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THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO

SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE STATE CASE STUDY:

EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA

AIDA MOHAMED YEHIA SALAH EL DIN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER

OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU-----	African Union
ARPAC-----	Arab Region Parliaments Against Corruption
CAPMAS-----	Central Agency For Public Mobilization And Statistics
CPI-----	Corruption Perception Index
EU-----	European Union
EOHR-----	Egyptian Organization for Human Rights
FDI-----	Foreign Direct Investment
HSN-----	Human Security Network
HRC-----	Human Rights Commission
MP-----	Members of Parliament
NDP-----	National Democratic Party
NCHR-----	National Council for Human Rights
NGOs-----	Non-Governmental Organizations
ODA-----	Official Development Assistance
OECD-----	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UN-----	United Nations
UNDP-----	United Nations Development Program
UNGA-----	United Nations General Assembly
UNCAC-----	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
US-----	United States of America
TIC-----	Transparency and Integrity Committee

INTRODUCTION

A. Research Topic

This thesis argues that marginalizing the political dimension of human security should be seen as a threat to a state's national security and its regime. The case studies showing this are from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Although on the surface these states might seem to be calm, a deeper look into their respective state-society relationships shows great tension. This is as a result of the social change unparalleled with political one. Professor Bahgat Korany has described this situation as, "with the societal change that has taken place beneath, the 'volcano underneath' showing the discrepancy between 'social transformation' and lack of political transition" (Korany, 2010:208). Things are in flux and people are rebelling against the status quo. This in turn is having an impact on the regimes and on their national security. The linkage between national security and political rights and freedoms in these two states is shown by the attempts of both peoples to break the chains that are holding them from seeking their rights. There are several reasons that the uprisings of the peoples are counted as a threat to the states' national security. One is that such uprisings may (temporary) lead to instability by causing a change of regimes. The region suffers from multiple forms of oppressions from foreign occupation to oppression by the Arab rulers against their own citizens. This has driven many Arabs to question the legitimacy of those rulers. Oppression and injustice contradicts with the definition of political security as given by Ronald Paris: "It is the enjoyment of civil and political rights and freedom from political oppression" (Paris, 2001:90). Depriving people of these rights therefore causes instability for the state. For example, a whole society might rise against the regime and call for its removal. This lack of political security could lead to revolution because the state is supposed to be a guardian of such security. When the protector of political security has failed in its mission, rebellion against the state or the regime may result. In such circumstances, societies may experience the rise of religious extremism in the body politic as a counter-force to the regime. Both scenarios may create domestic disturbances, jeopardizing the security of the state.

B. Reasons for Choosing This Topic

The reasons for choosing this topic are numerous. First, there has been a wave of heightened awareness in Arab nations, especially after 9/11, concerning their rights and a persistent call for the restoration of these rights. People of these states have made use of the international pressures on their governments in seeking to become democratic states. The US-led international campaign for greater freedom and democratization in the Arab world has been based on the premise that the region has been performing very badly in terms of those two goals for a long time. There have been several calls by Arab people to end the continuous violations for their basic rights. Among those rights are those intended to preserve their human security. Arab states are seen as performing very poorly in preserving the political dimension of human security which has resulted in great Arab dissatisfaction with their leaders. This has two consequences. First, if a state fails to meet its own people's demands and fails to be questioned by its people, then it is the 'right' of its people to revolt against the ruling government. This concept rests on the implicit understanding that the state should be the main protector of the human security of the people, guarding and promoting their political security. However, by being the main violator of human security, people may be led to oppose the state and revolt against it. The social contract between the state and its citizens as explained by John Locke may then be terminated. This failure to meet the people's demands may give rise to rebellion against this state which may in turn destroy it. This destruction could take many forms. It could lead to a military coup d'état, a civil war which divides the state, a grassroots revolution, violent acts by terrorists, or a massive wave of migration from this state to another. In one of the chosen case studies; Egypt, many of these things are already occurring; in the other, Saudi Arabia, a few are.

C. Contribution of This Study

This thesis will investigate the Middle East region, giving specific attention to two different Arab states: Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It will focus on the seventh dimension of human security, a dimension that has been neglected in other studies. It will try to prove the hypothesis which is that there is a relationship between the national security of a state, the widespread of corruption and the lower level of its operational transparency and the deprivation of human rights within those states, leading to undermining the legitimacy of the state.

Main Ideas to be Covered in this Research

Violations of political security become a threat to the security of the state as they cause decay from inside since they form a domestic threat.

Authoritarianism in Arab governments is a threat to the Arab human security because Arab leaders seek to stay in power for a long time at the expense of their citizens' security.

The practices of the governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the area of human rights will be compared. Corruption, transparency, the status of human security in those two states will be investigated, especially with reference to national security and legitimacy of the state itself.


D. Conceptual Frame work

Human Security is this thesis' framework of preference to other theories of Security. Human security is made up of seven dimensions. These are health security, economic security, food security, environmental security, personal security, political security and community security. The main focus of this thesis shall be concerned with political security. Amitav Acharya defined the political security as, "ensuring that people live in a society that honors their basic human rights and ensuring the freedom of individuals and groups from government attempts to exercise control over ideas and information" (Acharya, 2001:492). Another definition given by Ronald Paris to political security is that "it is the enjoyment of civil and political rights and freedom from political oppression" (Paris, 2001: 90). This definition is related to performance of the governments in terms of democracy, open and free elections, human rights and free flow of information and ideas without being subject to fear of being oppressed.

E. Hypothesis

Human security is basic to the security of the state, therefore, a deficiency in human security results in a spill-over effect on the state's security.

Improvements in human security increase the security of the state. Violations of human security put the state's security in peril. The following diagram shows the relationship between them.



Assuming that state's security is a function of human security.

$$X = a + b (y)$$

Where

X is independent variable

A is constant

B is coefficient

Y is dependent variable

F. Principal Research Questions

The research questions are: What impact do deficiencies in the political dimension of human security have on the state's security? Do these deficiencies lead to the insecurity of the state? How exactly does the political dimension of human security affect the security of the state?

The argument of this paper is that the security of the state is bound to the security of its people. Thus any violation committed by the state against its people gradually leads to the insecurity of the state and poses a threat to its regime.

G. Road Map of This Thesis:

The case studies will show that certain indicators measure state's lack of protection of human security. The indicators chosen in this study are human rights as seen in the treatment of detainees, the imposing and implementation of emergency laws, rates of corruption, the level of transparency, and authoritarianism. The research methodology will be based on analysis of documents, collection of data and interviewing academics specialized in human security, in Egyptian politics and in Saudi politics. Also an interview has been conducted with an Egyptian Ambassador in the Arab League.

H. Reasons for Focusing on Certain Indicators

Special attention will be given to corruption, lack of transparency, authoritarianism, and human rights violations. These are seen as the most important sources of a state's decay from within. They are also seen as the main sources of human insecurity as violations of them cause threats to freedom from fear and freedom from want. They create a sense of despair in any society that undermines the trust between the rulers and ruled, threatening the state-society relationship. This in turns threaten the regime and the national security of the state.

CHAPTER 1

HUMAN SECURITY

This chapter discusses the efforts made by states, non-states and International organizations concerned with human security. It will trace individually their history of interest in the concept of human security, including where they have reached today.

The definition of human security centers on “freedom from *fear* and freedom from *want*”. This simple straightforward definition was introduced in 1994 by the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

Human security has seven dimensions: food security, economic security, environmental security, health security, water security, personal security, and political security. This thesis shall be concerned particularly with the seventh dimension of human security; political security. The first reason for that emphasis is that not enough has been written about it. The second is the low level of awareness of the importance of political security associated with the high levels of corruption, especially among the governing elites. Low transparency rates in any state lead to insecurity of the other dimensions of human security and eventually to the insecurity of the state.

This study shall try to fill in this gap by focusing on the political dimension of human security. It is not meant to undermine or marginalize the other dimensions of human security; in fact, it draws attention more closely to them by focusing on the political aspect. A reason for this is the high corruption rates, low transparency, and violations of human rights lead to violations and insecurities on the other dimensions of human security. All human security dimensions are interrelated linked and affect each other. In addition, the preservation of human security, with all of its aspects, is linked to the security of the state. Therefore, a reform in the political dimension of human security would lead to lowering in-securities on other dimensions. There are many violations taking place as a result of high corruption and low transparency in the Middle East.

Defining Human Security

There are many explanations and definitions given to the concept of human security. What is interesting is the definition for human “insecurity” given by Caroline Thomas in her article “*Global Governance Development and Human Security*”. She argues that human insecurity happens due to the existing structures which have the power to adopt a selective process. “Such a structure could be on several levels, ranging from global, to regional, the state and finally the local level.” (Thomas, 2001: pp.160). In addition she says “The qualitative aspect of human security is about the achievement of human dignity which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life, and unhindered participation in the life of the community.” (Thomas, 2001: pp.163). This definition of human security, in specific, shows that this concept values personal freedoms and highlights the importance of public participation. These are found in worldwide calls for protecting human rights, yet a further reason for making the political dimension of human security the main focus of this study.

Another definition illustrating the meaning of human security is given by Hienbecker as “the ability to protect people as well as safeguard the state” (Thomas, 2001: pp. 161). This definition means that human security ensures the security of both individuals and the state. The argument of this paper is that the state which fails to maintain any form of security to its people on the local level should be counted as a ‘failing state’. The state will likely be the main violator of human rights in this case and be on hostile terms with its people. “The weak state-society relations often mean that the state hinders rather than helps in the achievement of human security” (Thomas, 2001: pp.162). In these circumstances, questions will arise about the state’s legitimacy and the state’s ability to survive due to domestic conflicts or foreign invasion.

Finally a definition for Political dimension of human security must be given. Ronald Paris defined it as, “it is the enjoyment of civil and political rights and freedom from political oppression” (Paris, 2001:90). Another definition for political security that revolves around the same meaning was given as, “ensuring that people live in a society that honors their basic human rights and ensuring the freedom of individuals and groups from government attempts to exercise control over ideas and information”(Acharya, 2001:492).

All seven human security dimensions are important. However, researchers, human rights advocates, governments, and international organizations often give much more attention to food, water, and economic security, unintentionally deemphasizing political security.

Canadian Government's Efforts

The governments of Norway and Canada along with other states promoted the concept of human security in the post-cold-war era. This happened when they understood that conflicts between states have been reduced after the end of the cold war. This led them to focus on a different kind of tensions which threaten the security of peoples. The outcome of their intellectual migration was the concept of human security. Therefore, researches and policy analysis in those two states started to focus on problems which face human beings and threaten their security and well-being. Those problems are such as “widespread use of arms, Land mines, and spread of HIV/AIDS”, these were a few problems mentioned by the Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy in his speeches. These problems have a more acute impact on “intrastate” security. Axworthy stressed the importance of many issues which build the core of human security from rule of law, to preservation of the well being of the individuals, to the peace and security of a state and he saw them as all intertwined (Thomas, 2001: pp.159-175).

The efforts that Axworthy and the Canadian Government made in defining human security and bringing it to the fore in world affairs are crucial. Its emergence on the world stage was partly due to the fact it was not coming from one of the former superpowers as they did not have credibility. They were viewed as aggressive states having an interest in dominating other states and interfering in their internal affairs. As such they were not seen as trustworthy.

Axworthy stressed in “Canada and Human Security: Search for Leadership” that states run their own affairs in the post-cold-war era with the goal of decreasing the chances of war erupting between states, especially a war involving themselves. Yet while interstate conflicts have gone down, intrastate conflicts have gone up, largely because of rising insecurities. One can explain it as a result of the many problems inside the states that are leading to violence and conflict between groups within a state. Intrastate conflict is not just an internal security threat but can

easily become an international one. Since this globalized world, states and societies live in webs of interdependence. An issue threatening one state can send shock waves felt in another. Axworthy says in this regard “that the forces of influencing human security are mutually interrelated and mutually reinforcing” (Lloyd Axworthy, 1997: pp.184).

The Canadian Government argues that the rule of law, good governance, democracy, preserving human rights and freedoms, concern for individual well-being, the eliminating of physical violence are cornerstones of human security. They also believe that human security preservation will eventually lead to the world peace and security. Many analysts saw the Canadian approach as summarized in the ‘freedom from fear’ part of the definition of human security (Karakaya, 2010). Canada itself has “worked on improving the international governance through, inter alia, democratization, respect for human rights and the peaceful resolution of disputes”. This has been the main priority on its foreign policy agenda (Axworthy, 1997:184).

Canada has also given much attention to the concept of human development. In fact, Canada’s concern with human security is seen as so intertwined with human development as David Bosold and Wilfried von Bredow described it as follows “for the government of Canada human development is complementary to human security”(2006, pp.832). Bosold and Bredow evaluated Canadian foreign policy as “ Canada has successfully punched above its weight class, initiating creative and promising new modes of negotiation, and further development of international law and forms of government” (Bosold and Bredow,2006: pp.836).

As successors of Axworthy, Canadian Foreign Ministers John Manley, Bill Graham and then Pierre Pettigrew have had to face the impact of 9/11. This led the issue of human security to decline in the importance attached to it. The ministers of foreign affairs focused on other areas which suffer from insufficient attention such as drugs, HIV/AIDS, environmental problems, human rights, small arms and nuclear proliferation. These topics can be seen as having a direct negative impact on human security and acting as threats to it (Bosold & Bredow, 2006:pp.829-844). The Canadian stand towards human security is therefore not viewed as having totally shifted away from human security.

Norwegian Government's Efforts

The Norwegian Government worked with the Canadian government on promoting the idea of human security. Norway's efforts were less important than those of Canada. Both governments started together and shared the same interests. Norway is mainly concerned, like Canada, with the preservation of rule of law, respect for human rights and international human rights laws, implementing democracy, and promoting peace and security. Norway is similarly interested in having a world free of landmines and small arms so as to avoid dangers to many human beings. As a forward step towards putting human security in action, Norway hosted in 1998 the first international talks on the island of Lysoen. What emerged is known as the Lysoen Initiative. This formed the foundation of the Human Security Network (HSN).

Norway is also strongly supportive of peace keeping and peace making in disputed areas such as Sri Lanka, Sudan, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti, and Palestine. It negotiated the famous Oslo Accords (Karakaya, 2010). This was Norway's principal success in its efforts towards building peace through solving conflicts around the world. Norway still uses its good offices with disputed parties to bring them to negotiate for peaceful solutions. The Norwegian Government works closely with many NGOs and international organizations such as the Red Cross and the UN in helping to provide humanitarian relief.

Japanese Government's Efforts

Japan is considered the third key player in the human security arena. It has invested a lot of its efforts to promote the concept of human security. Japan's concern with human security goes back to Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo. Obuchi sought to make human security a pillar of Japan's foreign policy and to make the 21st century the human security century (Edstrom, 2003, pp.209-255). Japanese concern with human security focuses on stabilizing the Asian economies, specifically aftermath the Asian financial crisis of 1997; maintaining peace and security in East Asia; and peace-building and peace-making, especially by stabilizing the social and political systems of neighboring countries. Moreover, it concentrates on environmental and developmental problems as well as humanitarian relief after disasters.

Japan represents Asian block in the HSN. Asians pay closer attention to human security issues in general because of the many disasters they are prone to, ranging from pandemics to earthquakes to tsunamis. Much of the region is also still at the developing-country phase and needs help to move forward. The region's focus on human security helps in advancing these goals. Japan has pushed hard to establish the Commission on Human Security. Among the founding members and its first co-chair Sadako Ogata, a former UN High Commissioner for Refugees. This commission was established in 2001 with the goals of promoting human security and solving the problems individuals face in their quest for such security. Japan worked on funding a human security unit at the UN known as the Trust Fund for Human Security in 1999 (Karakaya, 2010).

The Japanese government helps other nations on human security issues by giving them aid. Japan sees that preserving human security in the Asian region, especially Southeast and East Asia, as a high priority. The Japanese interest to build human security in Asia comes from the strong sense that Japan is closely interconnected with its regional neighbors. Japan believes that any problem within the region could have echoes on Japan's security and its political, economic, and social stability. Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Japan worked on providing aid to Southeast Asian countries as a way to help them overcome their economic contractions resulting from the crisis. Japan sees that stabilizing the Asian economy is a priority for its own economy.

In early years of the 2000s, when the region was hit hard by the health pandemics of the Avian flu, SARS, and tsunamis, Japan played a pivotal role in helping to alleviate the problems of those affected. Japan again saw this as part of its policy to support and build human security in its region (Karakaya, 2010). Some view Japanese interest in human security as a way to establish Japan's hegemony over south and Southeast Asia as well as a way for it to move away from the US control. Karakaya stated, "The positive role of enhancing Human Security beyond traditional confines of the US-Japan Alliance, and stretching its power away from US supervision" (Karakaya, 2010). This became important to Japanese thinking. Bert Edstrom argued that Japan's approach is "a highly attractive perspective for Japanese foreign policy decision-makers as the pursuit of human security will enable Japan to pursue policies that are devised in Tokyo

not in Washington” (Edstrom, 2003:220). Human security is often seen as a tool in the hands of rising powers to prove them on the world stage.

Japanese achievements are represented in its active diplomacy in support of human security issues. Japan has established a record for speeches by its Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy Ministers advocating human security. “Between 1998 and 2004, Japanese prime ministers and their top representatives have made at least 16 speeches specifically on Japan and Human security” (Karakaya, 2010). Through generous aid and strong international support, Japan was able to establish the Trust Fund for Human Security in the UN in 1999.

Japan has also placed big emphasis on human security in its Official Development Assistance (ODA), seeking to fund peace-building activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, Cambodia, and other conflict-torn areas. Its substantial humanitarian relief program provides nations with funds and supplies to get past wars and natural disasters. It shows great concern with the development projects adopted in neighboring countries as it believes that development close by will impact its own development. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs follows the issue closely and puts forward regular announcements on it. Japan has strong ties to the ‘Commission on Human Security’ and ‘the Friends of Human Security.’ Many former ministers of foreign affairs in the region are active in those organizations. Some Japanese universities offer courses on human security. Human security is clearly a high priority to Japan.

To sum up, the Japanese role on human security issues is described as active, substantial, and creative. It promotes human security at many levels, supports it broadly around the world, and educated the Japanese people on human security.

The following table shows the difference between the approaches of the three major governments to human security.

Table (1)

State	Canada	Norway	Japan
Defining Human Security	It is concerned with the freedom from <i>fear</i> , part of definition of human security	It is concerned with the freedom from <i>fear</i> , part of definition of human security	Although it tries to balance between both parts of the definition of human security, yet it is more inclined towards the freedom from <i>want</i> part of definition
Main Field of Concern	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rule of law, - Good governance and spreading democracy, - Well being of individuals, - Preservation of Human Rights and Freedoms - Preservation of Peace & Security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preservation of the rule of law - Promoting and respecting Human Rights and International Human rights law by establishing International criminal courts -Peace Promotion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Stabilizing Asian Economies - Stabilizing Peace & security in the region - Peace building and making - Environmental & Developmental policies
Success Area(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protecting children and women in armed conflicts - Reducing Land-mines - Established the Human Security Network (HSN) -Working on 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace making and building through its good offices and mediation among disputing states such as in East Timor, Cambodia and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Active Diplomacy in the region - Established the Commission on Human Security - Established Trust Fund for Human Security within the UN

	<p>containing the spread of HIV/AIDs in Africa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Worked on promoting Human rights and democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Established the Human Security Network 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formed the Friends for Human Security in the UNGA.
Tools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diplomacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Diplomacy - Humanitarian relief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aid - Diplomacy - Humanitarian relief
Approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A <i>Practical</i> approach by its active diplomacy and its out-reach to small states which suffer from human insecurities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A <i>Practical</i> approach by its close alliance and support to NGOs; Red Cross and international and regional organizations as the UN & EU. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A strong <i>Academic</i> approach; symposiums, conferences, many speeches given by public figures - A <i>Practical</i> approach by its close alliance with the UN and working under its umbrella.

Human Security Concerns After 9/11

Many critics argue that concern for human security after 9/11 has decreased and priority has been given to the security of the state facing, especially against terrorism. Another group of scholars argue, however, that part of the solution to terrorism is to address the problems that gave rise to it. A closer look at these problems indicates part of problem is political, part economic, and another part social. The lack of human security may well lead to terrorism, results sometimes in insecurity of the state. Jutta Bruneo and Stephen Toope confirmed this idea when they said, "It is right to draw attention to governance and humanitarian crises as 'root causes' of global terrorism and other threats to international peace and security" (Bruneo and Toope,2004: 259).

I support the views of the scholars who argue that human security has not been marginalized since 9/11. Looking at activities of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the member states in the Human Security Network, one can see that many of the activities mentioned show that these states are still concerned with human security issues. They are still working on different dimensions of human security and support it morally and financially. They are still raising awareness on the different dimensions of human security and bringing the attention of many nations to the dangers of this insecurity, this proves their moral support. Financially this is done by giving aid and loans to states to fight and contain the violations of human security.

UNDP's Efforts

The first entity to draw people's attention to the human security concept was the UNDP in 1994. This led to the UN in 1995 resetting its main development goals on its agenda to those related to human security. The UN concentrates hard on poverty, human rights, and health threats such as HIV/AIDS. The UN Millennium Development Goals set the goal of reducing poverty in the world by 50 % by 2015 (Thomas, 2001:159-171). The UNDP has helped persuade other institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF to take up the human security concept. The UNDP is mainly concerned with human development which means fighting poverty, improving people's living conditions, creating better health systems. A deeper look into these concerns leads one to conclude that they, in fact, concentrate on the many dimensions of human security. They concentrate their efforts on creating conditions free from want and free from fear. The

success of the UNDP is remarkable. It is an influential world organization that has influenced many other major institutions. The UNDP is more established in institutional terms than other units like the HSN or the Commission on Human Security. It is a multi-purpose agency and with multiple goals. This helps it to put its efforts in action and to achieve its goals. It is more successful too because it is better funded, has many ways to bring people and resources together, and has long-term plans.

UN ex-Secretary General Kofi Annan was influenced with its ideas, which inspired him to create and sell countries on the whole Millennium Development Goals process for this century. Annan has been concerned with the main concepts of human security freedom from want and freedom from fear and he stated them in the Declaration of the Millennium Development Goals. International organizations can clearly promote human security conceptually and programmatically. More than any other organization in the world, the UNDP supported by the UN itself, made the international community aware of the concept and committed to working on it.

Commission on Human Security

The commission started its work in 2001 and ended when it achieved its goals by 2003. It was established due to the initiative of the Japanese Government. It was co-chaired between Mrs. Sadako Ogata and Nobel Economics Laureate Amartya Sen. It worked closely with governments, the UN, the UNDP, World Bank, and many foundations. It researched the areas of the world suffering from human insecurity and their programs on them. The goals of the commission were to:

1. promote public understanding, engagement and support of human security and its underlying imperatives;
2. develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation; and
3. propose a concrete program of action to address critical and pervasive threats to human security. (*Establishment of the Commission: commission on Human security: Protecting and Empowering people*).

One could argue from reading these goals that the commission devoted its full attention to freedom from want rather than freedom from fear. Yet it was successful in reaching many of its

targets and solving some of the problems that it took up. It was replaced by the newly created Human Security Unit of the United Nations in 2004.

Human Security Network

The Human Security Network (HSN) was created in 1998 by the UN General Assembly. It is made up of 13 member states represented by their foreign ministers: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, and South Africa. The main goal of the network is to put human security on top of governments' foreign policy agendas around the world. "Encouraging the resolution of international issues that represent an immediate threat to human security" (Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2009).

Scholar Mike Fell argues that building worldwide awareness of the idea of human security would result in a more peaceful world (2006: pp. 1-11). The idea of human security network started as a way to advance the ideas of the Ottawa Convention on Banning Anti-personnel Mines and then developed into the human security initiative. The HSN is concerned with many issues like poverty elimination, protecting children in armed conflicts, human rights, and containing HIV/AIDS. The most active member in the network after Canada and Norway is Greece. Greece's main concern was with the environmental dimension of human security, largely because of national concerns about climate change. Greece believes that "vulnerable population groups such as women, children and persons fleeing their homes as a result of climate change in the developing regions" may well be in its and the world's future (Greece Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Greece focused hard on putting the issue of climate change on the agenda of the European Union. Its goal is to make climate change a major EU issue, which in turn will lead to EU aid to countries in the developing world suffering from climate changes, especially those who must abandon their islands and coastal sites. This would help those affected to overcome those problems.

European Union

The EU's interest in human security emerged as a result to 9/11. The sense of fear that these attacks created moved the EU to adopt human security goals. Karakya stated that these positive steps were:

In December 2003, the EU Council agreed upon a EU Security Strategy (ESS) which advocates preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. This report is about the implementation of the ESS. It argues that Europe needs the capability to make a more active contribution to global security. The report proposes a "Human Security Doctrine" for EU comprising three elements:

- A) There are seven principles; the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force.
- B) A "Human Security response force" composed of 15,000 of men and women of whom at least one third would be civilians. There would be "Human Security Volunteer Service" as well.
- C) A new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene and operations on the ground.

(Karakaya, 2010).

Karakya has compared the EU's stand on human security to that of Canada in that they both focus on "freedom from fear". This shows the interest and role of a major regional organization in advancing the concept of human security.

Conclusion

This chapter has covered the role of the key players in the human security arena: Canada, Norway, and Japan. These three governments see human security as a major priority in their foreign policies. They have invested a lot in it and promoted it worldwide. They are more active and successful than the 'major powers' in pursuing human security issues. The interest of these governments stems from their beliefs in international cooperation, in concentrating on the root causes of problems, and that the security of a nation is intimately connected to the security of other nations. Thus, they see it is a global duty to combat deficiencies in human security at home

and abroad. These states find that their approach gives them a bigger role on the world's stage than they otherwise would have.

There are many other successful partners in the human security field. There are major organizations such as the UNDP, UN, HSN, the World Bank, and the bilateral aid programs. Some of them have become efficient in their programs, such as UNDP. Others are still finding their way and seeking to prove themselves. Or they may have gone from one form to another such as the Commission on Human Security which became the UN Human Security Unit. This shows that human security has taken a lot of support from state and non state actors.

Human Security still has a lot to achieve and is still going strong despite 9/11, unlike what some critics say about it. In fact, 9/11 has served increased interest of the approach because freedom from fear and want had been neglected in trying to understand terrorism. Human security supporters believe it better to strive for improvements in living conditions on the seven dimensions of human security, especially its political dimension, than it is to concentrate all one's efforts on fighting terrorism.

The next chapter discusses the first case study of this thesis: Egypt. It will evaluate Egypt's performance on human security issues and the deficiencies in the Egyptian approach to the political dimension of human security and how that relates to Egypt's national security.

CHAPTER 2

THE CASE OF EGYPT

This chapter discusses the first case study of this thesis: Egypt. The reason for choosing this state comes from the fact that it is a pivotal state in the region. Due to its strategic location, size and history, Egypt is still seen as the key to the Middle East and the Arab world. Hence anything that happens in it sends shock waves throughout the region. Many events have occurred since 9/11 that has had major impacts on the Egyptian political system. That has in turn influenced how the political dimension of human security has developed and became endangered. It is important to point out several features of the Egyptian system that caused it to result in threatening the political dimension of human security. These in turn have their impact on the national security of the state and the regime.

This chapter includes a selection of problems that Egypt has presented such as corruption, lack of transparency, and the continuing extension of authoritarian rule and human rights violations. The chapter will touch on attempts to reform Egypt born out of pressures coming from three levels of analysis. The conclusion of the chapter assesses the reforms, evaluates the pressure points for political change, and draws a link between these violations of human security needs and attempts at reform.

A. Problems Facing Egypt

A.1. *What is Corruption?*

What is the definition of corruption? According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the glossary of International Standards for Criminalization of Corruption defines the term as follows: “The international definitions for corruption for policy purposes commonly cite abuse of public or private office for personal gain”. This means that the element of abuse is the salient feature, putting the interest of one group or one person over the good of the whole, the common good.

The famous political scientist Joseph Nye has defined corruption as “a behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private (family, friendship, tribal), pecuniary, or status gain - or which violates rules against the exercise of private-regarding influence.” (1967:419).

Transparency International on its home page gives its definition as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain; it hurts everyone whose life, livelihood or happiness depends on the integrity of people in positions of authority.”

Thus, a dichotomy between types of corruption should be drawn. First there is Petty Corruption; which is mostly found among small government employees from civil servants to small police officers. It is simply exemplified in taking bribes to overcome red-tapes or paying fines. As for the second type it is known as Grand corruption this is seen when high government officials take large amount of money from the country into their own pockets.

Corruption is an issue that is wide spread in Egypt among different levels of the society, starting from the presidency and ending up to poor government employees. Therefore, both types of corruption petty and grand are anchored in Egypt. According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Egypt has a low ranking on its scale. In 2007 it came out as the 105th country with a 2.9 rating, in 2008, it ranked 115th with a 2.8, and in 2009, it ranked 111th with 2.8. The latest report in 2010 ranked it as 98th with a 3.1 rating (CPI, 2010). This comparative study shows a slight improvement in Egypt’s status within the region and the world, showing slow progress in fighting corruption and in adopting transparent governmental practices.

What are the reasons for spread of corruption in Egypt? What are the reasons for the slow progress in fighting corruption that have been achieved so far?

A.2. Why is Corruption so High in Egypt?

There are many reasons that lead to high corruption rates in Egypt. First, Egypt is still a developing country and the bureaucratic sector pays very low salaries, making government employees poor. This drives them to seek to improve their living standards in any way they can, including illegal practices. They accept bribes to compensate for their low salaries.

Second, corruption is embedded in the political culture of the society. The Arab world often categorized having 'parochial' political cultures, meaning they are made of passive participants. Egypt is not an exception. In the parochial political culture, people feel they lose their pride and their sense of belonging to the state. People instead have pride in their tribes or their religion which makes them become more self-interested in respect to those values. This type of political culture becomes very dangerous because people forget about their state and react against it. They then accept corruption as natural because it benefits them and not the state. At the same time, people do not see that accepting bribes favors one person over another, leading to a deteriorating status. They do not see that benefiting the whole nation as an important value, seeing instead that benefiting an individual or small group is superior to being the nation as a whole. Such diversions of public wealth to an individual or small sector of the society are therefore acceptable even though the recipients might not deserve it.

Third, in the political culture of Egypt, there is little or no respect for law or rules imposed by the government. This disrespect and violations of laws is common at all levels of society, including the educated, wealthy elite members of the executive and legislative branches of government. Egypt is not a country where law is respected; on the contrary, it is a country which rarely cares about the law, marginalizing it in everyday life.

Fourth, another form of corruption is the high-level of favoritism; people's relatives, friends, and business associates. This concept has been inherited from the late 1950s and 1960s when hiring people with the right views who follow policies with question over people of "merit" was standard practice. This was done to protect the Egyptian 1952 revolution against any traitors. This meant hiring large numbers of people of "trust," but with no or little experience or knowledge, for positions both high and low. This led to declines in the level of work efficiency, the abuse of power, and the loss of people's control over their property.

Fifth and finally, the Egyptian system is known to have fused the power of the executive and the Legislative branches. The executive branch exercises control over the other branches, especially legislature, as well as over on the whole country. This has led to the rise of new strata in the society that is seen to be highly corrupted by the average citizen. Members of this new class are seen as abusing their positions in the government for their own interests over the interests of average citizens. The rise of this class has been coincided with rise of corruption and rise of monopolies in society. It has had the effect of keeping people outside this class from achieving the rights and benefits which they deserve and which are promised to them.

Corruption is not only found in the public sector but is also well-known in the private sector. It largely does not come from the poor class, because of their poverty, but from the rich and powerful because of their access to political and economic power. Abd El Moneim Said mentioned in his article "Transparent Truths" that the spread of corruption is the result of "greed and ambition which drive some to seek illegitimate gains and an unfair advantage over others" (Said, 2010). All these different forms of corruption and their many reasons for their various reasons for their existence make finding and uprooting corruption in Egyptian society a very difficult task.

Corruption is not only limited to taking bribes and abuse of the power. It could also be seen in the inability for some services to reach the right people. A case to explain this is the 'bread crisis' and 'subsidies crisis' that have been on-going for a long time. These crises have been raised because many of the poor have been deprived of having access to subsidized goods and services, principally bread. Ahmed El Said El Naggar in his article "Goods Subsidies in Egypt: Cancellation or Reform or Restructuring", argued that subsidies reach the wrong people, mainly

the rich and the foreigners rather than the poor. He gave the example of subsidized wheat used for famous pastries for the rich and the foreigners but not used to make bread for average Egyptian citizens. The government's subsidy for fuel is mainly consumed by the middle and upper classes rather than the poor. (El Naggar, 2008). This is yet another form of corruption in Egypt, threatening peoples' well-being and leading to 'fear from want.' This contradicts the core concept of human security which is 'freedom from fear and want'.

A.3.Egypt's Attempts to Reduce Corruption

After realizing the very poor level it had reached internationally in terms of corruption and due to both international and domestic pressures, the Egyptian Government decided to do something. The action was to establish a committee to act as a watchdog to fight corruption. This has resulted in "The Transparency and Integrity Committee" (TIC). This was formed under decree No.86 of 2007 issued by the Minister of Administrative Development (Executive Summary, TIC report). The committee began its work by issuing its first report at the end of October 2007.

The report addressed the reasons for corruption and lack of transparency and outlined methods to contain and fight them. It was remarkable in highlighting immense control the executive branch has over the country. It argued that this power should be shared with People's Assembly. From my own point of view, the sharing of power between the branches is only a partial solution to the problem because many of the members of the legislature are themselves corrupt.

Many of the members of the Egyptian parliament have been involved in major scandals and have not been severely punished, largely arising from parliamentary immunity which they enjoy. They run for reelection in the parliament as if corruption is normal and acceptable. There are numerous examples of MPs who get pilgrimage visas at very high cost for their constituents. They themselves, their families, relatives and friends go on pilgrimage free as they are not charged for visas. Two MPs, including former minister of finance Botros Ghali, were seen to be abusing their privileges by travelling free of charge to get a treatment on the country's expenses and preventing needy cases in their constituencies. None of these incidents has been seriously questioned or caused them to be removed from their positions in parliament or in the cabinet. Instead they stayed in their positions and were re-elected in November 2010 only to be later

removed from power due to the January 25th Uprising. It is clear that the charges against them were never taken seriously.

Another recommendation mentioned in the TIC report was to empower law enforcement to act on any and all allegations. This area of law enforcement has long suffered from inaction as there is no interest in sincerely enforcing the law. This recommendation is a good one and alone, if seriously imposed on all office-holders not on “enemies” of the regime, would help in reducing corruption.

The TIC report further suggested that Egypt become a member of the major international and regional organizations that seek to fight corruption. This recommendation has been taken seriously and Egypt has signed and is trying to adhere to these conventions. Examples are the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Egypt is one of the 30 countries that signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption in Merida, Mexico, on December 9, 2003. The treaty came into force on December 14th, 2005 (Promoting Transparency and Enhancing Integrity in the Arab Region: 2009). Furthermore, Egypt proposed that the Arab League adopt anti-corruption policies and apply them on each member state. Egypt has also signed the Treaty on Preventing and Combating Corruption in the African Union (AU).

“Forming the Committee of Transparency and Integrity among other monitoring bodies as a coordinator with the secretariats of the UN to follow up on the implementation of the provisions of the UNCAC in accordance with article 6 of the convention. Egypt also submitted documents for the accession to the African Union Treaty on Preventing and Combating Corruption, in addition to its participation in formulating and supporting the Arab League in drafting a convention to combat corruption which shall enter into force in 2009 and which will constitute a framework of the Arab commitment to the United Nations Convention to combat corruption and work on asset recovery” (Executive Summary, TIC Report).

Another recommendation from the report was to focus the government’s attention on the important role that civil society NGOs can play in fighting corruption. This is a significant point as the burden cannot realistically be put entirely on the government’s shoulders, especially when

the government is not really efficient in that area. Open governments encourage NGOs involvement to complement work that the government could not do alone. Civil society has been vital elsewhere in fighting corruption. The civil society can make public awareness campaigns that alert people to what corruption is, how harmful it is, and what the methods are to fight it. It can make people aware that it is unethical and immoral to be corrupt. Civil society can work here with the religious institutions as corruption is contrary to religious practices. Transparency International has noted, however, that civil society NGOs is not always effective due to the many obstacles that are put in their way restrictive laws and corrupt officials.

A more practical suggestion to fight corruption in Egypt is by providing for and retraining civil servants. One method would be to give them higher salaries making them less susceptible. Through retraining, their awareness level of corruption should be raised while making understand they are prone to be investigated, exposed in the press, fired, tried, and jailed. The enforcement provisions for corruption need to involve heavy penalties. This would make any civil servant reconsider whether or not they should engage in corruption. It would deter the person who gives a civil servant a bribe as they too could be severely punished for committing such a crime. El Naggar has argued that the best process to use in fighting corruption is to start by “first improving the wages and salary system in the country, second by increasing the level of the bureaucrats and developing their skills and third by increasing the penalty on law violators” (El Naggar, 2008).

B. Transparency

The problem of lack of transparency is the other side of the coin for corruption. They are both interlinked and have repercussions on each other. When there is corruption that means there is lack of transparency. An open system that is transparent enough lowers the chances for corruption. Lack of transparency is obvious in many sectors of the Egyptian society. It is clear in the elections which are un-free, unfair, and closed elections. It is also obvious in covering much of the corruption within the bureaucracy and within the government. Lack of transparency

can be seen in the intense censorship that is imposed on many statements and acts by advocates, academics, and intellectuals in the society. The lack of published reports about many features of society all facilitates corruption in certain sectors of the government. Transparency International has confirmed these ideas by saying “Accountability and transparency is very weak in the legal and regulation system and its implementation. This includes the accountability of the government and parliament, despite the fact that there are regulations to govern conflict of interest and asset disclosure. Moreover there is lack of access as well as lack of creation and circulation of information” (Promoting Transparency and Enhancing Integrity in the Arab Region: 2009).

Egypt is attempting to open its system and make it more transparent to the people and to the international world. These attempts are seen in establishing the ‘Transparency and Integrity Committee’ as well as other governmental organizations such as the Central Auditing Agency and Administrative Prosecution Authority. Civil society NGOs are also working on increased transparency in the media (Promoting Transparency and Enhancing Integrity in the Arab Region: 2009).

The Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies has worked with the Danish-Egyptian Institute for Dialogue on a project under entitled “Transparency, Accountability and Supporting Mechanisms for Anti-corruption”. This project started in December 2007 and ran for two years. It aimed to increase understanding of the transparency issues, analyzing problems arising from the lack of transparency and finding the reasons for the obstacles to a transparent government.

The project has three parts. The first part deals with a study on the status of transparency and its problems in the banking, privatization, customs, and health. The second part deals with the role of the supervisory bodies in Egypt with a special focus on legislative and institutional mechanisms handled through the administrative control authorities such as Central Agency for Public Mobilization And Statistics (CAPMAS), Bank Regulations, the Market Authority, and the parliamentary Commission on Planning and Budgeting. The third part deals with suggesting recommendations for new policies to increase transparency in the Egypt through a comparative study with Denmark (Project on Transparency, Accountability and Support Mechanisms for Anti-corruption).

The Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies has recently published a 2009 study entitled “Towards a More Transparent Society in Egypt” co-edited by Abd El Fattah El Gibaly and Hanaa Ebid. This qualitative study investigates the spread of corruption and lack of transparency in a number of selected sectors. It pointed out that most of the reasons for corruption and lack of transparency are correlated with economic problems. It suggests that as part of the solution to the problems of lack of transparency and the spread of corruption is to reform the economic sector by decreasing the unemployment rates, eliminating poverty, and offering better wages and salaries to people (Abd El Gawad,2009).

Another proposal is to reform the political system with reforms based on the underlying premise that the new system be more transparent and open. A system that is open and democratic is much more likely to function better and with less corruption since the people in a democratic system have the chance to question their government and to change it whenever it is found unsatisfactory. Such a process does not happen easily, sometimes not at all, in an authoritarian system or in a socialist one. Abd El Moneim Said confirms this idea by saying “Socialism is the worst form of corruption”. He gave the examples of the ex-Soviet states and how corruption and lack of transparency were deeply rooted in them. He further explained that high corruption is even present in states that adopt the socialist ideology such as in Vietnam and Cuba. He justified this idea by arguing that socialist systems lead to the state’s continual interference in the economy, bringing with it a very large bureaucracy and an expansion of the government functions. All of these results in a system open to massive corruption with low or no transparency (Said, 2010).

While this line of argument is powerful and persuasive, it does not mean that democracies are immune from corruption or lack of transparency. There are democratic countries with corrupted systems such as the USA, Italy, and Spain. However, the difference between democratic and non-democratic regimes is that there is more openness and the possibilities of change are much greater.

To conclude, the problems of corruption and lack of transparency must be solved by first reforming the economic sector. This should be done by fighting poverty, increasing wages and salaries, and reducing unemployment rates. This should be followed by reforming the political

system. It should be done by having a more democratic system that adopts a ‘checks and balances system’ in which the three branches of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial have equal weight with each having some independence from the other two as well as some control of them. By building strong supervisory bodies that produce transparency and check corruption, a government can keep make the public more aware and produce some trust that corruption will be punished. Amongst other things, progress should be openly and frequently reported openly through public announcements and the media. There should be a much more active role for civil society and the media as they work on complementary tracks with the government in exposing corruption and building transparency. Finally, there should be an increasing role for law, with much greater penalties for violators and much greater respect for the rule of law.

C. Authoritarianism

Egypt has been under authoritarian regimes of varying intensity throughout its history. This authoritarianism has resulted in several problems which the society suffers from. One example is the 30-year-long emergency law imposed after the death of Sadat in 1981 and is still in place today.

C.1. Emergency Law

The government imposed the emergency law after ex-President Sadat’s assassination stating that it would contain terrorism, the reason given the death of Sadat. Without clear justification or explanation, the government has simply renewed this law over and over again through the present. As part of the reform process started in 2005, President Hosni Mubarak promised to put an end for this law. Yet in May 2010, the government has submitted a proposal to the parliament to renew it and it was accepted without serious debate. It has been renewed for two years until 2012. In 2010, the government used the same excuse to justify the call extension, namely the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking.

These two reasons have been repetitively used even though there have been only occasional terrorist attacks within Egypt in the past 10 years. The government earlier in 2010 arrested a

terrorist group in Sinai found to have had affiliations with HezboAllah in Lebanon. In late March and early April of 2010, there was a big scandal in the media about the crisis of ‘hashish’ (cannabis) in the black market. Hashish is actively used by many people in the working class and by university students. The problem is that hashish has been widely available since 2004 under the earlier emergency law. Yet in 2010 the “crisis” proved that the justification for the emergency law was illogical. The 2010 “crisis” proves the inefficiency of the law and the rationale for its continued existence.

The emergency law contains the following provisions:

“broad power to impose on restrictions on freedoms of assembly, movement or residence, the power to arrest or detain suspects or those deemed dangerous, the power to search individuals and places without the need to follow provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (contained in Article 3).....

the right to establish exceptional courts such as the state security courts and the supreme state security court of emergency to hear cases related to crimes committed in violation of rulings made by the president of the republic or his deputy.....

powers given the military ruler, or his deputy, such as the power to monitor newspapers, booklets and other publications of expressing opinion including the power to confiscate and stop circulating these publications...” (The Emergency Law of Egypt, 2001).

By giving to itself such powers, the government is not truly fighting terrorism or drug trafficking. On the contrary, it is violating many of the universal human rights granted in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights as well as the Egyptian Constitution. The law has been used to terrorize people instead of protecting them. It is a law that curtails their rights and their freedom.

A further illustration that this law is an explicit violation for the International treaties Egypt has signed and ratified. Taking the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Egypt signed in 1967 and ratified in 1982, in its preamble it is mentioned that:

The States Parties to the present Covenant,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,

Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights,

Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,

Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant,

Thus, the preamble of this convention if compared to the provisions of the emergency law would prove that this law is a violation for both international laws as well as to human security of the Egyptians as the element of freedom of fear is threatened. In addition this law is in violation to the Egyptian constitution. In an interview with one of the Egyptian Judges, who preferred to stay anonymous, in one of the Egyptian governorates courts he said, “the Emergency law is unconstitutional because it contradicts with the rights and freedoms granted in the Egyptian constitution”. In one of the reports given by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) to the UN it agreed with the judge’s words. “The Emergency law has become a tool being used by the Executive branch of the Egyptian government to violate public rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution.” (EOHR Report, 2009).

Finally, it is widely believed in Egypt that the renewal of the Emergency law is done for the purposes of fighting the Muslim Brotherhood, the biggest of the opposition groups and an outlawed party, and oppressing the other opposition parties. The government also believes that

there is a rising tide of dissent among the people represented in long-lasting strikes in front of the People's Assembly as well as strikes carried out by workers asking for better wages and more job opportunities like the latest ones lasting for a month in summer of 2010. The government believes that the country is going through a period of upheaval and therefore, in truth, justifies the emergency law as the solution to these problems.

C.2. Lack of Democracy and Openness

A democratic system would mean an alternation of power through a multi-party system, a role of the civil society, openness of information, and independent judiciary, and the protection of freedoms. However, this is not the case in Egypt. The problem of opposition parties in Egypt exemplifies this. Although late President Sadat in 1970s wanted Egypt to become a multiparty system and made some constitutional amendments to ensure that, this situation never really emerged under his presidency nor later under the Mubarak regime.

The current regime has not been successful in strengthening opposition parties and giving them a chance to expand, to win elections, and to carry out their policies through even-though it is their constitutional right to be formed. Egypt is an example of crushing the opposition and oppressing the civil society. Some scholars describe the opposition in Egypt as struggling to survive at all. Joshua Stacher argued that there is a “demise of Egypt’s political opposition” in an article under the same title (Stacher, 2004). Stacher described the opposition parties as being fragile, inefficient, and uncompetitive. The reasons for their weakness are found in the authoritarian system, the impact of the emergency law, and the nature of the parties themselves.

There are many parties that have formed but not received official recognition by the government. The most famous of these unrecognized parties are as: the Muslim Brotherhood, but there are also others such as the Wasat Party and Democratic Front Party. These parties have had major problems to gaining official status because of the obstacles put in their path by the Political Parties Affairs Committee, considered an arm of the NDP. Other parties such as the Amal and the Ghad parties have been closed by this committee. Stacher writes that “Since 1998, the political parties committee has closed seven out of the sixteen legal opposition parties. The government is not only stifling group development but also preventing prominent independent

members of parliament from using already existing parties to challenge the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)” (Stacher, 2004).

However, not all of the blame should only be imposed on the government for the weak status of the political parties. Some of these parties start as weak and fragile and never grow. Hassaninen Tawfik argued this point in his article “*Constitutional Amendments and the future of political and democratic development in Egypt*” (Tawfik, 2008). He saw that the political parties in Egypt suffer from weak foundations making them inefficient, lacking in influence, lacking in internal democracy, and having many internal conflicts that produce frequent divisions. Many of these parties depend entirely on one person. This person either turns an authoritarian inside the party or the party collapses if and when he leaves. This puts Egypt’s political parties under the category of devotee parties based on one person’s leadership.

Due to their political culture, the people in Egypt do not have trust in the political parties, do not believe in their ability to compete against the ruling party, or do not believe they will function in the peoples’ interest rather than their own (Tawfik, 2008). These opposition parties often seem to lack the ability to organize themselves to achieve their own goals and to compete for seats in elections.

The lack of openness and fairness in the authoritarian political system of Egypt could be vividly seen in the November 2010 parliamentary elections. Despite the promises given by President Mubarak in 2005 to bring in more openness and freedom, the 2010 elections were very disappointing to all Egyptians in specific and to the international community in general. Hopes had been raised that these elections would be free of fraud in them, yet they actually went to the other extreme. These elections were held in two rounds and were stained by the broken promise of fair elections. They were a step back to the days to earlier, totally fraudulent elections. They resulted in almost 95% hegemony for the NDP in the parliament, leaving very few seats to the opposition. Gamal Essam El Din, wrote in *Ahram Online* “the ruling National Democratic Party scored a landslide victory, winning 209 or 95% of the seats that were designated that day and 40% of the parliament’s total 508 elected seats while just twelve other seats were designated to the opposition” (El Din, 2010). This shows that the elections were basically controlled by the

ruling party to minimize any chance for the opposition to establish greater influential in the People's Assembly.

In comparison to the 2005 parliamentary elections, the 2010 were considered a crisis for the opposition. "The opposition has only around 3% in contrast to their 23% representation in the outgoing parliament,..., the Muslim Brotherhood won only one seat down from 88 in the previous parliament" ('Official Results: 16 opposition, 242 NDP, 65 independents', 6 December 2010). The Anonymous Judge described the 2010 Elections as, "leading to more disrespect for the judges and further belittling the role of the judiciary". He described the role played by the judges in the 2010 elections as, "we (judges) were not 'real' observers we were more like accountants counting votes and the reason behind this came from the 2007 constitutional amendments which curtailed the judicial role to end up in this status" (personal interview Nov. 2010).

These results have been met with an uproar from the Egyptians as well as Egypt's observers and allies such as the US and human rights organizations. The Egyptians saw the result as further evidence of the corruption of the ruling regime and its dominant party. Many Egyptians saw that the resulting parliament as completely lacking in legitimacy and not represent them at all. These elections became a catalyst for the Egyptian uprising on January 25, 2011. The US, Egypt's major ally, stated in many declarations before the elections that they expected genuinely democratic elections and would be closely following what happened. After the elections the US expressed its worries about the status of democracy in Egypt and stated that it was unsatisfied with the measures used by the NDP, justified under the emergency law, to curtail the opposition. Philip Crowley, US Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs said, "We are disappointed by reports in the pre-election period of disruption of campaign activities of opposition candidates and arrests of their supporters as well as denial of access to the media for some opposition voices. We are furthered dismayed by reports of election-day interference and intimidation by the security forces" (US State Department, 2010).

Civil society organizations in any society can be very crucial as they complement the role of the government and are more reachable and approachable than the government in many areas. Civil society is successful in covering many issues such as fighting corruption, alleviating poverty,

advancing economic and political development, and preserving human rights. Many of the human rights observers who monitored the 2010 elections indicated that they were marked by higher degrees of fraud, deception, and violence than the 2005 elections. Civil society can help in supervising elections and providing a political awareness of their freeness and fairness. The civil society can also be an indicator of the government's performance. Realizing these possibilities, the Egyptian government worked to keep civil society organizations weak and as far removed from the elections as possible. This was done by imposing laws that restrict the establishing of NGOs and closing any NGO that is funded by foreign funds and supported by foreign actors. The NGOs in Egypt are subject to the law no. 84 of 2002 which is viewed by many intellectuals as a mean of oppressing civil society organizations.

D. Human Rights

According to many human rights organizations, Egypt is one of the main violators of human rights in the Middle East, especially through violations carried out against the political prisoners and detainees. According to the Department of State Human Rights Report of 2009, most of the politically detained prisoners are from the outlawed Muslim Brothers as well as the opposition parties in Egypt. Many of them were arrested without warrants or formal charges by using the Emergency Law as an excuse. It is common news in Egypt to find that many of the Muslim brothers are being arrested, especially prior to any elections. In October 2010, Amnesty International reported that 150 members of the Muslim Brothers from different governorates were arrested prior to the upcoming November parliamentary elections. ('Dozens detained in Egyptian pre-elections':2010). In this manner, the government reduced the number of independents affiliated with the Muslim Brothers who were running as candidates in the elections. The government clearly believed that these massive and random arrests of brotherhood members would deter the people from voting to them and make the Brothers reconsider nominating candidates.

The same 2009 US Human Rights Report stated that most of the human rights abuses were carried out by the Ministry of Interior and the State Security Investigative Services. These practices started back in the 1960s to contain the communists, Muslim Brothers, and leftists in Egypt. The detainees are subject to harassments, brutal beating, sleep deprivation, and physical

abuse, and inhumane detention conditions lacking food, clean water, hygiene, and medical care (US Department of State, 2010). The EOHR further elaborates saying that, “ from the year 2000 until April 2009 the number of tortured detainees reached 285 cases of torture and 118 deaths due to torture” (EOHR Report to UN, 2009). When commenting on the detainees’ status inside the detention camps EOHR mentioned that many of the prisoners die out of disease and the maltreatment of prison hospitals. Add to the fact that most of the political prisoners are arrested for many years and are transferred from one prison to another so that their families lose hope in finding their places (EOHR Report to UN, 2009).

The heavy reliance on the Emergency Law underlies these human rights violations. Human rights advocates as well as average citizens have called for elimination of this law. These human rights violations lead people to fear their government because of their fear of being kidnapped, tortured and perhaps even killed. This is also another violation for their human security needs because their basic desire for ‘freedom from fear’ is not fulfilled. The political dimension of human security is violated when Egyptians feel that their personal security is endangered.

However, there have been attempts by the Egyptian government to reform. These reforms result from two main sources of pressure. The first is international and the second is the domestic. Though Egypt experiences regional pressures as well, there are no regional pressures to stem human rights abuses.

International Pressures to Reform

Three main forces from international arena put pressure on the Egyptian government to reform. The first is globalization. Through increasing interconnections and interdependence, many international events that sent shock waves through Egypt. The collapse of the communist model associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the transition of the Eastern European states to democracy, meant to Egypt that socialism as a form of governance was losing worldwide acceptability. Liberalizations adopted in East Asia and the outstanding economic progress those countries have made has inspired also Egypt to liberalize its economy.

New levels of freedom of expression were granted to the media, opening the door to many opposition voices. Many newspapers that have been managed to survive the worst controls and

are today seen by the public as objective and transparent in discussing closed issues in our society. Examples of these newspapers are 'El Sherouk', 'El Masry Al Youm', 'El Youm El Sabaa', 'El Dostour' and others. These papers have become trusted by many Egyptians and are easily found in the streets or accessed on the internet. These newspapers became the voice of the people in expressing their dissent from the governments' decisions and acts. Furthermore, these papers have published many of the scandals of government, giving them credibility in people's eyes.

The second of the three international forces for pushing Egypt to reform comes from a major world event, the attacks of 9/11. The US has used 9/11 as a tool to pressure Arab and Muslim countries to reform by becoming more democratic. US foreign policy at one point called for democratic reforms in its Greater Middle East Initiative. President Bush argued that the US believes that democracies are less likely to breed terrorists. He also argued that democratic states do not go to war against each other and are therefore more peaceful in nature. These concepts from the liberal internationalist school of thought as well as democratic peace theory and are widely held in the western world. Democracies are therefore inherently more cooperative, especially in their dealings with each other. The US call for reform has included reforming the educational, economic, and political systems of the Arab states.

Moataz Salama, however, countered in one of his articles that, "the true reasons behind the US call for reforms in the region are not good intentions. First, he argued that it serves US interests in reducing terrorist threats to the US. Second, it is also in the US interest to have stable systems in the Arab world in order to ensure that the oil flows securely to the US. Third, Arab reforms would also decrease the threat to the security of Israel" (Salama, 2005).

The US also sees Egypt as the key country in the region. "Reform in Egypt is therefore critical for the region as a whole. Egypt's leading position among Arab states and its important role in matters of peace and security in the Middle East, particularly in the area of Arab-Israeli peace.....and successful political reform in Cairo would significantly enhance Egypt's leadership role throughout the Middle East and Africa, helping constructive political engagement in the region for years to come" (Tumah,Lara:2010).

The Egyptian Government has been somewhat receptive to these calls for reforms and has started trying to carry them out to some extent. American pressure on Egypt to carry out reforms has not been tied just to the Bush administration but has, in fact, continued under the Obama administration as well. An article published by Egypt's International Economic Forum entitled 'US Elections Reduce Likelihood that Resolution Criticizing Egypt Will Pass', related to a bill proposed by a US Senator in July 2010 to Egypt's "supporting democracy, human rights and civil liberties"(Tumah,2010). The article mentioned that both parties in congress support pushing Egypt for more reforms. The main provisions of this bill showed US dissatisfaction with Egyptian practices such as fairness in elections, human rights violations including torture, judicial independence, and the continuing use of the Emergency Law.

The EU also puts similar pressures on Egypt. This has become especially important since the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement which came into force in 2002. Political reforms were agreed upon in this treaty in order to establish a democratic state in Egypt. In a statement delivered by the EU on Egypt in February 2011, they mentioned that, "The European Union is determined to lend its full support to the transition process towards democratic governance and pluralism,.....the European Council is committed to a new partnership involving more effective support in the future to those countries which are pursuing political and economic reforms including through the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean" (EU Declarations on Egypt and the Region:2011). The EU is paying closer and closer attention to the establishing democracy and better governance in the region and Egypt is one of the most important countries in that regard.

Regional Pressures to Reform

There is no doubt that the regional level has been influential in driving Egypt to carry out some reforms as well, especially with reference to the 'War on Terror' and the US invasion to Iraq in 2003. This sent shock waves through the region. The Iraqi experience was a wake-up call for Arab states to start putting reforms into effect "in the Arabs way' instead of being forced into American-style reforms. Many countries launched reform efforts at that time, including Egypt.

Domestic Pressures to Reform

This sector produces the most pressing and influential pressures for reform. This is because the pressures that many Egyptians suffer from have driven them to call for reform in an outspoken and explicit way after years of apathy. This was represented by the many demonstrations carried out by different factions of the society, from intellectuals to opposition parties' to the Muslim Brothers to workers. There has been an increase in the popular protests around the country. Everywhere people have showed their discontent with their situation. The rise of movements such as the 'Kefaya' (Enough) Movement, the 6th of April Movement, the Judges' Movement and the University Professors' Movement demonstrate this. These movements paved the way for the 25th January Uprising this year, which brought the end to President Mubarak's 30-year reign on the 11th of February 2011.

Civil society has played a role in calling for media reforms. Many human rights NGOs have pressured the government continuously for reforms. These NGOs have worked with international organizations to call upon the Egyptian government to liberalize its system and halt unacceptable practices. Last but not least, the on-again, off-again role of the judiciary in supervising the elections is a cry for more transparent electoral processes. The same is true of the push for fair trails for detainees and constitutional review of laws.

Attempts for Reform

Egypt has established several regulatory bodies to ensure this progress on corruption and transparency. The government has given a 'limited' green light to civil society and the media on fighting corruption and ensuring accountability. In 2005 President Mubarak proposed constitutional amendments, followed by presidential elections, and then amendments in 2007, all with the intent to reform. The goal was a further shift towards a democratic capitalist and away from a socialist system. The plan was warmly applauded nationwide. The expansion of freedom of expression, both personally and in the media, that followed after the constitutional amendments has been remarkable.

The government established the National Council for Human Rights under Law 93 stating that this council would report on the human rights violations in Egypt and recommend ways to

preserve these rights. There has been substantial criticism of this council however. First it has been seen as one of the governments' arms since it is funded by the government money. Second, it is seen as working more on reporting many human rights violations from outside Egypt, specifically in Palestine and Iraq, than inside the country. Stacher has written that "urban professionals in the NCHR are more concerned that the Egyptian state adopt a strong stance toward Israeli and US-British abuses in Palestine and Iraq" than they are in pursuing domestic cases (Stacher,2005). Third, the council is seen by many observers as weak, essentially performing an advisory role rather than trying to achieve real results. The government does not take the council's recommendations seriously. Human rights violations have continued even more intensely after establishing the council than they did before. Stacher observed that "most of the human rights activists argued that the NCHR was a government attempt to coopt certain personalities so as to divide civil society" (Stacher, 2005).

Conclusion

Domestic pressures for reform have been very intense, more pressing than changes demanded from outside the country. Stacher has stated that "President Hosni Mubarak's regime is beginning to 'bow' to popular pressure for reform" (Stacher, 2005). People who feel the time for change, people who sincerely know their own interests, and people who know to expect from government have been catalysts, inspiring large numbers of people and motivating them to seek reforms and to support a broad people's movement.

The Egyptian Government's attempts at reform have been not very successful. Much more needs to be done and it is very hard to do under the same autocratic regime and under emergency laws. There are many articles in the constitution which need amending in order to stimulate the reform process. The imbalance of power between the executive and the legislative branches stops the development of a system of checks and balances. It also leads to more and more centralization power in executive hands and undermines the prospects for a transition to genuine democracy. Tawfik has argued that the imbalance between the executive and the legislative is enshrined in the constitution which must be amended to achieve any real balance of power (Tawfik, 2008).

The solution to this fundamental problem will happen when political reforms take place such as when power is properly distributed to the people, the political parties, the civil society, the constitution, and the judicial branch.

The spread of corruption and lack of transparency, along with the violations of human rights and extreme authoritarianism in Egypt, jeopardizes the security in the regime and the state. When people feel that they are unable to meet their needs and are oppressed whenever they call for their rights, there is a threat to their human security. It is the 'fear' element in the equation of human security which leads to this threat. 'Freedom from fear' in the political dimension of human security has not been achieved in Egypt and puts the human security of the Egyptians in peril.

This leads to various repercussions to this. First, people feel that they are ruled by an illegitimate government. This in turn leads them to rise up massively and revolt against the regime seeking to overthrow it, which started with 25th of January Youth Revolution and is continuing even now. Second, the fear factor breeds discontent, even terrorism, within the country and rise of radicals and fanatic ideas. The rise of fanaticism and radicalism in turn threatens the security of the state. When radicalism breeds further repressions occur by the state. Aladdin Elaasar described the situation post Mubrak's regime as, "instability in Egypt after Mubarak may become an international security concern. There is no clear chain of command or civil society base to facilitate the transfer of power to the next president" (Elaasar, 2009). This vicious circle further undermines legitimacy which in turn can lead to a state with so little popular support internally that becomes vulnerable to coups, to violent revolutions, to foreign invasion, and to loss of sovereignty.

CHAPTER 3

THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the second case study for this thesis. The interest in such a state although did not come from the researcher own interest but it was proposed by her committee, something now appreciated as this conservative state is experiencing turmoil in the Arab uprisings of 2011. The question that is raised in this thesis is whether or there is a relationship between human security and the national security of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is a state where almost everything revolves around just one big extended kinship group, the Saud family. It has a monarchical system. Certain groups have called for a constitutional monarchy but this has been resisted by both the ruling family and the ulama, religious scholars, who prefer the status quo. Most see democracy in Saudi Arabia as distant goal that will probably never be achieved.

Although the Saudi people are not as politically active as the Egyptians, there have been some wake-up events in its history involving widely supported calls for political change in the Saudi system. Saudi Arabia has been able to maintain the same political status quo through the present day unlike in Egypt. The possibilities and chances for change in Saudi Arabia are very difficult because of the enormous control that religious groups have, together with the ruling family, over the Saudi society. In Egypt there are groups across the whole political spectrum seeking to move society to the right, to the left, or to the center. The Egyptian people are more centrist and moderate in their political views as compared to the Saudi people who are inclined towards the right-wing extremist wing views due again to the control of religious groups and with the Saud family. This royal-religious alliance in Saudi Arabia could be described as an ‘ancien-regime’ analogous to the French system prior to the French Revolution.

Calls for change within the Saudi society have come from two sources. The first is domestic pressure coming from the ‘Sahwa’ (awakening) movement as well as other internal pressure groups. The second is the international pressure, specifically from the United States after 9/11. It is worth highlighting that these calls are associated with the rise and fall of world oil prices. The Saudi system is one based on the distribution of oil revenues to the people in order to “buy” their acquiescence. When those revenues go down, dissatisfaction and rebelliousness emerge. The petro-dollar money influences the state-society relationship and is an indicator for the behavior of the society.

A. Problems Facing Saudi Society

A.1. Corruption

The Saudi Corruption rate is 4.7 on the Transparency International index. Corruption is seen as primarily coming from the ruling family, not from the citizens as a whole. Thus, the Saudi type of corruption could be considered as highly Grand corruption with very low petty one. The royal family members hold many of the key positions within the Saudi government. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Saudi Arabia is difficult because of the expectation of corruption associated with such investments. “Corruption is a significant problem, foreign companies reporting that they often pay bribes to middlemen and government officials to secure business deals” (Freedom House, 2010).

The Saudi bureaucracy is less corrupt than the one in Egypt as a result of the welfare system in Saudi Arabia. Still the bureaucracy is not very transparent and is undoubtedly corrupt to a degree. “Bribery occurs, in Saudi Arabia, but with the potential exception of the labor bureaucracy and the security sector is less widespread than in poorer Arab countries such as Syria and Egypt”(Freedom House, 2010). Studies show that the main corrupt figures are the heads of government units who are also members in the royal family. “There were reports of government corruption during the year, and the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance indicators

reflected that corruption was a problem. There was widespread public perception of corruption on part of some members of the royal family and the executive branch of the government” (U.S. Department of State, 2010).

Corruption acts are illegal and punishable as crimes. There is reluctance from the Saudi government to enforce those laws as the royal family is expected to be beyond investigation or any penalty. Dr. Stephane Lacroix, a Saudi specialist and a political science instructor at University of Paris, when asked about the Saudi corruption said “People in Saudi Arabia are not as easily bribed and corrupted as in other Arab states. Transparency is very low because the family business is, at the same time, government business so they do not open it up in the media or in public. Yet in 2009 the media in its coverage of an incident as ‘Jeddah flood’ uncovered corruption through in the use of poor building materials and poor engineering design. The collapse of the building resulted in King Abdullah’s initiative to fight corruption and to denounce it in public.” This is only one incident to cite, but there are many others which establish that Saudi corruption is mostly the product of the Al Saud family.

The ‘Al Yamamah’ arms deal scandal under the supervision of Prince Bandar bin Sultan is yet another major incident, one that jeopardized British-Saudi relations and ended up with the British shutting down their investigations so as not to lose their ally, Saudi Arabia. Prince Bandar sees no harm in corruption in the Saudi system as long as the Saudi people are satisfied and do not complaint and get their basic needs. “If you tell me that, in building this whole country out of 400 billion dollars, we misused or got 50 billion dollars, I’ll tell you so what?” wrote David Leigh and Rob Evans quoting Prince Bandar in “Secrets of Al Yamamah”. This shows that a prominent member of the royal family takes the issue of corruption lightly; arguing that as long as the ruling family is well providing the people then state corruption is really a secondary issue.

Corruption in Saudi Arabia is salient in different sectors such as health, business, education and government. An economist Mohamed Al Qahtani was quoted in the *Khaleej Times* as saying “the decline in governmental services, especially in health and education sectors as well as the

spread of poverty show that public money was not spent in proper manner, administrative corruption was taking place secretly” (April 6, 2007). This aspect of corruption is contrary to what someone like Prince Bandar might think. Saudis are not satisfied with the corruption in their system as it results in abuse of power as well as it acts as an obstacle to achieving their rights and fulfilling their needs. Dr. Yasmine Farouk, a political scientist and Saudi & Syrian specialist at Cairo University, said about corruption “the amount of bribes is higher in Saudi Arabia than in Egypt. Corruption exists because there’s no accountability, oil revenues are highly transferred to Royal family. They follow the concept of ‘no taxation, no questioning for the government’. Reinter states are more prone to fall into corruption as there is no accountability and Saudi Arabia is no exception.” Information on Saudi corruption is off course very limited as little is released to the public. Among other things, this creates limits for this study.

Corruption results from lack of public supervision over government activities. There is no real body representing the people such as a parliament so the government is not questioned by any legislative body. The judicial branch is seen as acting unilaterally when it comes to decisions that are related to “hedood” but if these decisions were just “taaziz” (recommendations) they are open to royal family interference, even to the point of overruling decisions, as explained by Dr. Lacroix. This implies that the judicial branch is corrupted must bow to the king’s interests in certain cases. The judicial branch does not have any power over the other two branches of government, which produces a situation more open to corruption than not. It should be mentioned that patron-client relations and favoritism are also found in the Saudi system, especially when one of the many princes is involved. This process favors Sunnis over Shia’s when it comes to getting higher job posts in the government, adding to the discrimination which minorities feel in Saudi society.

A.2.Saudi Efforts to Fight Corruption

The Saudi government has, on the other hand, tried to find methods to fight corruption. This was clear when King Abdullah himself promised the public that he would fight corruption after the

collapse of a Saudi building in 2009 which killed many of its inhabitants. Saudi Arabia, along with other Arab states, has joined the Arab Region Parliaments against Corruption (ARPAC) agreement. This organization fights corruption under the umbrella of the UNDP initiative on fighting corruption and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) that was adopted in 2003. Saudi Arabia has signed but not yet ratified the UNCAC. Saudi Arabia joined many projects and workshops organized by ARPAC seeking to enhance its skills in fighting corruption. In 2007 the Saudi Council of Ministers established the National Authority for Combating Corruption as a government body to act as a watchdog, investigate cases, and issue penalties for proven cases. The ulama, intellectuals, and reformers applauded this development, seeing it as a step towards reforming the Saudi system. This initiative has increased the standing of the King and the Council of Ministers on the corruption issue. It adds to their legitimacy and credibility in Saudi eyes, showing to some reformers that the ruling government is receptive to their demands.

Many observers, however, still see Saudi anti-corruption efforts as weak. “Enforcement of anti-corruption rules is limited and occurs mostly behind closed doors. The occasional newspapers reporting on corruption trials convey the impression of a haphazard process. There is a Corruption Investigation Department at the Ministry of Interior which examines corruption cases within the administration. Malfeasance is also investigated by the government’s Investigation and Control Board. These bodies are not accountable to the public.” (Freedom House, 2010). The Saudi public does not trust their government’s ability to control corruption. They see the efforts as targeting lower levels of corruption but not addressing the heart of the matter; the corruption within the royal family. People believe that, to set a good example for the nation, the Saud family should impose heavy penalties on the members of its family if they are proven to have been involved in corruption cases. Anti-corruption laws should be imposed on the Saudi princes to change their image as being above the law. This would help them gain more credibility and legitimacy in the public’s eyes.

The Saudis need to open up their system and make it more transparent. Where there are public issues that should be publicly discussed, for example the national budget, the revenues and expenses should be available openly and Saudi citizens should be able to learn about them and question them. “The laws do not provide for public access to government information, including precision in sources of state revenue and expenditure such as ministerial budgets or allocations to royal family” (US Department of State, 2010). This would create a more transparent atmosphere and help the public to regain their trust in their government. It would also create an image internationally that the Saudi system is credible and above board. At a minimum, this would help draw in more FDI to the country, boosting other parts of its economy alongside its oil sector.

B. Authoritarianism

Saudi Arabia is the seventh most authoritarian state on Democracy Index for states made by the *Economist* (2010). The power is concentrated in the hands of the royal family rather than in the hands of the king. Dr. Lacroix says “The king is not very strong and the system is not absolutist monarchy. The royal family is stronger and limits the power of the King.” The Allegation Council made up of the sons and grandsons of Al Saud gather and choose a king and his deputies. This shows the power of the family, a feature of this system inherited from their earlier tribal traditions. “The king himself is constrained in his decision-making by powerful brothers, rendering the kingdom in practice an oligarchic rather than an absolutist system” (Freedom House, 2010). The Saudi system, despite its authoritarianism, has managed to stay in power for a long period and has been able to gain legitimacy from the public founded on the alliance between religious groups in the society and the royal family. It is the alliance between the Al Saud with Mohamed Bin Abd El Wahab who created the Wahabi ideology which has made the ruling family legitimate in the public’s eyes. This gives the sense that there is power-sharing between the Saud family and the Wahabis. “The alliance between Wahab and Saud was based on principle of power sharing and princes have red lines not to cross concerning religion. So politics

is left to princes but religion is for Wahabis”, said Dr. Lacroix. One could describe the relationship between the King, Al-Saud family, and the Wahabist ulama as three pillars of a stool. It creates a set of relationships that look like the ‘ancien-regime’ of France prior to the French Revolution, with the differences that the French were more feudalistic while the Saudis are more capitalistic.

B.1. Emergency Laws

Dr. Lacroix states that “Saudi Arabia’s system is more stable than other Arab systems and feels ‘safe’ from within.” Saudi royal family sees this as justifying their reluctance to impose an emergency law on the country as a whole. Although Saudi Arabia has been subject to Bin Laden-inspired terrorist attacks after 9/11, the Saudi government did not resort to emergency laws as other governments, including Egypt, have. Dr. Lacroix describes the Saudi system as being not a ‘police state’ like in other Arab countries such as Iraq or Syria. This can be explained as a matter of “trust” that has developed between the people and the security system of the state. The Saudi government trusts its citizens and confident enough in its security system that there is no need to impose an emergency law on Saudi citizens. Dr. Lacroix further explains that the Saudi community still today draws upon the tribal behavior code which exists in the context of most families knowing each other and being related in one way or another to the royal family. This means that most of the heads of families know each other and know many of the princes, thus reinforcing a sense of mutual security. Dr. Farouk has further elaborated that “the Saudi society has a “rule of order” rather than “rule of law”. There is no written legal document to refer to in cases of crime nor is there a criminal code. Such matters are left to judges and their interpretation of the Shari’a. Affairs of everyday life are dealt with through ‘customs’. The religious police and the other police forces are prominent in the streets, leading to low crime rates and decreased chances for crimes to arise.”

B.2.Lack of Democracy and Openness

The Saudi system is an authoritarian regime which lacks most of the features of a democracy. There is no circulation of power, no freedom of expression, and no religious freedoms in their system. Neither political parties nor elections are allowed by the state. To think of forming a political party is to cross a 'red line' that was drawn when the foundation of the kingdom occurred. The logic behind having no political parties in Saudi Arabia is linked to the philosophy of Wahabism. Wahabism believes in the 'rule of God' and that there should be no party except the 'party of God' to ensure God's oneness. "Parties lead to 'fetna' (sedition) and there should be no other party except the party of God", said Dr. Lacroix. It is true, however, that there is a very small party called the Green Party, but its voice is suppressed and it is not heard or supported by many Saudis. The Saudi government tolerates it and sees no danger coming from it.

The calls for reforms in the Saudi system started as early as the 1990s. They originated with a group of ulama who were against the American or western presence on Saudi soil that occurred during and after the Gulf War. But soon these ulama retreated back to the side of the ruling family, seeing that the Western troop presence was a legitimate way of providing security for the kingdom against Shi'i threats coming from Iran and Iraqi threats. The other group of reformers who continued through and after the 1990s were known as; the "liberal Islamist reformers." They wanted reforms in civil society and an empowering of citizens. They called for a constitutional monarchy and to the protection of human rights in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Lacroix said that "These were a group of intellectuals; they were both from the opposition and independent from any affiliations." These Saudi opposition groups were represented in the communists, liberals, and shi'a activists. The liberal Islamist reformers allied themselves with this opposition and pressured the government to establish a "Shura" (Consolatory) system and a constitutional monarchy.

The opposition in Saudi Arabia is, however, fragile and even weaker than the opposition in Egypt. One reason for this is that people cannot form a political party. The opposition in Saudi Arabia can only form a 'movement' or get the official status of an 'association'. Many of these movements and associations in the kingdom lack enough public support for them to be effective in presenting alternative policies as well as out of the people's fear that the security police would jail them. Opposition groups are generally passive politically, hampered by their fear of the government and the religious authorities. Lacroix explains that "The only way to get politicized in Saudi Arabia is through joining the 'Awakening Movement.' It calls for continuous social and educational reforms in Saudi domestic affairs and Palestinian liberation in foreign affairs. The average Saudis are either politicized in this way or they do not bother about politics as their basic needs are being met by the government. It is the intellectuals who are more concerned with genuine political, social, and educational reforms in the system and they form a small portion of the Saudi society."

'Political culture' is another reason that the average Saudi citizen is passive politically. Like the rest of the countries in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia suffers from a 'parochial' political culture which means lack of interest and trust in the state's system. Saudis instead of affiliating themselves to the state they would rather affiliate themselves to their tribes. Dr. Lacroix explains that "Many Saudis see as long as there's enough money to employ people and create jobs, and as long as they do not have to pay electricity bills, then they live in a welfare state" which takes care of them. Dr. Farouk further clarifies that in "Saudi society the local identity is dominant and most of people see themselves in terms of their tribal identity rather than in terms of their citizenship under the state. What really links the Saudi society together are the common Islamic and Bedouin values rather than the state."

The year 2004 was the year of arrests of Saudi reformers marking the suppression of reform efforts in the kingdom. This shows how repressive and authoritarian the regime really is. This episode has created a sense of fear among average Saudis, making them shy away from reform

movements for fear of losing the benefits and privileges they get from the government. This situation violates the basic definition of human security as essentially a freedom from fear. In the Saudi case, they fear mistreatment by the government either by imprisonment, or tortured in prison or by losing access to their basic needs. They fear becoming a hostage to wants instead being free from want.

The authoritarian features of the Saudi system are further seen in the lack of supervision or control of any of the three branches of government over the other. The Freedom House report says “the judiciary is not involved in any direct supervision of administrative action” (Freedom House 2010). This makes clear that there is no countervailing power in the judicial branch as it relates to the executive branch. There is also no supervision on the Consultative Council (Majlis Al Shura) over the cabinet. Both the cabinet and the Majlis are made up of essentially the Al Saud family, explaining why no need to see or to one check the other. Such a situation, logically, leaves the door open to corruption. Freedom House again states “The Majlis can question ministers, but it has no means to dismiss them or to access ministerial accounts” (Freedom House, 2010). The Majlis is weak in comparison to the cabinet. Hence, there are really no checks and balances within the Saudi system to ensure supervision or diminish chances for corruption.

As for the municipal elections it was held only once for the first time in 2005 and many intellectuals and liberals thought of its results as not representing them or the Saudi average citizens’ demands. The intellectuals even went further to call for a boycott for the upcoming Municipal elections held in September 2011 as they think, “it lacks the authority to effectively carry out their role and half of their members are appointed” (AFP, May 2011).

Saudi society suffers from weak civil society in spite of the calls by some reformers to establish a political system concerned with civil liberties and rights. “The weakness of the Saudi civil society is caused not only by a restrictive licensing regime, but also by the weakness of bottom-up pressures from the society itself. Freedom House writes “civil society traditions in the kingdom are weak and society remains organized by kinship or on other informal bases”

(Freedom House, 2010). Dr. Farouk adds that “civil society connecting society to the state is absent in the Saudi system, so the concept of political and civil rights is absent as well.”

B.3.Saudi Government’s Efforts to Reform its System

The external and internal pressures for reform have pushed the Saudi government to carry out some reforms. These reform actions have not been substantial and should be counted only as small gradual steps forward.

In 2005 Saudi Arabia held its first popular municipal elections. A group of liberal intellectual reformers had pressed continuously for this with some success. The US after 9/11 had done so as well. The US is a major ally of the kingdom yet their relationship had been severely damaged as a result of 9/11 attacks as 15 out of the 19 attackers were Saudi nationals. This made the US administration and the American public began to look at Saudi Arabia differently and led them to call for internal reforms. “The Al Saud family should realize that to convince US opinion formers of their worthiness as an ally they must take radical action at home” wrote Roula Khalaf in her article “Saudi Arabia Needs Genuine Reform” in the *Financial Times* (Khalaf, 2004).

The reforms undertaken were the municipal elections of 2005, although women were not allowed to run for office or to vote. Still the opposition saw it as a step forward. The elections were carried out in the thirteen regions of the peninsula in three phases. Only 150,000 showed up to vote according to the *BBC* on “Q&A on Saudi Municipal Elections in 2005” published on February 9th, 2005.

Other reforms led to both ousting and appointing new figures in key positions in the government. In an article published in the *New York Times* under the title “A Promise of Reform in Saudi

Arabia” on February, 25th 2009, many people were satisfied that some reformers were appointed to key positions in the government and others known as hard-liners were removed from office. The major step was, however, the appointment of the first female to the position of Deputy Minister for Women’s Education. A second major change was the opening of the first co-educational university in the history of Saudi Arabia, the University of King Abdullah for Science and Technology, in 2009. This has allowed the education of both females and males on the same campus. These moves helped integrate women into the social life of Saudi Arabia. They were also seen as real progress in reforming Saudi society and making the conservatism of the kingdom less rigid.

C. Human Rights Violations

The Saudi record on human rights is very poor. Part of the reason for this is that many issues are not open and international investigations are often not allowed in the kingdom. There are political prisoners in Saudi Arabia who are seen as anti-regime as their ideas are seen to jeopardize the stability of the Saudi system. Thus, it is difficult to know that exact number of political detainees and prisoners in the kingdom. The US Human Rights Report of 2009 estimated that there were about 3,000 prisoners with terrorist affiliations (2010). “The government asserted that secret detentions were in conjunction with its efforts to combat terrorism. International NGOs and Amnesty International in particular, criticized the government for abusing its anti-terrorism prerogative to arrest some members of the political opposition” (US Department of State, 2010). Also, recently the Saudi government has declared there are a number of suspects under investigations due to their affiliations to al Qaeda. “The government has arrested scores of people for alleged involvement in Al Qaeda attacks or plots inside Saudi Arabia, especially between 2003 and 2006” (France24 International News, 2011). Furthermore, there are several disappearance cases in which the Saudi government claims detention due to terrorist affiliations while various NGOs claim that the individuals in question come from the

opposition. The massive arrests waves in the Kingdom are not only directed towards suspects to Al Qaeda, they are many more who are viewed as suspects because of their political views as liberals or because of their religious believes as being Shia. The year 2004 was when many arrests of people in the reform movement occurred. This action drove some of reformers either to flee outside the country, especially to London, or to realign themselves with the government to avoid imprisonment. Those who were put in prison were subject to torture and physical abuse. According to Human Rights Watch report issued recently mentioned, “that Saudi Arabian police had arrested over 160 activists since February 2011”(Al Sharif & Hares, 2011). This has occurred after the small protests that are on going in the Kingdom since February 2011 following the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings. This caused many Saudis to fear joining the reform movement for fear of being detained or tortured if imprisoned. Thus, off course, is a violation of the element of freedom from fear from the perspective of human security.

C.1.Efforts to Improve the Saudi Image on Human Rights

The Saudi government established the Commission on Human Rights that reports cases of torture and abuse in Saudi prisons. According to the first article of the Statute of the Human Rights Commission (HRC); “the commission shall be the government competent body to submit views and counseling on human rights issues” (Al Duraiby, 2009:219). This commission, however, has not gained full credibility with Saudi intellectuals who still prefer working with the Saudi Civil and Political Rights Association as well as other NGOs over it as it is seen as a government body which would still be biased and lack transparency.

Conclusion

Saudi Arabia is an extreme example of an authoritarian, monarchical system. Corruption is widespread in its ruling family which has damaged the public interest and led to abuses of

power. There are no checks and balances in the system. There is power sharing between the ulama and the royal family, which has produced a closed system which lacks transparency. The system needs more openness and more involvement by the people in their own governance. A greater role needs to be given to civil society which would help in educating the public about their rights and privileges. More power should be given to the Majlis Al Shura, for example by allowing it to dismiss corrupt ministers and to oust them from power. The members of governmental bodies acting as watchdogs in fighting corruption should be chosen from the people, not from the ruling family, in order to give such bodies more legitimacy. The role of the intellectuals and the reformers as well as the Awakening Movement should be restored. It is true that the government established the National Dialogue Initiative in 2007, but this initiative needs to prove its efficacy by putting talk into practice. These changes would make the Saudi public feel empowered rather than repressed.

The Saudi government deals with its people on the basis that they are followers, not partners, in the state-society relationship. In order to compensate for the severe oppression and the many violations of the rights of the people, the government bribes them with the welfare system to keep them quiet. Many, however, are dissatisfied with such practices as they understand that such arrangements are violations of basic human rights and do not fulfill people's basic needs.

The political dimension of human security in Saudi Arabia, from personal safety to freedom from want and fear, are in peril in the kingdom due to the oppressions carried out by the government, principally Saud family. The extreme authoritarian attitude of the Saudi government threatens the human security of the Saudi people. It threatens their personal safety through such policies as "disappearances" and torture in detentions. "Most of the authoritarian regimes are short-sighted and look under their feet instead of planning ahead which explains their neglect for human security" states Dr. Lacroix in explaining Saudi behavior towards human security. Eventually, as the violations for human security continue and mount up, the contradiction between the Saudi national security and Saudi human security will cause a

breakdown politically. Human security suffering cannot build up and up forever. No one knows when that will happen but it seems a near certainty when the oil revenues are gone and the Saudi government is not being able to “bribe” its society anymore. This will lead to a people’s rebellion against the government and jeopardize the national security of the state. Attempts have already been made by terrorists. Such episodes will probably continue as long as oppression remains.

The next chapter will compare the Egyptian and the Saudi cases and seek to establish which state is the greater violator of human security. It will elaborate further the relationship between the national security and human security.

CHAPTER 4

COMPARING EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA

This chapter compares between the two case studies used in this thesis. Both systems might seem different on the surface due to the nature of the ruling system; a more in-depth look will show there are also many similarities between them. The comparison will include the major similarities and differences in the two political systems. It will also discuss the impact of the two political systems on human security and evaluate how both states deal with human security, especially its political dimension. One common feature of both systems is an intentional neglect of the concept of human security as many describe it. The two regimes see human security as something to be dealt with later or as part of their developmental agenda even though there is significant difference between the concepts of human security and of development.

A. Corruption

In the previous chapters, a definition of corruption was given and forms of corruption were illustrated by examples from each case study. Kate Gillespie and Gwenn Okruhlik wrote in their article that one of the reasons for the occurrence of corruption is the transition from a colonial period to independence (1991:77-95). Such transition involves introducing new institutions and new skills that people are not used to do. They sometimes become unable to adapt to change and become corrupt. This particular explanation applies well to the case of Egypt but would not fit the case of Saudi Arabia, the only state in the Middle East region which was never formally colonized. However, it could be argued that due to the continuous pressures for change in the

Saudi system, whether from domestic or international pressures have culminated in creating new unfamiliar institutions which led to corruption.

The authors also mentioned another reason for the rise of corruption in certain societies which is “the expansion of government authority and regulations multiplies the opportunities for corruption” (Gillespie and Okruhlik, 1991:78). The rising amount of bureaucracy and the ever-expanding number of government employees with low salaries could also lead to corruption. This explanation applies well to both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This has been the case in Egypt after the 1952 revolution which a large bureaucratic sector that increased over time as a result of the rising number of university graduates, poor economic performance and high unemployment rates. These factors pressured the Egyptian government to expand its governmental sector and to hire large number of employees with low salaries, many of whom eventually had become corrupt.

Gillespie and Okruhlik mentioned another reason for corruption which is that “corruption is prevalent in those modernizing societies which lack effective political parties as corruption varies inversely with political organization”(Gillespie and Okruhlik,1991:78). This explanation applies across the Arab region and in both case studies in this thesis. The Saudi political system prohibits political parties, even forbidding talking about them. Egyptians, on the other hand, were promised a multi-party system by President Sadat, a promise which was never implemented, except formally, either by him or by President Mubarak. Even though Egypt currently has more than 20 legal parties, it is under the control of one party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which puts Egypt in the category of countries with a single dominant party. The other legal parties in the Egyptian political system are very weak and are mostly dependent on one character; their leader, who if he leaves the party or dies the party falls after him, thus putting them into the devotee party category.

Arab societies are therefore run by autocratic regimes which are interested in power, thus increasing the likelihood of corruption levels in both the government and the private sectors. It is the mix of money and politics which leads to much more widespread corruption in these states. Egypt ranks 98th on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Saudi Arabia 50th, although they have made some improvements in the past two years since they were scored. As previously mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, corruption in Egyptian society is found at all levels of society while in the Saudi system it is heavily concentrated in the royal family, explaining why Saudi Arabia's place on the index is far better than Egypt's.

The main difference between the Saudi and the Egyptian case is that in Egypt the rich want to get richer so they use corrupt means whether they have their own businesses or are affiliated with key figures in the government. As for the poor, they want to improve their living conditions arising from Egypt's low economic performance and that drives them to corruption. In Saudi Arabia, the king and the royal family are accused of being corrupt as they have total control over the oil revenues and do not equally distribute them among the people. This in turn drives the Saud family to "bribe" the people with services which would be endangered if they questioned the exact amounts of government revenue and how it is being distributed. This further explains the lower level of corruption in Saudi Arabia in comparison to Egypt on the Corruption perception index scale.

Another reason that corruption in Egyptian society is more widespread than in Saudi society is the size of the population. In Egypt population is around 80 million while Saudi population is about 28 million. This puts much more pressures on the Egyptian economy as it seeks to provide services to a society that is 2.9 times larger. A greater volume of corruption on all different levels is inevitable.

Moreover, corruption in Egypt could be described as serving the interest of the authoritarian regime as it has helped it to stay in power for almost 30 years but had later a reverse impact leading to the collapse of this same regime in 2011. This positive yet temporary impact of

corruption is known as the “positive theory of corruption” which Samuel Huntington has mentioned referring to the communist regimes in late 1960s. “Samuel Huntington along with others such as Nathaniel Leff once argued that by improving both economic efficiency and human rights record of repressive and flexible dictatorships ; public sector corruption could help to maintain an autocratic regime: corruption may thus be functional to the maintenance of a political system in the same way reform is”(Miller, Grodeland and Koshechkina,2001: 9) .

The Egyptian government is, nonetheless, viewed as being receptive to the domestic calls for openness and reform on accountability and in fighting corruption. As a result of international pressures, Egypt has started implementing programs to fight corruption in cooperation with European and American governments. It has founded many ‘watchdogs’ committees and administrative units to address the problems of corruption. This explains the improvement in its corruption index ranking in previous two years from 115th in 2008 to 111 in 2009 and 98th in 2010 (CPI 2010, Transparency International).

Saudi Arabia has been subject to both international and domestic pressures for reforms and fighting corruption, forcing the king to take these problems seriously and to move forward with anti-corruption measures. The first step the Saudi government took to prove its sincerity in fighting corruption was made by signing the UN Convention against Corruption in 2004. Until today the Saudi government has not ratified this treaty and thus it is not put into action. By this step, the Saudis are following the footsteps of the Egyptian government to address lower levels of corruption in their society in response to the various pressures upon it.

B. Autocracy and Authoritarian Rule

Both states are typical examples of authoritarian rule. They may seem quite different on the surface as one is a monarchy and the other is a republic. Yet the republic of Egypt with its long ruling period under the same leaders has not differed much from Saudi Arabia.

Egypt is more open than Saudi Arabia though this arises in only certain matters deriving from the history and culture of Egyptian society. Egyptians in general have more civil liberties and more freedom of expression than Saudis. These differences arise because the Saudi system is more conservative than the Egyptian one, in part as a result of being the land of Holy Mecca. Also, the role of religious leaders, the ulama, is more influential in Saudi society than their counterparts in Egypt. In Egypt, religious rulers are seen as followers of the regime, issuing 'fatwas' (religious edicts) that essentially suit the interest of the ruler. The Saudi system is also more closed due to the influence of tribal behavior on its customs and traditions. Egypt, on the other hand, seems very religious but is described by many observers as moderate by comparison with the Saudis.

Egypt has experienced colonization which brought ideas of openness and freedom that eventually became accepted by the people and even their rulers. Saudi Arabia has not had this kind of experience as it was never officially colonized. Egyptian society is more mixed and diverse as it has had different ethnic groups internally such as Nubians, lower Egyptians, upper Egyptians, and Bedouins all as part of one body politic. This has helped in the openness of the society with the acceptance of the 'other' and a somewhat freer internal atmosphere for its people.

Both states are nevertheless authoritarian in nature. First, they lack a system of circulation of power. Rulers do not change until their death, which then brings another ruler with more authority. Neither state allows any role for opposition movements. Only in Egypt can opposition voices sometimes be heard - when the regime wants to allow it - but most of the time they are kept quiet. In the Saudi case, the opposition is condemned and even seen as anti-

religious. Both systems lack competitive political parties that present alternative policies and people to incumbent regime. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia deal aggressively with opponents of the regime. Opposition members in Egypt are subject to detention and torture without right of trial, which is a violation for their human rights. Opposition in both countries has become weaker and quieter over recent times. *The Economist* magazine in its article “Arab Autocracy: Thank You and Goodbye” described the status of the opposition as follows: “decades of repression have ensured that the opposition is quiescent in Egypt and virtually inaudible in Saudi Arabia” (July, 2010).

Both states impose close supervision over their people. In Egypt the long-lasting Emergency Law imposed since 1981 has been restricting people’s movement and gatherings in the street. Although unconstitutional in Egypt, it is systematically imposed in order to contain “terrorism and drugs.” It has proven a failure in practice as the real reason behind it as many observers and analysts think is to contain opposition and restrict them from voicing their views in the streets. This especially applies to the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. Saudi Arabia does not have an emergency law, but the police are nevertheless everywhere publicly, specifically the “religious police” who watch over people’s dress and their conformity with religious regulations and traditions. This police force is seen as a watchdog for the Ministry of the Interior in order to decrease the voices of opposition in the Saudi street. Egypt is also a police state though not to the same extent as Saudi Arabia. Fouad Ajami in one of his article described the Egyptian political system as follows: “the security apparatus had ‘effectively’ closed up the Egyptian political world” (Ajami, 2010). This shows the degree of authoritarianism in Egypt. Political life in Egypt under such a regime has effectively reached a dead end.

The Saudi and Egyptian systems have many similarities. Their similarities do not arise from geographical location or having the Arab language in common or from similar histories in building a state. Their similarity is being autocratic; both their peoples see them as monarchies. Since the Egyptian president has sought to put his son forward as his successor, as happens in

monarchical succession. Fouad Ajami says “the line between monarchies and republics was thus erased” (Ajami, 2010). Raymond Hiennbush has described the state that has a president the son of a previous president as a “Presidential Monarchy” (Hiennbush, 2002).

C. Human Rights Violations

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are viewed as performing very poorly when it comes to human rights. Saudi Arabia is a closed system and human rights investigators often cannot get the information to describe cases clearly. One obvious example would be the case of political prisoners. There are a large number of political detainees in Saudi prisons. The Saudi government claims that these prisoners embrace ideas that threaten the stability of the political system. A justification for this comes from the two phases of dissent in the Saudi state. One takes the form of violence represented by terrorists, with Osama Bin Laden being on top of the list. The second phase was with the reformers, intellectuals, and minorities in Saudi society. This second group, although seen as non-violent, are seen to pose a major threat because they have well-reasoned arguments which are influential with educated Saudis. The government carried out massive arrests with this group and many were imprisoned and tortured without trial.

The situation of political detainees in Egypt is similar to the Saudi case on one point. Both authoritarian regimes take action against any ideas or acts that oppose the regime and might threaten the stability of their system. There are, however, differences between them. First, the number of detainees in Egyptian prisons is more openly known than is case with Saudi Arabia as the Egyptian system is, in part more open. Second, the number of opponents in Egypt is larger than in the Saudi case as there are many different sources of opposition in Egypt such as different parties, workers, journalists, intellectuals, or academics. The Egyptian government damages the opposition’s image publicly by making non-political charges against them that are false. An illustrative example was given by Ajami saying, “Mubarak’s regime made a lesson of one of Egypt’s most celebrated academics the sociologist Saad El Din Ibrahim, imprisoning him

on trumped charges of corruption” (Ajami, 2010). Any voice that sounds reasonable and logical in criticizing the regime is subject to imprisonment.

There have been periods of massive arrests for the opposition in Egypt, especially the Muslim Brothers. These always coincide with upcoming elections or following any new major decisions such as those that affect the average citizen negatively like increases in food prices, reductions in subsidies, or failure in governmental support after a natural disaster. In Saudi Arabia waves of arrest happen when oil prices decrease and the level of dissent in the country goes up. Dr. Stephane Lacroix, a political scientist at the University of Paris, said Saudi dissent is related to oil prices as this influences the revenues coming through government hands “When oil prices decrease, revenues decrease and returns on the Saudi society decrease so the level of dissent increases.” (Personal Interview, Dec 8th, 2010). Hamza Al Hassan a Saudi political activist agrees with Dr. Lacroix on this issue and further elaborated in one of his articles that, in times of prosperity people close their eyes on all of their government’s defaults and mistakes among them political rights. But, he further continued, in low productivity seasons for the oil Saudis open their eyes and think openly about the reasons for failure and think of someone to be blamed for their low status they have reached especially the youth who usually lose their future jobs. (Al Hassan, 2010). Repressions in both states reach a peak in periods of major economic and political change.

When the Saudi and Egyptian governments made efforts to improve their human rights records, they used the same mechanism. They created national organizations that report on the status of human rights in their country, publishing these reports to the public as well as to the international community. Both the national councils in Saudi Arabia and Egypt lack credibility domestically and internationally. Domestically they are viewed as the ‘cosmetics’ of governments trying to improve their image with the international world. Internationally these councils are seen as a façade which is not intended to do much. The Egyptian government, however, is seen to be more active in signing conventions on human rights so as to improve its image and to be responsive to the pressures presented by activist groups in Egypt domestically, activist groups which are growing in number every year. The establishment of the Saudi National Council for

Human Rights is seen as the outcome of the US pressures on its close ally Saudi Arabia after 9/11 seeking more openness and freedom in Saudi society. Saudi reformers are dissatisfied with this council, however, and view it skeptically.

D. The Political Dimension of Human Security

Ambassador Hisham Youssef, an Egyptian who is the Chef de Cabinet of the Arab League of the Secretary General in Cairo, said about Arab interests in human security “Arab countries are suspicious about the concept of human security. They see it as a ‘Western’ product. They also see it as ‘vague’ in its definition. Most of them see it as a part of their sustainable development agenda, but human security adds no value for development.” (Personal Interview, November 25th, 2010). When asked about the Arab performance on human security issues, he said “Arabs are not doing well although there are different degrees of failure and success in human security efforts.” The Arab world in general, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt are no exception, see human security as a newly introduced concept that is not their own national product. Since Arabs believe easily in conspiracy theories about things coming from the West, they suspect anything that comes from the West and do not easily accept or absorb it even if it would benefit them. They still see these as ‘colonial’ ideas intended to interfere in their domestic affairs.

Arab governments see that it is better for them to integrate human security into their development agenda and not to deal with it separately since some of the human security concepts are within their development agenda already. In general, Arabs do not pay enough attention to human security in general, which helps explain the violation of all of its dimensions including its political dimension. What Arab regimes fail to understand, Saudis and Egyptians included, is the fact that there is a difference between development and human security. Many average Arab citizens are suffering on a daily basis from lack of “freedom of want and freedom of fear”.

Arab governments, especially the ones in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, have to understand that their acts towards their own societies, in particular their continuous oppression, increases the sense of fear among the citizens and may well produce negative results in the long term. The negative impact is already clear in the terrorist acts and rising number of strikes in both countries. Both Egyptian and Saudi Arabian societies are uncertain about their future and their children's future due to the oppression that they see. This could easily lead them to rise up against the current regimes. As *The Economist*, stated “the uncertainties of dynastic mongering and the corruption inherent in patronage-ridden autocracies often lead to plotting at the top and frustration that could spill over into anger at the bottom” (The Economist, July 2010). This could push both countries into chaotic periods that would be difficult to get out of.

* This table illustrates the major differences and similarities between Egypt and Saudi Arabia

Table (2)

Indicators	Egypt	Saudi Arabia
<i>Corruption</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very highly corrupt ranks 98th in 2010 on the CPI. - Suffers from very high levels of both types of corruption Petty & Grand corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Better rank on the CPI 50th in 2010 on the CPI - Suffers from very high level of Grand corruption and lower on Petty corruption
<i>Transparency</i>	- Reached level of 3.1 in 2010 on Transparency International scale	Reached level of 4.7 in 2010 on Transparency International scale
<i>Authoritarianism</i>	- Extreme control over people's political and civil liberties in a presidential	- Extreme control over people's political and civil liberties in a monarchical

	<p>system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Imposes Emergency law to further expand its control over the society imposed since 1981 - Lacks openness and fairness in any of its elections - Political Parties are present but very weak, incompatible with the Dominant party and lacks public support - Civil society is present but very ineffective and curtailed by the government's control 	<p>system</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No Emergency law imposed - Elections for municipal council held only once in 2005 and it lacked openness and fairness one third of its members were chosen by people while rest were appointed by the King - No Political Parties formed - Civil society is rarely found and is very weak
Human Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Poor record on human rights and government commits many violations against political detainees in specific - Access to information on human rights is relatively 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Very poor record on human rights and government commits many violations against political detainees - Access to information on human rights is almost null

	<p>available</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Open to international investigators and World Human rights organizations - A number of human rights organizations have offices in Egypt. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Closed to national and international investigators and World Human rights organizations - No human rights organizations have offices in Saudi Arabia except the governmental National Council for Human Rights.
Human Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Neglects the concept of human security and take it as part of its development agenda - Very poor performance on Human security putting it into peril. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Considers it as an imported concept that is infidel and deals with it as part of its development agenda. - Very poor performance on Human security putting it into peril.

Conclusion

One finds similarities and differences in varying degrees between the two systems examined in this thesis. Both states are autocratic and are in need of opening up their systems to their own people and to the international world. Both need to pay full attention to reforming their political systems. Both states should see reform as a benefit not as a threat or an obstacle. The reforms should be gradual rather than quick as sudden changes of a reformist type could lead to chaos after long periods of tyranny and authoritarianism. Also, it could reverse back and return to extreme authoritarian control or even a dictatorship.

These governments should realize that they need to respect laws and implement them fairly. They need “elections though vital in the end..., the rule of law, independent courts, freer media, women’s and workers rights, a market that is not confined to the ruler’s friends, a professional civil service and education system that are not in hock to the government..., and civil society with robust institutions” (The Economist: July 2010). This would help in preserving the human security and dignity of their citizens as well as keeping future generations from having to be subject to the same types of oppression that their predecessors endured. It would also lead to the spread of peace and security as long as justice is widespread in their countries. It would also please the allies of the two big states and encourage other countries to become stronger allies of the two nations for everyone’s mutual advantage.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The dignity of a person comes from the dignity of his country. As long as the country meets the expectation of its citizens, this keeps its citizens proud of it and strongly committed to it. If a citizen feels dehumanized, however, and unable to realize his basic needs and rights, the credibility of the country and his sense of pride in it collapse. Loss of bonding with one's country can be the result of a growing gap between the ruler and the ruled and a continuing sense of injustice which it generates. Such injustice can come from human rights violations or an unequal distribution of wealth and opportunity generated by high corruption rates and lack of transparency. Lack of transparency and an inability to pursue corruption results in rising corruption rates.

Human security has gained a lot of academic and governmental attention since 1997 in certain regions of the world. The Middle East, a region suffering from human insecurity, has neglected it. Some treatments of human security have been focused on dimensions of it other than its political dimension. This thesis has been mainly concerned with exploring the impact of the political dimension of human security and its relationship to the state's national security. A direct relationship has been drawn between the political dimension of human security, the stability of a regime, and the national security of the state. The case studies used have exemplified this direct relationship.

In the case of Egypt, the relationship has been exhibited successfully. Egypt has been suffering from neglect to its human security in general and the political dimension of it specifically, leading to the collapse of the Egyptian regime in February 2011. Such a collapse may result in growing internal conflict, a greater vulnerability to terrorism and fanaticism, and possibly even

the threat of invasion by other states to rescue one party over another if a civil war erupts as a result of the domestic unrest. Thus, with the collapse of the Egyptian regime a direct relationship between human security and regime's stability has been positively proved in this case study. Moreover, a loss of the states sovereignty may occur if a newly established regime in Egypt might seem willing to breach international peace treaties with its neighbors. Thus, the national security of the state becomes threatened by neighboring countries or by great powers. Hence, the link between human security and state's security becomes stronger.

In the other case study; Saudi Arabia, the government has successfully kept itself from collapsing so far unlike the Egyptian regime. That does not mean, however, that human security in Saudi society is on a sound footing. The Saudi government will probably experience the same situation as Egypt because its people cannot be bribed and repressed indefinitely. The shock waves of peoples' discontent, their willingness to rise up and challenge repression, is moving through the Arab world from one state to another at this time. Calls for ending authoritarian regimes started in Tunisia, flowed on to Egypt, then on to Libya, then Yemen and Bahrain, then Oman and Saudi Arabia, and now Syria. The collapse of Arab regimes depends now on the remaining strength of regimes versus staying power of the people challenging them. The level of corruption and the transparency of the society will play a role in these contests of power from one state to the next.

The Saudi regime has learnt from the experiences of other Arab states which explain their survival so far. The Saudi king has adjusted some of his policies, increased salaries, and invited all contending groups to join him in a national dialogue. The traditional state-society relationship in Saudi case relies on "bribing" Saudis to be quiescent, but that is now currently in flux. The "bribery" of the past may not be so effective given that the whole region is rising up showing greater concern with freedom from fear than freedom from want in an already wealthy society. The threat to the Saudi regime would come from the increasing pressure of the dissent groups. The radical voices in the Kingdom might become more influential over other pressuring

groups leading the Saud family to become an extreme Islamic autocratic regime. This would dissatisfy the Saudi Western allies, the US in specific. The US would see its interests threatened and could drive it to invade the Kingdom to protect those interests as well as to overthrow the radical groups in Saudi Arabia. Hence, the sovereignty of the Saudi state would be lost and therefore, the link between human security and national security of the state would be proved.

The Direction Arab States Should Take Now

Reforming the political system of Arab states becomes very essential. A liberal democratic system should be adopted in the Arab world. More openness and transparency should be implemented in order to decrease corruption rates and to ensure greater equality, fairness, and better standards of living. Arab governments should abandon the culture of favoritism and trust; instead they should choose people for societal positions based on merit. Merit should everywhere be encouraged as a shield against corruption. There is a need for political reforms which is represented in more supervisory bodies to check abuses of power in government and private institutions, bodies with the ability to take strong measures against corruption and the violators who perpetrate it.

Governments should be based on separation of power rather than fusion of power as this reduces chances of power abuse. There ought to be checks and balances between the three branches of the country in order to ensure transparency. The judicial branch in a checks and balances system would have the standing and the power to regain the trust of the people. In the Arab world, the judicial branch is the last resort in settling disputes, but it is rarely resorted to in cases of corruption and fraud. In the liberal democratic system of governance, rule of law and independence of the judiciary should not be the last resort but instead should be the basis. That would help people regain trust and confidence in the way the judiciary works.

Building upon that, well written comprehensive constitutions should be well established in the Arab states. There is a need for a culture that trusts and closely follows the constitution from both sides the citizens and the rulers. This would also lead to respect for rules and laws adopted in any Arab country.

The executive branch of government should be open to questioning and oversight by the parliament at any time. Government reports on the annual performance of government units should be published in the media in order to create more transparency and to help give people a voice.

There should be a culture of resignation among ministers in the cabinet. This is a phenomenon rarely seen in any of the Arab governments. This should change as it shows honesty of the ministers and allows a change of leaders when individuals prove ineffective, pursue bad policies, or lose the confidence of the electorate.

Emergency laws everywhere should be rescinded and strict limits on the authority of the police need to be enforced everywhere in the Arab world. The Arab government's mentality that the police state is better as it gives more trust to the regime should be reconsidered or even abolished. This would lead to greater trust between governments and the people whom they govern. Such trust would be furthered if the people feel that their rights and privileges are respected and they are treated with dignity by all government officials, especially the police.

There ought to be more free elections held in Arab countries. The electing of alternative parties and circulation of elites would bring much greater credibility to the system. Open and free elections would move Arab countries much closer to democracy. A belief in the 'power of the ballot box' to bring in rulers and to remove them as well should be formulated.

Human rights need to be both respected and protected. Detainees should have the right to know the reasons for their detention. All interrogations should be video recorded to prove that procedures are followed, rights are respected, torture is not used, and to be able to prove abuse if it happens. Better prison conditions should be provided for detainees. The location of detention camps should be known to the public. There should be an open public record of the names of detainees and their locations in order for their families to be able to track them. Their cases should be made public so a wide audience knows what is happening. This transparency is another assurance for accountability.

International and local human rights organizations should have the right to investigate the status of human rights in the Arab countries. Many Arab states deny such organizations permission to open their offices in their countries and usually view these organizations skeptically. Human rights NGOs should be allowed to express their views openly on any human rights issue in the country. Their reports should be available to the public. These NGOs can help by making people aware of their rights and report violations that they discover. Human rights organizations should not be affiliated with any government entities but should be independent NGOs rather than government councils.

There should be an enhancement of civil society's role in the country. Civil society should be seen as a partner to the government in society-building, not something that is working in opposition to the government that should be crushed. Civil society could work as a watchdog body over certain governmental institutions, thus working in the interest of the state. Finally, it should work in many areas such as political awareness, human rights, and charity.

This thesis has tried to establish that, in this interdependent era, governments should focus on human security. Human security is related to stability of regimes and the national security of the state. The main focus of security should not only be on the state but also on individuals that are the foundation of the state. This thesis argues that the main reasons for decay of states comes

from within and not from outside. The sources of domestic decay come from corruption, authoritarianism, and violations of human rights. These are main concepts which drive people to feel politically insecure. They are the main cause for the contradiction between freedom from want and freedom from fear which are fundamental to human security. The political dimensions of human security should gain more attention from world leaders, thinkers, and policy-makers. Marginalizing human security can lead to very serious consequences such as the collapse of regimes and the collapse of states as well. This comes from the belief that human security ensures the security of both the state and its individuals.

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INTERVIEWS

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