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What Follows the Fall? Investigating The Shifting Landscape of Political Violence in the Wake of Regime Breakdown

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What Follows the Fall? Investigating The Shifting Landscape of Political Violence in the Wake of Regime Breakdown

A THESIS SUBMITTED BY

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TO

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ABSTRACT

While it is commonly argued the prior regime type influences regime breakdown outcomes during contested transitions of power, the observed disparity between two countries with identical prior regime types and distinct post-breakdown results poses a significant challenge to the existing theories. This thesis navigates into the complexities inherent in the post-breakdown sphere by examining how different modes of regime breakdowns can impact the level and duration of state violence instigated by the incoming regime after the breakdown. Developing a theoretical model that compares and contrasts the political environments created after military coups and popular uprisings, this thesis argues that regimes arising from a military coup are more prone to perpetuate violence in the short and long term compared to regimes emerging from a popular uprising. It then tests the argument using cross-sectional data between 1900 and 2013. Regimes that emerge after breakdowns facilitated by military coups are found to exhibit higher levels of violence compared to those emerging from popular uprisings when the level of state violence is assessed one year after the breakdown. This pattern is consistent even when the level of state violence is assessed five years post-breakdown. However, the analysis reveals that the impact of the mode of breakdown on state violence diminishes over time, becoming less pronounced when tested ten years after the breakdown. Through a lens of realpolitik, this thesis provides a contextualized perspective on the quantitative findings by illustrating the sequence of events surrounding the 2011 popular uprising and the consequential 2013 military coup in Egypt and examining the different levels of violence instigated by the Morsi regime following the uprising and the El-Sisi regime in post-coup Egypt.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction

Regime breakdowns are pivotal moments in political history, shaping the course of nations. These critical junctures often dictate the subsequent trajectory of a country, serving as catalysts for transformative change or tumultuous upheaval. For instance, the 21-year military regime in Brazil ended in 1985 via a series of widespread protests and mass mobilizations. Motivated by the goal to withdraw the military from domestic politics, the Brazilian uprisings centered around the demand to transition to civilian rule (Power, 2016). As a result, Figueiredo's military regime broke down with elections taking place in 1985, and the newly-elected and inaugurated democratic government started restoring free elections and civil liberties (Hochstetler, 2006).

In contrast, the breakdown of Mubarak's 30-year military regime in Egypt exemplifies a different facet of regime breakdown. Although the 2011 protests in Tahrir Square ultimately resulted in the incumbent ejection of Mubarak and paved the way for procedurally free and fair elections, the military and the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Armed Forces used them to create an exclusivist political arena, marginalize political voices and further shatter any democratization attempts (Stacher, 2020). Upon Morsi's democratic election in 2012, he took an aggressive turn as he edged towards authoritarianism by retiring military officers and issuing unchecked decrees, sparking widespread demonstrations (Adigbuo, 2013). Shortly after, in 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi orchestrated a violent

military coup, ousting Morsi and inaugurating an enduring autocratic era characterized by aggressive state violence, the suppression of opposition groups, and shattered attempts at democratization (Stacher, 2020). The subsequent 2013 military coup d'etat ultimately led to the emergence of a new military regime, one that is far more authoritarian and repressive than Mubarak's 30-year-long rule over Egypt (Stacher, 2020).

While these cases are not exhaustive, they stand as compelling examples illustrating the diverse trajectories that regime breakdown and post-breakdown spheres can take, from non-violent and stable transformations to violent and unstable ruptures. The briefly outlined cases furthermore raise a fundamental question central to our current understanding of regime breakdown processes: Although it is frequently asserted that the prior regime type has a varying effect on the regime breakdown outcomes when the established order is contested (Geddes, 1999), how can we account for the disparity observed between two countries with identical prior regime types that lead to distinct post-breakdown results? For instance, one military regime transitions to democracy through a regime breakdown enabled by a popular uprising. Conversely, the other military regime becomes a more entrenched authoritarian setting via a military coup d'état. The intricate dynamics within these cases serve as a springboard for understanding the broader puzzle centered around deciphering the varied

dynamics surrounding political violence across different modes of regime breakdown.

As such, this thesis analyzes the relationship between the different modes of regime breakdown and the extent to which they impact state violence by the incoming regime after the breakdown. Specifically, it addresses two overarching questions central to our understanding of this relationship:

(1) What is the effect of the mode of regime breakdown on short-term state violence instigated by the incoming regime?

(2) What is the effect of the mode of regime breakdown on long-term state violence instigated by the incoming regime?

The theoretical framework presented in this thesis is underpinned by the following conceptualizations of regime breakdown and state violence: regime breakdown is understood as the first of three phases of regime change, namely, the deconstruction and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime. As for state violence, it is conceptualized as the use of physical violence by state actors to inflict harm on non-state actors. Theoretically, this thesis examines the multifaceted mechanisms through which military coups create a political environment conducive for the incoming regime to catalyze and exacerbate state violence. From the abrupt overthrow of the existing regime and the fast

8

consolidation of power and repression tactics used by the incoming military regime to achieve the militarization of institutional and governance structures, this thesis dissects different factors through which military coups engender violence committed by the incoming regime. Similarly, this thesis examines the mechanisms linking popular uprising with post-breakdown state violence. It underscores how the participatory nature of popular uprisings influences legitimacy, governance structures, economic development, and the level of international support – thereby linking how these factors help mitigate the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime after the breakdown.

As such, the hypotheses are formulated as follows:

H1: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in the short term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising.

H2: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in the long term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising.

To test the outlined hypotheses quantitatively, this thesis undergoes an empirical analysis with cross-sectional data spanning from 1900 until 2013 to examine the different modes of regime breakdown and their correlation to the level and duration of state violence. It does so by analyzing the levels of state violence by the incoming regime one year after each breakdown, five years, and ten years after. As such, the primary objective is as follows: By analyzing different modes

of regime breakdown, this research aims to improve our understanding of how state violence by the incoming regime persists and varies in the post-breakdown sphere. The regression models found that military coups are more likely to be associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. These findings underscore the importance of considering the mode of regime breakdown when discussing post-breakdown state violence and the implications for state-society relations. Furthermore, this analysis underscores the evolving nature of state violence dynamics. While the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of violence by the incoming regime is significant until five years following a regime breakdown, the impact diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant at the ten-year cut-off point after a regime breakdown enabled by a military coup or popular uprising.

To contextualize the quantitative analysis, this thesis also illustrates the sequence of events surrounding the 2011 popular uprising and the consequential 2013 military coup in Egypt. Specifically, a process-tracing analysis is conducted, which aims to delve deep into the implications of state violence when two successive regime breakdowns occur within temporal proximity. In doing so, this thesis examines the extent to which state violence was instigated by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces and the Morsi regime after the 2011 uprising. It contrasts it with the level of violence instigated by El-Sisi's regime in post-coup

Egypt – and the duration thereof. The sequence of events in the Egyptian context shows how the military regime, which emerged against the backdrop of a popular uprising, was initially successful in leveraging the symbolism of the revolution to gain legitimacy and present narratives of stability, security, and economic promises. However, after securing the public's mandate to instigate violence initially against the Muslim Brotherhood and shortly after against any source of dissent, the popular support that once bolstered the El-Sisi regime has since been supplanted by widespread popular discontent in light of the ongoing cycle of unprecedented violence and repression.

In consideration of the above, the contribution of this thesis to existing scholarship is twofold. While regime breakdowns have gained significant scholarly attention in the past decades (Levitsky & Way, 2013; Goldring & Greitens, 2020; Clarke, 2017), it is often treated as a single concept and traditionally perceived in the transitology literature as the first phase in regime change, one that is followed by democratic transition and democratic consolidation (Gill & Gill, 2000; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2017; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). Only a few studies have examined how different factors in the post-breakdown sphere can vary depending on the mode of breakdown (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). As such, this paper's first contribution lies in its focus on the mode of regime breakdown and its implications for the level and duration of state violence instigated by the incoming regime in the

post-breakdown political sphere. This thesis transcends existing theories that predominantly focus on assessing and explaining the levels of political violence in the post-breakdown sphere based on the prior regime type pre-breakdown. Instead, this study endeavors to shift its lens toward examining the modus operandi of the regime breakdown itself, seeking to present an alternative explanation for the varying levels of state violence after the breakdown. Second, in addition to augmenting the understanding of state violence through the different intensity levels, this thesis aims to broaden the scope of the analysis by examining the temporal dimension of state violence. By analyzing the duration of state violence by the incoming regime, this thesis provides a more comprehensive narrative that captures the evolution of state violence over time in post-breakdown scenarios. It unveils the interplay between different modes of breakdown and the duration of state violence in the aftermath of the breakdown. Overall, this thesis provides a holistic perspective on the complexities inherent in the post-breakdown sphere by analyzing whether the mode of regime breakdown affects the level and duration of state violence.

This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 constitutes a comprehensive literature review examining existing arguments on political violence and regime breakdown. It elucidates the intricacies of political violence by addressing its different conceptualizations, typologies, and determinants. Similarly, it delves deep into the processes of regime breakdown by discussing scholarly discourse

surrounding the different modes of breakdown, authoritarian durability, and the variables that can influence regime trajectories. Subsequently, Chapter 3 builds upon the literature by developing a theoretical model that hypothesizes on the mechanisms through which military coups and popular uprisings influence the level and duration of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime following a breakdown. This analysis presents this study's formulated hypotheses, which shed light on the multifaceted mechanisms through which military coups create a conducive political environment for the incoming regime to catalyze and exacerbate state violence. In contrast, popular uprisings create a climate that helps mitigate the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime after the breakdown. To test the hypotheses, Chapter 4 presents a set of regression models that find that military coups are more likely to be associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime than popular uprisings. As such, Chapter 5 contextualizes the quantitative results by illustrating the events of the 2011 popular uprising and the 2013 military coup in Egypt through a process-tracing analysis. Lastly, Chapter 6 offers concluding remarks.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter constitutes a comprehensive literature review examining existing arguments on political violence and regime breakdown. It aims to dissect the different dimensions and factors underpinning the occurrence of both phenomena. The first part elucidates the intricacies of political violence, whereas the second part delves deeper into regime breakdown.

The first part is titled "Part I: Understanding Political Violence." This part embarks on a journey to understand the multifaceted nature of political violence. The chapter begins by exploring the concept of violence itself. It presents different scholarly perspectives, ranging from the classic delineation of legitimate rule to contemporary definitions addressing the different violations considered violent, such as the restriction of physical freedom and mental integrity. After laying the groundwork, the challenges of defining and conceptualizing the term political violence are presented. The sections navigate through different historical precedents and theoretical frameworks to understand the inherent, symbiotic connection between politics and violence. Moving forward, the typology of political violence is discussed by presenting comprehensive classifications proposed by different scholars to gain insights into the varied dimensions of

political violence, its dynamic nature, and complex interactions. To conclude the first section, the intricate web of factors that shape the emergence of political violence is explored. Specifically, the different determinants of political violence, with a specific focus on structural, cultural, and individual factors, are examined.

Transitioning to the second part of this chapter, "Part II: Understanding Regime Breakdown", the focus of the literature review is shifted toward the process of regime breakdown and its aftermath. To conceptualize this phenomenon, the sections below delve deep into the scholarly discourse surrounding authoritarian regimes, democratization processes, and authoritarian durability. Through the exploration of regime breakdown in the context of regime change at large, this chapter discusses different questions about when it leads to regime change and when it does not. Continuing this exploration, the different determinants of breakdowns are discussed by probing into both domestic and international factors that influence regime trajectories. In this context, factors like economic crises, political mobilization, and international pressure are dissected as myriad forces shaping the fate of authoritarian regimes. Building upon this foundation, different modes of breakdown are discussed, ranging from the classical categorizations of military coups, popular uprisings, loss in war, and so on, but also delving deep into the dynamics of pacted transitions. Lastly, the emergence of political violence in the post-breakdown sphere is discussed.

While Part I and Part II of this chapter discuss the ongoing scholarly debates revolving around the definitions of regime breakdown and political violence, the sections clearly highlight how both phenomena are conceptualized and defined in this paper. For the definition of political violence, this research has chosen to conceptualize political violence in its most narrow definition, namely as "the use of physical force to inflict injury or cause damage to a person or property" (Thomas, 2011; pg. 1817) by state or non-state actors for political reasons. Subsequently, state violence is understood as the use of physical violence by state actors to inflict harm on non-state actors. As for regime breakdown, this thesis perceives regime breakdown as the first of three phases of regime change; namely, the deconstruction and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime.

In essence, this chapter serves as a foundational exploration of political violence and regime breakdown, laying the ground for the subsequent analysis in the subsequent chapters. By synthesizing different scholarly perspectives, this chapter aims to conceptualize the phenomena discussed in this thesis and unravel the associated factors.

Part I: Understanding Political Violence

1. Definition of Violence

Before discussing the literature on political violence, it is essential to take a step back and delve deep into the intricate dynamics of the term "violence." This is a springboard for understanding the interplay of violence in politics.

The most narrow understanding of violence is deeply rooted within the Weberian sociological school of thought and what Weber himself referred to as *legitime Herrschaft* – legitimate rule (Weber, 1921). The concept of the legitimate rule implies compliance with laws, but more broadly, the authorization to act. As such, understanding violence from the legitimate rule perspective imposes a clear distinction between the authorized and legitimate use of violence by state actors and the illegitimate use by non-state actors. In building up on Weber's distinction, scholars have typically referred to the former as *force* and the latter as *violence* (Parsons, 1964; Coser, 1967).

A broader understanding of violence in more recent literature frames violence as the use of physical force, regardless of which actors are performing it and the kind of substantiation that is provided (Van der Dennen, 2005). The conflicts that could potentially arise within the legitimation of violence by non-state actors were thoroughly given thought to by international organizations such as the United Nations in the 1970s. This consideration came in light of non-state actors

resorting to violence to justify their attempts at national liberation during anti-colonial struggles or to threaten authoritarian regimes (Taylor, 1991). Under this conceptualization, violence is perceived as an invasion of personal inviolability no matter who resorted to its use and who was victimized by it. In other words, the former distinction between force and violence is blurred — violence is primarily perceived as the restriction of physical freedom by any entity. (Grundy & Weinstein, 1974).

A more expansive understanding of violence encompasses not only the restriction of physical freedom and integrity but also the violation of an individual's or a group of people's mental integrity (Taylor, 1991). Consequently, the term violence encompasses not only physical attacks but also discrimination and defamation. It also constitutes any acts that threaten the autonomy of a person and extend to different forms of emotional or mental abuse and the determination of destructive harm (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001; Mazurkiewicz, 2006). It is noteworthy that some scholars have contested this definition of violence by arguing that both defamation and discrimination cannot be placed under the same category as physical violence (Grundy and Weinstein, 1974).

In the broadest definition of violence, it is understood as the restriction that is imposed on an individual. It is perceived as any form of violation, such as the violation of fundamental rights, individual rights, or community rights (Grundy

and Weinstein, 1974). At large, individuals are entitled to two fundamental rights: the right to their bodies and the right to autonomy (freedom). If one of these rights is violated, this school of thought asserts that it is perceived as violence (Garver, 1974). Under this definition, the concept commonly known as "structural violence" was first conceptualized by Galtung (1969). Structural violence results from inequalities stemming from economic, political, and social structures and institutions, which can result in inequalities in different social subsystems, such as education opportunities and military and legal structures. This type of violence is invisible within social structures and can create both political oppression and economic exploitation. However, structural violence can result in the suffering and death of the individuals suffering from it, and it also can lead to direct violence from the oppressed towards the oppressors (Winter & Leighton, 2003).

However, Thomas (2001) argues that broad definitions of violence, including structural violence, are not useful in the study of international relations. While the relationship between structural injustice and violence is important, scholars should not label all structural injustice as violent. Instead, the author argues the narrow understanding of direct violence as "the use of physical force to to inflict injury or cause damage to a person or property" is more useful (Thomas, 2011; pg. 1817).

2. Definition of Political Violence

Political violence is a type of violence and can be manifested and examined from the perspective of the different understandings of violence illustrated above. In general, it is difficult to define the relationship between violence and politics due to its cognitive and multifaceted nature (Taylor, 1991). Wright Mills' (1956) famous quote, *"All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence,"* and Weber's (1921) belief that the lack of violence in political life can only be explained by the indifference of individuals and their insensitivity to socio-political problems are both a springboard for the standard argument in the literature; namely that politics and violence cannot be separated from each other. Other scholars also argue for the connection between violence and politics. Arendt (1963) argued that violence in politics dates back to medieval and postmedieval schools of political thought, during which legitimate rebellion against an existing authority and resistance was used as a tool to instill pressure on the authority. In her renowned essay "On Violence", Arendt (1970) also emphasizes the permanent nature of the violence in politics and asserts that the connection of violence in politics is interconnected in a way that conspicuously manifests power – although violence and power can be perceived as the opposite sides of the spectrum, both can be used for politics.

Furthermore, in attempts to conceptualize what political violence is, scholars have found themselves in conflict with each other on the definition of "political" in the

term "political violence". This stems from the fact that there is a certain flexibility in defining the concept of politics, which ultimately results from different experiences and historical traditions (Ryszka, 1990). Politics can be exceptionally subjectively defined and categorized, and the question of the limit of politics even goes back to the limits of an individual's political sensitivity (Dybel and Wróbel, 2008). A narrow and broad definition of politics is available in the stream of literature on political science as a discipline at large (Bodio, 2003). A narrow definition is restricted to the consensual definition of politics and tightly limits the understanding of political actions to what can be considered legitimate. It emphasizes the importance of consultation and cooperation. For instance, Deutsch (1966) defines politics as the coordination by individuals to arrive at the goals of society. Another definition encompasses concepts such as stability, coordination, contribution, and integration to the social structure, which is built upon the common values shared by members of society (Dahrendorf, 1975).

However, these narrow definitions of politics do not take into consideration different phenomena like war, civil war, and coups within a political framework. Not only do they not take into consideration instances characterized by high intensity of violence, but they also do not take into account other instances with violence levels, such as the use of physical force against individuals or the violation of fundamental rights of individuals. As such, the definitions of political violence encompass the broad definition of politics (Mider, 2014). The broad

definitions of politics leave excellent room for subjectivity in their interpretation; it can encompass the procedures of elections or the outbreak of a revolution or a civil war (Mider, 2014). For example, Rapoport (1960) defines politics as a gradable concept, which can either be practiced as a form of debate to convince the enemy of a game with cooperation and rivalry as its rules or a fight to destroy the political opponent.

Against this backdrop, scholars have proposed different theories to define the actions that are considered political violence. First, Lupsha and Mackinnon (1973) examine this from three perspectives. The first perspective entails all activities related to politics from the opinion of the target against which these actions were taken. This includes attacks on state institutions and government representatives. Their second perspective categorizes acts of political violence based on the events and the initiator consciousness that led to an act of violence. For example, it would be considered an act of political violence if it resulted from a political decision being introduced or implemented. Lastly, the third perspective takes into account violent actions that have been taken by groups that have specific political goals, such as political parties and movements. In this perspective, acts of violence are perceived as intentional or semi-intentional actions that include force, lead to psychological or mental harm to other individuals and groups, and were undertaken with the ultimate goal of influencing a political process.

On the other hand, other scholars have put forward more broad definitions that conceptualize political violence as collective action involving high intensity physical force intended to damage an enemy or achieve political goals. This broadness is rooted in the classical social science definition of violence, namely widely perceived as the behavior "designed to inflict physical injury on people or damage to property" (Graham & Gurr, 1969: XVII) and "any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance" (Tilly, 1978; 176). When specifically looking at oppositional or non-state political violence, it has also been perceived as a series of collective acts used within a political community to attack and oppose the regime in power (Gurr, 1973).

As the academic debate on the definition and conceptualization of both violence and political violence dates back to the timeframe of 1960s-1980s, many modern scholars have followed this line of thought and characterized political violence as the use of force, coercion, or means of intimidation by individuals, groups or states to achieve their political objectives or maintain power (Hoffman, 2006). They also add that the term can encompass and take different forms of violence, including but not limited to armed conflicts, terrorism, political assassinations, riots, and state repression (Collier et al., 2002). Additionally, Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017) stress that political violence comprises diverse elements such as repertoire, targeting, frequency, and technique. However, Della Porta (2002) has

criticized the stretching potential of the term as it has resulted in difficulties in operationalizing as it is highly subjective to interpret and closely related to subjective historical experiences. The operationalization and empirical assessment can become controversial or even problematic for three reasons: (A) it is essential to understand that a degree of physical force may be included in collective actions that cannot be perceived or considered violent per se; (B) all collective action, violent or non-violent, typically has the goal to damage an opponent or an adversary and lastly, (C) even if we were to stick to the narrow definition of political violence as behavior that cannot be considered legitimate political action, it remains challenging to measure legitimacy empirically (Mider, 2014).

While all authors cited above make a great case in justifying their definitions of political violence, this research has chosen to define and conceptualize political violence in its most narrow definition. Therefore, political violence is understood "the use of physical force to inflict injury or cause damage to a person or property" (Thomas, 2011; pg. 1817) by state or non-state actors for political reasons. As such, moving forward in following sections of this thesis, when state violence is discussed, it is defined as the use of physical violence by state actors to inflict harm on non-state actors.

3. Typology of Political Violence

Political violence can take many forms and involves different collection actions such as property destruction, rioting, clashes between ethnic or political factions, confrontations with law enforcement, targeted physical assaults, indiscriminate bombings, the armed takeover of locations or individuals, robberies, and instances of hijacking (Kalyvas, 2019). Given the broadness of this phenomenon, several authors have created criteria to reduce the complexity of political violence and increase its traceability. First, Della Porta (2002, pg. 7) suggested the following:

"I suggested the following dimensions as most relevant for a typology: (1) the intensity of violence (low-level violence, usually not enacted against people, versus high-level violence, including political assassinations) and (2) the organizational form of violence (open versus underground). On the basis of these two variables, I formulated a fourfold typology including the following: (1) unspecialized violence – low-level, less-organized violence; (2) semi-military violence – violence that is also low-level but is more organized; (3) autonomous violence – violence used by loosely organized groups that emphasize a "spontaneous" recourse to high-level violence; and (4) clandestine violence – the extreme violence of groups that organize underground for the explicit purpose of engaging in the most radical forms of collective action"

Another classification was put forward by Kalyvas (2019), who classified different types of political violence based on two different dimensions: (A) the perpetrator — being either a state or non-state actor, and (B) the target — being either a state or non-state actor. Based upon these criteria, he classifies different existing categories and typologies of political violence in the literature.

Interstate war is classified by Kalyvas (2019) as a violent activity perpetuated by a state against another state. Previously not paid attention to in the literature beyond legal theories regarding the laws of war, violence had been overlooked by other topics and perceived as a natural consequence of interstate war (Gat, 2008). However, recent theories developed on civilian victimization during the interstate war have shifted scholarly attention to the correlation between regime type and civilian victimization (Downes, 2004). The most renowned theory in IR studies remains the democratic peace theory, positing that democracies are less likely to engage in wars against each other (Russett et al., 1993). However, other theories have challenged the premise of the democratic peace theory by arguing that democracies also resort to violence to maintain their existence against any threatening violent movements; such violence can escape democratic control and the democratic state's foundational rights (Schwarzmantel, 2009).

Under the category of state-perpetuated violent activities against non-state actors, Kalyvas (2019) identifies state repression, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. State repression is characterized by the use of violence by states against their opposition within the country. It is typically deployed by autocratic regimes with different intensities – varying from limited coercion to extensive mass violence (Davenport, 2007). The academic consensus on state repression is that non-violent opposition dissent provokes state repression more than violent dissent, the effects of repression in the longer run heavily rely on the state's capacity and its relationship with the security apparatus, and lastly, the effectiveness of state repression is decreased when it is targeted against organized non-violent opposition in comparison to other forms of opposition (Chenoweth et al., 2017). Genocide is a state-led activity motivated by the intent to completely exterminate a particular group of people based on characteristics determined by birth as perceived by the state (Straus, 2015). Likewise, ethnic cleansing is a subcategory under genocide that also aims at the extermination of a particular group, specifically targeting the creation of a state characterized by ethnic homogeneity (Liebermann, 2006; Bulutgil, 2016).

As for politically violent activities perpetuated by non-state actors and targeting state actors, the following types are classified: organized crime, mass protest, military coup, political assassination, civil war, and terrorism (Kalyvas, 2019). Organized crime, produced by organized criminal motivations such as cartels and

motivated by illicit profit maximization, typically aims at exercising indirect influence on state actors to ensure that their business can be conducted in a country. The violence that is associated with organized crime can create militarized violence against the state and its civilians (Schedler, 2013), lead to full-fledged wars (Lessing, 2017), recruit local civilians and provide them with arms (Kalyvas, 2015), and lastly increase political contention and rebellion (Hobsbawm, 1971). While mass protests can be a peaceful activity to express claims in democratic settings, this might not be the scenario if they erupted in authoritarian settings (Kalyvas, 2019). Authoritarian states are likely to either react with the use of violence and cause civilian casualties or resort to repressing the mass protest violently (Pierskalla 2010). In a few cases, protests can escalate into a mass uprising or even a social revolution. If the authoritarian fails to repress, it could lead to regime breakdown (Beissinger, 2002).

On the other hand, military coups constitute a coordination game from the military's side and a form of rebellion against the state (Luttwak, 2016). They tend to occur overnight and produce low levels of violence, but they could also lead to intense fighting between the military and the state or transform into civil wars (Singh, 2014). Political assassinations target high-profile figures for political reasons and can have significant effects on democratic prospects (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008). Weak and repressive authoritarian leaders face the highest risks for assassination, but the successful assassination of authoritarian leaders typically

leads to sustained efforts toward democratization after the attack (Jones and Olken, 2009). Civil wars have been closely associated with high levels of violence due to their transgressive nature of extreme civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 2006). It is frequently argued that low income countries and weak states are more prone to the onset of civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). In the same context, countries that are neither clearly democratic nor autocratic and are situated in times of political change are more likely to be at risk of civil war (Hegre, 2001). Lastly, terrorism is used as a means of violence to intimidate a large group of people beyond the immediate victims of the terrorist group. It is typically operated not only on domestic land but also internationally in foreign states (Enders and Sandler, 2012).

Finally, intercommunal violence is considered among politically violent activities perpetrated by non-state actors but also targeting non-state actors. It describes the setting whereby there is intense and lethal conflict between civilians from one ethnic group and civilians from another ethnicity (Horowitz, 2000). It also includes rebel groups killing opposition party supporters and members (Sundberg et al., 2012).

A seminal insight emerging from the scholarship on political violence underscores a close relationship between armed conflict and violence against unarmed civilians, notably visible in autocracies such as genocide, mass killings, and ethnic

cleansing (Valentino, 2000; Straus, 2006; Downes, 2017). In the past decade, scholars have increasingly acknowledged that large-scale violence against civilians in interstate and civil wars is not random, unintended, and peripheral to the essence of warfare (Valentino, 2014). In this regard, Valentino (2000, p.47) has modified Clausewitz's famous "war as politics by other means" to "sometimes mass killing is simply war by other means". This perspective shows that civilians are not bystanders to armed conflict but often unwitting participants who serve as essential providers of a war's material, financial, or human resources (Valentino, 2014).

4. Determinants of Political Violence

In understanding the complex phenomenon of political violence, it is pivotal to explore the multitude of factors that contribute to its occurrence. A plethora of scholars have argued that acts of political violence have emerged out of reality with a system of defective socio-political structures. As such, three different approaches have been taken to explain the determinants of political violence, namely structural, cultural, and individual approaches. The sections shed light on these different theories.

(A) Structural Determinants of Political Violence

Scholars have argued that the structural sources of political violence stem from the social and political systems, specifically the inequalities between the different social classes, the economic system, and the prevailing political hierarchy

(Burgoon, 2006). Likewise, the role attributed to how the states' institutions and structures function concerning generating political violence or suppressing attempts at political violence is also frequently discussed. In this context, specific arguments are made about different governance systems. It is argued that the different structures and systems in democratic states are designed to prevent actions of political violence through a multitude of layers, for instance, by holding periodic free and fair elections and undergoing both police procedures and court proceedings (Keane, 2004). When violence is manifested in democracies, it is usually a testimony to significant defects in a country's democratic structures. High governmental legitimacy is typically associated with low levels of violence (Hughes, 2004).

Another structural source of political violence is theorized to be an excessive distance between the state and its citizens. This distance is likely to create a social clash between different ethics and mutual blocking (Mider, 2014). Overwhelming institutionalization and bureaucratization of a state not only exacerbate the distance between the state and its citizens but can also be perceived as a form of violence from the state against its citizens and can retaliate the use of force and violence by its citizens as a reaction (Peyrefitte, 1982). In his essay, Mider (2014, pg. 180) summarizes the widely identified structural determinants of political violence as follows: "violation of the democratic process (violation of human rights, violation of legal norms by the state, corruption), political instability

(sudden changes in governance), the ethnic composition of the ruling group differing significantly from the rest of society (political and economic power distributed according to an ethnic, religious or social key), the deterioration of public services (a significant decline in the range and effectiveness of public social security allowing for the provision of a universal minimum standard of services)."

(B) Cultural Determinants of Political Violence

Another stream of literature has found an alternative perspective to explain the emergence of political violence. Namely, scholars argue that the sources of violence need to be considered from a cultural perspective by paying attention to the patterns of behavior and actions within a social community resulting from sanctioned values and beliefs passed down through the natural course of socialization (Mider, 2014). More specifically, violence emerges when it is culturally widely held that violence is an effective method to achieve socio-political goals and objectives in a society (Gurr, 1970).

To furthermore understand how these cultural beliefs normalize the use of violence as an effective tool for political goals, scholars have shifted their focus on (A) micro-social factors, such as the socialization processes that normalize the use of violence, (B) macro-social factors, such as the historical experiences and consequent beliefs and (C) factors that emerge from contact between different

cultures, such as cultural shocks and clash of civilizations (Mider, 2014). From the micro-social perspective, the emergence of violence can be perceived as a result of defective socialization processes within the family, e.g., broken families, emotionally distant families, exposure to domestic violence and domestic sexual abuse, or extreme religious and cultural beliefs at home that embed specific cultural norms, values, and rules. This remains a significant cause of violence as such an environment normalizes different subcultures of violence, for instance, by having a relationship with the perpetrators, building loyalty within gangster groups, recurring hospitalization as a result of violence, normalization of violence from the media and lack of condemnation for violence at large (Guerra & Huesmann 2004; Hartogs, 1970). Some scholars have even built upon these micro-social factors to explain the basis of an authoritarian personality, highlighting that cultural factors such as conservative methods of upbringing, lack of emotional support, and severe punishments fuel displaced aggression (Sanford et al., 2010).

From the macro-social perspective, authors pay attention to the dominant cultures that can generate the willingness of individuals to partake in violent actions. More specifically, in the attempt to explain the different cultural approaches to violence, scholars pay attention to the differences between the different scopes, frequencies, and intensities of violence in different societies (Gurr, 1970). In this context, the historical context of every culture is deemed of significant importance. For

example, the frontier theory and the role of firearms in the creation of the US state

(the gun theory) are theorized to have contributed to the normalization of the

Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms (Nieburg, 1963). Any approach or

historical event that normalizes the use of violence evolves over time into the

emergence of a dominant culture that accepts violence (Mider, 2014). However,

other scholars contributed to this debate by arguing that the cultural determinants

of violence cannot be dated back to one historical event but rather to the

characteristics of the entire cultural system. Precisely, the societies that still have

agrarian, pre-modernist characteristics create a recipe for war. In contrast,

societies that have fully emerged in social control development are less likely to

be violent (Durkheim, 1992).

(C) Individual Determinants of Political Violence

The third approach to explaining the determinants of political violence involves

the examination of personality-based characteristics. It mainly focuses on

subjective perspectives – such as different emotional factors, personal motives,

and experiences – that could lead to some individuals condoning and actively

participating in acts of violence, whereas others do not (Barken & Snowden,

2001; Mider, 2014). At large, one overarching argument stemming from

psychoanalytic studies views the concept of violence as devoid of social sense,

pathological, and symptomatic of an individual's insanity (Apter, 1997). The

perception of violence as a phenomenon that lacks social sense can anchored in

three different understandings: violence can be caused by random or unintentional factors, it can signify behaviors of individuals exhibiting irrationality due to factors such as mental illness, substance influence, and extreme stress or lastly, violence can be performed without moral and ethical contemplation and devoid of consideration for possible consequences (Ball-Rokeach, 1973). Additional arguments have been set forward on the correlation between the use of violence and severe childhood or sexual traumatic experiences (Grimshaw, 2017).

While on the one hand, Barkan and Snowden (2001) posit that a rational explanation of collective violence does not exist, other scholars embrace the rational choice theory and argue that the use of violence is a rational choice taken by an individual after calculating the advantages and disadvantages (Apter, 1997). When analyzing both the advantages and disadvantages of violence, the contention arises that the use of violence comes at a prohibitive cost and can only rationally be taken if the potential advantages outweigh the potential punishment or loss that comes with it (Mider, 2014). Therefore, it is assumed that the decision to undertake such an action is thoroughly thought through and typically significantly serves any interest (Malešević, 2010).

Part II: Understanding Regime Breakdown

1. Conceptualizing Regime Breakdown and Authoritarian Durability

The study of the third wave of democratization has commonly perceived the process of regime change as three phases: regime breakdown, democratic transition, and democratic consolidation. While regime breakdown typically refers to the deconstruction and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime, a democratic transition is defined as the change and shift in the structure and process. Lastly, democratic consolidation is when these new structures and processes have stabilized in a country and have been embedded across its institutions and citizens, gaining normative authority. Remarkably, these three phases are only sometimes temporally separate from each other and can simultaneously overlap. Nonetheless, a regime breakdown does not necessarily lead to establishing a democratic system (Gill, 2000). In line with this categorization, this paper defines and refers to regime breakdown as the first of three phases of regime change; namely, the deconstruction and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime.

Evidence from the third wave of democratization indicates a rise in the frequency of regime breakdowns followed by democratic transitions and consolidation, alongside a simultaneous increase in rates of democratic backsliding (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). This phenomenon has prompted many scholars to ask themselves different questions about authoritarian durability and many underlying

factors that answer the following questions: First, why do some regimes break down while others do not? Second, why do some breakdowns lead to democratic consolidation, whereas others do not?

In this context, different theories and explanations have been put forward. A notable argument by Brownlee (2007) posits that there are institutional differences between unstable authoritarian regimes and durable dictatorships. He argues that whereas authoritarian regimes tend to hold elections to receive clear indicators for political competition, elections can either serve as catalysts to promote democratization opportunities or ensure durable authoritarianism. Instead, the main factor preventing regime breakdown and enhancing regime durability is the interaction of elites within the ruling party. If the ruling party takes on the function of sustaining the coalition of elites, contributes to the resolution of elite conflicts during the period of regime formation, and enables a structure that allows room for its members' influence on agenda-setting and individual ambitions, the likelihood of elite defection to the opposition can be minimized and regime breakdown will be less likely to occur. A different perspective proposed by Gerschweski (2015) puts three pillars at the forefront of the stability of autocratic regimes: legitimation, repression, and cooptation. Specifically, the author contends that these three pillars gain their stabilization effect by three different processes that happen within the individual pillars and between the pillars: 1) the exogenous self-reinforcement process within the pillars

is driven by the need for an external drive to navigate the process, such as power and material resources, 2) the endogenous self-enforcing institutionalization process within the pillars when they are enforced by high-fixed and set-up costs, coordination efforts and network effects and start exhibiting increasing returns and lastly 3) the reciprocal reinforcement and complementarity within the pillars.

Beyond the arguments that discuss regime breakdowns in authoritarian regimes at large, other arguments have been put forward in this regard on specific types of authoritarian regimes. For example, Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that autocracies that emerge from social revolutions – commonly referred to as revolutionary regimes – are more likely to be durable and, therefore, less likely to break down than non-revolutionary regimes. When revolutionaries take over power in a collapsed state, radical policies are typically implemented to transform the state. These are typically catalysts for violent conflict initiated by counter-revolutionary and military threats. Revolutionary regimes that survived these conflicts built a cohesive ruling elite, a loyal military, a powerful coercive apparatus, and a decentralized source of power due to the existential threat faced during their state-building process. These legacies strengthen authoritarian durability and protect the regime against elite defection, military coups, and mass protests. On a similar wavelength, Levitsky and Way (2012) address the durability of party-based authoritarian regimes and argue that the distribution of patronage among elites in ruling parties enhances regime durability during peaceful times

but ultimately does not prevent elite defection and regime durability during violent conflict. Specifically, they argue that "ruling parties will be most cohesive where they have gained power due to a sustained, violent, and ideationally driven struggle" (Levitsky and Way, 2012, pg. 871). Violent conflict fosters partisan identities, strengthens partisan boundaries, necessitates the establishment of militarized structures within the military and the security apparatus, and enhances the regime's capacity to repress altogether while cultivating leaders with elevated levels of domestic legitimacy and authority. These non-material resources, when combined with material sources such as the distribution of patronage, enhance the regime's durability against threats, which could have led to the possibility of regime breakdown.

2. Elements of Regime Breakdown

Different elements have been paid attention to in the literature concerning their effect on regime breakdown. In the study of political economy, economic crises have been frequently linked to regime breakdown. For example, previous research on South America has demonstrated that zero non-democratic regimes survived three consecutive years of negative economic growth between 1945 and 1988. Furthermore, economic crises have been suggested to play a key role in enabling democratic transition in the post-breakdown sphere, but not necessarily sufficient alone to induce democratic consolidation (Gill, 2000). Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2018) argue that party-led regimes with extensive patron–client networks can

help the elites navigate the economic crisis by distributing to the citizens necessary for the regime's survival and shifting the economic burden to other weaker segments of the population. However, regimes that do not have wide party networks among different party leaders, local political leaders, and other leaders nationwide will not be able to co-opt citizens in the same manner and, therefore, are prone to breakdown if the regime does not respond effectively.

Another element that could stimulate regime breakdown is the degree of political mobilization of the opposition. Whether repressed or co-opted, potential opposition leaders still exist in regimes and were often at some point closely tied with the incumbent leader. The available resources and wide networks that the leader's allies enjoy are often valuable resources employed to challenge the regime (Svolik, 2012). The potential opposition leader decides if and how they challenge the regime based on a cost-benefit calculation, including the extent of resources available, the degree of support by citizens, the risk of the challenge, and the probability of the win (Geddes et al., 2018). The strategic choice on how to challenge the current regime, if successful, is what is referred to as a "mode of breakdown," unfolding in the patterns that are either coups, uprisings, assassinations, etc.

Beyond domestic explanations, other authors have focused on the international factors that could lead to the breakdown of an authoritarian regime. The intensity

of the international factors leading to breakdown could vary from highly intense factors, such as a defeat in war, to less intense factors, like international sanctions coupled with other domestic factors (Gill, 2017). In the literature, two different types of international pressure have been identified: international pressure aimed at a regime breakdown via direct foreign policies or international political economy structures (Gill, 2000). Beyond this distinction, other theories have been put forth on the effect of the international environment on regime breakdown and regime change. In the vanguard of these arguments, Levitsky and Way (2006) argue that the international environment has two different dimensions to influence regime change: western linkage (the socio-political and economic ties) and leverage (the vulnerability of governments towards international democratizing pressure). Because the primary source for linkage is geographical proximity, it enhances the effectiveness of leverage by strengthening international prominence of regime abuse, enhancing the likelihood of the West to shift the country's domestic actors pre-democratically and influencing the reorganization of domestic powers within authoritarian regimes. High leverage and linkage lead to regime change via international democratization pressure regardless of unsupportive domestic actors. High linkage and low leverage lead to indirect but substantial means of international pressure toward regime change. Low linkage and high leverage lead to partial effectiveness of international democratization pressure.

Another domestic feature of regime breakdown is international splits within the regime's ruling structure. These splits can contribute significantly to the weakening of a regime by reducing its support base and creating a state of dysfunction within the regime itself; if regime leaders are internally in conflict with each other and have failed to resolve that internal conflict, the opposition or military force can seize the opportunity to overthrow them. Institutional differences can often be a source of internal split within regimes, whether the regime is ruled by collective leadership or one single prominent finger. If an authoritarian regime does not have adequate institutional procedures to resolve these disputes, the threat of regime survival is heightened. Furthermore, disunity within the regime also poses symbolic challenges due to the frequent authoritarian rhetoric emphasis on unity. As a result, these internal divisions can threaten the regime's legitimacy, capacity for effective governance, and ideological framework and ultimately pave the way for regime breakdown (Gill, 2017; Gill, 2000).

3. Modes of Regime Breakdown

Regime breakdowns can be manifested in various ways, representing a unique confluence of circumstances and dynamics. The spectrum of potential modes of breakdown is vast and multifaceted. It can take many forms, such as a military coup, autogolpe, assassination, or the natural death of the incumbent leader, defeat in civil or inter-state wars, gradual policy shifts under the same leader, popular uprisings, foreign intervention, or the failure of the political elite to retain control.

These different processes through which regimes break down are commonly called "modes of breakdown".

Amongst different modes of breakdown, this thesis looks explicitly at two different modes, namely military coups and popular uprisings. Military coups denote the removal of the incumbent regime by the orchestration of military leaders who defect from their support of the regime. Coups necessitate the voluntary cooperation of a few senior officers, leveraging the obedience of lower-ranking personnel to execute their plans. Regime breakdowns via military coups typically unfold over a brief period and hinge on the element of surprise. It often does not take more than a couple of days for the military officers to consolidate their power (De Bruin, 2019).

On the other hand, popular uprisings are grassroots movements of dissent against the incumbent regime, which are fueled by widespread dissatisfaction among the citizens. These uprisings often emerge as a response to perceived injustices, inequalities, and abuses of power. They rely on collective civilian action and take to the streets to voice their opposition. Compared to military coups, popular uprisings can be protracted processes, lasting for days, weeks, or even months as protestors demand systematic change (Geddes et al., 2018). The proposed theory of this thesis, as outlined in Chapter 3, delves deeper into the intricacies of both

modes of breakdowns and presents the challenges faced in coups and uprisings during the process of the breakdown and the post-breakdown sphere.

Beyond the precise categorization of different modes of breakdown, other scholars have focused their attention on the prominence of pacted transitions in authoritarian regimes that lead to democratization. This stream of literature is based on the typology presented by O'Donnell et al. (1986) that builds on the existing modes of breakdown and adds that there are two scales to a regime change and democratization process, namely the drivers of regime change (elites or opposition leaders) and the degree of cooperation between elites and opposition leaders. This has led transitology scholars to suggest different modes of regime change. For instance, Schmitter (2015) posits that there are four different modes of regime change: regime change through policy reform, regime change through a revolution demanding liberalization, pacted transitions between regime leaders and the opposition, or imposed transitions undertaken by the government alone. Pacted transitions, characterized by negotiations between ruling elites and the opposition, are advocated as the most successful path to democracy (O'Donnell et al., 1986; Huntington, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stradiotto and Guo, 2014). These transitions are more likely to result in democratic outcomes than other regime breakdown modes (Stradiotto and Guo, 2014; Geddes et al., 2018). Early scholars in the transitology literature argued that the democratization success of pacted transitions is due to the success of the negotiations creating a path

dependency by excluding radicals and preventing violence (O'Donnell et al., 1986; Huntington, 1993). Modern scholars predict the success of regime change and the transition into democracy based on the prior regime type in the authoritarian setting pre-regime breakdown, not based on whether the regime change happened through a pacted transition (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes et al., 2018). In Chapter 3 below, this thesis will delve into these modern arguments regarding the connection between the prior type of the authoritarian type and the processes of regime breakdown and regime change, particularly emphasizing the different contemporary scholarly perspectives.

4. Political Violence In the Post-Breakdown Regime Consolidation

While "Part I: Understanding Political Violence" revisits different theories on the levels of violence expected during regime breakdown, the subsections delve deeper into the intricacies of political violence in the post-breakdown sphere.

The issue of violence following regime breakdown is discussed concerning state-building and regime-building. As Fukuyama (2004) defined, state-building involves "creating new government institutions and strengthening existing ones." Brahimi (2007) expands on this idea by emphasizing elements such as 'constitution-making,' 'electoral processes,' 'reintegration and national reconciliation,' and establishing the 'rule of law.' Many scholars have presented evidence that state-building processes after regime breakdown often coincide with political violence and instability (Newman, 2013). Throughout history,

state-building has frequently involved coercion and violence. It typically entails imposing a centralized state while subjugating regions to consolidate national political projects. Scholars like Tilly (1991) and Skocpol (1976) emphasize the importance and centrality of conflict in state-building, whether driven by domestic reform agendas, ideological conflicts, or external pressures. Although recent scholarly consensus suggests a decrease in both the scale and number of conflicts, Goodwin (2001) and Pinker (2011) have shown that there is still an association between state-building efforts, revolutionary change, and armed conflicts.

In recent decades, efforts in international peacebuilding within post-conflict and conflict-prone societies have shifted towards state-building engagement. The primary goal is to prevent the recurrence or escalation of violence and establish lasting peace. (Fukayama, 2015). Scholars argue that activities related to peacekeeping and state-building have become interconnected and mutually dependent (Brahimi, 2007; Suhrke et al., 2002; Rubin, 2005). Similarly, Billerbeck and Tansey (2019) suggest that international peace-building missions can influence regime-building in post-conflict countries, potentially enabling authoritarianism by strengthening the capabilities of existing authoritarian leaders and creating a conducive environment for them.

Furthermore, Tansey (2009) suggests that international authorities and peacebuilders have gone beyond their primary focus on promoting development during regime change. They have also taken on the responsibility of establishing a system in the host country through their actions and interactions with local actors. As a result, the nature of their intervention directly impacts how the transition unfolds after a regime breaks down.

Lastly, several theories have been proposed regarding the long-term effects of violence regardless of how the regime broke down. These theories argue that political violence can lead to socio-economic consequences, such as decreased trust in state institutions, reduced investment, and slower economic growth (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Additionally, over time, political violence can undermine the rule of law and perpetuate cycles of retaliation that can persist for generations. It can also exacerbate existing divisions and make it more challenging to build an inclusive society (Weinstein, 2006; Roht Arriaza et al., 2006).

Conclusion

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the literature on political violence and regime breakdown, laying the groundwork for a deeper understanding of both phenomena. By examining political violence and regime

breakdown separately and in conjunction, the insights gained in this chapter are essential for the foundation of this thesis.

Moving forward, the next chapter, which encompasses the theory and hypotheses-building sections, expands the discussion introduced in this chapter. Specifically, Chapter 3 first expands on the existing literature on two modes of breakdown, namely military coups and popular uprisings, which have been introduced in this chapter. It intensely looks at the different theoretical arguments presented on both modes of breakdown. Second, it builds upon the above foundation by including further literature on the connection between political violence and regime breakdown. It elaborates more extensively on theories briefly presented above and challenges the connection between the prior type of the authoritarian type and the levels of political violence after regime breakdown. In doing so, the groundwork laid above is essential for exploring the connection between the mode of breakdown and political violence.

Chapter 3: Theory: Expectations and Hypotheses

Introduction

This chapter embarks on a comprehensive journey to understand the intricate dynamics between different modes of breakdowns and political violence. Specifically, it aims to delve deep into the mechanisms through which military coups and popular uprisings influence the level and duration of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime following a breakdown. In doing so, this chapter synthesizes existing literature and develops a framework to illustrate how the mode through which the regime breaks down creates a political environment that influences the level and duration of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime.

As such, this chapter explains two mechanisms connecting military coups and popular uprisings with the violence perpetrated by the incoming regime post-breakdown—or lack thereof. After laying out the mechanisms, this chapter concludes with formulating the hypotheses for empirical testing in the following chapters.

This chapter's first section examines the mechanisms linking military coups with post-breakdown state violence, focusing on how different factors at play, which are associated with the events of the military coup, impact state violence. It analyzes factors ranging from the consolidation of power, repression tactics,

institutional erosion, political polarization, and the international response to unravel the pathways through which military coups catalyze and exacerbate state violence, both in the immediate aftermath of a regime breakdown and over a prolonged period.

Following the first section, this chapter examines the mechanisms linking popular uprisings with post-breakdown state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime. It investigates how the participatory nature of popular uprisings mitigates the likelihood of state violence from the incoming regime following a breakdown. Specifically, it explores different variables, including but not limited to the role of legitimacy, governance structures, institutional continuity, economic development, and international support.

Drawing on these analyses, the chapter concludes by presenting the hypothesis that will be tested empirically in the subsequent chapters. The formulated hypotheses offer comparative insights into the impact of military coups and popular uprisings on the level and duration of state violence in the short and long term.

1. Relevant Theories

Several theories have been proposed regarding the long-term effects of violence in general. These theories argue that political violence can lead to socio-economic consequences, such as decreased trust in state institutions, reduced investment, and slower economic growth (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Additionally, over time, political violence can undermine the rule of law and perpetuate cycles of retaliation that can persist for generations. It can also exacerbate existing divisions and make it more challenging to build an inclusive society (Weinstein, 2006).

Beyond the examination of political violence as the independent variable in the sections above, an ongoing academic debate exists surrounding the extent to which the mode of regime breakdown impacts the perpetuation of violence during regime breakdown. The cornerstone of the debate is best articulated by Geddes (1999). In the words of Stradiotto and Guo (2010, pg. 26):

> "Geddes (1999) argues different types of authoritarian governments have varying effects on the incentives facing regime supporters when the status quo is challenged and classifies authoritarian regimes into three primary categories: military, single party and personalistic. According to Geddes, "...military regimes tend to split when challenged, personalist regimes... circle the wagons, and single-party regimes co-opt their challengers." Geddes' argument suggests that military regimes are more likely to negotiate a withdrawal and democratize. Personalist regimes rarely leave office voluntarily; as a result, these transitions are violent such as revolution or intervention. Single-party regimes tend to

survive the longest, even under severe economic crises, but when

they do end, it is through negotiation."

Building on this, Balcells (2015) contributes to the discourse with a more recent study, asserting that economic conditions before regime breakdown shape the potential for a violent process. Cheeseman and Klaas (2018) also follow in Geddes' (1999) footsteps by suggesting that the prior regime type and the political elite's response can synergistically influence the extent of violence during the breakdown. Additionally, Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) posit that the prominence of political polarization and the prevalence of armed groups also play a crucial role in determining the likelihood of violence. Scholars like Gates (2002) and Sisk (2009) argue that the extent to which institutions provide a framework for conflict resolution and promote political stability can significantly impact the course of violence. Crucially, political elites wield substantial influence, as their decisions play a pivotal role in determining the nature and scale of political violence. This point is illustrated by the choice made by political elites either to pursue their goals through force or to seek a peaceful compromise (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2006).

Adding context to Geddes's (1999) argument, other scholars briefly discuss how different modes of regime breakdown can potentially lead to varying levels of

violence. Tilly (1979) argues that popular uprisings are associated with high levels of political violence. According to him, such uprisings often entail extensive mobilization of citizens, rendering the political landscape more challenging for the government to manage and creating opportunities for violent reactions. In contrast, Brancati (2009) takes a divergent stance, asserting that military coups significantly contribute to creating a political environment that are conducive to high levels of violence. This perspective is grounded in the idea that military coups typically involve force and breaking down state institutions.

While the arguments presented above, specifically by Tilly (1979) and Brancati (2009), touch upon the relationship between the mode of breakdown and political violence, they do not encompass an overarching theoretical framework that explains whether the mode of breakdown can explain the levels and duration of violence. As such, this thesis seeks to explore this argument in greater depth.

2. Rationale of the Theory

As illustrated above, the existing theories that predict the level of violence experienced following a regime breakdown encompass different explanations; some scholars argue that the regime type prior to the breakdown affects the level of violence post-breakdown, others seek to explain the level of violence in the aftermath of regime breakdowns by examining different structural factors, such as economic conditions before the breakdown, the level of political polarization

during the breakdown, the role of the political elite and the extent to which conflict resolution efforts have been exerted.

While recognizing the viability of these arguments, this research presents an alternative approach to studying political violence in the wake of regime breakdown. At the heart of this chapter's analysis lies a fundamental question: How do different modes of breakdown influence the level of duration of state violence by the incoming regime after the breakdown? Whereas the different modes of breakdown are widely discussed in the literature, as presented in Chapter 2, the critical role they play in shaping the dynamics of the political arena after breakdowns is frequently overlooked. This omission in the study of democratization points to a gap in the connection between two different streams in the literature; on one side of the argument, the elements leading to a mode of breakdown and the difference between the modes are discussed, whereas on the other the implications of each mode on the subsequent political system are discussed.

While Geddes's (1999) notable efforts contributed to a breakthrough argument on how military, single-party, and personalistic regimes transition differently post-regime breakdown, no scholarly efforts have been made to argue for a connection between the mode of breakdown and specific factors in the post-breakdown sphere—or the lack thereof. The absence of work on this topic is

surprising, especially considering how frequently modes of breakdown are discussed. This omission is even more surprising given the scholarly consensus on the importance of the mode through which the regime broke down.

Given that the breadth of this gap in the scholarly literature is so extensive, this thesis has chosen to focus on a specific subset of this under-researched topic. While synthesizing the existing scholarly work, the argument that will be examined and developed in the following chapters focuses on the gap in understanding around how the nature of (A) military coups and (B) popular uprisings create a political environment that impacts the level and duration of state violence after regime breakdown.

In addition to synthesizing the literature on political violence after regime breakdown, this thesis delves into a crucial aspect often overlooked in existing studies. While prevailing arguments typically focus on the violence that unfolds in the different stages associated with the regime-building process following a breakdown, this thesis takes a different approach in this context. Rather than examining the violence perpetrated by the incumbent regime in response to military coups or popular uprisings, the arguments presented below focus on the levels and durations of violence perpetrated by the regime, which assumes power after a breakdown. The deliberate choice to specifically examine the violence by the post-breakdown incoming regime and not the incumbent one serves an

essential purpose; it allows for an in-depth analysis of how the mode of breakdown shapes the post-breakdown sphere beyond the immediate response of the incumbent regime and how the mechanism through which power transitioned leaves an effect on the newly formed regime.

Importantly, this thesis does not aim to explore how incumbent regimes respond to violence during military coups and popular uprisings. Instead, the primary focus lies in illustrating how modes of breakdown, namely military coups and popular uprisings, create different conditions in the post-breakdown context that impact the level and duration of state violence. Going forward with this examination and directing attention to the violence perpetrated by the incoming regime, this thesis seeks to uncover the consequences and impacts of both modes of breakdown, which are argued to shift the evolving landscape of state violence in the aftermath of regime breakdowns.

Lastly, it is crucial to highlight that this thesis is interested in the institutional legacy of violence that emerges after military coups or popular uprisings. As such, this thesis does not aim to contribute to the question of democratization post-regime breakdown. While high or low levels of state violence are indicative of the presence of democratic values or the lack thereof, this analysis will be conducted independently of the regime type that emerges after regime breakdown. Fully acknowledging that the legacy of violence is intertwined with

democratization processes, the quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 will control for the effect of the democracy level. However, in the theory discussed below, the main focus remains fixated on the effect of the mode of breakdown on the institutional legacy of violence in the post-breakdown sphere.

3. Understanding Military Coups

The threat of violence is reinforced in military coups in comparison to other modes of regime breakdown, e.g., voluntary resignation and peaceful transfers of power (Luttwak, 1979; De Bruin, 2019). Nevertheless, the extent of violence in coups varies in different cases. In some cases, the military takes over the power without bloodshed (e.g., in Nigeria in 1993, Fiji in 2006, and 1992 in Peru) (De Bruin, 2019), other cases demonstrate that coup plotters resort to violence and result in mass killings (e.g., Dominican Republic 1965 and Guinea Bissau in 1998) (Bosch, 2007; Dixon & Sarkees, 2015).

In an attempt to explain why some coups are violent, and others are not, scholars have focused their attention on the dynamics of coup attempts in hopes of explaining the variation in the level of violence during coups. In this context, two overarching schools of thought have emerged in the literature, explaining why we can predict coup plotters to either use violence or deliberately avoid it.

Regime breakdowns occurring via military coups are typically characterized by a group of military officers' sudden, violent takeover of power. However, before the takeover, coup plotters plan and coordinate their attack by recruiting potential supporters in the state apparatus. The coordination and consultation are usually close in time of the coup to ultimately maintain secrecy before their attack (Stepan, 2015; Nordlinger, 1977). The number of coup conspirators is usually very low to avoid the danger of the regime finding out about their planes, leaving the majority of military officers not committed to their side (De Bruin, 2019). During the first hours of the coup, the conspirators and plotters aim to capture centers that symbolize the takeover of power (e.g., parliament, presidential palace) and mass media stations to livestream their attack (Geddes, 1999; De Bruin, 2019; Singh, 2014).

The literature broadly agrees that the level of violence associated with a coup depends on two factors: (A) how the incumbent regime responds and (B) how the military and security forces respond. Beyond this agreement, the literature proposes different, often contradictory, arguments. On the one hand, some studies assert that coup plotters are incentivized to avoid intra-military violence and, when able, consult with as many officers as possible in advance to have their coup successful without visible force or resistance from the military (De Bruin, 2019; Geddes, 1999; Lutwak, 2016). Likewise, it is argued by Geddes (1999) that the worst outcome for a military coup is the scenario in which civil war breaks out

between the different armed forces within the military fighting each other. Similarly, coup plotters also avoid violence to maintain support for the coup and ensure unity and cohesion within the military (Needler, 1975).

On the other hand, other studies assert that coup plotters use violence to suppress opposition and maintain power when the military coup succeeds and successfully forms a new military regime. More specifically, it is argued that the level of violence is likely to remain high in the immediate aftermath of the takeover because coups are likely to increase state repression, even when they target repressive autocrats (Lachapelle, 2020). Increased violence and repression can be explained by the fact that military leaders typically reduce executive constraints in the post-coup sphere, are unable to deliver economic benefits in the short term, and may be faced with strong popular support from the ousted regime (Thyne & Powell, 2016).

Recognizing that the literature only entails different arguments on whether military coups are violent without generating statistical predictions on when coup violence can occur, De Bruin (2019) develops a theoretical model that considers the likelihood of success, cost of defeat, and cost of violence. The result suggests that when the incumbent regimes and military officers can estimate the likelihood of the coup succeeding, the outcome of the coup is likely to be coordinated without violence. When the post-coup outcome appears dire, the cost of defeat is

higher than the cost of violence. In this scenario, the incumbent regime will likely use violence to combat the coup. In contrast, when the regime perceives a reasonable prospect of peaceful retirement, they are likely to relinquish their power without violent fighting. Lastly, if all actors perceive the cost of violence to be high, they are likely incentivized to avoid the use of it.

4. Mechanisms of Military Coups and Post-Breakdown State Violence

Understanding the mechanisms that connect military coups with post-regime breakdown state violence is paramount to synthesizing the existing literature on political violence after regime breakdown. While recognizing that the literature in the section above covers the different dynamics of a presidential overthrow perpetrated by military officers, this section builds on the insights gained from the existing arguments. It mainly aims to construct a coherent framework that elucidates the pathways through which the nature of military coups creates a political environment in the post-breakdown context that influences the level and duration of state violence. It does so by focusing on the actions of the incoming regime rather than the incumbent one and examining different factors that influence the outbreak of state violence.

By elucidating the mechanism through which military coups and post-breakdown state violence are intricately interconnected, this section delves deep into different variables that influence patterns of violence. As such, these variables are analyzed: power consolidation and repression, institutional erosion, political

polarization and social fragmentation, international response, economic stability and domestic resource allocation, and lastly, transitional justice processes. By exploring these factors, this section presents a comprehensive mechanism of how military coups catalyze, perpetuate, and exacerbate state violence in the immediate aftermath of regime breakdown and in the long run.

Following a successful military coup, heightened uncertainty and instability are often prevalent (Koehler & Albrecht, 2021), providing fertile ground for increased state violence. The incoming military regime typically embarks on a path to consolidate its power, legitimize its authority, and establish its control over the state apparatus. This consolidation process involves many forms of violence – against public dissent, opposition forces, or incumbent leaders' resistance – and simply any perceived threats to the new military regime's stability (Slovik, 2015). The new incoming military regime commits significant human rights violations (Lachapelle, 2020), including but not limited to the repression of political opponents, activists, and any perceived sympathizers of the ousted regime who often face arbitrary arrest, extrajudicial killings, or systematic oppression. The objectives of this type of state-led repression are twofold. On one hand, the consolidation of power is the immediate, short-term objective. On the other hand, instilling fear in the long run is vital to ensure the sustained dominance of the incoming regime. It is worth noting that how military coups are orchestrated inherently disrupts the existing institutional continuity by creating a power vacuum that the incoming regime aims to fill rapidly. In the context of power

consolidation, the use of violence by the incoming regime becomes a fundamental means of asserting dominance and dismantling potential threats to its rule.

In the period of power consolidation, the incoming military regime works to dismantle the existing institutions – whether previously democratic or authoritarian. The erosion of civilian control over institutional structures undermines the principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law and enables the regime to impose authoritarian institutional structures (Beliakova, 2021). Hence, when there are no institutional checks and balances to hold the incoming military regime accountable in a fair manner (Bennett et al., 2019), the regime creates conducive conditions for the proliferation of violence and the use of coercion to maintain its grip on authority in the long run. Even the new institutions established by the incoming regime in the post-coup political landscape can be expected to prioritize the interests of the military over the civilian interests. This can pave the way for militarizing institutions, state apparatuses, the economy, and the overall entrenchment of military influence in different governance structures. This militarization exacerbates the inclination for state violence even further, as any threat to the stability of these governance structures is directly a threat to the interest of the military, which can lead to the prioritization of regime stability and security over respect for civil liberties.

The militarization of the institutional structures following a military coup can have profound implications for transitional justice, which directly influences the

patterns of state violence and domestic conflict resolution. The transitional justice processes are manifested in prosecutions, truth commissions, and institutional reforms. These manifestations are crucial in addressing human rights abuses, promoting accountability, and achieving reconciliation. However, it is noteworthy to understand that transitional justice can only be successful when coupled with the political will of the perpetrators to acknowledge their past mistakes. In the context where the perpetrators of violence remain unpunished, the existing grievances and the continuity of the cycles of violence persist. However, the militarization of transitional justice processes and, in turn, their ineffectiveness paves the way for the incoming regime to maintain the use of violence to repress any perceived threats without being held accountable judicially for its acts of violence and injustices. As a result, the militarization of the transitional justice processes increases the likelihood of state violence in the short and long term in the post-coup political landscape.

Whereas military coups aimed at orchestrating a rapid and swift transfer of power via the coup, they can give rise to resistance and insurgency from the different segments of the society opposing the incoming regime (Cynkin, 1982). Although, as discussed above, the incoming regime is likely to respond with violence and force to suppress dissent and consolidate its power, insurgent movements and armed resistance can still emerge. These movements, fueled by grievances about the coup, can challenge the regime's stability. As such, the incoming regime's response in this context can further exacerbate the likelihood of state violence, as

63

the regime can go to extreme extents to impose its rule and maintain its control amid insurgency movements. Counterinsurgency operations, characterized by a cycle of indiscriminate violence and human rights abuses, are also enabled by the militarization of institutional governance, which encourages the incoming regime to amplify its use of violence and force as a primary means to address political threats and challenges. This also affects the likelihood of state violence in the long run.

Likewise, the post-coup political landscape can also exacerbate existing political polarization and social fragmentations between different segments of society (Aydin-Düzgit & Balta, 2017), which can lead to intense tensions and conflicts manifesting different types of violence. The other ethnic, religious, or ideological cleavages within the society can be defined as a result of the various perceptions of the coup based on the different affiliations and interests. As a result, the incoming regime, which seeks the consolidation and legitimacy of power, can exploit these divisions by co-opting specific segments and mobilizing their support while marginalizing others. In doing so, the incoming regime can perpetuate intergroup rivalries and violence as a means of suppressing the opposition. This can breed resistance from the opposition and fuel cycles of violence and counter-violence.

Beyond domestic factors, the consolidation of power by the incoming regime can attract international attention. The different international responses to coups are

shaped by several factors, including but not limited to geopolitical interests, material interests, and normative commitments to human rights (Shannon et al., 2015). Foreign interventions brought about by diplomatic pressure or instigated by economic sanctions or military intervention can influence the level of violence in the post-coup landscape. While international condemnation of the coup and economic isolation can constrain the ability of the incoming regime to resort to violence, international support or indifference can encourage the regime to resort to excessive violence against its perceived threats. Another viable scenario in which international actors involve themselves in the post-coup sphere is when they provide the opposition support or encourage the incoming regime to restore domestic order. This form of intervention can aggravate existing tensions and thus contribute to the perpetuation of state violence.

Furthermore, military coups also have significant implications for economic stability and resource allocation within the regime (Blum & Gründler, 2020), which also affect the likelihood of state violence in the post-coup timeframe and in the long run. The economic disruption following a coup, political uncertainty, international investing confidence, and capital flight can create economic grievances and exacerbate social inequalities. These grievances and inequalities fuel public dissent and opposition resistance to the incoming regime. In response to these threats, the incoming regime can prioritize resource allocation towards security and defense sectors to hold onto its power and suppress perceived threats. This prioritization can divert the resource allocation away from social welfare and

development sectors. The militarization of the state perpetuates cycles of state violence, deepens economic grievances and socio-economic inequalities, and, lastly, strengthens the civilian resentment against the military regime.

In summary, military coups serve as catalysts for the perpetuation of state violence. The different processes investigated above – including the erosion of the previous institutions, the militarization of the political sphere and the economy, and the state's response to opposition – elucidate how the incoming regime creates conducive conditions for the perpetuation of violence immediately after they overthrow the incumbent regime and assume control over the state, but also on the longer run after they have consolidated their power.

5. Understanding Popular Uprisings

Not all regime breakdowns facilitated by popular uprisings are alike. While some uprisings are primarily characterized by violence, with armed opposition challenging the existing regime, others unfold through nonviolent means (Schock, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). In the timeframe between 1950 and 2013, it is estimated that mass killings occurred in approximately 43% of all popular uprisings challenging the existing regimes (Chenoweth & Perkoski, 2018).

Existing literature addressing the extent of political violence during regime breakdowns via popular uprisings commonly focuses on structural factors to explain the use of violence from both state and non-state actors. Two widely held

explanations to explain mass killings during uprisings are capacity and threat (Hill & Jones, 2014). When a popular uprising breaks out, the existing regime is more likely to resort to physical violence if the military has the strategic logistic capability and financial capacity to coordinate and go through with mass killings. If such capacity exists within the military, non-state actors and key opposition figures in the popular uprising will likely find this intimidating. Existing literature asserts that the existing regime is likely to resort to violence and mass killing if the uprising poses an existential threat to its survival and its rule (Hill & Jones, 2014). Therefore, mass violence from state actors typically occurs during popular uprisings to maintain the status quo if their military is sufficiently capable and if the uprising is perceived as a threat (Valentino, 2003). Structural theorists also take into account regime type, power concentration, GDP per capita, level of democracy, power concentration, ethnic fractionalization, population number, and recent history of coup attempts (in the country or neighboring countries) when theorizing on the level of state violence in specific instances of popular uprisings (Chenoweth & Perkoski, 2018).

Recent theories on political violence during regime breakdowns have emerged via popular uprisings extending beyond structural theories. Chenoweth and Perkoski (2018) build on the theories outlined above and argue that the characteristics of an uprising and the strategic interaction between the opposition and the regime can explain the likelihood of subsequent state-based violence. Specifically, they argue

that the primary mode of contention of the uprising (violent versus nonviolent), the behavior of the military during the uprising, the degree of foreign support to the uprising, and the opposition's goal shape the government's response. The study finds that nonviolent resistance and uprisings are less threatening to the regime and decrease the likelihood of a violent reaction. Contrarily, violent uprisings increase the threat of the regime's rule over power and the personal safety of its leaders. Therefore, the existing regimes will go to any lengths to maintain their power, with mass violence being positioned as a last resort for them. Regime leaders who order the military to attack unarmed civilians, specifically in nonviolent uprisings, risk the defection of the military and insubordination. For this reason, leaders are less likely to suggest launching mass violence and atrocities in non-violent uprisings and resistance. Lastly, when foreign states provide material aid to the dissidents within the uprising, the likelihood of mass violence increases from violent insurgencies that are against the regime – overall increasing the possibility of violence as a response from the existing regime.

6. Mechanisms of Popular Uprisings and Post-Breakdown State Violence

Understanding the mechanisms connecting popular uprisings with post-regime breakdown state violence is further paramount to synthesizing the existing literature on political violence after regime breakdown. Whereas the literature in the section above covers the different elements related to a regime breakdown by

a popular uprising, this section builds upon these arguments to construct a framework elucidating how the nature of a popular uprising creates a political environment that can affect the level of violence perpetrated by the incoming regime following a successful post-uprising breakdown.

By illustrating the mechanism through which popular uprisings and post-breakdown state violence are intricately interconnected, this section delves deep into different variables that influence patterns of violence. As such, these variables are analyzed: legitimacy, governance structures, institutional continuity, democratic transition, economic development, and international support. By exploring these factors, this section presents a comprehensive mechanism of how the participatory nature of popular uprisings ipso facto decreases the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime.

First, it is essential to highlight that popular uprisings are likely to gain domestic and international legitimacy from broad public support and a perceived alignment within the society on popular grievances against the incumbent regime. Unlike the events associated with military coups, which may lack legitimacy and face resistance from both domestic and international actors, uprisings often enjoy legitimacy if the participants are diversely representative of different demographics, the events are rooted in a grassroots nature, and the demands align with the principles of democracy (Bartkowski, 2016). As a result of the legitimacy of the events of the uprising, the incoming regime following the breakdown is

presented with a crucial opportunity to establish its authority through peaceful and inclusive means. By capitalizing on the democratic spirit of the uprising, the incoming regime can consolidate and maintain its power without resorting to violence as a means – it can instead do so by engaging in dialogue with the opposition and instituting reforms that are responsive to popular demands.

Furthermore, the legitimacy garnered from popular uprisings leaves a sense of national unity and collective identity, which promotes social cohesion and transcends existing socio-economic and ideological divisions (Adler, 2012). Suppose the incoming regime capitalizes on this opportunity by emphasizing common values. In that case, it can consolidate its power by providing the public with a sense of shared responsibility that comes with its support for the regime. The collective sense of shared responsibility in the immediate aftermath of the uprising can be translated into inclusive governance structures that promote citizen participation. If the incoming regime harnesses the participatory approach post-uprising, it can enhance its legitimacy and simultaneously decrease the likelihood of resorting to violence to suppress dissent and opposition.

When an incoming regime assumes power after a popular uprising, a significant challenge for its leaders is restoring public trust in the governance and institutional structures (Ishiyama & Pechenina, 2016). Therefore, in the short term, at least, the incoming regime needs to provide a foundation for institutional continuity, show a willingness to foster a democratic transition, and uphold the

rule of law. The participatory nature of popular uprisings fosters a culture of civic engagement and political activism, often followed by citizens' demand for a strengthened social contract between the incoming regime and its citizens. This social contract includes an open dialogue through which citizens can hold their leaders accountable and expect transparency. As such, the incoming regime is left with no choice but to uphold democratic norms and employ a participatory governance approach to consolidate its power in the short term. The civilian expectations for its incoming regime immediately post-regime breakdown ipso facto create a political environment in which there is no room for the incoming regime to consolidate its power by violent means and repression. Contrarily, the incoming regime can only gain domestic legitimacy if inclusivity, transparency, and representation are promoted in the political process immediately after it assumes power.

On an economic note, while popular uprisings may have a short-term negative economic impact by disrupting economic activities and undermining investor confidence, they do not carry the risk of prolonged economic instability and uncertainty as military coups. On the contrary, popular uprisings present the incoming regime with economic development opportunities (Sadiki, 2000). Implementing inclusive economic policies and addressing underlying socio-economic grievances will help the incoming regime overcome the threats related to potential social unrest and violent conflict. Support and assistance from the international community in reconstructing the economy following the collapse

of the previous regime will also reduce the likelihood of employing violent means to restore economic justice. While popular uprisings do not guarantee immediate economic prosperity and stability, the opportunity for civil society actors and grassroots organizations to assert more influence promotes greater economic resilience and innovation in the long term.

Finally, another element that could explain the state violence patterns post-uprising is international support (Stewart et al., 2016). Popular uprisings often attract significant international attention. Therefore, the incoming regime may draw support from foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions. Unlike military coups, which may be diplomatically isolated and faced with economic sanctions, the international solidarity of popular uprisings can help the incoming regime consolidate and maintain its power without resorting to violence. The link between international support for the incoming regime can operate via two different channels: First, the various forms of international support, e.g., diplomatic pressure, economic aid, and humanitarian assistance, can be of significant importance for the incoming regime and thus, the regime will not risk losing this support at the risk of international condemnation resulting from state violence. Second, international solidarity also significantly increases the legitimacy of the incoming regime, decreasing the extent to which opposition groups will be perceived as a threat to its survival –

therefore reducing the likelihood of the state resorting to violence to suppress these groups.

In conclusion, the nature of popular uprisings can transform the post-breakdown political landscape and shape the trajectories of the incoming regime's use of violence. By fostering legitimacy, principles of good governance, social cohesion, democratic transition, and economic development while simultaneously leveraging international support, the incoming regime is left with little room to resort to state violence as a means to consolidate and maintain its power. Instead, citizens' demands of political change, accountability, and transparency lay the groundwork and create an opportunity for the incoming regime to either (A) consolidate its power by responding to civilian demands or (B) consolidate its power based on the momentum of the international support without necessarily responding to these demands. However, whichever option the regime chooses, the likelihood of using violence to consolidate and maintain power is decreased – because, in both scenarios, the threat posed by the opposition is not likely to be perceived as a challenge to the regime's stability.

7. Hypothesis Building

The discussion of the mechanisms linking military coups and popular uprisings with the level of violence perpetrated by the incoming regime after a regime breakdown has been instrumental in analyzing how the different elements associated with both coups and uprisings can create different post-breakdown

political environments that impact the extent to which states resort to violence. As such, this section presents the hypotheses that have been derived from the theoretical framework above on the level and duration of state violence, both in the immediate aftermath and over prolonged periods. The following hypotheses encapsulate the expected arguments from the preceding sections and will be tested quantitatively in the next chapter of this thesis. They are formulated as follows;

H1: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in the short term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising.

Hypothesis 1 postulates that military coups' abrupt and coercive nature predisposes the incoming regime to instigate state violence immediately after the regime breaks down to consolidate its power. The intense suppression of opposition forces often accompanies the swift assumption of power by military officers and, therefore, is expected to result in a surge in state violence in the short term. Different elements, including but not limited to the challenges of consolidating power, resistance from the ousted regime and opposition groups, and the need to establish authority abruptly increase the likelihood of the use of violence by the incoming regime.

H2: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in the long term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising.

Building upon the promise of the first hypothesis, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the resonance of military coups is likely to extend beyond the immediate aftermath and its repercussions, as the incoming regime can perpetuate state violence over an extended timeframe to hold its grip on power. Factors such as the erosion of previous institutions, the militarization of governance structures, and the suppression of democratic norms are all characteristics that have emerged from the nature of military coups and contribute to a greater likelihood of state violence in the long term.[1]

As mentioned above, the hypotheses present a set of core concepts to explore empirically in the following chapters. They are intended to provide a framework

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[1]In other words, the hypotheses can also be formulated as following:

H1: A regime that emerges after a popular uprising is less likely to instigate violence in the short term than a regime that emerges after a military coup.

In contrast to military coups, the nature of popular uprisings, which are characterized by grassroots mobilization and collective action, impact the incoming regime's use of violence. The broad legitimacy and participatory nature of uprisings create an immediate political environment for the incoming regime that mitigates the use of violent measures in the short term. Instead, it fosters a conducive environment for democratic transition and governance, reducing the likelihood of immediate state violence in the short term following a breakdown.

H2: A regime that emerges after a popular uprising is less likely to instigate violence in the long term han a regime that emerges after a military coup.

Extending on the rationale of the third hypothesis, Hypothesis 4 suggests that the conditions created by popular uprisings leave a long-lasting effect on the incoming regime's use of violence. The demands for political change during the uprisings often result in accountability in governance structures and socio-economic reform. This contributes to the facilitation of political stability and democratic resilience in the long-term post-breakdown context and decreases the likelihood of state violence.

for a comprehensive insight into the multidimensional relationship between state violence perpetrated by incoming regimes and different modes of regime breakdown. As the complexity of the immediate and cumulative consequences of military coups and popular uprisings is examined from various perspectives, such endeavors will contribute to the existing scholarly knowledge and offer a basis for future scholarship to examine the post-breakdown context from a different lens.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has shed light on the multifaceted mechanisms through which military coups can catalyze and exacerbate state violence. From the abrupt overthrow of the existing regime and the fast consolidation of power and repression tactics used by the incoming military regime to the militarization of institutional and governance structures, this chapter has dissected different factors through which military coups engender violence committed by the incoming regime. Similarly, this chapter has examined the mechanisms linking popular uprising with post-breakdown state violence. It has underscored how the participatory nature of popular uprisings influences legitimacy, governance structures, economic development, and the level of international support – thereby linking how these factors help mitigate the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime after the breakdown.

At the heart of this chapter's analysis lies a fundamental question: How do different modes of breakdown influence the level and duration of state violence

by the incoming regime? The hypotheses presented herein offer insights to answer this question for two modes of breakdown, namely military coups and popular uprisings. The following chapters build upon the mechanism developed in this chapter and the hypotheses presented herein with an empirical analysis.

Chapter 4: Operationalization, Data, and Findings

Introduction

This chapter undertakes a quantitative analysis to explore the relationship between the mode of breakdown and the subsequent level of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime following the breakdown. It aims to test the hypotheses outlined in the preceding chapter and draw robust conclusions regarding the effect of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence by the incoming regime.

Without further ado, Part I of this chapter sets the stage by creating the scaffolding of the analysis. It introduces the Varieties of Democracy Index and elucidates the different variables employed to measure the independent, dependent, and control variables. Moreover, it provides a detailed analysis of the selected timeframe from the analysis, spanning from 1900 until 2013, and delineates the specific cut-off points utilized to measure state violence by the incoming regime one year, five years, and ten years following each observation of a military coup or popular uprising within the selected timeframe.

Part II delves into the heart of the analysis and unveils the findings after employing Ordinary Least Squares beta regression models to estimate the effect of military coups and popular uprisings on the level and duration of state violence across the selected timeframe and cut-off points. Through a systematic examination of the different coefficients, standard errors, and significance levels, this chapter aims to answer the following question: How does the mode of breakdown affect state violence by the incoming regime?

The analysis explored below shows that military coups are more likely to be associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. Moreover, the findings illustrate that the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of violence by the incoming regime diminishes ten years after the breakdown. After elucidating and discussing the empirical patterns detected in the different regression models, this chapter concludes by discussing the potential limitations that can arise from the analysis, thereby providing a comprehensive understanding of the scope and implications of the findings.

Part I: Operationalization

1. Timeframe

This paper's research question will be analyzed quantitatively using OLS beta regression models. The three models will measure the extent of political violence during (1) one year after the breakdown, (2) five years after the breakdown, and

(3) ten years after the breakdown. By doing so, this research will measure levels of state violence by the incoming regime associated with each mode of regime breakdown for ten years following the original incident of each breakdown. As a result, interpretations of the data will examine the short- and long-term variations in the level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime associated with each mode of breakdown.

The selection of the cut-off points in this analysis (one, five, and ten years) is driven by a dual consideration of both short- and long-term effects following a regime breakdown. A one-year post-regime breakdown examination allows immediate analysis of the post-breakdown scenario, capturing the incoming regime's initial reactions and repercussions immediately after its leaders assume power. In other words, this short-term perspective is essential for understanding the immediate impact different modes of breakdown have on the first orders of business of the incoming regime. The choice of a five-year timeframe enables the analysis of medium-term effects. It facilitates a nuanced analysis of how the dynamics of state violence evolve over a more extended period of time while still considering the distinctive features of each mode. Lastly, choosing a ten-year timeframe provides an understanding of the long-term repercussions. It simultaneously acknowledges that the impact of the mode of regime breakdown on the level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime can extend far beyond the immediate assumption of power and allows for an analysis of the

sustained impact of each breakdown on the evolution of violence over time. This approach to timeframes, coupled with a specific focus on the mode of breakdown, enables a thorough analysis of the temporal dimensions of state violence by the incoming regime in the post-breakdown sphere.

While the choice of the timeframe may prompt reasonable questions about the choice of the specific cut-off points, it is essential to acknowledge that these intervals are both arbitrary and logically selected. This analysis establishes a foundation for exploring temporal dimensions of state violence by the incoming regime following regime breakdowns. Therefore, starting with these particular timeframes stems from the need for a practical and manageable analysis. Recognizing that the manifestations and dynamics of state violence are complex and multifaceted, the chosen timeframes provide an initial framework to delve into this complexity. Viewing these cutoff years as a starting point is essential, and fully acknowledging that future research can build upon and extend these temporal boundaries. The goal of this research is to lay the groundwork for a nuanced understanding of the effect of the mode of regime breakdown on state violence by the incoming regime. It comes with the flexibility to refine and expand the temporal dimensions in future studies.

The quantitative analysis in this study covers the period from 1900 to 2013. This timeframe was selected to ensure sufficient data availability while

accommodating the measurement of the lagged effects of state violence up to ten years following an observation of a regime breakdown. As such, the inclusion of data from 1900 onwards enables the analysis of a significant number of observations, whereas stopping at 2013 serves as a meaningful endpoint to examine the long-term effects of the mode of breakdown on state violence.

2. Independent and Dependent Variables

The measurements of the independent and dependent variables are all derived from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset (2024) for ease of data collection and vary over the timeframe of 1900-2013. The V-Dem Dataset offers extensive political, social, and economic indications, providing a multidimensional perspective of democratic processes and governance worldwide. By leveraging access to more than 350 indicators and observations that date back to the French Revolution, my analysis enjoys a robust foundation of operationalizing the variables with measurements that provide insights into the complexities and nuances of regime breakdown and state violence.

The selection of the V-Dem Index (2024) as the sole source for independent, dependent, and control variables in this research is driven by practical considerations to enhance the efficiency and efficacy of data collection within the specified timeframe. Opting for one overarching database offering data for the different variables used in this analysis offers a solution for coding consistency.

Likewise, it is also considered a pragmatic approach to the overall research proposal as it minimizes potential discrepancies that could arise from integrating data from different sources and ensuring a more streamlined analysis.

As the consolidation of data from different sources and databases is a practice done in many papers, the decision to rely solely on V-dem (2024) is rooted in the necessity for a manageable analysis within the given timeframe for the thesis. While acknowledging that the V-Dem (2024) Index, like any dataset, has received both acclaim and criticism, the research seeks to strike a balance between practicality and awareness of the potential limitations of relying on a single database. It recognizes that this choice involves a trade-off but is essential for the feasibility of this research.

For the independent variable, the mode of regime breakdown measurement will be operationalized with the "Regime End Type" variable from the V-Dem Index (2024). The selection of this variable to operationalize the mode of regime breakdown is deliberate and aligns seamlessly with the objectives of this research. The variable, developed by Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020), offers a classification of the modes through which each observation of regime breakdown occurred in the specified timeframe of 1900-2013. This research will extract data from this variable, coded as a dummy variable, to indicate the mode through which a regime breakdown occurred and how the preceding regime ended. This

binary nature facilitates precise quantification and categorization to distinguish between each mode of breakdown. The decision to code this variable a binary allows for straightforward identification of (A) military coups and (B) popular uprisings. As such, modes of breakdown that occurred via military coups are coded as 0, and modes of breakdown that occurred via popular uprisings are coded as 1. This variable's inherent strength lies in its ability to provide detailed and specific observations for each instance of regime breakdown. Therefore, it clarifies the mode of breakdown that led to the assumption of power by the incoming regime in the post-breakdown sphere. Moreover, through this dummy variable, this analysis is able to control for the effect of the different categories (military coups vs. popular uprisings) within the data and isolate the impact of other continuous variables or modes of breakdown. By extracting data to indicate each observation of a regime breakdown via military coup or popular uprising, the quantitative analysis of this paper will be able to statistically explore the variations in levels and durations of state violence by the incoming regimes that emerged after either mode of breakdown within the specified timeframe of 1900-2013, thereby contributing to test the different hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2 on the impact of military coups and popular uprisings on the use of violence by the incoming regime. In the specified timeframe, the dependent variable includes 2,493 observations for regime breakdown via military coup and 351 observations for popular uprisings.

For the dependent variables, typically, the quantification of political violence encompasses the following categorization: physical vs. non-physical violence and state vs- non-state actors' use of violence. As this study primarily focuses on state violence by the incoming regime, the analysis below narrows this down to focus on the physical violence by state actors to ensure a concentrated analysis. In this context, this study has prioritized the measurement of violence from state actors in the analysis. This choice provides a more focused approach to exploring political violence exercised by state actors while maintaining flexibility for potential future analyses. As such, first, the state violence variable will be run from data by the Physical Violence Index, which defines the absence of violence as the "freedom from political killings and torture by the government" (Skaaning in V-dem Codebook, 2024). The dependent variable is coded as an interval variable with a scale of 0-1, 0 representing low physical violence and 1 representing high physical violence. It is important to note that the dependent variable is coded three times as it will be run in three different models to capture the level of violence one, five, and ten years after the breakdown. As such, the first model that tests the effect of the modes of breakdown on state violence one year after the breakdown will include a lagged dependent model that measures the level of state violence after one year of each observation of military coups and popular uprisings. Likewise, the second model that tests the effect of the modes of breakdown on state violence five years after the breakdown will include a lagged dependent model that measures the level of state violence after five years of each

observation of military coups and popular uprisings. The third and last model that tests the effect of the modes of breakdown on state violence ten years after the breakdown will include a lagged dependent model that measures the level of state violence after ten years of each observation of military coups and popular uprisings. The three lagged dependent variables have 2,844 observations each, with a minimum value of 0.014 and a maximum value of 0.98.

3. Control Variables

Although the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 emphasized different factors linking military coups and popular uprisings to the likelihood of state violence in the post-breakdown there, it is essential to include the same set of control variables in the regression models to facilitate a direct, comparative analysis of the relative impact of both modes of breakdown on the outcome variable. Because control variables help account for other factors that may influence state violence and could potentially confound the relationship between the independent variable (military coups or popular uprisings) and the dependent variable, including the same control variables in all models helps control these potential confounders consistently. If the control variables differ between the models testing military coups and popular uprisings, any observed differences in the effects of both breakdowns can be attributed to the differences in the control variables. As such, this analysis has opted for including common control variables that can influence the effect of both modes of breakdown on state violence to

ensure that the differences observed in the effects of military coups versus popular uprisings on state violence are less likely to be due to differences in the control variables. The sections below draw on the shared contextual factors that can influence state violence after both military coups or popular uprisings.

The models include the following control variables: GDP per capita, democracy level, power structures, socioeconomic inequalities, civil war, and international conflict. **GDP per capita**, the Gross Domestic Product of a country on a per-person basis, reflects the country's economic health. It quantifies the nation's total economic output by dividing it by the number of specified individuals. This variable furnishes a picture concerning the general level of prosperity and its distribution among various societal classes. Economically developed countries with higher income per person tend to enjoy a sense of cohesion and stability in politics (Dalgaard & Olsson, 2013). Including GDP per capita as a control variable in regression models would allow this analysis to account for the impact of economic growth on state violence. As per the modernization theory (Lipset, 1959), we could assume that countries with higher GDP per capita may experience lower violence ways down due to stronger institutions, greater access to resources, and improved living standards. By controlling for GDP per capita, the analysis can isolate the specific effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while accounting for the underlying economic factors.

The level of **democracy** is measured by the Electoral Democracy Index, which is an instrument that evaluates how much the country is labeled with the ideas of electoral democracy. The index compasses different indicators, which include electoral competition, free expression, independent media, and suffrage. Democracies manifest through political systems that center around citizens taking an active part in the decision-making process, holding the leaders accountable, and following the law. Incorporating the Electoral Democracy Index as a control variable is a prerequisite for this analysis to further examine to what extent democratic governance is an impactful factor in the matter of state violence. Higher degrees of democracy at the level of elections could be one of the reasons for lower levels of state violence because accountability, transparency, and peaceful conflict resolution are just some examples (Chenoweth & Perkoski, 2018). Using the democracy level as a control variable allows this research to assess more clearly the unique effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while considering the broader political context.

The concept of **autocratic institutionalization** refers to the degree to which a country's political system demonstrates autocratic characteristics, including limited political competition and highly centralized power structures. Institutionalized autocratic characteristics can result in reduced civil rights and freedoms, lack of political pluralism, and centralization of power in the few hands of the elite, leading to higher levels of violence. This research accounts for the influence of authoritarian political characteristics on state violence by including

the level of autocratic institutionalization among the control variables. Autocratic regimes may use different repressive measures to maintain power, likely leading to higher levels of state violence. As such, this control variable contributes to analyzing the specific effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while considering the broader political environment and power dynamics. Including both democracy level and institutionalized autocratization as control variables is crucial to capture the different dynamics that influence state violence. While democracy levels are reflective of the degree of democratic governance and political freedoms, the degree of institutionalization of autocratic characteristics assesses the concentration of power within a political system.

The level of **socioeconomic inequalities** is controlled via the Equal Distribution Index, which analyzes the level to which tangible and intangible resources are distributed even within a society. This variable determines to what degree resources are distributed in an equal manner among different social groups, including socioeconomic classes, genders, and ethnicities. Socio-economic disparities and unequal resource distribution can exacerbate social cleavages, destabilize political systems, and fuel conflicts within different segments of society (Burgoon, 2006). Including this control variable allows this research to account for the impact of socioeconomic inequalities on state violence. Countries with a more even resource distribution could expect lower conflict, higher social coherence, and a stronger principal-agent relationship with state actors. By controlling for socioeconomic inequalities, this research can isolate the effect of

military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while considering other social and economic factors.

The notion of **civil war** is distinct from international conflicts wherein specific clans or tribes in a given nation engage in violent engagements with the state or each other. Civil wars are sprouted from deeply rooted divisive political, ethnic, or socio-economic factors and also have the potential of leading to a bloody ending for the civilian populations. Including the dummy variable indicating whether there is an ongoing civil war as a control variable enables researchers to investigate the effect of ongoing internal wars on state-directed violence (Kalyvas, 2019). Conflicts in the homeland are likely to be accompanied by toughened state policies. Increased state violence during a civil war can be expected due to the breakdown of governance structures, the check of power and enforcement of order becomes perplexed with the rise of armed groups, and cases of insecurity abound in such countries. As such, the civil war control variable enables the research to assess the effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while accounting for concurrent internal conflicts.

International conflicts are the armed encounters between one country at war against another or between states, and in the context of regime breakdown, can indicate the lack of international support for the breakdown of the regime. International conflicts could shape domestic policies and determine state behavior, including the level of state violence (Gat, 2008). Including the

occurrence of international conflict in the models as a dummy control variable gives this analysis an opportunity to account for the effect of external factors on state violence. Countries engaging in international conflict could experience higher levels of state violence as a result of higher security concerns, increased militarization, and diplomatic tensions. By controlling for international conflict, this research can analyze the specific effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while considering external geopolitical dynamics.

Part II: Findings, Discussion, and Limitations

1. Findings

Table 1: The Effect of Military Coups and Popular Uprisings on State Violence

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
Modes of Breakdown: Military Coups and Popular Uprising	-0.072***	-0.032**	0.007
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.014)
GDP per Capita	-0.007***	-0.002	0.004**
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Democracy	1.116***	0.883***	0.744***
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.039)
Autocratic Institutionalization	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Socioeconomic Inequalities	0.068***	0.074***	0.091***
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Civil War	-0.096***	-0.082***	-0.031
	(0.139)	(0.016)	(0.018)
International Conflict	0.054***	0.029*	0.031*
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Observations	2,305	2,305	2,305
R-squared	0.4579	0.2803	0.1834
Constant	0.118	0.147	0.152
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.011)

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table I presents the findings. I use OLS beta regression models as the dependent variable is an interval variable scaled from 0 to 1 and the data is cross-sectional. The table presented above aims to estimate the effect of the mode of regime breakdown (either a military coup or popular uprising) and the subsequent state violence by the incoming regime in the post-breakdown sphere. Model (1) estimates the effect of military coups and popular uprisings with a lagged dependent variable representing the level of state violence one year after each observation of a military coup or popular uprising. Likewise, Model (2) estimates the effect of military coups and popular uprisings with a lagged dependent variable representing the level of state violence five years after each observation of a military coup or popular uprising. Lastly, Model (3) estimates the effect of military coups and popular uprisings with a lagged dependent variable representing the level of state violence ten years after each observation of a military coup or popular uprising.

It remains crucial to reiterate that the independent variable is coded as a dummy variable, wherein 0 corresponds to observations for regime breakdowns via popular uprisings, and 1 corresponds to observations for regime breakdowns via military coups. Therefore, a negative coefficient would imply that instances of regime breakdowns enabled by popular uprisings are associated with decreased violence by the incoming regime in comparison to regime breakdowns via military coups. Conversely, if the coefficient is positive, it suggests a higher

likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime following regime breakdowns via military coups when compared to regime breakdowns via popular uprisings.

Model (1), which examines state violence by the incoming regime one-year post-regime breakdown, shows that regime breakdowns via popular uprisings are associated with a decrease in state violence by the incoming regime in comparison to breakdowns enabled through military coups. Keeping all variables constant, the coefficient (-0.072) indicates that a regime breakdown via a popular uprising is associated with a 7% decrease in the probability of state violence by the incoming regime compared to regime breakdowns via military coups. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. All control variables included in Model 1 demonstrate a statistically significant association with state violence at the 1% level except for the control variable measuring the institutionalization of autocratic features, which fails to reach significance. First, GDP per Capita shows a statistically significant negative association with the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime, which indicates that higher economic prosperity is correlated with reduced violence by the incoming regime one year after the regime breakdown. This finding supports existing theories highlighting that economic development has a stabilizing effect on the behavior of state actors. Second, the level of democracy exhibits a notable positive association with the probability of state violence by the incoming regime, suggesting that higher levels of democracy and democratization efforts may initially be associated with

increased state violence. This unexpected relationship can indicate the potential complexities related to democratic transitions post-breakdown. Third, higher levels of socioeconomic inequalities, measured by the level of inequality in the distribution of resources within society, are associated with an increase in the probability of state violence by the incoming regime. This finding suggests that the inequalities that result from unequal resource distribution, such as wealth, education, or opportunities, can intensify state-society relations and contribute to higher levels of repression or conflict. Additionally, the dummy variable indicating whether there is an ongoing civil war is associated with a decrease in the probability of state violence by the incoming regime one year after a regime breakdown. This unexpected finding may suggest that the focus of the state actors may be shifting toward managing internal conflict rather than exerting violence against civilians during the first periods of their rule. Contrarily, the dummy variable for ongoing international conflict shows a positive relationship between the occurrence of international conflict and an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime. This can be attributed to different factors, such as heightened security concerns or changes in state-society relations due to international conflict. Notably, autocratic institutionalization does not yield statistical significance in this model, suggesting that a decentralized power structure does not affect state violence by the incoming regime one year after regime breakdown.

Model (2), which examines state violence by the incoming regime five years after regime breakdown, also shows that regime breakdowns via popular uprisings are associated with a decrease in state violence by the incoming regime in comparison to breakdowns enabled through military coups. Keeping all variables constant, the coefficient (-0.032) indicates that a regime breakdown via a popular uprising is associated with a 3% decrease in the probability of state violence by the incoming regime five years after the breakdown, when compared to regime breakdowns via military coups. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. As for the control variables, higher levels of democracy remain associated with a higher probability of state violence, higher levels of socioeconomic inequalities also remain associated with a higher probability of state violence, and the occurrence of a civil war remains associated with a decreased probability of state violence. All of these results are significant at the 1% level. The occurrence of international conflict remains associated with a higher probability of state violence by the incoming regime and is statistically significant at the 10% level. Contrarily, the relationship between GDP per capita and state violence loses its significance when measuring state violence by the incoming regime five years after the breakdown. Lastly, the relationship between state violence and the extent to which autocratic features are institutionalized remains statistically insignificant.

As the empirical analysis points to a casual correlation between a regime breakdown enabled via a military coup and a higher probability of state violence by the incoming regime one year and five years following an observation of a regime breakdown (when compared to a regime breakdown enabled via a popular uprising), I reject the first null hypothesis ("H1: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in the short term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising").

Model (3), which examines state violence by the incoming regime ten years after regime breakdown, shows notable changes in the relationship between military coups or popular uprisings and state violence. Similar to Models (1) and (2), regime breakdowns enabled via popular uprising continue to be associated with a decrease in the probability of state violence compared to regime breakdowns enabled via military coups. However, the magnitude of this effect diminished significantly over the ten-year timeframe. With a coefficient of 0.007, the effect of the mode of regime breakdown is no longer statistically significant at the conventional levels of 1%, 5%, or 10%. This finding indicated that the effect of the mode of breakdown on the probabilities of state violence by the incoming regime diminishes after ten years and dissipates the initial effect observed after one and five years. It is interesting to note that several control variables maintain statistically significant associations with the probabilities of state violence, such as the level of democracy, socioeconomic inequalities, and international conflict.

The relationship between the occurrence of civil war and the likelihood of state violence by the incoming loses its significance. In contrast, the relationship between GDP per capita and the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime regains significance. Lastly, the relationship between the occurrence of civil war and the likelihood of state violence remains insignificant, as is the case in Models (1) and (2).

As the empirical analysis does not point to a statistically significant correlation between a regime breakdown enabled via a military coup and a higher probability of state violence by the incoming regime ten years following an observation of a regime breakdown (when compared to a regime breakdown enabled via a popular uprising), I cannot reject the second null hypothesis ("H2: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in long term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising").

2. Discussion

Model (1), which examines state violence by the incoming regime one year after the regime breakdown, demonstrates a statistically significant negative coefficient for popular uprisings, indicating a 7% decrease in the probability of state violence compared to military coups. Similarly, Model (2), which examines state violence by the incoming regime five years after the breakdown, shows a negative coefficient for popular uprisings, though less pronounced at 3%, but still

statistically significant at the 5% level. The findings confirm the hypothesis that regime breakdowns enabled by military coups are associated with an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime compared to popular uprisings, particularly in the short to medium term (one to five years). This finding is consistent with the notion that the mode through which the regime breaks down creates a political environment that influences the level and duration of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime.

In the case of regime breakdowns via military coups – which are characterized by the abrupt overthrow of the existing regime, the fast consolidation of power, and the militarization of institutional and governance structures – the findings confirm that the nature of this process is associated with an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after each breakdown. However, in the case of popular uprisings, which create a different political environment due to their participatory nature – which influences the level of legitimacy, democratic governance structures, and the level of international support – the findings confirm that the nature of this process is associated with a decreased probability of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after each breakdown one and five years after each breakdown.

However, in Model (3), which examines state violence by the incoming regime ten years after each breakdown, the coefficient for the mode of breakdown is no longer statistically significant. This indicates that the impact of the mode of

breakdown on the level of violence by the incoming regime diminishes over the long term. This finding raises important questions on the sustainability of the initial impact of the mode of breakdown on the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime. The diminishing effect of popular uprisings or military coups on state violence by the incoming regime after ten years can be attributed to different factors, potentially such as institutional changes or shifts in the state-society relationship, which may erode the extent to which the regime resorts to the use of violence.

As such, this analysis has not only emphasized the effect of military coups and popular uprisings on the level of state violence by the incoming regime but also outlined the significance of temporal dimensions. While this analysis serves as an initial effort to understand the relationship between the mode of breakdown and state violence by the incoming regime, there remains plenty of room for future considerations. First, this analysis allows for future considerations and research on other modes of breakdown, such as breakdowns enabled by civil wars, international wars, foreign interventions, loss of election, pacted transitions, or death of the incumbent leader. Second, this analysis paves the way for a more nuanced understanding of temporal dimensions. In other words, it provides an initial understanding of the duration of state violence by the incoming regime that can be attributed to how the mode of breakdown occurred. The cut-off points chosen for this analysis demonstrate in the abovementioned analysis that the effect of military coups or popular uprisings on the level of state violence by the

incoming regimes is only statistically significant until five years after the breakdown. As such, this analysis has provided an initial springboard of understanding that can be built upon in future research by choosing different cut-off points that can offer more insight into the statistically significant duration of state violence that the mode of breakdown can explain.

Last but not least, addressing the additional insights offered by the control variables across the different models is noteworthy. The relationship between GDP per capita and the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime does not seem to be consistent throughout the cut-off points. Although there is a statistically significant negative association between both variables one year after the breakdown, the relationship loses its significance initially five years after a regime breakdown but regains statistical significance after ten years. While the findings of the models measuring the level of state violence one and ten years following a regime breakdown indicate that higher economic development is correlated with reduced violence by the incoming regime, the fluctuation of significance over time can be indicative of the evolving nature between economic factors and state violence during transitional periods. Another unexpected finding is pertinent to the relationship between the level of democracy and the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime. The results exhibit a consistent positive and significant association between both variables, suggesting that higher levels of democracy efforts may be initially associated with increased state violence. However, as initially expected, higher levels of socioeconomic inequalities are

consistently associated with an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime across all models measuring the three different cut-off points: one, five, and ten years. This finding is a clear indication that disparities in resource distribution within society exacerbate state-society relationships and contribute to higher levels of state violence. On another note, the occurrence of an international conflict is associated with an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime after one or five years. This finding suggests that external factors in the international arena can shape domestic factors by fueling violent state behavior due to heightened security risks or shifts in state-society relations. However, the influence of international conflicts on state violence by the incoming regime loses its significance after ten years, suggesting that this influence may be attenuated as the incoming regimes stabilize their power. Lastly, the occurrence of a civil war is unexpectedly associated with a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime one year and five years after the breakdown. However, the relationship loses significance ten years after a regime breakdown. While civil wars are typically associated with high levels of state violence, as seen in Chapter 1 (Literature Review), this finding suggests that incoming regimes that assume power might shift their focus on managing internal and societal conflicts rather than exert violence against civilians during the initial phases of their takeover.

3. Limitations

While this study carefully examines the intricate relationship between regime breakdown and the level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime, it remains important to recognize certain limitations that may constrain the scope and depth of the findings.

First, the analysis primarily relies on data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index, which is a dataset widely used in different research studies. Yet, like any other dataset, it does not come without its limitations. As is the case with any other dataset, V-Dem (2024) can include gaps in data coverage, potential data inaccuracies, and inherent biases that could raise uncertainties when it comes to the validity of the results. While relying on one single dataset for the independent and control variables is perceived as a pragmatic approach in this thesis due to the time constraints for conducting this study, it is imperative to acknowledge that it can also raise concerns about dataset-induced biases.

Second, the analytical approach centered around using Ordinary Least Squares (OLD) beta regression models, which is a fairly common method for regression analyses with interval control variables. Using OLS regressions to analyze complex political phenomena, in this case, mode of regime breakdown and state violence can result in a few methodological challenges related to the ability of the model to truly capture the dynamics inherent in these political processes. While diagnostic tests were run for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity and the

regression models were run with robust standard errors, the methodological constraints may remain. Likewise, despite the efforts exerted above to account for different compounding factors that can affect the relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the possibility of unobserved variables raises endogeneity concerns for this study.

Another potential limitation related to the directionality of control variables is noteworthy. While the theoretical model in Chapter 2 has two different explanatory mechanisms linking (A) military coups and (B) popular uprisings to the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime, it was paramount from an econometric perspective to include the same set of control variables in both models to enable a direct comparison between all coefficients. As such, methodological comparability was prioritized in the quantitative analysis. Therefore, I have opted to include the common control variables between both modes of breakdown and omitted other theoretically relevant variables that are not relevant for both modes. As such, it is pivotal to underscore that the directionality of the control variables included in this analysis does not fully align with the broader theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2, making the interpretation of the analysis challenging and highlighting the dynamic nature of political processes.

Moreover, it is important to circle back to the cut-off points chosen for this analysis (one, five, and ten years after regime breakdown). As this study offers a

panoramic view of the modes of breakdown from 1900 to 2013, it was essential to choose specific cut-off points for an initial analysis of the effect of the mode of breakdown on state violence. It remains important to note that while the cut-off points were chosen from a logical perspective as a meaningful timeframe to measure short- and long-term state violence patterns post-regime breakdown, exploring other cut-off points with additional lagged dependent variables could furthermore enhance the robustness of this analysis.

On a similar note, the measurement of the independent and dependent variables is also important to discuss. Although the index employed to measure state violence accurately measures what this study is looking at – namely, physical violence from the state's end –, the complexities of prolonged violence have a multifaceted nature. This nature can pose challenges in precisely defining and categorizing which form of violence is being used. As such, the categorization into distinct types of violence (in this case, physical violence by the incoming regime) may overlook the intricacies of political violence in which different forms and manifestations of violence occur simultaneously. As for the measurement of the independent variable, the quantitative assumption of homogeneity within both modes (especially after including the same control variable for purely econometric reasons) may overlook considerable variation in the country-specific circumstances and contributing factors to regime breakdown, potentially influencing the levels and persistence of political violence.

Lastly, I would like to illuminate another limitation that stems from the inherent variability in the temporal dynamics of military coups and popular uprisings. Because this analysis compares both modes of breakdown to each other with the same cut-off points, it is automatically associated with an assumption of a uniform temporal timeline for the transition period. While both modes of breakdown can have similar starting points, the transition time can be different. For example, military coups are characterized by abrupt power seizures and subsequent power consolidation efforts and can have prolonged periods of transition when compared to popular uprisings, whereafter, the incoming regime can enjoy a faster transition to stable governance structures. The divergence in transition timelines can introduce complexities uncaptured in this analysis as it can partially explain why military coups are associated with higher probabilities of state violence compared to popular uprisings.

Conclusion

This analysis has provided valuable insights into the effect of the mode of regime breakdown and the subsequent level of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime. After running different Ordinary Least Squares beta regression models, this analysis has found that military coups are more likely to be associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. These findings underscore the importance of taking into account the mode of regime breakdown when

discussing post-breakdown state violence and the implications for state-society relations.

Furthermore, this analysis underscores the evolving nature of state violence dynamics. While the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of violence by the incoming regime is significant until five years following a regime breakdown, the impact diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant at the ten-year cut-off point after a regime breakdown enabled by a military coup or popular uprising.

However, in light of the limitations of the analysis as outlined above, it has become evident that the relationship between the mode of regime breakdown and the subsequent state violence by the incoming regime necessitates a multifaceted analysis. Therefore, the next chapter aims to complement this quantitative analysis with a qualitative examination of the intricate dynamics of this relationship. The aim of the qualitative study is to balance out the limitations of the quantitative analysis and provide a nuanced understanding of different contextual factors and mechanisms that might have been left unobserved quantitatively.

Chapter 5 - Qualitative Analysis

Introduction

The quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 has shed light on the correlation between the mode of regime breakdown, namely military coups and popular uprisings, and subsequent levels of state violence by the incoming regime. Specifically, the analysis has found that military coups are more likely to be associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. After a regime breakdown, the impact diminishes at the ten-year cut-off point and becomes statistically insignificant. However, the inherent limitations within the quantitative analysis in this context necessitate a complementary qualitative analysis for the following reasons;

While characterized by statistical robustness and generalizability to broad applicability, the quantitative analysis discussed in the previous chapter can be criticized for its failure to capture the relevant contextual factors and its shortcomings in analyzing all the mechanisms discussed in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3. By embracing a qualitative approach, this chapter seeks to illustrate pivotal aspects in understanding the relationship between the mode of breakdown and state violence by the incoming regime – which need to be underscored beyond the interpretation of coefficients and the discussion of statistical significance. A notable limitation of the quantitative

model is the assumption of homogeneity within both modes of breakdown: military coups and popular uprisings. This limitation becomes particularly evident when the same set of control variables are included for econometric comparaiblity. This may lead to considerable variation in the country-specific circumstances and contributing factors to regime breakdown, potentially influencing the levels and persistence of state violence.

As such, this chapter conducts a process-tracing analysis to illustrate two critical factors left uncaptured in this study so far. First, it seeks to delve deep into the implications of state violence when two successive regime breakdowns occur within temporal proximity. To elaborate more extensively, this chapter aims to elucidate the levels and durations of state violence in cases where multiple regime breakdowns occurred via different modes shortly after one another. The question at the forefront of this chapter can be formulated as follows: Does the probability of state violence by the incoming regime increase after a coup that was preceded by a breakdown instigated by a popular uprising? Second, this chapter observes the causal process of the mechanisms linking each mode of breakdown with state violence by the incoming regime. Because the quantitative analysis maintained uniform control variables across models for the sake of direct coefficient comparison, this chapter seeks to illustrate the different mechanisms that could influence the incoming regime's use of violence in the post-breakdown environment.

An integral aspect of this qualitative approach is the utilization of a case study to conduct the process-tracing analysis. Therefore, this study has opted to analyze the case of Egypt to (A) examine the implications of state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime that arose following a regime breakdown via a military coup in 2013, which was preceded by a regime breakdown via a popular uprising in 2011, and (B) utilize the contextual factors to illustrate the different mechanisms and variables which link the occurrence of military coups or popular uprisings with the perpetuation of state violence by the incoming regime in the post-breakdown sphere. A case study serves as a means to examine the hypothesized complex causal chains, and the choice to utilize Egypt as a case study serves this purpose twofold. First, the Egyptian context sheds light on the extent to which a post-coup regime exacerbates its use of violence against any perceived threat. However, it must be acknowledged that the utilization of Egypt compromises the analysis because the post-uprising regime had not consolidated itself enough and was overthrown by a coup after a year. As such, while the process-tracing analysis is only able to examine the violence instigated by Morsi's regime for one year, the weight of the analysis lies in the examination of the post-coup regime and the unprecedented levels of violence that accompany it. Second, the utilization of Egypt allows for a comprehensive analysis of how the post-coup regime clearly utilized the sentiment of the previous uprising to instigate violence. This analysis furthermore enhances our understanding of the complex interconnectedness of successive regime breakdowns.

The Egyptian contexts of 2011 and 2013 present a case study that can advance this thesis' analysis to account for the complex causal chains that explain the quantitative results demonstrating that post-coup regimes are more likely to instigate more violence than post-uprising regimes. The theoretical mechanisms that were outlined in Chapter 3 linking the modes of breakdown to state violence are as follows: For regime breaks enabled by popular uprisings, these mechanisms are touched upon: legitimacy, governance structures, institutional continuity, democratic transition, economic development, and international support. As for regime breakdowns enabled by military coups, the following factors are dissected in this analysis: power consolidation and repression, institutional erosion, political polarization, international response, economic growth and domestic resource allocation, and transitional justice processes.

The narration of Egypt's case study supports a number of these mechanisms. When analyzing the post-2011 revolution regime, the following mechanisms are discussed: mass mobilization, international support, democratic transition, economic factors, coalition building, and the fight for legitimacy. The analysis also addresses country-specific factors, which in this case were: cooptation by the military, civil-military relations, and the transitional judicial process. When analyzing the post-2013 coup regime, various theoretical mechanisms are examined: legitimation strategies, power consolidation, repression, political

polarization, institutional erosion, economic development, and domestic resource allocation.

In light of the aforementioned considerations, this study's quantitative lens further provides an even more nuanced illustration of the relationship between the mode of breakdown and state violence, which enriches our understanding of why the mode through which regimes breakdown can significantly impact post-breakdown political dynamics.

1. Illustrating the Events: Egypt's 2011 Popular Uprising in Review

The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 arguably had deeper roots that emerged before the outbreak of the uprising on January 25. Different movements and forms of mobilization dating back to a decade pre-2011 have possibly cultivated the road for the revolution. Among those are the movements against the Iraq war in 2003 and Gaza in 2008, the pro-democracy moments, notably Kefaya, and the movement supporting judiciary independence throughout 2004-2005. Another pivotal catalyst that paved the way for the 2011 revolution was the series of labor protests that emerged in 2006 and spread nationwide. Lastly, the response to the church bombing in early January 2011 also led to anti-sectarian protests (Korany & El-Mahdi, 2012).

On January 25, 2011, thousands of Egyptians initiated a series of mass protests by pouring into Tahrir Square and marching along the Nile Corniche. Initially, the protests were centered around socioeconomic issues, commonly referred to in

Egypt as "eish (bread), horreya (freedom), and aadala egtemaeya (social justice)," and spread within hours to 15 out of Egypt's 27 governorates. When the protestors arrived at Tahrir Square, despite outnumbering the heavily armed riot police due to the unpreparedness and underestimation by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, the present riot police officers shot tear gas and rubber bullets at the demonstrators who were yelling "Silmiya (peaceful)" Many contend that starting at this very moment, the protest seeking socioeconomic reforms had swiftly transformed into a revolutionary uprising demanding the end of police brutality and the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak (Ketchley, 2017).

On January 26 and 27, smaller marches, demonstrations, and sit-ins were responded to with significant repression by riot police, which resulted in the temporary demobilization of anti-regime opposition (The New York Times, 26 January 2011). However, this was not the case in El-Suez, wherein activists continued to escalate their demands and inspire the re-outbreak of anti-regime protests nationwide (The San Diego Union-Tribune, 27 January 2011). In retaliation to ongoing police brutality, different Egyptian activist groups called for another day of national protest on January 28, dubbed the "Friday of Anger." The Friday of Anger is considered one of the most violent days of the 2011 revolution, during which protests armed with Molotov cocktails and self-assembled weapons were engaged in pitch battles with police and security force units after attacking police stations and vehicles (Mukhtar et al., 2012).

In the following days, demonstrators continued taking to the streets. On the evening of February 1st, Mubarak delivered an emotionally charged speech in which he promised not to re-run for office again in the following September, which earned him the sympathy of many demonstrators and led them to head home. However, those who did not leave were confronted the following days by pro-Mubarak thugs on horses and camels attacking them in Tahrir Square. Dubbed the "Battle of the Camel," public opinion turned irreversibly against Mubarak and gave the demonstrators the necessary momentum to continue their sit-ins and demonstrations at Tahrir Square (and nationwide) (Wynne-Hughes, 2021). A week later, on February 11, 2011, the Vice-President announced Mubarak's resignation and the end of his thirty-year rule over Egypt (CNN, 11 February 2011). After his resignation, the Security Council of the Armed Forces assumed interim power in their capacity as the "Guardians of the Revolution" until President Mohamed Morsi was elected in Egypt's 2012 procedurally free and fair elections (Lutterbeck, 2013).

2. Analyzing Theoretical Mechanisms Behind the 2011 Popular Uprising

After President Mubarak was ousted in February 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed a pivotal role in navigating Egypt's transitional phase and positioned itself as the steward of Egypt's democratization process. Having been previously marginalized for decades, the Muslim Brotherhood was closely coopted by the SCAF during this period – which led to

their re-emergence in the electoral sphere as they officially established the Freedom and Justice Party as their political arm (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 June 2011)

Central to the democratization process and the reshaping of Egypt's political landscape was the amendment of the Constitution, which has been closely associated with the authoritarian rule under the Mubarak regime. The national referendum held on the amendments to the 1971 Constitution (which have been modified by SCAF and presented as the new interim Constitutional Declaration) in March 2011 served as a reminder that there are profound ideological differences within the Egyptian society on the pace and scope of democratic reforming, with the MB advocating for a "yes" and other secular groups advocating for a "no" (The New York Times, 20 March 2011). While in the early stages of the post-uprising landscape, there were coalition-building efforts by forming the Democratic Alliance in Egypt, which was comprised of pro-revolution parties and was intended to present a unified front, challenges arose within the alliance as a result of different priorities, power struggles, and strong reservations related to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in light of their parliamentary electoral victories (Ketchley, 2017).

One year later, when the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi ran for the presidency and assumed power after the 2012 presidential elections, the prospects for democratization slowly died in light of the growing tension between the

Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF. The sequence of the judicial battle and the battle over the constitution-drafting process between both entities is presented here in a snapshot: Since the constitutional referendum in March 2011, Egypt had been ruled by the Constitutional Declaration issued by SCAF, which was drafted to serve as an interim constitution until the new one is written. Different debates were taking place between the SCAF, the MB, and other political parties about the sequence of events: Should the presidential elections be held first, or should the constitution be drafted before the elections? After having decided to schedule the presidential elections before the constitution's finalization, the newly elected parliament elected the members of the Constituent Assembly to draft the new constitution. Because the Assembly was majorly comprised of MB-affiliated members, Egypt's Higher Administrative Court ruled to dissolve the Constituent Assembly's first incarnation due to membership irregularities in April 2012 (BBC, 10 April 2012). In June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court, which was still comprised of judges appointed by Mubarak, ruled in favor of the dissolution of the lower house of parliament six months after it was elected and a few days before the second round of the presidential elections (The Guardian, 14 June 2012). In November 2012, after Morsi was elected, he issued a constitutional declaration, shielding himself from judicial oversight by placing his presidential decrees beyond the scope of jurisdiction for the Egyptian courts until (ostensibly until the new constitution was drafted) (Ahram Online, 22 November 2012). This declaration was made just a couple of weeks away from the Supreme

Constitutional Court's scheduled ruling on the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly, which Morsi tasked to draft a new constitution. In December 2012, Morsi signed a new Constitution into law, which was widely perceived as controversial among Egyptian society and different political factions (The Guardian, 26 December 2012).

Numerous factors have contributed to the strained relationships of the Muslim Brotherhood. Beyond the tension with SCAF, it can be argued that the Muslim Brotherhood failed to cultivate positive partnerships with the different political factions after the failed attempts to establish a Democratic Alliance. This arguably led to enduring repercussions during Morsi's presidency, in which he only had the support of the Muslim Brotherhood but none from other political parties, the security apparatus, the judiciary forces, and the military forces. The overreliance on solely Islamist allies and the focus on electoral legitimacy, while simultaneously neglecting mass mobilization among revolutionaries and coalition building, led to (A) the detriment of democratic gains and (B) heightened tensions from different fronts for Morsi, to which he responded to with the November 2012 constitutional declaration – which ultimately paved the way for the 2013 military coup.

It is essential to underscore that in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, there was an absence of international support for the ousting of Mubarak, as his Western allies maintained their support for the fledgling (Way, 2011). A byproduct of this

continuous support was that the United States' foreign policy in Egypt was criticized for not actively supporting the democratization process. In this absence of international support, the success of the democratic transition was contingent on the outcome of the struggle between the pro-democratic political factions and the anti-democratic (Brownlee, 2012). As described above, with the Muslim Brotherhood's inability to maintain a coalition spanning the ideological spectrum, Morsi's regime did not last more than one year in power. At the same time, while Morsi's legitimacy was being undermined domestically, international support was not forthcoming. Despite Morsi's internationally recognized status as the legitimate democratically elected leader of the most populous Middle Eastern state and his attempts to broaden Egypt's alliances beyond its traditional partnership with the Washington-the EU bloc and towards Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia (Roll & Jannis, 2012), his overthrow was not condemned by the international community at large. In retrospect, this lack of international support casts doubts on the veracity of international democracy movements surrounding the Arab Spring. It highlights the prioritization of stability, maintaining the status quo, and a prospect that was severely undermined by the Morsi regime, namely its failure to expand its base of power beyond the Muslim Brotherhood and other similarly minded fundamentalist factions. The international community's priorities were laid bare when presented with a choice between support of an unpopular, though democratically legitimate regime or the acceptance of an illegitimate military takeover promising to restore stability.

In the period between Mubarak's ousting and Morsi's election, SCAF continuously responded to demonstrations and sit-ins with significant use of violence, which ultimately resulted in hundreds of Egyptians having been extrajudicially killed and thousands injured or detained. While the country's pro-democracy activists had temporarily gone silent starting Mubarak's ousting in February 2011, thousands gathered for the first time in Tahrir on 19 March to protest against the results of the national referendum, which approved the Constitutional Declaration drafted by SCAF. This specific demonstration marked the start of SCAF's journey of perpetuating violence and its insistence to "pursue policies of suppressing freedom of expression and using the military judiciary as a tool to subjugate civilians and harass peaceful activists" (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 7 May 2012). SCAF's consistency in the use of violence to repress any expressions of dissatisfaction – which was ultimately rooted in the belief that the demands of the 2011 revolution were not close to being met – was significantly condemned by different organizations, such as the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (20 October, 2011). Notable examples of SCAF's systematic violence against peaceful demonstrators are the following incidents: Maspiro (October 2011), Mohamed Mahmoud (November 2011), and Abbasseya (April 2012). On October 9th, 2011, peaceful demonstrators demanding the rights of Coptic citizens in Egypt were brutally attacked by military police and central security forces in the Maspiro Area, which is situated in the heart of Cairo. The violent attack initiated against the demonstrators is estimated to have led to more

than 25 deaths, 300 injuries, and the arrest of detainees and their referral to the military prosecution (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2011). The Mohamed Mahmoud incident, considered among the deadliest protests under SCAF's rule, had begun when peaceful demonstrations erupted on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, next to Tahrir Square, to advocate for a faster political transition in Egypt. In response to this, military and riot police forces used live ammunition and rubber bullets to attack the demonstration over six days, killing hundreds and severely injuring thousands (Human Rights Watch, 19 November 2012). Against the backdrop of the increasing dissatisfaction with SCAF's rule, which prevented a democratic transition, a peaceful sit-in in Abbaseya Square took place in April 2012. In response to the sit-in, military officers and individuals in civilian clothing embarked on a violent attack to dismantle the peaceful sit-in in the Square by shooting live ammunition at them (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 7 May 2012).

As illustrated above, SCAF's rule over Egypt had (A) resulted in significant levels of state violence perpetuated against any civilian expression of dissatisfaction with the political developments in Egypt and (B) cast significant doubt on the prospect of democratization in Egypt. Given the Muslim Brotherhood's political opportunism, which was evident when they were co-opted by the military and failed to respond to popular demands seeking a genuine political transition, it was initially not clear to which extent Morsi's regime would resort to the use of

violence against any form of dissent. Whereas it is essential to note that Christians and seculars mainly opposed Morsi's election at first, the degree of opposition had reached its peak in early 2013 in light of the deteriorating socio-economic situation, characterized by the EGP losing its value against USD and shortages in both, electricity and gas. However, the state's reaction to the ongoing opposition and protests became increasingly violent over time (Prat and Rezk, 2019). Most infamously, an incident which he was later referred to Egypt's criminal court, took place in December 2012 surrounding the Al-Itihadaya Presidential Palace in Cairo. Against the backdrop of Morsi's issuance of the Constitutional Decree (as discussed above), a peaceful protest erupted in December 2012, in which Morsi incited violence against the demonstrations by allegedly ordering his supporters to use violence against the assembled protest (Ahram Online, 1 September 2013).

The sections above illustrate the sequence of events following the 2011 Revolution in Egypt and the ousting of Mubarak. In doing so, it highlights several factors that were discussed in the theory on the mechanisms linking popular uprisings to state violence (See above: Chapter 3), namely mass mobilization, international support, democratic transition, economic factors, coalition building, and the fight for legitimacy. It also addresses country-specific factors, which in this case were: cooptation by the military and civil-military relations. While the theory in this study suggests that a popular uprising creates a political environment that mitigates the use of state violence by the incoming regime, this

was not the case in Egypt for various reasons. First, when SCAF undemocratically appointed itself as the steward of Egypt's democratic transition, granting itself interim rule over the country, it undermined the very nature of a democratic transition. While the theoretical model presented in my paper is designed to predict the level of state violence perpetuated by the first incoming regime post-regime breakdown, the sequence of the post-revolution political developments in Egypt necessitates an analysis of the violence perpetuated by SCAF during their interim rule before the "incoming regime" was even elected. The exceptionally high level of state violence in this period was a sign of SCAF's unwillingness to allow any expression of opposition to its rule and laid the groundwork for the eventual coup, which overthrew the president of the incoming regime. Second, the analysis above points to the conclusion that the Muslim Brotherhood's inability to engage in broad coalition building and mass mobilization beyond maintaining its initial supporters with a similar religious belief led to Morsi resorting to the use of disproportionate violence against protesters in an attempt to keep his grip on power. Although the theory in this study does not de facto encompass the violence perpetuated in the interim rule post-regime breakdown and only zooms in on the level of state violence after a new regime is in power, the analytical process tracing the events during this timeframe in Egypt points to the argument that the level of violence perpetrated by Morsi is a direct result of his judicial and ideological battle with SCAF, despite his initial cooptation. Although the Morsi regime and SCAF both perpetuated

state violence against non-state actors, in comparison, the level of violence used by Morsi ("the incoming regime") showed to be significantly less intense than that of SCAF ("interim rule"). Moreover, the dynamics explained above serve to demonstrate how the military's actions during their transitional rule (characterized by the unwillingness to respond to the popular demands of pro-democracy activities and the cooptation of the Muslim Brotherhood) have ultimately prevented the prospect of democratization in Egypt. Even after Morsi was appointed as president after procedurally free and fair elections, the military hampered any hope for democratization by overthrowing him. These dynamics explain why Egypt does not show the hypothesized results that initially suggest a decreased likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime in the short term following a regime breakdown. As for the hypothesis on long-term violence by the incoming regime, the analysis was not possible in Egypt's case, given the fact that Morsi was overthrown after his first year in office.

In the following sections, this analysis illustrates the short- and long-term patterns of state violence by the incoming regime led by Al-Sisi, which emerged from the military coup overthrowing Morsi. It aims to analyze the level and duration of violence by a regime that emerged after a military coup that was orchestrated against the backdrop of a popular uprising. At the forefront of the following sections illustrating the sequence of events during this timeframe is the following question: Are the hypothesized results on short- and long-term state violence by

the incoming regime post-regime breakdown via military coup affected if the military coup is orchestrated against the backdrop of a popular uprising?

3. Illustrating the Events: Egypt's 2013 Military Coup in Review

Before the 2013 military coup is discussed, it is essential to gain a deeper understanding of the roots of this coup and the different factors that enabled the military to orchestrate a successful intervention. First, this section zooms in on the escalating tensions and power struggles between Morsi and SCAF prior to his overthrow. Before Morsi assumed the presidency, SCAF dissolved the Islamist-dominated lower house of parliament in June 2012 (The Guardian, 14 June 2012) – a move that has been widely perceived as an effort of power consolidation from their end before handing over authority to civilian leadership (Bou Nassif, 2017). After Morsi's election, he dismissed key influential military figures, notably Field Marshal Tantawi and Lieutenant General Sami Anan (The Washington Post, 14 August 2012) – a move that has also been perceived as an attempt to assert civilian control over the military and resulted in increased animosity within the military (Bou Nassif, 2017). A testimony of the slowly but surely growing tension was the widely spread rumors of the souring relations between Morsi and El-Sisi, back then in his capacity as the Minister of Defense under Morsi's rule. In February 2013, when different sources reported Morsi's plan to dismiss El-Sisi. These rumors were still circulated until June 2013, when Morsi's intention to replace Sisi with Major General Ahmad Wasfi added more fuel to the ongoing tension (Gad, 2013). The military dissent was clearly

expressed in March 2013, when the armed forces refused to enforce a curfew imposed by Morsi surrounding the Suez Canal Zone cities, indicating silent mutiny within the military (Ashour, 2015).

Against the backdrop of the straining civil-military relationship, the military proved to strategically support and back the emergence of the civilian-led Tamarrod movement as an oppositional force against Morsi's regime. First, the organizers of the Tamarrod movement were protected against any disruptions or crackdowns by the Muslim Brotherhood through intelligence channels within the military. Second, pro-military circles contributed to the provision of sufficient media coverage and financial backing to amplify Tamarrod and increase its domestic and international visibility (Gad, 2013; Bou Nassif, 2017). The success of the Tamarrod campaign was unambiguous when the movement managed to collect 15 million signatures by June 2013 on their petition advocating for Morsi's resignation. Most notably, it is important to highlight that the movement was the first to call for the 30 June protests (Gerbaudo, 2013).

Subsequently, after the widespread support garnered by the Tamarrod movement lent legitimacy to calls for intervention against Morsy's presidency, millions of Egyptians took to the streets in June 2013, demanding an immediate end to Morsi's presidency, the military intervened on July 3rd by deposing Morsi, detaining him and his top aids and shutting down Islamist broadcasters (Gad, 2013). The military's intervention not only leveraged this public sentiment but

also framed their actions as an answer to the people's will in an effort to gain legitimacy and avoid the stigma around a traditional coup. Moreover, the coup led by El-Sisi clearly framed its interventions with a nationalist narrative concerned with Egypt's national security and stability, namely by justifying the overthrow of Morsi as a step necessary to prevent widespread chaos, economic collapse, and civil conflict (as stated by Major General Ahmad Wasfi, 2013)[2] To sum it up, the military's mobilization of civil society actors against the Muslim Brotherhood and its isolation of Morsi in the political realm led to the scenario in which military interventionism became a viable option (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, 2015).

The Sisi-led coup appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Adly Mansour as interim President, while arguably, SCAF control over the decision-making processes remained significantly high (Housden, 2013). After the coup, high-ranking military officers proclaimed that Egyptians would be able to choose to vote for their new president after a new parliament was elected and seated. However, as SCAF had suspended Morsi's new constitution and the interim president only issued a Constitutional Declaration to pave the way for a transition through constitutional reform, the Supreme Constitutional Court needed to review the new electoral law before the parliamentary elections could be held (Brown, 2013).

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[2]See interview with Amr Adib and Major General Ahmad Wasfi broadcasted on October 2, 2013 – as mentioned by Bou Nassif (2017).

Despite claims made by El-Sisi shortly after overthrowing Morsi in July 2013, underscoring that he had no intention to assume Egypt's presidency, his statement in March 2014 proved differently. Just two months before the scheduled presidential elections, El-Sisi announced his intention to run for president with the following statements: "Today is the last time you'll see me wearing this [military] uniform. I was honored to wear it to defend the nation and today, I am also leaving it behind to defend the nation (...) no one could be president without the people's will (...) my determination to run in the election does not bar others from their right to run. I will be happy if whoever the people choose succeeds" (Ahram Online, 26 March 2014). Shortly after, he won the presidential race with a staggering 96.91% (Ahram Online, 3 June 2014).

4. Analyzing Theoretical Mechanisms Behind the 2013 Military Coup

Shortly after El-Sisi assumed his rule over Egypt, it did not take long before many scholars started referring to it as a new form of authoritarianism. He created a new political order that is more authoritarian and repressive than anything Egypt has witnessed throughout its history (Armbrust, 2017; Rutherford, 2018), which is characterized by systematic repression and violence perpetuated against the Muslim Brotherhood and any kind of opposition – whether manifested within the civil society actors or on social media platforms – and coupled with the creation of a monopoly in which the military controls the economic, social and political landscape (Rutherford, 2018; Shahata, 2018). As such, the sections below delve

deep into the characteristics and mechanisms that emerged immediately after the military coup, which could explain the short- and long-term level of violence perpetrated by the El-Sisi regime.

El-Sisi's pursuit of legitimacy involves considering various theoretical mechanisms as presented in Chapter 3. These mechanisms suggest that regimes following military coups are more inclined to perpetuate state violence. By examining El-Sisi's legitimation strategies; the following mechanisms are automatically also discussed: power consolidation, repression, political polarization, economic development, and domestic resource allocation.

El-Sisi's quest for legitimacy and efforts to consolidate his power after overthrowing Morsi via a military coup was strategized through different dimensions, including his narrative as a protector and leader, economic promises, and repression mechanisms (Yefet and Lavie, 2021). While initially, his legitimacy was closely tied to the 2011 revolution, El-Sisi swiftly capitalized on his perceived threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to rebrand his image as the guardian of Egypt against internal and external threats. What came with being the "protector of the nation" was a series of unprecedented authoritarian strategies tailored toward seeking personal legitimacy (Hijazi, 2018). To gain personal legitimacy, El-Sisi embarked on a journey to establish a military electoral authoritarian system with a non-dominant party electoral system (Aziz, 2017).

In terms of economic legitimacy, El-Sisi assumed power when Egypt coincided with Egypt facing severe economic challenges – varying on the spectrum of recession, rising debt, and high unemployment rates. While on the one hand, he made a number of economic promises when he first assumed power (Aboushady & Aboushady, 2018), El-Sisi quickly championed mega-scaled infrastructure projects like the expansion of the Suez Canal and the building of a new capital city. While the announcement of these mega-projects in 2014/2015 was met with immediate controversy, El-Sisi portrayed these projects as a crucial step towards Egypt's much-needed economic growth and presented himself as a leader capable of steering Egypt towards economic prosperity (Yefet and Lavie, 2021).

At the same time, ElSisi's legitimation strategy heavily relied on controlling political narratives and repressing/delegitimating oppositional forces (Rutherford et al., 2018). This entailed rejecting the promises pertaining to 2011 and delegitimating the Muslim Brotherhood while posing them as a threat to Egypt's stability and national security. The increased terrorism threats in Sinai post-2013 also allowed El-Sisi to claim his legitimacy as the protector of Egypt against terrorism and internal unrest (Edel & Josua, 2018).

Regarding international support, Egypt's economic difficulties highlight a significant level of backing for the coup and Sisi's government, as evidenced by the provision of international financial assistance. The international community's priorities were laid bare when presented with a choice between support of an

unpopular, though democratically legitimate regime or the acceptance of an illegitimate military takeover promising to restore stability. Following the political developments centered around the coup in July 2013, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, swiftly proceeded to provide economic assistance to Egypt. Having perceived the Muslim Brotherhood's rule over Egypt as a threat to regional political stability, the three countries pledged grants and in-kind donations to Egypt worth $12 billion in July 2013. Further signaling the support for the military coup, Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided Egypt with an additional total of $4 billion in early 2014. Likewise, after El-Sisi was elected, Saudi Arabia called for an international conference to mobilize financial assistance to Egypt (Amin, 2018).

Taking a similar approach, the European Union also maintained its longstanding assistance framework agreement with Egypt after the 2013 coup. However, the United States took a more cautious approach by initially suspending the provision of military aid and delaying previously scheduled military transfers. Despite this, the Department of State refrained from classifying Egypt's political developments as a military coup, as that would have constitutionally led to legal restrictions on military aid. The United States' continued engagement with Egypt and their relatively prompt delivery of military equipment also indicated tacit support for El-Sisi's regime (Amin, 2018).

5. The Dynamics of State Violence: Post-2013 Military Coup in Egypt

While the escalation of state violence patterns after the uprising by SCAF was perceived as a "preservationist" form of state violence by the military to destroy all revolutionary forces seeking democratization, in the aftermath of El-Sisi's coup in July 2013, resorted to more aggressive state violence, namely constituent state violence to demobilize the protestors and establish governing structures and processes (Stacher, 2020). When El-Sisi assumed power, state violence strategies diverted from defensive to offensive, and Egypt has been witnessing an unprecedented level of state violence and repression since (Stacher, 2018)

As the pact between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood was clearly broken, the military created a political environment that dehumanized the Muslim Brotherhood and garnered domestic support for the use of state violence against them. As a reaction to the ousting of Mubarak, Morsi's supporters and allies assembled sit-ins and protests across Egypt, which were met with lethal violence by state authorities. In July 2013, in a televised speech, El-Sisi asked Egyptians to take to the streets to mandate the military to act against political violence and terrorism, undertaking the narrative that the military stands ready to act upon the "will of the people" (Pratt and Rezk, 2019). Following the speech, millions took to the streets, providing the military with the necessary political cover for the new regime to instigate lethal violence against the Muslim Brotherhood. On July 30, the cabinet mandated the Ministry of Interior to proceed with the necessary legal

measures to confront terrorism and road-blocking, which came in light of the ongoing large sit-in still assembled by Morsi supporters in Rabaa and Nahda Squares (Pratt and Rezk, 2019). Two weeks later, police forces dispersed the sit-ins over 12 hours, killing approximately 800-1000 individuals (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In the following months, repressive measures were taken against the Brotherhood, which included their condemnation, imprisonment, and mass death sentences – actions that were endorsed by different segments of the population after feeding into the military's propaganda (The Guardian, 8 July 2013).

Although the state violence instigated by El-Sisi in the immediate short-term was a direct result of the securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime quickly started widening repression and violence beyond the Brotherhood to anyone who expressed any form of opposition or criticism towards El-Sisi and the regime at large. Particularly civil society actors, human rights groups, journalists, and any participants in peaceful protests – including individuals who initially supported the overthrow of Morsi, have been direct targets of state violence since July 2013 (Hamzawy, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; Guerin, 2018). To institutionalize the repression tactics, new laws and legal amendments were initially introduced in 2013 (Hamzawy, 2017). For example, in November 2013, a law was signed into implementation that forbids any protests taking place without a permit from state authorities. Shortly after, high-profile activists closely tied to the 2011 Revolution

were imprisoned, such as Alaa Abdel-Fatteh (Guerin, 2018). The detention, disappearance, and torture of activists were exacerbated when Egypt's public prosecutor was assassinated in August 2015. Against this backdrop, a terrorism law was introduced, which allowed the state authorities unprecedented measures to control the media while simultaneously offering the security apparatus and military officers impunity in their fight against "terrorism" in Egypt (Human Rights Watch, 2015). In light of the new law, more than 400 media outlet platforms have been blocked, an increase of political prisoners have been detained, mass death sentences have been implemented, and a staggering number of disappearances and torture have been reported (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Amnesty International, 2014; Howeidy, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Specifically, more than 1500 enforced disappearances have been reported between 2014 and 2018, and 17 new prisons have been built in light of the unprecedented amount of political prisoners (Guerin, 2018). Moreover, laws undermining the independence of non-governmental organizations and the de facto criminalization of human rights organizations were implemented in 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2018). The degree to which state violence has been institutionalized in Egypt has resulted in protests becoming rare despite significant opposition to El-Sisi's policies – for example, the controversial transfer of sovereignty of the Red Sea Islands to Saudi Arabia (Ketchley and el-Rayyes, 2017). Simultaneously, media discourse until around 2019 – which is primarily owned by the state now in light of the monopoly of the military in practically all industries – had been centered

around depicting Egypt to be in a state of permanent emergency and would spread conspiracy theories around hypothetical state collapse perpetrated by Islamists and foreign governments (Hamzawy, 2017). In spite of growing opposition and widespread discontent, mainly due to the evolving economic crisis, El-Sisi secured a second term in 2018 and a third one in 2023. As this year (2024) marks ten years since El-Sisi was elected president, one could reasonably say that the civil society in Egypt has been experiencing an unprecedented level of state violence and repression against any expression of opposition.

The illustration of the trajectory of state violence in post-coup Egypt presents a complex narrative – one that is rooted in the circumstances of a military coup backed by the sentiment of a popular uprising. While El-Sisi's regime initially enjoyed widespread support, it ultimately diverted to unprecedented levels of state violence, coupled with propaganda and constitutional backing for its use of violence. Against the backdrop of the confluence of the military coup in 2013 following the uprising in 2012, El-Sisi's regime leveraged narratives of stability, protection, and meritless economic promises to consolidate its power and justify its aggressive state responses to popular dissent. In the immediate aftermath of the coup and El-Sisi's consequent election as president, the targets of mass state violence were the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi's supporters. As discussed above, the military capitalized on and leveraged popular sentiment from the 2011 revolution to garner support to "act based on the will of the people" to instill

violence against the Muslim Brotherhood, consolidate its power, and gain its legitimacy without facing the stigma centered around "traditional" coups. As the military regime solidified its power and managed to sign laws into implementation that outlaw different types of opposition (such as banning protests, blocking media outlet platforms, crackdown on activists, and undermining NGOs), state violence evolved from Muslim Brotherhood-targeted to being proactively strategized at stifling any perceived threats and created a political climate of fear and limited public discourse. Moreover, the regime's ability to maintain continued international support and leverage backing from strategic and regional alliances contributed to its ability to maintain its repressive structures in the past ten years. The escalation of state violence by SCAF and the persistence of state violence perpetuated by El-Sisi since 2014, which eventually led to the normalization of repression and limited avenues for dissent, would not have been possible in the post-coup atmosphere if it were not for the popular mass support for the military. It would not have been possible had the military not embarked on a journey of dehumanization of the Muslim Brotherhood and the simultaneous adoption of the popular narrative in which the military was positioned as the "protector of the people's will".

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates the events surrounding Egypt's political upheaval periods, namely the 2011 popular uprising and the consequential 2013 military coup. It

presents a process-tracing analysis underpinned with theoretical mechanisms to illustrate the level of violence instigated by the incoming regime after a military coup that emerged following the popular uprising and its duration.

By narrating Egypt's case study, the following complex causal chain mechanisms are discussed to examine the relationship between the mode of breakdown and the level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime. In the context of Morsi's regime, these mechanisms were examined: mass mobilization, international support, democratic transition, economic factors, coalition building, and the fight for legitimacy. The analysis also addresses country-specific factors, which in this case were: cooptation by the military, civil-military relations, and the transitional judicial process. When analyzing El-Sisi's post-coup regime, various theoretical mechanisms are examined: legitimation strategies, power consolidation, repression, political polarization, institutional erosion, economic development, and domestic resource allocation.

This analysis demonstrates that the emergence of El-Sisi's military regime in post-coup Egypt, which succeeded a period of military interim rule after the ousting of Morsi, El-Sisi leveraged the symbolism of the revolution for legitimacy and presented narratives of stability, security, and economic promises. However, when the regime diverted from its initial wave of optimism into a cycle of democratic erosion, authoritarian consolidation, violence, and repression, the

popular support that once bolstered his regime has since been supplanted by widespread popular discontent.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis embarks on a journey to explore the dynamics surrounding regime breakdown and political violence. It specifically navigates the complexities inherent in the post-breakdown sphere by examining how different modes of regime breakdown impact the level and duration of state violence instigated by the incoming regime following a breakdown. By focusing on the different mechanisms that link military coups and popular uprisings to the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regimes, this thesis has challenged conventional theories in the realm of comparative politics studies.

An interdisciplinary lens has been central to this thesis's theoretical framework, which presents an alternative perception of the modes of regime breakdown. Rather than treating the mode of breakdown as a peripheral aspect surrounding the regime breakdown process, this thesis places military coups and popular uprisings at the heart of its analysis. It has sought to fundamentally understand the distinct factors that emerge in military coups and popular uprisings, the manner through which they shape the post-breakdown political environment, and the extent to which these newly emerged political environments influence the incoming regime's propensity for instigating violence in both the short and long term.

The empirical journey traversed in the chapters above involves an in-depth analysis of cross-sectional data, which yields substantial insights into the likelihood of the incoming regime instigating violence following a regime breakdown. Statistically, regimes that emerge after breakdowns facilitated by military coups are found to exhibit higher levels of violence compared to those emerging from popular uprisings when the level of state violence is assessed one year after the breakdown. This pattern is consistent even when the level of state violence is assessed five years post-breakdown. However, the analysis reveals that the impact of the mode of breakdown on state violence diminishes over time, becoming less pronounced when tested ten years after the breakdown.

In addition to empirical validation, this thesis presents a process-tracing analysis of the sequence of events surrounding Egypt's 2011 and 2013 regime breakdowns and compares the consequent levels of violence perpetrated by each incoming regime. This analysis, through a lens of realpolitik, has demonstrated that regimes emerging after a breakdown facilitated by a military coup and against the backdrop of a previous regime breakdown facilitated by a popular uprising demonstrate significantly higher levels of violence that persist over time. In the case of El-Sisi regime, the analysis clearly indicates that leveraging the symbolism and legacy of the 2011 uprisings, coupled with the subsequent voluntary political mandate granted to his regime by the public, has paved the way for his regime to instigate violence initially against the Muslim Brotherhood and eventually against all expressions of dissent, to an extent that is

unprecedented in Egypt's history. In sum, the mixed-methods approach has added volume to the empirical approach by fostering a contextualized understanding of how the mode of regime breakdown can affect the level and duration of state violence. It has also contributed to this thesis by elucidating an additional angle in the analysis that had been unobserved quantitatively, namely the examination of a case study in which two successive regime breakdowns occurred within temporal proximity. This is not only reflective of the complexities surrounding the nature of regime breakdown processes, but it has also, in a way, illustrated the extent to which regimes emerging from military coups instigate violence in the post-coup environment. This was specifically interesting in El-Sisi's case, as initially, his regime justified the use of violence by presenting themselves as the guardians of the popular uprising that had broken out two years prior to the coup.

In the future, this thesis paves the way for various avenues of future research and scholarly attention. By placing the modes of breakdown at the forefront, this thesis represents an initial endeavor to understand the nuanced dynamics that can emerge after different modes of breakdown. By analyzing only military coups and popular uprisings, this thesis has been designed in a manner that invites future contributions and refinements to this study in different ways. Firstly, future contributions to this thesis can refine the existing analysis by using different quantitative measurements and contrasting additional case studies. Secondly, future research endeavors can also capitalize on the current results and delve into a deeper analysis regarding the chosen cut-off points to measure the level of

violence instigated by the incoming regime. Future studies can adopt other cut-off points to understand exactly at which year the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of state violence by the incoming regime loses its significance. Thirdly, the inclusion of other modes of breakdown can provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between state violence and modes of breakdown. Notable examples of other modes include but are not limited to loss in an election, civil war, interstate war, and the natural death of the sitting leader. Last but not least, the results can be enhanced once other types of political violence are taken into account. While this thesis focuses solely on physical violence perpetrated by state actors against non-state actors, future research can include other types of political violence for a more comprehensive analysis.

In conclusion, this thesis lays the initial groundwork for future analyses measuring the effect of the mode of breakdown on different variables in the post-breakdown sphere – beyond political violence. The analysis developed in the preceding chapters provides sufficient merit to believe that the mode of breakdown can influence micro-level trends in the post-breakdown environment, such as elite strategies, social mobilization dynamics, and international interventions. By offering a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the mode of breakdown on various variables arising in the post-breakdown political arena, future research endeavors would take a step closer to unraveling the intricacies inherent in regime breakdown processes.

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149

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