

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Archived Theses and Dissertations

November 2021

The norm of humanitarian intervention and state behaviour: an assessment of the norm's role in humanitarian intervention and non-intervention

Karine Magued Elias Zabal

The American University in Cairo AUC

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds



Part of the [Models and Methods Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

APA Citation

Zabal, K. M. (2021). *The norm of humanitarian intervention and state behaviour: an assessment of the norm's role in humanitarian intervention and non-intervention* [Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.

https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/2434

MLA Citation

Zabal, Karine Magued Elias. *The norm of humanitarian intervention and state behaviour: an assessment of the norm's role in humanitarian intervention and non-intervention*. 2021. American University in Cairo, Thesis. *AUC Knowledge Fountain*.

https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/2434

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Archived Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact fountadmin@aucegypt.edu.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE NORM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND STATE BEHAVIOUR:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NORM'S ROLE IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND NON-INTERVENTION

KARINE MAGUED ELIAS ZABAL

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY/2011

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This thesis would have never been possible without the guidance and the help of several individuals who in one way or another contributed and extended their valuable assistance in the preparation and completion of this study.

First and foremost, my utmost gratitude to Dr. Bahgat Korany, my thesis advisor and my mentor, for his guidance, support, and encouragement not just during the writing of this thesis, but throughout my years as a graduate student at the American University in Cairo. Dr. Korany not only helped me with my thesis and put me on the right track during the initial phase of research, but he also enriched my knowledge in the field of international relations.

My two readers Dr. Riham Bahi and Dr. Charles Davidson are especially thanked for all their efforts during the review of my thesis. I greatly appreciate all their words of encouragement, insightful comments, advice and constructive criticism regarding this study.

I would also like to thank and express my gratitude to Ms. Dina Hosny, Student Liaison Officer at the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo for her continuous help and support during my graduate years and specifically for her patience with my many questions and requests during the time of the proposal and thesis writing.

Last but not least, I am very grateful to my parents Magued and Sonia, my husband Marco, and Monique my sister for their continuous love and support. They have always been there for me, willing to help in any way they could, putting their lives on hold and changing plans just to accommodate my endless studying nights.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
Methodology	5
PART I	
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE NORMATIVE SHIFT/EVOLUTION	7
CHAPTER 1	
THEORETICAL REVIEW	7
1.1. Defining Humanitarian Intervention	7
1.2. What are norms?	11
1.3. Humanitarian Intervention: the Emergence of the Norm, the Normative/Shift Evolution, and Redefining the Concept of State Sovereignty	12
<hr/>	
PART II	
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND STATE BEHAVIOUR	28
CHAPTER 2	
THE IMPACT OF THE NORM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ON STATE BEHAVIOUR	28
2.1. Political Belief System	28
2.2. Domestic Pressures (the media, local population, government assemblies/Congress)	30
2.3. Pressure of International Organizations	33
PART III	
CASE STUDIES	35
CHAPTER 3	
CASE STUDY 1: THE U.S. AND SOMALIA – OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1993)	35
3.1. Account of Event	35
3.2. Intervention Analysis	38
3.2.1. The Individual Level	38
3.2.2. The Domestic Level	45
3.2.3. The International Level	50

CHAPTER 4	
CASE STUDY 2: THE U.S. AND NON-INTERVENTION IN RWANDA (1994)	54
4.1. Account of Event	54
4.2. Intervention Analysis	57
4.2.1. The Individual Level	57
4.2.2. The Domestic Level	62
4.2.3. The International Level	67
CHAPTER 5	
SOMALIA AND RWANDA: A COMPARISON OF SUGGESTED FACTORS BEHIND THE U.S. DECISIONS OF INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION	71
5.1. Somalia	73
5.1.1. New World Order and the President’s Historical Legacy	74
5.1.2. Upholding UN Credibility and Strengthening Peacekeeping Missions	76
5.2. Rwanda	81
5.2.1. Lessons from Somalia	82
5.2.2. The Credibility of the United Nations and U.N. Peacekeeping	88
CONCLUSION	90
BIBLIOGRAPHY	97
APPENDIX	102
LITERATURE REVIEW	102

INTRODUCTION

“The concept of humanitarian intervention is nothing new. It has long been part of the inventory of European power politics,”¹ “ highly evident in [...] the late medieval philosophy and jurisprudence of Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suárez, Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius, who were all inspired by the scholastic tradition founded by St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.”² According to these theorists “foreign intervention and even punishment could rightfully be undertaken in the interest of humanity, if a ruler mistreated his subjects to an outrageous extent.”³ However, with the “Peace of Westphalia in 1648”⁴, the concept of state sovereignty steadily has become the sacred concept guiding international law, and accordingly, “sovereign states [were] expected to act as guardians of their citizens’ security [without the interference of any foreign states,]”⁵ and the concept of humanitarian intervention has been overshadowed, and many cases of abuse of authority on behalf of sovereign states have been considered as falling within internal affairs, yet the concept of humanitarian intervention has not totally disappeared.

After the Cold War (during which humanitarian intervention hasn’t played much of a role, as opposed to earlier periods) came to an end, and challenging the concept of state sovereignty, “the issue of humanitarian intervention attracted considerable

¹ Hans Köchler. *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of The “Just War” Compatible with the International Rule of Law?* (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001), 2.

² Tonny Brems Knudsen. “The History of Humanitarian Intervention: The Rule or the Exception.” Paper, University of Aarhus, Denmark, 2009, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴ Srinivas Vaitla, “Norms and Interests of Humanitarian Intervention” (Master Thesis American University Washington, D.C., 2002), 56.

⁵ Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 556.

attention”⁶ as “there was a ‘developing international norm’ to forcibly protect civilians who were at risk from genocide and large-scale killing.”⁷ Since then, the notion of humanitarian intervention has been the heated topic of many debates among both theorists and practitioners.⁸

As a natural result of the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention, a considerable amount of academic work has been dedicated to the analysis of such “[coercive interferences] in the domestic affairs of [other] states.”⁹ Many have debated the issue of the legality of such interventions and the notion of violating state sovereignty, while others immersed themselves in the analysis of the actual interventions and the extent of their successes and failures. This thesis will, however, focus on analyzing whether the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention was the trigger behind state intervention or non-intervention in humanitarian crisis in other states in the post Cold War era.

This study will focus on the determining factors behind a states’ decision to intervene or not to intervene in humanitarian crises in other states. To be more specific it will focus on the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention and whether it became the dominating reason behind the United States’ decisions to intervene or not in another state’s domestic affairs on the grounds of humanitarian crises in the post Cold War era. The hypothesis of this research is that the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention had no impact (played no role) on the United States’ decision to intervene

⁶ Andrew Mason and Nick Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” in *The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change*, ed. Barry Holden (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), 94

⁷ Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 556.

⁸ Jennifer M. Welsh, “Introduction,” in *Humanitarian Interventions and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1.

⁹ R. J. Vincent qtd. in Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 557.

or not in humanitarian crises in other states (Somalia and Rwanda) in the post Cold War era.

The research is divided into three parts. The first part provides a review of the term humanitarian intervention and an overview of the normative shift/evolution in international relations and the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention. It starts with a section on the definition of humanitarian intervention, encompassing all the important qualifications applying to the term, an explanation of what norms are, followed by a detailed section on the normative shift, the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention and the redefinition of the concept of state sovereignty. This part also introduces the conceptual framework used for the purpose of this research, which is based on the centrality of the concept of norms.

The whole thesis revolves around the role played by norms to impact state behaviour. Hence to examine the normative evolution one has to examine norms starting from their emergence all the way to their impact on state behaviour. The best framework of analysis to fulfil this task is a combination of both Constructivism and Solidarism (a wing of the English School of international relations), which both put the concept of norms at the centre of their analysis. Both Constructivists and Solidarists base their analysis of international relations on the conception that states interact with each other within a normative fabric, which links states together in an international society, and both their analysis complement each other in building the conceptual framework for this thesis.

The second part of this research is dedicated to the analysis and assessment of how norms, and in particular the norm of humanitarian intervention, can exert its influence on state behaviour. To analyse the impact of norms on state behaviour, and with the aid of the conceptual framework adopted in this study, this section provides an overview of the different mechanisms through which the norm of humanitarian intervention can exert its influence, and hereby affect state behaviour

In order to assess whether the norm of humanitarian intervention had an impact on a specific state behaviour, the influence of this norm is analyzed through the mechanisms offered by the Solidarist scholars. The first mechanism is the political belief system of state leaders and decision makers, which is analyzed on the level of the individual. The second mechanism, through which the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention manifests its influence, is analyzed on the domestic level and is comprised of the role of the mass media, domestic public pressure, and finally Congressional pressure. The last mechanism is how the norm of humanitarian intervention exerts its influence on state behaviour through pressure applied on states by international organizations, which is analyzed on the international level. All different mechanisms offer an insight in how the norm of humanitarian intervention can affect state behaviour; hence, if the norm, had an impact on any or all of these levels, then as a result it should also shape state behaviour.

The third part of the research focuses on two case studies dedicated to the examination of the role played by the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention in the post Cold War era, and whether it resulted in US intervention and non-intervention in Somalia (1992-1993) and Rwanda (1994). This section will

present accounts of events for both case studies, and the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention will be assessed through the different mechanisms mentioned here above, determining whether it had any effect on the U.S.'s behaviour with regards to humanitarian crises. A comparison of the analysis and outcomes of both case studies will also be conducted.

The final section following the third part of this research consists of the conclusion, where a summary of the findings of this proposed study will be presented, in addition to some concluding remarks.

Methodology

The findings of this research are based on the analysis of current existing literature in addition to the examination of published accounts of events about the chosen case studies. This research also analyzed public statements, newspaper articles, and interviews, which are directly related to the issue of U.S. intervention and non-intervention in humanitarian crises in Somalia and Rwanda.

The case studies have been carefully chosen to examine the hypothesis presented in this thesis because both took place in the post-Cold War era, hence, are fit examples for the assessment of the hypothesis. Furthermore, the cases took place during two different US Administrations (Bush & Clinton Administrations), and they took place in two different countries, hereby presenting diverse examples. Both cases are also put forth by Constructivists as examples of pure humanitarian intervention/non-intervention where the United States had no specific interests, geostrategic or other, in these countries.

The U.S. has been chosen for the purpose of this thesis, because it is one of the major powers in the world, which played a notable role in the post-Cold War era, especially after the defeat of the Soviet Union, and the rise of western-style liberalism. The U.S. also played a very important role in various humanitarian crisis cases in the post-Cold War phase.

PART I HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE NORMATIVE SHIFT/EVOLUTION

CHAPTER 1 THEORETICAL REVIEW

1.1. Defining Humanitarian Intervention

Defining humanitarian intervention posed some serious “analytical challenges [due to] the variation in how it is defined.”¹⁰ In order to define the term humanitarian intervention one needs to understand “what constitutes intervention, and what sorts of considerations count as humanitarian.”¹¹

An act is considered to be intervention if “the state that is the object of intervention [is] widely acknowledged to be sovereign.”¹² This implies that the state in question has to be recognized by other states to be exercising its right to autonomy, which means that groups that form states on their own that are not widely recognized by the world, are not considered sovereign nor autonomous and an act of interference from a state towards those is not considered an intervention.

Furthermore, “intervention implies that the act is designed to influence the conduct of the internal affairs of a state, and not to annex or to take it over.”¹³ Hence, acts of intervention totally exclude wars and conquests because the aim of an intervention is not to “take [...] over [a state, nor] defeat it in a military confrontation,”¹⁴ it is simply

¹⁰ Jennifer M. Welsh, “Introduction”, 3.

¹¹ Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Political Science Review* 18 no.1 (1997), 53.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

the interference in its internal affairs with the aim of guiding it towards a specific direction.

Another criterion of intervention is if the country in question is opposed to the intervention.¹⁵ This excludes all cases in which a country asks another country to interfere in its domestic affairs. An act of intervention has to be unwelcomed by the state in question or otherwise one cannot consider such as an act to be one of intervention but “a case of giving support to a willing party.”¹⁶

Last but not least, intervention is a type of interference that “occurs when an external agency violates a state’s territorial integrity by using physical force in one form or another. It usually involves military force, but it need not.”¹⁷

Hence regardless of the mode of action, if an act of interference fulfils the aforementioned criteria, then it counts as an act of intervention.

Having explained what constitutes an intervention, one needs to pay close attention to the definition or description of the term humanitarian. For an act to be considered humanitarian it “is intended to address what is regarded as a violation of the minimum that is due to human beings.”¹⁸ The main focus here is on what the state offers its citizens and how it treats them. If the government turns against its citizens and rules them tyrannically and commits acts of abuse against them, then an intervention by another state, group of states, or international organization is considered humanitarian

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 54.

¹⁸ Ibid.

because it is addressing violations committed against citizens of another state by their own government.

Additionally, if a group within a state is committing acts of abuse against another group, and the government/state is not taking any actions to protect those harmed, this implies that an external intervention is considered humanitarian, too. This however, excludes a state's "mismanagement of [its] affairs [which] cause [...] acute poverty, starvation, disorder and gang warfare,"¹⁹ which is generally considered as matters that need to be resolved between the government of the concerned state and its citizens. It also excludes "interventions to protect foreign nationals from natural disasters"²⁰ hereby only focusing on "man-made violence."²¹

The second condition so an act can be considered as humanitarian is that it "should be wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling, and in that sense disinterested."²² This means that a state intervening in another state's domestic affairs on the grounds of relieving suffering, cannot have ulterior motives, other than saving the citizens of the state in question. If a state intervenes in another state's internal affairs, claiming that it's humanitarian but on the other hand has selfish interests and hidden agendas, then the act does not count as humanitarian.

¹⁹ Ibid., 55.

²⁰ Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), 53.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 54.

Taking the aforementioned criteria into consideration “Humanitarian Intervention” can hence be defined as: *an activity undertaken unilaterally or multilaterally, where coercive interference through military force is sent into a territory beyond the interventionist’s jurisdiction, in order to prevent or put an end to man-made physical suffering and atrocities against other citizens and with the aim of reordering its internal affairs.*²³

This definition builds a specific guideline for the research of this thesis in terms of what is considered to be an act of humanitarian intervention. First of all, it denotes that humanitarian interventions can be undertaken by “a state, a group of states, or an international organization,”²⁴ hence unilateral or multilateral interventions. Second, the research can be limited to humanitarian interventions where “military force[s] [are deployed] across borders to protect foreign nationals,”²⁵ meaning that one can exclude humanitarian relief efforts, which do not include coercive force. Third, the definition is narrowed down to protecting national foreigners only and not the protection of the country’s citizens abroad.²⁶ Last but not least, because of this definition the focus here will be on violence caused by human beings, i.e. manmade violence, hence excluding human suffering due to environmental catastrophes and the government’s mismanagement of its affairs, as explained previously.²⁷

²³ Definition gathered from various definitions by Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” 54-55; R.J. Vincent qtd. in Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 557; Andrew Mason and Nick Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” 95; Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 53; Jennifer M. Welsh, “Introduction,” 3; Oded Löwenheim, “Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003): 23-24.

²⁴ R. J. Vincent qtd. in Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 557.

²⁵ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 53.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Yet by examining the criteria constituting an act of humanitarian intervention there is one criterion put forth that poses a problem, which is that a humanitarian intervention “should be wholly or primarily guided by the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling, and in that sense disinterested.”²⁸ This implies as explained before, that the main motive of such intervention has to be guided by a humanitarian nature. However, determining the purpose or intention of a certain intervention conducted by a state or a group of states poses a big challenge, merely because states do not usually utter their intentions, or they state what they don’t mean, and sometimes they act differently to their own declarations. Since the issue of motivation can be the topic of a whole study on its own, this thesis will assume that humanitarian interventions are restricted to those actions where coercive force is deployed whereas interveners overtly declare that they have a humanitarian validation for their actions.

1.2. What are Norms?

Defining what norms are has never been a simple task, despite “the prevalence and importance of norms to many fields of study.”²⁹ However, going through various versions of the definitions of norms, some seemed more thorough such as Martha Finnemore’s version stating that norms are “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors,”³⁰ and another similarly explaining that norms are “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity.”³¹

²⁸ Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” 54.

²⁹ Vaitla, “Norms and Interests of Humanitarian Intervention,” 25.

³⁰ Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 22.

³¹ Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein and Ronald L. Jepperson. “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 54.

However, norms are not laws nor rules, but they are “constructions based upon discursive practices and repeated use of those discursive practices. [...] Norms have been repeatedly used in discourse and acted upon over time.”³² Such repeated use of norms has made them a dependable and consistent practice and members of the international society draw upon some norms in order to use them as grounds to take action and as justifications for their actions.³³ However, this does not mean that members of the international society are forced to follow norms, “but rather, a norm provides an intersubjective expectation about how an actor should act given their identity.”³⁴ To sum up “norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave,”³⁵ and they generally become “typical or modal behaviour”³⁶ or the “dominant practice”³⁷ in specific situations or under particular circumstances.

1.3. Humanitarian Intervention: the Emergence of the Norm, the Normative Shift/Evolution, and Redefining the Concept of State Sovereignty

There has long been a discussion among “theoretical frameworks in which states are treated as autonomous actors and those in which they are embedded in global structures.”³⁸ The issue in question is whether “one treats actors [...], capabilities and preferences as given and derives social structures from their interaction, or whether

³² Vaitla, “Norms and Interests of Humanitarian Intervention,” 26.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 27.

³⁵ Wendt, Katzenstein and Jepperson. qtd. in Vaitla, “Norms and Interests of Humanitarian Intervention,” 27.

³⁶ Robert O. Keohane qtd. in Neta C. Crawford. *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge. U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 86.

³⁷ Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics*, 86.

³⁸ Ibid., 14.

one takes the social structures as given and treats actors, their preferences and powers as defined by the social system(s) in which they are embedded.”³⁹

In view of the fact that norms, are components of social structure,⁴⁰ and this study’s main focus is the effect of the norm of humanitarian intervention on the behaviour of the international society’s actors, namely states, therefore the framework of analysis adopted in this study must follow a “structure-oriented approach,”⁴¹ hereby defining state preferences and actions according to the components or elements constituting their social structure.

The best known paradigms adopting arguments of a social-structured type are Constructivism [and] the English School.⁴² Constructivism, to begin with, focuses on “how the world hangs together, how normative structures construct the identities, [behaviours] and interests of actors [such as states],”⁴³ and it is “concerned with the impact of cultural practices, norms of behaviour, and social values on political life.”⁴⁴ This paradigm also explains how norms develop, rise and become part of the fabric guiding international society.

Additionally, Constructivism has also been one of the particular paradigms that considerably theorized about the concept of humanitarian intervention, as opposed to

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., 14.

⁴² Ibid., 15.

⁴³ Michael Barnett “Social Constructivism.” In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 264.

⁴⁴ Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 15.

realism and others who claim that “states always pursue only their national interest”⁴⁵ hence humanitarian interventions are only conducted to serve selfish state interests. Therefore, by adding together theorizing about norms and about the concept of humanitarian intervention, Constructivism hereby poses one of the main approaches examining the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention, the normative shift and the redefinition of the concept of state sovereignty.

In order to examine norms, and how they not only restrict actors, but also form their “identities and interests, and define standards of appropriate conduct, [Constructivists do a great job in examining the] origins, rise and widespread acceptance of various international norms,”⁴⁶ namely, the emergence, socialization, and taken-for-granted quality or adoption of a norm. Constructivists explain that norms do not simply rise out of nowhere but they “rather evolve through a political process [... called] the life cycle of norms.”⁴⁷

Norms usually rise or emerge when what Constructivists such as Finnemore and Sikkink call “norm entrepreneurs, attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms. Norm entrepreneurs call attention to issues [...] by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them. [They] attempt to establish frames ... that resonate with the broader public understandings and are adopted as new ways of talking and understanding issues.”⁴⁸ Mostly after norms have emerged and for them to take their natural course in their life cycle, and after norm entrepreneurs simultaneously attempt to convince a considerable crowd to take on

⁴⁵ Mason and Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” 96

⁴⁶ Barnett, “Social Constructivism,” 264.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 265.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 266

new norms,⁴⁹ norms “become institutionalized in specific sets of international rules and organizations,”⁵⁰

After the norm has emerged, it follows in its life cycle and moves into the phase of socialization, where state leaders put a lot of effort in convincing various states to follow and adhere to certain norms,⁵¹ which is facilitated by “a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimization, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem.”⁵² This phase is characterised by pressure from states who lead an emergent norm on other states in order to transform the emergent norm to a well socialized and widely accepted international norm, hereby changing the normative fabric governing the international society. The norm then in turn will move to the third and final stage of its life cycle and become the for-granted international rule, by which all members of the international society go.

The final stage of a norm’s life cycle is when a norm finally has an influence and an effect on members of the international society, namely states. Constructivists argue that norms “acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate and thus are automatically honoured.”⁵³ When a norm has acquired the taken-for-granted position, it is automatically adopted as the common way to respond to certain issues relating to that norm and it naturally affects the behaviour of states.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

When Constructivist examine humanitarian intervention as an emerging norm, they explain that for it to originate and rise then a change in the normative fabric of the international society must have had taken place. Such change in the normative fabric and in the international society's decisions regarding what is considered legitimate and what is not, are what have opened the floor for the emergence and development of the norm of humanitarian intervention.⁵⁴

The emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention has posed a challenge to the well ingrained concept of state sovereignty, which was guiding the members of the international society. Constructivists, who focus on the normative context wrapping the international society, explain that the normative shift that occurred in the fabric of the international society giving rise and more importance to individual international human rights has, hence redefined or evolved the understanding of what state sovereignty is.

The rising of the importance of international human rights, meaning that the individual has been given more importance over the norm of non-interference into sovereign states, has been a "strike to the heart of normative shift in international relations"⁵⁵ because "changes defining what governments can do to their own people"⁵⁶ have taken place, and opposed the concept of states possessing ultimate

⁵⁴ The emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention has been contested by many, yet in terms of politics, the norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged and is one that is well established. In fact Secretary-General Kofi Annan has always been forthcoming on the importance of the norm of humanitarian intervention and the international society's responsibility to act upon it. In his Annual Report to the General Assembly in September 1999, Kofi Annan referred to "a developing [emerging] international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from wholesale slaughter." Annan, Kofi. "Secretary-General presents his Annual Report to the General Assembly." (20 September 1999), http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=28.

⁵⁵ Coral Bell, "Normative Shift," *The National Interest*, 70 (2003), 49.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

sovereign rights. In this case individual rights have taken priority in the normative fabric guiding the international society and the concept of ultimate state sovereignty falls under the influence of the norm of humanitarian intervention and the members of the international society will hold other states violating the rights of their own citizens responsible for their actions, and will coercively intervene to save the suffering citizens, even if such actions are in breach with the state's sovereignty. This implies that "the protection of human rights [has become] a universal obligation of all states and respect of this obligation [has become] the concern of all states."⁵⁷ This shift or revolution in the normative fabric guiding the international society has worked towards the redefinition of the concept of state sovereignty. The concept of state sovereignty has shifted from revolving around "sovereignty as control"⁵⁸ and a state's authority to do whatever it pleases within its territory to "sovereignty imply[ing] a dual responsibility: externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state."⁵⁹ "Sovereignty as responsibility [and protecting the citizens' human rights] has become the minimum content of good international citizenship"⁶⁰ and the norm guiding international relations, mirroring the norm of humanitarian intervention in other states' crises.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Bruno Simma qtd. in Hans Köchler. *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics*, 30.

⁵⁸ "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty." Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001. <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>, 12.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 8.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Despite the fact that the rise in the importance of human rights and the need for humanitarian intervention seems to have been the main factor behind the shift/change in the concept of state sovereignty, "the conditions under which sovereignty [has been] exercised [...] have changed dramatically since 1945 [not only during the Cold-War era]. [...] Evolving international law has set many constraints on what states can do, and not only in the realm of human rights [but also in different domains]." "The Responsibility to Protect," 7.

With the shift in the normative fabric guiding international society giving rise to the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention, hereby redefining the concept of state sovereignty, Constructivists explain that there has been an extent of socialization and adoption of the norm among members of the international society. Scholars such as Martha Finnemore explain how Constructivism stresses that “the ‘legitimacy’ approach is predicated on the assumption that states adhere to norms because they accept them as valid, [which means that] at this point, states do not follow norms because they calculate that they will serve their interests [as opposed to what realists claim]. Instead, the norm has served to reconstitute the identity and interests of the actor.”⁶² Furthermore, to associate or identify with a legitimate and justifiable principle is considered the most profound level of norm adoption or deepest level of the taken-for-granted status of a norm and it represents the maximum level of normative institutionalization.⁶³

This further strengthens the Constructivists’ views that the normative fabric in which the members of the international society interact is of ultimate importance, because it “shapes conceptions of interests and gives purpose and meaning to action.”⁶⁴ It is the normative fabric that guides states towards means of action which are believed to be legitimate, in order to achieve specific objectives.⁶⁵ Hence, when states interfere in humanitarian crises in other states by resorting to the norm of humanitarian intervention as a justification for their actions, then this “speaks directly to normative

⁶² Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society,” in *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31.

⁶³ Oded Löwenheim. “Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind,” 28.

⁶⁴ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 53.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

context. When states justify their interventions, they are drawing on and articulating shared values and expectations held by other decision makers and other publics in other states, [meaning that they are] attempt[ing] to connect [...] actions to [...] standards of appropriate and acceptable behaviour,”⁶⁶ which is generally what constitutes the normative fabric.

When Constructivists talk about an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention they don't mean that the concept of humanitarian intervention hasn't previously existed. The concept of humanitarian intervention has long existed prior to the post Cold War era in the form of a doctrine that was a fundamental part of the European power politics.⁶⁷ However, as previously explained the concept of humanitarian intervention has been overshadowed by the concept of state sovereignty, especially during the phase of the Cold War.

However, the post Cold War era saw a revival of the concept of humanitarian intervention and “states have increasingly come under pressure to intervene militarily and, in fact, have intervened militarily to protect citizens other than their own from humanitarian disasters.”⁶⁸ Constructivists explain that the revival of the concept of humanitarian intervention had experienced a notable transformation in three specific aspects.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 159.

⁶⁷ Köchler, *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics*, 3

⁶⁸ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 52

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 53

First “who is human has changed.”⁷⁰ Previously, in the nineteenth century, “only white Christians”⁷¹ undergoing humanitarian disasters were the ones to be saved by strong states intervening in humanitarian crises. “By the end of the twentieth century, however, most of the protected populations were non-white, non-Christian groups.”⁷²

Second factor to have changed is how interventions are conducted.⁷³ In the post Cold War era “states that [undertook humanitarian] intervention[s] portray[ed] themselves as acting as agents of the 'international community'.”⁷⁴ They undertook such interventions as one state or a coalition of many for the international community. “In short such intervention is represented as 'international' intervention that is undertaken to achieve 'humanitarian' objectives.”⁷⁵

Finally, the “military goals and definitions of success have also changed.”⁷⁶ In the nineteenth century authoritative and dominant states could establish a government they saw fit as a consequence of humanitarian operations, yet in the post Cold era intervening states could only set up a process to establish a government, namely elections.⁷⁷

Constructivists further argued “that [the humanitarian] objectives [undertaken in the post Cold War era] are intrinsically far too valuable to be held hostage to the norm of

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002), 83

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 53

⁷⁷ Ibid.

state sovereignty and, therefore, ought to override that norm.”⁷⁸ With the examination of the humanitarian intervention cases that took place after the Cold War, Constructivists assert that there exists an emergent norm of humanitarian intervention, since “nowadays, [exists] a right - even a moral duty - to intervene”⁷⁹ militarily to save citizens of other states from humanitarian disasters.

The second approach adopting a social-structured type paradigm can be found in what has been called the English School. This approach, like Constructivism, puts forward “an international society of states which affects state behaviour.”⁸⁰ English School scholars explain that the international society “is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory.”⁸¹

“The basic idea of international society is quite simple: just as human beings as individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live in an international society which they shape and are shaped by.”⁸² Hence, the main focus here is how states, as units, interact together and how they are affected by their decisions, which are embodied in rules, shared values and interests. Furthermore, if the states in the international society share mutual rules or norms “then these intersubjective understandings not only condition their behaviour, but also define the boundaries of a social system.”⁸³ Hence, the paradigm of the English School is fit to

⁷⁸ Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” 84

⁷⁹ Köchler, *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics*, 34.

⁸⁰ Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society*, 18.

⁸¹ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 8.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

build up to the understanding of norms, their emergence and legitimization, the normative evolution, and the effect of norms on the international society and hence state behaviour.

Among the English School scholars, the branch that focused the most on humanitarian intervention is the Solidarist branch of the English School, which focuses on the international society that is connected by “universal standards of justice and morality, which would legitimize practices of humanitarian intervention.”⁸⁴ Solidarists contend that states have a “legal right and a moral duty” [to intervene in situations of humanitarian crises] that offend against minimum standards of humanity.”⁸⁵ The legal right of humanitarian intervention can be explained as falling under “customary international law”⁸⁶ and “based on an interpretation of the human rights provisions in the UN Charter.”⁸⁷

Solidarists furthermore explain that states are bound to create mutually agreed upon moral principles which in turn adds legitimacy to an act of humanitarian intervention, and ensures that intervention will take place when needed, because states would have identified a responsibility and obligation to take action.⁸⁸

Recognizing a duty or obligation to act means that a norm to act/intervene has emerged and this norm has reached the taken-for-granted level, which in turn

⁸⁴ Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 562

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 559.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 560.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 562.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

“legitimizes practices of humanitarian intervention,”⁸⁹ hereby affecting the behaviour of the members of the international society. Hence, the Solidarist wing of the English School is best to offer in theorization the mechanisms by which the norm of humanitarian intervention puts its influence into effect regarding state behaviour in humanitarian crisis. This means that Solidarism is best to examine the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention on the U.S.’s decision to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and not to intervene in Rwanda.

“The Solidarist position is driven both normatively (what states should do, and what norms should be part of international society) and empirically (what states do do, and what norms are becoming part of international society).”⁹⁰ Since this study is examining the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention and its impact on state behaviour, then its examining a norm that becomes part of the international society and what actions states actually take based on the impact of this norm, hence the focus should be on the empirical position of the Solidarist wing.

English School scholars, and of course the Solidarist wing, as opposed to Constructivists, have supported their analysis of the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention and the normative shift that took place in the 1990s by resorting to actual cases from that period. Nicholas J. Wheeler, a prominent Solidarist scholar explains that “the 1990s witnessed a new activism on the part of the Security Council as it extended its chapter VII powers into matters that had previously belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states.”⁹¹ Additionally, Wheeler, among other

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Buzan, *From International to World Society*, 47.

⁹¹ Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty,” 29.

Solidarists, argues that the international society is bound by shared values and concepts that build up the normative fabric and legalize actions of humanitarian intervention.⁹² He also clarifies that with the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention and the Security Council actually extending the understanding of threats to “international peace and security”⁹³ to humanitarian crises, the norm of humanitarian intervention, a part of the normative fabric of the international society has been institutionalized. This understanding implies that “forcible humanitarian intervention [...] to alleviate human suffering of some or all within a state’s borders”⁹⁴ has been legitimized.⁹⁵

This “fundamental change in normative practice that occurred during the 1990s [...] began on 5 April 1991 when the Council decided by ten votes to three (with two abstentions) to name the refugee crisis caused by the Iraqi Government's oppression of the Kurds and Shiites as a threat to the peace.”⁹⁶ This means that as opposed to Cold War practices, the UN now considers a state’s oppression of its citizens and humanitarian crises as being a threat to peace and security, as opposed to falling within domestic affairs.⁹⁷ It was explained that such actions “threaten [...]

⁹² Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 562

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 561.

⁹⁵ Despite the fact that the Security Council actually extended its understanding of threats to international peace and security to humanitarian crises, and that politically the norm of humanitarian intervention is well established and proponents of the importance of human rights support actual cases of intervention, the legality of humanitarian intervention has and still is highly contested among international lawyers. They base their arguments on the grounds that article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not allow for the use of force against the territorial integrity, hereby not allowing forcible humanitarian interventions, and article 2(7) denoting that nothing in the Charter allows an intervention in matters, which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The issue of the legality of humanitarian intervention is not the main focus of this thesis; however it constitutes a very important issue, which can be the topic of another major study.

⁹⁶ Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty,” 33.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

international security.”⁹⁸ The decision of the Council has been substantiated when “the first operative paragraph of Resolution 688 ‘condemn[ed] the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq ... the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region’.”⁹⁹

With the Security Council including internal threats and humanitarian crisis as being a threat to international peace and security, states hereafter, for “the first time since the founding of the UN [...] explicitly defended the use of force in humanitarian terms, [...] and western powers [...] defend[ed] their action[s] as being in conformity with Resolution 688, ”¹⁰⁰ which confirms the idea that when new norms are put forth, actors ensure that their behaviour is well-matched with the existing legitimizing rationales,¹⁰¹ supporting the Solidarist notion that the members of international society act within the normative fabric that’s based on shared sets of values and rules affecting and legitimizing their behaviour.

The two cases that contributed the most to the understanding of the normative shift/evolution put forth by Solidarists, and of course Constructivist, are the Somali and Rwandan cases, which this study later on takes up as case studies. The Somali case supports the idea of a normative shift through the following: for the first time and as opposed to previous humanitarian cases “the debate in the Security Council [regarding the Somali crisis] centred on the humanitarian reasons for acting, [and] Resolution 794 adopted unanimously under chapter VII [...] declared that ‘the

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ United Nations Security Council “Resolution 688,” (5 April 1991), qtd. in Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty,” 34

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, [...] constitutes a threat to international peace and security’.”¹⁰²

This implies that “the Security Council had to employ the language of chapter VII to justify authorizing intervention, but it was [also] clear from the debate in the Council that the primary justification for acting was [explicitly and for the first time] humanitarian.”¹⁰³ The case of humanitarian intervention in Somalia hence sustained the emerging norm denoting that with the downfall or disintegration of states, a responsibility for other states and the Security Council to act is inevitable, which was later on reinforced by the international interventions in other areas going through humanitarian disasters.¹⁰⁴

The Rwandan case is best suited, as explained by Wheeler to “illustrate both the development of a new norm and its moral limits.”¹⁰⁵ Despite the fact that the UN was not successful in stopping the humanitarian disasters taking place in Rwanda, it was not due to the idea of upholding the concept of sovereignty of states. In fact “sovereignty was never raised in the Council as a barrier to military intervention to end the genocide, [...] and] no state tried to defend the UN's stance of non-intervention on the grounds that genocide fell within Rwanda's domestic jurisdiction.”¹⁰⁶ The fact that the concept of sovereignty has not been the grounds on which humanitarian intervention in Rwanda has not been undertaken, implies that there was a normative evolution and a shift in the normative fabric of the international society from state

¹⁰² Ibid., 35 United Nations Security Council “Resolution 794,” (3 December 1992). qtd. in Ibid., 35

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty,” 36

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

sovereignty being the ultimate concept guiding and shaping actions of members of the international society, to humanitarian morals and principles playing an important role in state interactions within the international society.

To examine the means by which the norm of humanitarian intervention can impact state behaviour, this study resorts to Solidarists explanations, which are presented in the second part of this study.

PART II HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND STATE BEHAVIOUR

CHAPTER 2 THE IMPACT OF THE NORM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ON STATE BEHAVIOUR

The 1990s witnessed a significant rise in the importance and centrality of humanitarian cases in international diplomacy,¹⁰⁷ as a result of humanitarian norms and values becoming “a sine qua non,” an essential condition that is, guiding the international society.¹⁰⁸ The focus of this study is, hence, the assessment of whether the norm of humanitarian intervention played any role in bringing about state behaviour in the post Cold War era. In order to assess the extent of which or how the norm of humanitarian intervention can exercise its influence we resort to the Solidarist wing of the English School, which presents various means through which the norm of humanitarian intervention can influence members of the international society with regards to their behaviour.

2.1. *Political Belief System*

The first mechanism, through which the norm of humanitarian intervention could exert its influence on state behaviour, is as Wheeler explains that state leaders could have actually been influenced by the norm of humanitarian intervention because they truly do believe in it, because the norm has become embedded in their political belief system,¹⁰⁹ which would in turn be guided by humanitarian motives. Corresponding to this argument, “the end of the Cold War meant that the struggle between Western-

¹⁰⁷ Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s,” in *Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics, and Contradictions*, ed. Humanitarian Studies Unit (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 27.

¹⁰⁸ Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty,” 39.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 39- 40.

style liberalism and Soviet-style communism, and all the variations and permutations of the struggle, ceased to have their hold on the minds of men and women,”¹¹⁰ with the victory of the Western-style liberalism. During this phase various humanitarian crises erupted with the members of the international society left faced with the need to find a strategy to deal with such crises. At this point humanitarianism offered the ideal and most closely related political ideology to Western-style liberalism, which was dominating the values of all state leaders during the post-Cold War phase.¹¹¹ This is the first mechanism through which the norm of humanitarian intervention could influence state behaviour, namely by implanting itself in state leaders’ political belief systems, as a result of corresponding to their current ideology and values.¹¹²

When assessing the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention in relation to the political belief system of state leaders, the attention is focused on their actions and decisions. Wheeler explains that for a norm to have had an impact on state leaders, those would as a result “publicly endorse the norm in [their] domestic and international statements.”¹¹³ Moreover, when the norm of humanitarian intervention manifests itself in state leaders’ decisions and actions (to intervene in humanitarian crises), it implies that it has reached its taken-for-granted level and that state leaders really do believe in it. When leaders really do believe in the norm of humanitarian

¹¹⁰ Roberts, “Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s,” 27.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² There are definitely other mechanisms through which the norm of humanitarian intervention can exert its influence on state leaders, such as their upbringing, their personal convictions, and most importantly the political psychology of decision makers. The field of Political Psychology is an interdisciplinary academic field committed to the association between the field of psychology and that of political science, focusing on the role of emotions, human thoughts, and behavior in politics. This field has been advanced by many prominent political psychologist scholars, such as James David Barber, who wrote his famous book *The Presidential Character: predicting performance in the White House*, classifying presidents’ characters and political behaviour through their worldviews. Yet for the purpose of this study and due to its limited size, such factors will not be discussed, as they can constitute a study on their own.

¹¹³ Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty,” 40.

intervention, state behaviour is then guided by humanitarian motives, as Wheeler explained, and hereby the norm exercises its influence. In this case, where the norm of humanitarian intervention exerts its influence on state leaders and decision makers, it has manifested itself on the level of the individual, and has hence exerted its influence on state behaviour via state leaders and decision makers. When considering the influence of the norm of humanitarian intervention at the level of the individual, one has to establish who the decision-making unit is, which mattered for the humanitarian intervention decision being examined. Meaning that it is important to note whether the decision making unit is comprised of an individual, or a group of individuals. If the decision making unit (individual or group) has issued the policy to intervene and was urged by humanitarian motives, then this is evidence that the norm of humanitarian intervention had an impact on state behaviour, and one should expect this decision making unit to continuously indicate that their interventions were a result of humanitarian values.

2.2. Domestic Pressures (the media, local population, government assemblies/Congress)

The second mechanism put forth by Solidarists, allowing the norm of humanitarian intervention to impact state behaviour is through domestic pressures. State leaders and decision makers, who themselves have not been directly influenced by the norm of humanitarian intervention, could however, be indirectly influenced by it via domestic pressures. Domestic pressure in the case of humanitarian intervention is exemplified through widespread media reporting of humanitarian crises, pressure to intervene exerted by the local population, and/or finally intense pressure supportive of intervention by government assemblies, such as Congress.

The capability and competence of the mass media to instantaneously report catastrophes as they take place¹¹⁴ is a mean by which the norm of humanitarian intervention can influence state behaviour.¹¹⁵ When there is an increased coverage of humanitarian crisis in newspapers, radio, and television before any intervention decisions are made, this applies pressure from the media on the decision making unit to actually comply with the norm of humanitarian intervention, and deploy forces to save the suffering individuals. Even if the intensive media reporting does not directly affect the state leaders' decisions, it affects the local population of that certain state, by rallying the public opinion in favour of humanitarian intervention, which in turn pressures government/state leaders into humanitarian action. The influence of the norm of humanitarian intervention through the media can be measured by the rise in rate of recurrence and time-span of the coverage in all mass media right before any intervention decision is undertaken, which is then considered as media pressure.

However, the media is not the only means of domestic pressure through which the norm of humanitarian intervention can influence state behaviour. If the local population, regardless of the role of the media, has adopted the norm of humanitarian intervention and strongly favours acting to save the suffering, then this would in turn affect state behaviour in favour of intervention. In the case of a strong domestic public opinion in favour of intervention, and albeit state leaders may themselves not

¹¹⁴ Roberts, "Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s," 28.

¹¹⁵ This has been mostly referred to as the "CNN-Effect" (which will be examined in details in part 3 of this study), which revolves around the media effect on decision makers and the public opinion, hereby exerting an influence on policy making and, hence, state behaviour. Jon W. Western, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media and the American Public* (Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 134

have been directly influenced by the norm of humanitarian intervention, states would almost always want to act in accordance with what its public favours.

This level of domestic pressure can for example be measured through surveys, ballots, or polls taken prior to any decision making process regarding intervention in a humanitarian crisis taking place in the world.

Last but not least, pressure from government assemblies, such as the Congress, counts as part of the domestic pressures, through which the norm of humanitarian intervention exerts its influence. When members of Congress stress their favour towards intervention in humanitarian crisis, in line with the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention, this naturally has an effect on the state leaders' decisions towards humanitarian crises, and is usually manifested in how the leaders respond to such pressures. In line with this argument, state leaders, who themselves have not been directly influenced by the norm of humanitarian intervention will eventually shift their policies towards intervention if the Congress exerts strong pressure favouring involvement in humanitarian crises. In order to assess the pressure exerted by the Congress, an examination of public statements by members of the Congress would indicate the level and direction of the pressure.

So the intensified media reporting of humanitarian crises, and the local public and Congress pressure in favour of humanitarian intervention all form the domestic pressure, another mechanism through which the norm of humanitarian intervention

can influence state behaviour. As the name implies, this mechanism is analyzed on the domestic level.¹¹⁶

2.3. *Pressure of International Organizations*

The third and last mechanism put forth by Solidarists, through which the norm of humanitarian intervention can influence state behaviour, is through international organizations. The claim is that international organizations may actually be the reason behind a state's decision to intervene in humanitarian crisis, even though state leaders may not favour intervention actions. "When states with different perspectives, interests, fears and capabilities meet to discuss a particular crisis [through international organizations], it is easier for them to agree on an impartial humanitarian approach than to decide on a substantive policy to resolve the conflict."¹¹⁷ Therefore, states acting through international organizations are mostly inclined to act in line with the norm of humanitarian intervention, as an easier means to attain to crises.

States acting through international organizations legitimize the norm of humanitarian intervention by relating it to the language of the organization's charters, as explained by Nicholas J. Wheeler, hereby making humanitarian intervention actions a duty and a commitment. When international organizations view humanitarian intervention as a duty and a commitment, they pressure unwilling or hesitant state leaders into humanitarian interventions, hereby indirectly affecting state behaviour, since leaders were not inclined towards intervention in the first place. Pressure by international organizations to intervene, manifests itself through statements of leaders of

¹¹⁶ Of course there are other mechanisms that play an important role in the domestic level of analysis, such as the Economy and the Political Regime, yet in the case of intervention and for the purpose of this study the focus will be on the role played by the media, the domestic public pressure, and Congressional pressure, through which the norm of humanitarian intervention can exert its indirect influence on state behaviour.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

international organizations, and official documents or resolutions issued by such organizations also play an important role in exerting pressure to act upon a certain issue. But then again, to prove that the norm of humanitarian intervention exerted its influence through pressure by international organizations, evidence has to be presented regarding state leaders and decision makers clearly reacting to such pressure or being troubled by it.

To assess the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention on state behaviour all mechanisms have to be examined for evidence. For the norm to have exerted its influence, it has to have had impacted state behaviour through one or all of these mechanisms. In order to examine whether the norm of humanitarian intervention had an impact on the United States' behaviour regarding humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era, two case studies have been selected and analyzed in the following part: intervention in Somalia in 1992-1993 and non-intervention in Rwanda 1994, where the United States role in both crises will be explored.

PART III CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER 3 *CASE STUDY 1: THE U.S. AND SOMALIA – OPERATION RESTORE HOPE* *(1992-1993)*

3.1. Account of Event

“When Said Barre, the longtime dictator of Somalia, was forced from power by a coalition of clan-based opposition forces in January [1991], [and] soon thereafter the factions began fighting among themselves to fill the power vacuum,”¹¹⁸ Somalia experienced a complete breakdown in civil order and the state collapsed. “The combination of internecine fighting and an ongoing drought [in addition to a halt in the food and medicine production] created a famine [...], which in turn contributed to the creation of a massive humanitarian crisis.”¹¹⁹ The fighting continued non-stop in Somalia and it is estimated that “from November 1991 to March 1992”¹²⁰ the death toll of non-combatants reached “50,000”¹²¹ in addition to the thousands who were displaced and with the city almost completely destroyed.

With the fighting, the famine and the complete anarchy in which Somalia was swallowed, since it had no functioning government, the country has been transformed into a dangerous environment for the operation of humanitarian relief organizations.¹²² It was estimated that “40 to 80 percent of the nearly sixty thousand

¹¹⁸ Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 45.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

metric tons of emergency food rations per month that arrived in Somalia in 1992 never reached the victims of the civil war and famine.”¹²³

Despite the rapidly deteriorating crisis in Somalia “formal involvement by the UN and its specialized agencies was, however slow in developing.”¹²⁴ In 1992 it was estimated that “95 percent of Somalis were suffering from malnutrition, [...] exclud[ing] about 350,000 who had already died from severe malnutrition and disease and the more than 1 million who had become refugees and were living in [...] relief camps in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia.”¹²⁵ It was then that the UN Security Council Resolution 733 of January 23 was passed, requesting to raise humanitarian aid and approving the appointment of a particular coordinator to supervise the delivery of the aid.¹²⁶

Even with the increased humanitarian aid to Somalia the situation continued to worsen. On April 24th, 1992 Security Council Resolution 751, was passed, establishing the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM I instantaneously called for the dispatch of fifty UN observers to monitor the cease-fire, which had been established after resolution 733 had been passed.¹²⁷ Resolution 751 also gave the possibility for “future deployment of a peacekeeping force of 500.”¹²⁸

¹²³ Thomas George Weiss and Cindy Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, ed. George Lopez, 2nd ed., Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 2000), 79.

¹²⁴ James L. Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia,” in *Learning from Somalia : The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1997), 152

¹²⁵ Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, 79.

¹²⁶ John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 20.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 21

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

“Over the summer the humanitarian crisis deepened [...] and in spite of laudable efforts by the relief community, supplies of food and medicine could not keep up with Somali needs.”¹²⁹ Hence in August 1992 Operation Provide Relief (OPR) to support UNOSOM I, in action out of Mombassa, Kenya, and lasting until mid-December, was instigated by the US.¹³⁰ The operation allowed for the airlifting of “28,000 metric tons of aid to southern Somalia,”¹³¹ in addition to “transport[ing] UN security forces to Somalia (the 500-man Pakistani contingent),”¹³² who never got beyond [...] Mogadishu airport.”¹³³

With the conditions and catastrophe not getting any better in Somalia, on 25 November 1992, President Bush informed the UN that he is ready to transport a U.N.-led intervention to ensure the instant arrival of humanitarian aid, initiating the US led coalition, United Task Force (UNITAF).¹³⁴ On December 3rd 1992, UNITAF was authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 794, to resort to all means by which to create an immediate safe environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.¹³⁵

President Bush announced in his “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia” on December 4 1992 that the U.S. will be intervening in Somalia with humanitarian motives in order to save the people from the crisis. He stressed that “America must act” and that “some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American

¹²⁹ Ibid., 23-34.

¹³⁰ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 46.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Woods, “U.S. Government Decisionmaking,” 155

¹³³ Ibid., 156

¹³⁴ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 46

¹³⁵ Ibid.

involvement.” He also explicitly said that the US’s mission is strictly humanitarian, denying any other interests.¹³⁶ On December 9 Operation Restore Hope was launched “commit[ing] almost 35,000 U.S. troops, [in addition to] France, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Pakistan, and others [who] also deployed troops,”¹³⁷ forming a multinational coalition.

The intervention comprised four phases. The first was the initial deployment of forces and securing the harbour and airport sites in Mogadishu, from where the overall operation would be managed. The second phase aimed at expanding the security zone to include the surrounding regions of southern Somalia. [...] The third phase saw a further expansion of operations into Kismayo and Bardera and the maintenance of secure land routes for the delivery of relief supplies throughout the area of operation. The final phase included handing the operation over to the United Nations and withdrawal.¹³⁸

3.2. *Intervention Analysis*

3.2.1. The Individual Level:

It is mostly argued that “the single most influential factor motivating Bush’s action[s] [regarding the crisis in Somalia] was his humanitarian impulse to do something about what he saw as massive human suffering.”¹³⁹ This means that the norm to immediately intervene in humanitarian crisis as soon as one is set off, had become the taken-for-granted reaction, affecting the president’s decisions, hereby affecting state behaviour.

¹³⁶ “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia December 4, 1992,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush 1992-1993, United States, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2175, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/search.html>.

¹³⁷ Weiss and Collins, *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*, 79.

¹³⁸ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 46

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

“Administration rhetoric insisted that the operation was a mission of mercy driven by the humanitarian impulse, [and] Bush made this clear [in all his speeches, and especially] in his address to the nation on 4 December 1992”¹⁴⁰:

“Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, over a quarter-million people... have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead 5 times that number, 1 and ½ million people could starve to death.... The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We’re able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope. America must act. ... Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death. ... When we see Somalia’s children starving, all of America hurts. We’ve tried to help in many ways. And make no mistake about it, now we and our allies will ensure that aid gets through. ... Let me be very clear: Our mission is humanitarian. ... To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence. Based on my conversations with other coalition leaders, I can state with confidence: We come to your country for one reason only, to enable the starving to be fed.”¹⁴¹

Furthermore, a famous statement that Bush made, which highlights his humanitarian motives is “no one should die at Christmastime.”¹⁴² Bush hereby expressed how he was touched and moved by the crisis ongoing in Somalia and that it was his humanitarian motivation that initiated the intervention in Somalia.

Following the Address to the Nation, the Bush Administration frequently stressed that the Somalia intervention was humanitarian in nature and that there was no concern to protecting any fundamental national interests,¹⁴³ nor “important economic interests at stake in Somalia.”¹⁴⁴ In fact Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated that

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia December 4, 1992,” qtd. in Ibid., 53

¹⁴² Warren P. Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 141.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 52.

“there was no one in the Bush Administration who thought of [intervention in Somalia] as anything other than fundamentally a humanitarian mission.”¹⁴⁵

The Administration not only emphasized the humanitarian nature of the mission based upon the president’s statements and his own humanitarian motivations, but some state officials who have previously been suspicious of resorting to military interventions, have proved to have been guided by humanitarian motives. They shifted their positions from opposing to supporting, and sometimes even noting that military humanitarian interventions were the only solution to the crisis. For example, Herman Cohen, who served as the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1989 to 1993, had previously been doubtful of the probability of the U.S. ever resorting to forcible military intervention in Somalia, later supported the humanitarian intervention in Somalia.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, what has been put forth is that “a massive humanitarian tragedy was ongoing, and the United States was the only actor with the ability to respond in a timely and effective manner.”¹⁴⁷ Yet not only that, but also that the United States had a moral imperative to intervene in Somalia. In fact Eagleburger explained that Somalia is a disaster of enormous magnitude, a disaster that the United States could and had to do something about.¹⁴⁸ A senior White House member further affirmed

¹⁴⁵ David D. Laitin, “Somalia: Intervention in Internal Conflict,” in *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century*, ed. William J. Lahneman (Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 38-39.

¹⁴⁶ Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 135.

¹⁴⁷ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 53

¹⁴⁸ qtd. in Don Oberdorfer, “The Path to Intervention,” *Washington Post*, December 6 1992

“only the United States can do something.”¹⁴⁹ Bush also further confirmed such statements in his address to the nation by stating the following:

“We also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement, that American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from death.”¹⁵⁰

Here Bush has justified the US intervention in Somalia through relating it to humanitarian motivation. He explained that the US was the only one that would be able to save lives in time.

The president’s humanitarian motives did not emerge with his address to the nation right upon intervention in Somalia, yet “reportedly, Bush began to take a personal interest in the situation after reading a cable from his ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, entitled ‘A Day in Hell,’ which described the dire humanitarian situation along the Kenyan-Somali border.”¹⁵¹ Bush “wrote in the cable’s margins: This is very, very upsetting. I want more information.”¹⁵² With the emergence of Bush’s humanitarian motivated actions he gave his Administration instructions to “become ‘forward leaning’ on Somalia,”¹⁵³ with the department hereby issuing the first statement since the crisis began involving the US and supporting “sending armed UN security personnel to Somalia,”¹⁵⁴ “which was evidence of presidential concern and engagement on the issue.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ qtd. in *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁰ “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia December , 1992”

¹⁵¹ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 50

¹⁵² Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 132.

¹⁵³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 50

¹⁵⁴ Hirsch and Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, 38

¹⁵⁵ Strobel, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, 141

Evidence substantiating the public pronouncements of the president and his Administration regarding humanitarian motives guiding the intervention in Somalia and Operation Restore Hope (ORH), is that the actions in Somalia were consistent with the motives uttered by the Bush Administration and the president himself, namely securing specific locations in southern Somalia in order to facilitate the delivery of food and humanitarian aid,¹⁵⁶ which is exactly what took place during the intervention, with no deviations from the plan occurring. “There was no attempt to conquer the country, to establish a puppet government, to take control of oil reserves or other precious natural resources, to protect the economic interest of American corporations, to establish a beachhead for an extended military presence, to influence regional politics, or anything like that.”¹⁵⁷ Following the implementation of ORH, there was a handing over phase from the US to the UN as agreed upon and Bush explained that “[the US] will not stay one day longer than is absolutely necessary.”¹⁵⁸

Even though it seems that the norm of humanitarian intervention has impacted state behaviour through embedding itself in the political belief system of the President and his Administration, which is manifested through the humanitarian motivation articulated by both president and Administration, there are some arguments stating otherwise.

To begin with, had the norm really been embedded in the political belief system of the decision makers of the US, this would have implied that from the onset of the crisis in Somalia, the US would have been guided by its leaders towards military intervention to save lives. However, before the November 21 deputies meeting, it was actually

¹⁵⁶ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 53.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia December, 1992” qtd. in *Ibid.*, 54.

totally unexpected that the President or his Administration would support any U.S. humanitarian mission to Somalia. In fact for over a year, the Administration and other many top officials had continuously refused any U.S. humanitarian military interventions in crises area such as Somalia, Liberia, and Bosnia.¹⁵⁹ The argument here was that all these conflicts were “simply humanitarian tragedies [and] none of these conflicts was relevant to U.S. vital interests.”¹⁶⁰ Hence, if the president and his Administration were influenced by the norm of humanitarian intervention and were guided by strong humanitarian motives, then why would they refuse to intervene in massive humanitarian crisis such as those mentioned above? Why would they assess them in terms of interests to the U.S.?

What supports the here-above argument more is that there was a fragmentation among state or Administration officers regarding the importance of the Somali crisis, implying that it did not occupy a case of high concern on the president’s plate. In fact, many expressed their views about being “against extending effort and scarce financial resources on an area peripheral to U.S. strategic interests.”¹⁶¹

Furthermore, even when in cases such as Iraq, which represents a place “of greater national interest to the United States than Somalia,”¹⁶² with Saddam Hussein killing thousands of rebellious Shi’is and Kurds, the United States did not act upon Saddam’s deeds for numerous weeks.¹⁶³ Even when it actually responded to the crisis, it did not act to fully save the suffering, as it should have if its behaviour was stimulated by

¹⁵⁹ Western, *Selling Intervention and War*, 133.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ John G. Sommer, *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994* (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994), 20.

¹⁶² Alberto R. Coll, *The Problems of Doing Good: Somalia as a Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention*, Carnegie Council Case Study Series on Ethics and International Affairs: #18 (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997), 3.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

humanitarian motives and its political belief system was influenced by humanitarianism. The United States actually intervened in Iraq, only by limiting its intervention to “the imposition of a ban on Iraqi military aircraft in southern Iraq and the establishment of a protected zone in the northwestern Kurdish region of Iraq,”¹⁶⁴ a minimal level of intervention compared to its normal reaction of forcible military intervention if it had been influenced by the norm of humanitarian intervention.

The last argument against the explanation that the mission in Somalia was influenced by humanitarian motives affecting the president and his Administration’s decision guiding state behaviour is the postponement in responding to the humanitarian crisis taking place in Somalia. Had President Bush and his Administration’s decision to intervene in Somalia been affected/directed by humanitarian motives, then intervention should have taken place with the onset of the crisis in Somalia. However, despite the fact that “the situation in Somalia had long been one of profound need, the U.S. decision [to intervene] in November 1992 came nearly a full year after the famine there had been declared the world’s worst humanitarian emergency,”¹⁶⁵ which meant that “the situation had become untenable long before November 21,”¹⁶⁶ hereby counter arguing the fact that the norm of humanitarian intervention had influenced the beliefs of the US decision makers, hereby causing the intervention in Somalia.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Western, *Selling Intervention and War*, 134.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 135

3.2.2. The Domestic Level:

- The “CNN Effect”

“The intervention in Somalia is often cited as a prime example of the CNN effect, the purported influence widespread television coverage has on policymaking because of its influence on public opinion.”¹⁶⁷ Regardless of the fact that comparable catastrophes were taking place in Sudan, it has been argued by many that Bush was pushed to take action in the Somali crisis because “the cameras were there.”¹⁶⁸ It is explained that the “emotive new media coverage of suffering people caused policy-makers to decide to intervene.”¹⁶⁹ For example Bernard Cohen argued that the exposure of Somalia on television “mobilised the conscience of the nation’s public institutions, compelling the government into a policy of intervention for humanitarian reasons.”¹⁷⁰ This implies that the overly exposed widespread suffering in Somalia through the media invoked the norm of humanitarian intervention, among the domestic public, as an immediate response to the humanitarian crisis, and hence pressured the Bush Administration to intervene in Somalia as opposed to any other crisis that was simultaneously taking place somewhere else in the world.

Yet many argue that the media pressuring Bush and his Administration into a humanitarian intervention in Somalia is refutable and that the CNN effect does not offer the complete and full picture.¹⁷¹ DiPrizio explains that although the media really does possess the power to influence state behaviour and policymaking, in the case of intervention in Somalia it seems improbable that it directed the President against his

¹⁶⁷ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 55.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 49-50

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 50.

¹⁷¹ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?,” *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 2 (1996): 209.

will.¹⁷² By that time Bush was a lame duck president, completely unaffected by the different political pressures that usually affect state leaders, and since he were not be re-elected, the public opinion could not exert any of its influence on his decisions and in turn, on state behaviour.¹⁷³ In order to examine the claim that the intervention in Somalia has been triggered by media coverage an analysis of the media preceding the intervention decision and following the decision is conducted.

“If critical and empathy-framed news media coverage ran alongside policy uncertainty preceding decision to intervene, then media coverage is likely to have been a factor in policy deliberations. Alternatively, if policy certainty and supportive empathy-framed new media coverage was present in the run up to intervention then the media coverage is more likely to have simply reflected, and perhaps even helped build support for, the policy of intervention.”¹⁷⁴

An examination of the period before President Bush’s decision to send troops into Somalia “5 November to 25 November 1992” and an examination of the period between his military intervention announcement and the arrival of the troops in Mogadishu “26 November and 9 December 1992” is necessary to determine whether the norm of humanitarian intervention had any influence via the media on the decision of intervention in Somalia.¹⁷⁵

The findings of the analysis offered little support to understanding the Somalia intervention as a case of CNN effect. During the phase prior to the decision to offer ground troops, journalists directed only negligible attention towards Somalia. “The combined average number of articles per day for the Washington Post and New York Times was 0.76 and Somalia received front-page coverage only on two occasions. CBC devoted a mere three minutes of airtime to Somalia for a whole 21-day

¹⁷² DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 55.

¹⁷³ Ibid..

¹⁷⁴ Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*, 52

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

period.”¹⁷⁶ This is considered a really low level of coverage compared to the drastic catastrophe that was taking place in Somalia. Despite the fact that some of the coverage was “empathy framed, it is difficult to imagine this level of coverage being sufficient to mobilise the conscience of the nation’s public institutions’ or political clamour”¹⁷⁷ to intervene in Somalia.

What is, however, the case, is that “substantive media attention to Somalia followed increased levels of policy certainty when Bush had decided to offer ground troops to the UN. Once this decision was leaked, media coverage increased dramatically.”¹⁷⁸

This was reflected with a major rise in the number of articles and TV coverage dedicated to Somalia,¹⁷⁹ which implies that media coverage followed as opposed to triggered decisions of intervention, hereby not having any effect on state behaviour.

“In short, rather than helping cause the Bush Administration to intervene in Somalia, media coverage actually turns out to have helped build support for the policy of intervention.”¹⁸⁰ The norm of humanitarian intervention has then not exerted its influence through mass media pressure, because the instantaneous media reporting was not prior to the intervention decision but occurred after. Hence, it could not have been the mechanism through which the US state behaviour complied with the norm of humanitarian intervention.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 58

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 58-59.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 59.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

- Congressional Pressure

It is argued that “the 102nd (1991-1992) Congress played a crucial role in getting the United States to act to save starving Somalis [with many Congress members having] felt a special responsibility to come to the aid of the Somali people in their hour of need.”¹⁸¹ Furthermore, it was the concern uttered by Congress members about the Somali disaster, “expressed through hearings, trips, resolutions, letters, and informal contacts [that] had clearly helped to lay the groundwork for this large-scale humanitarian deployment.”¹⁸² For instance, at the July 22 hearing, many Congress members revealed their growing interest in military intervention in Somalia in order to save those suffering.¹⁸³ To support the argument of growing Congressional pressure towards humanitarian intervention, “in October a member of the [Congressional Black Caucus], Representative Lewis, introduced a resolution calling for a U.S. role in a possible humanitarian intervention in Somalia.”¹⁸⁴

All this is argued as evidence that “Congressional activities were influential in publicizing the Somalia crisis, pressuring [...] the executive branch toward action, and articulating the basis of a policy of intervention for the United States.” In fact, in a letter issued on December 10 to convey the decision to deploy troops into Somalia, President Bush explained that his decision has included the views of the Congress regarding the urgency of intervention in Somalia.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, “Congress and the Somalia Crisis,” in *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1997), 191-192.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 195.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 193

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 195

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

Nevertheless, despite how convincing these arguments are that a Congress guided by the norm of humanitarian intervention exerted pressure on President Bush to intervene in Somalia, there are arguments explaining that it was doubtful.¹⁸⁶

In effect “Congress was in recess at the time of the decision, and only a few members were actively pushing for a more assertive response. [Moreover], if the rhetoric of some members influenced President Bush, it was in convincing him of the merit of an intervention,”¹⁸⁷ not its necessity. Additionally, President Bush was not going to be re-elected, hence there was no need for him to feel pressured by the Congress.

Last but not least, the intervention in Somalia was not widely supported in Congress even though some important House and Senate members had been insisting on an intervention since early 1991. In fact, the intervention decision was ultimately made by the President, and Congress’s role was not crucial. Actually with the situation taking a fast downfall in Somalia and the cost of the U.S. mission escalating, the little support, which previously existed in the Congress, evaporated.¹⁸⁸

Again, here the norm of humanitarian intervention has not exerted its influence through Congressional pressure to intervene in Somalia. Had the norm influenced state behaviour through strong Congressional pressure to forcibly intervene in Somalia, then we would have initially witnessed continuous pressure with the onset of the crisis, and the President would have been influenced by the Congress’ wishes.

¹⁸⁶ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 55.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁸⁸ Johnston and Dagne, “Congress and the Somalia Crisis,” 196-197.

- Public Pressure

Even though the media was inundated with coverage of the famine in Somalia, and the atrocities taking place there, it had by no means an impact on the public opinion. There is no evident or organized public pressure on the government to intervene in Somalia, nor significant manifestations or campaigns that could compare to, for example the anti-apartheid movement that took place during the mid 1980s.¹⁸⁹ Moreover “the decision to commit U.S. forces to Somalia was more of intergovernmental policy dynamics and broader foreign policy concerns than it was a product of public pressure.”¹⁹⁰ Here again, the norm of humanitarian intervention has not impacted state behaviour through domestic public opinion. Had the local population adopted the norm of humanitarian intervention, then it would have put pressure on the government to intervene in Somalia, in line with the taken-for-granted norm.

3.2.3. The International Level:

- The role of the United Nations

It has been argued that the United Nations’, specifically “Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s lobbying for an increased response [was] a key factor in the U.S. decision to intervene.”¹⁹¹ Boutros Ghali has throughout 1992 complained about the Council focusing all its efforts on the white, European Balkans, while paying little attention to

¹⁸⁹ Kenneth John Menkhaus and Louis L. Ortmyer, *Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention*, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 464 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1995), 5.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 56.

disaster in poor, black African Somalia, and he continuously insisted for a greater involvement by the US.¹⁹²

However, counterarguments clarify that US intervention due to UN pressure seems unlikely. According to John Hirsch and Robert Oakley, Boutros-Ghali considered with Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Frank Wisner the option of “an enlarged peacekeeping operation in which the United States would supply logistical support, while the Canadians, Belgians, and others would supply troops.”¹⁹³ This means that the UN was not looking for a greater military involvement by the US but one that does not involve a forceful intervention. In fact “Boutros-Ghali [...] indicated that he did not want U.S. forces, which he thought were unavailable anyway.”¹⁹⁴

The lame-duck-president theory also plays an important role here. Bush was not going to be re-elected and he was on his way out of the White House, and therefore the UN trying to pressure Bush into an intervention in Somalia does not make sense, and was not going to yield in affecting state behaviour.¹⁹⁵ Bush was immune to pressure during this phase and hence his intervention decision couldn't have been influenced by the UN's insistence.

Analysis here has proved that the United States' intervention decision in Somalia and hence, the initiation of Operation Restore Hope does not seem to have been influenced by the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention. There is no evidence of

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

pressure from the public, the Congress or the media, meaning that the norm did not exert its influence through the domestic level because it was not considered the taken-for-granted action towards the crisis in Somalia, and hereby had no indirect impact on state behaviour. Furthermore, there is also no evidence that the United Nations was pressuring President Bush to forcibly intervene in the crisis in Somalia; hence military intervention was also not considered the consequential action with regards to humanitarian disasters. This implies that the norm of humanitarian intervention did not exercise its influence through the mechanism of the international level, namely the UN.

The examination of the impact of the norm on the individual level could have supported the notion that the norm did in fact have an impact on the President and his Administration and hence affected state behaviour and initiated the intervention, yet the delay in response to the humanitarian crisis counter argued such assumptions. Indeed the President and his Administration expressed humanitarian motives towards the crisis in Somalia, yet their slow reaction meant that their motives were not what initiated the forcible intervention, meaning that they did not intervene because of the pressure of the post-Cold War emerged norm of humanitarian intervention guiding state behaviour. Had the norm been embedded in the decision makers' political belief system, then it would have put forth intervention in humanitarian crisis to end massive human suffering as the justifiable and automatic reaction to humanitarian crises, which was not the case.

If the norm of humanitarian intervention did not exert its influence through the different mechanisms, and hence did not affect the US state behaviour, and bring

about intervention in Somalia, then what did actually determine the United States intervention in Somalia? The intervention decision in Somalia, as will be explained in a subsequent part, has been influenced by two complementing factors, with one giving rise to the second and the second acting as the main reason bringing about the intervention decision in Somalia.

The main reason the United States initiated military intervention in Somalia was in order to strengthen and uphold the credibility of the United Nations peacekeeping missions. Strengthening and upholding the credibility of the UN peacekeeping missions was a result of another factor, which is the Bush Administration, or Bush as a leader, launching a new world order phase with the end of the Cold War, highlighting a shift or a change in policy towards humanitarianism and a concern for the historical legacy he was to leave behind after stepping out of the White House. It will be further elaborated upon this conclusion in a subsequent part of this study.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY 2: THE U.S. AND NON-INTERVENTION IN RWANDA (1994)

4.1. Account of Event

Following a social revolution in Rwanda, a longstanding ethnic competition and tensions between the minority Tutsi, who had controlled power for centuries, and the majority Hutu peoples, who had come to power in the rebellion of 1959-1961 and overthrown the Tutsi monarch, was initiated.¹⁹⁶ The ethnic competition resulted in sporadic ethnic related violence in Rwanda over the following years: 1963, 1966, 1973, and 1990-1993, which caused the mass murder of Tutsis and an increase in the number of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.¹⁹⁷ The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) gathered most of its fighters from the huge numbers of refugees who escaped to Uganda, with which it tried to reintegrate in Rwanda, causing the eruption of civil war between the RPF and the government, which came to a halt with the signature of the Arusha Accords.¹⁹⁸ “The accords called for new power-sharing arrangements between Hutus and Tutsis, repatriation of Tutsi refugees, and the integration of the RPF and the [Rwandan Armed Forces] RAF.”¹⁹⁹

In an attempt to help with the accord implementation a peacekeeping force called the United Nations Assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), including 2500 troops, of which none were Americans, was authorized by the Security Council.²⁰⁰ UNAMIR,

¹⁹⁶ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 62.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 62-63.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*,

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 66

however was not met with much cooperation from the different parties, hereby failing to achieve much and allowing for the continuation of the crisis.²⁰¹

The major crisis began “on 6 April 1994 [when] the plane carrying the Rwandan [Habyarimana] and Burundi [Cyprien Ntaryamira] presidents home from a meeting in Tanzania aimed at salvaging Arusha Accords was shot down by two ground-to-air rockets launched from territory near Kigali airport,”²⁰² leaving both presidents dead.

The killing of both presidents set off a crisis with massive proportions and within the hour Kigali was surrounded by road blocks and many Tutsi ethnics were massacred.²⁰³ The killing however did not stop here. The speaker of the National Assembly, the president of the Supreme Court, the democratic movement opposition leaders, the prime minister and ten Belgian [UNAMIR] soldiers assigned to guard her were butchered by Hutus causing the Belgian government’s decision to withdraw all its peacekeeping forces from Rwanda.²⁰⁴

“On April 8, the systematic slaughter of Tutsi began in Kigali and soon spread to outlying areas as Rwandan Radio des Milles Collines called on Hutus to kill Tutsis.”²⁰⁵ This date marked the onset of the massive civil war in Rwanda, with RPF battalions in Kigali fighting the government forces due to the killings of Tutsis and

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid., 64; Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 181.

²⁰³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 64.

²⁰⁴ Ibid. 64, 66.

²⁰⁵ John A. Ausink, *Watershed in Rwanda: The Evolution of President Clinton's Humanitarian Policy*, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 374 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1997), 3.

moving south with the “reignit[ion]” of the civil war.²⁰⁶ The situation had become too dangerous to operate in Rwanda, and the international community has contemplated the possibilities to withdraw forces from Rwanda. “On 21 April, [...] the UNSC voted unanimously to reduce the number of UNAMIR personnel to 270 [...] because it wasn’t able to do much good and it was at risk.”²⁰⁷ Come late April 1994, the situation in Rwanda took an even stronger downturn with mass murder of civilians not coming to an end, specifically in southern Rwanda. Reports have estimated that around 200,000 people had been killed up to this point, in addition to as many as 400,000 Rwandan refugees who fled to neighbouring countries.²⁰⁸

At this point, in May 1994, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali officially declared the disaster in Rwanda on US public television a ‘real crisis,’²⁰⁹ which led the UNSC to adopt Resolution 918 on May 17, 1994, expanding UNAMIR’s mandate and size. “Its authorized troop level was increased to 5,500, and it was to contribute to ‘the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in Rwanda [and] provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.’”²¹⁰ This was the initiation of UNAMIR II into Rwanda. However, with the deployment of UNAMIR II delayed or hindered, on June 23rd, the UN Security Council approved to dispatch a multinational operation of 2500 troops,

²⁰⁶ Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 186; Ausink, *Watershed in Rwanda*, 3.

²⁰⁷ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 66.

²⁰⁸ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” in *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume X (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), 44-45.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 51

²¹⁰ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 67.

mainly led by the French.²¹¹ Opération Turquoise was to hand over its activities to UNAMIR II after it finally arrives.²¹²

A month later, with the victory of the RPF and the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire, President Bush authorized Operation Support Hope (OSH), which was initiated on 23 July 1994. The operation was initiated in response to the occurrence of a large flow of Rwandan refugees, over a million, who escaped to Zaire and created a massive humanitarian crisis there.²¹³ The United States response however has been considered a much delayed one regarding the massive catastrophe that had developed in Rwanda. Even President Bill Clinton hinted to the shame of this delay in his address to genocide survivors in Kigali when he said “we did not act quickly enough after the killing began.”²¹⁴

4.2. Intervention Analysis

4.2.1. The Individual Level:

After the Rwandan crisis came to an end, there were many implications by President Clinton, especially when he held an apologetic speech in Kigali in 1998 to a crowd that included survivors of the genocide that he did not act upon the crisis in Rwanda because he did not know what was happening.²¹⁵ This was the generally used excuse for inaction by the President and his Administration when faced with questions or discussions regarding the Rwandan genocide. They blamed it on confused information

²¹¹ United Nations Security Council “Resolution 929,” (22 June 1994).

²¹² DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 67.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 65 and 68-69

²¹⁴ “Remarks to Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda March 25, 1998,” United States, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 432, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/index.html>.

²¹⁵ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 83-84.

and lack of knowledge about the nature and level of the catastrophe that was taking place in Rwanda.

But when did the President and his Administration actually realize and recognize the massive genocide that was taking place in Rwanda? And when they recognized the size and nature of the crisis, were the President and his Administration guided by humanitarian motives, or was there a lack of interest in Rwanda?

One of the “problematic feature[s] of the U.S. diplomacy before and during the genocide was a tendency toward blindness bred by familiarity: The few people in Washington who were paying attention to Rwanda before Habyarimana’s plane was shot down were those who had been tracking Rwanda for some time and had thus come to expect a certain level of ethnic violence from the region.”²¹⁶ The officials who had been in charge of monitoring Rwanda did not expect anything out of the ordinary. They had been used to this kind of ethnic problems sprouting in Rwanda. Hence, with the onset of the massacre in April, some U.S. regional specialists originally assumed that the crisis in Rwanda was one of many that were taking place there and would “involve another ‘acceptable’ (if tragic) round of ethnic murder.”²¹⁷ Therefore, officials reporting on Rwanda were relatively toning down the level of importance and urgency of the crisis and not presenting it according to its actual scale of atrocities. In fact, the U.S. ambassador to Kigali, David Rawson explained that “although he expected internecine killing [in Rwanda], he did not anticipate the scale

²¹⁶ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2003), 347.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

at which it occurred.”²¹⁸ Rawson’s statements were reiterated by Assistant Secretary Moose who agreed by saying: “we were psychologically and imaginatively too limited.”²¹⁹

Another aspect that led to the confused and distorted knowledge about Rwanda is that “the State Department’s African bureau [even though it] was most on top of the situation [providing information, reports, etc], tended to minimize the most incredible rumours for a whole,”²²⁰ hereby further toning the level of the disaster way down. Additionally, due to the outbreak of conflict, deportations and evacuations taking place in Rwanda, “the normal sources of proprietary intelligence were not available [...] and so could not engage in normal intelligence gathering.”²²¹

Furthermore, the media also played an important role in distorting the image and knowledge of the US Administration with regards to the level and nature of the crisis. The media transmitted wrong information about the nature of the conflict, convincing officials it was a 2-sided ethnic conflict as opposed to an organized ethnic genocide on one side only, in addition to weak levels of reporting due to minimal presence of the press, which will be discussed in the following section.

Due to the here above reasons the United States did not know of the massive genocide that was taking place in Rwanda until after the first two weeks of the onset of the

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid., 348.

²²⁰ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 88.

²²¹ Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 23

crisis.²²² However, now that the Administration has recognized that there was a massive nationwide genocide boiling up in Rwanda, did President Clinton and his Administration meet such knowledge and act upon in line with the norm of humanitarian intervention, hence, guided by humanitarian motives? The Clinton policy, nevertheless, toward Rwanda during the genocide “was of non-intervention and the official explanation was quite clear: Rwanda was of insufficient national interest to justify the risks and costs associated with an American or U.N. intervention.”²²³ In fact, Clinton declared on May 25 that the United States had no vital interest there and therefore was not to intervene.²²⁴

Even prior to the recognition of the genocide in Rwanda, James Wood Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs at the Department of Defence from 1986-1994, explained in an interview that when he identified Rwanda as a potential crisis, he was told to remove it from the list because it wasn't an important area. Officials straightforward said “we don't care [...] take it off the list [...] just make it go away.”²²⁵

Hence, since before the genocide even became an issue within US Administration discussions; it was not included in the policy plans. Non-intervention was the verdict from the onset and not one executive including the President was intending to act upon Rwanda in terms of humanitarian intervention. George Moose, who was U.S. Secretary of State for African Affairs at that time, explained in an interview the

²²² Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 24.

²²³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 71.

²²⁴ Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 97.

²²⁵ James Woods, interview, *Frontline: The Triumph of Evil*, PBS, January 26, 1999. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html>

following: “I have to say [Rwanda] was not the first order of priority in terms of our policies. [...] it honestly was not [a] first-tier issue for us at the time,”²²⁶ confirming the notion that intervention in Rwanda was not in the picture.

This implies that the issue of humanitarian intervention in Rwanda was not put on the table for discussion and received a negative vote, but it was not even discussed or been part of the foreign policy dialogue in first place. Journalist William Shawcross labelled Rwanda a “sideshow,”²²⁷ while National Security Advisor Anthony Lake took it a step further and asserted that Rwanda was a “no-show.”²²⁸ In fact “during the entire three months of the genocide, Clinton never assembled his top policy advisors to discuss the killings [in Rwanda],”²²⁹ despite the intensity of the crisis.

Having examined the here above arguments it is safe to assume that the norm of humanitarian intervention did not exert any of its influence through the level of the individual in the case of Rwanda, and hence was not the reason behind the decision of non-intervention in the Rwandan crisis. For the norm to have been the determining factor behind the decision of non-intervention, then it should have been embedded in the political belief system of President Clinton and his Administration, hereby immediately directing the US decision towards humanitarian intervention in Rwanda with the onset of the crisis. However, what happened is that the issue of intervention in Somalia was not even introduced on the table of discussion and the decision makers were not, despite the level of atrocities, merely guided by humanitarian motives.

²²⁶ George Moose, interview Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda, PBS, November 21, 2003.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/moose.html>

²²⁷ qtd. in Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 364

²²⁸ qtd. in Ibid.

²²⁹ Ibid., 366

Consequently we can conclude here that the norm of humanitarian intervention played no role or had no impact on the level of the individual, not just because the President and his Administration were not guided by humanitarian motives but also because the issue of intervention in itself was not even introduced and wasn't of primary importance in terms of US policy.

4.2.2. The Domestic Level:

- Role of the Media

By examining the role of the media in pressuring the United States' decisions in a certain direction regarding the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda, observers explain that there was a "generally poor level of media coverage"²³⁰ in comparison to the size and nature of the crisis. In fact during the first quarter of 1994, "there was virtually no Western media coverage of events in Rwanda [... and] surveys of [...] US media show that relatively little change occurred in the media coverage after 6 April compared to the paucity before."²³¹ But what was the reason for the negligible covering of the genocide in Rwanda?

It is argued that the lack of coverage cannot be simply blamed on the government's disinterest in the Rwanda crisis, but it was due to the "restricted mobility of the reporters, and the inability to fly out photos or videos, [which] were major handicaps."²³² Moreover, the majority of American employers had withdrawn their reporters out for safety reasons in addition to issues of cost.²³³ Even though there

²³⁰ Ibid., 81.

²³¹ Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, "Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management," in *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, ed. David Millwood (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), 46.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid.

was major lack of coverage of the genocide in Rwanda, there was still some coverage that managed to reach the western world, specifically the United States. How did this limited in size coverage affect the US's decisions regarding Rwanda? In fact the media coverage that managed to reach the US has "perpetuated [...] cliché explanations for the violence – 'tribal warfare,' 'civil war,' 'failed state,' 'ancient hatred' – and contributed to the general belief that outsiders could neither understand nor do anything about it."²³⁴

This distorted media coverage actually hindered the real image from being transmitted. While an organized and planned genocide was taking place in Rwanda, the media transmitted a totally different picture of the events in the Rwandan crisis.²³⁵ For example, "reporting in both The Times and New York Times had appallingly misleading reports: the downed plane was a result of a Tutsi attempt to destroy the Hutu leadership in Rwanda and Burundi; 'mobs' or a troop rampage killed the Rwandese Premier and 10 Belgian soldiers; [...] 'rival tribal factions waged vicious street battles'."²³⁶ Early reports "were wrong on all the critical points,"²³⁷ hereby misleading the public.

Moreover, it has also been argued that "because of five trends in the reporting during the first two weeks, the president of the United States could not have determined that a nationwide genocide was under way in Rwanda until about April 20, 1994."²³⁸

²³⁴ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 81.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Adelman and Suhrke, "Study 2," 47.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Kuperman, *Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 24.

To begin with, the violence in Rwanda was originally depicted as a two-sided civil war – one that the Tutsi were winning – as opposed to a one-sided, ethnic genocide against the Tutsi. The second trend notes that after a couple of days during the crisis in Rwanda, violence was reported to be diminishing and toning down, whereas it had actually picked up the pace. Third, the death toll reported early on was always far away from the truth. Death tolls were reported as gross estimates and did not come close to the actual numbers, representing the genocide taking place. Fourth, the main focus since the beginning of the massacre was always set on Kigali, and the larger span of violence taking place outside Kigali, has been ignored and was not included in the reporting, hereby downsizing the level of the crisis. Last but not least, it took all observers, journalists, or anyone who was monitoring the situation in Rwanda almost two weeks until anyone suspected a massive genocide.²³⁹

All this confusing and misleading information reported by the media resulted in little or no pressure on behalf of the media on the United States in order to intervene in Rwanda. In fact “the Western media’s failure to report adequately on the genocide in Rwanda possibly contributed to international indifference and inaction.”²⁴⁰

- Public Pressure

What additionally contributed to the “general lack of interest in Rwanda and the resistance to intervene was a silent public.”²⁴¹ There was no one in the United States that pressured the Clinton Administration decisionmakers and made them feel as they would bear the consequences and pay a political price for not intervening to save

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Adelman and Suhrke, “Study 2,” 48.

²⁴¹ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 80.

Rwandans.²⁴² In fact “there were few letters or phone calls to the U.S. Mission to the UN or to the White House to urge that something to be done.”²⁴³ Hence, there was no strong public pressure for the US to intervene in Rwanda.

This silence among the American public “was likely due in part to what might be described as compassion fatigue.”²⁴⁴ When the Cold War ended “old and new complex emergencies around the world splashed onto the front pages of many newspapers,[with] the misery and death that accompanied conflicts [...] broadcast[ed] live into millions of living rooms.”²⁴⁵ With this repeated and constant broadcasting of miserable events, scenes and news, at first it was shocking and affected the viewers/readers, yet after a certain time viewers and readers became “desensitized to horrors occurring in far-off places about which they cared little and knew less.”²⁴⁶ Hence when Rwanda erupted, the public did get affected and appalled by all the violence, yet the public was “wary of getting involved in another internal conflict [it] did not understand in another African country [it] never heard of.”²⁴⁷

This meant that the public did not seem to see humanitarian intervention as the immediate action to be taken regarding Rwanda; hence no public pressure was exerted on the US Administration.

- Congressional Pressure

Throughout the Rwanda crisis there was no obvious Congressional pressure and support for sending in U.S. troops. “Hearings were held, and much rhetoric was

²⁴² Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 373-374.

²⁴³ Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, 140.

²⁴⁴ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 80.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

spewed deploring the situation, calling for an end to violence, and expressing horror and regret at the carnage,²⁴⁸ yet no one expressed that Rwanda was of any national interest to the United States, nor was it an urging matter on the Administration's agenda. For example, the Republican Senate minority leader, Bob Dole stated that he didn't think that the US has any national interests in Rwanda and that the Americans are out, and as far away as possible from getting involved in Rwanda.²⁴⁹ Furthermore, "there was even criticism of the Administration for not describing the events as genocide, [...yet] there was no Congressional clamour for intervention, and no efforts were made to pressure the Clinton Administration to respond more vigorously, and PDD 25 [...] was well received on Capitol Hill."²⁵⁰

Even though some members of the Congress expressed an interest in US intervention such as Senators Jeffords and Simon's letter to the White house "asking for the USA immediately to request the Security Council to approve sending troops to Kigali to stop the senseless slaughter,"²⁵¹ those have been informed by White House Officials "that there was no public support for US participation in such an operation."²⁵² Such examples of calls for action were very few and scattered and could not compete with the overpowering disposition of the majority of the Congress as to not to intervene.

So here again, one can conclude that there was no domestic pressure exercised on the US to intervene in Rwanda, neither by the media, the public, nor the Congress, noting that the norm of humanitarian intervention did not either exercise its influence trough

²⁴⁸ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 75.

²⁴⁹ Power, *A Problem from Hell*, 352.

²⁵⁰ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 75-76.

²⁵¹ Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 203.

²⁵² Ibid.

the mechanism of the domestic pressures. The norm was not for the media, nor the public and the Congress the adopted norm that directed them in pressuring the US into intervention in Rwanda.

4.2.3. The International Level:

By the time the Rwanda crisis struck “the Clinton Administration had already moved away from its earlier assertive multilateralism [... and it] initially sought the total withdrawal of UNAMIR troops.”²⁵³ With the onset of the US new foreign policy directions, the United Nations started placing little pressure on the US at the initial phases of the crisis in Rwanda. On 20 April the Secretary General Boutros-Ghali offered the Security Council UNSC three options regarding UNAMIR forces. “The first was to strengthen UNAMIR’s mandate and capability [...], the second was to reduce its force level but maintain a presence in Kigali [...], the third [...] was to withdraw UNAMIR.”²⁵⁴ Taking into consideration the US wishes of total UNAMIR withdrawal, the only option that appealed to it and was somewhat in line with its new direction was the second option to reduce UNAMIR forces yet maintain a presence in Kigali. For Washington to actually succumb to the second option put forth by Boutros-Ghali, he explained that during the crisis phase in Rwanda he had a private meeting with Ambassador Madeline Albright, in which he pushed for the US to take action to stop the killing in Rwanda, and to which she argued against any intervention action.²⁵⁵ From that point on forward there seems to be no evidence of the UN trying to put pressure on the US to intervene militarily in Rwanda. On the other hand the US,

²⁵³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 77.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 228.

although approved the second option of the UN to keep a small force in Rwanda, still continued to seek the removal of UNAMIR and hinder the reinforcement progression.

When the crisis in Rwanda (around end of April – beginning of May) intensified, “Boutros-Ghali suggested the creation of an all-African force to impose a cease-fire,”²⁵⁶ which was met with acceptance by the Clinton Administration and they offered to transport this mission, since they were not intending on sending troops to Rwanda. Yet this mission fell apart because the secretary general could not gather the troops, partly due “America’s refusal to participate in the mission, thus decreasing its prestige and likelihood of success, and in turn, deterring potential volunteers.”²⁵⁷ This was only the beginning of a series of direct and indirect obstructions on behalf of the Clinton Administration with regards to intervention in Rwanda.

Boutros-Ghali “called for increasing UNAMIR’s troop level to 5,500 and changing it with protection of refugees and other people in need and helping provide humanitarian relief,” a proposition accepted by many members of the UNSC, who “supported a Chapter VII mandate, authorizing it to use force to fulfil its mission.”²⁵⁸

The US however opposed the secretary general’s plan and suggested one which proposes troops to be placed on Rwanda’s borders to assist and provide measures of protection, instead of the secretary general’s suggestion of reinforcing the presence of UNAMIR inside Kigali and then fanning out through the country, hereby keeping troops as far as possible from being involved in the heart of the crisis.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 78

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

At the May 13 meeting a compromise had been reached among UNSC members, yet when it came to take the decision the American U.N. delegation stated that it hadn't been informed by its government on how to vote with regards to the crisis in Rwanda, hereby forcing the postponement of the decision.²⁶⁰ Finally, UNSC Resolution 918 was passed "authorizing an increase in the size of UNAMIR [...] and contribut[ing] to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians at risk in Rwanda [and] provid[ing] security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations."²⁶¹

Despite the fact that Washington supported Resolution 918, "the Clinton Administration went out of its way to hamper implementation,"²⁶² and the United Nation's rush towards intervention. Ambassador Albright in fact stated that "it would be folly [...] to allow the United Nations to rush into the intervention."²⁶³ Moreover, the US's actions obstructing intervention in Rwanda also included "the Pentagon effectively block[ing] the provision of promised vehicles and equipment [to UNAMIR II] for weeks,"²⁶⁴ which later on arrived when the crisis was over.

The examination here above, shows little evidence that there was any pressure exerted by the UN on the US Administration to intervene in Rwanda, in fact the US managed to topple or better said hinder all actions by the UN to intervene in Rwanda because it thought such actions were hasty and not in its interest. Here again, one can conclude that the norm of humanitarian intervention did not influence the US's state behaviour

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 918," (17 May 1994). in Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., 79.

²⁶³ qtd. in Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

towards non-intervention in Rwanda through any of the mechanisms proposed by Solidarist scholars. Had the norm been embedded in the political belief system of the decision makers, then immediate action to intervene would have been taken by the President. Additionally, if the norm had any influence through domestic pressures, then the media, the public or the Congress would have also managed to pressure the government into intervention. Last but not least, if the norm of humanitarian intervention had managed to exert its influence through international organizations, then Boutros-Ghali would have been able to convince the US President to intervene militarily in Rwanda through continuous applied pressure, yet this was not the case. The UN was not notably urging the US to intervene militarily and when it did at the beginning of the crisis; its insistence was met with immediate refusal.

So what were the actual factors that have guided US state behaviour towards non-intervention in Rwanda? Again, as it is the case with Somalia, there are two complimenting factors that contributed to the US decision of non-intervention. The main factor behind the non-intervention in Rwanda is the shadow of the past lessons of the Somali intervention, which loomed over any future US decision regarding humanitarian intervention. The second factor, which is maintaining the credibility of the United Nations and U.N. peacekeeping operations, actually derives from the first one or is related in some sense to the lessons dragged from the Somali intervention. With the unsuccessful intervention decision in Somalia resulting in huge costs and many undertaken risks, in addition to shaking the UN's credibility as a political actor, the US has decided to save face and resort to non-intervention in Rwanda. The UN served the US in many of its new world order policies and it was not about to let it go down with another attempt at a failed intervention.

CHAPTER 5
SOMALIA AND RWANDA: A COMPARISON OF SUGGESTED FACTORS
BEHIND THE U.S. DECISIONS OF INTERVENTION AND NON-
INTERVENTION

“What emerges from post-cold war state practice is how Western states have taken the lead in advancing a new norm of armed humanitarian intervention in international society. [...] There was [also] a growing acceptance of the idea that [...] military intervention was [the] justifiable, [taken-for-granted routine or action] in cases of genocide and mass killing.”²⁶⁵

Yet after having examined whether the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention had any impact on guiding the United States’ behaviour in both Somalia and Rwanda through the different mechanisms put forth by Solidarists, this study construes that the norm had no impact on state behaviour regarding humanitarian intervention in both crises. In the case of Somalia, the reason behind the U.S. intervening militarily in the crisis was not because it was the norm to do so. It was not because the fabric in which the U.S. interacts in the international society dictates humanitarian intervention as the normal and immediate reaction to genocide and mass killing, but because of other factors that played an important role in shaping the U.S.’s decision of intervention.

This does not however mean that since the norm of humanitarian intervention had no impact on the decisions undertaken by the U.S. regarding the crisis in Somalia that the intervention does not count as humanitarian. Nicholas J. Wheeler, a Solidarist scholar, explains that “the primacy of humanitarian motives is not a threshold condition [for an intervention to be considered humanitarian]. [... Hence,] even if an intervention is motivated by non-humanitarian reasons, it can still count as humanitarian provided

²⁶⁵ Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 568.

that the motives, and the means employed, do not undermine a positive humanitarian outcome.”²⁶⁶

Now looking at the non-intervention case of Rwanda one cannot assume that because an intervention did not take place, then the norm of humanitarian intervention simply does not exist or cannot be the guiding framework of action in cases of genocide and mass killings. Simply because the norm of humanitarian intervention was advanced by Western states in the 1990s does not mean that it should have an impact on state behaviour every time a crisis of a massive level occurs. Constructivists and English School Scholars explain that the best demonstration of the presence of the norm of humanitarian intervention in the Rwandan case is that intervention in the Rwandan genocide has not met opposition in the Security Council on the grounds that this violated Rwandan sovereignty.²⁶⁷ “Instead, the barrier to intervention was the lack of political will on the part of states to incur the costs and risks of armed intervention to save Rwandans.”²⁶⁸ Moreover, Martha Finnemore, a Constructivist, clarifies that it is common for the norm of humanitarian intervention “to compete with other interests states have as they weigh the decision to use force.”²⁶⁹

Yet, if the norm of humanitarian intervention did not have an impact on the United States decision to intervene in Somalia and its decision not to intervene in Rwanda then what pushed intervention in first case and what was the factor, which resulted in

²⁶⁶ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38.

²⁶⁷ Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 568.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ Finnemore, *Purpose of Intervention*, 79.

holding back from intervention in the second case? The following section will present the determining factors behind intervention in Somalia and non-intervention in Rwanda.

5.1. Somalia

Having analysed the U.S. decision of intervention in Somalia, it does not seem to be a result of the impact of the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention on either level of analysis, since it doesn't seem to have been driven by pressure from the United Nations, the media, the Congress or local public pressure. The only factor that could have been in favour of an impact by the norm of humanitarian intervention is that of a President or/and Administration driven by a humanitarian inclinations, yet the delay in response has refuted such assumption.

The intervention decision in Somalia has been influenced by a merger of two complimenting factors. The first factor that influenced the intervention decision, which also gave rise and paved the way for the second factor behind the US's decision of intervention, is Bush's historical legacy as the usher of the new world order. With the end of the Cold War and the victory of western-style liberalism, the United States, specifically President Bush, was steering the way for a new world order, dominated by US policies. In this line of reasoning, President Bush wanted, as the usher of the new world order, to leave a strong mark behind, namely a memorable historical legacy, since he was leaving and not going to be re-elected.²⁷⁰ The post-Cold War new world order introduced by the US, and Bush's concern for his historical legacy, gave way for the second and main factor behind the intervention in Somalia, namely

²⁷⁰ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 60.

“strengthen[ing] UN peacekeeping” as “an important part of [the United States’] vision of global conflict resolution,”²⁷¹ and as a means by which Bush can leave a strong mark on the world, as the leader of the new world order.

5.1.1. New World Order and the President’s Historical Legacy

Bush as “the man who had overseen the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, [...and as the one who] ushered in the new world order”²⁷² in the post-Cold War era was now in charge of dictating the dominating policies in the realm of foreign policy. Bush had now the ultimate responsibility of setting the perfect example of how the leader of the new world order should act in the face of the newly emerging issues, which were not present during the phase of the Cold War. The President was then inclined to take specific actions, which will leave a strong mark on the world and allow him to leave the White House with a resonating big bang. It is, therefore, believed by many that “Bush’s decision to intervene in Somalia was in part due to his concern over his historical legacy,” as the leader of the new world order.²⁷³

What proves this point is that “President Bush began to turn his full attention to Somalia after a disappointing defeat to Bill Clinton in the November election.”²⁷⁴ He began thinking of a way through which he could “end his presidency on a high note,”²⁷⁵ in order to maintain his position as the victorious leader, coming out of the Cold War. Foreign policy has always been Bush’s strong point and hence he

²⁷¹ Shannon Peterson, “Stories and Past Lessons: Understanding U.S. Decisions of Armed Humanitarian Intervention and Nonintervention in the Post-Cold War Era” (PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2003), 68-69.

²⁷² DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 59.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ Coll, *Problems of Doing Good*, 4.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

perceived his legacy to “undoubtedly be [fitting within] the realm of foreign policy,” and what better than “initiating a popular and just humanitarian mission” to save the lives of the starving,²⁷⁶ and set a precedent to future US leaders.

Yet what makes historical legacy a secondary factor motivating the decision to intervene in Somalia though is that “the operation was not risk free: the lives of many U.S. soldiers, billions of dollars, and America’s prestige”²⁷⁷ also played an important role. Despite the fact that there is a risk calculation attached to this possible factor behind the decision of intervention it is argued that “it is neither far-fetched nor inconsistent with events to suggest that Bush contemplated his historical legacy and that this influenced his decision making, but without stronger evidence that such calculations were pertinent”²⁷⁸ this study gives historical legacy the rank of secondary factor motivating the decision to intervene.

However, Bush’s concern for his historical legacy as the leader of the new post-Cold War new world order, not only influenced the US decision to intervene in Somalia, but also gave rise to the main factor behind the intervention decision. In the newly ushered post-Cold War world order and the views instilled by the US as the leader, UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities occupied an important means through which the world was to deal with the newly emerged humanitarian issues. Furthermore, the UN was considered a channel through which the US can maintain its world views and implement its new policies, hence promoting it as a political actor was of utmost importance to the Bush Administration.

²⁷⁶ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 59; Coll, *Problems of Doing Good*, 4.

²⁷⁷ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 59.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 59-60.

5.1.2. Upholding UN Credibility and Strengthening Peacekeeping Missions

The main factor or motive behind the United States' decision to intervene militarily in the crisis taking place in Somalia was "the Bush Administration's perception of peacekeeping in the post-cold war world. [... Evidence proves that] the enhanced credibility of the United Nations as a peacekeeping and peacemaking organization"²⁷⁹ was what pushed the US's intervention decision. Sending in U.S. troops to Somalia was "a product of the intergovernmental policy dynamics and broader foreign policy concerns,"²⁸⁰ with the argument that while the U.S. had no national interest in Somalia or similar cases whatsoever, the increased examples of failed states, ethnic related wars and massacres and of course the anarchical conditions in which states existed, created a threat to the U.S. interests in the new world order introduced in the post-Cold War phase.²⁸¹

Hence, by enhancing and building up the UN's peacekeeping operations, conflicts can be prevented and controlled in a legitimate effective manner, while the US can stop being consumed by other states' crises. With the end of the cold war and the successes of the humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq, the US decision makers, specifically President Bush, perceived the UN peacekeeping missions as an integral element of the US's views of global conflict resolution.²⁸² "[Bush] also saw the United States as playing a central part in that vision [...] and intervention in Somalia was one way of advancing [the US's conflict resolution] objectives."²⁸³

²⁷⁹ Peterson, "Stories and Past Lessons", 68-69.

²⁸⁰ Menkhaus and Ortmayer, Key Decisions, 8.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Peterson, "Stories and Past Lessons", 69.

²⁸³ Ibid.

The idea that Somalia offered the perfect opportunity for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy goals and its tactics for global conflict resolution objectives came into context when in mid-November the U.S. diplomatic mission to the United Nations circulated a cable emphasizing the necessity and the U.S.'s interest to increase UN credibility in peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era, and the importance of the success of the first peace enforcement operation, which was a policy that was in line with Bush's statements during this phase.²⁸⁴

In his September 1992 address before the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated that he supports UN peacekeeping missions, and the reinforcement of the United Nations' capability to prevent and resolve conflicts around the world.²⁸⁵ Following the cable, Somalia offered an "easy" opportunity for the achievement of the U.S.'s policy towards "global stability [...being] well served by a muscular UN peace enforcement capability to manage growing regional crises."²⁸⁶

In response to the cable circulated and to adhere to Bush's Administration aims at increasing UN peacekeeping capacities in a November 25th meeting, the Deputies Committee, a National Security Council panel of officials presented Bush with three policy options with regards to the crisis in Somalia.²⁸⁷ The first option was sending "provisions of U.S. airpower and seapower in support of a reinforced UN force,"²⁸⁸ the second option "the ball-peen hammer [which denotes involving a] limited U.S.

²⁸⁴ Menkhaus and Ortmyer, *Key Decisions*, 6.

²⁸⁵ "Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City September 21, 1992" qtd. in Peterson, "Stories and Past Lessons", 69.

²⁸⁶ Menkhaus and Ortmyer, *Key Decisions*, 6.

²⁸⁷ Oberdorfer, "Path to Intervention." ; Menkhaus and Ortmyer, *Key Decisions*, 6

²⁸⁸ Menkhaus and Ortmyer, *Key Decisions*, 6

military intervention as a prelude to and expanded UN force,”²⁸⁹ and the third option “the sledgehammer [denoting a] full scale intervention by a U.S. division, plus allies, under UN auspices.”²⁹⁰ President Bush in accordance with his top advisors decided on option three,²⁹¹ which was doubled and approved by the Bush Administration after the meeting, as General Joseph Hoar insisted that an intervention of such magnitude requires two divisions.²⁹²

Under this full scale option the U.S. would be committing an entire division of around 15000 troops, including both combat troops and significant logistics support staff. This huge force would ensure total control of main lines of communication throughout most of the southern towns in Somalia including Mogadishu, and also provide the U.S. with what Colin Powell called “decisive advantage”²⁹³ in case dealings with Somali militias were spoiled or in the case the U.S. had to resort to forcible disarmament. After the implementation the operation is to be phased out and handed over to a UN-led force as soon as possible.²⁹⁴

Out of the third option, on December 3, 1992, the United Task Force (UNITAF) was authorized by Security Council Resolution 794.²⁹⁵ With the UN supporting the U.S.-led mission to Somalia it marked an important move towards making “the UN a more

²⁸⁹ This was a plan to inject about five thousand U.S. ground troops into Somalia to secure the seaport, and main lines of communication in Mogadishu, while providing convoy protection into the famine zone. The two key elements of this plan were that it (1) was to be quick, temporary measure to be replaced by a significantly enlarged UN force; and (2) would be carried out in conjunction with negotiations with local warlords. *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁹⁰ Menkhaus and Ortmayer, *Key Decisions*, 7.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 46.

credible actor, [since] it wasn't a credible military actor before. [And] by not being a credible military actor, it wasn't a credible political actor."²⁹⁶

Enhancing the credibility of the UN peacekeeping and peacemaking forces and proving that the UN is a credible political actor was the US's motive behind the intervention. But at the same time there was a more specific facet to this motive, which is also why Somalia was chosen. "Boutros-Ghali reportedly told President Bush that the international Islamic community was aroused by the U.N.'s failure to protect Muslims [in crises]."²⁹⁷ And hence, the US's aim was to enhance the UN's peacekeeping credibility in front of the whole world, and specifically with regards to the wary Muslim countries, by coming under the UN auspices to the aid of Muslims in crises like the Somalis. The intervention in Somalia has been described as "a good signal to the Muslim world."²⁹⁸

But in order to appease the Muslim world and convince them of an enhanced UN peacekeeping credibility, the US could have intervened in either Bosnia or Somalia, which were both taking place at the same time.²⁹⁹ It is in fact argued that Somalia presented a far more attractive case of intervention as opposed to Bosnia because "such a mission was determined to be 'doable'.³⁰⁰ When asked why Somalia and not Bosnia one Administration official explained that "the risks are lower."³⁰¹ Hence the

²⁹⁶ Peterson, "Stories and Past Lessons", 69.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 68.

²⁹⁸ Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. Navy admiral, who was later appointed the U.N. special envoy to Somalia qtd. in Ibid.

²⁹⁹ Western, *Selling Intervention and War*, 136.

³⁰⁰ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 59.

³⁰¹ Menkhaus and Ortmyer, *Key Decisions*, 8.

US chose Somalia over Bosnia, because costs and risks were lower, and therefore, it was “perceived [as an] opportunity to establish a foreign policy on the cheap.”³⁰²

Last but not least, what in fact enabled the Bush Administration to implement its perception of a strong UN peacekeeping force in the post-cold war world is that President Bush had become a lame-duck president at the time of his decision to intervene in Somalia.³⁰³ As a lame-duck president “Bush was largely immune from the political pressures a president normally faces,”³⁰⁴ hence he was able to focus on what was in line with his Administration’s policies and not what could have been dictated upon him due to pressure by the media, the public, Congress, or the UN.

So as clarified here above, the intervention decision does not seem to have been subject to the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention having exerted its influence through the mechanisms suggested earlier in any of the levels of analysis. On the individual level, humanitarian motives have been trumped by the delay in reaction towards the crisis, on the domestic level; the media coverage seemed to have followed the intervention decision as opposed to have influenced the state to intervene, there was no noticeable public or Congressional pressure, and finally on the international level, the UN itself was not in favour of involving US troops in the interventions.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 60.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 55.

Hence, the intervention has been motivated by the US long-term post-cold war interest in a strong UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capability, as part of the US's vision for a global conflict resolution framework.

5.2. Rwanda

After having analysed the U.S. decision of non-intervention in Rwanda, and finding no evidence that the norm of humanitarian intervention has exerted its influence through any of the mechanisms on either level of analysis, it is wise to assume that the decision of non-intervention has in fact been influenced by other factors. It is however, noteworthy to mention, that as previously explained, the lack of intervention does not deny the existence of the norm of humanitarian intervention. It is just that in this case the norm did not affect the US's state behaviour.

The non-intervention decision in Rwanda has also been influenced by a combination of two different complimenting factors, like the case with Somalia, a factor that exerted the most influence on the US's decision of abstaining from intervention, and a second factor that derived from the main factor behind the decision of non-intervention. The first and main factor that influenced the non-intervention decision, are "lessons of past history," specifically "lessons of Somalia," which had a great impact on the US's decision not to intervene in Rwanda as a result of the consequences of the Somali intervention.³⁰⁵ The second influencing factor is the maintenance of "the credibility of the United Nations and U.N. peacekeeping,"³⁰⁶ similar to the Somalia case, yet in the case of Rwanda, this factor was not what

³⁰⁵ Peterson, "Stories and Past Lessons", 172.

³⁰⁶ Ibid., 175.

mainly motivated or influenced the US's decision, but it derived from the factor of the shadow of Somalia. "The United States had downgraded the importance of peacekeeping to its overall national security strategy after Somalia,"³⁰⁷ proving that the factor of the credibility of the UN and its peacekeeping has been derived from the shadow of Somalia looming over humanitarian intervention decisions.

5.2.1. Lessons from Somalia

When the Clinton Administration came into office it initially supported "a more active policy toward peace operations than its predecessor. Candidate Clinton was outspokenly supportive of an increased role for the United States and the United Nations in such activities."³⁰⁸ In line with his words, in February 1993, the President signed the Presidential Review Directive 13 in order to review the U.S.'s policies towards multilateral peacekeeping missions, aiming at creating a guide for future U.S. policies with regards to multilateral peace operations.³⁰⁹ The draft was approved on July 19, 1993, offering a major change in the United States' multilateral peace operations policies. The Presidential Review Directive "support[ed] an enhanced use of multilateral operations, elevat[ing] the United Nations as a major actor on the world stage, and commit[ing] the United States to support such operations in all of their political, military, and financial dimensions."³¹⁰ Yet this draft of the PDD did not go into effect, due to the aggravated events in Somalia, which led to its reassessment.³¹¹

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 72.

³⁰⁹ Ausink, *Watershed in Rwanda*, 4.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

With the death of four U.S. soldiers by a landmine in August 1993 in addition to eighteen others who died in October while tracking down General Mohamed Aideed, Congressional and Senate opposition to peace operations augmented as a result of the downturn in Somalia.³¹² This growing pressure on the Clinton Administration to withdraw from Somalia led the president to withdraw all troops by 31 March 1994.³¹³

Following the events in Somalia, John Shattuck, U.S. assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labour explained that the Somalia crisis was going to have an impact on the soon-to-begin genocide in Rwanda. He mentioned: "I remember, before the genocide started, hearing a number of Administration officials tell me -- particularly people in the White House ... our principal focus has to be, "No more Somalias."³¹⁴

The argument of the shadow of Somalia affecting intervention decisions in Rwanda perfectly fits the popular saying: *once bitten, twice shy*. It was because the US suffered negatively from the intervention in Somalia, that the lessons dragged from it have continuously loomed over any future intervention decisions that came up during the post-Cold War phase. These dragged passed lessons affected the decision-making process with regards to Rwanda, through the different mechanisms influencing state behaviour, and in turn resulted in an abstention from intervention.

³¹² DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 74.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 75

³¹⁴ John Shattuck, interview, *Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda*, PBS, Dec. 16, 2003.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/shattuck.html>

The Somalia case had its effect on the Clinton Administration's policy towards peacekeeping and "set an ominous shadow on Washington."³¹⁵ The PDD went through many adjustments, because of the Clinton Administration decision by May 1994, to move away from its previously assertive policies of multilateralism.³¹⁶ PDD 25, issued on May 3 hence, "set guidelines for determining when the United States would support a U.N. peace operation, when it would participate in an operation, and when it would contribute combat troops,"³¹⁷ with very strict conditions.

The new guidelines in PDD 25 hence ensured that the U.S. was not going to go through another Somalia case, here by automatically initiating comparisons between any future humanitarian crises erupting and the case of Somalia, which is what happened when the crisis in Rwanda struck. White House officials saw Rwanda "through the prism of Somalia"³¹⁸ and hence "they reasoned [that] any intervention would have to be large-scale and costly and would probably produce no measureable improvements anyway."³¹⁹ Additionally with the many killings taking place, it drew a horrible image in the eyes of the US officials, "evok[ing] the image of Somalia,"³²⁰ leading U.S. officials to think that they will eventually have to get involved, which they did not want.³²¹

³¹⁵ Thomas G. Weiss, "Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention," in *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, ed. Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1997), 207.

³¹⁶ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 73.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ Alison Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story," 624.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*

³²⁰ Shattuck, interview, *Frontline*.

³²¹ Power, *Problem from Hell*, 366.

The result of such direct references to the case in Somalia led to the idea that the U.S. had to “steer clear of Rwanda”³²² which is also what pushed the US to call for total withdrawal of UNAMIR forces, in addition to the Clinton Administration putting a lot of effort to not to call the killings in Rwanda a genocide but ‘acts of genocide fearing that it would drag them into a humanitarian intervention by a rallied public opinion.’³²³

So as explained here, the ominous shadow of Somalia has actually exerted its influence through the individual level of analysis, causing the Clinton Administration to shift its policy from totally supporting military humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions to feeling wary of such actions. Clinton was weary of an intervention in Rwanda, due to the costs and implications that the Somalia case has proved, and therefore opted for a non-intervention decision.

On another note, the lessons dragged from the Somalia case also exerted their influence through the mechanisms of domestic pressure. The media, the Congress, and the public opinion, in fear of another replica of the Somali case, did not promote an intervention decision in Rwanda. The media coverage was confused and incorrect at times, in addition to emphasizing that the US’s involvement in the crisis in Rwanda would end like the Somali case. “The New York Times admonished: Somalia provides ample warning against plunging openendedly into a humanitarian mission and demonstrates the problem of ad hoc force under multinational command carrying out an ill-defined mission.”³²⁴ Additionally, the public as mentioned previously was silent, and did not even exert a minimal level of pressure on the Clinton

³²² Ibid.

³²³ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 81.

³²⁴ Klinghoffer, *International Dimension*, 96.

Administration to intervene in Rwanda. In fact “after the Mogadishu shootout the public clearly wanted out.”³²⁵

Among the Congress members, criticism of the Somalia case was mounting, and hence spilling over the decisions regarding intervention in Rwanda. Congress members, as explained previously, called against an intervention in Rwanda, based on relating it to the high costs and risks that incurred from the Somali case. The Congress pointed out on many occasions that it did not want to spend more money on U.N. peace missions, with doubtful success rates without the involvement of the U.S., which was not going to happen.³²⁶ Moreover, since “the shadow of Somalia loomed large over the country,”³²⁷ Senator Robert Byrd stated “we had enough of that Somalia,” implying that the US should not militarily intervene in Rwanda but only help through relief operations.³²⁸ “Most in and out of Washington saw another Somalia when they looked at Rwanda.”³²⁹

Here evidence proves that the history lessons from Somalia actually worked their influence through the mechanisms of the domestic pressure, hereby laying the ground for the US to choose non-intervention in Rwanda.

Similarly, on the international level, evidence could also be found that the image of Somalia played, in fact a role in bringing about the non-intervention decision in Rwanda. With the onset of the Rwandan crisis, leaders within the UN had a twisted

³²⁵ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 80.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 83.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 76

³²⁸ Klinghoffer, *International Dimension*, 96.

³²⁹ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 83.

view of the events, implying that Rwanda was a failed state, hereby drawing a parallel to the Somali case.³³⁰ This analogy with Somalia, hence affected the UN's behaviour with regards to the conflict in Rwanda.

The shadow of Somalia implied that any UN peacekeeping forces sent were doomed to fail, hence the "bureaucratic caution reinforced the conclusion drawn from that experience, [by clarifying that] the UN could not afford another peacekeeping failure [such as the one in Somalia], with failure defined as loss of UN peacekeepers in the field." This resulted in the fact the very little pressure was placed by the UN on the US to mutually intervene in Rwanda, in fact the distorted image the UN presented about the crisis in Rwanda and relating it to the Somali case even aided in reinforcing the non-intervention decision undertaken by the US.

The shadow of the past lessons of Somalia has in fact resorted to the mechanisms through which, the norm of humanitarian intervention would exert its influence on state behaviour, in itself influencing state behaviour in the Rwandan case. It was because of the looming image of Somalia and its effect on all levels of analysis that it managed to counteract the norm of humanitarian intervention, hence turn it around to a non-intervention decision. The shadow of Somalia, not only affected state behaviour in terms of the US choosing not to intervene militarily in Rwanda, but it also influenced its decision by directing it towards humanitarian relief efforts as opposed to the US's original policies.

³³⁰ Adelman and Suhrke, "Study 2," 43.

As an example, the US initiated Operation Support Hope on 23 July 1994, with 3000 plus soldiers, charged with providing assistance to aid givers in the region as well as providing direct relief to refugees, in addition to American airlift capabilities. It was strictly implemented as a humanitarian operation, with no security responsibility on behalf of the US.³³¹

5.2.2. The Credibility of the United Nations and U.N. Peacekeeping

“While Rwanda itself was not deemed important to U.S. interests, U.S. and even greater U.N. involvement in Rwanda did threaten one thing the Administration deemed important: the credibility of the United Nations and U.N. peacekeeping.”³³²

Because of the lessons dragged from the intervention in Somalia and the shadow of high costs, risks and failed peacekeeping efforts, “preventing another U.N. peacekeeping debacle was perceived as necessary and worked against U.S. support of intervention in Rwanda.”³³³ The argument was that, intervening militarily in Rwanda will naturally end in failed results, such as what happened in Somalia, hence shaking the credibility of the UN as a political actor on the scene. The UN’s credibility had been previously sacrificed in the case of Somalia but the US was not about to let that happen again.

Furthermore, “although the [Clinton Administration] had downgraded the importance of peacekeeping to its overall national security strategy after Somalia, the Administration continued to view the United Nations and U.N. peacekeeping more specifically, as important cost-effective tools for dealing with conflicts in the post

³³¹ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 68-69.

³³² Peterson, “Stories and Past Lessons”, 175.

³³³ *Ibid.*, 177.

cold war era.”³³⁴ With the presence and efficacy of the UN peacekeeping missions, the US could have its interests in global conflict resolution implemented without costing it much. An example of which, is “Operation Turquoise, an armed humanitarian intervention authorized by the United Nations under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, [... which] was led [...] by the French.”³³⁵ Here another state would be implementing what the U.S. had planned for but without costing the United States anything and without the U.S. taking any risks, either. Had the U.S. pushed in favour of an intervention decision in Rwanda, and the peacekeeping forces failed miserably, then the option of humanitarian intervention at the cheap would cease to exist because the U.N. would have lost its credibility.

Moreover, the US associated its own credibility and leadership with that of the UN, since the US was “the world’s last remaining superpower, [... and it] had repeatedly demonstrated that it could move the United Nations to take rapid and effective action.”³³⁶ If the US had chosen the intervention option in Rwanda, and the peacekeeping efforts had failed as assumed, the UN peacekeeping missions would have lost their credibility, and hereby also the US’s credibility and leadership, since it dragged the UN into a failed attempt at humanitarian intervention. Accordingly, “for the [US ...] avoiding further damage to U.N. credibility – and by association U.S. credibility and leadership – was more important than stopping genocide in Rwanda.”³³⁷

³³⁴ Ibid., 175

³³⁵ DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians*, 67.

³³⁶ Adelman and Suhrke, “Study 2,” 51.

³³⁷ Peterson, “Stories and Past Lessons”, 177.

CONCLUSION

“Humanitarian intervention remains a contested issue. [...] A growing consciousness of common humanity permeates the emerging global civil society, but how can this society best promote humanitarianism? Is forcible humanitarian intervention sometimes the only way to respond to massive human rights abuses? Or is this use of violence to stop even greater violence a strategy that can only result in a spiral of bloodletting to the detriment of humanitarian goals?”³³⁸ Those are all valid questions that need to be assessed based upon case by case basis.

This study however was concerned with the norm of humanitarian intervention put forth by both Constructivists and English School scholars. It examined the claim that the 1990s or the post-Cold War era saw a phase where a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged and how it became ingrained in the fabric guiding the international society. The emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention has caused a shift in the normative fabric because it has reformatted the age-old and previously sacred concept of state sovereignty.

Nowadays, humanitarian intervention in the face of mass killing and genocide is not considered a violation of state sovereignty, provided the justification is in line with the definition of humanitarian intervention. For the purpose of this study the definition of humanitarian intervention has been limited to military interventions, hence forcible military interventions to save individuals from suffering caused either by their own

³³⁸ Wheeler and Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” 575.

government or other groups, hereby excluding suffering as a result of environmental disasters.

This study has focused on the role of the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention in bringing about the United States' decisions to intervene or not in humanitarian crisis in the post-Cold War era. The question was, whether the norm of humanitarian intervention was the trigger, or had an impact on state behaviour, and whether the U.S. chose to intervene in Somalia and not to intervene in Rwanda, as a result of the influence of the norm of humanitarian intervention guiding the fabric in which states interact.

The influence of the norm of humanitarian intervention has been examined on all mechanisms put forth by Solidarists, which are analyzed on the individual, domestic and international levels. Had it had an influence on one or all levels, then this study would have concluded that the norm of humanitarian intervention is what brought about the US's decisions of intervention and non-intervention in the post-Cold War era. It is however concluded that the norm of humanitarian intervention had no impact on generating US state behaviour, such as the intervention in Somalia and the lack of it in Rwanda.

The reasons behind the United States' decisions are however very different, with one common factor that played a different role in both case studies in terms of level of influence. In the case of Somalia, or Operation Restore Hope, there was a merger of two complimenting factors that caused the decision of intervention in Somalia. The first factor was the fact that in the post-Cold War era, the United States, with George

Bush on top, was launching a new world order, with the defeat of the Soviet Union, and the victory of western-style liberalism. Bush was ushering in a new world view with a possibility and a responsibility to dictate new dominating policies in the realm of international relations. For that reason, and since Bush, the leader of the new world order, was leaving office, he wanted to leave a strong mark behind. Bush was concerned for his historical legacy, and wanted history to grandiosely remember him.

Bush's concern with his historical legacy as the leader of the new world order, hence influenced his decision with regards to Somalia, in favour of intervention, in order to be remembered as the one who saved the starving at Christmastime, and the one who presented new policies to deal with the emerging post-Cold War humanitarian crises. Yet, this factor has taken a secondary place in influencing the department of state behaviour, since there were lots of costs attached to such a factor, which may have weakened it a bit as a main factor bringing about US decisions.

On the other hand, the main factor influencing the US decision to intervene militarily in Somalia was the US's concern for the credibility of the United Nations and its peacekeeping missions. As previously explained, in the newly ushered post-Cold War world order and the views instilled by the US as the leader, UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capabilities occupied an important means through which the world was to deal with the newly emerged humanitarian issues. Furthermore, the UN was considered a channel through which the US can maintain its world views and implement its new policies, hence promoting it as a political actor was of utmost importance to the Bush Administration. For that reason, Bush opted for an intervention in Somalia to support UN peacekeeping missions, and have history tell

that not only he saved the starving, but he also upheld an international organization and saved it from perishing. A strong UN peacekeeping and peacemaking capability was part of the US's new world order vision for a global conflict resolution framework.

In the non-intervention case in Rwanda there is also little evidence that the norm of humanitarian intervention has exerted any influence through any of the proposed mechanisms. What actually brought about the US decision of non-intervention is also a combination of two complementing factors, with the main factor being the ominous shadow of Somalia lingering over the country, and the secondary factor here being upholding the credibility of the UN and its peacekeeping missions. The lessons from the botched peacekeeping missions in the Somali case have lingered in the minds of politicians, the public, the leaders, the media, and international organizations, which in turn is what influenced the United State's decision of non-intervention in Rwanda. Parallels were drawn between the Somali and Rwandan case, where the former has been labelled a failed state. When crisis struck in Rwanda, consequently it, too, had been labelled a failed state, as a result of the lingering shadow of Somalia, and hence the US held back from intervention, thinking that it will fail in any case.

The factor of upholding the credibility of the UN and its peacekeeping missions, similar to the Somali case, as also played a role in affecting the US's behaviour with regards to humanitarian crisis. However, in the Rwandan case this factor is secondary and did not exert the main influence on state behaviour. It was also influenced by the Somali Shadow of the UN's credibility having been sacrificed, and the US was not about to let this happen again. If humanitarian intervention implied a doomed failure,

then why intervene in first place? The US opted for the non-intervention option in order to prevent the sacrifice of the UN's credibility as a political actor one more time, but as explained, this was a result of the parallels drawn between the Rwandan and Somali cases.

Constructivism and Solidarism offered good insights into the examination of the norm of humanitarian intervention and its effect on state behaviour, leading to the conclusion that the norm had no impact on the U.S.'s decision of intervention and non-intervention in Somalia and Rwanda. Yet that upholding the credibility of the United Nations was one of the triggers for both intervention and non-intervention decisions, brings another theory of international relations into play, namely neo-liberal institutionalism, which could in turn offer better insights regarding such findings.

Finally, due to the requirements of this study, it remains limited in terms of its research components and findings. Only two cases, have been examined, namely one of intervention and one of non-intervention (for the purpose of the comparison), whereas if more case studies are to be adopted, then the findings would be less limited. Furthermore, only the US's decision with regards to these two case studies has been considered, which also ends in limited results. Had there been a consideration of more than one state's behaviour regarding these two case studies, then again findings would have been boundless. For that reason, future studies intending on focusing on the same or a similar topic of this thesis, can examine whether the findings and conclusions of this study also hold for different case studies

other than Somalia and Rwanda, and other cases of interventions and non-interventions involving states aside from the United States.

The norm of humanitarian intervention is actually considered by many a double-edged sword, having a different impact on the future of humanitarian intervention. Some consider it an obligation and a moral duty that will help end and control major atrocities against human rights in the world and others explain that it could negatively affect the future of humanitarian intervention. In fact they go further and explain that the norm of humanitarian intervention can be exploited in favour of promoting hidden agendas and to put forth selfish interests of different states.

Yet those who believe that the emergence and adoption of the norm of humanitarian intervention has actually been the first step towards its institutionalization were and still are major proponents of the creation of the Responsibility to Protect report, which was initially produced in 2001 to discuss and set a framework for the “right of humanitarian intervention, [and how and when] it is appropriate for states to take coercive -and in particular military- action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in other states.”³³⁹ R2P has been created to act as an obligation for states to protect their own citizens from all crimes against humanities, giving each state the right to act upon atrocities taking place within its territories, before any foreign intervention. However, if a state refrains from protecting its own population, then R2P gives the right to the international community to intervene, first through peaceful measures, and then by resorting to forcible interventions.

³³⁹ “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreword, VII.

R2P is a valuable and insightful report providing a framework of action with regards to the future of humanitarian interventions and offering means by which the abuse of the right of intervention can be avoided. An examination of the report in relation to current cases of humanitarian interventions and non-interventions can actually present us with major findings about whether the creation of R2P has managed to positively affect the future of humanitarian intervention, regulate its activities, and validate the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia December 4, 1992.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush 1992-1993. United States, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration.

<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/search.html>.

“Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City September 21, 1992.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush 1992-1993. United States, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration.

<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/search.html>

Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. “Study 2: Early Warning and Conflict Management.” In *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, edited by David Millwood. Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996.

Annan, Kofi. “Secretary-General presents his Annual Report to the General Assembly.” (20 September, 1999).

http://www.un.org/News/oss/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=28

Ausink, John A. *Watershed in Rwanda: The Evolution of President Clinton's Humanitarian Policy*, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 374. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1997.

Ayoob, Mohammed. “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty.” *International Journal of Human Rights* 6, no. 1 (2002): 81-102.

Barnett, Michael N. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002.

———. “Social Constructivism.” In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith, 251-270. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Bell, Coral. “Normative Shift,” *The National Interest*, 70 (2003), 44-54.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. “Introduction.” In *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, 3-111. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996.

Buzan, Barry. *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

- Coll, Alberto R. "The Problems of Doing Good: Somalia as a Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention." *Carnegie Council Case Study Series on Ethics and International Affairs: #18*. New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997.
- Crawford, Neta C. *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Des Forges, Alison. *"Leave None to Tell the Story": Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.
- DiPrizio, Robert C. *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo*. Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002.
- Finnemore, Martha. "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 153-185. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- . *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996.
- . *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo. "National Interest, Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement after the Cold War?" *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 2 (1996): 205-215.
- Johnston, Harry, and Ted Dagne. "Congress and the Somalia Crisis." In *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, edited by Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst, 191-204. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1997.
- Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda*. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Knudsen, Tonny Brems. "The History of Humanitarian Intervention: The Rule or the Exception." Paper, University of Aarhus, Denmark, 2009.
- Köchler, Hans. *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of The "Just War" Compatible with the International Rule of Law?* Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001.
- Kuperman, Alan J. *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.

- Laitin, David D. "Somalia: Intervention in Internal Conflict." In *Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century*, edited by William J. Lahneman, 29-46. Lanham, M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004.
- Löwenheim, Oded. "Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates." *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003): 23-48.
- Mason, Andrew, and Nick Wheeler. "Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention." In *The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change*, edited by Barry Holden, 94-110. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996.
- Melvorn, Linda. *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide*. London: Zed Books, 2000.
- Menkhaus, Kenneth John, and Louis L. Ortmayer. *Key Decisions in the Somalia Intervention*, Pew Case Studies in International Affairs: Case 464. Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1995.
- Moose, George. Interview. *Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda*, PBS, April 1, 2004.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/moose.html>
- Parekh, Bhikhu. "Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention." *International Political Science Review* (1997), Vol. 18, No. 1, 49-69.
- Peterson, Shannon. "Stories and Past Lessons: Understanding U.S. Decisions of Armed Humanitarian Intervention and Nonintervention in the Post-Cold War Era." PhD Dissertation, Ohio State University, 2003.
- Power, Samantha. *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2003.
- "Remarks to Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda March 25, 1998." Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton 1998. United States, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration.
<http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/index.html>.
- Roberts, Adam. "Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s." In *Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics, and Contradictions*, edited by Humanitarian Studies Unit, 23-54. London: Pluto Press, 2001.
- Robinson, Piers. *The CNN Effect: The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

- Shattuck, John. Interview. *Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda*, PBS, Dec. 16, 2003. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/interviews/shattuck.html>
- Sommer, John G. *Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994*. Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1994.
- Strobel, Warren P. *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
- “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.” Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2001. <http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp>.
- United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 688.” 5 April 1991.
- . “Resolution 794.” 3 December 1992.
- . “Resolution 918.” 17 May 1994.
- . “Resolution 929.” 22 June 1994.
- Vaitla, Srinivas. “Norms and Interests of Humanitarian Intervention” Master Thesis American University Washington, D.C., 2002.
- Weiss, Thomas George, and Cindy Collins. *Humanitarian Challenges and Intervention*. Edited by George Lopez. 2nd ed, *Dilemmas in World Politics*. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 2000.
- Weiss, Thomas G. “Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention,” in *Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, edited by Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst. 207-228. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1997.
- Welsh, Jennifer M. “Introduction.” In *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, edited by Jennifer M. Welsh, 1-7. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Wendt, Alexander , Peter Katzenstein, and Ronald L. Jepperson. “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 31-75. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
- Western, Jon W. *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public*. Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Alex J. Bellamy “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, edited by John Baylis and Steve Smith, 555-578. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

———. “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society.” In *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, edited by Jennifer M. Welsh, 29-51. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

———. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Woods, James. Interview. *Frontline: The Triumph of Evil*, PBS, January 26, 1999.
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html>.

Woods, James L. “U.S. Government Decisionmaking Processes During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia.” In *Learning from Somalia : The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, edited by Walter S. Clarke and Jeffrey Ira Herbst, 151-172. Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1997.

APPENDIX

LITERATURE REVIEW (taken from the initial thesis proposal)¹

When looking at the academic literature for the purpose of this research, the focus was on works that addressed the following: (i) the definition of humanitarian intervention and the definition and role of norms, (ii) the emergence of the norm of humanitarian intervention after the Cold War, the normative shift/evolution in international relations and the redefinition of the concept of state sovereignty (iii) and the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention on state behaviour.

The literature written on the here above subjects are usually intertwined, meaning for example that for one piece of work to discuss the impact of the norm of humanitarian intervention, it must also discuss the definition of humanitarian intervention in addition to the emergence of the norm. Hence, I will try to categorize the works I chose for this thesis' literature review according to the areas of focus mentioned here above, but eventually some of them will contribute to the analysis of more than one category in thesis.

Works on the Definition of Humanitarian Intervention and the Definition and Role of Norms:

For the purpose of this thesis I combined a definition of the concept of humanitarian intervention from a range of definitions presented in a variety of works on humanitarian intervention, such as Martha Finnemore's The Purpose of Intervention:

¹ All referenced sources in the appendix are included in the thesis bibliography on pp. 97-101

Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force,² Jennifer M. Welsh’s “Introduction” in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations³, Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy’s chapter “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,”⁴ Bhikhu Parekh’s article “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,”⁵ Andrew Mason and Nick Wheeler’s chapter “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention” in The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change,⁶ and finally Oded Löwenheim’s article “Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates.”⁷ All these works offered the same definition but presented in different wording so by combining all I put together the definition that will serve the purpose for this thesis, which is: *humanitarian intervention can be defined as an activity undertaken unilaterally or multilaterally, where coercive interference through military force is sent into a territory beyond the interventionist’s jurisdiction, in order to prevent or put an end to man-made humanitarian crisis and atrocities against other citizens.*

The literary works I chose to put together this definition helped narrow down the criteria for the definition of humanitarian intervention on which I am going to base my thesis. First of all, I can examine humanitarian interventions undertaken by “a

² Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003)

³ Jennifer M. Welsh, “Introduction,” in *Humanitarian Interventions and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

⁴ Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics,” in *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁵ Bhikhu Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” *International Political Science Review* 18 no.1 (1997).

⁶ Andrew Mason and Nick Wheeler, “Realist Objections to Humanitarian Intervention,” in *The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change*, ed. Barry Holden (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996).

⁷ Oded Löwenheim, “Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind: British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003).

state, a group of states, or an international organization,”⁸ hence unilateral or multilateral interventions. Second, I can limit my research to humanitarian interventions where “military force [es] [are deployed] across borders to protect foreign nationals,”⁹ meaning that I can exclude humanitarian relief efforts, which do not include coercive force. Third, these works help me to further narrow down the definition to protecting national foreigners only and not the protection of the country’s “own nationals”¹⁰ abroad. Last but not least, because of this definition I am only focusing on “manmade”¹¹ violence, hence I can exclude human suffering due to natural disasters.

Furthermore, Martha Finnemore’s National Interest in International Society¹² offered a thorough version of the definition of norms explaining that norms are “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors,” which was complimented by a similar version of this definition in the works of Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, and Ronald L. Jepperson in their chapter “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics.¹³

For the examination of the role of norms, this thesis resorted to the work of Neta C. Crawford Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention¹⁴, in addition to Srinivas Vaitla’s thesis on “Norms and

⁸ R. J. Vincent qtd. in Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy, 557

⁹ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 53

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Martha Finnemore, *National Interest in International Society*. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

¹³ Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein and Ronald L. Jepperson. “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security” in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

¹⁴ Neta C. Crawford. *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge. U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Interests of Humanitarian Intervention,”¹⁵ which both offered a detailed examination of the role of norms with regards to how states behave.

Works on the Emergence of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention after the Cold War, the Normative Shift/Evolution in International Relations and the Redefinition of the Concept of State Sovereignty:

In the pre post-Cold War era, the concept of humanitarian intervention was a latent notion. States during that time were pre-occupied with their own troubles, and limited with a strict notion of state sovereignty, that did not leave much space to humanitarian interventions. However, with the end of the Cold War there has been a revamping of the concept of humanitarian intervention, which eventually gave way to the emergence of the international norm of humanitarian intervention and redefined the concept of state sovereignty. Hans Köchler’s Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of the “Just War” Compatible with the International Rule of Law?¹⁶ offers a detailed study of the concept of humanitarian intervention. Köchler conducted a very thorough study on the historical background of the concept of humanitarian intervention, the development of the concept of state sovereignty and international law and how it affected the concept of humanitarian intervention and pushed it into a dormant phase, until its “revival”¹⁷ in the 21st century after the Cold War. Köchler’s arguments directly feed into my thesis, in which I suggest that the resurgence of the concept of humanitarian

¹⁵ Srinivas Vaitla, “Norms and Interests of Humanitarian Intervention” (Master Thesis American University Washington, D.C., 2002).

¹⁶ Hans Köchler. *Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of The “Just War” Compatible with the International Rule of Law?* (Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001).

¹⁷ Ibid, 19

intervention has led to the development of a norm of humanitarian intervention. This norm is “nowadays, a right – even a moral duty – to intervene”¹⁸ which means that the concept of humanitarian intervention has moved from being just a notion to being a practice, a norm.

Another example written on the topic of intervention is The Purpose of Intervention: changing beliefs about the use of force¹⁹, by Martha Finnemore. Her work in this book adopts a constructivist approach for the interpretation of changes in states’ behaviour with respect to military interventions. For the purpose of this thesis, the main focus was on her ‘Changing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’²⁰ chapter. In this chapter Finnemore explains how in the post Cold War era “states have increasingly come under pressure to intervene militarily [...] to protect citizens other than their own from humanitarian disasters,”²¹ as opposed to during the Cold War, whereas states mostly shied away from any interventions in humanitarian crisis. Georg Nolte explained in his review of Martha Finnemore’s book, “[she] provides excellent illustrations and explanations for the emergence of new shared understandings [by which he means norms] from both a historical and a political science perspective”²² in order to support her arguments. This notion supports my argument that after the Cold War there has been a resurrection of the concept of humanitarian intervention and there has been more pressure to intervene militarily in other states’ humanitarian crisis, which resulted in the emergence of a norm of humanitarian crisis. Finnemore supports this argument by explaining that a norm of

¹⁸ Ibid, 34

¹⁹ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*

²⁰ Ibid., 52

²¹ Ibid.

²² Georg Nolte “Review: Finnemore, Martha. *The Purpose of Intervention, Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force*” *European journal of International Law*, Feb 1, 2005. 169

humanitarian intervention has emerged because the “normative context”²³ surrounding the concept of humanitarian intervention has changed, not because humanitarian intervention is a new concept to the international society. One example is “the definition of who qualifies as human and is therefore deserving of humanitarian protection by foreign governments has changed,”²⁴ meaning that the concept of humanitarian intervention has become a universally socialized norm, which applies to all.

Additionally, Coral Bell’s article “Normative Shift”²⁵ and Nicholas J. Wheeler’s chapter “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society” in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations,²⁶ offered this study a valuable and detailed examination of the normative shift of the fabric guiding international society in the post- Cold War era, due to the redefinition of the concept of state sovereignty from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility.

With regards to the conceptual framework adopted in this research Michael Barnett’s “Social Constructivism” In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations²⁷ presents a detailed account of how Constructivism is the best fit theory to explain the emergence, rise and adoption of the norm of humanitarian intervention and how the international society is guided by a normative fabric affecting its preferences and behaviour. Additionally, Barry Buzan’s book From

²³ Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention*, 53

²⁴ *Ibid*, 83

²⁵ Coral Bell, “Normative Shift,” *The National Interest*, 70 (2003).

²⁶ Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Humanitarian Responsibilities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of a New Norm of Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes in International Society,” in *Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations*, ed. Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

²⁷ Michael Barnett “Social Constructivism.” In *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. John Baylis and Steve Smith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation²⁸ also is best to explain the second paradigm contributing to this research, which like Constructivism is a social-structured approach, putting forward “an international society of states which affects state behaviour.”²⁹

Works on the Impact of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention on State Behaviour:

When analysing the issue of the norm of humanitarian intervention and how it affects state behaviour, one cannot possibly not include Nicholas J. Wheeler’s Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.³⁰ It is by far one of the best academic works on humanitarian intervention. In this book, Wheeler adopts a Solidarist approach in an attempt to argue that states do act in humanitarian crisis not only because they have individual interests, but also because they accepted the fact that they have a duty of humanitarian intervention based upon humanitarian reasons. This statement is in line with my argument that when actors adopt a norm of humanitarian intervention (accepting the fact that they have a duty of humanitarian intervention), it affects their decisions and behaviour, and that’s when they act upon humanitarian crisis, either intervene or not.

Wheeler bases his argumentation on the role of norms in the international society and how they influence state behaviour, because states, despite the fact that they are self-absorbed entities, are ingrained in a developing and evolving international normative fabric, which defines what reasons are legitimate or illegitimate actions/state

²⁸ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

²⁹ Buzan, 7.

³⁰ Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

behaviours, which again feeds into the conceptual framework of analysis adopted in this thesis. Wheeler, however, notes that state behaviour is not explained by this normative fabric, it is rather facilitated by it, meaning that not because states are part of an international normative fabric, that norms immediately have an impact on state behaviour, but the normative fabric facilitates for norms to be socialized, so that they can exert some influence on state behaviour.

Wheeler also explains that the emerged and adopted norm of humanitarian intervention does not need to always be the reason behind a state's decision to intervene or not in humanitarian crisis.

Martha Finnemore's chapter "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention."³¹ is another academic work examining humanitarian intervention. In this chapter Finnemore examines the question: why states conduct humanitarian interventions when there is no security or resource interest involved? She explains that in order to answer such question, one needs to examine and look at norms. She examines cases from the 19th and 20th century and explains how a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged, and she tries to "establish the plausibility and utility of norms as an explanation for international behaviour,"³² such as state intervention in other states' domestic affairs. She discusses the issue of norm's reaching the taken-for-granted level and being legitimized and how it might be the factor affecting state behaviour, which directly relates to the topic of this thesis. Finnemore argues that "norms [...] shape interests and interests [...] shape actions"³³, so "the connection assumed here between norms and action is one in which norms create permissive conditions for

³¹ Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)

³² Ibid., 159

³³ Ibid., 158

action but do not determine actions,”³⁴ which supports the notion that not because a norm of humanitarian intervention has emerged and reached its taken-for-granted level then it has to have an impact on state behaviour.

Finally, if this paper will focus on analyzing whether the emerged norm of humanitarian intervention was the reason behind state intervention in humanitarian crisis, then one has to analyze how the norm can exert its influence on state behaviour by examining it on the different mechanisms presented by Solidarist Scholars, which are analyzed on the individual, domestic and international levels. On the individual level one examines whether the norm had an effect on the political belief system of state leaders and decisionmakers, on the domestic level we analyze whether the norm exerted its influence through pressure applied by the public, the media and the Congress to intervene in humanitarian crises. And finally, on the international level we examine whether the norm has had any influence through pressure exerted by international organizations.

In order to explain the here above and provide examples, one can refer to Adam Roberts’ chapter “Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s” in Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics, and Contradictions.³⁵

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian Principles in International Politics in the 1990s,” in *Reflections on Humanitarian Action: Principles, Ethics, and Contradictions*, ed. Humanitarian Studies Unit (London: Pluto Press, 2001).