



Graduate Studies

Peace-building and Stability after Civil Wars: The cases of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

A Thesis Submitted By

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
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The Graduate Program in Political Science***

Declaration of Authorship

I, Ali ELsharkawy, declare that this thesis titled, “Peace-building and Stability after Civil Wars: The cases of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and the work presented in it are my own. I confirm that:

- This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at this University.
- Where any part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree or any other qualification at this University or any other institution, this has been clearly stated.
- Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed.
- Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.
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Abstract

Why do some rebel groups successfully establish stable and sustainable states after civil wars, while others fail? Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are two African countries that experienced long and bloody civil wars. Despite the commonalities, the two cases strongly diverged in the political outcomes after civil war. Angola successfully made the transition to stability and prosperity, while the DRC slipped back into violence. This thesis compares and contrasts between the two peace- building processes in both countries. The results illustrate that two main variables made the difference between the two cases, the geography of the capital city and the strength of state institutions. The two variables allowed the regime in Angola to defeat the opposition and establish control over the whole territory, thereby independently implemented locally crafted peace building-process. On the other side, external intervention in the peace-building process undermined stabilization efforts.

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List of Abbreviations

IFIs	International Financial Institutions
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
WB	World Bank
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ODC	Civil Defense Organization
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
AU	African Union
MONUC of the Congo	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
MONUSCO of the Congo	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
MDRP	Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
AFD	Allied Democratic Forces
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army

Introduction

Civil wars have always been marked by devastation and destruction that annihilated the means of livelihood and hope for a decent, peaceful, and prosperous future. The United Nations shifted its focus from international conflicts to civil wars, in an attempt to contain the surge in internal strife during the twenty first century and to realize international peace and security. According to Fukuyama (2004, 92): “(s)ince the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order”. Throughout the past decades, Africa and the Middle East were stages for civil wars, which spilled over to neighboring states, thus undermining regional stability.

The African Union in its agenda 2063 emphasized the promotion of peace and stability in the continent and has launched a number of initiatives to end civil conflicts, for instance, “silencing the guns”, which aimed at “(e)nding all civil wars, gender-based violence, and violent conflicts” (Musau 6, 2019). The United Nations along with regional organizations orchestrated peace-building processes to resolve such a phenomenon. Furthermore, International Financial Institutions have increased their financial contributions to post conflict countries (Berdal and Zaum 2013, 140). Moreover, the African Union has deployed peace-keeping operations to Somalia, Darfur, Uganda and Burundi to deescalate the violence. Despite all efforts, many African countries still suffer from civil wars, thereby hindering any attempts to realize prosperity and stability.

Two African cases, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were stages for long bloody civil wars that lasted more than two decades and were followed by peace-building processes. Nevertheless, both cases showed divergent outcomes: Angola suffered a bitter civil war from 1975 to 2002, after signing the Luena Memorandum of Understanding in 2002 which enabled it to move towards peace and stability (Spears 2010, 210). On the other hand, the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo has extended for more than 25 years and continues to drag the country into conflict and violence, even after the Global and Inclusive agreement of December 2002 that followed the Luanda, Pretoria and Sun City agreements (Kisangani 2012, 138). The research question is why do some rebel groups successfully

establish stable and sustainable states after civil wars, while others fail?

The hypothesis is that the geography of the capital city and strong state institutions enabled the MPLA to score a decisive victory, whereby the central government defeated the opposition militarily. The geography of the capital city is identified as the proximity of a coastal capital to areas rich in natural resources. The first factor allows the regime to export the resources, thereby finance the war, and enhance its legitimacy. The second factor which is the strength of state institutions which enables the regime to mobilize the population and exploit the resources to finance the war. Both variables would allow the regime to score a decisive victory without external pressure to impose reconciliation and abstain from approaching the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for financial support. As a result, the government can pursue a nationally crafted peace-building process while avoiding the destabilizing effects of policies imposed by the IFIs (Exenberger 2007, 15).

Due to its proximity to the sea and areas rich in natural resources, Luanda, the capital of Angola allowed the Angolan rebels to export oil to the international market, and in parallel, strong state institutions enabled them to firmly control the economic activity (Le Billon, 2001, 58). As a result, the MPLA scored a decisive victory and acted independently from international pressure, thereby crafting a national peace-building process.

On the other hand, the regime in the DRC lacked access to ports and territories rich in resources, while the opposition-controlled areas which were abundant in minerals. As a result, the government in the capital was pressured to accept reconciliation. Accordingly, the peace-building process was dictated by external actors and the government in the DRC had to approach the IFIs for financial assistance (Hoebeke, 2007, 50; Karlsrud 2015, 47). The structural adjustment policies applied weakened state institutions and undermined their capacity (Exenberger 2007, 15). As a result, the government in the capital was not able to exercise control over the whole territory and violence continued in the East. In the end, the country slipped back into violence.

Types and Aims of Rebel Groups:

Not all rebel groups have the same, structures, goals and ideologies; they differ from one organization to the other. Besides, the origins of rebel groups tend to be different, they develop from a preexisting political organization or an ethnic community. Political organizations such as non-state armed groups, political parties, political movements, religious groups, trade unions, student organizations, foreign organization, all can develop into rebel groups (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020, 185). Nevertheless, rebel groups can come out of governmental organizations such as the military, a former regime's military, non-military government faction, non-military factions from a former regime (Braithwaite and Cunningham 2020, 185).

Africa has a rich history of rebel groups that could be traced back to the liberation wars. From the 1960's to mid-1970's, anti-colonial rebels were at the forefront of the liberation wars in Africa. The groups were promised support from the two super powers, the US and the USSR (Reno 2011, 37). The rebels rallied behind nationalistic and socialist ideals to reconcile ethnic, religious or racial differences which marked their countries (Reno 2011, 37). The second type of rebel groups is the majority rule rebels which fought regimes dominated by white minorities during the period of the 1960's through the early 1990's. To receive international support, majority rule rebels groups should display superiority in the battlefield and raise socialist slogans (Reno 2011, 79). Such groups had to adopt a political organization structure similar to that of the state in liberated areas, as the rival regimes had a strong military might (Reno 2011, 85).

During colonialism, rebel groups not only fought for independence, but also rallied for a cause either nationalism or socialism. The integration of the civilians in the newly established polities in liberated areas was a priority, as a result, the rebel groups established sustainable forms of governance after winning the war. In addition the recipient of foreign aid along with regional and international recognition enhanced their position.

In the 1970's a new form of rebels came to the surface, rebel groups which aim to overthrow African rulers and promise a new social order (Reno 2011, 119). However, there was no international support and the other African countries intervened to keep the old regimes (Reno 2011, 119). The last

generation of rebel groups was the warlords who were concerned mainly with looting of resources and building strong personal networks (Reno 2011, 163). Warlords received minimal international support and failed to establish sustainable form of governance, as there was no ideology to rally behind (Reno 2011, 164). Contrary to earlier rebel groups, these types of organizations operated in a hostile regional and global order. Besides, these rebel groups didn't establish stable regimes as territories under their control were marked with chaos. That can be attributed to the lack of integration of the civilians and the sidelining of local authorities.

That brings the discussion to the type of institutions established by the rebel groups in liberated zones which depend on the tactics and goals used. The tactics used as an outcome of the goals and aims of the rebel group. First, the rebel group should decide on sharing power with civilians, if not, then the existing legal system will be suspended and the group takes all the decisions regarding governance (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, 23). Otherwise, the rebel group may share power with pre-war civilian institutions (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, 25). Despite integrating the pre-war institutions, the rebel group can decide to renovate, depending on its revolutionary aspirations (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, 27). Meaning, abandoning old forms of government and establishing new institutions in place. Lastly, the rebel groups may decide to integrate previous socio-political formations such as religious figures, tribal and clan leaders (Mampilly and Stewart 2021, 28).

All that depends on the intentions of the rebel groups, besides the exclusion of the civilian population from decision making will require a degree of coercion. In the absence of a clear mechanism for expressing the interests of the civilians, friction is very probable which can escalate into organized resistance. Also ideology plays an important role in directing the actions of the rebel groups. Revolutionary organizations exclude previous forms of governance to create new social and political realities.

Peace-building

Peace-building processes are pivotal for stability in post conflict contexts. Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali was the first to discuss peace-building in his report "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping". Ghali (1992, 960) started with defining a set of

terms,

“(p)reventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur....*Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations....*Peace-keeping* is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nation’s military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well”

Peace-building is introduced and defined as taking actions to strengthen peace and avoid relapse to violence, through supporting relevant structures after cessation of hostilities. In case of civil wars, a range of activities fall under peace-building, such as, disarmament of militias, repatriating of refugees, building state institutions, training law enforcement forces and reviving the political process (Ghali, 1992, 969). The report emphasized the role of regional institutions and joint efforts, whereby regional associations played a crucial role in resolving crises.

Peace-keeping can be conceptualized as being divided into four distinct modes of operations. The first, monitoring or observation mission that intervenes with the consent of the conflicting parties, the second, traditional peacekeeping whereby troops are deployed to facilitate reaching a peace settlement (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 781). The third, multidimensional peacekeeping which carries comprehensive operations to reach a sustainable peace settlement, finally the fourth, peace enforcement that entails military intervention under chapter VII of the UN charter (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 781).

Peace-building is also defined as “strategies designed to promote a secure, and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur” (Lambourne, 2004, 3). Other scholars have introduced different definitions: “(t)hose activities and processes that focus on the root causes of the conflict, rather than just the effects; support the rebuilding and rehabilitation of all sectors of the war-torn society; encourage and support interaction between all sectors of society in order to

repair damaged relations and start the process of restoring dignity and trust; recognize the specifics of each post conflict situation; encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the design, implementation and sustainment of activities and processes; and promote processes that will endure after the initial emergency recovery phase has passed” (Bleiker and Evans, 2001, 137). However, the definition doesn’t state a specific duration that can identify this conflict as “civil war”. for the conflict to be categorized as civil war.

Sometimes clashes take place between groups within the same country that last for a limited period, yet they are not referred to as civil wars. Hence, it is of paramount importance to set a specific time frame for a conflict to be able to refer to it as civil war. It is important to set a time frame for examining the impact of different variables on the peace-building process. After extensive research, there weren’t any sources that specified a certain duration for the peace-building process. That can be attributed to the complexity of the process; however, the duration of peace agreements offer some guidance.

The average time between reaching a peace agreement after a civil war and the breakout of violence again is 6 years (Fortna 2003, 103). Meaning, in post-conflict contexts if peace lasted for more than six years, there is a very high chance of transitioning to stability. Another study argues that the average duration is 29 months which amounts to 2.5 years (Derouen et al. 2009, 372). Thereby, the study will adopt the time frame proposed by Fortna, 6 years as time needed to test the stability of peace. Thereby, the thesis intends to examine the policies applied in the first 6 years after the termination of hostilities to decide on the success or failure of the peace-building process.

The duration identified by Fortna (2003, 103) is applied because the data presented and investigated in the study has been used by Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 785) who have examined peace-building and were shared on the World Bank website. All that supports the robustness of the results.

IFIs engagement in countries rich in natural resources:

IFIs are lenders of last resort, meaning countries seek their support at times of despair, thereby countries rich in natural resources use their revenues of natural resources as a cushion, limiting the impact of exogenous shocks. However, countries rich in natural resources approach the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for financial support (Ross 2015, 255). Natural resources help governments provide for their needs and sometimes provoke governments to overspend and undermine domestic institutions (Ross 2015, 255).

The IMF offers technical assistance and capacity building for governments incapable of realizing maximum potential of their natural resources due to weak institutions, ineffective laws and inexperienced bureaucrats who fail to negotiate with mining and oil companies (Goes 2022, 229). Thereby, the IMF shares expertise and develops the capacities of institutions to boost revenues from sales of natural resources (Goes 2022, 229). Capacity building is one of the conditions for structural adjustment (Goes 2022, 229).

Some statistics have indicated that IMF loans to countries rich in natural resources promote investment and stabilization, in addition to regulation of usage of revenue generated from sale of natural resources (Goes 2022, 248). In Bolivia the IMF along with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank formulated a re-structural policy for oil that paved the way for privatization; such a step significantly impacted the environment and indigenous inhabitants (Hindery 2004, 294). Goes (2022, 248) and Hindery (2004, 294) propose two opposing perspectives reflecting divergent outcomes of the engagement of the IFIs in countries rich in natural resources, obviously the policies prescribed has had a resonating impact, yet identifying the losers and winners remains contentious.

The role of IFIs in countries such as Angola and the DRC which are rich in natural resources is relevant to this study. It was important to investigate the relation between IFIs and countries with wealth of natural resources and draw the contrast between how revenues of such wealthy resources are used during civil wars and at normal times. The section intended to provide a general overview of the relation between IFIs and countries rich in natural resources at times of stability. Nevertheless, the discussion will shift to the effect of IFIs on post conflict countries.

The Impact of IFIs on post-conflict countries:

The impact of IFIs, specifically the structural adjustments associated with the IMF credit facility has been a contentious topic. Some scholars have argued that countries pursuing liberalization and free market policies prescribed by the IMF are at a higher risk of civil war, in comparison to other countries that

refrained from them (Hartzel 2010, 353). The study delved into the underlying mechanisms of such a proposition; the structural adjustment program produces winners and losers, leaving no room for the government to cushion the losers or redistribute the costs between the actors (Hartzel 2010, 353). On the other hand, governments carrying economic liberalization at their own pace and conditions have the capacity to redistribute the costs of the transition, thereby limiting the prospects of losers engaging in protests (Hartzel 2010, 353).

The food riots and social unrest that took place in the developing world throughout the 70's, 80's and 90's were traced back to the waves of economic liberalization. During the 1960's and 1970's, developing countries had to approach the IMF for credit due to the recurrent exogenous economic shocks (Huge, 1996). It all started with the spike in oil prices followed by the declining prices of primary commodities and the debt crisis. The austerity measures implemented in different social, cultural and geographical contexts caused political unrest (Huge, 1996).

Another study investigated the impact of economic liberalization on Sub-Saharan Africa, through examining two case studies that pursued liberal economic reforms, in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Bussmann 2005, 570). The results illustrated that the implementation of free market policies increased the risk of the outbreak of civil wars in the two countries (Bussmann, 2005, 570). First, in many countries the market was dominated by a minority, such a situation fostered resentment among the majority (Fort, 2011, 348). Second, democracy as an integral part of the liberalization process empowers the majority to exact revenge on the ruling minority, thereby triggering violence and bloodshed (Fort, 2011, 348).

The economic liberalization promoted by the IFIs has been celebrated by other scholars as a pathway to peace; it is claimed that the components of globalization, including foreign trade, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), portfolio investment and aid, have more influence on the intensity of the conflict than the probability of its outbreak (Blanton and Apodaca, 2007, 610). The increase of foreign trade and portfolio investment reduces the intensity of conflicts, while FDI and foreign aid undermine the chances of the eruption of violence (Blanton and Apodaca, 2007, 610). The rationale is that the FDI requires commitment from the host country to increase the incentives for business, through maintaining peace and preserving a

stable business environment (Blanton and Apodaca, 2007, 609; Bussmann, 2007, 94).

Methodological approach:

Some studies have argued that “[t]he currently predominant view among social scientists seems to opt for the strategy that Naroll calls studies of Concomitant Variation” (Driver, 1971, 32). Such studies are based on the belief that systems similar in as many features as possible constitute the optimum samples for comparative inquiry (Driver, 1971, 32). The following method targets cases that are very similar yet reached a different conclusion.

Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have some similar characteristics: both are developing countries, are dependent on extraction of minerals, have racially diversified populations, have a long history of colonialism, and intervention of foreign powers in domestic conflicts (Spears 2010, 210; Pearce 2015, 18). It is important to note that both countries have experienced recurrent internal strife. Until now the DRC is experiencing recurrent internal violence while Angola has been stable and has experienced sustainable economic growth. (Kisangani 2012, 8; Kabamba 2013, 28)

The comparative method applied in this study is optimum due to the nature of the subject. Some scholars have emphasized that “(t)his first objective of comparative politics is the process of describing the political phenomena and events of a particular country, or group of countries” (Landman, 2003, 5). Moreover, the comparison serves other important purposes, such as, classification, hypothesis testing and prediction (Landman 2003, 4). Civil wars are marked with the interplay of multiple factors which cannot be dissected without a thorough analysis of the subject. Only descriptive methods can attain such an outcome.

Process tracing is the optimum methodology for the study; the analysis would examine the peace-building process in Angola and the DRC while focusing on the role of IFIs. Some scholars define process tracing as “the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (Brady 2004, 199). So, the methodology focuses on examining causality between the independent variable and the dependent variable. One of the major advantages of the process is narrowing down the potential causes of a phenomenon (Bennett 1982, 200). In addition, the

peace-building process is marked with multiple variables, thus process tracing appears to be the optimum method.

Conclusion

The purpose of the study is to examine why some rebel groups manage to make the transition to stability after civil war while other groups fail. It also aims to explore the impact of the financial assistance provided by the International Financial Institutions on stability and peace-building in post-conflict contexts through understanding its role in the two case studies.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 will present literature on peace-building, role IFIs and challenges for state building in Africa. Chapter 2 will provide a historical background of the two civil wars. Chapters 3 and chapter 4 will dissect the peace-building process in Angola and the DRC, highlighting the role of International Financial Institutions, respectively. Chapter 5 will compare and contrast between the two case studies.

Chapter 1: Factors Affecting Peace-building and Challenges for state building in Africa

Introduction:

Civil war is a complicated phenomenon which has been the reason for much destruction. Despite the specificities of each process of peace-building and civil war, scholars have been trying to draw parallels and identify patterns to understand its dynamics. This chapter will first provide a definition of civil war, discussing how the number of fatalities is important in categorizing a conflict as a civil war, some estimates have claimed that more than 1000 fatalities constitute a civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 565). Then the chapter will delve into the impact of weak state institutions, natural resources, ethnic and racial diversity, and geography of the capital and foreign intervention on the peace-building process. Afterwards, the chapter will tackle the challenges for state building in Africa then the role of IFIs in the post conflict contexts.

Defining Civil War:

Scholars analyzing civil wars have argued that grievances are a major factor in civil wars, the failure of the government to meet material expectations causes frustration which produces violence (Muller 1987, 430). First, it is important to lay down a clear-cut definition of civil war, the phenomenon may be misconceived for insurgency or uprising. Civil war has been defined as internal armed conflict with a minimum of 1000 fatalities resulting from combat (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 565). Other scholars have provided a more descriptive definition, arguing that civil wars, just as war “(a) politically organized, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country, principally among large/numerically important groups of its inhabitants or citizens over the monopoly of physical force” (Gersovitz and Kriger 2013, 160).

Another definition for civil wars is the breakout of armed conflict within the boundaries of a

sovereign state conducive to hostilities between parties subjected to its authority (Kalyvas 2006, 17). From another perspective, meeting the following criteria has constituted a civil war: fighting over power between the government and non-state group, and more than 1000 fatalities with a minimum 100 per year on both sides. These figures mark the distinction between civil war and genocide (Fearon 2003, 76).

Keegan and Bull have presented a similar definition of civil war: a violent conflict between identifiable combatants taking place within a national territory over power and involving popular participation (Keegan and Bull 2006, 4). Other scholars have criticized the western attempt to set hard and fixed frameworks through which civil wars can be identified, undermining the specificity of each case (Baégas et al. 2007, 2).

The definition introduced by Collier and Hoeffler (2004 560) will be the reference for the thesis. One of the important advantages of the definition is setting clear-cut boundaries between civil war and genocide. Both authors identify only numbers of fatalities related to combat and not civilians. In addition, pinpointing a cut-off number of fatalities further solidifies the proposed definition. Lastly, both Collier and Hoeffler (2004 560) have made the distinction between insurgency and uprising on the one hand and civil war on the other hand (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 562).

Variables Impacting the Peace-building process:

Weak State Institutions

The role and strength of the state is central for peace-building due to multiple reasons. Strong state institutions should prevent the re-eruption of violence between guerrilla groups without committing human rights violations and repression, which may trigger violence (Call 2008, 61). Containing conflicts before escalating into violence is a priority for state institutions (Call 2008, 61). In addition to preserving law and order, state institutions are expected to provide basic needs and services (Call 2008, 61). The ability of the state to provide services and respond to political demands has enhanced the legitimacy of the government in addressing grievances and providing a mechanism for expressing them (Gurses and Mason 2010, 151).

Another study stated clearly that strong states are less prone to civil wars which appears intuitive,

a deeper examination illustrated a strong state experiencing violence is more capable of committing to peace agreements, in comparison to weak states (Sobek 2010, 270). Meaning, weak states in post conflict contexts have high chances of sliding back to violence (Sobek 2010, 270).

The complexity of the issues arising from civil conflict such as reconciliation of sectarian interests, diverse societies, and weak state institutions hinder peace-building efforts (Spears 2012, 320). Due to its impact on peace-building, weakness of state institutions is a priority on the international peace-building agenda (Menocal 2011, 1715). Besides, bypassing state institutions during peace-building to realize short term goals undermines and sabotages the process itself (Menocal 2011, 1728). Lastly, it is important to engage and empower informal traditional authorities in peace-building efforts (Menocal 2011, 1729).

Blaming the state for not reconciling conflicts or failing to address grievances traces the reason for violence to other factors, not the strength or weakness of state institution. In post conflict situation grievances are addressed through negotiations and agreements, meaning in a post-conflict situation the peace accord is concerned with this issue. The aforementioned arguments depoliticize the state, meaning perceive the state as neutral, and is supposed to carry its duties. In other words, the analysis doesn't account for the possibility that the acts of state institutions can be the reason for the re-eruption of violence.

On the other side, state institutions can act as agents of war, where they are instruments for profiteering without providing services to the rest of the population (Call 2008, 61). Weakness of state institutions is one of the major challenges for peace-building alongside arbitrary borders and population diversity (Spears 2012, 320). Such challenges are traced to the colonial legacy of the countries experiencing civil wars (Spears 2012, 320).

Weak state institutions adopting patrimonial politics and ineffective developmental approaches undermine peace-building efforts; thereby peace-builders should pursue an approach that tackles such a configuration (Paris 2009, 24). Peace-building should solve the root causes of violence and foster peace, not only end violence (Paris 2009, 26). Weak state institutions serving the interest of a specific minority through appropriation of resources and ignoring the rest of the population impede peace-building efforts. Sometimes, state elites resist peace-building efforts to keep their grip on power, however, they are keen on

manipulating the resources offered by peace-building (Paris 2009, 26).

Again, tracing the re-eruption of violence to the control of a minority takes the discussion to the effect of ethnic and religious diversity which seems to be the underlying variable of the presented claim. Also, attributing instability to the control of the elite is not compelling, as there is always an elite that controls the state in every country, the question then is whether this ruling elite is capable of governing the people or not.

The importance of state institutions was highlighted throughout the literature discussing the history of the conflicts in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, given that both countries had a long history of colonialism and struggle for independence, which is the case in other African countries that suffered from social unrest (Rosoux 2014, 18; Pearce 2015, 24). Although it is important to note that state capacity is one of the main differences between the DRC and Angola, the government in the DRC was much weaker than that in Angola (Kabamba 2013, 48; Thaler, 2012, 549). As a result of the important role played by state institutions in the peace-building process, understanding the effect of the state's weakness on the civil war is important for the thesis.

Despite that weakness of state institutions can hardly be accepted as the only reason for sliding back to violence. Correlation doesn't mean causation, in civil wars state institutions are threatened and pressured which can undermine their capacity, so it could be the case that civil wars cause weakness of state institution. The role of state weakness is important; however it cannot serve solely as a justification for the break out of violence.

Natural Resources

The significance of Natural resources on the outcome of peace-building depends on the role played in the break out and continuation of the conflict (Nicholas et al. 2011, 12). High value natural resources can hinder peace-building efforts (Nicholas et al. 2011, 12). On the contrary, natural resources can be an agent for peace, through building trust, reconstruction, providing for the basic needs of the population and restoration of governance (Nicholas et al. 2011, 12). Revenues from natural resources can be allocated to provide shelter for displaced people, in addition to land, water, and sanitation.

Natural Resources entail not only minerals and oil, but also land which can trigger civil conflict. The absence of legal mechanism for resolving land conflicts impedes peace-building efforts (Brunch, 2009, 75). In such a context, displaced individuals challenge the post-conflict ruling government and its legitimacy (Brunch, 2009, 75). The post-conflict strategies implemented in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Cambodia illustrated the significance of the land problems for peace-building (Brunch, 2009, 75).

As mentioned earlier, regardless of the type of natural resources, they constitute an opportunity and challenge to many governments in post-conflict context. In Sierra Leone the government needed to regulate the flow of diamonds, while in Iraq the regime should have allocated the oil revenues between Kurdistan and other provinces (Bruch 2016, 2). Nevertheless, post-conflict authorities in Liberia were required to consider the environmental dimension of post-conflict reconciliation (Bruch 2016, 2). Besides, the solutions should be contextualized based on the actual needs on the ground.

Indeed, the impact of resources on post conflict contexts depends on their usage, so the argument doesn't provide an added value, as it put forth the political will. Meaning, it depends on who is in power during the time of post-conflict, thereby undermining the significance of the variable. Besides, not all resources are the same, land, oil and minerals are very different. Similar to oil, land requires investment of capital and time to make profits, on the other hand minerals are much less easier to appropriate. Resources appear to play a very critical role, however, the dynamics are not clear yet.

To get a deeper understanding, it is important to account for the relation between natural resources and outbreak of civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2004, 580) argue that primary commodity exports were significantly related to civil wars as the risk is highest where they represents 33% of Gross Domestic Production (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 580). The study has also highlighted a strong correlation between foregone incomes, revenue lost for taking part in rebellion, and low secondary schooling enrollment (Collier and Hoeffler, 581, 2004).

Collier and Hoeffler wanted to decide which variable is more significant, mixing models illustrated higher significance for access to financial resources. It is believed that financial resources are the most significant, as some scholars highlighted the role of financial resources in extending the duration of the

conflict (Hazen 2013, 50; Kisangani, 2012, 2; Davis and Hayner, 2003, 38; Pearce 2015, 9).

The presented arguments highlight the role of rational decision making when taking part in rebellion, perceiving the act as a form of investment. It is important to note that carrying arms has dire implications on people's future, therefore armed groups are not motivated only by making profit. Similar to the other literature, the type of resource was not accounted for in the study, meaning the effect of oil vs minerals. Natural resources play an important role in conflicts; however, it is not the only factor.

Ethnic and Racial Diversity

In post-conflict contexts where ethnic and racial diversity have instigated violence, there is a high risk of re-eruption of the civil war if peace-building does not address these matters (Cox and Sisk 2017, 8). In such circumstances, pervasive fear incites behaviors that undermine peace-building efforts (Cox and Sisk 2017, 8). Racial and ethnic groups compete to control the state apparatus to protect itself from persecution, driven by collective fear (Cox and Sisk 2017, 8). Such a contest limits the effectiveness of peace-building, thereby, it is important to address collective fear.

To address the issue of ethnicization of the conflict, the peace-building process may build new institutions along ethnic lines to ensure legitimacy and social stability (Simonsen 2005, 315). In some cases of ethnic conflicts there is a majority that needs to be strongly presented in the political system to enhance the system's legitimacy. As a result, the minority would feel threatened and resort to violence (Simonsen 2005, 315). The ethnicization of institutions deepens ethnic conflicts, thereby raising the chances of re-eruption of violence. Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq are examples of the institutionalization of ethnic politics that hindered the progress in peace-building (Simonsen 2005, 315).

Collective fear can be a factor that undermines peace-building efforts due to the competition. However, before the breakout of war these ethnic groups lived together without clashes or violence, so there is another underlying variable that pushed the groups to act in such a manner. Besides, fear can be triggered in response to religious discrimination, not only ethnic or racial conflicts.

Another study has stated that ethnicity is likely to lead to conflict, not because of cultural differences but as an opportunity for galvanization (De soya, 2002, 410). Moreover, common identity helps

political leaders mobilize ordinary people (Diamond and Plattner 8, 1994). In so doing, it is not ethnic diversity that causes conflict, but rather tension. The claim put forth takes another step, through pinpointing the role of agency. Meaning groups don't act defensively without reason, rebels take advantage of identity politics to galvanize the masses behind their cause. Yet, the question remains what triggers fear in the first place. Besides, there are countries that are ethnically diverse and didn't experience civil war.

In an attempt to reach a deeper understanding, a study re-examined the indices used to measure diversity; the results displayed that polarization is the cause of conflict not fractionalization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 798). Fractionalization has measured diversity in absolute terms, through assessing the possibility that two individuals belong to different groups, on the other hand, polarization takes into consideration the size of the ethnic groups, the existence of a large dominant ethnic group along with a coherent large minority which is the optimum configuration for a conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 798). A wide spectrum of minorities reduces the possibility of a conflict, as civil wars require a high degree of cooperation between minorities to form a coherent large minority, accordingly, there must be two big groups and one is dominating the other (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, 798).

The mechanism presented is deep and provides a more compelling analysis of the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. However, identity politics cannot describe the reason behind violence and conflicts because at the end of the day it acts as a catalyst of violence not the trigger. Meaning, before the war the same communities co-opted peacefully, thereby there has to be another underlying variable or another factor that caused the break-out of violence again.

Geography of the capital city

Geography plays an important role in the competition between countries on the international stage, as it strongly affects political power (Kyle, 2005, 271). Nevertheless, geography impacts the duration of the conflict (Buhuang, Gates and Lujala 2009, 547). Fighting taking place in areas far from the government's stronghold, rich in minerals and proximate to international borders extends the duration of the conflict (Buhuang, Gates and Lujala 2009, 547). The distance travelled by the army to fight with the rebels influences the duration and tactics used (Buhuang, Gates and Lujala 2009, 547).

Long conflict duration entails two strong sides fighting, thereby it took a long time to reach a reconciliation or for one side to score a decisive victory. Two strong sides means that there is a high chance of re-eruption of violence because once one of the sides feels eliminated, it would respond violently to such a threat. It can be deduced that long conflicts have an impact on the peace-building process and its results.

Other factors that fall under the geography of the conflict are the distance between the rebels and the capital, which is affected by the target of the rebels, whether to overthrow the regime or secession (Buhaug and Gates 2002, 419). Another study has tackled the effect of geography in relation to mineral resources, the results have illustrated that a coastal capital proximate to the ocean allows the government to export the natural resources in a systematic manner and tilts the balance of power to its side, as the other opposition lacks this privilege (Le Billon, 2001, 58). However, in the absence of such an advantage to the government, it has low chances of scoring a decisive victory.

The proposed argument investigates the impact of geography while relating to the role of natural resources, it provides an important description of the dynamic at work. Although the capacity to exploit the resources properly was not discussed, meaning the role of strong state institutions. Access to natural resources is crucial, however, the ability to exploit it in a sustainable manner requires effective and strong state institutions.

Foreign Intervention:

The potential for conflict resolution after military intervention depends on the peace agreement and the extent to which this peace agreement is binding to all parties (Rupesinghe 1989, 248). Peace agreements should ensure the presence of a political structure that engages all stakeholders (Rupesinghe 1989, 248). Thereby, foreign military intervention impacts peace-building. The presence of foreign military troops put pressure on governments and paves the way for the intervention of other actors. Besides, the agenda of the intervening party is of utter importance.

To start with, the involvement of a third party in the reconciliation process complicates matters, as the increase in the number of actors limits the prospect of reaching a settlement (Cunningham 2010, 122). Moreover, the cost of fighting is less for external parties and the continuation or re-eruption of violence

may be more profitable, all that adds to the complexity (Cunningham 2010, 123). In other words, external actors intervene with an agenda to expand their influence or exploit natural resources. In addition, the destruction is taking place on a foreign soil, so the benefits outweigh the costs making withdrawal for external actors less appealing.

Nonetheless, military intervention is costly for external actors in terms of money at least, also losing the war can be perceived internally as a public humiliation. Additionally, the domestic actors have much more risk at stake in comparison to foreign actors, hence the foreign actors are prone to sabotaging the peace-building process. Henceforth, the domestic actors play a decisive role in ending the war.

According to estimates, a lot of military, economic and diplomatic interventions came after the outbreak of civil war not before the clashes (Regan 2010, 471). The type of intervention affects the results, diplomatic engagement carried in a timely manner strongly reduces the duration of the conflict (Regan and Aydin 2006, 749). While economic intervention has no significant impact on the duration of the conflict (Regan and Aydin 2006, 749). Diplomatic intervention is understood as mediation between the conflicting parties, and civil wars end with either mediation or domination. Therefore, the impact of mediation should be accounted for, yet the political will of domestic actors determines the effectiveness of mediation. In the absence of a political will, all the diplomatic efforts lead to nothing.

The duration of war is negatively related to the success of peace-building (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 785). Thereby interventions that reduce the longitude of civil war positively affect the peace-building process. The longer the civil war lasts, the higher the casualties and violence thereby grievances accumulate, making reconciliation harder and less accepted by the warring parties. Despite this effort, in the end it all boils down to the domestic actors.

The intervention of foreign actors depends on the stability and strength of the government, meaning in the presence of a strong military and effective institutions capable of enforcing their decisions, the costs of intervention will be high. During the Cold , foreign intervention was at its peak, thereby it was affected by the international order. Also the regional order impacted the chances of intervention from neighbouring countries.

Challenges of State building in Africa:

A successful peace building process requires an effective state building approach (Curtis 2013, 79). The two case studies under examination are in Africa, thereby it is of paramount importance to understand the challenges associated with state building in Africa. International peace building efforts have been criticized for prioritizing control and stabilization and ignoring legitimacy (Curtis 2013, 79). Hence, the consensus of the governed population is absent. Another criticism is the imposition of a Western style state that is divorced from the actual needs and specificities of these communities (Curtis 2013, 79). Another point is inconsistency, as the peace building goals of different actors clash (Curtis 2013, 79).

Such points are valid and touch upon critical aspects that should be taken into consideration in the design of peace building processes. The problem with the previously mentioned arguments is that it blames the international actors without offering a recommendation or guidelines for tackling the specificities of the African communities. To achieve such a goal, it is important to delve deeper into the African context and engage with the actual needs.

A historical perspective would provide some insights Hyden (2006, 2) claims that two main terminologies explain the development of politics in Africa in historical terms, “State” and “Community”. “State” is a top-down mode imposed by the colonizers to integrate the continent into the international order (Hyden 2006, 2). On the other side, “Community” reflects the African reality pre-colonialism, a bottom up mode developed from the culture and traditions (Hyden 2006, 2). Looking into the history of the communities provides guidance indeed. However, the dilemma is the means to construct a new mode for organizing political life that takes into account the culture and traditions and avoid clashing with the world order that takes the nation state as a starting point.

Concepts such as the nation state and sovereignty emerged in Europe as a response to socio-political developments. These conceptions are hardly applicable in Africa for several reasons. First, Africa has been marked with relatively low population densities making exertion of control over a specific number of people expensive in comparison to the European context (Herbst 2000,11). Second, the ecological variation in Africa across provinces, which can be coastal, Savannah, desert, also raises the costs of exertion of control

(Herbst 2000, 12). Third, the geography of the continent makes projection of power very expensive, as Africa has a large surface area, while neither the terrain nor the rivers offer a feasible medium for transportation (Herbst 2000, 12).

Thies (2009, 623) has subscribed to the important role played by geography. The scholar adds that war, which played a critical role in the development of the European states, is not a viable option at the moment for African leaders (Thies 2009, 623). Indeed, war reshaped the European map and is not an accepted means for settling disputes now. However, nowadays territorial conflicts are a predominant phenomenon of modern Africa (Boyd 1979, 2).

In comparison to Europe, Africa appears far more expansive, thereby both the geography and the ecology of the continent hinders the application of a Western style nation state. On the other side, the continent is blessed with resources which can mitigate the effect of the previously mentioned variables. In other words, African leaders can exploit the available resources to cover the huge costs of ruling low density populations. Another point the mentioned arguments do not account for the role of traditions and culture in Africa, as the tension between traditional structures and the nation state cannot be undermined.

International Financial Institutions in Peace-building Context:

IFIs has engaged in countries in need for assistance through multiple tools, not only loans but also consultation and capacity building; however, the impact has been contentious, especially in post conflict contexts (Boyce 2004, 8; Adams, 1992, 105). The dilemma is that post conflict contexts are extremely sensitive and require deep understanding of the context, thereby policies prescribed should be very considerate of the delicate situation (Boyce 2004, 8). Major changes in economic policies are one of the main concerns regarding the engagement of IFIs.

In 1995 both IFIs the World Bank, and IMF reconsidered the fund facilities provided to post-conflict countries, however, neither the goal nor the approach changed (Berdal and Zaum 2013, 140). The priorities of financing remained the same, macroeconomic stabilization and privatization, only the staff of the institutions were given more weight in the decision making process.

The IMF designed a program, tailored for post conflict and fragile situations, which is composed

of three main pillars: capacity building, fund facilities and program design, and lastly policy support. Capacity building focuses on training of government officials and was admired by the recipient authorities as it was perceived as being of high quality and in alignment with economic priorities (International Monetary Fund 2015, 2). The fund facilities and program design has shifted to Rapid Credit Facility, different from the program offered to low-income countries; however, it is criticized for its inadequacy of funds' flow and the gap in the toolkit of facilities (International Monetary Fund 2015, 2).

Despite the reconsideration of the fund facilities presented to post-conflict countries, the policies put a much bigger weight on macroeconomic stabilization. Since their establishment, the IFIs has been promoting liberal economic policies as being part of their mandate. Besides, the institutions have never acknowledged the negative impacts of the policies dictated on the political and social realities of the recipient countries. Thereby, it is expected that the changes do not reflect a radical shift.

As mentioned earlier, the consequences of IFIs policies on peace-building are significant. To start with the recessionary effects of prioritizing macroeconomic stability pursued through orthodox policies at the expense of political priorities for peace (Del Castillo 2008, 67). Cutting budget expenditure, raising taxes, privatization, and liberalization are all orthodox economic policies required for structural adjustment to repay debt and generate economic growth. Such policies place a burden on the most vulnerable sectors of the society and the poor (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006, 1001).

Domestic economic institutions, in post-conflict context, working closely with IFIs, are significantly impacted by them (Curtis 2005, 7). IFIs's intervention creates structure of power, mainly the central bank and the ministry of finance (Curtis 2005, 7). In the presence of such structures, the push for privatization and the flow of aid can provide an opportunity for corruption and clientelism (Curtis 2005, 10). In the absence of strong monetary bodies there is a chance of corruption and abuse of power by institutions allocating the received funds and implementing privatization.

It appears that the policies dictated by the IFIs not only impact the economy and put pressure on the vulnerable groups, but also alter the structure of state institutions. In civil war context, these dictated policies represent a fertile soil for clientelism and corruption, due to the absence of accountability and

prevalence of looting. Hence, post conflict countries should refrain from policies that provide opportunities for such practices. Especially, in the presence of natural resources that already raise the prospects of corruption and clientelism.

A study proposed some considerations for IFIs, for instance, assessment of horizontal disparity between religious and ethnic groups, and vertical equity, mainly the gap between the rich and the poor (Boyce 2004, 8). Another point is the reconciliation between macroeconomic stabilization and political stabilization (Boyce, 2004, 10). In addition, regarding lending the quality of should come as a priority, not the quantity (Boyce, 2004, 10). The study has added that trade liberalization shouldn't be at the expense of available funds allocated for peace-building (Boyce, 2004, 12).

Lastly, financial assistance should be articulated to assist in peace consolidation. Another criticism for the IFIs, specifically regarding its engagement in Africa, is the staff being divorced from everyday life of ordinary citizens in the recipient country (Adams, 1992, 105). In addition to the absence of the population participation in the decision-making process, as the World Bank and the authorities have full control (Adams, 1992, 107). Finally, the lack of knowledge of the IFIs staff about the inner workings of the national economies (Adams, 1992, 110).

Such considerations are important for reducing the drawbacks of policies proposed by the IFIs; however, probably the IFIs will not change their doctrine. As mentioned earlier, the attempts to change the facilities offered to post conflict countries didn't lead to a huge shift. On another note, countries decide to approach these institutions rather than seek alternative sources of funding. Moreover, the bargaining power of the post conflict countries is very limited due to the dire need for liquidity.

All the mentioned results address the effect of IFIs on peace-building; however the factor of natural resources was not accounted for (Nicholas et al. 2011, 12). As mentioned earlier, natural resources strongly affect the course of civil war and the peace-building process. Hence, it is of utter importance to examine the effect of natural resources on the intervention of IFIs in post conflict context. The thesis intends to cover this gap in the literature through investigating the impact of IFIs on peace-building in the DRC.

Conclusion:

This chapter aimed to present literature on effect of different variables on peace-building. A huge number of scholars have investigated the effects of different elements, and some have had conflicting opinions which enriched the discussion. Most importantly, some of the studies presented the dynamics of the interaction between the dependent and independent variables rather than simple statistics. That has allowed for drawing parallels between the cases under investigation, given that there were some similarities which helped in reviewing the cases with a new lens. The literature discussing natural resources, geography of the capital, weakness of state institutions appears to be the most relevant one to the cases under investigation. The next chapters will highlight the dynamics presented in the literature in the two case studies examined by the thesis.

Chapter 2: Historical Background of the Civil wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Introduction

Throughout history, civil wars have been a recurrent phenomenon that caused misery, despair, chaos, and suffering; its worst ramifications was witnessed in Africa, rupturing families, forcing minors into carrying weapons and elderly escaping their homeland seeking refuge in a safer country. Committing atrocities and terrorizing are commonly used tactics in civil wars to spread fear; such crimes are always carried against civilians who lack the military means to react (Jurge 2020, 5).

Not only does internal strife impact those who witnessed it, but also future generations, through tearing the social fabric and breaking down state institutions; where societies suffer to reach a power sharing agreement and heal the wounds (Jurge 2020, 5). The social order that develops after civil wars is very different from that during and pre-civil war (Jurge 2020, 5).

The chapter aims to provide a historical background of the two conflicts, despite the similarities between the two cases, two main themes made a huge difference in the outcomes. First, the strength of the institutions, in Angola the bureaucracy has been operating effectively since the beginning of the war, on the other side, the Congolese state has not been capable of providing service or control the economy (Thaler, 2012, 549; Eriksen, 2009, 655).

Another element is the geography of the capital, Luanda's proximity to the sea allowed the MPLA to export natural resources to secure a coherent social base and finance the war efforts (Thaler, 2012, 549; Le Billon, 2001, 63). In the DRC, the regime was not exporting enough as most of the minerals are found in the East and Kinshasa lacked ports (Le Billon, 2001, 63). The two variables allowed Angola to score a

decisive victory and independently direct the peace-building process, while the government in the DRC accepted a reconciliation in response to pressure from external actors who took charge of the peace-building process later (Kozul-wright et al. 2011, 88).

The chapter aims at analyzing the internal dynamics of such events and mechanisms evolving them; moreover, it covers the roles of regional and superpowers in conflicts. Several factors appeared to be at play in such complicated phenomenon which will be investigated and analyzed thoroughly.

History of the civil war in Angola:

The Beginning

Located on the Western end of the African continent, Angola suffered a bitter history of Portuguese colonialism which extended after its departure, leaving behind a colonial legacy that gravely impacted the future of the African country (Pearce 2015, 28). On the 11th of November 1975, the anti-colonial struggle in Angola took another dimension, a bloody civil war erupted between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), a nationalist guerrilla, and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the communist movement MPLA. Besides, the FNLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola which took part in the initial stages then it didn't survive the war.

The MPLA was in control of Luanda, the capital, while UNITA settled in Huambo, the Central highlands. In July 1975 After the spread of rumors about massacres in Luanda, forcing people with origins from the high lands to escape, the civil war broke out (Pearce 2015, 35). The MPLA inherited the colonial state in Luanda, which provided free education and food, already financed by oil revenues, thereby raising its popularity (Pearce 2015, 71).

Both groups had different social configurations, the central elite in Luanda, the social base of the MPLA resented the Portuguese colonial rule as it suffered its repression in the capital (Thaler, 2012, 549). As a result, the elite in the capital rallied behind MPLA; the movement ensured its support through promotion and employment in the expanding bureaucracy (Thaler, 2012, 549). On another note, the proletariat also pledged allegiance to the MPLA in return for some concessions (Malaquias, 2001, 528).

The movement provided a program for independence financed by oil export revenues, based on Marxist idealism which was implemented through re-distributive and expansionist policies (Thaler, 2012, 549). On the other side, UNITA didn't enjoy the same support in the rural areas, as most of the peasants supported FNLA (a liberation movement established in the Congo). It was the white bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie that formed the backbone of the MPLA movement along with the black bourgeoisie resenting the concentration of wealth in the capital (Malaquias 2001, 530). To implement these policies, the MPLA took advantage of the strong state institutions which were inherited from colonialism.

On the other side, UNITA, dominated by Ovimbundu an ethnic group in central Angola, had been renowned for its ethnic biases and was involved in atrocities against civilians during the war (Thaler, 2012, 549). Moreover, UNITA struggled to provide basic services due to its guerrilla nature and lack of experience in managing state institutions (Pearce 2015, 51). The movement was supported by Apartheid South Africa, while Cuba backed up the MPLA, thus adding an international component to the conflict (Pearce 2015, 29).

Both groups attempted to exercise power over their territories, in response to the military intervention of the apartheid South African in 1975 to expel the MPLA out of the capital, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided military support to the MPLA (Spears 2010, 54).

In 1976 UNITA lost a few strategic cities, forcing its retreat to Jamba in the south in 1979 (Spears 2010, 50). Although Apartheid South Africa conducted raids and airborne landings along with other military actions during the early 1980s (Spears 2010, 198).

In December 1988, the American administration pushed the parties to sign an agreement that prohibited foreign powers from intervening in domestic affairs of South African states, thereby Cuba began withdrawing its military troops from Luanda; however, the American military continued to support UNITA (Spears 2010, 191). A year later the Angolan government announced that negotiations were held with UNITA leaders; afterwards, the first draft of a settlement plan was presented in a summit of African heads of states in 1989 (Spears, 195, 2010). The plan stipulated the stepping down of UNITA's top leader and the integration of the rest of the members in the Angolan state (Spears, 195, 2010).

Making Peace:

In 1991 the Bicesse peace accord was signed by the conflicting parties under the observation of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Portugal (United Nations Security Council 1991). The agreement entailed the following: the establishment of a monitoring and verification committee to oversee the implementation of ceasefire, the demobilization or integration of the paramilitary groups into the national army, and the assembly of armed groups in areas far away from the civilian population (United Nations Security Council 1991). For such an attempt to succeed, peace accords should include all actors without segregation and power sharing as top priorities to foster trust between parties.

As a result of the humiliating defeat in the elections in 1993, UNITA decided to take up arms again; however, the international community condemned such a step, thereby the party lost its strongest allies (Spears 2010, 203). In the late 1990's violence erupted again, UNITA committed atrocities in the countryside where rebels took away villagers from their land by force. In response displaced individuals moved to the areas controlled by the government, putting more pressure on the services provided in the cities (Spears 2010, 203).

It is civilians who paid the price for such inhuman tactics as it was reported that atrocities at such a point were at the peak (The Economist, 1999). In 1994, the parties signed the Lusaka protocol that stipulated power sharing and reintegration of the UNITA in the army and state institutions, in addition to sharing diamond in regions controlled by UNITA (Spears 2010, 210).

Agreements with the IMF and World Bank:

According to the IMF, Angola didn't sign any agreements with the IMF since its independence, till the end of the peace-building process, (International Monetary Fund Angola report, 2023). Taking a step back to colonial times, the Portuguese administration expanded to cover the whole territory, replacing taxation, a systematic tool for collecting money, with tributary, a haphazard approach (Clarence-Smith 1980, 112). However, the colonial rule provided health care and education to the whole population (Clarence-Smith 1980, 112). Capitalism in the center developed into export-oriented growth due to the flow of Portuguese investments, while peasants in the rural areas became proletariat (Clarence-Smith 1980, 113). Both public and private employment were offered to the locals and were not exclusive to the white settlers

(Clarence-Smith 1980, 113).

The MPLA inherited the colonial state established in Luanda, the movement was able to direct the state and mobilize resources to serve the war (Pearce 2015, 71). The Angolan elite managed to take control of state institutions and the resources right after independence, besides, the role of the state was central in the extraction of resources, without the intervention of foreign powers (Pearce 2015, 72). The East provided support for the Marxist MPLA throughout the war; the Soviet Union had been backing the movement in the context of the Cold War (Dulley 2023, 2). Angola has been immune from the Western influence since its independence.

According to the World Bank (WB) website, throughout the 90's Angola received 10 loans from the bank, equivalent to 248 million USD, the loans were granted for infrastructure, urban environment rehabilitation, capacity building for economic management, power sector, education, and health projects (World Bank Angola, 2023). All the highlighted projects were concerned mainly with specific sectors. Along with all these loans, the bank also provided technical assistance. The sectors mentioned are all critical for a sustainable economic development. The advantage of the loans provided by the World Bank was that no structural adjustments were conditioned, meaning the impact of the loans was concentrated on the targeted sector not the whole economy.

Regional and International interventions:

Since their establishment the different movements were affiliated with foreign power. Since its establishment in 1956, the MPLA received logistical and financial support from Cuba and the USSR (Spears 2010, 182). On the other side, the FNLA depended on Zaire and China (Spears 2010, 182). The engagement of super and regional power magnified the effect of foreign intervention in the conflict. Initially, foreign actors provided non-military support; it is interesting to note that China and the USSR supported two different factions.

Not only were the movements prepared for the day the Portuguese left the country in the early 1960's, but also external actors. In 1975 the US and Apartheid South Africa engaged militarily to support FNLA then UNITA later (Spears 2010, 183). On the other side, since 1975 the USSR and Cuba provided

military and economic support to the MPLA (Spears 2010, 183). All events were part of the Cold War rivalry, which aggravated the conflict and lowered the chances of reconciliation. This illustrates the effect of foreign intervention. Global powers ensured the engagement of regional actors. Besides, receiving foreign aid put the slogans of anti-colonialism raised by these groups into question.

The deployment of Apartheid South African troops in 1975 led to the direct involvement of Cuba which amounted to 2000 or 3000 personnel (Spears 2010, 184). The intervention of Apartheid South Africa solidified the discourse of the MPLA which projected itself as the only liberation movement, accordingly a number of African countries recognized the regime in Luanda (Spears 2010, 184). Regional powers complicated and aggravated the conflict, as the dynamics of the politics in the region were a reflection of the Cold War. The regional actors were proxies of the superpowers. It is worth noting that oil also may have played a part in attracting such a strong engagement of the different actors.

Miller (2012, 190) has claimed that the Apartheid government in South Africa, one of the main actors in the crisis, intervened in Angola to ensure the continuation of the regime in an attempt to contain communist and nationalist movements (Miller 2012, 190). Wright (1997 10) has claimed that the US took part in the war to limit the influence of the USSR in Africa, turning Angola to a cold war ground field (Wright 1997, 10).

During the last days of the Cold War, the US turned its attention from defeating the MPLA to the removal of Cuban troops. In 1988, the New York Accords was signed between Angola, Cuba, and Apartheid South Africa, stipulating that both South Africa and Cuba withdraw their troops (Spears 2010, 191). However, the US continued its support to the UNITA which came to an end after the MPLA was recognized as the legitimate governor in 1993, as a result of winning the elections (Spears 2010, 207). Despite all the efforts and support of the US, the sole super power at the time, it didn't manage to overthrow the MPLA. The US focused on limiting foreign support to the MPLA then scoring a military defeat. That illustrates the relative ineffectiveness of foreign intervention, in this case at least. The only superpower, the United States, was not able to replace the MPLA with a loyal puppet.

Analysis

It appears that multiple factors were at play during the civil war. First, the strong state institutions in the capital allowed the government to provide basic services to the population, enhance its legitimacy, and exploit its natural resources (Pearce 2015, 51). Second, foreign intervention further fueled the war, providing the conflicting parties with arms and financial resources, consequently, reducing chances of reconciliation (Spears 2010, 53). Lastly, the geography of the capital and mineral resources played a crucial role as the coastal city of Luanda enabled the regime to finance the war efforts through exporting oil. On the other side, the rebel group was not able to sell the appropriated resources in the international markets (Thaler, 2012, 549; Le Billon, 2001, 63). As a result, the regime achieved a decisive victory.

For a deeper understanding, it is important to analyze the impact of the different variables separately, afterwards the discussion can shift to the relation and interaction between the variables. First, state institutions played a critical role in the war, through providing services and security to the population. As the MPLA focused on mobilizing the masses and providing services to the population.

Foreign intervention played an important role in the conflict; however, in the end the MPLA that was not supported by the US won the war. Accordingly, foreign intervention fueled the war at the beginning, yet foreign actors decided on the outcome of the war. The inter-linkage between the geography of the capital and resources impacted the course of the war, as the accessibility to international market gave the MPLA leverage over the UNITA. The institutionalization of the extraction of oil and selling it in the international market provided the MPLA with the required financial resources to set itself at a better position in terms of military in comparison to the UNITA. On the other side, the UNITA sold diamond in an unsustainable manner. That brings the discussion to the role of state institutions that was mentioned earlier, the MPLA operated a relatively well functioning state apparatus and developed it. The state apparatuses mobilized the masses, provided services and security.

Both UNITA and the MPLA presented themselves as national liberation movements. Nevertheless, the MPLA embraced the socialist doctrine which provided a common cause that would bring people with different identities together (Reno 2011, 40). Such a discourse supported effectively institutions implementing re-distributive policies, and allowed the MPLA to mobilize the masses and develop a strong

social base, with the state at its heart. Moreover, such an approach granted the MPLA international recognition from the East first, then the West (Reno 2011, 70). On the other side, UNITA embraced a warlord approach in the 1990s as its leader was concerned with wealth accumulation and developing personal networks (Reno 2011, 72). However, not only operating a strong state was a decisive factor, but also the geography of the capital and resources nexus. Both factors played a decisive role in ending the conflict.

Malaquias (2001, 530) has blamed domestic ethnic and class divisions for the war which was further exacerbated by Cold War rivalries; it is the elite in command to be blamed (Malaquias 2001, 530). The author has further explained that “(t)he optimistic dreams set free by independence quickly turned into a collective nightmare as the nationalist movements that led the anti-colonial struggle failed to find peaceful mechanisms to share power in a post-colonial state” (Malaquias 2001, 530; Clarence-Smith 1980, 117). Ethnic divisions are present in the war in Angola but not to the extent of causing civil strife, as the MPLA incorporated different ethnic groups. Furthermore, foreign intervention was based on ideological rivalry not ethnic one .

History of the Civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:

The Democratic Republic of the Congo has been marked with recurrent civil wars, throughout its history as it has experienced secession, mutinies, invasions and rebellions (Kisangani 2012, 1). Right after the departure of the colonizers in the 1960's, the country started to experience a number of secession attempts: First in 1960, the industrial copper rich province of Katanga, the secession attempt was supported by Belgium as it was already receiving preferential treatment from the colonizers (Kisangani 2012, 42).

The unrest lasted thirty months where the United Nations backed the central government, while the Belgian military supported the rebels (Kisangani 2012, 44). In 1961, the UN security council resolution number S/RES/ 161 called for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign troops, later the organization deployed troops to Katanga (Kisangani 2012, 45). Second, a secession attempt took place in 1960 in South Kasai where local leaders announced its independence based on the UN principle right to self-determination which lasted only for 18 months, resulting in failure due to internal divisions within the elite and the illegal

trade of diamonds (Kisangani 2012, 51).

A historical Background of colonialism in Congo:

Since the European colonizers stepped in the Congo in 1885, it became the property of King Leopold of Belgium who used the most brutal means of subjugation to extract as much minerals as possible. In 1908 the Belgian government succeeded the King and looting and barbaric oppression continued, yet in favor of a government not a monarch (Rosoux 2014, 18). An era marked with systematic violations of human rights (Rosoux 2014, 18). Despite the huge flow of profits from the Congo, little was left over to build infrastructure or provide the basic needs for the local community.

With the rise of Pan Africa movements all over Africa, in 1960 Patrice Lumumba became the first leader of the free Congo. Shortly Katanga, the mineral rich eastern part of the Congo witnessed a secession attempt orchestrated by Belgium (Kabamba 2013, 48). The United States was skeptical of Lumumba's socialist tendencies, thereby turned a deaf ear to Lumumba's calls for support. Accordingly, the Congolese president approached the Soviet Union in 1960 for military assistance to crush the rebellion (Kamamba 2013, 48).

The Reign of Mobutu

The chief of staff Joseph Mobutu decided to take matters into his own hands, staged a coup and arrested the elected president in 1965 (Young and Turner 1985, 60). The strong military general ruled with an iron fist for 30 years. In the early days of his reign, he crushed rebellious attempts all over the Congo and shortly the country was back to stability (Young and Turner 1985, 60). In the first period of his rule 1967-1970, the new leader worked hard to consolidate power and crush rivals, only those endorsed by Mobutu were allowed to have a role in the political game where political parties were banned. The political sphere was totally controlled by the government (Young and Turner 1985, 61).

The next phase from 1970-1974 was marked with state expansion, changing the country's name to Zaire was the first step in a set of policies to realize the new slogan "Zaireanization" (Young and Turner 1985, 65). The focus on the economic sphere that was apparent in the wide range of projects undertaken

by the state to boost production of copper, build roads, and infrastructure (Young and Turner 1985, 65).

However, the grandiose expansion of the Zairian state was impeded with recurrent economic and financial crises in 1974. The decline in copper prices deprived the government from a steady flow of income; domestic expansionary policies along with the boom in oil prices brought the government to its knees (Young and Turner 1985, 65). The involvement in the war in Angola alongside the United States, undermined Mobutu's credibility as a Pan African leader (Young and Turner 1985, 65). All such policies illustrate obsession with personal glory at the expense of the people's welfare, as all efforts focused on drawing a luring picture of the ruler.

Muboto didn't change much of the colonial clientelistic economic networks, turning the country to a cash cow for transnational enterprises. Resources were extracted to be sold in the international market, while most of the revenues were given to companies, only a small chunk of it was left to individuals affiliated with the president (Kabamba 2013, 48). Throughout its history, the state of the DRC was deprived of its natural resources which strongly impeded its capacity.

Kabila Taking Over

The neighboring Rwanda experienced one of the bloodiest genocides of the century from 1990 to 1994, where the Hutu killed around 800 thousand to 1 million Tutsi and the civil war by turn spilled over to Congo (Reyntjens 2009, 3). In 1996, the government in Kigali planned an intervention to take down the Hutu militias, under the justification of protecting the persecuted "Banyamulenge" people (Reyntjens 2009, 48). Nevertheless, the legacy of Lumumba haunted Mobutu, Laurent Kabila, a supporter of the independence movement, and the leader of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) organized a Guevara-style guerrilla in the Eastern provinces. Laurent Kabila, took the driver seat long after the rebellion was organized by Rwanda

This marked the beginning of the deadliest war in the twentieth century, after the Second World War (UN website) (Reyntjens 2009, 3). The impact of the war extended to the whole continent as it is even called "The Great African War" as actors from the East and the West were engaged in the conflict (Reyntjens 2009, 3). All the above exhausted the Congolese state and undermined its capacity.

After Laurent-Desire Kabila toppled Mobutu Sese Seko's in 1997, in response to allegations of serving the interests of Rwanda, the leader decided to take a different path (Kisangani 2012, 141). The president decided to cut military ties with Rwanda; afterwards, troops in different battalions mutinied, and the fighting spread to the military basis in the capital Kinshasa (Kisangani 2012, 141). In response, Zimbabwe deployed military troops to rescue the regime, furthermore, Namibia provided weaponry and supplies to Kabila (Kisangani 2012, 145). Additionally, Angola intervened to push back the rebels; later Sudan and Chad joined the conflict to support Kabila as well (Kisangani 2012, 145). It all started as a domestic conflict, then escalated to a full-fledged intercontinental war. A peace agreement was signed that involved all conflicting parties in 1999 in Lusaka, yet it didn't last long and the cease fire broke down (Kisangani 2012, 146).

In 2001 Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard; after several attempts to conclude a peace agreement, the conflicting parties signed an agreement in 2002 that included both domestic and regional actors, signaling the beginning of a transitional period towards sustainable peace (Kisangani 2012, 146). In addition to the multiple elements at play, foreign intervention added to the complexity. First, the involvement of foreign powers that were able to recruit and mobilize huge numbers of Congolese youth, increasing the number of conflicting factions exponentially. Second, extraction of minerals was carried out on a large scale to finance the war.

Finally, at the end of the war in 2002 the parties signed a "Global and All-inclusive agreement" that set the guidelines for the transitional period (Davis 2009, 9). Four vice presidents from the central government along with representatives of the rebels and the opposition formed the transitional government (Davis 2009, 9). Despite the weakness of the coalition, national elections were held with the assistance of the UN, and Kabila won the presidency (Davis 2009, 9). However, insurgency continued in the Eastern parts of the Congo, as armed groups based in the Congo and from neighboring countries operated freely (Davis 2009, 9).

Agreements with the IMF and WB

The DRC signed a total of 12 standby arrangement agreements after the independence, as illustrated

in the table 1 (International Monetary Fund DRC, 2023).

The engagement with the IMF goes back to the era of Mobutu, who carried a very ambitious program led by the state through doubling the copper production, completing the construction of the Inga dam, developing the coastal and offshore oil wells, and constructing roads (Young and Turner 1985, 65). All that required the intervention of the state in the economy and the mobilization of resources which were achieved through nationalization (Young and Turner 1985, 65).

The government increased pressure on copper production and tax revenues, yet the downturn started with the drop in copper prices globally, in addition to the rise of oil prices in mid 1970s (Collins 2002, 612). Thereby the regime had to approach the IMF for financial support. The Zairian state depended on networks of patronage, exploiting the natural resources to ingrain its rule, the same structure with different individuals continued after Kabila ousted Mobutu (Collins 2002, 612).

In 2001, a three-year special arrangement was signed with the IMF (International Monetary Fund DRC staff report, 2001).

The staff report issued by the IMF discussed important measures taken by the government to reduce macroeconomic instability, such as, free-floating the exchange rate, cutting government expenditure, restructuring of public enterprises, increasing the price of oil, and increasing interest rate to curtail inflation (International Monetary Fund DRC staff report, 2001).

From 2001 to 2003 the DRC entered a period of restructuring the economy to pave the way for private investments (Marysse 2018, 12). Two sectors were taken over by private investments, mining, and telecommunication (Marysse 2018, 16). As a result, a network of competitive clientelism was established between the presidency, foreign investors, and the public mining company in the mining sector (Marysse 2018, 18). Again, the state was sidelined by the government officials to profit from privatization, thereby undermining national institutions.

The weakness of state institutions and the flowing returns of sales of resources recreated patterns of exploitation (Exenberger 2007, 15). Warlords, rebel armies and corrupt government officials exploited these resources, hence privatization contributed to the perpetuation of violence (Exenberger 2007, 15).

Privatization didn't establish the networks of patronage however, fed into its recreation.

Table 1: DRC history of lending commitments with the IMF

Facility	Date of Arrangement	Expiration Date	Amount Agreed	Amount Drawn	Amount Outstanding
Extended Credit Facility	12-Jun-02	11-Jun-05	580,000	420,000	420,000
Standby Arrangement	9-Jun-89	8-Jun-90	116,400	75,000	0
Structural Adjustment Facility Commitment	15-May-87	14-May-90	203,700	145,500	0
Standby Arrangement	15-May-87	14-May-88	100,000	24,500	0
Standby Arrangement	28-May-86	21-Apr-87	214,200	47,600	0
Standby Arrangement	24-Apr-85	23-Apr-86	162,000	162,000	0
Standby Arrangement	27-Dec-83	26-Mar-85	228,000	198,000	0
Extended Fund Facility	22-Jun-81	21-Jun-82	912,000	175,000	0
Standby Arrangement	27-Aug-79	26-Feb-81	118,000	118,000	0
Standby Arrangement	25-Apr-77	24-Apr-78	45,000	5,000	0
Standby Arrangement	22-Mar-76	21-Mar-77	40,960	40,960	0
Standby Arrangement	6-Jul-67	5-Jul-68	27,000	0	0
Total			2,747,260	1,411,560	420,000

Source: IMF website

According to the World Bank website, from the 1970's till the 1990's, the DRC received around more than 1 billion USD loans from the World Bank (World Bank DRC Overview, 2023). The loans covered numerous projects that included infrastructure, palm oil, cotton irrigation, agriculture, water supply, power system, petroleum sector, alongside a huge number of fields (World Bank DRC Overview, 2023). Nevertheless, the DRC received technical assistance. The huge number of loans illustrated the dependence of the DRC on the World Bank. When compared to the amount of loans provided to Angola, the difference was huge. Although the loans provided by the WB are different from those offered by the IMF, as the purpose of lending was the enhancement of specific sectors, without altering the political economy of the country. It is apparent that the DRC has been dependent on loans, given the long history of projects with the World Bank.

Eastern Congo

Despite having all the minerals and resources, the eastern provinces paid the highest price for the secession attempts and mutinies; the majority of the 5 million dead due to the war were from Eastern Congo

(Kabamba 2013, 53). It is important to have an overview of the local communities that established a trading network in place of state institutions (Kabamba 2013, 52). Before colonialism, local communities, such as the Nandi in the Eastern Congo, were in a state of flux and social hierarchy was based on control of ecological factors which were ingrained in traditions, but the introduction of slavery and ivory trade changed such an arrangement (Kabamba 2013, 59).

The European colonizers mobilized labor to enhance agricultural production, many in the local communities were forced to work in the fields or face imprisonment (Kabamba 2013, 62). It appeared that the local communities in the Eastern Congo had their own social scheme, yet foreigners who came with new forms of economic activities restructured the social fabric in a disruptive manner, while the communities were not able to resist (Kabamba 2013, 65).

Fast forward to the post-independence era, the Zairian state seized control of resources leaving no room for the local communities to feed on. In response, the Nande community looked for side ways to further enhance their position through developing local autonomous forms of government independent of the state (Kabamba 2013, 74). Functions, supposedly, carried out by the government were taken over by the Nande, for instance, building road and schools, preserving security, establishing courts for settling disputes. Thanks to the joint efforts of the militias and traders, money and power were recreated domestically (Kabamba 2013, 76).

In the absence of a central authority that could preserve law and order and provide for the basic needs of the society, local initiatives and organizations took over, especially, in the mineral rich regions. The new organizations engaged in exploitation of natural resources and labor. The wide spread of militias in the Eastern provinces could be traced to the early days of independence, during which political factions in the region were mobilized along ethnic lines (Kabamba, 2013, 74).

Regional and International context:

For a comprehensive understanding of the war in the DRC, it is of paramount importance to discuss the foreign interventions from neighboring countries. The civil war involved multiple regional actors thus it was labeled “The Great African War” (Reyntjens 2009, 1). In 1994 as a result of the massacre in Rwanda,

1.5 million civilian along with the defeated army moved to the Congo, thereby exporting the conflict (Reyntjens 2009, 45). In 1996, Rwanda organized and supported militias belonging to the “Banyamulenge” people and the Tutsi in the Eastern Congo (Reyntjens 2009, 50).

The whole rebellion appeared to have been orchestrated by foreign powers concerned about their survival. Ethnic diversity and the longstanding grievances were the breeding ground exploited by Rwanda. Identity politics were an integral component of the conflict. Another point, the resources in the East attracted intervention, in addition to the weakness of institutions. The presence of strong institutions in the East would have halted the rebellion and countered the invasion.

Regionally, Uganda indirectly engaged in the war through logistical support and offering its territory as a base for launching attacks (Reyntjens 2009, 58). Nevertheless, Angola joined the coalition, as Mobutu supported the UNITA (Reyntjens 2009, 63). Lastly the US showed understanding for the Rwandan security concerns and didn’t even condemn its actions (Reyntjens 2009, 66). In essence Rwanda was taking the lead of the situation as it strongly supported Kabila. It is worth noting that the atrocities committed by the Hutu in Rwanda compelled the international community to tolerate its actions. Besides, Mobutu didn’t have any allies in the region as almost all the actors came together to replace him.

Moving to the “Second Great African War” which started in 1998 with a military coup carried by officers in the Congolese army and surprisingly enforced by Rwandan troops (Reyntjens 2009, 194). Again the Rwandan intervention, in the name of protecting national security, was met with American acquiescence (Reyntjens 2009, 195). Not only Rwanda but also Uganda took part in the intervention, who justified it on the ground that Kabila failed to secure the Congolese side of the borders (Reyntjens 2009, 196).

Unlike Mobutu, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia came to the rescue of Kabila within a short span of time (Reyntjens 2009, 197). Angola didn’t want the return of Mobutu who supported the UNITA and Zimbabwe wanted the regime to survive to pay its debt (Reyntjens 2009, 202). Surprisingly, Rwanda and Uganda clashed due to disagreement on the way forward (Reyntjens 2009, 206). Rwanda wanted to install another puppet in place of Kabila, while Uganda preferred a nationally owned transition (Reyntjens

2009, 206).

It appears that the war in the Congo was strongly affected by external intervention. In an attempt to preserve their interests, regional powers aggressively intervened in the Congo. Some ethnic elements are strongly present in the conduct of the regional powers as well. The speed at which alliances shifted illustrated the complexity of the conflict. Besides, it is worth noting that the absence of a strong state in the DRC, especially in the East, made it vulnerable to external intervention.

In the East, neighboring countries easily organized rebellion and mutiny, even the military troops present there were not fully controlled by the capital. Not to forget the role of the minerals in the East that were not protected by a strong state, therefore, were appealing for exploitation. Another point, the expansiveness of the Congo and the presence of minerals in areas far from the capital, makes intervention more alluring and less costly, as it will be met with limited resistance. Thereby, the domestic factors seem to have been the underlying elements behind the acts of external actors.

Peace Agreements:

The Luanda peace agreement was signed in 2003 between Uganda and the DRC, and the Pretoria agreement included the DRC and Rwanda. In terms of domestic policies, the agreement called for the formation of a new government under the leadership of Joseph Kabila, Laurent Kabila's son, that incorporated four deputies who represented the armed factions (Sun City agreement, 2003). The central government and the provinces should represent the eight main actors in the conflict (Sun City agreement, 2003). The new government managed to preserve peace and stability, however, the insurgency continued in the East (Autesserre 2010, 53).

Continued Instability After Peace Agreements

Even though the peace agreements were signed, violence continued in the Eastern province of Kivu. A hall mark of the conflict was the spread of different militias affiliated to a variety of ethnicities (Sterns, Baaz and Verwijen 2016, 21). Some of the militias were backed by Rwanda and Uganda during the second civil war, in addition, the genocide in Rwanda led to migration of huge numbers of the Hutu to the DRC

(Sterns, Baaz and Verwijen 2016, 21). The peace process produced two dynamics that strongly hindered stability. Firstly, the loss of power through elections provoked some groups to take up arms again. Secondly, the leaders of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) lost control over huge parts of the East due to its limited representation in the parliament, thus urging the groups to resort to violence (Sterns, Baaz and Verwijen 2016, 21).

Nevertheless the Mai-Mai group took part in the violence, as its elite were not able to obtain promotions in the military, nor gain access to economic resources (Sterns, Baaz and Verwijen 2016, 23). In 2005 the state retreated and completely withdrew in the end (Autesserre 2006, 10). The displacement of hundreds of thousands fueled disputes and conflicts over farmland, in addition, rebels in the east took advantage of the absence of the state and exploited the local population (Larmer, Laudati and Clark 2013, 4)

Elections were a form of political competition, thereby raising the prospects of conflict. Holding elections while some groups still carried arms raised the risk of the break out of violence as the losing side probably wouldn't accept the results. First a comprehensive Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) program should have been implemented before carrying the elections, especially in the absence of a power sharing mechanism. The different militias present in the East should have been either integrated in the government forces or disarmed before holding elections, all that triggered political competition which has escalate into armed clashes. Nevertheless, the government forces failed to fight back the rebellion in the East again. All that brings the discussion to the importance of effective state institutions which was highlighted earlier.

The estimates illustrated a significant increase of poverty from 2005 to 2012 in provinces of Bas-Congo and Katanga (Marivoet, Herdt and Ulimwengu 2019). Such a dysfunctional social reality forced the youth to take part in looting and join militias to secure a source of living. Lack of control over such areas provided the rebel groups the opportunity to keep the insurgency while forcing the locals to have relations with them.

Other scholars have argued for a more global approach, the weakness of the states in Africa is

attributed to their lack of importance on the international scale, thereby developed countries were not willing to receive their manufactured goods (Reno 2006, 52). The same can be argued about developing countries in South America, they exported raw materials not manufactured products.

Yet the domestic dimension was not ignored, the state led a developmental model pursued by Mobutu which provided cadets with power and prestige (Reno 2006, 52). This created local networks that galvanized the local communities along ethnic lines, which contributed to the fragmentation of the state (Reno 2006, 51). Such fragmentation of power developed a predatory state (Evans, 1995, 46). Though Muboto can be blamed for the weakness of the state, Kabila had the opportunity to develop the institutions and mobilize the masses behind a common cause, but this didn't happen. The state inherited from the colonial era was not capable of delivering services or basic needs. Most importantly, the absence of the state in the East, where militias extracted and sold minerals in return for arms, continued to pose an existential threat to the capital.

Conclusion:

By and large, both countries experienced long and bloody civil wars, the ethnic element was strongly present in both countries along with the extraction of minerals. Colonialism was also to be blamed for the deterioration of the situation (Spears 2010, 210; Pearce 2015, 18).

Both the geography of the capital and the weakness of state institutions impacted the two cases differently. The regime in Angola managed to take control of the whole territory without concessions, as the two variables tilted the balance of power in its favor, thereby, the peace-building process was crafted nationally (Thaler 2012, 549). While in the DRC, the regime was pressured to accept reconciliation due to the effect of the two variables on the outcome of the war (Eriksen 2009, 655). As a result, the peace-building processes in the two countries took different paths.

Despite all the similarities, both countries reached a different end. Angola managed to have a sustainable peace while integrating some of the opposition in the state apparatus, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo suffers from the relapse of violence until now (Oliveira 2011, 287). Hence, it is important to underline the major differences. In Angola the peace-building process was not liberal, as one

party dominated the other, not only through military means but also its state apparatus managed to deliver basic needs to the community while financing the war efforts .

On the other hand, the Eastern provinces in the DRC lacked the presence of state institutions; the locals organized their social capacities to provide the basic needs for themselves (Beswick 2009, 340). Furthermore, the DRC approached the IMF for a loan with all the conditionality associated with it, while Angola depended on a more nationalistic approach to encounter the economic hardships. Besides, a variety of analysis and arguments were presented that examined the effects of different factors on both cases. It is apparent that both countries ended up in different places, despite the similarities.

Chapter 3: The peace building process in

Angola and the role of IFIs

Introduction:

After discussing the details of the civil war to get a historical overview, the remainder of the thesis will proceed to investigate the peace building processes. The previous chapters provided the context in which the main actor emerged and established themselves. In the case of Angola, it is the victorious MPLA which completely took control of the peace-building process. Due to the strong state institutions and the geography of the capital, two factors strongly contributed to a decisive victory, consequently the peace-building process, lasting for 6 years, was crafted in accordance with the local context and independent from the IFIs (Thaler 2012, 549; Le Billon, 2001, 63).

In 2002, the United States mediated a peace agreement between the two parties, resulting in an agreement which stipulated the demobilization and reintegration of the UNITA forces (Spears 2010, 203). Besides, the movement became a political party and participated in the elections. Additionally, the peace agreement included a power sharing mechanism, lastly, the sharing of the diamond in UNITA controlled territories (Spears 2010, 203). The MPLA became the dominant political actor; yet it encountered grave challenges which will be discussed further and more importantly the party's response and policies.

The following chapter aims at discussing the peace-building process in Angola, through analyzing the specificities of the process and laying out the facts. It is the small details that make the difference between the cases and guide the research through the different layers of the phenomenon. The role of the International financial institutions will be analyzed, mainly the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, it is important to examine the domestic politics at the time to understand the dynamics of the Peace-building process.

Consolidation of Power:

Following the signing of the peace agreement in 2002, MPLA became the dominant party in Angola, after years of a bloody civil war. To consolidate power, the party deployed a set of strategies: distribution of oil revenues in return for political support, mobilizing social groups to rally for the party, cracking down on opposition and controlling the public sphere (Kyle 2005, 287). Firstly, oil played a decisive role in the war and afterwards the MPLA took advantage of the revenue stream from oil to finance war efforts and secure a strong cohesive political base in Luanda, and later to pay back foreign debt (Kyle 2005, 287). Such a matter will be thoroughly discussed in the next section; however, it was one of the fundamental policies for firmly establishing its rule.

After the MPLA crushed UNITA, the ruling party started enrolling combatants from the rebels, hence growing its political base to an extent of conscripting 2.1 million of a population of 16 million (Roque, 2009, 140). The group affiliated with the MPLA such as youth and women's league further expanded its influence in the society. For instance, the Civil Defense Organization (ODC) civil militias which was legalized after the war, worked on promoting the image of the ruling party in the rural areas (Roque, 2009, 140).

To consolidate power, the ruling party tightly controlled both media and civil society, critical tools for directing and mobilizing the masses (Roque, 2009, 145). Given the low literacy rates and high levels of poverty, the radio, quite an antique tool, was the most widely used medium of communication (Roque, 2009, 145).

For instance, the regime limited the funds approved to competitors, appointed its supporters in the National Electoral Commission, threatened civil servants to vote for the party or risk losing their jobs. In other words, the elections were not forged, yet unfair (Roque, 2009, 145).

Autocracy entails the concentration of power, in Angola, the president Dos Santos held a tight grip on power. Despite the delegation of power to the prime minister in the constitution, ministries with real political and economic power, such as, finance, justice, defense, foreign affairs, central bank and Sonangol directly reported to the president (Roque, 2009, 146). Nevertheless, security and intelligence services were strongly involved in state administration, representing a second line of governance after the president

(Roque, 2009, 146). On the other side, the opposition suffered from internal frictions and divisions. By the end of the war, UNITA became so weak, lacking the capacity to represent an alternative to the MPLA .

Subsequently, the regime managed to establish a strong autocratic rule in place of a weak and fragile state, UNITA, once a feared rival of the regime, became very weak and did not pose a threat to the regime (Roque, 2009, 132). Non-of the parties on the political landscape was able to confront or compete with the ruling party as it contained all rivals (Roque, 2009, 132). Despite the rapid economic growth, a minority reaped its fruits, due to mismanagement and corruption.

After crushing the opposition, the MPLA applied a set of authoritarian policies and practices to ensure full control of the state and land, to the extent of following in the footsteps of totalitarian regimes. At this point the new regime aimed not only to control the population, but also mobilize factions of the society behind its ideals. As mentioned earlier the party promoted Marxism and embarked on re-distributive policies. Oil also helped in realizing the aspirations for control through distribution of benefits and covering the expenses of social services. In the aftermath of a long bloody civil war, it is justified to witness some autocratic practices and to buy loyalty, as in such delicate times there is a chance of re-eruption of violence. In addition, the government tends to be skeptical of any kind of political activity and rebellious attempts, a preemptive strategy is to mobilize the masses and provide benefits in return for loyalty. The regime expanded its social base to ensure its survival.

In 2008, the government held elections which were praised for its credibility and transparency by international observers, despite the lack of fairness (Schubert 2010, 661). There was no level playing field for competitors, the government manipulated the laws and registration of voters to ensure its victory. Civil society organizations taking part in organizing the elections were controlled by the regime (Schubert 2010, 661).

According to Roque (2009, 147), behind the democratic façade of multiparty electoral politics, the authoritarian regime in Angola dominated the political scene (Roque 2009, 147). The system left a niche open to input from other parties, as other stakeholders were engaged in the peace-building process, mainly non-governmental organizations (Roque 2009, 142). In the end, the regime was capable of closing the space

offered for those actors, in case of emergency.

The literature on civil wars has highlighted the correlation between semi-repressive regimes and violence, due to the absence of a mechanism for raising grievances (Höglund 2009, 423). In the aftermath of civil war, there are triggers of violence associated with democratic practices, the electoral process can constitute a threat for conflicting parties afraid of losing access to power (Höglund 2009, 423). Some underlying conditions must be present to set the stage for violence, such as, access to arms, political mobilization, and weak electoral institutions (Höglund 2009, 423). This justifies the practices of the regime to enforce some authoritarian measures which aim to prevent the re-eruption of violence likely to take place with democratic practices.

Contrary to the presented argument, a study has illustrated that countries holding elections after civil war are less likely to experience electoral violence (Straus and Taylor 2009, 26). The fact that elections after civil war causes violence remains contentious, and obviously the political environment in which the process is held significantly impacts its outcome. In such a case, political violence is highly anticipated as was the case in Angola, after the elections, violence broke out again (Spears 2010, 203).

As mentioned earlier, the regime limited the public space and undermined the opposition to limit competition in the elections. Such a regime cannot be categorized as democratic nor authoritarian, due to the presence of some democratic practices, at least in respect to procedures. Accordingly, the regime can be described as semi-democratic or an electoral democracy, due to the absence of a level playing field between the government and the opposition. The government deployed a set of tools that put the opposition at a weaker position in comparison to the government, denying it all the means to compete. All that illustrated the practical nature of the regime, sidelining the ideological doctrine, and pursuing policies that best served its interests.

The policies pursued strengthened the regime and supported state institutions. The firm consolidation of power limited the fluidity and uncertainty of the political context, pivotal for the success of the peace-building process. Through containing the opposition and expanding its social base, in addition to other policies implemented to prevail, the regime managed, to implement its nationally crafted peace-

building process.

Clientelism:

The regime in Luanda secured a strong social foundation through clientelism: the distribution of oil revenues to loyal factions of the population (Le Billon 2001, 63). Socialist states used the same approach, providing material incentives to the social base of the regime in return for loyalty. Employment in public sector firms and state bureaucracy were key mechanisms for distribution of oil revenues and rental rewards (Le Billon 2001, 63). Sonangol, the state-owned oil company, set the optimum example. The firm employed 5,000 personnel who received a wide range of rewards such as education, fully covered medical care and exemption from taxes (Le Billon 2001, 63).

Army officers and high-ranking civil servants were granted access to profitable privatization opportunities and annual bonuses that boosted their earnings (Le Billon 2001, 63). Individuals belonging to the closed circles of the president got a bigger piece of the cake, foreign oil companies provided services and goods to their associations which were used also to promote the public image of the president (Le Billon 2001, 63). Nevertheless, a significant portion of the government expenditure financed utilities of the small privileged minority.

The party strongly depended on clientelism throughout its history to secure the support of the elite in Luanda. Despite the criticism of such an approach, it was crucial for the war to take advantage of the revenue stream to preserve a strong political base and ensure loyalty (Le Billon 2001, 65). the MPLA looked for a source of foreign fund to finance infrastructure projects, and China was the perfect partner (Foster 2008, 2). Infrastructure projects were exchanged for oil and minerals.

The regime ensured the presence of the state at the heart of the distribution of economic gains. Expanding the bureaucracy to enlarge the social base of the regime was a classic socialist approach; however, it was not sustainable in some countries due to large budget deficits. In the case of Angola, the oil revenues allowed the government to sustain such a controversial situation. In spite of the socialist discourse, other fields of the economy were governed according to free market rules as multinational corporation were welcomed. Nevertheless, the government aimed to expand its social base as a tool to

stabilize the political situation after the war. The distribution of material incentives was the main tool to realize the aforementioned goal. Political support was exchanged for money and benefits. Most importantly, that support was provided through state apparatuses not illegal trade.

Minerals and warlords: the role of Diamond and Sonangol

Sonangol, the oil company was established in 1974 as the oil concessionaire, regulator and tax collector, moreover, the key figures in Sonangol's core team were party members who enjoyed strong ties with the president (Oliveira 2007, 599). The entourage belonged to the same social background and the upper ranks of the party, and most importantly were well educated and based in Luanda (Oliveira 2007, 599). After the eruption of violence again, the company sold oil for arms, such a huge shift in the form of transactions provided the managers of the firm the opportunity to receive huge commissions (Oliveira 2007, 599).

Despite the Marxist-Leninist discourse, the party was keen on aligning its interest with that of international corporations to enhance its financial position. Due to the complexity of the oil industry, the government had to establish a long stable rewarding relation with foreign oil corporations to maintain its operations (Oliveira 2007, 599). The party perfectly exploited oil as it managed to keep expats to prevent disruption of the operations while having the management under its direct supervision and strengthening ties with multinational corporations.

On the other side, UNITA enjoyed an abundance of diamond in areas under its control. The group earned around 380 million USD annually from selling diamonds that were used to finance the war efforts (Kyle, 2005, 273). The movement expanded to territories rich in diamond, thereby boosting its financial capacity, although diamond was not a sustainable source of income in comparison to oil, due to its location (Kyle 2005, 273). UNITA lacked access to ports, thereby limiting its capacity to export diamonds, on the other hand, MPLA was placed in a coastal city (Le Billon 2001, 58).

Despite its political isolation due to its affiliation to Marxism, the proximity of the capital to the sea integrated the MPLA in the global economy (Le Billon 2001, 58). That also explains the ability of MPLA to reach a decisive victory. In comparison to UNITA's diamond business, the MPLA followed a

more successful mode of operation. The MPLA established a strong partnership with the multinational corporations in the energy field, thereby the operations continued despite the war, due to the trust between the government and the business (Oliveira 2007, 608). The government was a beneficiary of the business deals, meaning returns of oil were distributed through the state (Oliveira 2007, 608).

All that illustrates the pragmatic nature of the MPLA, meaning the Marxist idealism didn't hinder cooperation with international finance. Moreover, the regime in Luanda institutionalized the relation between the ruling elite and oil corporations, thereby empowering and supporting state institutions. That is a very important aspect as the state institutions were not sidelined. Not only was Sonangol engaged with multinationals, but also the government levied taxes as well to cover public expenditure. Thereby the government has been present in all economic activities. International finance invested in the infrastructure of the country further expanding the number of beneficiaries (Oliveira 2007, 605). The MPLA efficiently took advantage of all the resources at its disposal, and strived to preserve the mode of operation, even after the war came to closure. Another point differentiating oil from minerals is that a huge bulk of investments are required before oil production, thus it is long term investments that finance building roads and infrastructure (Oliveira 2007, 605). In addition the MPLA managed to institutionalize the process to make it sustainable and serve the interests of the country, not only the private business.

On the other side, UNITA strongly depended on the trade of diamond in the international market. UNITA war lords extracted the diamond to sell it in the international market, only a small niche of the elite profited from this mode of operation, while the government was sidelined. It is worth noting that the revenue stream from Diamond was less than that of oil, as its extraction required long term investments, obliging the business to invest in sustainable infrastructure projects (Oliveira 2007, 605). While selling diamond required cheap labor without the need for huge investments. Additionally, UNITA lacked the capacity to provide social services which undermined its social base. It appeared that the mode of operation pursued by UNITA was less sustainable and not institutionalized in comparison to that applied by the MPLA. The difference between the two types of management is huge, UNITA's approach was not sustainable, hence the balance of power tilted towards the other side.

UNITA managed diamonds in a cartel style, based on shadow networks of warlords. As a result, the MPLA managed to strike a decisive victory and had the institutions capable of mobilizing the people behind its political goals. In the end, the opposition was integrated into the ruling party along with significant stratum of the society, as a result, the regime had a completely freehand in the peace-building process. After years of instability and internal strife, a strong leadership capable of mobilizing the masses behind its vision was pivotal for a sustainable peace-building process, otherwise the odds of slipping back to violence were high.

The Relation with the IMF and WB:

Despite the regime's ability to finance the war and provide material incentives in return for loyalty, the economic situation was on a downturn. Inflation was extremely high, reaching 100% which can be attributed to large government expenditure (International Monetary Fund report Angola, 2003). Besides, the sharp decline in the value of the national currency along with the increase in foreign debt, both can be traced back to war economy (International Monetary Fund report Angola, 2003).

The dire economic conditions, as a result of the war, forced the government to approach the IMF and the World Bank; however, the government refrained from signing an agreement. Angola didn't sign an agreement, the fund only provided consultations (Adams, 1992, 110). It is worth noting that the policies proposed by the IMF are criticized for their effects, as they prioritize economic stabilization without accounting for the political implications (Boyce 2004, 10). At such a delicate situation it is important to avoid policies that may undermine political stability, thereby the MPLA avoided the structural adjustment set forth by the IMF. Another point is the privatization policies proposed by the IMF would have deprived the regime of a vital source of income. For instance, the privatization of the energy sector would have limited the government's ability to provide benefits to loyal factions.

The policies imposed by the IMF could have undermined the ability of the government to distribute economic gains through expanding the bureaucracy which is essential for the survival of the regime. In case the regime showed signs of weakness, the opposition would have taken advantage and reorganized itself and fought back. At such a point, the country could have fallen into another endless cycle of violence. In

post conflict contexts, the situation is very volatile and state institutions are vulnerable, all that raised the temptation to resort to violence, thereby, the centralization of power is pivotal for the success of peace-building.

On another note, cutting government spending could have threatened the survival of the regime, due to its social and political implications. the IMF has been criticized for its disruptive effects on stability and social cohesion (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006, 1001). Cutting budget expenses, suggested by the fund, limited the resources allocated to delivering social products and services, raising the prospects of social unrest due to the deteriorating living conditions (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006, 1001). Furthermore, such an approach undermined the state institutions, due to the absence of the role of the state and social protection which affected its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.

The regime looked for alternative sources of funding. China provided infrastructure loans in return for oil, thus allowing the government to exploit the resources without implementing disruptive policies. Ex-Im bank provided loans collateralized in oil for infrastructure projects (Foster 2008, 2). Such a model of funding has been convenient for the regime whereby a revenue stream is provided in exchange for resources without conditionality. This configuration allowed the government to sustain distribution of benefits to loyal factions and social spending, both preserve the social base of the MPLA.

Given the huge destruction in the infrastructure because of the war, the MPLA decided to engage with the World Bank which required creating the transitional support strategy (TSS) agenda that focused on “a) enhance the transparency, efficiency and credibility of public expenditures management, b) expand service delivery to war-affected and vulnerable groups and c) prepare the ground for broad-based pro-poor economic growth” (Cihlar 2010, 22). The program required allocating 125 million USD during the period of 15 months (Cihlar 2010, 22).

The government in partnership with the World Bank announced the establishment of Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Construction program which aimed at the consolidating of peace, building state capacity, promoting food security, and improving rural life (Cihlar 2010, 23). In total, the World Bank provided loans to Angola throughout the Peace-building process equal to 209 million USD (Cihlar 2010, 23). The loans

covered a variety of sectors including social support, the economy, and emergency demobilization (Cihlar 2010, 23).

In essence the regime avoided the negative effects of IFIs, such as, the structural adjustment policies and took advantage of the programs and funding that were in alignment with its aims. The IMF was approached only for consultation. On the other side, the projects offered by the World Bank that targeted infrastructure, which was devastated during the war, were welcomed and supported. Infrastructure projects focused on certain sector without engaging with macroeconomic policies.

Domestic DDR:

One of the main pillars of peace-building is Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration whereby militias are required to surrender their arms to the government and get back to civilian life, and in some cases they are integrated in the army or police forces (MDRP, 2008). All this depends on the peace agreement which should dictate the presence of a single entity that enjoys an exclusive right to the legitimate use of force (MDRP, 2008).

After signing the peace treaty, the MPLA carried out a national program of Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration which targeted 105,000 UNITA ex-combatants (MDRP, 2008). The project was financed by multiple international donors, the government of Angola paid 157 million USD, while the European commission provided 20 million USD and the World Bank offered 38 million USD (MDRP, 2008). The results showed that 92,297 direct and indirect beneficiaries were reintegrated. That was a huge success, also given that none of the participants resorted back to violence (MDRP, 2008).

The process of reintegrating combatants into the community is very complicated as the government should ensure the employment of the subjects and secure a fixed stream of income; otherwise, there is a high chance of returning to violence. To measure the success of the program, a study interviewed 10,500 of the combatants after receiving the financial support, the findings illustrated the following: 61% of them are self-employed, yet 35% don't have a job, surprisingly 95% have access to agricultural land and 98% established families, lastly 93% consider themselves reintegrated (MDRP, 2008).

As illustrated earlier, the government independently directed the Demobilization, Disarmament,

and Reintegration process, without much interference from external actors. A sovereign government wouldn't allow other non-governmental actors to have the right to use force. Thereby, Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration is of paramount importance for the peace- building process. The DDR is a critical step towards stability, as armed militias represent a huge threat for stability and security. Armed groups critically undermine the government's ability to preserve law and order, in addition, they tempt other local communities and social groups pressuring them to carry arms. Nevertheless, during elections or political competition there is a possibility that losers resort to violence, so the availability of arms raises the prospects of the outbreak of fighting again. It was one of the main tools to control the government and consolidate power.

UN missions to Angola:

Throughout the conflict in Angola, the UN attempted to send missions to oversee the application of the terms of peace agreements while tackling different complex issues hindering them. However, the success of these missions was in doubt (Dzinesa 2004, 646). The UN decided to replace the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III with United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) a smaller observer mission, it is claimed that financial considerations were behind the decision (Dzinesa, 2004, 646). The new mission had an observatory role with minor tasks such as the observation of the Angolan national police, preserving the free movement of people, commodities and the safety of UNITA leaders (Dzinesa, 2004, 647).

It appears that the UN has been trying to engage in the conflict through various missions to help the parties reach an agreement. The intervention had two main tracks, political reconciliation, and demilitarization, yet a very limited success was achieved (Dzinesa 2004, 648). After the cease fire, the role of the UN became minor. It is worth mentioning that later in 2002 the government managed to take control of the situation and impose stability (Dzinesa 2004, 648).

It appears that the regime took matters into its hands after the gradual withdrawal of the UN. The government depended on its capabilities and institutions to enforce the law and preserve order. The consecutive failures of the UN missions allowed the MPLA to take the upper hand. The gradual withdrawal

of the UN from the political scene allowed the government to take charge and become the sole provider of services and security. Also, after the elections the regime gained international recognition and became the only legitimate actor in the political scene. Lastly, after the elections the role of the UN became minimal and the MPLA took charge.

Illiberal Peace-building

After 2003, Angola represented an obvious case of successful “Illiberal Peace-building”, through applying a set of measures that were far from the liberal peace-building doctrine (Oliveira, 2011, 287). The government reintegrated the armed opposition into the state through material incentives, simultaneously, authorities had full control of the media, linked peripheral areas to the capital through infrastructure projects, and lastly created a business class (Oliveira, 2011,292). The government in Thailand followed an ” illiberal peace building” approach to put an end to the rebellion in the South which offered another example for an approach different from the conventional liberal doctrine (Chalermripinyorat 2020, 85).

Peace-building in Angola involved civic organizations that collaborated and initiated a national dialogue which engaged mainly domestic actors, cultivating a sense of ownership, thereby the process was fruitful (Ntoni-Nzinga 2003, 89). One of the tools was establishing partnerships with international actors that helped the Angolan civil organizations strengthen peace networks which played a critical role in the cease fire and resolved the conflict (Ntoni-Nzinga 2003, 89).

Today Angola is one of the promising economies in Africa, both oil revenues and Chinese loans funded the construction of roads, airports, and bridges, along with thriving cotton and coffee industries (Deutch Bank 2023; Foster 2008, 2). Although the government encountered high unemployment and poverty rates which undermined social and political stability, it succeeded in the huge reduction of child mortality rates. Despite all that, there are some voices which criticize the peace process as the reconciliation was on the ruling party’s terms (BBC News, 2012).

Conclusion:

By and large, it appears that the peace-building process in Angola took an unconventional

path. MPLA finally defeated UNITA in a long bloody war that extended from 1975 to 2002. After the consolidation of power, the government launched a reconciliation program to integrate the opposition in the regime (Roque, 2009, 140). The government in Luanda refrained from Western assistance, thereby pursued its own path.

In contrast to other countries, the government in Luanda exercised control over minerals and secured revenue streams that preserved the independence of the decision-making process (Oliveira, 2007, 608). On another note, the MPLA inherited a relatively efficient state institutions from the colonial rule, the regime managed to direct it to preserve its clientelistic networks and provide basic needs and services to the population (Clarence-Smith, 1980, 113).

Against this backdrop, peace-building was carried out without political or economic changes in the system. Through the exploitation of minerals and establishing alliances with Eastern countries. The regime managed to rebuild the country without loosening its tight grip on power. However, civil society organizations, with the consent of the government, pushed forward for social reconciliation along the lines of customs and traditions. Now, Angola is one of the flourishing economies in Africa which illustrates the success of the peace-building process (Deutch Bank website).

Chapter 4: The Peace Building Process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and The Role of the IFIs

Introduction

After decades of bloodshed, finally in 2002 according to security council resolution S/2002/914 the DRC reached a peace settlement with Rwanda, sponsored by South Africa and other international actors in Sun City, that stipulates the withdrawal of the Rwandan forces. Earlier in 1999 according to Security Council resolution S/1999/315, the African Union (AU) and South Africa came together in Lusaka Zambia to agree on cease fire. In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his bodyguard in the absence of a constitutional successor (Kisangani, 146, 2012). Eventually, both Angola and Zimbabwe agreed on Laurent's son, Joseph, to inherit his father's rule with the blessings of the West.

This chapter will have the following sequence: first, the roles of foreign actors in the process will be analyzed, mainly the UN and the EU. Second, the process of state building in the DRC will be introduced. In this part a critical discussion on state fragility and the absence of state institutions, along with the details of the process in the DRC will be developed. Third, the impact of the IFIs on the state and the ruling elite will be examined. Lastly, the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in the DRC will be investigated.

The chapter argues that the geography of the capital along with the weak state institutions impeded the capacity of the government to win the war, as a result external parties mediated for a reconciliation and hijacked the peace-building process. The new regime had no choice but to engage with the World Bank and the IMF; consequently, the IFIs intervened in the political and economic domains, undermining the state

institutions, and exacerbating instability (Exenberger 2007, 15).

Despite the attempts to democratize the DRC, it slipped back into authoritarianism (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 707). Unlike the MPLA, the regime in the DRC failed to bring stability, despite sharing the authoritarian form of governance; due to the weak institutions that were completely absent in the East and remained not effective after the war (Beswick, 2009, 340). Another reason is the geography of the capital, being detached from the external world as it is distant from the sea, and lacking the natural resources which are concentrated in the East (Le Billon, 2001, 58). The two aforementioned factors impeded the regime's ability to direct the peace-building process, hence, foreign powers intervened in the process.

During his inauguration, the new president addressed the need to follow the Lusaka Peace Accord (Kisangani 2012, 146). After his visit to France, Belgium and the US, Joseph Kabila returned to pursue peace-building (Kisangani 2012, 146). The Sun City peace agreement established a transitional government, reunited the country, and expelled most of the foreign parties. This marked a holistic agreement in the transition process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sun City agreement, 2003).

Two agreements were conducted in parallel, the Luanda agreement between the Congo and Uganda, on one side, and the Pretoria agreement between the Congo and Rwanda, on the other side. The domestic agreement stipulated that the configuration of the administration should include a president (Joseph Kabila) along with four deputies representing armed and non-armed factions (Sun City agreement, 2003). The eight main actors in the conflict should be represented in the central government and the provinces as well (Sun City agreement, 2003). In the first years of its rule, the transitional government successfully unified the Congo, eliminating the borders between fighting provinces. However, hostilities continued in the Eastern parts (Autesserre 2010, 53).

UN and EU engagement in the DRC:

After signing the Lusaka agreement in 1999, the Security Council increased the number of deployed troops and expanded the mandate to include, protection of civilians and UN personnel , ensuring security and freedom of movement, maintaining presence in key areas of volatility, monitoring the borders, seizing and collecting arms (MONUC 2023). Such huge changes made the mandate of the mission one of the most

expansive in the history of peace-building (MONUC 2023).

Back to the mission in DRC, in response to its failure to protect civilians and its incapacity to prevent the Kisangani massacre, both the mandate and the name of the forces were expanded and altered, respectively. MONUC became the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), besides, the forces were authorized to take all necessary measures to neutralize and disarm groups threatening civilians and undermining state authority (Karlsrud 2015, 45). In addition, the mission received more support in terms of equipment and personnel (Karlsrud 2015, 45).

Despite the support provided by the international community for the mission, the militias were operating actively in the Eastern provinces (Karlsrud 2015, 45). Using the latest technology in communication along with the cooperation of the locals to report human rights violations, MONUSCO exerted effort to be more responsive to crimes and violations (Karlsrud 2015, 46). Although, the mission was not successful in protecting civilians, massacres took place even after the expansion of the mandate (Karlsrud 2015, 47). The UN's approach changed from Peacekeeping to Peace enforcement. On the other hand, the UN mission was responsible for preserving law and order and protecting civilians as the central government in Kinshasa was incapacitated (Karlsrud, 2015, 45).

After the withdrawal of military forces of Uganda and Rwanda from the East, the MONUC was responsible for preserving law and order (Miskel 2003, 9). However, the mission lacked the capacity and equipment to preserve public order (Miskel 2003, 9). Violence escalated at an alarming pace. In response, the multinational force was deployed in to ensure security and protection of civilians (Miskel 2003, 9).

Despite the huge number of resources and personnel deployed to the DRC, the mission hardly realized its goals. The UN expanded the mandate of the mission gradually to the extent of enforcing laws and protecting civilians. All that shed light on the diminishing capacity and role of the central government. To the extent that an external entity became responsible for providing the basic needs and services to the population. Despite all these efforts, the situation in the East deteriorated. The killing and violence continued which put into question the effectiveness of this approach. The government in Kinshasa became extremely dependent on the UN mission.

Along with other international organizations, the EU operated in the DRC, under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), European troops were deployed for peace-keeping along with UN missions. Four ESDP missions were sent to the DRC, 2 military and 2 civilians (Hoebeke, 2007, 48). The civilian missions are still active to the present day and play a crucial role in the security sector.

The EU has also provided humanitarian aid, all these efforts have been guided by certain priorities such as macro-economic stability, institution building and poverty reduction (Hoebeke, 2007, 50). It is worth noting that the EU was concerned with the elections, 165 million Euros were given to the government to ensure the success of the process (Hoebeke, 2007, 43). Part of the funds were allocated to reform the security sector, to ensure the minimal security conditions for the elections through mixing different Congolese militias to break the chain of command and train the national police (Hoebeke, 2007, 43). Albeit the government failed to have monopoly over the use of legitimate force because of the different actors that maintained parallel military structures.

It appears that the priorities set by the EU were guided by the liberal agenda. Allocating funds to reform the security sector to set the stage for elections clearly shows that the policies aimed for realizing ideal aspirations rather than responding to actual needs. The EU was concerned with having an elected government in the DRC where the state institutions failed to fulfill their basic duties. The priority should have been building state institutions that are capable of enforcing rules.

Both the UN and the European Union (EU) implemented a liberal agenda that is divorced from the actual needs of the country. Aside from its military nature, the mandate of the UN was also liberal as the mission promoted reconciliation and democratization. (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 714). In parallel, the EU pursued a liberal approach regarding multiple realms, security sector reforms, poverty reduction and DDR. Surprisingly, the regime in Kinshasa became more autocratic (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 714). It seems that both actors, the UN and the EU attempted to implement a liberal agenda in a very fragile context, the government was not capable of carrying its basic duties. The next part will tackle the details and effects of the state building process governed by external actors.

State building in the DRC

In its pursuit for the establishment of a Western style nation state, the international community obliged the political actors to include democratization and decentralization in the constitution as pillars of the state building process (Brandt, 2017, 626). The international community aspired to realize liberal principles through the first presidential and parliamentary elections, yet the outcome was the exact opposite, an autocratic regime (Brandt, 2017, 626).

The international community, along with supervising the elections, ensured that Joseph Kabila won the race (Pellillo and Coyne, 2011, 42). The plan was to establish a national unity government, recognition and aid were provided on the condition of including all key actors in a coalition government (Eriksen, 2009, 656). Accordingly, members of the new cabinet were motivated to keep the coalition, in return for granting access to resources and power.

The ruling elite undermined the capacity of the state to ensure the comparative advantage of affiliated militias and preserve access to natural resources (Eriksen, 2009, 655). Even during Mobutu's rule, the military elite were allowed to profit from gold and diamond business in return for loyalty, thereby undermining the power of the state (Eriksen, 2009, 655).

Unfortunately, state building reproduced the same power structures, strong actors in possession of resources to be distributed to the local population in a clientelistic manner (Brandt, 2017, 630). Such a relationship was already present because of the war, though decentralization further deepened it. The policies applied strongly undermined the capacity of the state institutions.

Despite all the efforts to establish a united government, local agendas at the level of individuals, families, municipality, districts, and ethnic groups were marginalized, thereby the roots of the problem had not yet been addressed. In the absence of a state, individuals depend on their social relations to receive services (Trefon 2004, 22; Pellillo and Coyne 2011, 40).

Despite successfully holding the elections, the insurgency in the East undermined the stabilization efforts, as militias controlled vast areas of the Congolese territory. The absence of the state for a long time, especially in the East, undermined efforts to rebuild state institutions, other players provided security and basic services throughout the vast territory. Since early 2000's, UN missions were deployed to preserve

public order, whilst domestic local actors provided basic services to the population (Neethling, 2011, 32). The cycle was ingrained in the political and economic realities, to the extent of rendering the state incapacitated.

Foreign actors directing the peace-building process intended to carry elections, as a testament for the legitimacy of the ruler, Joseph Kabila, who appeared to be the only viable option. Then Kabila formed a coalition government that included the main actors in the political scene, thanks to foreign incentives. Accordingly, the old power structure didn't change, but was recreated. Despite attempting to put elected representatives in office, the international community further empowered the old clientelistic networks. Meanwhile the needs of the local communities were sidelined. Meaning the policies proposed and implemented realized the liberal ideals without tackling the roots of the problem and the actual needs of the local communities. Besides, the issues of looting and profiting from selling of resources that undermined the state were not addressed. The continuation of violence in the East showcased the negative implication of that approach.

Decentralization was supposed to empower local citizens, though it strengthened the militias, whilst undermining the central government in Kinshasa (Brandt, 2017, 628).

An example of decentralization is the expansion of the educational sector which set an optimum example for the effect of decentralization on clientelism. Decentralization and fragmentation caused multiplication of brokers who competed for access to resources (Brandt 2017, 629). All the actors sought to get accreditation from the ministry of education, thereby reproducing a predatory state that allowed bureaucrats and politicians to extract resources from the locals (Brandt 2017, 629). It is important to note that reproduction of such a relation was not the purpose of the reforms, the decentralization process didn't consider the social and political realities and complexities undermining the efforts exerted. The actors didn't follow the rules, yet bent them to serve their interests (Brandt 2017, 630).

Not only democratization but also decentralization further deepened the phenomenon of clientelism. As illustrated decentralization offered opportunities for profiteering and brokerage, all at the expense of state institutions. The problem with state building in the DRC was the implementation of a one

size fits all model, regardless of the specificities of each country. International institutions following the Western model of a nation state imposed a foreign version that doesn't fit the social and political realities. That illustrates the implementation of the liberal agenda highlighted earlier. It is important to address the actual needs of the country not to implement a specific agenda.

On another note, some scholars have argued that state building should be one step at a time, without a fixed plan (Pellillo and Coyne 2011, 42). Meaning, planning for state building should follow a trial-and-error approach, decision makers should observe the reactions of the subjects before setting regulations. The authors have added that the organization of human beings in a hierarchy, a state, was an outcome of spontaneous order, which developed through trial and error, hence it was hard to impose a certain form of state on communities accustomed to living autonomously (Pellillo and Coyne 2011, 42).

Eastern Congo:

The government in Kinshasa was weak, nevertheless, in the East it was completely absent. The Eastern provinces have been marked with violence and absence of state (Beswick, 2009, 340). Despite the success of reconciliation, instability persisted in the East, highlighting the importance of digging deeper in the reasons behind the exceptionalism of the Eastern provinces (Beswick, 2009, 338).

The region of Kivu had been strongly involved in the conflict in Rwanda, where many of the Hutu sought refuge, during the civil war (Beswick, 2009, 340). The Hutu groups continued fighting the Tutsi in the Congo, arousing the suspicions of Rwanda. General Laurent Nkunda established a militia to protect the Tutsi from another genocide in Eastern Congo where the central government was absent (Beswick, 2009, 340). Another group supported by Rwanda and Uganda came to the surface, the Rally for Congolese Democracy, in response to the support provided by Kinshasa to the Tutsi groups (Beswick, 2009, 342). In addition, Rwanda was also interested in the resources in Kivu, not only the protection of the Tutsi. Lastly, the rise of shadow economic networks fueled the emergence of landlordism (Beswick, 2009, 343).

Moving to the role of the government institutions, despite all international efforts to build institutions in the East to preserve the rule of law and realize democracy, the ruling elite manipulated the legal institutions to consolidate power and punish adversaries (Lake 2017, 298). The justice system was

disrupted by giving concessions to mines in exchange for captured dissidents (Lake 2017, 298). In the East the rule of law was violated to protect loyalists through obstructing prosecutions of human rights violations (Lake 2017, 298).

The absence of state authority for such a long time allowed social networks to fill the vacuum and deliver basic services to the people, which indicated that the absence of state authority did not necessarily imply chaos, on the contrary, a different kind of order emerged to fill the vacuum. Despite all international efforts, the Kivu region proved to be un-governable (Beswick, 2009, 345).

In the East, a different type of social and political order filled the vacuum. A network of landlords took charge of the Eastern provinces through exploitation and terror (Beswick, 2009, 345). Due to the absence of the state for so long, shadow networks of warlords came to the surface, resulting in disequilibrium which explains the recurrent violence in the East (Beswick, 2009, 345). In the Eastern provinces, social networks provided security and services, whilst shadow economic webs governed economic activity and promoted landlordism (Autesserre, 2006, 12). One of the mechanisms pinpointed in the literature has been the effect of natural resources, as it had dramatically impacted the DRC. Natural resources were exploited by the rebels to fund the war and raised the chances of foreign intervention in support of the insurgency.

Most of the resources have been placed in the East far away from the capital which already lacks access to international markets (Le Billon, 2001, 58). As a result, rebellious groups enjoyed a comparative advantage in comparison to the government in Kinshasa, thereby the war extended for a long period (Le Billon, 2001, 58). In such a context, resources have played a critical role and so has geography. The aforementioned factors undermined the capacity of the government in the center.

A few elements are at play in the East, first the immigration of Hutu groups from Rwanda offered a justification for foreign intervention. Besides the presence of minerals in the East, that is easily exploited in comparison to other resources, encouraged foreign intervention and catalyzed the militarization of rebel groups placed there. Nevertheless, the absence of state institutions for a long time led to the emergence of shadow government, as social networks along with the warlords provided security and services to the local

populations. The weakness of the Congolese state institutions is visible mostly in the East where it is completely absent. Even after the ceasefire, nothing has changed. The state institutions, similar to those in the capital, are extremely weak and controlled by warlords. As mentioned earlier the warlords do not invest in developing state institutions, they only care about looting resources, thereby this configuration is a recipe for failure.

Authoritarian Warlord governing a weak state:

Despite the attempts of democratization, from external actors, DRC descended into an authoritarian state. Despite the democratic procedures, the fragility of the state in the west and the total absence of the state in the East, authoritarianism prevailed in the capital (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 707). The UN forces provided the basic services and security since its deployment. In 2006, the transitional government held elections, however, it was widely condemned as fraudulent (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 707).

The outcome was very far from a liberal democratic regime; after the elections Kabila deployed authoritarian policies to eliminate political rivalry (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 706). Kabila took advantage of the international support to crackdown on the opposition (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 706).

Despite winning the elections, Kabila was accused of cracking down on civil society and press, this caused international institutions, such as the UN and Amnesty International, to flag the risk of slipping back into authoritarianism (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 707). Some voices have blamed the UN for facilitating the divergence towards authoritarianism for several reasons. First, the transitional process was designed to ensure a strong presidency, through writing a constitution that empowered the executive authority, yet the opposition was also marginalized (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 708).

The rationale was that a strong presidency has been key for stability. Second, it was a one man show, the executive authority power was embodied in the person of President Kabila (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 708). Third, capacity building during the transition focused on preparation for the elections, rather than long term developmental and efficient governance goals (Billerbeck and Tansey, 2019, 708).

Actually Joseph Kabila followed in the footsteps of his father who was a product of the system that he rebelled against (Reno 2011, 164). Laurent Kabila was a general in the army during Mobutu's rule, who

lacked political ideology and was only concerned with coming into power. The breakdown of order and failure to mobilize the masses behind a political cause are attributes of warlordism ((Reno 2011, 164). In the 1990's some international institutions and countries co-opted and cooperated with this type of warlords in control of territories (Reno 2011, 167). After taking over a territory, warlords prioritize looting of the resources and the joy of exercising power, paying much less attention to state building and mobilizing the masses (Reno 2011, 165).

The international community attempted to establish a newly born democracy in the aftermath of a long civil war. Domestic actors were pressured to hold elections, foreign aid was directed to serve the same purpose. However, after the preferred candidate won the elections, the same authoritarian practices of warlordism continued. Besides, the new regime strongly depended on one person Joseph Kabila, recreating the same dynamics of the predecessor regimes of Laurent Kabila and Mobutu. Joseph Kabila didn't invest in developing state institutions and ensured the recreation of the clientelistic networks that served his interests.

It appears that the Congo has been cursed with successive warlords coming into power. The main problem lies in the type of rebel group taking charge of the government, such groups are concerned with appropriation of resources without paying attention to the needs of the population. The international community helped a new warlord to consolidate power.

IFIs in the DRC:

In 2001 the government of Kabila adopted a structural adjustment program monitored by the IMF. (International Monetary Fund, 2023) .

Along with other international donors, the IMF structured Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy to establish the framework for the government in Kinshasa. The program aimed at stabilizing and liberalizing the economy through structural reforms and free floating of the exchange rate (International Monetary Fund DRC staff report 2001 report). The program comprised of five pillars: 1. Removing distortions in the foreign exchange market. 2. Elimination of monopolization and price control in the diamond market. 3. Fiscal and judiciary reforms. 4. Good Solid governance and elimination of corruption. 5. Sector reforms in

mining and forestry codes (International Monetary Fund DRC staff report 2001 report). Such policies require a reduction in government expenditure and a decrease in the value of the domestic currency in relation to foreign currencies, both increase inflation rates. However, the results illustrated a decline in the already high inflation rate. Another point highlighted was the improvement of delivery and transportation of petroleum (International Monetary Fund DRC staff report 2001 report).

Along with the intervention in the political landscape, the international community restructured the political economy along its rules. After violence ended, both the IMF and the World Bank forced the government in Kinshasa to carry reforms in the mining and forestry sectors (Kuditshini 2008, 194). Contrary to the historical norms which the past Congolese governments followed strictly, whereby the soil and sub-soil belonged only to the state, the government loosened its control over mining and forestry (Kuditshini 2008, 194).

In an attempt to attract foreign investments and bring new technology to the mining and forestry sectors, the new laws gave the private sector access to these resources. The oligarchy took advantage of the new codes to double their profits due to asymmetrical access to the market, aside from the domestic business, the multinational corporations exploited the resources (Kuditshini, 2008, 196).

Based on the new laws, the mines were restructured according to the liberal doctrine, consequently, 10,000 workers were laid off (Marriage, 2018, 867). Such an outcome not only had social implications, but also political, especially regarding the peace process. The Congolese government has been criticized for corruption and misappropriation of funds provided by the international donors, also the ruling elite abused the funds to advance political and economic gains (Marriage, 2018, 867).

Privatization recreated and fed already established networks of clientelism, between the presidency, foreign investors, and the public mining company (Marysse 2018, 18). Before the engagement of the IMF, foreign investors provided capital for the exploitation of raw materials. The capital covered the expenses of private security companies to protect the fields (Exenberger 2007, 15). Kabila and his son Joseph after him legalized the process and received payments from the sales of minerals, moreover, took advantage of security companies to strengthen their position (Exenberger 2007, 15). Thereby privatization has been a

destabilizing factor as it allowed warlords, rebel armies and the corrupt government officials to exploit these resources (Exenberger 2007, 15).

Government officials sidelined the state to appropriate the revenues of the minerals which ultimately limited the state's capacity. Both the weakness of state institutions and the revenues of sales of resources recreated the patterns of exploitation and propitiated violence (Exenberger 2007, 15).

According to reports, Kabila appointed warlords at the top management positions of public enterprises which resulted in massive looting and embezzlement; due to the lack of supervision (Marriage, 2018, 870). Despite all the international reservations, the flow of donations continued under the justification that the DRC was a special case (Marriage, 2018, 870).

According to some estimates, the government lost 1.3 billion USD to suspicious mining deals during the elections, amounting to twice the government annual expenditure on education and health (Autesserre, 2006, 8). Depriving the government from such an important source of revenue strongly impeded state institutions (Autesserre, 2006, 8). As mentioned earlier, the privatization process increased corruption and allowed the government officials to engage in shady concessions (Smith, 2018, 1). The already weak state institutions became weaker due to the policies suggested by the IFIs that allowed for embezzlement and corruption (Autesserre, 2006, 8). The money collected from corruption fueled the conflict and instability (Exenberger 2007, 15).

The DRC implemented the policies imposed by the IFIs to ensure the flow of funds. The regime appeared to be concerned mainly with protecting the clientelistic networks, as the privatization process aimed at serving their interests. It was a continuation of the same approach, giving international business access to the resources in return for a share in the profits. Thereby, the profits were provided to individuals and taken away from state institutions. The privatization process focused on critical sectors such as forestry and mining for the government. The revenue generated through public enterprises operating in the two sectors was appropriated by the private business companies not the government.

In essence the regime already sidelined the state institutions, as the clientelistic networks served personal interests, yet the privatization further enhanced and recreated such tendencies and policies. Instead

of building the capacity of state institutions to help the government carry out its duties, the policies prescribed recreated the networks of clientelism. All that further undermined the capacity and role of state institutions.

DDR in the DRC:

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration has been a corner stone of peace-building in post conflict areas (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 118). Collecting arms then demobilizing the combatants in preparation for their reintegration in civil life has been a complicated task, especially in countries with a huge number of militias; similarly, security sector reform has been a challenging task (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 121). DDR programs have been implemented in post conflict zones for years; however, their success has depended on the context. The process involved a number of actors: the government, international organizations, and the militias, all of which with different capacities to influence the results (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 121). Accordingly, there were veto players who could successfully abort the process (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 122).

By the end of the war in 2002, the World Bank launched the biggest DDR program in its history, Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 121). Due to the lack of capacity to manage the program, the central government established Commission Nationale de la Demobilisation et Reinsertion to manage it (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 118). A total of 102,014 combatants were demobilized and received reinsertion payments through cell phones due to the incompetency of the banking system. Moreover, actual assistance was provided to 54% of the combatants (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 118).

The previously mentioned figures reflect a success story which can be attributed to the political process, nevertheless, violence didn't come to an end in the Eastern provinces. The government came on top of the list, of veto players, the two major rebel groups Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC) were integrated in the government thereby neutralized (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 124). The Congolese army, in total of 100,000-200,000 soldiers was another veto player (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 124).

Till the present day, the Mai-Mai militias act as a veto player, rebels who fight foreign troops, and were part of the DDR process (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 125). Nevertheless, the foreign troops presented a critical veto player. Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Ruanda (FDLR) in the East, estimated to have 6000 to 8000 combatants, not to mention, both Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), were active in the Northeastern parts of the Congo (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 126).

As illustrated, a number of factors impacted the DDR process, to start with, huge numbers of veto actors, also the chances of success were inversely related to the number of actors (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 125). Second, the distance between players hugely affected the process, in the case of the Congo, ethnic divisions along with competition over resources widened the gap between groups (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 125). Actors were even divided into factions, further exacerbating, and engraving the divisions (Ansorg and Strasheim, 2013, 125).

The government has been absent in the East for so long, allowing for unofficial networks of patronage to rise and take control, all that undermined the DDR program in the East (Beswick, 2009, 343).

The presence of foreign troops added to the complexity, as the foreign troops needed to leave the country before the process started since their presence would cause the other groups to resist disarmament. Besides, the foreign troops impeded stability and caused security threat, further limiting the effectiveness of DDR efforts. Besides, the involvement of more than one international actor in the process further complicated it. In such a context, the donor had the upper hand to impose certain policies in alignment with its agenda, regardless of the actual needs. National ownership of such programs was of utter importance due to the sensitivity and complexity of the task; in the case of the DRC international actors directed the process with limited involvement of the government. On another note, the absence of the state pressured the local communities to carry arms, so building the capacity of state institutions to enforce the law was crucial for the success of DDR.

Conclusion

The discussion of the peace-building process in the DRC illustrated the role played by the foreign

actors and the limited contribution of the national government in the decision- making process. The weakness of state institutions and the geography of the capital forced the central government to accept reconciliation, thereby the external actors guided the peace-building process.

As a result, the government had to approach the IFIs for support which entailed applying structural adjustment process. Structural adjustment required the application of policies that fed into networks of patronage that perpetuated violence (Exenberger 2007, 15). The intervention of the IFIs didn't create networks of patronage but strengthened them (Exenberger 2007, 15). Thereby, the policies imposed by IFIs indirectly recreated cycles of violence.

Chapter 5: Comparative Analysis between the Two Civil Wars in Angola and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Introduction

The previous chapters attempted to describe the historical context of the wars in Angola and the DRC, then the peace- building processes born of such a convoluted phenomenon. Both the DRC and Angola share some features, such as the colonial legacy, dependence on natural resources and their position in Africa.

Despite the similarities, the outcomes of the civil wars in the two countries were different. Until now the DRC is struggling with recurring violence, especially in the East (Beswick, 2009, 342). On the contrary, Angola has been growing economically, stable politically and active on the international stage (Deutch Bank 2023). The chapter intends to shed light on the variables that made the difference, geographical location of the capital and weakness of the institutions.

The geographical advantage enjoyed by the MPLA in Luanda, played a critical role in the conflict and the peace-building process (Kyle, 2005, 271). Consequently, Angola crafted a nationally owned peace-building process, while the DRC had to follow policies dictated by external actors. In other words, Angola had a free hand in the peace building process, unlike the DRC, foreign donors designed and oversaw the application of the peace building process. After the war both countries were in dire need of financial support (Foster 2008, 2). Angola refrained from signing a standby arrangement agreement. On the other hand, the DRC approached the IFIs for financial support and applied the policies dictated by them (International Monetary Fund DRC staff report 2001 report). Such policies had significant negative implications (Kuditshini 2008, 194).

The chapter intends to tackle the critical variables for a successful peace-building process and the interaction between these variables; geography of the capital, weakness of state institutions and the impact of IFIs. Afterwards, the discussion will move to the effect of each variable on the two-case studies Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Impact of geography of the capital, weakness of state institutions and IFIs on the Peace-building process:

After examining the literature of both cases, it appears that there are common variables that have impacted the peace-building process. Mainly three major factors are at play: geography of the capital, weakness of state institutions and the role of IFIs.

The Bretton Woods institutions or IFIs engage with countries encountering financial hardships and in need of support to fund developmental projects. The intervention of the institutions entails redirecting economic policies towards the liberal doctrine (Boyce 2004, 8). Loans are one of the tools of the IFIs, also the institutions offer capacity building and consultations (Boyce 2004, 8). The impact of the policies dictated by the IFIs is contentious (Adams, 1992, 105).

In response to the delicate situation marking the peace-building process, the IMF designed a tailored program that is comprised of policy support, program design, fund facilities and capacity building (International Monetary Fund 2015, 2). The policy support entails providing guidance and consultation to governments; however, the fund facility include financial support (International Monetary Fund 2015, 2). The fund facility was criticized for the inadequacy of the financial support provided (International Monetary Fund 2015, 2). Lastly, capacity building provides training to employees and administrators in the public sector (International Monetary Fund 2015, 2).

IFIs received much criticism for the programs mentioned earlier, one of which was the lack of reconciliation between macroeconomic stabilization and political stability (Boyce, 2004, 10). For instance, the liberalization of trade should be avoided if it negatively impacts the peace-building process (Boyce, 2004, 10). Another criticism was that the staff of the IMF serving in African countries were divorced from

the needs of the local populations (Adams, 1992, 105). It appeared that the institutions were concerned mainly with the amount of funds, rather than the quality of the staff serving in recipient countries. Lastly, the IMF should have considered horizontal disparities and gaps between ethnic and religious groups (Boyce 2004, 8). In essence, the policies proposed by the IFIs appeared to negatively impact the peace-building process.

The dilemma of the IFIs is the prioritization of economic goals, regardless of the socio-political implications when realizing such goals. Economic policies have political repercussions due to the linkage between the two domains, the neglect of the political consequences of this approach sabotages the whole process. The presented criticism addresses the political outcomes in a stable country, in a post conflict context the drawbacks are amplified. Another point is that the economic policies dictated affect the distribution of resources which is an important factor in the war, thereby negatively impacting the success of the peace-building process.

The strength of state institutions is assessed on their capacities to provide services and address political demands (Gurses and Mason 2010, 151). Through providing a mechanism for expressing grievances, state institutions are perceived as legitimate, thereby strong (Gurses and Mason 2010, 151).

State institutions affect the possibility of the outbreak of civil war as they are assessed based on their ability to preserve law, order, and the rule of law (Djankov 2007, 14). Besides, the ability of the government to protect property rights illustrates the strength of state institutions (Djankov 2007, 14). The results have shown that developing state institutions reduce the chances of civil war (Djankov 2007, 14).

Another point, strong state institutions reduce the chances of the recurrence of violence. Weak governments cannot adhere to the terms of peace agreements, accordingly there is a high probability of the break-down of cease fire (Sobek 2010, 270). The inability of the state to control its borders and to prevent the flow of contraband and the intervention of a third party, all that increase the duration of civil war (Hironaka 2005, 9).

Uncontrolled borders are breeding grounds for all types of crimes which exacerbates conflicts and allow third parties to indirectly intervene in domestic affairs. Besides, the inability of the government to

preserve law and order, pressures civilians and local communities to carry arms to protect themselves, thereby creates a vicious cycle of violence. The absence of state institutions limits the government's ability to enforce its laws and provide an opportunity for the rebel groups to organize rebellion and threaten its sovereignty.

The geography of the capital affects peace-building through impacting the duration and results of the civil war (Buhaug and Gates 2002, 419). However, it is important to underline the role of minerals in this context, capital cities placed in proximity to the sea and abundant in resources allowed the central government to export the minerals (Le Billon, 2001, 58). Thereby, the regime financed the war efforts and provided services to the local population to enhance its legitimacy using the revenues of exports.

On the other side, the rebels' positioned in territories far from the sea can hardly sell the extracted resources, placing them at a worse position in comparison to the regime in the capital (Le Billon, 2001, 58). That allowed the regime to score a decisive victory, thereby fully directs peace-building process without external pressure.

Another mechanism that falls under the geography of the capital is the distance between the capital and the rebels (Buhaug and Gates 2002, 419). Huge distances between the capital and the rebels extend the duration of the war and undermine the government's ability to score a decisive victory. Nevertheless, conflicts taking place close to international borders also tend to extend for long periods, especially with the presence of minerals in areas controlled by the rebels (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009, 547).

It is the nexus between geography and resources that makes the difference, and give strong comparative advantage to one of the sides. Meaning not only having access to the sea or resources exclusively, but both must come together. Nevertheless, the regime in charge must use this advantage efficiently through institutionalizing the process.

Moving to the interaction between the different variables, it appears that both the geography of the capital and the weakness of state institutions affected the role of IFIs. As the geography of the capital and the weakness of state institutions strongly impact the outcomes of the war, either a reconciliation or a decisive victory. In case of reconciliation the political context tended to be fluid and volatile, in addition to

the possibility of intervention of external actors, including the IFIs. Henceforth, the regime was not fully in charge of the peace-building process. On the other side, a decisive victory allowed the regime to take matters into its hands, and refrain from approaching the IFIs which was the most effective approach in such a delicate situation.

Geography of the Capital effect on Peace-building processes in Angola and the DRC:

The geography of the capital affected Angola and the DRC very differently. The position of the capital Luanda, as a coastal city, gave the central government access to international markets, thereby securing flow of finance vital for the war (Le Billon, 2001, 58). On the other side, the opposition positioned in the East, hardly capable of selling the resources appropriated, was at a weaker position in comparison to the central government (Le Billon, 2001, 58). As illustrated earlier, oil revenues were an integral source of income for the MPLA to finance the war efforts. Such a factor enabled the MPLA, not only to reach a decisive victory in the war, but also to expand its social base and buy legitimacy.

As mentioned earlier, despite its socialist government, multinational corporations invested in Luanda to establish the infrastructure for extraction of oil (Le Billon, 2001, 58). Due to the sales of oil, the government imported arms which cost more than 5 billion USD, oil-collateral loans were provided to companies to finance the war. On the other side, the opposition smuggled diamonds to Europe through neighboring countries (Le Billon, 2001, 58). As mentioned earlier the institutionalization of production and selling resources gave the MPLA the edge, as the UNITA smuggled, in a warlord style of business. The mentality of the two groups were very different, the MPLA planned to establish a state not just control a territory to loot its resources. Thereby, the regime scored a decisive victory over the opposition.

In contrast, the government in the Democratic Republic of the Congo didn't benefit from such a geographical advantage as it was denied access to resources placed in the East due to the insurgency. Most of the resources are in the peripheral areas far from the coast (Le Billon, 2001, 67). Nevertheless, foreign companies supported the rebel movements backed by Rwanda in the East which controlled minerals (Le Billon, 2001, 67). The government in the center needed resources to build its capacity and establish its presence in the East. However, the absence of the government gave the rebels an opportunity to loot and

undermine the security. Henceforth, the government was stuck in a vicious cycle of violence.

Then, Kabila who led the insurgency in the East was not capable of directing these revenue streams to Kinshasa after coming to power, due to the formation of a new configuration of alliances in the East (Le Billon, 2001, 67). The model established by the MPLA to finance the war set it apart from the UNITA, the government in Kinshasa and the rebels in the Eastern Congo, that can be attributed to the geographical advantage of the city of Luanda. The integration of Angola in the global economy due to the investments of multinational corporations benefited the MPLA as well.

Conflicts taking place close to international borders tend to be larger in scope (Buhaug and Gates 2002, 419). The conflict in the DRC was concentrated in the Eastern part, near the borders with Rwanda, thereby the conflict was intense and harder to end. On the other side, the conflict in Angola was in the Central highlands (Pearce 2015, 24; Kisangani 2012, 141). Thereby, the conflict in the DRC ended in a reconciliation, while in Angola the government managed to end the rebellion.

On another note, highly populated areas far from the capital, not hinterlands, are more prone to rebel. The north eastern part of the Congo fits the criteria as it is densely populated and far from the capital, hence, the prospects of violence coming to an end were low (Raleigh 2009, 234). Thereby, the geography of the DRC hindered the government to end the rebellion.

Weak state Institutions Peace-building processes in Angola and the DRC:

Moving to the DRC, since the early days of the state, clientelism was a hallmark of the political context. During the rule of Muboto, revenues from the extraction of minerals were appropriated by international enterprises, the leftovers were given to individuals and the state was the ultimate loser (Kabamba 2013, 48). After Kabila came to power the looting of natural resources continued, especially in the East by Rwanda (Kisangani 2012, 146).

After the conclusion of the peace agreement, the new president approached the IMF for a loan, consequently, the regime privatized the mining and forestry sectors, and deprived the government from crucial flow of funds (Kuditshini 2008, 194). Besides, the East has been marked with the absence of the state for a long time, as local communities and militias acted as the state.

Instability is not coming only from the East, the institutions of the government are weak, as clientelism deprive it from the required resources. Moreover, the economic policies applied by the regime exacerbated the crisis as privatization consumed profits that were appropriated by the government. Kabila followed in the footsteps of his father, focused on consolidating his rule through preserving the interests of his allies without strengthening state institutions.

Moving to Angola, the MPLA inherited a well-functioning state, relatively compared to the African context, the regime in Luanda controlled the state apparatus and pursued expansionary policies through expanding the bureaucracy and distributing benefits all through state institutions (Thaler, 2012, 549). Oil revenues were distributed through Sonangol, a state-owned oil company (Le Billon, 2001, 63).

Taking a step back, the colonial rule of Portugal expanded education and health services to the majority of the population (Clarence-Smith, 1980, 113). The regime in Luanda secured the support of the ruling elite through employment in the state, thereby the role of the state was at the heart of the political mobilization (Malaquias, 2001, 528). By and large, the state in Luanda had been effective since its independence from colonialism till now.

The MPLA invested in developing the state inherited from the colonial rule. Revenues from the extraction of resources were appropriated by the government. Even the benefits were distributed through the state machinery, putting it at the heart of the economic activities. Nevertheless, the distributive policies carried out by the state helped in mobilizing the masses. Such an approach institutionalized the extraction and selling of oil.

The Role of International Financial Institutions Peace-building processes in Angola and the DRC:

Speaking of the role of the Bretton Woods institutions, the impact varied from one case to the other. To start with, both Angola and the DRC are abundant in resources, however, both varied in terms of government control over resources.

Angola refrained from engaging with the IMF, despite the need for liquidity. After the war the

infrastructure was destroyed, consequently the government approached China to fund reconstruction (Foster 2008, 2). Ex-Im bank, the Chinese infrastructure bank, offered loans collateralized in oil (Foster 2008, 2). In other words, oil was exchanged for funding the projects. Moreover, Chinese firms were given rights to oil concessions (Foster 2008, 2). In addition, the success of the oil business helped the regime preserve social funding. The Chinese Ex-Im bank played a critical role in granting loans backed by oil as collateral, the first two credit lines totaled 11 billion USD (NIÑO, 2014, 85). In 2004 the line of credit extended by Ex-Im bank to Angola amounted to 2 billion USD, half of which were allocated to infrastructure projects (Foster 2008, 5)

Alternative financial assistance helped Angola escape the disruptive effects of structural adjustments. It is worth mentioning that tax and non-tax revenues represented the main components of financing reconstruction (Vines, 2009, 85). The relation between the government and the corporations was institutionalized. The role of the state in Angola was central which was further illustrated in the establishment of Sonangol, a giant oil company that managed the energy sector in Angola, hence the resources were owned by the government. The state managed the oil sector efficiently, prioritizing sustaining oil production and preserving partnerships with transnational corporations.

In the case of the DRC, matters took a different turn. As mentioned earlier, under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, the government offered the mining and forestry sectors for sale to foreign investors, thereby international corporations owned the resources (Kuditshini 2008, 194). In addition, the areas rich in minerals were contested, due to the ongoing conflict between the government and the insurgency (Kuditshini, 2008, 196). Thereby the configuration was far from sustainable. The government was not able to fully take control of the land and the foreign investors had full ownership, also the returns were provided on personal basis with the state sidelined (Kuditshini, 2008, 196).

According to a report issued by a special commission entrusted to examine contracts between the government and international mining companies, the revenue generated from these activities favored the private companies and the ruling elite (Kuditshini, 2008, 198). Huge mining companies had a free hand in the mines in the DRC, with limited government regulation (Kuditshini, 2008, 198). Accordingly, local

entities operating in the mining fields, incurred huge losses due to the absence of government regulations. Public mining companies were sold at low prices, further increasing the losses of the government (Kuditshini, 2008, 199).

The privatization proposed by the IFIs has been a destabilizing factor as it provided an opportunity for rebel armies, the corrupt government, and warlords officials to exploit the resources (Exenberger 2007, 15). Government officials sidelined the state to appropriate the revenues of minerals which ultimately limited its capacity. The patterns of exploitation were recreated due to the weakness of state institutions and revenues generated from sales of resources, which undermined stability (Exenberger 2007, 15).

Privatization recreated the same dynamics, where the regime loyalists appropriated the resources along with international corporations. The IMF loans didn't establish these networks of corruption, however provided new opportunities. Thereby, the prioritization of economic goals without understanding the socio-political context sabotaged the whole process. Moreover, the already weak state institutions were deprived of pivotal sources of revenue.

In essence, the economic process in Angola was institutionalized, even the fishy transactions were carried through formal mechanisms. On the contrary, economic activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were carried through shadow networks of beneficiaries far from the state institutions, besides the power of the central government was limited in comparison to other actors, such as foreign donors and militias. In the DRC state institutions attempted to legalize already existing networks of patronage. Thereby undermining the capacity of the state in every field, that can be attributed to the peace-building imposed by foreign powers, under the slogans of democratization and decentralization, the government ended up authoritarian and incapacitated.

All the aforementioned factors affected the peace- building process in Angola and the DRC differently. Angola went forward with a nationally crafted process while the DRC had no option but to comply with the policies imposed by the donors and International Financial Institutions. The weakness of the government internationally impacted its image domestically.

Conclusion

The chapter attempted to examine the impact of the three main variables: geography of the capital, weakness of state institutions, and the role of IFIs on the two case studies. The literature on the two cases illustrated that the aforementioned variables were the most critical ones. Both the geography of the capital and the weakness of state institutions were the underlying variables that affected the results of the war. The role of IFIs was dependent on the two other variables and their effects on the outcomes of the wars.

The chapter addressed the effect of the variables on peace-building, in addition, to the relation between these variables. In the case of Angola, the two variables allowed the regime to impose its own version of peace-building, that was authoritarian in nature. It is important to note that the purpose of the discussion is not the promotion of authoritarianism; however, the post-conflict contexts tend to be fluid and unstable. Thereby, for the purpose of the peace-building process, some authoritarian practices should be accepted, otherwise there is a high risk of re-eruption of violence. Afterwards, liberalization and democratization can be introduced.

The phenomenon of civil war is very complex and requires further investigation on the effect of the different variables on the peace-building process. More research is required to understand the underlying mechanisms that remain enigmatic. Different approaches in the investigations also should be pursued to examine the results.

Conclusion

The thesis attempted to understand the reasons behind the success of some rebel groups to make the transition to stability after civil war while other groups fail, the MPLA in Angola managed to overcome the drastic effects of civil war, while the Democratic Republic of the Congo descended into chaos and

violence. In addition the effect of International Financial Institutions on the peace-building processes were examined. First, the impact of a number of variables on the peace-building process, the role of IFIs and challenges for state building in Africa were investigated. The literature analyzed a wide range of variables, only two had a central effect, the geography of the capital and weakness of the state institutions.

To start with, the regime in the DRC lacked access to ports and areas rich in natural resources. Conversely, the Eastern part of the Congo, abundant in minerals, was controlled by the opposition (Le Billon, 2001, 58). In addition, the state institutions in the DRC were fragile and inefficient due to corruption, even after the reconciliation, the government failed to take control of the Eastern provinces due to the activity of the militias (Lake 2017, 298). All these factors prevented the regime from winning the war and accepted a reconciliation in response to external pressure. Accordingly, the government was not able to fully direct the peace-building process as external actors strongly intervened.

After the cessation of hostilities, the government in Kinshasa was in dire need of liquidity to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed because of the war. As a result, the government had to implement harsh economic measures that impacted the peace-building process (Trefon, 2010, 713). Privatization negatively impacted the capacity of the state institutions and the peace-building process (Marysse 2018, 18).

In the DRC the international community and foreign powers dominated the peace-building process due to the presence of foreign troops designated by the UN and the engagement of the Bretton Woods institutions (Beswick, 2009, 343). Foreign powers imposed a peace building process based on liberal ideals, while restructuring the economy according to the free market principles (Beswick, 2009, 343). The process ended up with fragmented state institutions incapable of do their duties (Beswick, 2009, 346).

Luanda, the coastal city, allowed the MPLA to export oil to the international market, meaning the port enabled the government to generate revenues to fund the war (Le Billon, 2001, 58). On the other side, the opposition was deprived of such a geographical advantage, as a result the regime won the war and dismantled the opposition (Le Billon, 2001, 58). The only dominant party, the MPLA was in full control of the peace-building process.

Angola managed the Peace-building process independently, with minimal intervention from the

UN or the IMF (Cihacir, 2010). State institutions were strongly supported; however, there weren't liberal reforms, thus the process entrenched the authoritarian rule (Roque, 2009, 134). Angola was offered foreign support without intervention in domestic politics (Roque, 2009, 135). Lastly, the regime refrained from approaching the IFIs, in spite of the need for financial assistance to rebuild the destroyed infrastructure.

In the Peace-building literature, the model offered by Angola has been entitled "Illiberal Peace Building" or "Authoritarian Conflict Management", whereby the conflict was resolved through purely coercive measures, prioritizing security and stability over liberalism. (Lewis, 2018, 491; Stoke et. al 3, 2021). Other scholars have argued for a more moderate approach "Institutionalization before Liberalization", defined as the establishment of state institutions, followed by the application of liberal reforms (Paris, 197, 2004). The definition has a gap that can be tackled in future research to understand the process and elaborate on how it affected the peace-building process.

The purpose is not to propagate authoritarianism, on the contrary, in post conflict contexts the state is vulnerable and weak, notwithstanding shocks and abrupt reforms. Establishment of state institutions should supersede liberalism. As some scholars frame it "Institutionalization before Liberalization", such an approach has avoided some of the disruptive measures of liberalism (Paris, 197, 2004). For instance, the timing of the elections, the sweeping victory of one party in the absence of power sharing mechanism, has raised the prospects of re-eruption of violence (Brancati, 2013, 823). Nevertheless, restructuring the economy through the introduction of free market policies deprives the state institutions from one of the main sources of government revenues. Weak state institutions have reduced their capacity, thereby the legitimacy of the government instigated further instability (Kuditshini, 2008, 196).

Process tracing is the ideal methodology for the purpose of dissecting two similar cases in terms of the diversity of the population, dependence on natural resources, colonial legacy, and intervention of foreign powers. However, the two countries strongly diverged with regards to the outcome. In addition, the effects of the intervention of the International Financial Institutions, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, in post conflict context have been at the heart of the thesis. The objective is to examine the two cases from a comparative perspective. Both primary and secondary sources were examined thoroughly

to reach a comprehensive understanding of the two case studies.

The addition of the role of IFIs offered another economic dimension to compliment the political perspective. On another note, the thesis touched upon the role of foreign and regional powers; other studies could build on that through delving into the dynamics of foreign interventions through putting it into the global perspective.

Other studies could compare and contrast between three case studies, with the focus on the role of external non-state actors. At the moment not only do governments and international organizations impact peace-building and civil wars, but also non-state actors play a critical role in such conflicts. Another area that has not been investigated is the effect of modern technology, for instance, digital currencies and drones, both have impacted the results and outbreak of civil wars.

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