmentation and vis-versa. Likud's intransigence on issues of greater Palestinian economic sovereignty suggest that this model might be useful in understanding Israel's ongoing attitude toward the negotiations which continue to define the boundaries of Palestinian autonomy.

In the OT − and particularly in Gaza -- the intifada upset this balance of the occupation's costs and benefits from the Israeli perspective. Many Israeli's began to realize that suppressing a rebellious population had social and psychological costs as well as economic costs. For a brief period in the late 1980s and early 1990s, active and broad based resistance to Israeli occupation seemed poised to transcend Gaza's economic and social fragmentation. The forging of economic linkages in Gaza society -- in particular by encouraging home production and other strategies of self-sufficiency -- was seen as crucial to breaking Israel's comprehensive and divisive political and economic grip on Gaza. An ideology of economic nationalism was introduced to counter actual fragmentation and (as in the Ghandian model) to undermine the benefits of occupation for the occupier. While these initiatives generated enthusiasm in the early stages of the uprising, they ultimately failed to accomplish the desired political or economic objectives. The structural gaps in the Gaza economy were too great to bridged by such a strategy.

Today, nowhere is the PA's lack of real power more devastatingly suspect than in its ability to regulate and encourage economic activity. Even where the PLO/PA seemed to have roots within various economic sectoral constituencies of the Gaza Strip, this proved illusory both because of the lack of any real foundation or context for sectoral unity among workers or other groups with shared economic interests, and the degree to which existing organizations came to be factional fronts organized to respond to the patronage structure of the PLO rather than address the needs of the constituencies. The fact that none of the unions have statistics regarding membership or sectoral participation figures says as much about the economic woes of Gaza as it does about the structural problems of the factions.

This lack of an economic base capable of encouraging some kind of coherent economic social agenda from the PLO or PA must be considered especially troubling given evidence of the economic rationale behind the initial support of the agreement by Gazans. Ali al Jarbawi provides a statistic which suggests a relationship between acceptance of the declaration of principles and improvements in the overall economic situation: a 65%

majority of the Palestinian population supported the declaration with 74% indicating that they thought the new order would bring about improvements in their economic situation.[29]

In many respects, the economic situation under self rule might be described as the transition from de-development to traditional neo-colonial underdevelopment. However, even in underdeveloped states political leaders and institutions enjoy the internationally recognized rights associated with state sovereignty -- the ability to distribute and protect the sovereign use of the natural resources of the state territory, to make laws, issue currency, to set trade policy and make laws without other states having a direct or absolute right of veto. Whether these powers of economic arbitration and redistribution are exercised in with a governing agenda addressing the economic concerns of a broad national social base or whether the state is run simply on behalf of a small power elite, is another question. The answer to that question depends in part on the political and social groupings upon which the state leaders have based their power. With Palestinian autonomy at present, the political relationship at the formal level in many ways reflects "standard" tendencies in relations between the developed and underdeveloped states in terms of the imbalance in power, but the real economic relationship is still characterized by a regime of resource exploitation and the use of relative political advantages to impose restrictions on the development of a viable Palestinian economic base capable of generating indigenous economic opportunities. Not even much pretense exists to suggest the economic sovereignty of the PA in the self rule areas. The Gaza economy may in fact be on a course toward increased marginalization and eventual obliteration.

Thus the entire basis of economic relations which underlie the agreement -- which given the imbalance of power between the negotiating sides may ultimately define the limits of autonomy as willingly granted by Israel -- is being questioned. Many observers warn that the new arrangement merely represents a contracting out of the occupation in line with the liberalization of the Israeli economy in general; i.e., it represents a restructuring of dependent relations.[30] From this perspective, rather than being an agreement between sovereign entities, the new track represents a process of decolonization with a quasi captive neocolonial relationship being institutionalized in its place.[31] The donor funded basis of the new economy has also fueled competition for external funding, a fragmentation producing situation which channels energy and attention away from economic competition and longer term developmental imperatives.[32]

According to Noam Chomsky, the transition implied at this stage of the peace process reflects a "standard colonial pattern" in which the former colonial powers look to a set of indigenous elites willing to carry out the administrative front of authority while economic exploitation continues.

"It is like the British when they held India. They didn't use British troops. They used 90% Indian soldiers. In Rhodesia, the worst atrocities were carried out by Black mercenaries. And that's exactly Rabin's reason. Then you don't have to worry about all sorts of bleeding hearts and all sorts of vengeful fathers. With the PLO willing to take on this task, the Israelis are perfectly happy to deal with the PLO. Now their job is to protect Arafat and make sure the forces he brings in, (mostly PLA forces from the diaspora), will be able to carry out this task."[33]

From a dependency theory perspective, the PA elite might indeed be identified as members of a compradore class. But even in the post occupation era, Gaza's dependency on Israeli political imperatives seems much more dramatic and comprehensive than the traditional core/periphery relationships described by classical dependency theorists. The PA has few of the tools normally associated with economic sovereignty which might be used to affect and influence the character and social impact of dependent international economic relations. The resources most fundamental to human survival (water and productive land) continue to be extracted not on the basis of trade, but on the brutal facts of uneven military force. A situation of socio-political dependency based not on unequal exchange relations, but on no exchange whatsoever, describes the current condition of so-called Palestinian autonomy.

Contextual Overview

The economic situation has not improved since the signing of the Oslo accords, and the loss of direct resistance against Israel as a base for concerted popular action has further exposed the lack of an economic base sustaining or politicizing horizontal linkages in society. During the intifada, social unity was in part inspired by shared experiences of a deteriorating economic situation across cleavages of class and social grouping. Awareness of the external political factors which were enforcing and even encouraging this decline brought society together in political opposition.[34] In many ways, ironically perhaps, some degree of unity was temporarily forged around an awareness of the lack of an indigenous economic base which was accountable to local market demands and skills, and an awareness of the need to come together to create one.

In the middle and late 1980s, many factors in Gaza promoted increased awareness of the need to unite across social classes and backgrounds to confront an untenable situation. These included: un- and under-employment across all social classes; an agricultural sector being subjected to hostile policies undermining the ability access inputs and market goods (affecting both large and small landholders); the restrictions on the entry

of day wage laborers into Israel; and the closing off of "borders" by the Israelis to restrict the import of what little goods and produce were available for export from Gaza. Survival was at stake. A boycott of Israeli products was encouraged to stimulate local production and strikes were called on a regular basis to alter the balance of costs and benefits of occupation for the Israelis.[35]

While Gaza's pre-occupation economy had been based on subsistence agriculture and trade in traditional commodities (notably citrus), occupation and the migration of labor to Israel upset the balance between production and consumption in the local economy. The middle and late 80s in Gaza saw attempts at institutionalizing networks of home production and other strategies of self reliance that were intended to create internal economic linkages and to break the grip of the occupier's economy.[36] The initial phase of the intifada wrought some advances in this area:

> "The political changes wrought by the Palestinian uprising in its first two years were accompanied by a fundamental attitude change that produced a new development paradigm. This paradigm was characterized by a new emphasis on self reliance. Two key alterations in economic activity took place: (1) a shift in emphasis from consumption to production; and (2) a reorientation in economic strategy from external competition with and employment in Israel to internal, local production for local markets. Although economic activity in Gaza was geared to addressing the immediate needs and burdens imposed by the intifada, it also aimed to redefine development according to local needs and criteria."[37]

One of Cossali's and Robson's informants, advocating the need for a structural economic basis of national mobilization rather than one based on rhetoric, describes the intent of these intended structures:

> "We've got labor and we've got a big internal market, so our economy has to exploit this -- producing labor intensive products that can be consumed locally and that are produced on a small enough scale to avoid posing a threat to Israeli monopolies, initially at least. I'm proposing that we create a whole range of cottage industries -- things that can be made at home and which use our few local natural resources."[38]

The goals included a lessening of economic dependence on Israel. Through a grassroots boycott on Israeli products, and a willingness to endure short term deprivation to achieve political goals, progress was made in this area.[39] However, there are problems in applying this "small is beautiful" approach to grassroots development in Gaza: consumption patterns have changed; there are difficulties associated with getting rid of surpluses when, with so few alternatives, everyone else is producing similar products and sale of products outside Gaza would be impossible; the strategy imposed hardship upon and Israeli retaliation

against the petit bourgeoisie, a traditionally conservative element who were made to feel that they were disproportionately feeling the negative brunt of the strategy;[40] and in the context of the dramatic decline in personal income and savings in the late 1980s, and the overall economic disruption during the intifada, the strategy simply represented "too little, too late."

The onslaught of "peace" has deflected responsibility for the economic situation somewhat. Today, "so many families have reached such a low level of subsistence that the most minimal job assistance -- (the promise of) a few days of work each month serves to calm unrest."[41] Dependency on the PA for jobs means that few will risk family employment with criticism of the PA.[42] Meanwhile, there is little basis within the structures and tools of limited autonomy upon which an opposition might articulate an alternative socio-economic vision to guide self rule governing institutions. Thus any talk of a challenge to the PA's economic policy chokes on its own lack of alternatives. Envy and anger toward the wealthy is prevalent, especially toward the newly arrived diaspora elite, but the lack of an environment in which specific alternatives can be presented, the lack of any real broad societal base to inform either the ruling or opposition ideology, means that this resentment often takes on an Islamist character. The lack of economic sectoral bases of opposition (or for that matter such a base as a group informing the policies of the PA) leaves Islam as one of the few possible bases of social integration and opposition in Gaza. If any opposition is going to be strong enough to challenge the PA's relative local monopoly over coercive force with viable alternatives for popularly based government, some sort of economic or societal base that cuts across the cleavages of Gaza's fragmented civil society must inform the proposed alternatives. This would seem to apply to any viable opposition, or, for that matter, to any regime that hoping to sustain authority into the future.

At present, the various subgroups that could potentially intertwine to create an integrated expression of civil society are retreating separately to protect what little basis of economic and social security they had. Concurrently, they are competing over the limited spoils of the new regime.[43] This encourages the PA leadership to create and manipulate neopatrimonial networks to create vertical linkages with segregated groupings in civil society. Such a situation further undermines the economic and political integration of Gaza's human geography.

The Gaza economy lacks a productive base. Under occupation, the separate integration of Gaza's principle economic sectors in the Israeli economy, combined with the extremely atrophied condition of Gaza's productive base, precluded the integration of

economic sectors within the Gaza Strip. The overwhelming majority productive enterprises tended to depend on subcontracts from Israeli producers and employed fewer than ten people.[44] Enforced by military occupation policies, the fundamental economic exchange and linkages in the stages of production that might have encouraged economic integration took place between Israelis and isolated Palestinian producers rather than between Palestinians. Thus, conscious Israeli policies fragmented the maneuvering space for class and sectoral based political mobilization.

While individuals and small groups in Gaza were responding to changing economic conditions and possibilities throughout the course of the occupation, they did so largely independently of the coordinated efforts of a political or social leadership. Economic change was therefore not accompanied by structural social and political change.

This problem was exacerbated once the Israelis began arresting the leaders of any movement that encouraged mass based organizing to confront the shortcomings of the situation. Combined with Israeli policies repressing all political activity which aimed at building the nationalist constituency, the political constraints on and the lack of immediate economic incentives for united resistance (until the intifada) meant that social, economic and political identification in Gaza remained fragmented. Only the transcendent nationalist message of the PLO created a distant allegiance to the concept of a common leadership. This legacy -- the lack of a basis for economic integration in Gaza combined with the historic lack of an agenda for social integration or economic development within the PLO -- presently hinders the ability of PA elites to unite the population of Gaza around any economic agenda. The political economy is thus characterized by patronage flows rather than any other particular relationship between power and any particular mode of production.

The Economic Trajectory of Gaza

The scope of economic dislocation in Gaza cannot be understood without a brief summary of the territory's erratic economic trajectory. Gaza's economy has been overwhelmingly politically determined, and while outside forces have been decisive, Gazans as a coherent political and economic entity have not confronted the international economy through directly accountable institutions, but rather through the mediation of occupiers: Ottomans, British, Egyptians, and, after 1967 Israelis. In effect, the result has been a process of peripheralization that reached an extreme with Israeli occupation.[45] In varying degrees and forms, the use of political power and incentives to shape resource flows and encourage specific modes of economic production were accountable not to the interests of the local population, but to the interests and ideologies of the occupying powers. This has inhibited

the construction of a local response to the challenges of economic internationalization. Gaza's economic fate has largely been shaped by events and political initiatives designed to serve ideological and economic interests external to the Strip itself.[46]

Before 1948, the Gaza province included the districts of Gaza and Beer Sheba. In 1948, all but 2.5% of the province fell under Israeli control. Not only was the area that became the Gaza Strip cut apart from its traditional ecological milieu and forced to bear a burdensome influx of refugees, but the development of a productive and integrated economy was stifled by militarily enforced occupation policies -- first under the Egyptians, and then the Israelis. The population of the remaining strip of land under Arab control was 280,000 with 190,000 of those being refugees.[47] Between 1948 and 1967, Gaza was administered by Egypt. Gaza's major trading partners during the period, besides Egypt, were in Eastern Europe, a situation which reflected political imperatives in Cairo.[48] A survey of twenty thousand refugees in 1949 found that 18% were skilled and semi-skilled workers, 17% professionals, merchants and landowners, and the other 65% were farmers or unskilled workers.[49]

The results of the 1948 Arab-Jewish war had severed traditional trading links and created a large refugee population in Gaza which had been alienated from its traditional economic base.[50] After 1948, trade between the West Bank and Gaza was all but non-existent. Besides market restrictions, the lack of natural resources or sources of energy discouraged the development of industry. The establishment of a duty free zone in the Strip and the tendency to look the other way when it came to smuggling activities encouraged tourism from Egypt.[51] Low customs duties and a free trade zone in Gaza encouraged trade.[52] However, there was little productive investment and Gaza was in fact merely a stopping off point for goods to Egypt with no value added locally. By 1960, 83% of the working age refugee population was officially unemployed, as compared with 35% of the working age "native" population of Gaza.[53] This may be seen as reflecting the lack of productive investment and the scarcity of land in a traditionally agricultural/pastoral society. However, it also reflected the hope of many refugees that they would soon return to their homes which were now in Israel proper -- a hope which encouraged a refusal by many refugees to settle and become economically active in their new environment. Some sources put the pre-67 per capita income at around 80$ per month,[54] and many refugees were establishing a dependence on a growing UNRWA bureaucracy.[55] As the population grew, so did the imbalance between already plentiful and under-utilized human resources and scarce, over-utilized natural resources. By 1966, citrus products accounted for 89.4 of the Gaza Strip's exports, "a clear indicator of Gaza's economic vulnerability and structural underdevelopment."[56]

The Israeli occupation led to the erosion of what limited opportunities for enrichment and mobility had been gained by traditional and professional middle classes after years of Egyptian control.[57] Once again, the inhabitants of Gaza would have to start facing another direction to see how they would make ends meet -- trade was redirected toward Israel. The economy of Gaza was integrated into the Israeli economy in line with Israeli interests. The system of integration was two tiered and severely imbalance; it was "based on a protectionist system of military orders and taxation procedures which effectively prevented Palestinian business from competing with Israeli producers for Israeli as well as foreign markets."[58] The occupation also placed severe restraints on the traditional economy. Water sources were capped and severe restrictions placed on fishing, which had previously been an important sector in the economy of the Gaza Strip.[59] The long term impact included: heightened dependency on external sources of employment (leading to migration and immigration and stress on the traditional family structures); an undermining of the independent economic base of peasants through the commercialization of agriculture; an eclipsing of the traditional crafts industries; and, the replacement of traditional economic relations with those determined by more immediate market imperatives.

A huge trade deficit between Israel and Gaza emerged which was financed by the import of Palestinian labor to work in the Israeli economy. One immediate impact of occupation on the Gaza Strip following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was that per capita income increased rapidly as laborers from Gaza migrated to work in the Israeli economy.[60] Accordingly, household consumption also increased.[61] The result was a proletarianization of a considerable portion of the local labor potential and the introduction of new consumer attitudes and expectations. Historic grievances became less ameliorable in combined conditions of unaccountable labor relations and increasingly falling real wages, encouraging left wing groups to try to promote sectoral unions, popular organizations and other structures reinforcing class consciousness. The value of wages was declining rapidly for a workforce not allowed to organize and which had no political influence in the country in which they were forced to work. Also, workers were exposed daily to the vast gap between the level and quality of services and infrastructure in Gaza and that in Israel. Complementing Sarah Roy's insight into Gaza's "de-development," the military occupation in some ways served as a way of disciplining low cost labor in the short term interests of Israeli capital and general development.

The occupation enforced restrictions that had been placed on Palestinian investment on the grounds that such investment would compete with Israeli economic interests. Israeli Journalist Asher Davidi notes that:

"A whole generation of Israeli Manufacturers tried to crush every possibility of capitalist industrial development in the territories. The Israeli occupation authorities operated as an arm of the Israeli bourgeoisie, making it impossible for a Palestinian capitalist to obtain the thousand and one approvals required for establishing any large business without producing a document stating that he would not be competing with an Israeli company. In this way, the authorities prevented the establishment of dairies, cement factories, food factories, and textile plants."[62]

The study by Fischer et al reports that:

"Among the military policies that have been reported as blocking the opportunities for development of the industrial sector in the West Bank and Gaza are:
- A licensing policy that discouraged the establishment of large industrial enterprises (abandoned as of the beginning of 1991, according to Israel);
- Military restraints on the movement of materials into and out of the territories;
- Limited local banking for the financing of local industry
- Restraints on the development of free trade zones, other industrial zones, and related infrastructure;
- Restraints on the development of supporting public institutions."[63]

While economic growth was initially rapid under the occupation regime, serious structural imbalances characterized the relationship between the Israeli and Palestinian economies -- separate economies which remained subject to different levels of political restriction and regulation. These structural imbalances included: "(i) the heavy dependence on outside sources of employment for the OT labor force; (ii) an unusually low degree of industrialization; (iii) a trade structure heavily dominated by trading links with Israel and a large trade deficit; (iv) inadequacies in the provision of public infrastructure and services."[64] While quality of life indicators showed improvement during the twenty-six years of occupation, this reflected trends in the region in general and should not be attributed to any benign effect of the occupation itself. While per capita income was higher in Gaza than in the region as a whole, real buying power was eventually less.[65] In the context of the customs union, funds were extracted from the occupied territories and reinvested elsewhere within Israel's economy and social and service infrastructure. The World Bank described this policy as "fiscal compression."[66] These and other political restrictions imposed by Israel impeded the development of economies of scale.[67]

In the aftermath of the 1967 war, some 300,000 Palestinians migrated out of the OT and emigration continued at 1% per annum afterwards; "nevertheless, the Palestinian labor force in the OT grew" by 100% in the 25 years between 67 and 93 while employment opportunities grew only 25% in the same period.[68] The high demand for skilled labor in the Gulf encouraged a migration of 40,000 people from the OT to the Gulf in the 1973-

1982 period.[69] Of those migrating to work in Israel, by the early 1990s 68% were employed in construction and 12% in the agricultural sector.[70] After a period of growth in household income during the seventies and into the very early 1980s, "the economy of the occupied territories is in the process of adapting to a new situation of reduced household income."[71]

While products in Gaza's shops were overwhelmingly made in or shipped via Israel, the gap in the real buying power of Israelis and Palestinians was growing. A 1988 study by Shadid and Seltzer documents that Palestinians saw their economic conditions deteriorate during the first half of the 1980s.[72]   At the same time, severe restrictions on water use and investment were creating greater dependence on outside sources of income and increases in the working age population were creating greater unemployment pressures.[73] The pumping of water from Gaza into Israel proper placed severe strains on the supplies, leaving water resources too salinated for human consumption and agricultural purposes.[74]   Population pressures, inadequate services and external exploitation of resources were leading to a situation of general environmental degradation and placing extreme constraints on the growth of agricultural production and employment.

Thus, the intifada broke out in a climate of job market shrinkage which frustrated newer entrants into the labor market. The economic instability and social uncertainty of the intifada reached its climax during the crisis which developed over Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Border closings became longer and restrictions targeted against specific segments of the population deemed as security threats (for example, closing the border for all males under thirty). During the height of the Gulf War, Gaza's Palestinian residents were subject to over one and a half months of twenty four hour curfew, a curfew enforced by the IDF's shoot on sight policy which aimed at ensuring compliance.[75]   Although Israel quickly overcame the effects of the war, the OT:

> "continued to suffer. The entire economy of the OT was brought to a halt as businesses ceased to open and farmers had been unable to water, harvest of market their crops. By the time the war ended and the curfew was lifted, the OT was working at 25%. The Estimated cost of the curfew to the OT was between $150 and $200 million, and total losses throughout the year were projected to be in excess of $600 million from a national income that had reached $2.4 billion in 1988" but which had been in decline as the intifada dragged on."[76]

This situation was exacerbated by the return of 300,000 refugees to the OT in the wake of the Gulf War.[77] Gradually, an increasing portion of the population was threatened with economic and political superfluousness. On the eve of the protocol, the Palestinian

economy could be described as "service and agriculture based, with agriculture contributing around one third of the GDP in the last several years."[78]

Small, underdeveloped enterprises dominate Gaza's private productive sector. Industrial establishments account for 14% of the labor force working in Gaza, but the typical industry is "cottage" -- i.e. family owned and employing few people. At the same time, Israeli restrictions on the movement of goods and services out of Gaza place further severe restraints on any possibility of export led growth in the Gaza economy. The ideal of a new Singapore in Gaza, promoted by many diaspora Politicians on returning to Gaza, is therefore a pipe-dream under the current provisional conditions. While there is potential in regional markets, Gaza is at present poorly positioned to take advantage of them. Goods continue to flow in from Israel and increasingly from Egypt, both these countries place severe restrictions on the import of Gazan goods and services. Trade deficits are therefore accruing rapidly.

In the future, if there is no productive investment in Gaza, the PA will lose an important potential source of tax revenue that could be placed into infrastructure and service projects which would in turn perhaps encourage further investment. Such a situation would also still not address the onerous conditions placed on the movement of agricultural produce and the products of small enterprise in Gaza.

The economic situation in Gaza has continued to decline in Gaza since the signing of the Oslo accords.

> "Approximately 12 percent of Gaza's population, or at least 102,000 people, are now dependent on some form of cash or food assistance. Of this number, it appears that approximately 40,000 were impoverished since the signing of the agreement."[79]

Whoever controls this influx of funds has thus considerable resources with which to cultivate factionalized and dependent relationships. Add to this the dependency on the PA and external labor markets (Israel) for jobs and the scope of economic dependence on the PA becomes clear. Roy identifies the economic crisis as the driving factor behind instability in Gaza. Immediately prior to the Gulf crisis, there were between forty-five and fifty thousand Gaza Palestinians working in Israel -- a figure which was already down from a height of 70,000 before the intifada. These 45,000 to 50,000 workers were supporting close to 250,000 people.[80] Since the signing of the accords, the number of Gazans working in Israel has shrunken resulting in the dramatic exhaustion of savings (once a bright spot in the local economic indicators[81]) and unemployment. The situation reached a point of extreme crisis in the wake of Israel's response of collective punishment

and increased separation following the spate of four suicide bombings in late February/early March 1996. Yassir Arafat warned of impending hunger in Gaza.[82]

The Gaza economy has long been largely determined by political events, political interference and hostile manipulation. The result is an almost total lack of viable and sustainable internal employment opportunities (exacerbated by growing population pressures), severe ecological restrictions on agricultural production, and a dependency on various external sources of income (workers remittances from the Gulf states, international NGOs--most notably UNRWA, and daily migrations to work in the Israeli economy, usually for one third less wage than Israeli counterparts in the same job). While growing economic hardship and a reduction of employment opportunities in the late 1980s and early 1990s seemed to unite Gazans around an awareness of the need to resist a government who bore a responsibility for the common plight, the occupation and the hardship associated with it have ceased to serve as a basis for mass political action.

Economic Interpretations of Self Rule: The View from Below

Within the public sector of the "self rule" economy, the PA has proven unable to ensure that funds intended for public services actually result in the provision of required basic services. As the direction of external funding shifts from NGOs to the PA, social services are contracting as the organizations which met many daily needs under occupation run out of funds and Palestinians lose access to services in Israeli controlled zones.[83] Whereas during the occupation many NGOs found that external funding was based on their ability to show results in a given community or sector, PA funding finds itself accountable to the pressures of keeping an elite coalition together and at the same time meeting external demands upon its limited powers and resources for security and stability. This change in the direction of funding with few tangible benefits to the local population has buttressed claims of corruption, incompetence and cronyism within the PA.[84]

Absolutely no mass based constituency has so far benefited from Oslo. None. In light of worsening economic conditions, why would any Palestinian not directly attached to the provisional regime feel compelled to identify with it ? Certainly the ability to participate in a political situation in which one can influence the prerogatives of state in relation to the economic security of its citizens must be considered a meaningful component of what the agreement has defined as "self rule?"

Amira Hass, the Gaza correspondent for the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* relates a revealing anecdote:

> "In the early days of April 1994, when the first Palestinian policemen began to arrive and (base themselves in) an ex-Israeli police building, a group of

Palestinian refugees, mostly from Beach Camp, gathered curiously around Israeli soldiers and policemen preparing to evacuate. Like former workers in Israel, they were waiting for Arafat. "And what do you expect him to achieve?" they were asked. "To convince Rabin to open the borders and let us return to our jobs in Israel," they replied.[85]

This expectation had its basis in Article 7 of the Cairo agreement which calls for the free movement of labor over the borders subject to the possibility of occasional and temporary restrictions with proper notification.[86] The current circumstances reflect the inability of the Oslo framework to meet even this short term goal. While it was always the case that Palestinians, for the most part, took jobs that Israelis were not inclined to accept, rising levels of unemployment in Israel make the import of Palestinian labor less rational to Israeli politicians. Unemployment in Israel increased from 4.8% to 11% in 1992.[87] This of course creates a tremendous disincentive for Israeli politicians to uphold article 7 of the Cairo Agreement. Hass also notes that

> "as fewer Gazans are allowed to enter Israel, the more, it seems, they forget the physical and emotional strain involved in working there. Some complain that before peace 'broke out', the procedures were less harsh and humiliating."[88]

Given the depressed state of the Gaza economy and the continued dependence on goods produced in Israel, wage levels in Gaza simply do not meet cost of living. Since day labor in Israel, while offering on average one third less for Palestinians than Israeli workers, still more closely reflects the cost of living levels given Gaza's continued political subjection to first world price levels in spite of an extremely "de-developed" economic base, workers are discouraged from taking more prestigious but lower paying jobs in Gaza. Besides placing tremendous stress on poorer families in Gaza, this distortion in the local economy has the effect of creating a kind of "brain drain" of Gaza's more educated and creative productive base, who are forced to accept menial jobs in Israel.

The provisional regime also threatens several economic coping strategies without providing immediately satisfying or promising alternatives. Previous bases of public to private transfers -- UNRWA support to "1948" refugees, a limited amount of need based social benefits from the Israeli civil administration, the redistribution of *Zaqat* by religious institutions, and martyr money which had been distributed by the PLO from outside -- all created special interests serviced by institutions scheduled to be taken over by PA authorities.[89] Extended family solidarity informed the direction of private to private transfers of wealth and patterns of investment in material and human resources.

Remittances from workers abroad, especially the Gulf states, constituted an important source of income which was lost after the Gulf War.[90]

Such factionalized coping strategies promoted little economic solidarity within civil society institutions and continues to reflect the developmental disorientation which seems to be at the base of much of the factionalism in Palestinian society -- disorientation which has been driven by Israeli policies as well PLO strategies. It also facilitates factionalized responses to PA authority. This in turn allows the PA to take an approach to co-optation which does not include the articulation of a social agenda and/or the defining of a developmental basis for the legitimacy of its rule.

Arafat himself has, however, noted the link between economic conditions and political stability in the OT on several occasions. It would certainly be one of the central contradictions of "self rule" if autonomy for the provisional regime did not include the ability to shape the political economic environment, or at least formulate effective responses to society's economic concerns using various features available to other governments, including diplomatic initiatives and control over taxation, customs, and the determination of economic imperatives and linkages to shape market forces to some internal advantage, comparative and otherwise.

The size of the labor force in Gaza currently stands at about 130, 000 and is poised to increase dramatically.[91] In the occupied territories, 48.8% of the population is under fifteen years of age.[92] At the end of 1994, 21,294 workers had permits for work in Israel, and this figure does not account for those who sought but failed to find work over the "green line".[93] Given the rapid expansion of the Palestinian labor force, Salah Abd-al Shafi predicts that at least 100,000 workers from Gaza will have to cross at Erez daily if basic needs are to be satisfactorily met in the Strip. Abd-al Shafi also argues that as of the end of 1994, the Israeli economy will only require about 40,000 workers from Gaza.[94] Assuming that demographic trends from the early 80s remain constant, Fischer et al report that the Palestinian economy would have to create 29,000 jobs a year for the next five years if it were to be able to make up for the loss of jobs in Israel over that time.[95] Recent trends, including Israeli importation of cheap labor from East Asia and the political pressure to crack down hard on Palestinians as a collective punishment for suicide attacks by Islamic militants in Israel, make it even less likely that anywhere near that number of workers will be able to return to jobs inside Israel. It is also often overlooked that even now after the agreement, the Israeli state still controls about thirty percent of the Gaza Strip. This thirty percent includes some of the territory's most fertile and productive land and produces considerable Israeli exports to Europe.[96]

The Gazan Economy in the Wake of the Agreement

The impact of these various changes on Palestinian society in general and in Gaza in particular was necessarily complex -- the new order applied to Gaza at once covered up and exposed social and developmental contradictions. The Palestinian leaders who had placed themselves at the center of the national consciousness after the *fedayeen* ascendancy within the PLO in 1969 now found themselves under siege in the realm of local politics, powerless to affect improvements in the fundamental economic issues which had been a prime condition of the local enthusiasm over the return of the PLO to Gaza.

"One area in which the Palestinians did not achieve improvement was in that of labor, and Israel continues to control the flow of Palestinian workers into Israel."[97] While Abed argues that it is ridiculous to base Palestinian development over the long term on dependence on the Israeli labor market, in the short term it is a necessity.

According to the 1993 declaration of principles, "the PA would assume direct responsibility for education, culture, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism."[98] But as Hanan Ashrawi pointed out upon seeing the agreement, those who signed it had obviously not been living under occupation.[99] Many of these functions, education for example, were already administered by Palestinians, and using its powers and authorities "with regard to other spheres not transferred," the Israeli authorities continued to close schools after the signing of the agreement of August 29, 1994.[100] While the Israelis gave the PLO the right to administer what Palestinians in the OT already had, "Israeli control or veto remained in the more strategic areas of water, energy, financial development, transport and communications, trade, industry, environment, labor, media and international aid." In other words, "Israel would divest itself of the expensive functions of government but retain control of matters directly related to economic development. (Direct taxation can be considered an expense, since a climate of widespread politically legitimate tax evasion had made revenues increasingly marginal to Israel's costs of occupation.)"[101] "Total control over water resources remains in Israeli hands, and all military orders -- such as those requiring permission to plant tomatoes and eggplants -- continue intact."[102] Roy notes in her book that the various agreements have only abrogated 70 of the nearly 1000 military occupation order which were used to govern Gaza.[103] Furthermore, "there is little likelihood that the PA will succeed in developing tourism, one of the transferred sectors, when it cannot grant licenses for entrepreneurs to build hotels or tourist centers outside municipalities, and lacks access to adequate sources of water or control over border crossings."[104]

The economic restructuring from above is in many respects determined by outside appraisals of the efficiency of certain models designed to bring employment in Gaza up to a

livable status quo without exceeding the limits of what is politically acceptable for any particular Israeli government. The imbalance of power seems to have led to a withdrawal without concessions on the part of the Israelis. Current proposals for restructuring of dependent relations in line with Israeli wishes and American support largely follows the model proposed by Israeli economist Edra Sadran.[105] Sadran has argued that the traditional agricultural base of the Gaza Strip should be allowed to deteriorate and be replaced with industrial agriculture which emphasized the production of non-food plants (flowers). Ornamental plant production is labor intensive and costs in Israel were high. Since the markets were in the hands of Israeli importers, very little would be lost to the Israeli economy by way of low cost competition. Before 1991, there were no cash crops of flowers at all in Gaza; production was introduced by the Israeli military authority in the wake of the Gulf War.[106] As of 1994, there were 140 greenhouses in the Strip dedicated to the cultivation of ornamentals.[107] However, flower production "is a very water intensive activity and therefore highly inappropriate for Gaza given its serious water problem."[108]

The Sadran plan also called for the building of industrial parks on the Gaza-Israeli border (re -- on the Gaza side of the border, thus displacing agricultural lands and/or living areas in an already overburdened ecology). Rather than migrate over the border into Israel, Gazan workers would commute to pockets of infrastructure which would allow Israeli and Palestinian capital to utilize low cost labor in Gaza while removing the costs of occupation to the Israeli state. The problem with such a plan is that it gives a basis for denying economic sovereignty to the PA. Sadran had advocated the establishment of industrial parks modeled on projects similar to those in Taiwan and Mexico (pockets of infrastructure). Since infrastructure for the whole strip would cost too much, the Israelis could aid in building up certain areas. The World Bank's prescriptions fit Sadran's exactly. Furthermore, instead of labor migration, it called for developing a system of sub-contracting between Palestinian capitalists, who would be allowed more opportunities for investment inside Gaza than before (liberalizing of licensing agreements), and sectors of Israeli capital (of course, the nature of these investments would be controlled to suit the needs of specific sectors of the Israeli economy). Given the differences in scale between the two economies to begin with, even Sadran concedes that concern over competition from Palestinian producers was nonsense.[109]

In a somewhat superficial sense, the current economic transition represents a shift from a colonial to a neo-colonial relationship.

"Instead of blocking all development in the territories and bringing the Palestinians into Israel for cheap labor, it makes a lot more sense to keep workers in the territories and move the assembly plants over there, and then exploit people unnoticed. Israelis wouldn't have to worry walking around their cities, and they could keep control of the resources and thus create a semi-colonial area...this was openly discussed in the Israeli media."[110]

In few other cases, however, is such a blatantly militarily imposed relationship given such international political support or heralded as the model for peace and stability. The problem with the relationship is that it is still based on politically imposed conditions of dependency. The opportunities for productive development outside of these industrial zones would still be subject to Israel's political control over borders and trade, Gazans would still be largely dependent on Israeli goods (although Egyptian goods are increasingly available in Gaza) and indeed, Israel would be inclined to protect advantages it gained by these zones -- economic interest might make it more difficult for Israeli politicians to make the concessions that would allow the Gaza economy to become less dependent on such zones. In this model, self rule becomes a device blunting the accountability of Israeli capital in relations with Palestinian labor.

As has been noted, the occupation's civil and military bureaucracy was used to stifle competition with Israeli economic interests. The result today is that Israel enjoys comparative advantages in all the crucial sectors of Gaza's economy -- primarily citrus fruits. Subsidies to Israeli producers and strict border controls reinforce these relative disadvantages. Given the high costs of living in Gaza, one must wonder whether wages could ever sink low enough in Gaza to offset these financial and political subsidies to Israeli production, especially since the Palestinian economy is subject to Israeli monetary restrictions, making expansion on public spending dependent on outside aid. Furthermore -- more important to understanding the development of a political economy of meaning which encourages common identification with the PA regime -- the continued lack of integration reflected in the relationship between society and any productive economy is being reinforced by regional political and economic imperatives as well as by the neopatrimonial practices of the PA. Elmusa and El-Jafaari call for greater economic integration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.[111] Certainly, assuming that national identity and solidarity in the state building context has an economic foundation, such an integration would encourage a sense of sharing a material basis for future common action.

For many Palestinians, the success or failure of the current track of the peace process, and with it the legitimacy of the current provisional regime, will be measured in terms of its impact on personal economy. In this context, the fact that living conditions

have deteriorated since the signing of the Oslo accords bodes ill for the ability of the forces empowered by the agreement to secure the stability and economic growth and development that would prove conducive to peace in the region over the long term. "Despite the subsequent agreements reached in Paris and Cairo, and the $2.4 billion fund offered by international donors, by the beginning of 1995 hopes of economic development had foundered, living standards were still falling and the donors themselves were declaring their strategy a failure."[112] Rather than granting any basis for the meaningful policy maneuverability which constitutes a relative degree of economic sovereignty, the agreements basically pass responsibility onto the PLO for the administration of Palestinian welfare as Israel restructures its economic relationship with the territories. As only a fraction of the promised aid money has trickled into the PA administered areas, few new jobs have been created in Gaza and people have not been allowed to return to their jobs in Israel, the result has been a loss of faith in the opportunities supposedly been presented by the agreement.

The PA has no ability to influence monetary policy, and its ability to determine its import and export needs are restricted by Israeli protection of its own interests as drawn into the accord as well as by the lack of reliable statistics to determine overall policy.[113] In fact, this lack of clear statistics together with the ability to use the institutions set up by the agreement to determine import policy in certain key areas, particularly those related to infrastructure development opens the door for collusion between wholesale importers and PA officials. While the PA has no powers in the area of foreign relations, it can go abroad to seek donor funding and economic agreements.[114] However, the productive opportunities of this right is perhaps being lost in corruption and patronage. In general the possibilities for corruption and manipulation in the context of unreliable information are great. Elmusa and El-Jafaari note situations in which the agreement might incur costs on the already burdened consumer, who is in a weak position in the majority of Gaza's households. They point out specific incidents in which contracts were given without public auction in cement, communications and petroleum, and in which particular merchants were favored.[115] According to economic researcher Aisling Byrne, the process works like this:

"several key deal brokers -- Israelis and Palestinians -- have made a specialty of arranging arrangements (sic) under which a single Israeli firm is awarded a lucrative contract to supply a certain product throughout the Palestinian autonomous areas. Competing firms are frozen out. In return, the single supplying firm usually pays a handsome commission to the deal brokers...a person responsible for making sure that only approved monopolies import products (is) Mohammed Dahlan, head of the preventative security forces in Gaza.
"Such deals already cover fuel (supplied by the Israeli company *Dor Energy* for a reported $100 million per year), cement (supplied by the Israeli

company *Nesher*), and there are similar reports of deals (sometimes with two or three suppliers) for steel, frozen meat, paint, flour, gas, cigarettes, communicaitons and computer harware/software. Many raw materials are now supplied exclusively by *Sharket El-Bahar* (an 'independent' holding company with reported close and direct links with Arafat and the PA) which is buying shares in a wide range of companies -- described by one economist as 'branches of El-Bahar with direct links to the PA.' As for the money, according to the Jerusalem Report, 'part of the commission...is channeled into an unaudited fund controlled by Arafat himself. Arafat does not use the fund for personal purposes, but rather to boost his popularity."[116]

According to economist Saleh 'Abd al-Shafi:

> "Like a cancer, these monopolies are slowly penetrating every sector...the centalization is even worse than in the former Soviet Union. In the former Soviet Union, benefits were for the state bureaucracy, the emerging picture in Palestine, however, is for the benfit of pseudo-official 'economic gangs.'"

A new socio-economic class is emerging whose close links to the PA and Israel give it significant political power, as alliances based on political and economic power are firmly cemented and used to shape an elitist context of self rule.[117] As in transitions elsewhere on the globe, new and often reinvented elites are using the resources of the state to allow for the primitive accumulation of capital and targeting these privileges tactically in ways that allow the regime to hold its power. In Gaza, this is done through the new bases of factionalism.

The initial agreements show that Israel has reduced the costs of occupation without really giving up the most notable benefits. Meanwhile, the PA acceptance of the stipulation in Article XI(8) of the August 1994 agreement -- which states that they are responsible for "any shortfall in tax collection that is not covered by the donor countries" and all expenditures beyond the six months agreed upon budget -- effectively creates "a budget deficit before there is even the prospect of a Palestinian state."[118] The Israeli demands that Palestinians "harmonize their tax and customs regime with the high levels in force in Israel," and limit direct trade between Gaza the outside (re: Egypt and Jordan only), to the servicing of "market needs" place severe restrictions on the ability of the PA to attract investment. These problems are exacerbated by the fact that shipments of goods and services are still subject to politically motivated border closings, subsidized Israeli competition, and discriminatory enforcement of quality inspection standards. The Cairo agreement added insult to injury by adding two conditions protecting Israel from competition and the payment of reparations for damages incurred during the occupation.

"(A)rticle VII accepted that all laws and military orders imposed by Israel should remain in force unless amended or abridged in accordance with the agreement. The PLO thus accepted the legitimacy of a vast number of military orders used to constrain the economic activity of the OT."[119] (Some of these military orders were listed earlier in this chapter.) Under the current terms, the PA must assume all fiscal responsibility for those spheres omitted by the agreement.[120]

Abed points out that while the results of the Paris Protocol might be considered better than could have been expected for the Palestinians, the problem remains that the Fatah based administration was neither technically, administratively nor institutionally prepared to manage its economic responsibilities during the transition. A situation of near-anarchy has been the result. The role of institutions are the cornerstone of any discussion of the effectiveness of the transition in the self rule areas. This requires legal and bureaucratic reform which the Arafat administration seems until now unwilling or unable to implement. In spite of the talk of private enterprise being the engine of Palestinian development, the role of the fiscal and legal administration in facilitating economic activity, coordinating tax systems and managing aid and other sectors of development is unavoidable. Effective administration must be executed in the context of efficient institutions and in line with a strategy developed in accordance with an accountable understanding of the general interests of the community, rather than a specific faction maintaining a relationship with power.[121] In the absence of institutional capability, this is not apt to be the case.

In light of the Israeli policy of "separation," Palestinian options may have even been reduced by the signing of the agreement, and in spite of the donor sponsored facelift of some parks and roads and a relative boom in construction (see Roy, "Accommodation or Alienation" for the shortcomings of construction employment), productive long term employment prospects remain grim for many if not most Gazans. Conditions in Gaza remain difficult for the majority.

Patronage and Strategies for Legitimizing Power: From Neopatriarchy to the Neopatrimonial Regime

In his essay on "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics," Rex Brynen argues that the small carrot and big stick approach to consensus building does not reflect any necessarily inherent feature of Arab/Palestinian political culture; rather, it reflects the organizational possibilities and limitations on the PA at the present time. Neopatrimonial politics is seen as one of the few tools available for overcoming the break in national consensus following the Oslo accords. In neopatrimonial politics, public office represents

"an important mechanism of private rent seeking; state resources (and the state's ability to shape resource flows) are used to lubricate patron client networks. At the same time, the state's ability to extract resources and regulate behaviors creates conditions under which the supply of, and access to, scarce goods can be manipulated -- the fundamental foundation of the power of patronage."[122]

Inasmuch as neopatrimony represents the connection of modern state like institutions to the quasi-traditional patriarchal framework, the promotion of patriarchy might also be seen as a way of relieving a state with limited resources of the responsibility for providing welfare for its citizens.[123] While such a strategy is certainly not discouraged by the dynamics of traditional Palestinian politics, it is precisely such features which define not only the practice, but also the limits of power available to PA elites under the Oslo regime. The situation exposes the facade of elections, and the irony of the situation might be that it would encourage and entrench the very kinds of institutional tendencies which in the end leave few people satisfied. These tools might not imply access to the quantity and quality of resources needed to stabilize and sustain the functioning legitimacy of the new order from the perspective of the Palestinian in the street. Furthermore, the neopatrimonial use of resources to hold together a dominant political order or coalition may not produce the desired outputs in terms of stability considering the structural crisis of authority within other sub-national social affiliations in the Palestinian social space. The rise of neopatrimonialism in Gaza does not seem likely to facilitate the preconditions of a stable political economy of meaning.[124]

Conclusion

The only power possessed by the PA in the area of what might be described as foreign policy is that its representatives are allowed to go abroad and seek economic aid and investment. However, instability, talk of corruption, and a peace process which seems stalled create a climate not conducive to attracting foreign investment. It is a tragic irony that economic isolation and the political instability associated with current economic hardships produce conditions which make amelioration even less likely, thus encouraging a downward spiral. Salama A. Salama reports that:

"When Yassir Arafat, president of the Palestinian National Authority, visited Germany recently to ask German industrialists and investors to invest in the Palestinian territories, he was told by the president of the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry that in light of the present political situation in the region, it would be illogical for German private

sector companies to make any long term investments in Palestinian territory."[125]

It seems unlikely that the PA will be able to emphasize the growth of the local economy or developmental issues as a basis for its legitimation over the near term. Under the terms of the agreement, the mechanisms of accountability inferred by self rule apparently do not include the ability of Palestinian "citizens" to influence the political mechanisms which shape the economic environment. One impact of this is that the chances of Gazans presenting a united front to encourage the articulation of a PA social and economic agenda in Gaza are slim. Instead, political compliance may be rewarded with the patronage largess of autonomous institutions. Furthermore, one must note the extreme dependence of the autonomous structures on outside funding -- a situation made more ominous by the fact that these structures offer the primary source of employment within the strip. The costs of the Palestinian police forces might quickly run as high as "$500 million a year, not to mention the cost of a PA civil bureaucracy of 27,000 employees."[126]

> "The idea that the PA can financially cover such non-productive sectors from locally generated revenue while running much needed services is wholly imaginary....What such an inflated public sector (in whichnearly 70% of all jobs are security related) actually portends is an interim period every bit as economically and politically conditioned by donor money as was its its Gaza-Jericho pre-amble."[127]

While Palestinian regime is thus dependent on external donors, society depends on the PA for its basic needs.

There is a danger that anti-developmental incentives and modes of economic behavior based around short term adaptation and survival strategies will be ingrained and carried into any future independent Palestinian political entity which will make it less likely that Gaza will be able to transcend dependency on and determination by the Israeli political policy and economic realities in the future. Conditions of economic fragmentation are unlikely to be resolved and the productive economy will remain largely outside the regulatory scope of Palestinian politicians. The use of industrial zones may mean that relations between labor and employers will not be arbitrated by Palestinian authorities or subject to internal laws and procedure. In any case, such issues have not been addressed and the author is unaware of any models upon which such issues might be resolved. The inability or unwillingness of either the patrons of the Oslo process or the partners to the agreement to address the continued structural inadequacies of Palestinian economy (many if not most of them politically imposed or reinforced, others having to do with the short term imperatives of the PA itself) may contribute decisively to political instability in Gaza in the

future. At any rate, economic integration will not serve as a basis encouraging a broad base supporting integrated social identification with the PA regime.

It seems possible that continued economic hardship and despair will discourage local identification with the current PA regime. Whether the situation will lead to social resignation and dependency on outside aid for survival (combined with a basically repressive paradigm of "self rule" which keeps the population listless in order to control it), or will eventually encourage dramatic countermobilization from below -- "the specter of superfluous man" -- remains to be seen. It seems very unlikely that developmental and political normalization along the lines of the Singapore model so often bandied around by PA elites, or for that matter anything close to it, will be achieved.

Abed hints that high expectations in the context of the agreements' inevitably long implementation time, the failure to improve real conditions, a "disillusionment with aid prospects" and the limited ability to facilitate employment opportunities have contributed to "economic recession and political malaise." Leaders were appointed from Tunis and did not receive adequate preparation, many appointments "do not inspire great confidence" while highly qualified people have not been called upon. "The appointments process has been murky to say the least: one is unclear as to the constitutional basis on which the PNA or its individual members have been appointed, not to mention the legal framework for the discharge of their public responsibilities."[128] The stable incorporation of "incoming PLO governing structures, such as they are, into what is essentially a rebellious -- but open and democratic -- civil society in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" seems in the near term as likely to be based on their ability to affect meaningful economic improvements as on rituals of accountability. While elections may have ameliorated frustrations over the short term by offering the satisfaction of recognition, limitations on effective authority make the prospects for near term economic improvement and stability slight.

---

[1] David Bar-Ilan of the Jerusalem Post has argued that such assertions are falsehoods, pointing out that central Cairo and even parts of Tel-Aviv are more densely populated than the Gaza Strip. What he fails to understand is that while these cities are quite organically integrated economically and socially into much larger environments, the Gaza Strip is a densely inhabited and economically depressed area politically isolated from its surrounding environment. It is an economically isolated ecological unit, which is in a losing competition with Israel for access to common resources. It does not have equal access to inputs from the regional environment and even under more politically ideal conditions the proper comparison is not between a territory and an inner city but between two regions subject to distinct geographically delineated political regimes. Thus the appropriate comparison would be one between Gaza and Israel or Egypt and not between Gaza and Tel-Aviv or Cairo.

[2] The ability of states like Taiwan and Singapore to invoke economic sovereignty to construct and manipulate a niche in the global capitalist system and access world markets in spite of a relatively weak political position has played a crucial role in their success. The ability to plan, set monetary policy and subsidize have played important roles in the development of these economies.

[3] Cossali and Robson, p. 157.

[4] See "Paris Protocol" Article III, paragraph 12. Riding between Jerusalem and Gaza on Jan. 21, 1996, I sat next to an older Palestinian-American on his way to visit family in Gaza. He informed me that Gaza

was the cheapest place in the world to buy a new Mercedes, and that he was thinking about buying one there and having it shipped to the states.

5 See the discussion of the Paris Protocol a few paragraphs down for details.

6 See Gaza-Jericho Agreement: Annex II, Article IIB, sub-paragraph 24b. See also Roy (1995book), p. 325.

7 See "Gaza-Jericho First," Annex I, Article XI, especially paragraph 4.

8 Shehadeh (1994), p. 21.

9 Shehadeh (1994), p. 22.

10 Byrne, Aisling. "Hammered from both sides: the failures of the Paris economic agreement and the PA's economic strategy" Received from Alternative Information Center home page (publishers of News from Within). The article was apparently published in the June issue of News from Within but further bibliographic information is not given, nor are page numbers. Incidentally, the quote Byrne gives at the end of this citation is from Usher, Graham.

11 Fischer et al, p. 94.

12 Shehada, Raja. "Transfers and Powers" Middle East Report no. 194/95 (May-June/July-Aug.. 1995), p. 32.

13 "Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex IV: Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO. representing the Palestinian people" Paris, April 9, 1994. (Source for my copy of the agreement is the Palestinian Information Center Home Page on the WWW)

14 See for example Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex II, paragraph 19c.

15 However, a map signed together with the agreements in Cairo fix the boundaries in which Gaza fleets are allowed to operate at twenty miles from shore and excluding the area off the coast from one and a half miles in the north and south. See Roy (1995book) p. 373(unnumbered page). For a mention of the importance of fishing in Gaza before, see World Bank Report, p. 8. See also Abu-Amer in Abed, 1988, p. 105.

16 Roy, Sara. "Alienation or Accommodation: Report from Gaza" Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIV, no. 4 (Summer 1995), p. 74.

17 "Paris Protocol" Article III, Paragraph 3. Article II of the protocol outlines the formation of "the Joint Economic Committee" and various sub-committees are called for and referred to throughout the text.

18 See especially "Paris Protocol" Article III paragraphs 2, 5, and 10 as well as the referred to appendices (lists of relevant goods).

19 See "Paris Protocol" Article III, paragraph 9. The way in which these licenses become in effect subject to Israeli standards is clear from a reading of the protocol.

20 Byrne, see citation 10.

21 For some examples, see "Paris Protocol" Article VI, paragraph 3, and Article III, paragraph 12. In fact, there are numerous examples in the text.

22 (elaborated upon in text below)

23 Ideological and ethno-historical factors, which are discussed at length by Roy and others, must not be discounted when analyzing the reasons for Israel's continued hold on the land which seems marginal to Israel's economic interests. Concerning use, the World Bank Report notes that Palestinian water use in the OT was capped at pre-1967 levels while reserves available for Israeli farmers were expanded...these limits on water use and quality, together with restrictive regulations placed on Palestinian farmers by Israel and limited land area have stifled the possibility for growth in the agricultural sector...increasing salinity of water resources has all but halted agricultural production in parts of Gaza. (World Bank Report pp. 7-8)

24 Byrne, (p. 1)(see footnote 10).

25 Most notably Locke and Stewart. Bantustan Gaza London: Zed Books, 1985.

26 Roy (1995book), p. 4.

27 ibid.

28 This is as opposed to traditional dependency theory where historical patterns of domination are reinforced by current imbalances in power to create unilinear lines of trade.

29 Al-Jarbawi, p. 141.

30 Usher, Graham. "Interview with Salah Abd al-Shafi" Middle East Report no. 186 (Jan-Feb. 1994), p. 11.

31 Peled, Yoav. "From Zionism to Capitalism" Middle East Report no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4 (May-June/July-Aug.. 1995), pp. 13-19. 1995. In a footnote to his article in Middle East Report 194/195,

Usher notes that "'Separation,' says the Israeli peace bloc, 'is the exact Hebrew translation for the South African term Apartheid.' See its statement in *Ha-Aretz*, February 2, 1995." p. 24.

[32] Roy 1993, p. 26.

[33] Rabbani, p. 96.

[34] This is evidenced in the stated ideology of the Palestinian left in Gaza who saw the need to break the cycle of economic dependence on Israel. The idea behind the economic strategy of the intifada and the popular organizations was that political and economic dependency reinforced each other, and that economic liberation could be useful as a precursor to political and social integration that eventually would create the social cohesion necessary for social and political liberation.

[35] See Tamari, Salim, "The revolt of the Petit Bourgeoisie," for an excellent overview of this.

[36] See grassroots movements section in Chapter 2 above.

[37] Roy (1995book), p. 294.

[38] Cossali and Robson, p. 157.

[39] Roy (1995book), p. 294.

[40] See Tamari, "The Revolt of the Petit bourgeoisie."

[41] Hass, Amira. "Gaza's workers and the Palestinian Authority" Middle East Report 194/195 (May-June/July-Aug.. 1995); p. 28.

[42] EU contractors building the UNRWA hospital in Khan Younis told the writer that workers seemed to be intentionally sabotaging the schedule of progress. During a meeting to discuss the problem, representatives of the workers had said straight out that they did not want the progress to finish as then they would once again be unemployed.

[43] One might be able to observe this tendency in election patterns as well, see chapter 5 above.

[44] See Fischer et al.

[45] See Roy (1995book), p. 120.

[46] Note for further research:(The initial contacts with imperialism and capitalist economies and the creation of the lumpenproletariate -- need to find some of the stuff that Tom was reading).

[47] Abu-Amr, Ziad. "The Gaza Economy" in Abed (1988). p. 101.

[48] Elmusa and El-Jafaari, p. 16.

[49] Roy (1995book), p. 78.

[50] This was particularly the case for many Bedouin, who while sometime classified as residents of the strip, were cut off from their traditional grazing areas in the Negev. See Stateless in Gaza and Bantustan Gaza.

[51] Abu-Amr. "The Gaza Economy" p. 113.

[52] Abu-Amr. "The Gaza Economy" p. 115.

[53] Abu-Amr. "The Gaza Economy" p. 103.

[54] Abu-Amr. "The Gaza Economy" p. 103.

[55] See Marx for the role of UNRWA in the local economy.

[56] Roy (1995book), p. 87.

[57] Hilal, Jamil. "The PLO: crisis in legitimacy" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (Oct.-Dec, 1995) (Hilal 1995),p. 7.

[58] Taylor, Mark. "The Economics of Defeat" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (Oct.-Dec, 1995), p. 99.

[59] See, among others, World Bank Report, p. 8.

[60] Øvensen 1994; Brynen 1995a; World Bank Report; Abu-Amr 1988.

[61] Øvensen, p. 12.

[62] Davidi, Asher. "Israel' Economic Strategy for Palestinian Independence" Middle East Report Sept. - Oct. 1993, pp. 24-26.

[63] See Fischer et al, pp. 60-62.

[64] World Bank Report, p. 5.

[65] World Bank Report

[66] Elmusa and El-Jafaari, p. 18.

[67] World Bank Report, p. 7.

[68] World Bank Report, p. 5.

[69] ibid. p. 6.

[70] Fischer et al, p. 74.

71 Øvensen, p. 11.

72 Shadid, Mohamed and Rick Seltzer. "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" Middle East Journal. 1988 VOL. 42, NO. 1 (Winter): 16..

73 Water use was capped at pre-1967 levels in spite of the growth of the population. See World Bank Report pp. 7-8.

74 See Roy (1995book), pp. 162-175. This section gives an excellent overview of water issues in the Strip. The degradation of the drinking water was a common complaint of residents of Gaza spoken to by the author. Ironically, refugee camp residents who live bordering settlements often have purer supplies of water because the get the run-off from the settlement (anecdote relayed by a resident of one of the middle camps).

75 See Ashrawi (Book) on this episode.

76 Peretz, Don. "The Impact of the Gulf War on Israeli and Palestinian Political Attitudes" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXI, no. 1, p. 18

77 Gillen, p. 45-60*.

78 Elmusa and El-Jafaari, p. 19.

79 ibid, p. 75.

80 Roy, Sara. "Gaza: The New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration". Journal of Palestine Studies, XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993), p. 21.

81 See Fischer et al, chapter 6.

82 Heard on Belgium t.v. "Journaal", March 30, 1996.

83 Connel, Dan. "Palestine on the edge: crisis in the national movement" Middle East Report no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4 (May-June/July-Aug.. 1995), p. 6.

84 In the literature, these claims have been made by Elmusa and Jafari, p. 23-25; Abed (1994), p. 44. They are also insinuated in interviews with Haydar Abd al-Shafi and are prevalent in reports from Roy.

85 Hass, p. 26.

86 In practice, security is used as an excuse for restricting trade. For example, the Israelis at times insist that every vehicle leaving Gaza be searched, but carry out these searches using limited manpower. Intentional stalling is also reported. The result is that trucks are lined up to deliver their goods but produce spoils in the heat before leaving Gaza. (See Daoud Kuttab home page).

87 Fischer et al, p. 74.

88 Hass, p. 27.

89 Several informants with UNRWA connections expressed fear and dismay at the prospect of UNRWA functions being turned over to the PA.

90 Øvensen, pp. 13-14. Although the research here is unable to suggest an answer to the question, one wonders to what extent the dispersion of extended families encouraged more core family economic thinking and isolated nuclear families from traditional neopatriarchal decision making. Such a pattern if it exists might effect the ability of the PA to consolidate its authority by mobilizing extended family loyalties.

91 Usher, "Interview with S. Abd-al Shafi" p. 12.

92 Fischer et al, p. 46.

93 Hass, Amira. p. 26.

94 See Graham Usher's interview with Salah Abd-al Shafi.

95 Fischer et al, (p. 76.)

96 Chomsky, Noam. "The Standard Colonial Pattern: Interview with Noam Chomsky" by Mouin Rabbani. The Journal of Race and Class Volume 37, no. 2 Oct-Dec. 1995. pp. 93-98. Also personal interview with Ibrihim Sheheda. A high level EU official told this writer that sources within the upper echelons of the Peres administration had assured him that withdrawal from areas of Gaza still under direct military occupation would be carried out following Israeli elections in May of 1996. This was of course assuming a Labor victory.

97 Abed, George T.(interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy", Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994), p. 42.

98 Murphy, p. 36.

99 Ashrawi, p.

100 Shehada, p. 30.

101 Murphy, p. 36.

[102] Shehada, p. 31.

[103] Roy (1995book), p. 22.

[104] Shehada, p. 31. In fact, on the surface the agreement seems relatively generous in the area of tourism until the implications of this are considered. A glance at the agreement upon considering these inherent restrictions show that the development of tourism means basically that the PA can issue licensees for tour companies, hardly the basis of a thriving sector regulated by autonomous institutions.

[105] Davidi, p. 25.

[106] Taylor, p. 99.

[107] Usher, Graham. "Interview with Salah Abd al-Shafi" Middle East Report, January-February 1994.

[108] Roy (1995book), p. 327.

[109] ibid.

[110] Chomsky, Noam. in "The Standard Colonial Pattern: Interview with Noam Chomsky"

[111] Elmusa, Sharif S. and Mahmud El-Jafari. "Power and Trade: The Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp.14-32.

[112] Murphy, Emma. "Stacking the Deck: The Economics of the Israeli-PLO Accords" Middle East Report number 194/5 (May-June/July-Aug.. 1995), p.36.

[113] Elmusa and El-Jafaari, p. 23.

[114] See Interim Agreement Article IX, or Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Article VI, paragraphs 2a. and 2b.

[115] Elmusa and El-Jafaari, p. 24. (Sections on exports and the diversification of trade partners follow in this article)

[116] Byrne, (see citation 10).

[117] See ibid, (p. 2).

[118] Shehada, p. 30.

[119] Murphy, p. 38.

[120] Shehada, p. 30.

[121] Abed, George T.(interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy", Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 41-51.

[122] Brynen 1995, p. 25.

[123] Moghadan, V. , p. 113 (need to find book and the original source of the quote to follow it up.)

[124] I would like to note here that in no way am I assuming a normative model of the political economy of meaning...the political economy of meaning is whatever links the various phenomena which bind society into a stable configuration of rights and obligations, empowerment and acquiescence.

[125] Salama, Salama A. "The bogus nuptials" Al-Ahram Weekly 26 September - 2 October, 1996, p. 13.

[126] Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 31.

[127] ibid, pp. 31-32.

[128] Abed, George T.(interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy", Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994), p. 44.

Chapter 5:
The Distribution of Powers Under Current Agreements and the Limitations Imposed on State-building from Above

Many critics have chastised the record of the PA as being overly repressive. Others have criticized the PA for not being repressive enough.[1] However, few observers suggest the ways in which the behavior of PA elites has been determined by the limited options contained within the framework of the agreement. Tellingly perhaps, Article II, paragraph 2 of the "Agreement on Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities" signed at Erez on August 29, 1994 defines the PA as "the authorized Palestinians," a formulation which begs the question of who authorized them, and which serves to remind one that autonomy refers to a specific scope of authorization as opposed to any kind of abstract authority or sovereignty.[2] The greatest portion of PA power is circumscribed not by accountability to the society in which it operates, but by the demands and constraints placed upon it by external actors and agreements; in particular, of course, Israel, with whom the PA shares the responsibilities of government by joint committee.[3]

Earlier chapters have noted the socio-economic framework characterizing the current stage of Palestinian autonomy, and suggested the impact of the demographic and economic environment of the transition in general. This chapter focuses in on the structures and technical features which define, even if they do not always effectively set the internal boundaries of, the power element itself, particularly as they express themselves in current agreements. Limits on power are implied within the terms of international agreements. Also, the failure to contain abuses of power within the self rule areas suggests the lack of any real institutional accountability within the autonomy at present.[4] PA authority is circumscribed by the need to consult with Israel on almost every issue that might be considered an expression of sovereignty -- its functions are primarily administrative. Particularly worthy of note is the degree to which any future expansion in the scope of PA power is linked to fulfilling the demands of external actors rather than to its performance in addressing the concerns of the inhabitants of the self rule areas. As will be shown, this is written into the agreements themselves. The PA's circumscribed ability to govern effectively during the transitional period limits its ability to inspire confidence in the new order.

Israeli historian Ilan Pappé has noted that the Oslo accord "embodies the immense imbalance of power between the two sides: Israel can do what it wants, Arafat cannot even say what he wants."[5] Shimon Peres himself has noted during the discussions on the

transition to greater Palestinian autonomy that "in some ways we are negotiating with ourselves."[6] Pappé continues:

> "Arafat in Gaza and Jericho has established a mechanism over which he has control. It is a limited control, but he has the powers of patronage, of salaries of prestige, the rudiments, if you like, of a bureaucratic mini-state. This may bear little resemblance to the aspirations of the Palestinian people, but it is a form of power...(albeit) a wholly unstable form of power...should the Oslo process remain stuck, will Arafat remain content as head of a bureaucracy oiled by five or six secret security services? Maybe he will, but then again, maybe he won't. If he does, then he is confirming (Edward) Said's vision of perpetuating the occupation on Israel's behalf. But, should this be so, what is going to be the final reaction on the Palestinian street to a 'final' peace agreement with Israel that does not include refugees in the diaspora, does not include the Palestinian citizens of Israel, does not include Palestinians who live in Jerusalem and, most probably, does not include Palestinians who live in what Israel deems are vital settlement areas in the West Bank? And who will lead this discontent if Arafat cannot contain it? Nobody can predict what will happen."[7]

The argument that instability is inherent in such a limited degree of government seems especially pertinent given the intentional vagueness and ambiguity as to the end result of the negotiations over power. The agreements had to pretend that there was something to negotiate while at the same time promising the PLO that their demands would be met within the framework of agreements. This in spite of the powerlessness they took with them to the negotiating table.[8] Internally, this vagueness manifests itself in the apparent arbitrariness of the coercive face of self rule. According to Usher:

> "The most ominous feature of the security forces is their proliferation, amorphousness, and their lack of terms of reference, which makes it impossible to define their different responsibilities. The difficulty of definition is clearly shared by the representatives of the various services."[9]

The situation makes it more difficult for Palestinians to distinguish between the unaccountable situation of self rule and supposedly more accountable condition of autonomy, and the imbalance of power occasionally pressed the Palestinian Security Forces into tasks which made them appear more culpable to external interests than the security of the society in which they operate.

The imbalance of power furthermore leaves the PA dependent on international arbitration to push forward Israeli concessions that might lead to a permanent status agreement, a fact which has been mocked in the Islamist press:

> "Arafat will resort to 'Arbitration' should his peace goal prove far from reality: Arafat has said: 'Arbitration. We have the United Nations, we have

the Hague, we have the Security Council, we have the Europeans. We'll go to arbitration."[10]

The limitations of power also indicate the limitations on the constituency of that power. Politically, power cannot be understood in a vacuum. It only has meaning in relation to its impact on people and can only be analyzed in terms of how it organizes people to serve its own institutional ends or how people -- people as the object and subject of power since self rule seems to imply some sort of twisting inward of power relations -- in turn shape its exercise. The failure of authority and a community to reach a stable basis of power relations may be viewed as the inability of power to strike a balance between services and coercion, and/or rights and obligations, within a particular community. Such an imbalance is at the core of much of the instability in Gaza today.

Why does the provisional regime seem unable to encourage the social and economic reconstitution of Gaza's civil society? The ability of Israel to win concessions on so many issues of substantive authority has left the PA with few tools with which to win broad recognition of its provisional authority. It has done so by limiting the PA's ability to inject its power and will into society in meaningful ways. In accepting the symbolic elements of autonomy (the postage stamp and telephone calling code) and assuming that this would inevitably lead to more substantive authorities -- perhaps even a state -- the PLO elites seem to have assumed that their historical status would bear legitimacy within Gaza throughout a new phase in the nationalist movement. But in this they may have erred. Given the instability inherent in any transitional order, and the limitations on the PA's ability to shape consensus, (that is, to produce the initiatives which mobilize society from above), it seems likely that any future stability in Gaza may be based on repression.

The inability of society to make demands of power leaves such limited power more prone to influence by external demands. Increasingly, individuals may turn to violence to force that their demands be taken into account when all other channels of communication between society and power seem to have failed. Abu-Amr has argued that, "violence is likely to erupt if the opposition is violently repressed or denied freedom of organizational or political work."[11] Tamari observes that:

> "the dismal performance of the PA relates to the unwarranted expectations regarding systems and institutional patterns of governance that were inherited from the intifada 'in embryonic forms,' as the prevailing expression had it. It also related to the absence of a strong civil society which can monitor, steer and temper the repressiveness of (PA) institutions."[12]

While the initial phases seem marked more by a withdrawal from politics, isolated poles of resistance may emerge in the face of the inability to address economic hardship and perceived social injustices posing the "specter of superfluous man."

Concurrently, the weakness of PA institutions encourages a strategy of rule characterized by an insecure stance toward civil society -- weakening it in order to ensure success *over* society in its limited administrative and coercive role during the provisional period. As suggested earlier, any discussion of a hoped for economic miracle in Gaza merely distracts from PA attempts to reconstitute society on factional lines rather than with reference to social organization or governing incentives conducive to and reflecting the need for sustainable economic growth.[13] Abu-Amr notes that: "Many Palestinians are skeptical about the economic promises thought to be inducements to a certain political conduct."[14]

The situation is encouraging short term tactics for power consolidation which may ultimately exclude significant segments of the population of Gaza from strong feelings of identification with the new regime. Given the limited extent of resources and privileges to distribute as patronage, and given that the crackdowns are seen by some as punishing legitimate resistance activities and/or affecting innocent as well as guilty parties, general mass alienation from the emerging political status quo may result. The distribution of powers, rights and obligations indicated by the agreement and its real environment promotes, and even demands, political behavior that discourages identification with the provisional regime. At best, it encourages socially and economically dependent linkages with a regime itself dependent on external funding and unable to promote the creation of an economic base capable of sustaining "self-rule" institutions. PA elites do not seem to be shaping the interests and expectations of society to conform with their own over the short term. This is exacerbated by the probable intransigence of the current Israeli regime in making concessions in powers and territory to the PLO/PA. As an exchange between Sherif Elmusa and Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi indicates, the effects could be profound.

> "Elmusa: Yet the PA officials insist that the process is heading towards a Palestinian state. What accounts for their optimism?
> " 'Abd al-Shafi: Well, basically you are talking about Arafat. Because the rest of them, deep in their hearts, know that it is not going to be so. I sit with ministers who say frankly: 'It's all over. We're finished.' They actually say it."[15]

Meanings of Power: The Degree of Government and Social Mobilization from Above

Both the national movement and the state-building project refer to specific contexts for social mobilization, and suggest different scopes of power and possibility. These in

turn shape a political dynamic which informs and orients individuals toward the institutions through which their interests are best articulated and satisfied. The liberation movement is by its nature loose and inevitably presents an abstract ideal for a basis of a government which contrasts with existing inhibitions on rights and expression. The nationalist movement articulates general responses and mobilizes society in the face of perceived shared threats or challenges to a socially, politically, economically and psychologically "self aware" community. State-building requires the establishment of an order with social structures deep and dependable enough to mitigate internal social conflicts. The state must be capable of asserting coercive force within the bounds of totemic (symbolic, psychological and perceived historical) legitimacy.

As Hanan Ashrawi has pointed out, hinting that some of the weaknesses in the agreement might be attributed to a rush by PLO leaders to re-assert the pre-eminence of the organization's institutions in Palestinian society at a time when it was threatened with relegation to the margins of Palestinian life, "its not who makes the agreement but what's in it...after you have signed, what power do you have?"[16] Samuel Huntington has argued that it is not the kind of government but the degree of government that determines whether a society is prone to violence and fragmentation or not:

> "The differences between democracy and dictatorship are less than the differences between those countries whose politics embodies consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, stability, and those countries whose politics is deficient in these qualities."[17]

Huntington goes on to ask his central question and suggest an answer.

> "What was responsible for this violence and instability (in the developing world)? The primary thesis of this (Huntington's) book is that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions."[18]

The current constitutive transition in Gaza undoubtedly represents a "rapid social change" which in turn encourages new patterns of social mobilization. The restrictions imposed by the agreement impede the development of effective institutions. The thesis therefore seems to apply to Gaza, but it must be modified to include the causal effect of the rapid awareness and mobilization of new groups both within and arriving from without Gazan society, the uncertainty of the new institutions, and their failure to meet their promises in a climate of high expectations and immediate need. While new institutions have sprung up overnight, they lack institutionalization, they are shallow, weak, and have more symbolic power than real power. They possess symbolic authority and real powerlessness.

Ultimately, legitimacy is built through the exercise of governing and not only in the mobilization of symbols and the awareness of shared social experiences. The ability of ruling state ideologies to penetrate society and the willingness (or constructed need) of society to in turn coalesce around governing institutions ultimately determines whether or not society and ruling elites can accommodate each other and identify the ruling order as legitimate. In short, Huntington identifies institutionalization as a precondition to stability, development, and the ability of society and ruling authorities to condition each other in the identification of legitimate symbolic and physical manifestations of power. Power that lends its weight to institutions inspires confidence in those institutions.

Huntington does not reduce degree of government to the degree of coercive force. Rather, his examples of the Soviet bloc, or more recent examples of the emerging East Asian economies (to which Arafat likens the future of Palestine), or the success of the dual economy model in China (where an upwardly mobile bourgeoisie seem to be making no moves toward insisting on rights of democratic expression), say something about the ability of the government to use coercion and incentives based on institutions which extend broadly and deeply into society to ensure the success of its social mobilizations from above to produce meaningful stability. The degree of government might also refer to the degree to which government institutions can be made to correspond to social institutions and vis versa. A social mobilization from above represents an elitist attempt to reshape society according to the logic of its own interests.

By definition, institutionalization would imply predictability in the manifestations of power and the institutions which mediate between power and the individual. The coercive element involves more than just the threat/use of physical force in the streets, it might also mean the arbitrary denial of an established right, procedure, or privilege. The degree of government can also be said to have an inverse correlation with the limitations placed on the ability of ruling institutions to make and enforce decisions. The neopatrimonial strategy discussed earlier tends to undermine the features which Huntington associates with factors conducive to stability. Neopatrimony is "generally corrosive of political institutional-ization, since (it) suggest(s) the primacy of connections rather than the formal structures of law, constitutionalism and bureaucratic procedure."[19]

The "degree of government" currently accorded to the PA is extremely restricted, possibly inhibiting the formation of enabling social and political institutions, and certainly affecting the tactics used by ruling elites to consolidate and/or legitimate their authority. Rather than seeking legitimacy through the actions of governing -- i.e. formulating and executing policy in the broad interests of society -- the PA, without effective control of the tools by which states usually attempt to control and manipulate the political economies of

the social and territorial space in which they rule, has been forced into legitimacy building by (1) manipulative sloganeering which raises public expectations, (2) coercion (police functions being the one area where it almost enjoys an absolute power of state), and (3) co-opting strategically located elites with the limited patronage available. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that Arafat has been pursuing a divide and rule tactic with the aim of breaking up possible organized opposition movements within Palestinian society.[20] Ironically, it does not seem that self rule has had the impact of strengthening and focusing the activity of civil society toward the construction of socially legitimate and productive institutions of political economy. Under the terms of the agreement, the PA has very few of the powers usually invoked to co-opt the population to a state building project. In fact, it lacks even most of the powers over resources and territory that most post colonial elites in Africa and elsewhere had.

According to Huntington's formulation as understood here, the PA's condition is conducive neither to development nor the types of predictable and efficacious institutions which promote a high degree of legitimacy. While it would certainly be wrong to assume that democracy is not a priority for the Palestinian people, the East Asian examples indeed show that legitimacy can be built on aspirations other than the need to express choice over the names and faces of those who sit within ruling bodies. For example, in China today the dramatically successful free market experiments have not been accompanied by political liberalization, and the upwardly mobile bourgeoisie do not seem to be demanding it as long as the regime allows them to get on with business. However, the lack of Democracy becomes more apparent to a population whose leadership seems unwilling or unable to respond to their needs and aspirations.

This low degree of government represents a situation legitimized by the Oslo agreement. The powerlessness of Palestinian politicians to articulate and execute positive policy on the one hand, and the pressures of state building and social competition on underdeveloped and under-empowered institutions on the other hand, contradict the expectations and promise of "self-rule." As Sara Roy has trenchantly noted, "with regard to autonomous decision making, the difference between the past and the present regimes is that there are now more Palestinians in positions of no authority."[21] The emerging contradictions -- i.e. relative powerlessness granted the title of self rule, and a new context for internal Palestinian socio-economic competition without corresponding accountable economic government institutions -- combine with a dismal economic situation to threaten the stability of the Palestinian space as well as that of the region as a whole. Elitist theories concerning the construction of legitimacy focus on the ability of elites to shape society in ways which allow the grassroots to identify with their interests. The Fatah elite comprising

the PA seems thus far not to be accomplishing this task in Gaza, but given that their power ultimately derives more from international agreements and patronage than any local societal formation, they may be able to service their interests without engaging in this task except in limited factionalized ways.

Tamari's definition of authority as a phenomenon encompassing "issues of legitimacy and control," is useful here. Even more interesting is the implication that national identity is subject to a meaningful relationship with authority.[22] Before elaborating on the issues of substantive authority versus administrative privileges below, a brief overview of the conceptual distinction between authority and administration should be made:

Au·thor´i·ty, n., pl. -ties.   1. the power to control command or determine. 2. a power or right delegated or given. 3. a person or body of persons in whom authority is vested. 4. Usu., -ties. government. 5. a. an accepted source of information, advice or substantiation. b. a quotation or citation from such a source. 6. an expert on a subject. 7. persuasive force; conviction.[23]

Authority represents the coercive force in society, it is that body invested with the power to punish (definitions one, and four), but it also refers to the sources which inform the decisions we make in every day life (especially definition five) -- the "accepted" is crucial to note in definition five. In a democracy or a client dictatorship (to note two extremes), it is important that we ask "from whom" authority is delegated as implied in definition two. Observers should also be specific about the "in whom" authority is vested as noted in definition Three. Ultimately, if authority is to be effective, it must be convincing (see definition seven), and it must have the ability to arbitrate, which necessitates the generally recognized existence of a representative of definition six. As noted in the previous chapter, the positive "power to control, command or determine" is largely missing in the current framework of "transition" toward greater autonomy, leaving in its place the largely negative social function of coercion. From the beginning, we see that the PA is at present lacking many of the tools and characteristics of authority. Functioning authority should contain a positive orienting impact which appeals to the well being of the individual beyond just the ability of the authority to physically discipline.

It is also important to distinguish between authority and administration/ administrator. Whereas the former contains some notions of internalization and coercive potential, the latter seems to refer only to executive structure and certain proceedural responsibilities within a given framework. The distinction is important because the administration of a particular order is less likely to be perceived as a legitimate political condition than is the ability to use authority to shape and determine the character of the

given order. As suggested by Chapter 4, the question of whether PA should stand for Palestinian Authority or merely Palestinian Administration becomes crucial to undersanding Palestinian perceptions of the legitimacy of the new order as well as the ability of the Fateh elites to negotiate conditions which will be conducive to the effective recognition of Palestinian sovereignty with both internal and external stable acceptance. Just to be clear before moving on, the following definition is given:

ad·min´is·tra´tion, n. 1. management, as of a government or a business. 2. (often cap.) the executive branch of a government. 3. the period during which an administrator or a body of administrator serves. 4. Law. the management of an estate. 5. the act of administering. —ad·min´is·tra´tive, adj. [24]

The important thing to note is that administration refers to the carrying out of pre-existing arrangements while authority denotes a positve creative relationship between agents and objects.

Coercion and Administration: PA Powers as Defined by Current Agreements

Developments as of September 27, 1996 make more pressing the need to understand just what kind of power structure is developing in Gaza.[25] If the peace process were to stall, and assuming that even a hostile Israeli government would not once again deploy the forces of direct occupation (at least not immediately), what would Gaza look like? Without the framework of negotiations promising a "final status," and an Israeli state at least willing to allow some workers inside the "green line" so that basic needs might be met, the structures set up by the agreement until now would leave Gaza looking like little more than an overpopulated "Fatah-land," with many of the same faces in place who were responsible for the chaos in Southern Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Netanyahu's stance is clear:

> "'I have tidings for [Labor opposition leader] Peres,' Netanyahu told the 1,500 Likud party members in attendence. 'There really is a new Middle East, and in it there is not and never will be a Palestinian state.'"[26]

The population might be left isolated and strangling, and the "specter of superfluous man" could pose a very destabilizing prospect for the whole region.

Shikaki notes that throughout the early stages of the peace process, the PA seems to have held to the view that:

> "...the requirements of democracy may contradict those of national reconstruction, and that in the early stages of state building it is more important to assert the state's right to monopolize power and eliminate

competitors for the people's loyalty....Meanwhile, the donor community's emphasis on building the capacity of the PA, rather than supporting the institutions of civil society, reveals a similar belief that the success of the peace process requires political stability achievable only through the creation of a strong central authority."27

However, the personalization of the autonomous authority, or at the very least its reduction to one faction is precluding the consolidation of state institutions; i.e. a party is monopolizing power and not thus far transferring those powers into state-like institutionalization, at least not after the European state model. Furthermore, the kinds of power available to the PA, circumscribed as it is by the needs to fill external demands, might not be up to this task. In other words, PA powers are such that while they might be able to disarm opposition, they are unlikely to encourage abstract or institutional identification with the new regime in either the specific or general sense of the word. As Usher notes:

> "The massive centralization of political power in the hands of one man and one faction, as well as its disproportionate emphasis on 'internal security,' does not augur well for Palestinian society in the interim period, to say nothing of realizing Palestinians' long-term goals of self determination and return."28

While Arafat has "micro-managed" the structures of power, and kept his control over the emerging autonomous institutions, he has not done so without provoking skepticism from society. This skepticism is reinforced by the lack of economic improvements and by the failure of advances in issues of local and national concern; including for example, the one-sided ability the Israelis to hold up advancement in the peace process due to the imbalance of power between the two sides, the issue of settlements, and rights over land and resources.

In fact, Arafat's power consists of the ability to wield coercive force and the control over administrative privilege -- i.e., distributing aid money, jobs in the bureaucracy, and the power to regulate in civil matters through the granting of licenses and so on. Current agreements make clear this emphasis on "security" functions as the cornerstone of Palestinian Authority. Article VIII of the original Gaza-Jericho First Agreement calls for a strong police force (while Article IX allows no other armed forces and no import or production of arms[paragraph 2-3]). The Interim Agreement signed in Washington on September 28, 1996 reaffirms this in several places, including Articles XII and XIV ((but Article XIII, paragraph 2b(2) notes that "the Palestinian police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved").

Information on the various factions of the Palestinian security forces are sketchy,29

but factions include: 1. the General Intelligence Service; 2. The Preventative Security Force; 3. The Presidential Guard/Force 17; 4. The Special Security Force; and smaller forces such as the Coastal Police, the Military Police and the Disciplinary Police. Usher sees the Security force engaged in essentially three tasks: 1. police functions; 2. Finishing the business of seeking out and punishing collaborators; and 3. the internal surveillance of Palestinian political opposition to Oslo.[30] They have been undermined in the first task by a lack of training, the placing of the interests of the security faction ahead of the unbiased enforcement of the law, and by the entrenched anti-authority attitudes amongst Gazans. They second two functions are as likely to provoke insecurity and violent responses as they are to promote the consolidation of PA rule. The agreements in theory limit the number of security personnel within PA to 9,000 under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 1994, and 12,000 under the Interim Agreement of 1995.[31] However, as noted by Usher, limits on numbers of personnel are simply not observed by the PA, Israel, or the various international sponsors. Usher reports that the police force of thirty thousand for the interim period in the West Bank and Gaza is a figure:

> "not questioned by either PA or Israeli officials. But this too is likely to be fluid. In June 1995, the head of Civil Police in Gaza City, Ghazi Jabali, said that the PA would eventually require a police force of around 40,000 for the autonomy."[32]

The importance of these trends to promoting factionalism rather than institutionalizing the rule of law was suggested in Chapter 2.

But while these powers and numbers may seem frighteningly unlimited from the perspective of the inhabitants of Gaza,[33] the agreements in fact tightly regulate their accountability to the interests and powers behind the process more than to the inhabitants of Gaza. Annex I of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement outlines the parameters of policing power down to the types of guns and ammunition allowed for the PA security forces to the top speeds and tonnage of the few boats allowed to the PA coastal police.[34] However, the PA's strong policing and internal security mandate does not include jurisdiction over offenses committed in the settlements or in the military installation area, nor may it arbitrate in offenses committed in the self rule areas by Israelis -- PA powers are only to be used in arbitrating between and quelling unrest among Palestinians, in situations where Israelis are involved, the IDF has jurisdiction.[35] The high degree of integration between PA and Israeli security forces undermines the perception of the accountability of Palestinian police to the population.[36] Furthermore, "nothing shall effect the continued authority of the military government and its Civil Administration to exercise their powers and responsibilities with regard to security and public order, as well as with regard to other

spheres not transferred."[37] This gives Israel broad scope for interference in Palestinian affairs.

Even administrative functions are strictly regulated. While the PA is responsible for enforcing regulations, they have only limited powers to amend existing regulation and, as noted in Chapter 4, most crucial regulations is fixed or pegged according to Israeli standard. Joint committees are responsible for drawing up and ultimately approving regulations in vital areas. The PA must consult Israel on issues such as where to build strategic infrastructure, such as an eventual port complex. And the PA must even inform Israel of road repairs that are being made within the autonomous areas.[38] Article II paragraph 26 sets out regulations for what the Palestinians may put on postage stamps (postal services are still dependent on the Israeli postal system, a situation which has on occasion caused problems as Israeli postal workers refused to handle mail with Palestinian Authority stamps). Erez agreement annex IV shows how the administrative functions give the right to issue the licenses regulating the tourist trade, but as was noted in Chapter 4, they lack the powers that would be needed to promote a comprehensive tourist industry, providing instead the peripheral service rather than controlling the fundamental elements of infrastructure. Annex V of the same agreement notes that property taxes are still the domain of the Israeli government. According to Gaza-Jericho Agreement Annex II, Article II, paragraph B28b, custodial absentee land rights do not fall to the PA. Finally, the PA has no real foreign policy mandate.[39] These are merely a few examples illustrating the inability of the PA to administer the autonomy in ways accountable to the interests of Gazans.[40]

This lack of effective PA power clearly poses a predicament for Arafat: in order to increase his authority in the Palestinian social space, he must first prove that he can provide stability; in order to produce stability and consensus around his rule, he first needs the authority and scope of political power to produce and enforce political and economic outcomes acceptable to the Palestinian population. In order to acquire the scope of power that might allow for the presentations of positive incentives for social mobilization, he must first demonstrate his ability to neutralize and repress that society. While it is tempting to attribute the failures of the PA to features which undermine the efficiency of regimes elsewhere in the developing world (especially considering the combination of cronyism and a new *wabenzi-ism*), one must at least consider how the externally enforced dynamic of emerging autonomy is in some ways denying the PA the possibility of moving toward broad societal legitimation.

Jurisdiction and Law: Establishing the Boundaries and Content of Power

The imbalance between the protective and the coercive functions of security represents another problematic feature of the autonomy. Many point to the role of the law in taking the first steps toward creating a comprehensible base for self rule. However, the legal context of the transition and the behavior of the PA suggest that its role might be complicating matters as much as clarifying them in the short term. First, the PA has only limited scope to distance the legal context of self rule from that of occupation. Article XVIII of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip states that:

> "4.a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of DoP, this agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.
>
> "b. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this Paragraph.
>
> "5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the legal committee.
>
> "6. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israeli considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such legislation. The legal committee will consider the legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity."

This is basically the same as in the "Agreement on Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities" (Erez - Aug. 29, 1994) where PA legislative authority is limited to promulgating secondary legislation "regarding powers and responsibilities transferred to it," including those laws listed in appendices. Article VII, paragraphs 2-5 of the same agreement list Israeli veto rights more specifically. A close reading shows that the most of the powers to legislate cover the form of administration and not the content. Those laws which the PA do have the power to amend or replace are outlined in appendices to the agreement and include only a fraction of the laws and orders that were used to regulate the occupation, this includes items regulating economic activity.

Secondly, while the territorial integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is repeatedly reconfirmed throughout the text of the agreements,[41] a following paragraph usually goes on to describe the actual patchwork of degrees and domains of jurisdiction. Article XVII of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip notes the following exceptions to Palestinian jurisdiction:

"a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the council.

The consistency of authority within given social and territorial spaces is also a factor which encourages individuals within a given community to identify common interests. In the OT today, however, one might refer to the Palestinians as one nation, divided under law. Questions of jurisdiction and legal precedent mean that Palestinians in different areas of the OT experience the rule of the PA through an inconsistent legal structure with uncertainty as who has the authority to arbitrate in many areas. This inconsistency is not as much a problem within Gaza, but it certainly does mean that Gazans will be experiencing self rule through the lens of a different legal regime than inhabitants of the West Bank, just as the experience of occupation in Gaza was in many respects qualitatively different.[42] The situation might not be conducive to creating the perception of equality in relation to institutions. The fact that people in different areas are experiencing the transition in different ways may be a factor undermining the future perception of the impartiality and autonomous character of self rule institutions.

Thirdly, current confusion and instability is exacerbated by the various poles of legal authority existing in the OT. This is both in terms of personalities and in the hodge-podge of legal codes that prevail in the Palestinian areas. During occupation, the Israelis used variously British, Jordanian, Egyptian, Israeli, and military legal precedent as it suited them and under the terms of the agreements, these laws are the reference for the autonomy.[43] Many of these laws are draconian and designed to circumvent basic individual rights:

"In 1945, the Mandate authorities issued a series of regulations called the emergency laws which were a compilation in one body of all the regulations and laws to deal with the special situation...three was provision for all kinds of collective punishments—house demolitions, curfews and so on as well as detention and exile for those individuals suspected of engaging in anti-British activities...these laws fell into disuse (under Egyptian administration) only to be resurrected by the Israelis when they occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967."[44]

Over 1,000 military orders were issued by the Israeli military government in the Gaza Strip since 1967. Only 70 of these orders, which have the weight of law, are abrogated by the agreement.[45] On top of this, "Palestinian leaders from outside have brought with them a criminal code applicable in Lebanon." Usama Halabi expands on these difficulties:

"Gaza and Jericho don't have the same laws. This complicates both the consolidation of the PA and people's ability to monitor the exercise of authority. For example, the head judge in Gaza issued a statement that courts in Gaza should make decisions based on Jordanian law, but Jordanian law does not apply in Gaza. How will the substance of legal matters be discussed and decided when there is not even a basic understanding about what laws apply...It is a mess and no one has the authority to take any decisions to clarify matters."[46]

Finally with regard to powers and jurisdiction, not only are there problems with the nature and consistency of the laws themselves, but also with regard to who is to administer them. In some municipal zones in the West Bank and in about 70% of the Gaza Strip, it is the PA alone. In other areas, there is joint PA and Israeli jurisdiction. And in other areas only Israel is responsible for enforcement of the confusing legal situation. After the suicide bombings inside Israel in early March of 1996, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) made arrests inside the autonomous areas in the West Bank further obfuscating the character and boundaries of effective jurisdiction (as have school closings by the Israelis in spite of the fact that this was a function explicitly turned over to PA administration). The clarity of legal jurisdiction is further complicated by the lack of clear distinctions between the branches of Palestinian self "government" and the vagueness of many job descriptions within the PA.[47] There are many different courts and the lack of effective powers means that there are institutions without immediate meaningful tasks. On top this, the lack of faith in and the inefficiency of the military courts set up by the Israelis encouraged people to use the traditional system of *Muhktars* (who were incidentally also appointed by the military authorities) to arbitrate disputes.[48] During the intifada and the general breakdown of the structures of military authority, Hamas played an increasingly important role in resolving disputes on the local level with even Christians resorting to and respecting their arbitration.[49] These trends have chipped away at faith in public institutions and increased the tendency to resort to local and traditional modes of social mediation, perhaps strengthening the foundation for the PA's factional control based on quasi-traditional reliance on *hamula* structures.

Beyond the potential contradictions suggested by the imposition of diaspora national institutions on the inhabitants of the OT, such a confusing situation of authority makes it difficult to see how the PA is going to cement a stable and meaningful relationship between society and the provisional regime over the short term. In Gaza, students study Egyptian history; in the West Bank, Jordanian history is studied. This situation reflects the complexity of Palestinian national history and the difficulties of forging a common practical

awareness of nationhood in spaces which have been influenced by different legal and economic conditions.

There are also cases which illustrate a dangerous trend toward the personalization and politicization of the justice system, and the limited ability of civil society to contain abuses of authority within the framework of current national institutions. Usher, for example, describes how Arafat:

> "personally authorized the setting up of 'special state security courts.' These are independent of any civilian judiciary system, allow secret evidence, brook no appeal procedures, and are 'judged' by PLO military personnel appointed by the PA. Verdicts are the prerogative of Arafat, who according to the PA's attorney general has sole power to 'confirm, ease or stiffen' any sentence passed by the 'courts.'"[50]

The legal precedent for these is found in the laws invoked during occupation:

> "The military security courts, established in February 1995 to deter Hamas and Islamic Jihad from Attacking Israeli targets and to demonstrate to the Israeli government the PA's seriousness about combating terrorism, were based on the hated 1945 Emergency Regulations under which Palestinians were subjugated by Israeli military occupation for over twenty eight years."[51]

Rabin was clear in predicting such tendencies in 1993, noting that such a trend would be in Israel's interests:

> "'The Palestinians will be better at it than we were,' he said in September 1993, 'because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the Israeli Association of Civil Rights access to the area. They will rule by their own methods, freeing, and this is important, the Israeli army soldiers from doing what they will do."[52]

In June 1996, Dr. Eyad Sarraj, human rights activist and Commissioner General of the Palestine Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights, was arrested several times without charge and severely beaten while in detention. Political outspokenness was openly stated as the reason for his arrest. Following a national and international outcry against his arrest, police *suddenly* found illicit drugs on his premises and thereby charged him with possession and sale. Dr. Sarraj stated, however, that not once during his interrogation was he asked abut drugs or drug dealing, but rather about a letter that he had sent to Arafat outlining criticisms and critical remarks he had made in an interview with the New York Times newspaper. The judge in the Palestinian Magisterial Court in Gaza dismissed the charges against Dr. Sarraj, who was released only fifteen days later in the middle of the night before a scheduled hearing before a security court.[53]

In another case in August 1996, the Palestinian High Court responded to the petition submitted on behalf of ten Bir Zeit students detained without charge or trail since March 1996 by ordering their immediate release. The high court ruled that there was no legal basis to justify continuing the students' detention, especially given that no charges had been brought against them. However, the next day Attorney General Khaled al Qidra stated that the students would not be released before he had conferred with President Arafat.[54] Commenting on the case, LAWE -- The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights -- noted that:

> "The attorney General has interfered with the functioning of the court and violated Palestinian Laws, which require that the High Court's decision be immediately acted upon....An independent judiciary is guaranteed by Palestinian law. According to the relevant Jordanian legal system, article 97 guarantees government respect and execution of the high court's decisions. Article 101/1 ensures that no authority influence the free and fair functioning of the courts. The refusal to release immediately the students represents a violation of the law and provides a dangerous precedent against the free functioning of the Palestinian legal system."[55]

By late August 1996, Arafat had pressured the judges involved in both the case against the students and the case against Eyad Sarraj to resign.[56] Furthermore, "excesses" and abuses by the plethora of different Palestinian security agencies have undermined public faith in the ability of the PA to administer and enforce justice humanely and impartially. Violations include: prisoners kept for periods in excess of their sentences; bad and violent treatment; detention without trail or hearing; the taking of hostages to pressure another wanted family member to turn him/herself in; arrests due to Israeli pressure; food shortages in the prisons; prisoners are forced to pay for necessary medicines while in detention.[57] While in Gaza, the author heard repeated stories of various Palestinian police factions fighting each other in the streets, and in one case witnessed in Gaza a mob aggressively confront police who had just arrested a cab driver after he had refused to obey a traffic officer and then had resisted arrest by threatening to run over the policeman. Even though the driver was obviously "in the wrong" the public took his side against the police, anecdotally reinforcing other reports of lack of trust and respect for new institutions.

Hilal also notes the trend to rationalize repressive practices under the heading of "national interest."

> "This is apparent in the initiation of ...imprisonment and the reported torture of political opponents, the undermining of the independent judiciary by setting up 'state security' courts, the obsessive concern with the symbols of sovereignty rather than its real powers, the proliferation of police and security organs controlled by the head of the PA, his adoption of presidential functions (before elections) and his refusal to devolve powers to

the ministries of the autonomy areas. All this is taking place before any legal safeguards of basic human and democratic rights have been formulated and approved in a Palestinian constitution."[58]

Palestinians themselves are wary of this trend. According to an exit poll conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Statistics:

> When asked whether they supported unrestricted freedom of the press and human rights versus national interests as defined by the Palestinian authority, about two-thirds selected unrestricted freedom of the press and human rights. This clearly indicates that voters are not giving the president an unquestioning carte blanch."[59]

Palestinian voters also expressed concern at the trend toward personalization of power:

> "...the responses to one of the questions on the exit poll provide an important qualifier for Arafat's mandate: 40 percent of the voters polled on the election day said they wanted Arafat to have less power than the council; another 40 percent said they wanted the council and Arafat to have equal power, and only 20 percent thought that Arafat should have more power than the council."[60]

This also demonstrates Palestinian skepticism toward the unaccountable use of power in general, the consequences of which they were made too well aware of under occupation. Usher notes that such a "securitization" of Palestinian culture might have long term effects:

> "The emergence of an increasingly authoritarian PA has contributed to a process of depoliticization of Palestinian society in which many of its most able members have 'collectively withdrawn,' reverting to individualistic or clan based (rather than political) solutions for their needs and aspirations. This is not only regressive in itself, but erosive of the essentially modernist and political national identity that the PLO--via its political factions and for all its faults--had brought into being."[61]

By way of summary, it can be said that the PA lacks effective jurisdiction in several crucial domains. According to Raja Shehada "in three key areas, the arrangements imposed on the Palestinians by the Israelis (during occupation) were either preserved or augmented."[62] These three areas are: legal jurisdiction, jurisdiction over water, and jurisdiction over land. The PLO seems to have bungled the water rights issue by giving jurisdiction to the Israeli Mekoroth water company and agreeing in effect to keep water use distribution at the same levels.[63] In the area of legal (civil) jurisdiction Shehadeh argues that the agreement gives Israeli courts wider authority to matters related to disputes and offenses involving Israeli citizens than the pre-intifada occupation jurisdiction did. The jurisdiction of Palestinian courts has been undermined at the current stage of the negotiations. Current zoning schemes allow settlers the freedom of movement in areas

populated by Palestinians, and are in no case accountable to Palestinian jurisdiction. The security of individual Palestinians is thereby threatened as settlers have continued leeway to harrass and attack Palestinians and vandalize their property. By putting the issue of Palestinian rights in Jerusalem under negotiation, the PLO has threatened to undermine a right that belonged to the Palestinians by international law.[64] Shehada makes the argument that the PLO has failed to pay attention to and recognize the short and long term significance of the legal components of the changing relationship with Israel, the transition period itself, and the impact of these phenomena on clear and understood law to the healthy functioning of Palestinian civil society and long term economic and social development.

> "The leadership must understand that, significant though the political transformations inaugurated by the PLO certainly are, the law also has a vital role: first, as a tool for achieving better success in future negotiations, and second, as a tool for peaceful and effective social transformation and economic and political development." [65]

Electoral Legitimacy?   Process v. Power in the Content of Ritual Elections

On January 21, 1996, the PA's lack of substantive powers was obscured by the conduct of elections. Adoni argues that:

> "While elections generally indicate a democratic process, in the Palestinian case, a democratic right has been permitted in order to legitimize a political process that could well lead to the perpetuation of Israeli control."[66]

Shikaki is somewhat more generous, but also notes the deviation from the standard meanings of elections:

> "For the PLO, since the old Palestinian consensus was gone, the elections were needed to give Arafat a mandate and to give legitimacy to a new political order. Therefore the democratic agenda is absent, and elections should not be seen necessarily as the start of a transition to democracy but in their role of nation building and peacemaking. This explains the attempt to manipulate the elections to serve both Israeli and Palestinian (re -- Fatah) needs..."[67]

The intended framework and scope of the elections was stated within the interim agreement:

> "These elections constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions"[68]

In fact, many Gazans who spoke enthusiastically of having taken this "significant interim preparatory step" became very cynical when asked what they expected the politicians to accomplish in the way of improving the basic conditions of life in Gaza.[69] Elections restored a sense of pride, but hopes for substantive and qualitative change remained dim. Before the elections, Shikaki had noted that "while the peace process had dealt the final blow to the old consensus, it provided the basis for a new source of legitimacy: the popular will and the elections through which that will could manifest itself."[70] This section discusses why elections seem to have failed to mold this new consensus, suggesting that legitimacy must be seen in relation to power rather than in terms of ritual elections.

In spite of the election monitors polling reports that said the elections were free and fair, Gazans spoken to by the writer told that they had been informed by the police that if they didn't vote they would be harassed and be denied permits for travel and work. There is also further evidence that the PA used what powers they do have to ensure a desirable outcome to elections from their perspective. Arafat used his control over resources and privileges, as well as control over the timing of the elections and campaigning, to make sure that preferred candidates stood the best possible chance of election.[71] Arafat's meddling with local Fatah slates of candidates before elections was discussed in Chapter 3. In spite of this, it is interesting to note that:

> "some of the largest margins of victory went to prominent nationalist independents such as Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, 'Abd al-Jawad Salih, and Hanan Ashrawi....Another point of significance is the fact that eighteen or nineteen of the Fatah people who won as independents -- the so-called "Fatah rebels" -- are very critical of Arafat and sometimes also of the peace process and therefore cannot be counted on to tow the party line."[72]

While Shikaki offers evidence which cautioning against the use of clan as a factor explaining voting preferences,[73] Adoni points out a seeming contradiction that if his analysis is right, demonstrates the rule, that the ability to access basic needs is still a primary factor of political allegiance rather than a good taken as a given:

> "One interesting aspect of the Fatah results was that while many local Fatah activists lost, the traditional leadership returning from exile all won without exception, seeming to counter the perception of strong popular resentment concerning the bureaucracy and corruption of the 'imported leadership.' One possible explanation for their success could be that the officials returning with Arafat relied heavily, perhaps even more than most Fatah candidates, on the PA's structures, including security, in their campaigns. In some areas, they were called the 'authority's candidates,' a description denoting some resentment but also *implying connections and the ability to deliver services.* Given that people's daily lives are still under Israeli

control and that the PA virtually acts as agent between the constituencies and the Israeli authorities, this represents an important advantage...others suggest that violations ensured the victory of the exile leadership."[74]

Elections supported the facade of self rule, but many Palestinians remain upset about the ultimate powerlessness of their politicians. Most elections are contested over power -- the essential thing is that every time we go to the polls we are not simply reaffirming our identity or the existence of the nominal political order but we are making an attempt to influence how the power necessary to enforce the rules and create the opportunities that hold a political body together impacts our individual and collective lives. If the elections were intended to serve as a referendum on a peace process, as was so often claimed in the press, then why not hold a referendum on that question instead of holding elections. In fact, the elections -- especially in as much as they demonstrated localized and factionalized outcomes -- can be seen as people trying to position themselves as well as possible in a new order which most are forced to accept as a *fait accompli*. The economic situation for many Palestinians at the time of the elections was such that any pondering of "to be, or not to be" as far as the peace process as a whole was concerned were subordinate to trying to get someone in office who might remember them when it comes time to distribute the crumbs.

Elections tend to work well when all parties agree on the ends and only disagree as to the means of pursuing the goals of social consensus. Probably the more vague and general the goals, the less likely are the tactics and politicking of political elites likely to be countered by destabilizing and even violent measures of opposition. Furthermore, the participating society must have a fixed consensus behind the boundaries of the political process, institutions, and space. But elections become less meaningful if the politicians do not have the power or institutional or systemic means at their disposal to follow through on election promises; and they may prove disastrous if the fundamental goals legitimized and institutionalized by elections are still being contested within the society nominally sponsoring the elections. The agreement lacks a fundamental conception of what makes the relationship between society and power stable and governable over the long term. Societies are governed based on power, not elections. In other parts of the world, continuing unrest after "free and fair" elections show that legitimacy is not merely the ritual observance of superficial democratic practice. In cases such as Bosnia, elections must be backed up by the presence of international force. If a power vacuum exists, chaos and violence might break out as groups find advantage in challenging the results with violence. Hence perhaps the concern with coercive force as the cornerstone of PA rule. Article IX, paragraph 9 of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement states that: "Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza

Strip and Jericho area prior to the signing of the agreement shall remain in force unless abrogated or amended in accordance with this agreement." As noted above, how and when this can be done is carefully regulated by the other terms of the agreement. Perhaps the PA's willingness to accept many of these laws might have something to do with their broad scope for coercive use of the "internal security" functions.

Historically states have not been born by elections, but rather through power. From an elitist perspective, the boundaries of rule have been determined by the ability of political elites to use power and influence to shape the interests of society in ways that conform to their own interests. Elections do not create or delimit states, states use elections to *re*-vitalize legitimacy. Elections in the occupied territories have given the Palestinians the rituals of self rule with none of the powers. The context of the elections of January 1996 allowed the Palestinians to go to the polls, but the politicians they elected do not have the necessary powers to deal directly with problems facing society. Furthermore, elections are a means and not an end. They work well when broadly defined goals of the society have been identified and when the basic consensual arrangement between state and society has been institutionalized, but they are less useful if the fundamental premise on which elections are held are still being deeply challenged within society. In the case of Gaza, elections may only serve to dramatize the powerlessness of Palestinian political elites to manipulate autonomy toward the best interests of the Palestinian populations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In a real sense, we can say that the agreement creates the situation of a state that reigns without governing. Ritualized democracy only slightly disguises the preconditions for autocratic factionalism. Elections that lead nowhere may only delegitimize the idea of election. Haydar Abd-el Shafi, a strong critic of undemocratic tendencies in the Fatah leadership, the director of the Red Crescent Society in Gaza, and a prominent figure in nationalist politics, did not spend a single shekel on his campaign for the Palestinian Legislative Assembly, stating only that he refused to make any promises that he would not have the power to keep. He was far and away leading vote getter in Gaza.

Leaders and societies are able to communicate with and manipulate each other by adapting each other's terms to serve their own ends, but however vague and transcendental that dialogue may at times seem, it is a dialogue that has almost certainly responded to the survival needs of each. Palestinian elections therefore reflected power and powerlessness. It seems that the council which was supposedly empowered by the elections has been able to accomplish little in the way of effective action and more research is needed to determine the reasons for this (no literature has been found which elaborates on the accomplishments of the council so I confess ignorance on this). But it seems that the council's main task

was to give the agreement the veneer of popular legitimacy, and perhaps its hesitancy about performing the rituals associated with filling this role has forced Arafat to supersede it.[75]

By reducing legitimacy to electoral legitimacy, and by focusing primarily on the mechanics of diplomacy -- reducing conflict resolution to the amelioration of the grievances of certain recognizable elites -- the political analysis informing the dominant media accounts fails to anticipate, theoretically account for or explain the emergence of contradictions within the process of transition from: (1) a nationalist movement which has organized, contextualized and given a vehicle for the expression of various interests; to (2) a re-articulation of interests which creates new bases of intra-national conflict and a new vehicle for the expression of coercive legal force and legitimation within the project of state-building. Elections, especially elections conducted under such dubious conditions, are poor tools for resolving these contradictions, or for measuring their actual significance.

Conclusion

In short, the distribution of rights, obligations and powers is not in line with popular expectations/aspirations. The low degree to which the PA are able to govern under the terms of the agreement threaten to get the process of building stable Palestinian autonomous institutions off to a bad start. The PA has been given an essentially negative, coercive role during the interim period. In this context, legitimation from above seems unlikely and the lack of power might in the end serve only to de-legitimize the conditions of the elections rather than the elections legitimizing the current set of elites under the order implied by the Oslo agreement itself. The limited autonomy may prove in the short term to be cost effective for the elites responsible for the signing of the agreement, but produces few tangible benefits for the population of Gaza.

Graham Usher implies that the nature of and limitations on authority as accepted by the PA represents a "culture of defeat."

> "This is not just due to the fact that the Palestinian political leadership has and is lowering Palestinian's national claims to a series of disaggregated parts of the West Bank and Gaza. More corrosively, it is borne out of an obsessive ethos of 'national security' and 'national interest' that, once their political and ideological content is unpacked, turn out to be no more than the practical implementation of Israel's territorial and security ambitions in the occupied territories."[76]

The limited repressive scope of power thus far granted to the PA by successive agreements only serves to highlight the degree to which the current project represents an attempted social mobilization from above as opposed to a response to popular or grass roots social concerns.[77] Given the limited powers granted to him by the agreement, Arafat

is posed with a tremendous challenge in terms of truly co-opting the population into accepting the current order. As the cases of nationalist movements in both the post colonial and post Soviet contexts show, state building and the creation of a stable political order following such a transition is tricky under more ideal circumstances, given the relative weak position of Arafat in relation to resources and the ability to manipulate "sovereignty" to his advantage, the prospect of the transition leading to a stable order seems unlikely. In particular, the ritualistic emptiness of elections and the tendency of external forces supporting the political transition to focus on technical and procedural issues rather than on issues of social substance and effective power is highlighted. Legitimacy, perhaps ironically, might not travel easily or automatically from one context to another as the designers of the agreement perhaps wrongly assumed. The situation in Gaza tends to bear this out.

---

[1] Human rights organizations in Palestine and elsewhere have documented abuses of power by the PA while Israeli and American statements have criticized Arafat for not cracking down on Islamist elements in the self rule areas.

[2] It also seems to ignore the power content of legitimacy, reducing it to recognition.

[3] A reading of the agreements refers to joint committees in almost every area, from establishing basic needs to deciding where on the Gaza sea-front the PA might be allowed to build. Even where the PA has apparent direct powers, they are usually carried out or overseen with reference to rules and laws drawn up by one of the many spheres that are regulated by joint committee.

[4] A case is made in this chapter that for al practical purposes, elections have failed to provide this accountability, although more recent data is needed to conclude this with any finality.

[5] Pappé, Ilan. "An Israeli Peace: Interview by Usher, Graham" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 1995. p. 22.

[6] Quoted in Murphy, Emma. "Stacking the Deck" Middle East Report no. 194/5, 1995, p. 36.

[7] Usher, Interview with Pappé, p. 22.

[8] In fact, the only power they brought was the ability of the inhabitants of the OT to make occupation chaotic, costly and even dangerous for the Israelis. Ironically, the future power of the PA is made contingent on their giving up this power within their new base.

[9] Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 24.

[10] Al-Quds home page (alquds@palestine-net.com).

[11] Abu-Amr, Ziad. "The View from Palestine: In the Wake of the Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 2 (Winter 1994)

[12] Tamari, Salim. "Fading Flags" Middle East Report no. 194/5, 1995, p.

[13] See for example Roy, "Alienation or Accommodation" on the un-sustainability of current PA economic initiatives, most of which involve construction.

[14] Abu-Amr (1994view from Palestine), p. 82.

[15] Butler and Elmusa. "An Interview with Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 1995)

[16] Ashrawi, p. 261.

[17] Huntington, p.1.

[18] ibid., (remarks in parenthesis added)

[19] Brynen (1995), p. 25.

[20] Beyond the evidence presented in earlier chapters, this was suggested in a personal conversation with Graham Usher, a journalist with years of experience in Gaza.

[21] Roy, Sarah. 1995b, p. 78.

[22] See quote above.

[23] Random House Webster's Dictionary, p. 43. New York: 1993.

24 ibid, p. 9.

25 See also the discussion of Security factionalism in Chapter 2 below. Recent events referred to include Israel's opening of a tunnel under the mosques of Al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock, increased settlement activity (including talks of expanding the Jewish population on settlements in Gaza), exchanges of fire between Israeli and Palestinian forces, and recent Palestinian mass demonstrations that were roughly put down by Israeli troops in Jerusalem. The situation further highlights the inability of the PA to enforce even the status quo in negotiations toward a final settlement.

26 Usher, Graham. "Down to jobs for peace" Al-Ahram Weekly 12-18 September, 1996, p. 1.

27 Shikaki, Khalil. "The Transition to Democracy in Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996[a]), p. 9.

28 Usher (1996), p. 31.

29 I personally attempted to get more detailed information on the security forces from the UNSCO office in Gaza, and while told that the information was available and that they would "see what they could do," never received the information. Apparently Usher was not entire successful either; see 1996, p. 23.

30 Usher (1996), p. 26.

31 Usher (1996), pp. 22-23.

32 ibid., pp. 22-23.

33 It should be noted that support for policing is there because it provides much needed income for families, and in an environment where the rule of law is not consolidated but rather personalized, it becomes an imperative not to alienate any contacts one might have in the security apparatus. The following section on jurisdiction illustrates how the basis of law that is guiding the transition allows the PA to overlook issues of internal accountability; prioritizing accountability to the peace process

34 See Article XI.

35 See Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex III, Article I, paragraph 2a. and 2b. and Article III, paragraphs 2 and 3; and, see Interim Agreement, Chapter 2, Article XIII, paragraph 2b2. See also Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 21-34.

36 See Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex III, Article I, paragraphs 5-9. See also Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 21-34.[esp. pp. 21-22.]

37 "Agreement on Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities" Article VI, paragraph 5 (Erez, Aug. 29, 1994).

38 See Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex II, Article II B 25.

39 See Interim Agreement Article IX, this re-establishes a situation grounded in the Gaza-Jericho agreement, see Gaza-Jericho agreement Article VI, paragraph 2a. Israel must approve all visitors from countries not having diplomatic relations with it Annex II, Article II B 27g1.

40 Unfortunately, I have as of yet not gotten hold of the annexes to the interim agreement. However, the main text reinforces most of the restrictions established by the previous agreements mentioned.

41 See for example "Interim Agreement" (Washington Sept. 28, 1995) Article XI, paragraph 1 and Article XVII, paragraph 1.

42 For example in the West Bank, the PA does not have authority over land in areas "c", but it will gradually have increasing civil responsibility for the population. See "Interim Agreement" Article XI, paragraph 1c.

43 For a brief but interesting overview of how they could be manipulated, see Cossali and Robson, p. 75.

44 Cossali and Robson, p. 65

45 Roy (1995book), p. 22.

46 Halabi, Usama. "There is not even a basic understanding about what laws apply here: Interview by Barbara Harlow" Middle East Report no. 194/5, p. 33.

47 ibid., p. 34.

48 Cossali and Robson, p. 71.

49 Conversation with Ron Wilkinson, UNRWA PR officer, September 1995.

50 Usher (1996), p. 32.

51 Shikaki, Khalil. "The Transition to Democracy in Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 10.

52 Quoted in (Usher) 1996, p. 28.

[53] LAWE (Land and Water Establishment; Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment) press releases of June 12 - June 30, 1996. It is worth noting that Sarraj was also moved for trail in security courts in spite of the fact that no security related charges were brought against him, which indicates that the PA continues to manipulate a confusing array of Judicial institutions to get the outcomes it desires in legal matters.

[54] LAWE (Land and Water Establishment; Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment) press releases of Aug. 18 and 20, received over the internet.

[55] ibid.

[56] Palestine Times, Issue no. 62 – August 1996. (Received via the internet)

[57] LAWE press release, March 26, 1996. Received via internet.

[58] Hilal (1995), p. 17.

[59] Shikaki, Khalil. "The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 22.

[60] ibid., p. 21.

[61] Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 21-34.

[62] Shehadeh, Raja. "Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement", The Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 18-25. (p. 22.)

[63] See Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Annex II, Article II, B, paragraph 31.

[64] Shehadeh (1994), p. 21.

[65] Shehadeh (1994), p. 24.

[66] Adoni, Lamis. "The Elections: Democracy or One Party Rule" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Spring 1996), p. 5.

[67] Shikaki (1996b), p. 17. (parenthetical note added).

[68] Interim Agreement, Article II, paragraph 2.

[69] Personal interviews with Gazans – Jan. 21-25, 1996.

[70] Shikaki, Khalil. "The Transition to Democracy in Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996), p. 9.

[71] For a comprehensive discussion see Adoni, Lamis. "The Elections: Democracy or One Party Rule" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Spring 1996), esp. pp. 8-12.

[72] Shikaki, p. 21.

[73] ibid., p. 22. "...based on our exit poll, we concluded that the most important primary selection criterion for the selection process was political affiliation, followed by the character of the candidate himself...only thirdly did family or clan considerations figure.

[74] Adoni, p. 15. (emphasis added)

[75] This is an important question to answer on further research and I hope to either find literature on this or preferably go and ask the questions myself.

[76] Usher (1996), p. 33.

[77] It has been consistently repeated by the Israeli leadership that concessions toward greater autonomy were premised upon Arafat's success at crushing unrest in the areas under his police control.

Chapter 6:
Conclusion

This work has examined the relevance of socio-economic and institutional developments engendered by the Oslo accords and subsequent agreements to the needs and expectations of Gazans. Analysis has focused on the ability of the transitional political economy to generate meaningful, stable and self-sustaining relationships between PA institutions and society in Gaza and on its ability to address the personal needs, collective expectations and ideological concerns of Gazans. The notion of a political economy of meaning has been elaborated upon to suggest that future stability in Gaza must be evaluated in terms of the agreements' paradigmatic impact on society, rather than in terms of the ability of an elite to "protect" the peace process from the attacks of a skeptical society.

Several sociological, political and economic features of Palestine's current autonomy are seen as undermining Palestinian faith in the new order, and thereby destabilizing relations between the PA and society in Gaza. The following phenomena have been identified as crucial to understanding the situation: 1) the construction of new factional relationships to establish a PA link to society in Gaza at a time when the PA has few other powers with which to win support or consolidate authority; 2) an imbalance of power between the PA/PLO and Israel that highlights the inability of the PA to pressure the Israeli government to move quickly forward on the final status issues that promise, in theory at least, to resolve issues which have been a source of anxiety and uncertainty to Palestinians on the "inside" and the "outside"; 3) a situation of autonomy which is accompanied by economic despair; and, 4) the inability of the PA to inject its authority in society in meaningful ways relative to social expectations, necessary socio-economic restructuring, and institution building. Current trends may profoundly impact any future state-society relationship in Gaza.

Certain types of social mobilization may be relevant to energizing the social base of a regime, and securing the basic needs or perhaps even social promotion of a constituency, but might also channel the dynamic potential of social mobilization into non-productive social activity. Ethnic political mobilization offers a case in point that is relevant in Africa, perhaps Bosnia, and certainly, to note an example closer to our study, in Lebanon. Factional politics runs on basically the same dynamic, and can in fact lead to the equivalent of what Walker Connor has referred to in the context of ethnic mobilization as a "nation destroying" phenomenon.[1] In Palestine today, the cost of maintaining the nominal unity of the population of the Gaza Strip under Fatah nationalist leadership seems to have the the converse side of suppressing the dynamic potential of other sectors and groupings in

Palestinian society, suppressing the emergence of alternative and perhaps more relevant bases of legitimacy, considering the pressures and expectations of a population socially and economically frustrated by the occupation. Arafat is either isolating or co-opting the social base of all potential rivals who seek to define themselves outside the scope of Fatah authority, or seem to be gaining a pre-eminent position within any particular social constituency. Contrary to Deutch's classic model, the social mobilizations indicated by the new mechanisms of PA factionalism are not leading to an expansion of the politically relevant segments of the population.[2] Rather, the contrary is occurring, and new faces occupying positions of authority invoke new institutions, powers and in many respects new tactics to pursue what are essentially still the strategies of traditional politics in the Arab world. This may have the effect of stifling the growth and emergence of grassroots and sectoral leadership, which in turns limits the possibilities for change by simply removing a platform for those who would be the bearers of change or socio-political alternatives.

Factionalism and neopatrimonialism are unlikely to create an environment conducive to the kinds and degree of economic growth that will satisfy expectations and demands associated with self rule given the current status quo. On the contrary, factionalism is likely to encourage non-productive forms of social competition which neither advance the cause of nation-building nor promote national political and economic integration over the long term. The PA may need to keep society weak and involved in internal conflict in order to channel conflict and frustration away from the regime itself. Gaza's history of external dependence, and reliance on a limited, vertically organized coping strategies has left society with little experience in channeling social competition into more positive developmental activities and mediating ideological disputes through large scale organs of political arbitration. While a dependent factionalism might be able to co-opt and provide basic needs and benefits for large segments of the population, its fundamental inadequacy is that the stability of the factional order depends not on a reinforcing internal dynamic, but on the willingness of external benefactors to reward the political compliance of the PA.

By reducing the number of organizations and social formations that might serve as mediators or buffers between the individual and the state, and by limiting the civic frame of reference, factionalism pushes those who remain uncommitted to the existing framework outside of the given political order; i.e., it does not diffuse or absorb isolated poles of frustration and anger.[3] By limiting the efficacy of civic discourse, factionalism leaves opposition to the order as a whole, perhaps violent opposition, as the framework in which alternatives may be evaluated. The other alternative, withdrawal, merely reinforces abject

dependence and nominal compliance as ways of surviving in the margins. At present there seem to be no mass based Palestinian constituency which has benefited from Oslo. None. PA resources are not so extensive as to be able to placate the population if current levels of unemployment (over 60% in Gaza) continue, and the economic situation and the repressive base of PA rule threaten to widen the realm of the marginalized.

Factional dependence would be a less ominous phenomena if there were a thriving alternative economy, a more varied productive sector or more flexibility for migration and other demographic developments to relieve land and population pressures; in Gaza, however, there are few escapes. As Deniz Kandiyoti has noted, "as the state itself uses local patronage networks and sectional rivalries in its distributive system, citizens also turn to primary solidarities both to protect themselves from potentially repressive states and to compensate for inefficient administration."[4] But how are "primary solidarities" understood in the context of transitional orders? And how have fundamental shifts in the politico-economic bedrock reshaped the perceptions and linkages which inform one's sense of social solidarity? By co-opting the structures of "primary solidarity," the PA defines itself tautologically rather than dynamically as the reference point of authority in Gaza society. Primary solidarities are based on the provision of basic needs, and the PA regulates access to the ability to make ends meet; i.e., the social affiliations individuals are prone to turn to in times of social stress and uncertainty are the same as those upon which the otherwise week and unaccountable regime nurtures relationships of factional dependency.[5]

In other words, the structural preconditions through which a counter elite such as that identified Robinson and Hilterman might have evoked to forge solid ideological contact with on the ground constituencies simply was not there. Nor is the *sine qua non* of political identification ideological in the current setting, but rather conditioned by the need to procure immediate basic needs. Accordingly, it seems as though personal ties – particularly social proximity with individuals and accordingly families with access to influence over the powers of autonomous privileges -- will continue to determine political behavior. As Shikaki's analysis reveals, even while responses to surveys indicated that clan did not play a role in voting patterns, Palestinians in many cases voted practically for traditional PLO and clan leaders, a situation which suggests that these are the people who are capable of providing the means to make ends meet tomorrow, and suggests willy nilly how the PA is consolidating itself from above. However, if the PA fails to deliver according to need or expectation, and their lack of power is revealed by their inability to fulfill the promises which sustain Palestinian hopes and thus contribute to compliance, then grave instability might result. Several studies were very optimistic and even insistent on the "modernity" of the social bases of mobilization under the intifada, but this has not

translated into a meaningful force in the context of self rule -- yet. How it might do so remains to be seen.

The inability of the PA/PLO to resolve issues of daily existential concern to Palestinians only heightens awareness of the regime's inadequacy in other respects. The current Israeli retreat from negotiations suggests that the timely resolution of the issues still subject to final status negotiations -- inter alia, the sovereign boundaries of self rule and the fate of the Palestinian diaspora -- is unlikely. This contributes to Palestinian anxiety over, and impatience with, the impotence of emerging "autonomous" institutions. The lack of progress on the diplomatic front, and the desperate economic situation, increase the potential for violent attacks against Israeli targets. Such attacks also weaken the PA position, which is inherently more dependent on a quick progress in negotiations, and delivering on the benefits of self rule. Attacks also undermine the willingness of the international community to arbitrate and place diplomatic pressure on Israel on the PA's behalf. Given the imbalance of power built into the bilateral negotiating framework, the PA is dependent on such pressure. Put directly, the responses to Palestinian violence are exacerbating the conditions which inspired the violence in the first place.

The contradiction does not seem entirely lost on the Israelis, who even as they are stalling on the negotiations, granted 18,000 new permits for Palestinians from the OT to work on the other side of the "green line," bringing the number of Palestinians with permission to work in Israel back up to 50,000. Subtly, this indicates a trend toward re-establishing the pre-Oslo status quo. It increases Palestinian dependence on Israel for basic needs, while using the defacto imbalance of power to expand the Jewish presence in the OT and consolidate control over productive land and water resources. The meeting between Netanyahu and Arafat in Washington in early October 1996 made no substantial move toward re-starting progress toward the fulfillment of outstanding Israeli obligations. The Israelis hailed the meeting as a success, while Palestinians declared the meeting a failure. The fact is, delay is in strategic interests of the Netanyahu regime,[6] while any delay for the PA means only further emphasizes the practical irrelevance of the PA in the lives of Palestinians. As of the middle of September, a majority of Palestinians still supported the peace process, but fifty-one percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza reported that they no longer trusted or held any opinion about Palestine's political factions.[7] Such apathy plays into Likud's strategy of subverting the viability of Palestinian political representation, perhaps leading to the re-establishment of Palestinian society's direct dependence on Israel, rather than dependence mediated through a Palestinian Authority, which will always be troublesome from the perspective of Likud ideology because of the broader national claims that a PA, in theory, represents. Palestinian political analyst

Ghassan Khitab argues that the current balancing act amounts to "trading Palestinians' national rights for jobs."[8] In the most pessimistic case scenario, the old PLO leadership must choose, its own irrelevance (at least for the short term), or the types of social irrelevance which might lead to what here has been described as the "specter of superfluous man." At any rate, the Likud seems to be trying to set the boundaries of Palestinian autonomy in terms of a Palestinian "millet" in which a PA would be given "vassal" status in exchange for quelling and deflecting popular discontent from Israel.

Palestinian patience is at present being sought with the promise of eventual control over land and resources. Long term economic viability depends on access to resources and an environment of greater individual and national economic autonomy. Ideologically, the Likud regime has put itself in a position where it will have great difficulty taking steps forward in negotiations, while for the Palestinian leadership, (and its hope of realizing even the limited aspirations of Palestinian nationalism in the near term), significant reversals of the peace process may prove fatal or even apocalyptic. Palestinians are thus face a dilemma. A rush to entrench the "final status" quo might mean that Palestinians are forced to accept something far short of the hopes engendered by self rule, and Palestinians could face the worst effects of the types of phenomena which have been described above. On the other hand, delays or reversals could lead to the defacto fulfillment of the Likud vision of a "Greater Israel."

The nature of PA power is such that it must respond coercively to the frustration that arises when the demands of the peace process exceed the new order's ability to provide. At the same time, it lacks the power to initiate socio-economic reform and provide positive incentives to encourage popular identification with the new order. The opinion of many was expressed in a Hamas press release of September 16, 1996:

> "Arafat's promises of 'prosperity and well-being' had proved to be 'nothing more than an illusion aimed at covering up the failure of the police regime' of his Palestinian self-rule authority."[9]

One wonders whether, in the face of Israeli intransigence and mounting Palestinian frustration, Arafat will be tempted to just let loose his tenuous authority over society in the OT, and take his chances on riding out the potential upheaval. At present, it is possible that an outright rejection of the peace process as a hopeless pantomime might even revitalize his broad based legitimacy among Palestinians.

At the level of nationalist ideology, (the supposed bonding agent of self rule), the crisis of stability within emerging authority/society relationships must be understood in the

context of the national movement's transition from a transcendent context of ideological idealism to a context of immanent accountability. What will happen as the nationalist ideology becomes embodied in real structures that place finite restrictions on the meaningfulness of interpretations? And what will happen when promises – promises made by a supposedly accountable administration -- remain unfulfilled? Authority must reconcile its own demands with those of society, and, in order to qualify for the distinction of a political economy of meaning, it must uphold what is perceived as a balance between rights and obligations. Authority shapes, and is in turn shaped by, the variety of perceptions society holds in this regard. That economic transactions, the arbitration of civil disputes, and the regulation of the flow of traffic (along with many other daily activities) occur without violence or broad based social protest speaks of the presence of an accepted and functioning authority. It is through the regulation of such daily activity that society and authority meet to conceive and reproduce the conditions and relationships which sustain authority and allow it to interact with the more convoluted trajectories informing ideology, social solidarities, and historically based understandings of legitimacy.

This study has suggested that within the current Palestinian political framework, the stability of the Gaza Strip will depend more upon the external backers of the agreement than the structural and institutional features which characterize today's autonomy. It will be the inability of the new order to generate developmental or ideological legitimacy (beyond the tautology of nationalism as the reference point of the national leadership), and the inability of the new order to accommodate alternatives within its own framework, that reveal the deficiencies in the current political economic order. Defense of the "peace process" is leaving emerging relationships as brittle as they are rigid.

Prescriptively, however, the general feeling that the Oslo process represents a *fait accompli* suggests that these issues can at present only be addressed with reference to current agreements and the trajectory which they imply -- a two state solution. Recent events demonstrate that future interventions designed to "protect" the peace process must take the sources of instability in Palestinian society into account. Protection of the new order must be envisioned not in terms of the protection of a particular elite, but through the institutionalization of a new order, an order which reflects the need and desire for socio-economic self determination within Palestinian society, and which is capable of mediating between aspirations and limitations. This can only take shape with the entrenchment of institutions and rights. It should not based on the "authorities" of a given administration, but in the ability to really govern.

Forced handshakes between Arafat and Netanyahu aside, the stability of any future order will depend on the perceptions those who live within it have of their own situation. Gazan society may lack both the resources and the will for patience. If the fundamental problems suggested by this work are not addressed, there is a danger that the current process could merely institutionalize the conditions of future conflict. Perhaps only an ironic alliance between coercive force and social disorientation postpone it for now. Unfortunately, there is little in the content of previous agreements and Israeli statements to inspire confidence that future negotiations will in fact lead to effective Palestinian statehood; and little in the early behavior of the PA suggests that it is truly committed to the establishment of the democratic and open society that Palestinians seem to expect after over half a century of repeated occupation and unaccountable rule. A stable political economy of meaning in Gaza seems an unlikely result of the current trajectory of Palestinian national accommodation with Israel over the foreseeable future. In spite of the nationalist assumption of some authority, precious little has changed for Palestinians.

---

[1] Robinson argues that this is not the case in Palestinian nation building because of the ethnic homogeneity of the population, but this idealizes a basis of self rule, and underestimates the extent to which factionalism represents basically the same dynamic of socio-political competition which undermines other more productive and ultimately more integrative forms of social competition.

[2] Deutch, Karl. "Social Mobilization and Political Development" American Political Science Review 55 (September 1961), pp. 497–498.

[3] "...a person will be more clearly determined sociologically, the less his participation in one group by itself enjoins upon him participation in another...In this way, the objective structure of society provides a framework within which an individual's non-interchangeable and singular characteristics may develop and find expression depending on the greater or lesser possibilities that structure allows."(Simmel p. 150)

[4] Kandiyoti, Deniz.

[5] It is interesting to note that in many developing states with weak regimes, ethnic rivalries are cultivated to fill a role similar to that of factional solidarities and competition in Gaza. According to X, writing on the situation in many sub-Saharan African states, points out that: " ."

[6] See also the "Preface" below.

[7] Usher, Graham. "Down to jobs for peace" Al-Ahram Weekly 12-18 September, 1996, p. 1.

[8] ibid., p. 1

[9] "Hamas makes new call for armed resistance" Middle East Times 22-28 September, p. 6.

I. Books

Abed, George T. The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development Under Prolonged Occupation. London: Routledge, 1988.

Abu-Amr, Ziad. Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Abu Shokor, Abdelfattah, "Income Distribution and Its Social Impact in the Occupied Territories" in Abu Jaber, K., Buhbe, M., Smadi, M. (eds.), Income Distribution in Jordan. Westview Special Studies on the Middle East. 1990.

Ajami, Fouad. The Arab Predicament. Cambridge: Canto, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Almond, Gabriel and Bingham Powell. Comparative Politics. Boston: Little Brown, 1978.

Apter, David. Re-thinking Development. London: Sage Publications, 1987.

Asrawi, Hanan. This Side of Peace New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995.

Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Cossali, Paul and Clive Robson. Stateless in Gaza. London: Zed Books, 1986.

Eikelman (book), Dale F. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, c 1981.

Endresen, Lene C. and Geir Øvensen. The Potential for UNRWA Data for Research on Palestinian Refugees: A study of UNRWA administrative data. Oslo:FAFO, 1994.

Fischer, Stanley et al. Securing Peace in the Middle East: Project on Economic Transition. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1994.

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents: the standard edition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989.

Gharaibeh, Fawzi. The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Boulder: Westview Special Studies on the Middle East, 1985.

Gresh, Alain. The Struggle Within: Towards and Independent Palestinian State. London: Zed, 1985.

Gilen et al. Finding Ways: Palestinian Coping Strategies in Changing Environments. Oslo: FAFO, 1994.

Gowers, Andrew and Tony Walker. Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution. London: W.H. Allen, 1990.

Heiberg, Marianne and Geir Øvensen. Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank and Arab Jerusalem: A survey of living conditions. Oslo: FAFO, 1993.

Hiltermann, Joost. Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories

Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968

Kalaf, Issa. Politics in Palestine: Arab factionalism and social disintegration, 1939-1948. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Kandiyoti, Deniz (Ed.), Women, Islam and the State. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991.

Kimmerling, Baruch & Migdal, Joel S., Palestinians. The making of a people, Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1994.

Moghadem, V. Modernizing Women.

Roy, Sara. The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development, Washington D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1995.

Rubenberg, Cheryl. The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Infrastructure IAS Monograph Series, no. 1, Bellmont: Institute of Arab Studies, 1993.

Schwedler, Jillian. Towards Civil Society in the middle East?

Sharabi, Hisham, Neopatriarchy : A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society,

Simmel, Georg. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations (translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhardt Bendix) Ney York: The Free Press, 1964.

UNCTAD. The Palestinian Finacial Sector Under Israeli Occupation. New York: United Nations, 1989.

UNCTAD. Palestinian Trade under Israeli Occupation. New York: United Nations, 1989.

Usher, Graham. The Palestinian Prospect: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo. London: Pluto Press, 1995. (Have not read)

World Bank. Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace. 1993: Vols. 1-3.

Øvensen, Geir. Responding to Change: Trends in Palestinian Household Economy. Oslo: FAFO, 1994.

II. Articles and interviews

'Abd Al Shafi, Haydar (interview with). "The Oslo Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 14-19.

Abed, George T. (interview with). "Developing the Palestinian Economy" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no.4 (Summer 1994). pp. 41-51.

Abu-Amr, Ziad. "The View from Palestine: In the Wake of the Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 2 (Winter 1994), pp. 75-83.

----------------. "Report From Palestine" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 40-47.

----------------. "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-19.

----------------. "Politics of the Intifada" in ????

Adoni, Lamis. "PLO at the Crossroads" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXI, no. 1 (Autumn 1991), pp. 54-65.

Adoni, Lamis. "The Elections: Democracy or One Party Rule" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXV, no. 3 (Spring 1996)

Al-Jarbawi, Ali. "The Position of the Palestinian Islamists on the Palestine-Israel Accord" <u>The Muslim World</u> Vol. LXXXIV, no. 1-2 Jan.-April, 1994, pp. 127-154.

Bard, Mitchell. "Homeless in Gaza" <u>Policy Review</u>. 1989 NO. 47 (Winter): 36.

Barghouti, Iyad (interview with). "The Islamist Movement in the Occupied Territories" <u>Middle East Report</u> July-August 1993. pp. 9-12.

Ben-Meir, Alon. "Israelis and Palestinians: Harsh Demographic Reality and Peace" <u>Middle East Policy</u>. 1993 VOL. 2, NO. 2 : 74.

Bisharat, Carol. "Palestine and Humanitarian Law: Israeli Practice in the West Bank and Gaza" <u>Hastings International and Comparative Law Review</u>. 1989 VOL. 12, NO. 2 (Winter): 325.

Brynen, Rex. "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 95), pp. 23-36.

Brynen, Rex. "The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXIV, no.3 (Spring 1995), pp. 31-43.

Butler and Elmusa, "Interview with Haydar 'abd Al-Shafi" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXV, no. 1, (Autumn 1995) pp. 76-85.

Connel, Dan. "Palestine on the edge: crisis in the national movement" <u>Middle East Report</u> (MER) no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4, pp. 6-9

Davidi, Asher. "Israel' Economic Strategy for Palestinian Independence" <u>Middle East Report</u> Sept. - Oct. 1993, pp. 24-26.

Eikelman, Dale F. "Introduction: Self and Community in Middle Eastern Societies" <u>Anthropological Quarterly</u> , 58:4. (Oct. 1985), pp.135-140.

Eikelman, Dale F. "The Political Economy of Meaning" <u>American Ethnologist</u> 6 (1979), pp.386-393.

<u>EIU 3 qtr '93</u> (Economic Intelligence Unit) Country Report - Israel & The Occupied Territories, 3rd quarter 1993.

EIU 4 qtr '93 (Economic Intelligence Unit) Country Report - Israel & The Occupied Territories, 3rd quarter 1993.

Elmusa, Sherif and Linda Butler. "Moving beyond Oslo: An Interview with Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi" Journal of Palestine Studies. XXV, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp.

Elmusa, Sharif S. and Mahmud El-Jafari. "Power and Trade: The Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp.14-32.

Falk, Richard A., and Weston, Burns. "The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defenze of the Intifada" Harvard International Law Journal. 1991 VOL. 32, NO. 1 (Winter): 129.

Farsoun, Samih K., "Class Structure and Social Change in the Arab World: 1995", in Sharabi, Hisham, The Next Arab Decade, 1988, pp.221-238.

Gabriel, Stuart A. and Eitan F. Sabatello. "Palestinian Migration From the West Bank and Gaza" Economic Development and Cultural Change. 1986 VOL. 34, NO. 2 (January): 245.

Hammami, Rema. "NGOs: the profesisonalisation of politics" in Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2; Oct-Dec. 1995. pp. 51-64.

Hammani, Rema. "Women in Palestinian Society"

Harlow, Barbara. "There is not even a basic understanding about what laws apply here: Interview with Usama Halabi" Middle East Report no. 194/5, pp.33-34.

Hass, Amira. "Gaza's workers and the Palestinian authority" Middle East Report 194/195 pp. 25-28.

Hilal, Jamil M. "The PLO: crisis in legitimacy" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2. Oct-Dec. 1995. pp. 1-18.

Hilal, Jamil M. "PLO institutions: The Challenge Ahead", The Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 1, pp. 44-60.

Hiltermann, Joost R., " Mass mobilization and the uprising: the labor movement" in ???

Hovsepian, Nubar, "Competing Identities in the Arab World", Journal of International Affairs, Vol.49, No.1 (Summer 1995), pp.1-24..

"Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area". International Legal Materials. 1994 VOL 33, NO. 3 (May): 662.

Jubran, Michel, and Drake, Laura. "The Islamic fundamentalist movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" Middle East Policy. 1993

Kuttab, Daoud. "Report From the Occupied Territories" Journal of Palestine Studies vol. XXIII, no 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 80-89.

Kuttab, Daoud. "The West Bank and Gaza Strip: Current Developments in the Peace Process" Journal of Palesinian Studies. vol. XXII, no. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp.100-107.

Lesch, Ann M. "Prelude to Uprising in the Gaza Strip" Journal of Palestinian Studies. VOL. 20, NO. 1 (Autumn 1990): 1.

Lesch, Ann M. "Transition to Palestinian Self Government" Journal of Palestinian Studies. VOL. 22, NO. 3 (Spring 1993), pp.46-56.

-------------. "Gaza: The Forgotten Corner of Palestine" Journal of Palestinian Studies. VOL. 15, NO. 1 (Autumn 1985): 43.

Lustick, Ian. "Israeli State Building on the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Theory and Practice" International Organization. VOL. 41, NO. 1 (Winter 1987), 151.

Marx, Emanuel. "Palestinian Refugee Camps in the West Bank and Gaza strip" Middle Eastern Studies. VOL. 28, NO. 2 (April 1992), pp.281-294.

MEED (Middle East Economic Digest). 21 January 1994: pp. 5-15.

Moore, James W. "Immigration and Demographic Balance: Israel and the Occupied Territories" Middle East Policy. 1992 VOL. 1, NO.3 :88.

Murphy, Emma. "Stacking the Deck: The Economics of the Israeli-PLO Accords" Middle East Report 194/195, May-June/July-August 1995, pp.35-39.

Muslih, Mohammad. "Palestinian Civil Society" in Schwedler, Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?

Naim, Mona. "An interview with Mahmoud Darwish" MER no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4, p.18.

Nakleh, "Studies of Arabs in Israel"

Nakhleh, Emile A. "The West Bank and Gaza: Twenty Years Later" Middle East Journal. VOL. 42, NO. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 209-226.

O'Sullivan, Edmund. "Putting Palestine back to work." MEED 1 Oct. 1993: 2.

Paust, Jordan J. et al. "Report of the IJC Mission of Inquiry into the Israeli Military Court System in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza" Hastings International and Comparative Law Review. 1990 VOL. 14, NO. 1 (Fall): 1.

Peled, Yoav. "From Zionism to Capitalism" Middle East Report (MER) no. 194/195 vol. 25 no. 3&4, 1995. pp. 13-19.

Peretz, Don. "The Impact of the Gulf War on Israeli and Palestinian Political Attitudes" Journal of Palestine Studies XXI, no.1 (Autumn 1991). pp. 17-35.

Rabbani, Mouin. "The standard colonial pattern: an interview with Noam Chomsky" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 93-97.

Romann, Michael. "Territory and Demography: The Case of Jewish-Arab National Struggle" Middle Eastern Studies VOL. 26, NO. 3 (July 1990), pp.371-382.

Roy, Sara. see Arab Stud. Quarterly 13 no 3-4.

----------. "The Gaza Strip: A Case of Economic De-development" Journal of Palestinian Studies. 1987 VOL. 17, NO. 1 (Autumn): 56.

----------. "Changing Attitudes Among Gaza Refugees" Journal of Palestine Studies. 1989 VOL. 19, NO. 1 (Autumn): 72.

----------. "From Hardship to Hunger: The econmic impact of the intifada on the Gaza Strip" American-Arab Affairs. 1990 VOL. 34 (Fall): 109.

----------. "The Political Economy of Dispair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip" Journal of Palestinian Studies. 1991 VOL. 20, NO. 3 (Spring): 58.

----------. "Gaza: The New Dynamics of Civil Disintegration" The Journal of Palestine Studies. VOL 22, NO. 4 (Summer 1993), pp. 20-31.

Roy, Sara. "The Gaza Strip: Past Present and Future" Current History 1994 VOL. 93, NO. 580 (February): 67.

Roy, Sara. "The seed of chaos, and of night: The Gaza Strip after the agreement". The Journal of Palestine Studies VOL. 23, NO 3 (spring 1994), pp.85-98.

Roy, Sara. "Closure and the economic future of the Gaza Strip revisited" Middle East Journal. 1994 VOL. 48, NO.1 (winter): 11.

Roy, Sarah. "Alienation or Accomodation" The Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 4 (Summer 1995), pp.73-82.

Roy, Sarah. "Civil Society in the Gaza Strip" in Schwedler, Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?

Rubenberg, Cheryl A. "Twenty Years of Israeli Economic Policies in the West Bank and Gaza: Prolouge to the Intifada" Journal of Arab Affairs. 1989 VOL. 8, NO. 1 (Spring): 28.

Sayigh, Rosemary. "Palestinians in Lebanon: (dis)solution of the refugee problem" in Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2; pp. 27-42.

Schiff, B. "Between Occupier and Occupied: UNRWA in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" Journal of Palestine Studies. 1989 VOL. 18, NO. 3 (Spring), pp.60.

Shaath, Nabil (interview with). "The Oslo Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp.5-13.

Shadid, Mohamed and Rick Seltzer. "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" Middle East Journal, VOL. 42, NO. 1 (Winter 1988), pp.16-32.

Sharabi, Hisham. "The Neopatriarchal Discourse: Language and Discourse in Contemporary Arab Society" in ????

Shehada, Raja. "Transfers and Powers" MER no. 194/95, pp.18-25.

Shehadeh, Raja. "Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement" Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII, no. 4 (Summer 1994).

Shenhav, Yehouda and Yitchak Haberfeld. "Organizational Demography and Inequality" Social Forces. 1992 VOL. 71, NO. 1 (Sept): 123.

Shikaki, Khalil. "The Transition to Democracy in Palestine" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996[a]),

Shikaki, Khalil. "The Palestinian Elections: An Assessment" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Spring 1996[b]),

Shlaim, Avi. "The Rise and Fall of the All Palestine Government in Gaza" The Journal of Palestine Studies. 1990 VOL. 20, NO. 1 (Autumn): 37.

Singh, Ranjit. "Palestinian Elections: A Necessity or a Luxury" Middle East International 8 Sept. 1995.

Steinberg, Matti. "Arafat's PLO: The concept of self determination in transition" Jerusalem Journal of International Relations. 1987 VOL. 9, NO. 3 (Sept): 85.

Tamari, Salim. "Fading Flags: The Crisis of Palestinian Legitimacy" Middle East Report no. 194/195 Vol. 25, No. 3 & 4. 1995. pp. 10-12.

Tamari, Salim. "The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising" Journal of Palestine Studies. 1991(Winter) VOL. 20, NO. 2 : 57.

----------. "Revolt of the petite bourgeoisie: urban merchants and the palestinian uprising" in ???

Tarabi, Ahmed H. "Humanitarian Law: Deprtation of Palestinians From the West Bank and Gaza" Harvard International Law Journal. 1988 VOL. 29, NO. 2 (Spring): 552.

Taylor, Mark. "The Economic of Defeat" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 (1995), pp. 100-106.

Usher, Graham. "An Israeli Peace: Interview with Ilan Pappé" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 1995.

Usher, Graham. "Bantustanization or bi-nationalism: an interview with Azmi Bashara" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2; pp. 65-80.

Usher, Graham. "What kind of nation? The rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories" Race and Class vol. 37, no. 2 p.

Usher, Graham. "Palestinian Trade Unions and the Struggle for Independence" MER no. 194/195 Vol. 25 No. 3 & 4. 1995.

Usher, Graham. "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services" Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996),

Usher, Graham. "The Islamic Movement and the Palestinian Authority" (includes an interview with Bassam Jarrar.) Middle East Report July-August 1994, pp.28-29.

--------------------. "An interview with Salah Abd al-Shafi" Middle East Report Jan.-Feb. 1994. p. 11-13.

Weaver, Thomas P.; J. David Gilespie and Ali al-Jarbawi. " What Palestinians Believe: A Systematic Analysis of Belief Systems in the West Bank and Gaza" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u>. 1985 VOL. 14, NO. 3 (Spring): 110.

Wells, Robert V. "The Demography of a Region: Historical reality or Historical Creation" <u>Proceedings of he American Philisophical Society</u> 1989 VOL. 133, NO. 2 (June): 219.

Yassin, Ahmed. Dar AlHaq interview with Sheik Yassin #1 -- IAP www page.

Zahar, Mahmud (interview with). Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self Destruct" <u>Journal of Palestine Studies</u> XXIV, no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp.81-88.