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The American University in Cairo

**Revolution in Cuba and Iran:
Toward a Unified Theory of Analysis**

A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of Political Science
In Candidacy for the Degree
Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

By:

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Cairo, Egypt

November 2022

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Abstract: This first chapter serves as an introduction to the thesis covering the topic, variables, research questions, hypothesis, outline, significance, and purpose of the work.

Introduction:

This work follows a long history of those who have languished in the pursuit of explanations for revolution, its origins, and outcomes. Revolution is perhaps one of the most challenging phenomena in the social sciences to explain. Many from virtually all disciplines of social sciences have attempted explanations. And there is indeed much challenge in approaching such a topic. The breadth of movements is daunting as they occurred throughout numerous decades of the modern world along with crossing geographical, cultural, economic borders, and more. Further challenges can be found in the sheer diversity of attempts of explanation and understanding. The questions to be answered are as numerous and diverse as the movements themselves, however, this thesis narrows that focus to just a few. Can analysis be based solely on class and structural approaches, or must agency and leaderships be included? And how can a reasonably comprehensive analysis be formed regarding such a phenomenon? There is much to consider within revolutionary movements: military, state institutions, demographics, mobilization, leaderships, ideologies, and more.

This thesis offers a non-revolutionary resolution to revolutionary riddles: a gentle push towards a unified theory of revolution utilizing existing literature. This is by no means a new concept. Countless scholars have paid their respects to the earliest authors of revolutionary studies by reviewing the body of work and subsequently crafting suggestions for future theory. Yet, despite the cacophony of recommendations, the field is far from

cohesive. Goldstone highlights the current condition of revolution studies accurately as, “...scholarship on the causes, processes, and outcomes of revolutions has sprawled across topics and disciplines like an amoeba, stretching various directions in response to diverse stimuli.”¹ However, as will be discussed below, this reactive character is not necessarily a new phenomenon. Indeed, upon review of revolution literature from beginning to end, one can see a pattern emerge. Time and time again, as one generation focuses on the structural explanations or specific processes, there come immediate calls for the “bringing back in” of everything left out, be it ideology, culture, leadership, or more. Even some of the most useful explanatory theories of revolution, composed by Skocpol and her contemporaries, find themselves the victim to the same critiques. It is proposed that the theory most able to explain revolution is not one that collects the most indicators but utilizes a mix of approaches.

Furthermore, a successful theory must be transferable between cases. As much as a pair of glasses cannot be tied to reading one book, an effective theory will be flexible enough for analyzing many diverse revolutionary movements. Theories responding to inherent, specific circumstances are not effectively transferable. While these maybe useful histories and explanatory tales of past movements, they often cannot be applied to other movements. Being too attached to circumstances such as the categorical analyses of the “third world” or “great revolutions” essentializes aspects of time, location, or culture. Theories of the third world or those theories which refer to a specific group of movements such as the Arab Spring walk a dangerous line of essentializing those movements as unique due to their geographical or cultural makeup. Even before an international pandemic, we

¹ Goldstone, Jack A. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” *Annual Review of Political Science* (2001, 4:139-87): 139.

could identify that deprivation, economic struggle, oppression, or the desire to be heard is experienced across borders. There indeed has been enough “oriental-izing” of nonwestern cultures, particularly in the Middle East but also a trend of essentializing other regions and cultures, and it is certainly the duty of modern scientists to direct theory development away from such notions, not only for the sake of political correctness, but also the advancement political scholarship.

With these concerns in mind, this thesis attempts a nudge towards unifying analysis of an otherwise disjointed field regarding two of the most perplexing revolutions to occur, the Iranian and Cuban. In the case of this thesis, both movements will also serve as the dependent variable of study, while the independent variables will be rapid industrialization or structural changes, leaderships, and ideologies all to be defined in greater detail. The movements chosen to be analyzed are selected with great consideration. For a theory to be more efficiently integrated and transferable from case to case, it must work for all cases considered. Iran and Cuba are often characterized as dissimilar from one another. One movement being considered a religious and the other a communist, however, this work hopes to show the effectiveness of integrating existing theories in explaining two seemingly divergent movements in a coherent manner.

Furthermore, this thesis aims not to build from scratch, as there exists a surplus of successful theories on revolutions and their origins. The focus of this work instead will be the upon existing scholarship of revolution, serving as an overview of the sub-field. To facilitate this evaluation, this thesis will also explore the varying “generations” of revolution studies and the contexts in which they emerged. Some of these earliest proto-sociologists were writing before the beginning of the 1900’s and had already discussed

what many consider to be the more modern aspects of revolution theory such as revolutionary spillover, dual sovereignty, and ideas of mass mobilization and the psychology within. It is also with the help of these early works combined with modern critiques that will serve as starting points for terminology utilized in this thesis. Provisions of revolution, understandings for state instabilities, vast structural shifts, definitions for ideologies along with leaderships will all be informed from the framework of the earliest writers on revolution.

Further, more modern works will form the cornerstone of the thesis as it endeavors to show the commonalities of suggestions and the consistency of which some critiques of revolution studies persist. Though this will build significantly upon the works of other scholars, what the thesis will introduce is that, when many critiques and suggestions of old and new theory are unified, there exists a more consistent theory of revolution. The intent of this thesis will be to present these pieces of theory as a whole and apply it to two seemingly contradictory revolutionary movements, illustrating its effectiveness of analysis. While the unification of agency and structural approaches is contentious, it is required. What will follow clearly defines the outline of the theory to be presented, but ultimately the assumption of this thesis is that, through a careful combination of both structural and agency-based indicators, one can find a basis for analysis that can be applied on a broad scale.

Research Questions:

- What structural indicators are most effective in predicting the rise of a revolution?
- Are strong leaderships and ideologies necessary to create successful revolutions?

- What makes a state susceptible to alternative leaderships and the ideologies that accompany them?

Variables:

Revolutions occurring in the selected cases, Iran and Cuba, will serve as the dependent variables. *Rapid industrialization* and the *leaderships* paired with the *ideologies* that accompanied them serve as the independent variables.

Hypothesis:

It is the proposition of this thesis that an integrated theory of revolution can be obtained and thus form a solid basis of analysis for supplementary or future revolutions. It is hypothesized that alternative *leaderships* implementing effective *ideologies*, being those which help facilitate revolution, coupled with favorable conditions presented by drastic *structural change* are the greatest catalysts towards a successful revolutionary movement. What must be additionally emphasized is agency's role in bringing a revolution to fruition. While it is fundamentally important to highlight structural changes, as it works to contextualize the environment revolutionaries find themselves in, this is something no scholar can ever fully present, but as contextualization increases, it only increases our understanding of how that movement came about. Furthermore, the greatest indicator for what might be considered a drastic structural change, is rapid development and modernization, which in effect creates state instability. It is only after this that leaderships accompanied by ideologies can successfully take advantage of a state in a weakened position. And it is only with effective, revolutionary leaderships accompanied by their ideologies that state instability will ultimately result in revolution. The specific definitions of terms here will be enumerated upon in subsequent sections.

Thesis Outline:

The thesis follows a fairly simple structure. It is first prudent to discuss the topic, hypothesis, then the significance and purpose of the work. The literature review found after this chapter focuses on presenting the literature on revolutions and their origins in sections of “generations.” More than following a tradition of revolutionary research, this generational presentation deliberately unveils patterns woven into the scholarship. In chapter three, there is a discussion of foundational literature important to building the theory this thesis operates upon, literature originating from a selection across generational boundaries. Following the review of literature, a discussion of key terminology and their originations is next. The relationship between these terms is shown in a section discussing important assumptions and predictions within the theory. Chapter four focuses upon the methodology of the work, highlighting the choice of a case study, the intrinsic concerns with case studies as an analytical tool, and the defense of case selections. Chapter five is the presentation of cases. Each case is presented as following: a summary of the revolutionary movement emphasizing the timeline, events, important leaders, ideologies, and structural changes preceding the revolution; an analysis of those structural changes and the state instability they cause; and finally, an analysis of ideologies and leaderships within the movement. Lastly, chapter six summarizes the findings of the previous chapters and concludes the work.

Significance and Purpose:

The significance of this topic cannot be understated. Revolution studies as a sub-discipline certainly deserves its position and should not be lost to diverging disciplines who may catalogue some movements as a form of contentious politics or sort based on alternative categories. Though the arguments within revolution studies are already numerous in addition to being quite contentious, more discussion must be undertaken. This thesis will continue the tradition found within that debate, to summarize, analyze, and propose changes for future writings within the discipline. One can become quickly overwhelmed with the diversity of theories, approaches, and philosophies used to explain revolution, its origins, and outcomes. However, this should be encouraging. Though the turbulence within the discipline is initially quite disconcerting, it is quite necessary. Through this ritual of summarizing, analyzing, and suggesting, the discipline itself is slowly reaching consensus, whether intended or not. The aim of this thesis is to add one further, incremental push towards agreement. Now more than before, innovative approaches and theorizing must be encouraged. Though the earliest writers of revolution comprehensively and grandly theorized, they lacked analytical tools. Newer scholars now find themselves wielding powerful analytical tools, but perhaps have forgotten the power of narrative theories for explanation. Now the discipline finds itself positioned to utilize both its grand theories and analytical tools to create a more unified theory, producing superior insights. Through debate, disagreement, and critique comes consensus.

Indeed, the discipline is already correcting the most overlooked areas or altering culturally insensitive theories. Authors are beginning to understand that an endless number of indicators will never fully explain a movement, nor will the focus upon a singular

individual, ideal, or process. Furthermore, scholars are identifying that for a theory to be effective, it must be transferable between cases, as already iterated above.² If a theory is limited in its explanatory power to an arbitrary set of cases and cannot reach beyond this set, one must wonder how functional it truly is.³ This, as to be discussed, is the reason the cases selected here are often categorized as distinctive, with one being characterized as a specifically religious and the other often noted as a communist revolution. A successful theory that explains any revolution should be functional across time, geography, and cultures. To do so, that also requires the combination of approaches as discussed.

Combining approaches whilst simultaneously recognizing the importance of structural changes with leadership and ideologies is perhaps the answer most necessary for explaining revolutionary movement.⁴ It is perhaps the answer seen the least as well. Many have argued in the favor of seeing processes, ideologies, leaderships, structural changes, class conflict, and more as important to explaining revolutionary movement. But very few moments in the discipline have there been a self-reflective or self-critical analysis strong enough to identify that firstly, the greatest explanatory theories might already exist, and two, modern tools can bring theory otherwise seen as backwards into functioning modern academic works. With the understanding this thesis is little more than an academic

² C.J. Beck, "The Structure of Comparison in the Study of Revolution." *Sociological Theory*, 2018. Beck documents a shocking lack of diversity in unique comparisons of revolutions reaching across specifically geographical and historical barriers.

Goldstone, Jack A. "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* (2001, 4:139-87). Goldstone offers recommendations, one of the most important being the provision for, "...extensions and generalization to cases and events not even conceived of in earlier generations of revolutionary theories."

³ Benjamin Abrams, "A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory Is Yet to Come," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 32, no. 3 (2019): 378–86, <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12248>. Abrams addresses a "crushing" lack of difference-driven analysis.

⁴ Goldstone, Jack A. "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory." Goldstone anticipates that the next dominant generation of revolution theory will not only account for structure and stability and important, but also, "...will feature a prominent role for issues of identity and ideology, gender, networks, and leadership."

exercise, it is nevertheless important to press towards a greater understanding of revolution, and to do so there must be a greater unifying of theory and practice.

Chapter 2: Early Works on Revolution

Abstract: This chapter covers the introduction to the literature review and some of the earliest writers on revolution. Importantly, this section introduces the notion of generational classification of revolution studies and covers the first two of these generations which run approximately between the years 1900 to 1975.

Introduction:

With a subset of literature having as much richness in analysis as quantity of works, approaching something which can be considered an effective literature review comes with great challenges. However tempting the urge to present past theories in terms of type of analysis, cases used, subjects studied, or other themes, the most obvious solution is to present theories as they presented themselves, that is historically, generationally. This is no revolutionary concept; many authors offer a quick view of the prior generations' work preceding their own new concepts. However, what this literature review will strive for is a greater understanding of some of those very foundational texts on revolution in order to see the progression occurring within the field. And if not progression, then a reordering of older theories under new titles applied to new cases, as can be seen through thorough examination. Furthermore, this generational approach to understanding previous theories of revolution allows a synthezation of each generation's contribution to the field. Indeed, what will also become clearer is how related some theories of analysis are to one another, and if not, then certainly the commonalities of critiques in the overall study of revolution. Upon a successful completion of this literature review, readers can see the conclusion drawn by this thesis, that the greatest "solutions" to analysis of revolutions have already been presented throughout the life of the discipline and must now be fully rearranged in

order to bring a coherent, modern analysis of revolution to life. While this is the main goal of the thesis, what one may also observe is how closely authors stick to the lines drawn along disciplinary fronts and boundaries of approach, increasingly so as generations progressed. Furthermore, evidence will be given showing the clearest theories of analysis attempt to overcome these barriers, with some being quite successful.

A Generational Overview:

It is generally agreed upon that revolution theory has come about in differing “generations” with some of the earliest stretching back to pre-1900. A consensus has been made, in general terms, that the generations fall within this structure: the first running from 1900 or before to 1940, the second from 1940-1975, the third is seen as ending with Skocpol in 1979, and the fourth and debatably fifth is what follows.⁵ This is generally agreed upon by Lawson, Goldstone, and others who also make up the fifth generation of works which sum up the generations, highlight what is missing in the current fourth generation, and suggest critiques for further generations of study. While this is a rough guide, as some works from authors such as Moore in ‘66 are classified as third generation works, it provides a general overview in which to analyze past works on revolution theory.⁶ And while this structure allows for some important works to slip through the cracks, it is important to choose some of the most foundational and representative works within each generation. However, as this thesis seeks to live within all of what is considered revolution

⁵ Jack A Goldstone, “TOWARD A FOURTH GENERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY,” 2001, 49.

George Lawson, “Within and Beyond the ‘Fourth Generation’ of Revolutionary Theory,” *Sociological Theory* 34, no. 2 (June 2016): 106–27, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275116649221>.

⁶ Goldstone, “TOWARD A FOURTH GENERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY.”

scholarship, utilizing structures and classifications such as this generational format to understand all of what is an overwhelming amount of study serves the style of this analysis more than designing from scratch another format for review.

Upon examination of the literature, one will also see the patterns that rise and fall coinciding with academic changes and trends. For example, some of the earlier works cross lines, dealing with issues such as the “psychology of the masses” amongst others.⁷ As times changed and academic disciplines evolved, there was less cross contamination of the disciplines resulting in fewer notions of psychology or mob mentality interpretations. Perhaps the most intriguing phenomenon in the literature is the fact that as analysis becomes more specific and disciplines more sequestered, there began calls for bringing more into the analysis and not less. Notions of bringing back in the masses or understandings how leaderships and ideologies effect outcomes versus richly detailed processual theories of economic change that produce revolution have been almost constantly present at concluding sections of new work. Of course, these earlier works were not without their issues. None of the earlier works had the numerical, statistical, nor rich historical analysis found in modern works. However, this does not mean these theories should be discounted. Indeed, what these theories lacked in statistics, they most certainly made up for in rich theoretical and often eclectic theories of analysis, or at least theories on the origins of revolution. This is proven by the similarities of these earlier concepts alongside their contemporary counterparts, as will be presented beneath. While it is not word for word, and every new theory is accompanied by a new type of analysis or heavy statistical data, some ideas are not unquestionably original. Psychology, leadership, and

⁷ Le Bon, Gustav. *Psychology of Revolution*. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001. Le Bon delves into the emerging field of psychology for answers to revolutionary inquiries.

ideological analysis in the study of revolution is not a new concept. Diverging ruling classes, elites, economic classes, conflicting sovereignty, etc. are not new concepts in preceding events to a revolution.

However, before laying out some of these earliest theories of revolution, a note of caution is required. Many of these theories, while yes having merit, find themselves mired in archaic and often manifestly racist or prejudiced patterns of thought.⁸ The point of this is not to simply ignore these issues. Indeed, it would be a disservice to the discipline of social science to forget these works based solely upon outmoded thought. More beneficial perhaps is the recognition of the faults found in the works, whilst salvaging what is often truly foundational and richly crafted theory. More than a benefit, it is also the duty of social scientists to right the wrongs committed by the fathers of our disciplines. With this in mind, it is important to extract what can be considered insightful writing and place it in a modernized context to examine the effectiveness of the work.

What is Revolution?

As stated, some authors in the “first generation” found their answers among the works of the psychoanalysts of the day, which in turn greatly influenced their conception of what revolution is and where it originates. Ellwood refers to the social order as being an important object of analysis and its subsequent collapse as characterizing a revolution. According to Ellwood, revolutions are “disturbances in the social order” and the constructions of a new social order following conditions under which current patterns or

⁸ While many of these may not be overt prejudices, it can be seen in notions of essentializing a culture or noting that a certain people *always* think or conduct themselves in a certain way.

“habits” cannot be continued.⁹ The key to this definition is the notion of social habits and their ability to be reproduced. When conditions make the continuous reconstructions impossible, there results a revolutionary movement. What should be carefully considered here is that the definition is not especially political in nature; indeed, a revolution permeates throughout the society as it shakes up societal habits. In contrast, LeBon, who also approaches his subject matter from a “psychological” standpoint, classifies three different types of revolution: the scientific, the political, and the religious.¹⁰ While the scientific refers more to a conception of technological progression in society, the political is defined as “sudden adaptation” of society produced by “affective and mystic origins.”¹¹ LeBon emphasizes that revolution consists of acts of faith inherently illogical, as faith is removed from logic. This revolutionary faith, or as he calls it “mystic logic”, also makes those fervent devotees of the movement intolerant of others, which leads to the common characteristics found in revolutionary movements such as violence, hatred, and persecution.¹² Pettee finds the role of tolerance important as well, defining a revolution as a movement by people who are “cramped” beyond tolerance. A cramp is a moment defined by not only the simple desires of life being limited, such as freedom and safety, but when these limitations are seen as especially avoidable and inherently unnecessary.¹³ Pettee goes on to define a revolution as specifically “social” in where, “...the whole extrinsic social system is to be readjusted to the intrinsic social life, formed by a new purpose expressed in a new myth.”¹⁴ The significance of the “myth” will be highlighted later.

⁹ Charles A. Ellwood, “A Psychological Theory of Revolutions,” *American Journal of Sociology* 11, no. 1 (July 1905): 49–59, <https://doi.org/10.1086/211375>.

¹⁰ Gustav Le Bon, “Psychology of Revolution,” n.d., 200.

¹¹ Bon. 13.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ George Sawyer Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York, NY: Howard Fertig, 1971). 33.

¹⁴ Ibid.

However, Lederer brings terminology to the subject of revolution in his definition that feels distinctly more modern than his contemporaries, perhaps laying foundational groundwork for further development of the suggested terms. Lederer found a revolution to be a, "...sudden overthrow of a political system through mass action, using force; on the basis of ideas which have long been in preparation it brings about a transformation in the legal and social order which, although new in its orientation, nevertheless arises out of implications of the old regime."¹⁵ This definition frames certain parameters through which a revolution can be identified as such. To be considered as such there must be a change of the political segment of the society through the means of force exerted through mass action. Brinton also suggests a relative pattern that unfolds through which a movement can be considered a revolution. The general path of these revolutions began with a real or feared financial breakdown, organization of the discontented in response to such a threat, followed by revolutionary demands that when met ensured a virtual abdication of the incumbent regime, attempted use of force and failure of such use by the regime, and the taking of power by the revolutionaries.¹⁶ This pattern-based or processual definition also begins to enrich the context of where revolutionary movements may originate from, suggesting conditions necessary for such movements. As the generations continue, future definitions became more comprehensive.

It is prudent to observe how the trends in the conception of revolution changed with each generation. Many of these authors focus on the violent aspect of the revolution, making it an identifying characteristic. Huntington, who devotes much to the effects of

¹⁵ Emil Lederer, "ON REVOLUTIONS," *Social Research* 3, no. 1 (1936): 1–18. 1.

¹⁶ Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, NY: Random House, 1965). 253. Originally from 1938 but refreshed in 1965.

modernization as the cause of revolution, conceptualizes revolution as, "...a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies."¹⁷ Davies also characterizes revolutions as violent, but puts more emphasis on the political change of one ruling group by another based on popular support.¹⁸ To an even greater degree of emphasis, Gurr avoids to a great respect the notion of revolution and promotes the idea of political violence. He defines it as, "...all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies."¹⁹ Tilly takes a step back from the inherently political or necessarily violent aspects of a revolution and focuses on the control of the state as an institution. Indeed, Tilly offers two definitions regarding more specific aspects of the event, one is the revolutionary situation and the other the revolutionary outcome. The revolutionary situation is a point in time where a dual sovereignty comes into play, or as Tilly notes, "...the presence of more than one bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus," with the revolutionary outcome being the replacement of one of those groups for the other.²⁰ What should be first and foremost noted about this generations' conceptions of revolution is the lack of focus on the societal and ideological changes, a trend that continues to the third generation, with Huntington being the only to mention societal changes. There is much more of a focus upon the "politicalness" of the revolution in addition to noting that most involve violence. More than concise

¹⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1968). 264.

¹⁸ James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (1962): 5–19, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2089714>.

¹⁹ Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971). 3-4.

²⁰ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York, NY: Random House, 1978). 190, 193.

definitions of revolution, the second generation also gives more weight to the analysis of structural changes that result in revolutionary movements and the process in which these events follow. Generations that follow will build heavily upon both the first and second generations' definitions and continue to add detail and complexity to the term's meaning.

The First Generation: A Healthy Society

In the time of these first-generation authors, a craze of psychoanalysis was in full swing. The writings of Freud were commonplace in discussions of the intelligentsia and permeated throughout much of society. These exciting notions became tempting for other sociologists at the time. Why not apply these groundbreaking notions to one of the most complex events in not just politics, but human nature as well? Revolution was too tempting a topic to avoid the clutches of trending psychoanalysis. Examples of this can be seen below, as revolution becomes a problem of society and an affliction that needs a diagnosis or a fever that must burn and exhaust itself.

Causes and Patterns:

Ellwood found previous causes discussed by economists and historians citing economic, governmental, or other “external factors” as unsatisfactory.²¹ But others were not so displeased with structural explanations linked to revolutions. Brinton discusses conditions that developed prior to revolutions. The “financial breakdown” as mentioned above covered issues ranging from governmental deficits, excessive taxation, the choice of which economic interests are favored, but also developments such as a “transfer of allegiance” from the ancien regime, taken from the French term for old, to the intellectuals,

²¹ Ellwood, “A Psychological Theory of Revolutions.” 49.

and lastly a loss of self confidence amongst the ruling class.²² This transference of allegiance to the intellectuals also creates a moment of “dual sovereignty” within society, an idea explored more fully by later scholars. Though Pettie’s analysis focused on social outcomes of revolutions, he also explored structural causes for revolution such as the discrepancies between forms of economic production and types of property and ownership.²³ Lederer concurred stating that, “. . .For every great structural change there has been a revolution somewhere.”²⁴

Le Bon, Brinton, and Lederer all saw the role of the military important within revolutionary movements. Brinton found the ineptitude of the use of force on part of the military and incumbent regime to be an important stage in the revolutionary process.²⁵ Le Bon and Lederer found that without the support of the military there is no revolution. Another trend that most of the authors agreed upon was that revolutions often began at the top.²⁶ And while this was true for these authors, what also is true is that revolution or the impetus for such action, is given actual power by the people, with Lederer calling the street the “battering ram of revolution.”²⁷

Another category that is vital to understanding causes discussed in first generational theories on revolution is the concept of social evolution or social reproduction. Many of the first-generation authors found the notion of societal movement, adaptation, or flexibility important to understanding revolution. Either society evolved or adapted to changes and a government followed, or the government was compelled to adapt. It also

²² Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*. Beginning in chapter two page 25 as part of his description of the “old regimes.”

²³ Pettie, *The Process of Revolution*.

²⁴ LEDERER, “ON REVOLUTIONS.” 3.

²⁵ Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*. 253.

²⁶ Lederer, Le Bon, Pettie.

²⁷ Lederer, “ON REVOLUTIONS.” 9.

functioned in the reverse if a progressive government became too distant from its base of support. Ellwood, Pettee, and Le Bon found that revolution was a result of a government's lack of adaptability. Ellwood emphasized that a society is particularly vulnerable to revolution when it is inflexible, lacking tools through which societal change can be made easier such as public criticism and discussion.²⁸ The greater inflexibility the more prone a society was to revolution. Pettee realized that revolution could occur as the ruling class progressively become more isolated and decayed, thus not adapting with the society in which it controls.²⁹ Le Bon and Ellwood noted that conservative societies are exceptionally vulnerable to revolutionary movements as they are inherently inflexible. Le Bon describes conservatives as the sector of society most addicted to violent revolution, "Being conservative, they are not able to evolve slowly, or to adapt themselves to variations of environment, so that when the discrepancy becomes too extreme they are bound to adapt themselves suddenly. This sudden evolution constitutes a revolution."³⁰

While the importance of structural causes of revolution should not be dismissed, first-generational authors also found the notions of leaderships and ideologies valuable. It was effective leaderships and ideologies that fully took advantage of the discontent caused by structural changes or threat thereof. Le Bon found that discontent alone was not enough to rally people against the government. It was a concerted effort of leaderships to continually persuade the people of the government's responsibility of the discontent being suffered by the society.³¹ Brinton and Lederer understood the shifting degrees of sovereignty and change of allegiances as important to understanding or at least identifying

²⁸Ellwood, "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions."

²⁹ Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*.

³⁰ LeBon, "Psychology of Revolution." 14.

³¹ LeBon.

stages of revolution. One of Brinton's stages of revolution was that very transfer of allegiance from the incumbent regime to the intelligentsia.³² Lederer observed that the intellectuals were the spotlights of the movement. The intellectuals called attention to and elaborated the revolutionary idea, even though this group inevitably finds themselves disappointed.³³ Lederer also found the intellectual classes as one of the necessary groups involved in the revolution. Pettee saw the importance of what he calls "myths." The creation of these "myths" was the responsibility of the elite class in society.³⁴ This function the elites play in crafting the myth within a revolutionary movement is a critical part of understanding Pettee's theory on revolution, as a revolution must develop a deep set of ideals and beliefs before it can accomplish any positive political action.

Most all the authors found importance in the role ideology, history, or "myths" play within revolutionary events. Le Bon found the true driver behind any revolutionary force, and what truly gave it its real power was faith, belief, and something he called "mystic logic" which he described as unexplainable and unreasonable, but ultimately what permitted people to disengage from their daily lives and involve themselves in such extreme acts which are common in revolutionary movements.³⁵ Lederer began an early understanding of the importance of "revolutionary spillover" in surrounding territories. He describes an unleashing of "psychological forces" that result from revolutions occurring in neighboring countries.³⁶ Lederer further emphasizes the importance of ideas with the notion of how these elites should craft them. The ideas are only effective when crafted in

³² Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*.

³³ LEDERER, "ON REVOLUTIONS." 9.

³⁴ Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*. 21.

³⁵ LeBon, "Psychology of Revolution."

³⁶ Lederer, "ON REVOLUTIONS." 3.

a timely manner in a way that will appeal to the masses and give them a preformed idea of what the future holds in the post movement era, and this is the reason he finds that before revolutionary movements there are long periods of spiritual disintegration of the current patterns of behavior and social order.³⁷ Brinton discussed the importance of ideology and its effects on the results of his process of revolution. His crisis or “fever” is resolved by the revolutionary players seizing power, though then having become radicalized through ideological fanaticism and conflict with counterrevolutionaries, this being the “delirium” symptom of the revolutionary disease.³⁸ However, the most richly detailed idea of what ideology represents in a revolution is that of Pettee’s myth.³⁹

Pettee’s myth, in the eyes of this author, is seen as somewhat ahead of its time as a concept in early formation of political science. As already covered, this myth must be formed in the constructive stage of the revolution, ideally attaining both common will and common ideas before any political action can be successfully carried out. But it is more complex than one political ideal or revolutionary figure. A myth is essentially a belief or value that, “...is always to govern present action towards future hopes...a far off divine event.”⁴⁰ Stripping away some of the less useful ideas of psychological analysis at the time, the term myth had multiple characteristics, all of which played an important role in society. One being that generally, “...a successful revolutionary myth must be logically integrated, and have artistic literary form, though not necessarily assembled as such in a single book, and must be seriously antagonistic to the last previous myth which has given a general

³⁷ Lederer. 2.

³⁸ Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*.

³⁹ Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*. Myth revolves around values and beliefs that contextualize the environment in which general ideas are formed for the basis daily life or the day-to-day “facts of life.”

⁴⁰ Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*. 19.

stamp to the society through its function as a common rule by which individuals govern their behavior.”⁴¹ Pettee describes that a successful myth must not be too exclusive, and can present a diversity of ideals with which to strive for, supplanting current suffering for good times of ole or prescribing utopic idea of the future. Furthermore, a myth can only be successful if it passes the survival trials faced during revolutions. A successful myth, “...must have the fewest internal flaws and the fewest contradictions of the known facts of human nature, and therefore be the best guide for conduct in the same sense of truth as that by which we judge the scientific.”⁴² A revolutionary myth is much similar to the religious myth, and therefore its greatest enemy is that of the skeptics. The myth is here emphasized as there will be shown direct correlations between this concept and later concepts, such as “imaginaries.” Furthermore, the power of a successfully crafted myth in the midst or absence of any structural change must not and cannot be underestimated.

Discontent represents a tricky concept in which to approach from a political perspective. Virtually all the analyses, from the earliest and the latest, find their focus, spoken or not, on discontent. It is tricky as it is cloaked in the fog of representing “human nature” than can be described as something political. So often authors find their focus on a manifestation of this aspect of human nature. It is a concept as hard to understand as revolution itself, so it is productive to otherwise focus on indicators which are often identified as “causes” of discontent, individuals that hone discontent for a purpose, or ideologies which guide discontent towards a seemingly higher purpose, a hope of a different society.

⁴¹ Pettee. 18.

⁴² Pettee. 20.

Discontent is the focus of all our authors thus far, and much more of the rest to be covered. Le Bon summed up all true causes of revolution in the single word. Brinton saw the founding stages of revolution required the collection of the discontented population for a singular purpose of rebellion. In Ellwood's view, inflexible societies give way with the inability to cope with discontent.⁴³ Lederer speaks of revolution as the readjustment of society as the gap between the new and old has grown beyond comfort.⁴⁴ Pettee's emphasis is placed on discontent as well but also refers to his idea of a cramp plaguing the societal body. This cramp can express itself in several ways: institutional, economic, ideological, social, decadence of the elite, and political.⁴⁵ Though these are more specific types of "cramps", surely it can also be summarized as differentiating discontents.

First generation authors have given much to academia to consider, and many of their ideas are considered more fully in later generations. These authors identified the importance of imagining more than just changing economic figures or market fluctuations. Indeed, they saw that it was the responsibility of leaderships to hone tides of discontent into a sharp weapon of change. Authors were already comprehending the importance of ideology. Ideologies not merely representing a single notion of independence but myths rich in detail. Authors were inching into notions of collective action theory and were attempting to understand complex relations in society between classes or groups. They identified the value of institutions and their role in the movement, whether it be analyzing their flexibility in response to changing needs or the importance of intra-military divisions in response to actions against the incumbent regime. And while these works may lack

⁴³ Ellwood, "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions."

⁴⁴ Lederer, "ON REVOLUTIONS."

⁴⁵ Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*.

numerical or complex modern analytical tools, they risked more in a chance to describe a confounding emergence of political phenomena.

The Second Generation: Movement Toward Modernization

If first generation theorists wanted to emphasize that more should be considered than just structural causes of revolution, the second-generation authors sought to confirm the status of structure. While taking a decidedly less focused view of ideologies or the “myths” discussed above, what the next generation brought was a more analytical perspective of the origins of revolutionary events, political violence, or collective action. Following a devastating set of World Wars, it is little surprise that these authors found their focus settling on these topics. The rise in the quality of analysis coincides with the developing disciplines of sociology and political science, but also with an opening of the field of academia. Though not completely immune from the follies of early generations, there was also an improvement of what is deemed as an appropriate academic vocabulary. What follows are the highlights of several selected authors of the generation.

Causes and Patterns:

While the second generation appears starkly different, and it does indeed offer new identifications of processes and emphasize the importance of structure, it also continues some trends identified in the first generation as well. However, it is prudent to begin with what most authors found highly important, that is structural change proceeding revolutionary movements. Huntington in particular places a heavy emphasis on the role of modernization in the changing societies, calling revolution a, “...characteristic of

modernization.”⁴⁶ He further states that revolution, alongside other forms of instability and political violence, is likely to follow periods of social and economic development in societies where the political development has fallen behind the other forms of change.⁴⁷ In this way, political institutions and incumbent regimes that are unable to keep up with the changing political demands that follow social and economic development are at the greatest risk of facing revolutionary movements. Davies found that revolutions were also most likely to occur following a long period economic and social development followed by a short reversal of that progress.⁴⁸ Gurr goes a bit further in analyzing not just what can be considered revolution, but political violence in general. Some of the most important hypotheses made that apply more directly to revolution are the notions of how institutional support succeeds or fails against discontent. For example, regime institutional support, according to Gurr, varies according to the proportion of the population in these organizations and to what extent regime connected organizations provide regular channels for protest.⁴⁹ The strength, or flexibility, of institutions and incumbent regimes are also a defining characteristic of the second generation.

First however, as discussed for the first generation, the conception of discontent is increasingly important in the understanding of revolutionary movements. And this continues to be the case in the second generation. Davies and Huntington both describe structural changes preceding movements, but these structural changes are the reasons for the discontent. The discontent is what pushes against the regime, whatever the cause of said discontent may be. That discontent takes several forms within this body of work.

⁴⁶ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 265.

⁴⁸ Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution.”

⁴⁹ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. 365.

Davies considers discontent to flow from the break between expectations versus reality. The growth period preceding sharp decline has set expectations in an ever-increasing pattern, and the significance of whatever that short decline may be is ultimately irrelevant as that expected progress must continue in the future.⁵⁰ Gurr goes as far to craft a term, relative deprivation, which is, "...a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities."⁵¹ Regimes are considered most successful or secure when they can cope with this discontent and adapt accordingly to changing desires.

Huntington describes two prerequisites of a revolution that follow a modernizing of society. The first is that the political institutions in question are incapable of accounting for the desires for participation of new social forces in politics, and the second being that the new social forces locked out of participation can only achieve goals by pressing demands on the political sphere.⁵² Davies and Gurr also concur that the regimes least capable of reproducing demands or meeting expectations are the most vulnerable of being replaced. Huntington finds that what he defines as "great revolutions" occurred under regimes controlled by the military or monarchies of which had virtually no ability to flex to the increasing demands of participation.⁵³

However, it is not structural change nor the discontent it creates alone that cause revolution. Gurr finds that the basic sequence of political violence is first the development of discontent, but secondly is the "politicization" of said discontent, and finally its actualization of violent action against political actors and objects.⁵⁴ It is vital that the

⁵⁰ Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution."

⁵¹ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. 13.

⁵² Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. 274.

⁵³ Huntington. 275.

⁵⁴ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. 12.

discontent be politicized to achieve revolution, as also noted by the first generation. Huntington also finds that three groups tend to play a major role in revolutions: the moderates, the counterrevolutionaries, and the radical revolutionaries.⁵⁵ And while these authors' focus heavily on the structural causes of discontent, there is a small recognition of the importance of ideological factors within the development of revolution. Gurr describes that societal variables align the focus of discontent upon political objects and these are, "...the extent of cultural and subcultural sanctions for overt aggression, the extent and degree of success of past political violence, the articulation and dissemination of symbolic appeals justifying violence, the legitimacy of the political system, and the kinds of responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation."⁵⁶ Then there is Tilly, whose main focus lies on the interaction of actors and their ability to gather resources in which to act.

Tilly's emphasis is neither upon the economic or grand societal changes, nor the ideological bases for action leading up to a revolution. His focus is collective action and the collection of resources to make it possible. Tilly breaks his theory of collective action into several components: interests, organization, mobilization, opportunity, and collective action. The beginning sketch of his theory starts with interests which bring the actors together. According to Tilly, interests can be within economic and political life, but the ones which are most important concern the gains and losses resulting from the interaction between groups.⁵⁷ One of the largest components of a successful collective action is the mobilization stage. This is the process in which groups work to collectively control the resources required for action, such as factors of labor.⁵⁸ His theory is simply sketched in

⁵⁵ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. 269-270.

⁵⁶ Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. 13.

⁵⁷ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.

⁵⁸ Tilly.

the abstract as: state making => (interests <=> organization) => mobilization => collective action for example.⁵⁹ He also defines the opportunity, or threat, in which this process is most likely to develop. The opportunity focuses on, “The extent to which other groups, including governments, are either (a) vulnerable to new claims which would, if successful, enhance the contender’s realization of its interests or (b) threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce the contender’s realization of its interests.”⁶⁰ It is important to emphasize Tilly’s effort to differentiate himself from his contemporaries through a view on the concrete accumulation of resources in order to allow groups to act, than a trust alone that with enough discontent comes a concerted or concentrated action regardless of who controls resources vital to state capture.

⁵⁹ Tilly, 230.

⁶⁰ Tilly, 55.

Chapter 3: Later Works on Revolution

Abstract: This chapter covers later, more modern theories of revolution, beginning particularly with post-WWII scholarship, and traces how the term revolution changes alongside the scholarship. Also covered is the debate on whether there exists a definable fifth generation or not. Further, this section additionally includes a summarization of the entire literature review which pulls together similar threads of logic found throughout each generation.

The Third Generation: Rise of the Structuralists

With the focus narrowing from the first generation to the second, as authors became focused upon more singular notions such as resource mobilization or relative deprivation, the third generation began to either offer theories of less than a singular view or at least with a greater contextualization to the specific revolutionary movements in question rather than theory at large. Goldstone best sums up what is missing from second generation analysis of revolution, and what is hopefully addressed within the body literature that is the third generation:

They are: (1) the variable goals and structures of states; (2) the systematic intrusion, over time, of international political and economic pressures on the domestic political and economic organization of societies; (3) the structure of peasant communities; (4) the coherence or weakness of the armed forces; and (5) the variables affecting elite behavior.⁶¹

While the third generation seeks to resolve many of the issues preceding generations failed to, they also fall short in the scope and transferability of their analysis, however distinct or

⁶¹ Jack Goldstone, "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation," *World Politics* 32 (April 1, 1980), <https://doi.org/10.2307/2010111>. 435.

insightful they may be to specific scenarios. Though partial portions of theories do perhaps provide insights when applied in a different manner to different cases.

The four theories chosen to be presented here are not inherently different from one another, indeed, with their focus on structural components of revolutionary movements, they further enhance the position of structural causes within analysis, at least for the specific cases chosen. However, it will be found that some of the theories to follow are either limited to specific cases or defined as being limited to certain “types” of revolutionary movements.

Perhaps the best example of a more limited theory is that of Jeffery Paige. Paige has placed his magnifying glass upon the namesake of his book, the *Agrarian Revolution*. Though this focus necessitates a certain limited ability of analysis, it would be a mistake to disregard the richness of theory presented due to a limited scope of applicability. Paige identifies the conflict that results in revolution presents itself in the relationship between two groups he describes as the “cultivators” and “noncultivators.” These new terminologies serve as the stereotypical classifications of the lower and upper classes respectively, though fit the habitat in which they occur. The categorization of when and why these conflicts occur, cleanly and plainly laid out for the reader, relates to when land ownership, and the subsequent profits tied to it, is more or less important to each described group.⁶² Noncultivators, or the upper landed class in the agrarian world, are considered weak or strong based on several key factors described by Paige. The first of these is how income is produced. Noncultivators are considered weak when the income is tied strictly to land ownership.⁶³ When this is the case, a pattern develops where the noncultivators rely on

⁶² Jeffery M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution* (New York: The Free Press, 1975).

⁶³ Paige. 18.

political restrictions for land control, resulting in a conflict over land control with a labor movement that can only manifest as political. The pattern is also normally characterized by a static agricultural product from which the upper class draws its income and results in a zero-sum conflict as there is often little room for compromise between the two groups.⁶⁴ On the other hand, a rural upper class is considered strong when its income is not solely tied to land ownership, but a diversity of incomes, such as commercial or industrial capital, resulting in conflicts more focused on, not land ownership, but distribution of income. This creates conflict more resembling a labor, economical struggle with a non-zero-sum conflict. For the cultivators, the conflict revolves around the importance of land as a source of income versus wage labor, etc. This class is weaker as the importance of land is greater, resulting in a class that avoids risk, resists political movements, has weaker incentives for political competition versus economic, and leads to structural isolationism or a dependence on noncultivators.⁶⁵ This weakness also results in weaker pressure for political solidarity. When land as a source of income is less vital, the lower class is strengthened. Members are more likely to accept risk and be receptive to revolutionary appeals, economic competition is weakened and political is strengthened, and there is an overall greater interdependence among class members resulting in a greater political solidarity.⁶⁶ These weak/strong relations between cultivators and noncultivators play out in four different scenarios described by Paige. When both groups are dependent upon land as a source of income, the movement likely to occur is described as an “agrarian revolt.” When noncultivators are not dependent on land but cultivators are, the movement is labeled as a reform commodity

⁶⁴ Paige. 23.

⁶⁵ Paige. 26-34.

⁶⁶ Paige.

movement. When neither group is dependent on land greatly, the result is identified as a labor movement. It is only when noncultivators are dependent on land and cultivators are not that the movement is labeled by Paige, a revolution. It is this interaction of upper and lower classes over the principal sources of income that ultimately determines which type of movement occurs in Paige's analysis.

Much like Paige's work, Trimberger's work is focused on a specific type of revolution and is thus limited in applicability but should not be disregarded, for the observations it makes are quite inimitable. Trimberger's aptly named *Revolution from Above* focuses on the process of revolution occurring at the highest levels of societal control. Firstly, she refuses to review or quibble over past arguments of characterizing the term revolution, hoping it to be seen more plainly in her cases as, "...an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime."⁶⁷ These are what she characterizes as a special set of cases lacking stereotypical characteristics present in definitions offered by others. This is prudent in explaining movements concentrated at the top of society, such as her selected case of Egypt's revolution as a concentrated group of officers seized power in a shocking manner, though differing from what is regularly described as "great revolutions." Trimberger emphasizes this type of revolution is identified strictly by the process it follows. That process, she describes concisely as initially: an extralegal takeover by members of the regime, with little to no mass participation, accompanied by little violence.⁶⁸ She continues, describing the movement as inherently pragmatic, with little

⁶⁷ Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick: Transaction, Inc., 1978). 2.

⁶⁸ Trimberger. 3.

association with radical ideologies, but most importantly is the relationship between this new group of revolutionaries and the aristocracy of the soon to be old regime. The greatest identifying characteristic of this type of revolution is the destruction of the economic and political bases of power of the incumbent aristocracy by the revolutionaries. These revolutionaries often come from the developed sectors of the state bureaucracy or military and could only successfully consolidate power after systematically weakening the grip of the old aristocracy or upper classes. Her emphasized “process” occurred in several steps: the neutralization of the aristocracy, the neutralization of the masses, political manipulation of the moderate supporters, and the defeat of the old regime followed by a consolidation of power.⁶⁹ Trimberger’s analysis stands alone in a departure from stereotypical assumption of revolution. Indeed, she disregards the importance of violence, mass mobilization, and radical ideology often advocated as necessary in revolutionary movements, with much success in her work describing these revolutions from above.

In a stark departure, though steadfastly structural, from the concise explanations of movements of a more singular nature above, Eisenstadt presents a broad reaching theory of analysis. In his rather dense work, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, he presents a theory that is substantially all-encompassing in spirit. Eisenstadt brings focus once again to the notions of “great revolutions” with discussion based less on the process in which they evolve but on the conditions in which they occur. Eisenstadt perpetuates the significance of modernization, strongly expressed in the second, into the third generation. In his interpretation, modernization presented several basic conditions in which great

⁶⁹ Trimberger. 16-19.

revolutions occurred.⁷⁰ The external conditions consisted of international economic and political pressures alongside interstate competition. Internal conditions consisted of new players in a broadening political sector of society, with one being the development of politically oriented elites. The second being new social classes rising amid modernization. These social forces arose in the circumstances of economic change and dislocation associated with the broadening of markets and the development of modern capitalist production modes accompanied by new ideologies. These conditions created a broad sense of frustration regarding participation in political and social centers. Eisenstadt continues his exhaustive account of revolution in describing the participants of such a movement. These were as follows: traditional but potentially modernizing monarchs, diversified upper and middle urban and landed classes oriented towards a capitalist market economy, heterogeneous peasant groups, traditional urban groups, new intellectuals and religious groups, and institutional entrepreneurs.⁷¹ What Eisenstadt also saw as a distinctive aspect of the revolutions, and perhaps his most unique contribution yet, are the sociocultural settings in which revolutions took place.⁷² These cultural orientations were based on where solutions were sought after and the resulting effects on resources. Eisenstadt identifies that societies with the highest level of free resources, widest scope of markets, and greatest variety of alternatives for social and political orders were those with high levels of tension between the transcendental and the mundane with a focus on worldly activities.⁷³ This holds true especially for those movements described modern revolutions. These were

⁷⁰ S.N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies* (New York: The Free Press, 1978). Discussion of conditions begins on 195.

⁷¹ Eisenstadt. 196.

⁷² Eisenstadt. Beginning 198.

⁷³ Eisenstadt. 150.

European movements. These movements occurred in the aftermath of reformation, counterreformation, and the enlightenment, the conditioning for structural pluralism. Moreover, Protestantism for the legitimization of the “strong warrior” in the battle for reformation or change. Though meticulous, Eisenstadt makes unique proposals regarding the sociocultural settings in which a revolution takes place, alongside the reaffirmation of the importance of modernization whilst also recognizing the role of the international sphere. Also taking note of how the international sphere affects revolution in the third generation was Skocpol.

Firstly, Skocpol further conceptualized revolution in a rather notable way. Differing from the limited conceptions of the movements described by Trimberger and Paige, Skocpol described “social revolutions” as, “...rapid, basic transformations of a societies state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.”⁷⁴ This definition refers not to the just inherently political aspects of a movement. Indeed, society must be transformed to fall into the category of a social revolution, considering more than just the actions of the elites or the process by which a state disintegrates. However, Skocpol also saw the importance of class relations and agrarian economies as Paige did. These played a role in the “crisis” of the old state. This crisis of the state is identified through several characteristics: when the state is unable to meet challenges of the international kind, when monarchical powers face threats or are subjected to newly increased competition from more economically developed powers, and lastly when a state becomes too restricted in its ability to respond by the very nature of

⁷⁴ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge University Press, 1979). 4.

autocratic institutions in relation to the landed upper classes or agrarian economies.⁷⁵ These conditions for state crisis become the first step in what can be roughly described as three steps of a social revolution. The first, state crisis leading to the collapse of the old regime. This is followed by the mobilization of the peasantry into class-based uprising, again putting emphasis on the rural and the action of the masses. Lastly is the reconsolidation of state power by the new elite.

Skocpol offers a unique set of perspectives in which builds a framework for application of said theory to different cases. She focuses on the structural, especially the importance of agricultural productivity and the landed upper class's role in politics. Her analysis extends beyond the border, stressing the importance of accounting for the effects of interstate economic and political competition through her focus on the "international and world-historical contexts." Furthermore, she clearly states the importance of seeing the state as an autonomous entity, something authors have only casually approached. If these factors and structural indicators were not enough to emphasize, Skocpol unambiguously expresses how revolutions must be analyzed as through a structural perspective, capping the return and devout devotion of the third generation to structural analysis of revolutions:

To explain social revolutions, one must find problematic, first, the emergence (not "making") of a revolutionary situation within an old regime. Then one must be able to identify objectively conditions and complex intermeshing of the various actions of the diversely situated group – an intermeshing that shapes the revolutionary process and gives rise to the new regime. One can begin to make sense of such complexity only by focusing simultaneously upon the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies with world-historically developing international structures. To take such an impersonal and nonsubjective viewpoint...is to work from what may in some generic sense be called a structural perspective on sociohistorical reality.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Skocpol. 47.

⁷⁶ Skocpol. 18.

The Fourth Generation: Fetishizing the “Third World”

The fourth generation of literature aimed to accomplish much for the body of work, including bringing back in concepts of ideologies, actors, and processes that were lost amongst a structural forest above. Perhaps the most useful accomplishment is the renewed attention given to the “third world” revolutionary movements. Though deemed not so “great” by earlier authors, movements in locales other than the western developed world deserve just as much attention. However, in the view of this work, the degree to which these movements are identified as inherently unique, and thus deserving a unique theory of their own, is somewhat problematic. Indeed, some of the theories applied exclusively to cases described as having occurred in the “third world,” follow patterns of theory of earlier generations applied to classic examples. Whilst the examples seem not so inherently different, nor are the theories applied to them. While they receive credit for bringing back in issues mentioned earlier, they rely heavily on previous theories, especially of the third generation.

Foran takes the deep dive in tracing roots of movements in less developed countries in *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. However, his unique case selection is not the only distinctive part of his work. He calls attention to issues of culture that have been largely absent for a generation. Foran identifies five distinct elements necessary for a revolution: dependent development, regime type, political cultures of opposition, economic downturn, and world systemic opening. The regime type Foran focuses on is one of an “exclusionary, personalist, or colonial state or open polity.”⁷⁷ The process of it is clearly presented. Foran sees the prerequisites of a state as requiring a

⁷⁷ John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

history of dependent development, a regime type as described, and the presence of political cultures of opposition.⁷⁸ These prerequisites are needed when certain structural changes arise, i.e. the economic downturn and world systemic opening. This pattern brings about a revolution or a “...multi-class, -race, -gender alliance.” Though Foran brings to the table notions of “political cultures of opposition,” he stresses an equilibrium more than disregarding the importance of structure in revolution.⁷⁹ He describes this process and applies it to different cases than most all while adopting Skocpol’s definition of revolution. However, he is not alone in building upon Skocpol’s work.

In Parsa’s title, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolution*, he directly adds what he saw as missing in Skocpol’s work. Though ideology holds a special place in the title, Parsa advocates for a “balanced approach” to revolution. Whilst highlighting ideology’s relative absence, much due to the emphasis of structure advocated by the third generation, Parsa also supports a focus on both structure and process. In Parsa’s view, structure “sets the stage” for conflict. Structure means more than only an economic downturn. While the crisis is important, the preceding structure of the state must also be understood. Most importantly is the degree to which the state is active within society with “highly interventionist states” often falling victim to attack in social upheaval, such as states heavily involved in capital accumulation.⁸⁰ Further characteristics of structurally weak states can be moments of state vulnerability to external pressures, breaks within the state, or when reform provides a relief of repression. Furthermore, states with highly exclusionary policies that form limited polities tend to push the moderates into the arms of radicals, especially in times of

⁷⁸ Foran. 18.

⁷⁹ Foran.

⁸⁰ Misagh Parsa, “States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines” (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 10.

economic crisis.⁸¹ While these ideas are certainly not new, the urge for a balance between the process and structure represents an attempt to bridge theory, especially with extra consideration for ideology. Parsa argues that ideology is fundamental in determining whether a conflict results in a full “social revolution” or not. Moreover, he also emphasizes the importance of the recognition of such an ideology by the actors who utilize it.⁸² That means not only is it necessary to examine the ideologies presented by the main actors, but also to examine the understandings of those ideologies by the masses who carry out collective action. When a group follows certain leaders, it does not necessitate an ideological conversion, but instead suggests reasons such as “political causes and tactical considerations.”⁸³ Notions of ideological analysis, as argued by Parsa, normally lack analytical depth and make large assumptions regarding ideology, particularly assigning all analytical focus to the ideology of the winners. Parsa urges against this type of ideological analysis for two reasons. One is that revolutionary challengers do not always disclose all aspects of their ideologies and sometimes even conceal certain notions, which could encourage participation of nonradical groups that would otherwise be threatened by such an ideology. Secondly, Parsa finds that, “...in repressive situations, ideological debates are very limited, and ideologically driven challengers may be unable or unwilling to reveal the precise nature of their ideology.”⁸⁴ One may find that typical analysis of ideology’s role in revolution can lead to grander assumptions than appropriate, resulting in a labeling of movements inherently nationalistic, communistic, or religious when that may not be the case. Parsa also cautions against the “sweeping powers” usually assigned to ideology in

⁸¹ Parsa. 22-23.

⁸² Parsa. 9.

⁸³ Parsa.

⁸⁴ Parsa.

revolution and advocates accounting for the “...social origins of ideologies and their relation to the social structure.”⁸⁵ However, like Foran, Parsa makes clear his work focuses on the ideologies of actors in the “third world.”

Selbin represents a different approach to revolutionary theory with a focus on story, applied to cases not relegated to the “third world.” Much like Anderson’s “imaginaries”, Selbin’s work builds on historical, social, and cultural bases for what he calls “story” and focuses on the role of said story in revolutionary events.⁸⁶ Selbin’s work steers clear from stereotypical focuses on processes, structure, and mobilizations and instead finds meaning in the richness of stories and narratives that power people to revolutionary actions. Selbin argues that revolutions are both as much about culture as they are social or economic in their causes. Thus, the impetus for revolution comes from not only economic stimuli, but also, “...injustice, impoverishment, the disenfranchisement of people, and the stories people tell of the liberty, freedom, and social justice they deserve and which promise them a voice in their present and future lives...and of their culture and society.”⁸⁷ With the general idea of how story works, Selbin traces four specific types of story and the revolutionary examples where they manifest. The first is the “civilizing and democratizing” stories found in the American Revolution amongst others.⁸⁸ The second is the “story of social revolution” and its role in the French Revolution.⁸⁹ The “freedom and liberation story of revolution” is the third type with Haiti and Mexico serving as Selbin’s prime examples.⁹⁰ Lastly is the “revolutions of the lost and forgotten” from movements that failed

⁸⁵ Parsa.

⁸⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, n.d.

⁸⁷ Eric Selbin, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story* (London [u.a]: Zed Books, 2010). 16.

⁸⁸ Selbin. Beginning 96.

⁸⁹ Selbin. Beginning 115.

⁹⁰ Selbin. Beginning 141.

and faded into history, such as the Paris Commune movement. Selbin calls these the “stories we don’t know and won’t tell.”⁹¹ While Selbin has given nods to issues of structural crisis that precedes movements, he ultimately comes to the conclusion that it is people that make revolution, and to do so, they create stories.⁹²

While the authors of the fourth generation begin realizing that there is more needed than the strict analysis of structural change, nor just a focus upon leaderships and ideologies, or stories, they still fall short of their goal. Too much emphasis is placed upon the location of the revolutionary movements or time they occur. The categorical analysis of the “third world” is both unnecessary and unproductive. Limiting a selection of revolutionary movements due to their development stage or colonial relationships is irrelevant and approaching a precarious argument of essentializing a culture or time. Furthermore, there was little productivity added to the development innovative theory, more of a repetition of the successful explanations found in the previous generation. Nevertheless, this generation began searching for a greater solution to revolution analysis by combining important approaches to understanding revolution. Parsa added upon Skocpol’s highly successful work, and because of that found greater explanatory power of the theory in the cases he selected for analysis.

The Elusive “Fifth Generation” and Subsequent Works:

Though there exist theories of revolution following the fourth generation above, the selected works for the “fifth generation” presented here make up an amalgamation of calls for change and suggestions to the body of work that is revolution theory, more than present

⁹¹ Selbin. 163.

⁹² Selbin. 185.

extensive novel takes of revolutions and their causes. Though works by Goldstone, Lawson, and others presented here do attempt to improve theory, more importantly they make suggestions calling for a “bringing back in” of several aspects forgotten in the more contemporary generations of work. The fascinating part is that though these articles take the approach of being “new critiques,” they follow a long tradition, as seen above, of adding and detracting from interweaving works on the origins of revolution. It seems as one generation accounts for what one body of work chooses not to focus on, the next generation must work in reverse. As this pattern emerges, we find ourselves left in a loop of theory on revolution.

In Goldstone’s “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory,” he advocates for several points for future consideration by the blossoming fourth generation, such as analysis of the state and bringing back in issues of ideology and leadership amongst others.⁹³ However, Lawson finds that Goldstone’s wishes are ultimately unmet by the fourth generation of work on revolution. Lawson refers to more of a “stall” in the progress.⁹⁴ Goldstone wanted to see a shift in the coming fourth generation of work. A shift that would involve treating state stability as problematic and focus on the conditions that provide a stable state environment. Goldstone also desired those issues of ideology and identity be included in analysis as well as networks, genders, and leaderships, treating “...revolutionary processes and outcomes as emergent form the interplay of multiple actors.”⁹⁵

⁹³ Goldstone, “TOWARD A FOURTH GENERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY.”

⁹⁴ Lawson, “Within and Beyond the ‘Fourth Generation’ of Revolutionary Theory.”

⁹⁵ Goldstone, “TOWARD A FOURTH GENERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY.”

Lawson follows in Goldstone's footsteps in making suggestions for continued improvement of revolution theory whilst attempting to dismantle the most useful theories still in use, such as Skocpol. Lawson goes even further, finding that inventive takes on revolution theory struggle under the weight of debt the discipline owes to authors like Skocpol.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, Lawson continues the traditions of critiquing the current generation's work on revolution and adding his own call for action. One must say, Lawson's suggestions break with tradition a bit more than his forefathers' advice. Lawson advocates viewing revolutions in a different manner than earlier generations, with the hope of shaking off some of the debt. His suggestions cover issues of "reorienting" the approaches in the fourth generation around three suggestions: viewing revolution through a processual lens rather than strictly attributional, social actions should be seen as relational rather than substantialist regarding meaning and practice, and lastly producing an inter-societal approach to the study of revolution.⁹⁷

There is much debate to whether there exists a fifth generation of work that has yet to emerge from the remnants of the fourth. Allinson argues that there has indeed emerged a fifth generation of revolution studies which is:

...distinguished...by a shift in the object of study; by the account of the relationship between intentions, behaviour and structure in revolutions; and by the place assigned to politics between, and beyond, states as well as within them...for the Fifth Generation, revolutions should [be] understood as processes constituted by particular 'sequences of events that attain their significance as they are threaded through and in time.'⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Lawson, "Within and Beyond the 'Fourth Generation' of Revolutionary Theory."

⁹⁷ Lawson. 29-30.

⁹⁸ Jamie Allinson, "A Fifth Generation of Revolution Theory?," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 32, no. 1 (2019): 142–51, <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12220>.

While this argument is indeed compelling, this thesis identifies with Abrams' conclusion that argues there is no new "fifth generation" of work, just a continuation of the fourth generation's ideas.⁹⁹ Abrams extends work done by Lawson in recommending directions to the fourth generation or, more precisely, finds that the issues of the fourth generation cannot be overcome until the birth of a true fifth generation of work solving several issues he identifies. First, he suggests three issues plaguing the progress of fourth-generation approaches: "...the overambitious attempt to replace theorizing with modelling; the related desire to cover too many variables at once; and the field's displacement by overlapping disciplines."¹⁰⁰ Abrams finds fault with assigning too much importance to the modeling or practice whilst letting theory fall to the wayside and proposes that innovation should be encouraged and "methodological purism" disposed of. With this, he hopes to see a "...return to grander theorizing than the kind seen in the fourth generation."¹⁰¹ Lastly are the suggestions he makes to encourage the onset of the fifth generation. More than looking at an agency centered approach of elites and their followers, the next generation must also look at the role of the masses once more. Abrams supports Selbin's efforts to characterize the masses not as a mob but, "...as an array of complex individuals responding to intense socio-political phenomena and drawing on a rich palette of imaginaries..."¹⁰² Abrams also reaffirms other calls to trace the role of revolutions in societies other than the ones they occur in.¹⁰³ The last call to action Abrams advocates is a shot of fervor back into the study

⁹⁹ Benjamin Abrams, "A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory Is Yet to Come," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 32, no. 3 (2019): 378–86, <https://doi.org/10.1111/johs.12248>.

¹⁰⁰ Abrams. 380.

¹⁰¹ Abrams. 384.

¹⁰² Abrams. Referencing Selbin, E. "Resistance and Revolution in the Age of Authoritarian Revanchism: The Power of Revolutionary Imaginaries in the Austerity-Security State Era." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*. (2019).

¹⁰³ Abrams. Referencing Beck (2011, 2015).

of revolutions instead of treating them with dispassion and distance. He advocates they be considered as the "...bloodied, broken corpus of the body politic in conflict with itself."¹⁰⁴

Generational Inheritance:

What are we left with, generations later, in the study of revolution? As alluded to already, we find ourselves caught in a revolving door, striving to break out of what disciplines deem acceptable, scholars find as scholarly, or questions decided as askable. Upon first glance, one might decide too much attention is given to the forefathers of revolution theory and not their ancestry, however, what one should also take from this generational overview is how little has *genuinely* changed since the beginning. While we certainly have at our fingertips a great number of tools not provided for a hundred years ago, be it basic data now collected by modern states or new analytical tools, we find ourselves asking the same questions about theory, designing theory already deployed, or, even more disappointingly, implementing theory claimed as novel when that is not the case. While the work of Abrams is much commended by this author, it can be taken as an example. No matter how novel the suggestions made by Abrams are in the midst of contemporary works, the same questions have been asked or answered, at least impart, by earlier authors. Though they may not have been addressed utilizing modern methods, one should not disregard the grand theorizing, once dismissed and now longed for, of the earlier generations. The notion of focusing on the masses advocated by Abrams now has been addressed at length by authors Le Bon and Brinton. Abrams advocates understanding the actions of such masses through Selbin's concept of imaginaries, a notion not so unlike

¹⁰⁴ Abrams.


Pettee's aforementioned myth. Abrams references Beck as calling for a focus on how a revolution in one place affects a revolution in another. This concept is no different from Lederer's discussion of "psychological forces" unleashed on neighboring states. Though the same exercise can be carried out utilizing almost every contemporary work covered here, the point is clear, and the purpose of this thesis is better understood.

Chapter 4: Theory and Background

Abstract: Theory is highlighted in this chapter alongside covering the background of where lines of logic used in this theory are found within the literature. Also presented is theoretical sketch, literature seen as foundational to this thesis, and key terms including: revolution, leadership, ideology, structural change, and state instability.

Theory and Background:

Perhaps the one of the two greatest takeaways from the literature reviewed above is that notions of structural change preceding revolutionary movements cannot be overlooked, even by those authors who praise notions of process, leadership, and ideology within their theories. However, the second is that structural analysis and strictly structural explanations for revolution are not enough. Indeed, no matter how rich an explanation can be drawn from in depth structural theories, one cannot remove the humanity from revolutions. And while the connections between structural woes and emotion is made clear through notions of relative deprivation, misery is not enough to fully explain revolution. Especially in the contemporary context, authoritarian regimes have become incredibly efficient at suppression or reorienting societal sufferings, but the same can be said of movements in the past. Instead, there must be something additional, something to push that suffering into the right direction or give aggression born from agony an objective. This is the domain of ideologies and the leaderships who utilize them. The specifics of these terms and their relation to one another can be found below. The substance of the theory crafted here will draw directly upon the literature discussed above.

Theoretical Sketch:

Alternative leadership partnered with effective ideology.

(Agency*)

The dependent variable in this thesis will be the *revolutions* that took place in Cuba between 1953 and 1959 and in Iran which occurred in 1978-1979. These are undeniably sufficient examples of revolutions, though discussion over what kind of revolution unfolded in each continues to persist but is ultimately irrelevant. The *rapid industrialization* that took place before the revolutionary movements and the *leaderships*, along with the *ideologies* they implemented, found within the revolutionary movements will serve as the independent variables.

Foundational Literature:

It is found that while there do exist newer studies on revolutions, a good portion of recent revolution works are in themselves literature compilations and summations covering what is lacking in the discipline and suggesting what can be improved. This new tradition is exactly what this thesis patterns itself after. The focus on compiling of works both guarantees a whole understanding of contemporary critiques but also safeguards knowledge of the past. This literature will review the foundations of the earliest “generations” of revolution theory as well, with a solid focus on middle generation, such as Skocpol who is placed in the “third generation.” However, this thesis will be founded

upon those novel notions regarding what the discipline of revolution should be whilst utilizing the works of the foundational authors of the discipline to provide answers to the calls for change.

Each of these articles revolved around the same concept: there is more missing from original works on revolution than there is being gained. These are not hopeless diagnoses, but indeed quite legitimate prescriptions for what is needed in the analysis of revolution. These works have a surprising similarity when examined side by side. Indeed, they come to many of the same conclusions as each other and have similar recommendations. Goldstone pays due respect to the foundational work of Skocpol while simultaneously explaining what is required for further explanations of revolutions. Perhaps what is most essential is a new conception of the state and its role in revolution. This “fourth generation” brought the question of state stability into play. This generation’s writings called to, “...treat stability as problematic and focus on conditions that sustain regimes overtime...”¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, additional works must account for issues such as, “...identity and ideology, gender, networks, and leadership...”¹⁰⁶ This call for unification of multiple variables and types of analyses is echoed by Lawson in his push for processual and inter-societal approaches to the study.¹⁰⁷ Essentially, Lawson yearns for a more comprehensive unified theory of revolution, one that offers to break the stall in theory development. In the opinion of Abrams, the issues of counter-revolutionary and authoritarian outcomes are ripe for attack as well as the often-neglected period of the endings of revolutions.¹⁰⁸ In addition to this, Abrams also advocated for giving more attention to the “masses” instead of a

¹⁰⁵ Goldstone. 175.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ George Lawson, “Within and Beyond the ‘Fourth Generation’ of Revolutionary Theory.” 29-30.

¹⁰⁸ Benjamin Abrams, “A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory Is Yet to Come,”.384.

narrow focus on elite relations while seeing the crowds as a complex group of individuals responding to different stimuli and drawing upon differing imaginaries.¹⁰⁹

While these articles have similar themes and recommendations throughout, the matter they are most devoted to is overthrowing the scholar that is king of revolutionary studies, Skocpol. Perhaps we have not seen a new unifying theory take hold of the subfield because Skocpol's work is such a rich and effective explanatory tool in the examination of revolution. While imperfect, as it does not efficiently account for ideology or agency of leadership within movements, it does bring descriptive lessons of how a revolution may take place resulting from extreme structural changes and outside influences. In her original work from 1979, she effectively understood not just the importance of in-state issues, but how the international military and economic competition in which the state exists had effects on revolution. In addition, Skocpol also understands the effects that modernization could take on a state, easily producing frustrated masses that then resort to ideological movements to overthrow a state. However, she specified that modernization cannot be understood only in an intrastate discussion but must be set in the greater context of the international system. Integral to this paper is also revisiting Skocpol's understanding of "ideological movements" as being more than just a result of frustration.¹¹⁰ Indeed, it will be important to understand that ideological movements and the leaderships within them must meet their own sets of criteria before they can act in times of state vulnerability. With all understanding that Skocpol removes ideology from the movement to improve the scientific accuracy of her analysis by taking an, "...impersonal and nonsubjective viewpoint..." emphasizing that, "Any valid explanation of revolution depends upon the

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*.

analyst's 'rising above' the viewpoints of participants to find important regularities across given historical instances..."¹¹¹ However, when structural explanations fail or movements culminate in unexpected outcomes perhaps ideology and the viewpoints of those who support it are the only clues left for understanding. Moreover, reducing the viewpoints of individuals who found themselves within what was often stress and anxiety filled moments in revolution would be a disservice to efforts to better understand what made a revolution, or at least what it felt like in the coming of a revolution. And, as discussed already, bringing back into focus issues of ideology also satisfies contemporary complaints about what is missing from analysis of revolution.

Vital to the understanding of both cases selected, the foundational literature will consist of works specifically focusing on the cases selected. Skocpol's work, for example, on Iran is unique in that she herself identifies the limits of her foundational theoretical work in application to the Iranian revolution.¹¹² While she maintained that her theory formed a good basis of analysis for the revolution, she noted a sharp departure from the causes of the Iranian revolution and those causes in the revolutions discussed in her original works, Russia, China, and France, identifying the roles mass mobilization, leadership, and other groups played.¹¹³ However, it is the opinion of this work that Skocpol went too far in discounting her original theory's effectiveness of explanation. It is easy to be consumed, especially with the relative youth of the revolution in Iran at the time, in the mass mobilization that occurred and the dramatic ideology that dominated afterwards. This is not to say these aspects were not important to the movement, indeed they were, but equally

¹¹¹ Ibid. 18.

¹¹² Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* 11, no. 3 (1982): 265–83.

¹¹³ Ibid.

important is what can be learned in applying Skocpol's theory to the movement while accounting for ideology and leaderships. Skocpol's theory is so effective that it is carried into newer generations by such writers as Parsa, already discussed. Parsa's work will also be used as an extension of Skocpol's as he also attempted to rectify issues such as the importance of leaderships and ideologies, though falling short as he limited himself to only "third world" movements. Furthermore, it is important to utilize Foran and Goodwin's work on third world revolutionary movements. While Goodwin and Foran make excellent arguments of the state of societies in the "third world" at the time of revolutions, ultimately the "uniqueness" attributed limits analysis of revolution.¹¹⁴ Indeed, "third world" revolution deserves to be understood alongside their counterparts having happened in the "first world." This is not to say that colonial aspects of society do not play a role, they most certainly do, but those roles can be understood within the same analytical framework applied to other revolutions. The same goes for Foran's work on Cuba. The attributes given to the Cuban movement, such as economic fluctuations, unique development conditions, political cultures of resistance, and personalist rulers, while have a greater occurrence in the "third world", are not inherently unique to states with colonial pasts or colonial ties during revolutions.¹¹⁵ The impact of economic or developmental changes preceding revolutionary movements is commonly understood.

In addition to these works and his longstanding critiques of the subdiscipline as a whole, it is important to examine what Goldstone himself has added to the body of work,

¹¹⁴ John Foran and Jeff Goodwin, "Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition Fragmentation, War, and the Limits of Social Transformation," *Theory and Society* 22, no. 2 (1993): 209–47.

¹¹⁵ John Foran, "Theorizing the Cuban Revolution," *Latin American Perspectives* 36, no. 2 (March 2009): 16–30, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X09331938>.

particularly regarding the importance of ideologies as shaping forces within revolutionary struggles. Goldstone's "Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution" highlights just what role, and more importantly when, ideologies take a leading role in the revolutionary struggle.¹¹⁶ Goldstone categorizes three important phases of the revolution, "...prerevolution (period leading up to state breakdown); revolutionary struggle and state reconstruction; and the stabilization of authority."¹¹⁷ In the first of these, the driving force is dominated by what he describes as, "...material and social forces: a combination of state fiscal crisis, elite disaffection due to turnover and competition, and long-term changes in wages, landholding, urban concentration, and youthfulness of the population that increase the potential for mass mobilization."¹¹⁸ It is after these phases, when the issues appear to be more structural in nature, that ideologies take a leading role. Goldstone states that, "...when the institutional constraints of the Old Regime have collapsed, ideology and culture develop a moment of their own. In fact, in the second and third phases, ideology and culture play the leading, rather than a following, role."¹¹⁹ Rephrased in the terms of this thesis, it is after the initial phase of structural shifts that account for a moment of instability, a moment where ideology takes a leading role in shaping what becomes of the society and politics in the future. In addition to assigning importance to the role of ideology within the process of revolution, Goldstone makes two additionally important contributions with this work. The first of these is that ideology typically takes a generalizable path within said process. Goldstone summarizes this as:

¹¹⁶ Jack A. Goldstone, "Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution," *Theory and Society* 20, no. 4 (August 1991): 405-453.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. 407.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 408-408.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. 408.

Initially, social and material change is likely to produce calls for rectification of Old Regime abuses. Such calls may be rooted in tradition and reflect a wide variety of elite and popular grievances. However, once the Old Regime loses the initiative, the struggle for power leads to heightened ideological as well as political conflict. Moderate reformers are likely first to win broad support for enactment of policies that rectify past abuses. But where marginal elites seek to articulate alternative principles for social and political rule, and particularly when such elites have access to organized networks for spreading their view, popular support for more extreme measures is likely to undermine moderates. More extreme leadership, turning first to redistributive measures and then to an aggressive, intolerant nationalism, is likely to result.¹²⁰

Thus, according to Goldstone here, the typical resulting ideology within the process of revolution takes the form of aggressive nationalism with blame being assigned quite heavily to the incumbent regime with moderates being drowned out by more extreme voices articulating said ideology. Additionally to the type of ideology seen evolving within the process, Goldstone gives two paths for the outcomes of institutional changes and the ideological basis thereof: these being a, "...modification and correction of basically sound traditional institutions (conservative state reconstruction) or else a totally new beginning, needed to replace obsolete traditional practices (revolutionary state reconstruction)."¹²¹ Though Goldstone argues that which path is taken is determined by the cultural setting the revolution finds itself in, this work will argue that it is the ideology, along with those articulating it, that determines to what degree institutional change occurs. Less important culture will be here, and more important will be just how effective ideologies are and how adept those articulators are in crafting and spreading said ideology. The greatest point Goldstone adds here is that structural change delivers a society to a certain point, moment of state instability, where ideology becomes the driver for institutional change. The more dramatic that institutional change is at the end of a revolutionary movement, the more

¹²⁰ Ibid. 418.

¹²¹ Ibid. 427.

effective that ideology and its articulators must be in order to justify such changes. Evidence will be discussed within the cases studies to support these reformulations of theories examined here.

It is within these bodies of literature, those who seek to critique and fix intergenerational issues and those who themselves represent efforts to drive towards new theoretical understandings, that form the basis of theory for this work. Skocpol's longstanding work features prominently with abiding calls for extending analysis towards ideologies and leaderships which will be carried out with the help of Goldstone's work. Understanding both the structural changes that lead the way towards state instability then the ideologies that take the driver's seat in determining which outcomes prevail hopefully pushes the subdiscipline into a realm of greater comprehension for such complex phenomena.

Key Terminology: Revolution, Leadership, Ideology, Structural Change, State Instability

Revolution is an inherently complex and fundamentally fraught term, and it would be a disservice to the discipline to attempt to craft the term anew. Alternatively, this thesis draws on definitions of the generations before it. Goldstone offers a particularly functional definition of revolution that fits contemporary conceptions without alienating past movements. However, a caveat is required here. This thesis is interested in "successful revolutions." Without plunging too far down into moralizing discussions, a successful revolution is ultimately a movement that sees fundamental change regardless of the official aims of said movement, leader, or ideology. To facilitate this, Goldstone's definition will be slightly modified as follows: revolution is, "...an [successful] effort to transform the

political institutions and the justifications for political authority in a society, accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine existing authorities.”¹²² Movements that fail to bring about fundamental changes in society, particularly the changing of justifications for political authority, shall be deemed as either failed revolution or any number of “lesser” movements such as rebellions, insurrections, or coups. This definition is chosen for the effectiveness of drawing a tighter circle around the movement itself, versus the addition of necessary, precursory events or conditions. Revolution exists not in the class changes or state structure that precedes it, but in the inherently political movements that are a result of such changes. Therefore, revolution is deemed as above and the class changes, state structure, or economic crises that precede such movements, sometimes many decades before, and show themselves within the body politic at last through the means of revolution. Furthermore, this definition covers important issues of participation. Some form of mobilization of the populace is vital when identifying revolutionary movements as successful. This is necessary to bring forth those truly fundamental changes to the society and not a simple change of the guard at the top.

As stated, virtually all authors who cover revolution find efficacy in the impacts of structural changes that often herald revolution. This even being recognized in the first generation, reiterating Lederer, “...For every great structural change there has been a revolution somewhere.” This thesis makes several important assumptions about the role of structure in revolution. In contrast again to important scholars such as Skocpol, the structural changes themselves do not constitute a revolution. Skocpol’s emphasis on “...transformations of a society’s state and class structures...” are preceding events to the

¹²² Jack A Goldstone, “TOWARD A FOURTH GENERATION OF REVOLUTIONARY THEORY,” 2001, 49.

revolutionary movement.¹²³ Instead, this thesis will argue along the same lines Parsa offers, that structure “sets the stage” for revolution to occur. Structural change ripples through society and then those changes continue to flow into the political realm as a revolution, making the new political reflect the new societal.¹²⁴ The exact nature of “structural change” shall be made clear in the presentation of said cases to follow in subsequent sections.

What must also be discussed is the state itself and when that state may become “unstable.” As with other terms, what this thesis shall consider state instability shall draw upon works of multiple authors. A state shall be considered stable when expectations can be continuously fulfilled as a capable state shifts under changing demands. When a state can no longer fulfil expectations, there exists moments of state instability. This includes the ability to adapt to expectations as they fluctuate. Again, this is no new concept. Ellwood found that flexibility is important in maintaining a stable state, including tools through which societal change is made easier, such as public discussion and public criticism.¹²⁵ Pettee found that a state begins to stumble as a ruling class becomes too isolated from its populations and forgoes adaptation to the changing society it controls.¹²⁶ This includes, as many of our earlier authors find, the degree in which a state can adapt to the needs of increasing demand for participation in governing. As new groups develop due to economic changes, they desire room for their voices to be heard, and a state who allows no room struggles inflexibly under these demands. Not so differently was Parsa’s characterization of a state’s vulnerabilities. Parsa notes the importance to which degree a state is

¹²³ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge University Press, 1979). 4.

¹²⁴ Misagh Parsa, “States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines” (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 10.

¹²⁵ Ellwood, “A Psychological Theory of Revolutions.”

¹²⁶ Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*.

interventionist in society, particularly concerning capital accumulation and control.¹²⁷ Furthermore, as a state extends itself into the international, it also becomes displaced from the population it represents and governs. With these qualities in mind, a state can be considered vulnerable when it is inflexible, “hyperactive”, and overreaching in the international. However, structural change and the state instability it causes alone are not enough to result in revolutionary change.

Leadership shall also find its definitional roots in authors already discussed. Most recently, there have been the numerous calls of bringing focus back to the importance of leadership, such as Goldstone’s calls to treat leadership as an equal player within the “...interplay of multiple actors.” With taking advice and understanding the importance of recognizing the power leadership plays within movements based on authors found in the literature review, there exists a more coherent characterization. Leaderships, as identified in this thesis, are those individuals or groups who are able to establish alternative legitimacy through directing blame for societal discontent towards the incumbent regime while crafting and wielding ideologies in which to further legitimize their oppositional role. With this more concise understanding, the focus must now be on the ideologies employed by revolutionary leaders.

This thesis utilizes the term *effective ideologies*, which generally implies those ideologies employed by leaderships to positively effect a revolution against incumbent governments.¹²⁸ However, it is important to discuss what the term implies. This thesis seeks a greater understanding of ideology than a term reducible to a single concept of

¹²⁷ Misagh Parsa, “States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines” (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

¹²⁸ This is used as a “catch all” term for this work that will serve to cover the ideological terms used by other authors i.e., story, imaginary, etc.

communism, religion, or nationalism. Indeed, the ideology this thesis aims to address is a type that could include all these concepts and much more including histories, stories, myths, and other revolutionary events. Like most of the terms discussed here, the first generation also saw importance in ideology's role in revolution. Lederer's notion of revolutionary spillover seems virtually ahead of its time in identifying the importance of how revolutionary examples elsewhere can influence other movements.¹²⁹ Particularly important from the first generation however, as already discussed at length, is Pettee's myth.¹³⁰ It is this "myth" alongside, Selbin's "story," that most greatly influence the discussion of ideology here.¹³¹ Though it could be argued that the term in reality more reflects the meaning of "imaginaries," this thesis chooses to persist with the term ideology as it more reflects the political nature of revolution. With these concerns in mind, the definition will build directly off the two authors mentioned. Ideology, as used in this thesis, is both a collection of values influenced by and appealing to the culture where it is found, and a use of story building on both historical references to revolution and a distinct vision of the future, often representing a diversity of ideals to strive for. Furthermore, the caveat of "successful" ideology will be made, understood as ideology effectively and knowingly used and constructed by leaders to legitimize their position and promote revolutionary change. It is also important to reiterate Parsa's warnings on ideology and its creation. Leaders who utilize such ideologies are aware of its usage and can choose what parts of their ideologies are made public or not.¹³² In addition, Parsa also discusses the importance

¹²⁹ LEDERER, "ON REVOLUTIONS." 9.

¹³⁰ George Sawyer Pettee, *The Process of Revolution*. 33.

¹³¹ Eric Selbin, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story*.

¹³² Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines*.

of understanding that just because a group supports a leader who adheres to a specific ideology, this does not mean that the group accepts all aspects of that ideology. Each group or individual may have motivations that in some ways align with that ideology and others not, but nevertheless identify it as the most efficient way to have their needs met.¹³³ Lastly, it is important to reiterate Goldstone's contribution here tracking what formational process ideologies follow in the overarching process of the revolution itself. Following the structural sufferings and state breakdown, ideologies take a pattern of development starting as general demands and developing to something more extreme:

In the conditions of social dislocation that precede state breakdown, ideologies are a diverse mix: folk views of rectification, largely conservative but possibly utopian elements; elite views of rectification, both conservative and transformative; and mostly, particularistic complaints of poor policies, injustice, corruption, bad ministers, and so forth. When the crisis reaches the point where the Old Regime is clearly breaking down and has lost the initiative, attempts are made to unite the opposition to the Old Regime by broad slogans that can bridge both the folk and the elite views of the problem and various particularistic complaints.¹³⁴

It is with this understanding of what ideology is, who wields it, and how it develops that this thesis analyzes the role of ideology within the two case studies to follow. Highlighting the often specific to general calls for change and revolution that so characterize ideology's position within revolutionary movements.

As the sketch at the beginning of this chapter highlights, these terms do not stand alone. The relationship between them and their interactions form the basis of the theory presented here. Drastic structural changes do not occur in a vacuum, nor does a state exist in an invariable society. Without structural change affecting what can often be surprisingly

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Jack A. Goldstone, "Ideology, Cultural Frameworks, and the Process of Revolution," *Theory and Society*. 423-424.

stable states despite autocratic tendencies, leadership nor ideology makes any difference against a stably anchored and economically secure state.

Chapter 5: Introduction to Cases and Iran

Abstract: This chapter covers the methodology used in the thesis, comparative historical analysis, and defends the choice of said methodology while also highlighted its limitations. Importantly, this chapter discusses the issues with comparison in general and makes an argument for the cases selected. This chapter also introduces the case studies and begins and concludes the case study of Iran. Within the case study of Iran are sections on: an overview of the revolution; structural change; state instability; leaderships, ideologies, and participants; and the results of the revolution including consolidation and its justifications.

Methodology:

This thesis fully employs the methods observed in Skocpol's work on revolutions, a comparative historical analysis.¹³⁵ There is much to be gained, and little lost, in the utilization of this methodology in the comparison and theorization of revolutions. Further, this approach allows observers to see revolution for what it truly is, an inherently complex historical build up to a fast moving, chaotic, and mystifying event. Indeed, participants in such events deserve the full attention of scholars and observers of their cases instead of a reduction to mere analytical playthings within massive datasets. Indeed, this approach allows due consideration to be given to lengthy historical buildups found within complex and interwoven webs of cultures, structural hardships, enticing ideologies, fervent leaderships, and more. Further, the greater the context provided gives due respect to what actors faced within these monumental shifts of society and politics, and such detail is afforded in perhaps no better approach than the comparative historical method.

¹³⁵ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*.

This is a point that should be reiterated as well, that revolutions are inherently human. They come from human suffering and agony. They are shaped by the humans who experience them and what those same individuals had experienced before in their lives. Though this thesis makes the argument that structural change paves way for revolution, each individual has a different response to *how much* suffering from such changes can be withstood. This is something also understood by Abram's plea to see revolution as, "...the bloodied, broke corpus of the body politic in conflict with itself."¹³⁶ One cannot provide the contextualization needed for framing revolution as it deserves without this approach. Further, the call for examining the role of, "...identity and ideology, gender, networks and leadership..." is made easier in this type of analysis, as it can be easily explained through the historical narrative how the interplay of each of these unfolds.¹³⁷

In addition to these considerations, it is also important to highlight that a comparative historical analysis, while on the surface, appears similar to those approaches utilized by the earliest practitioners of revolution theory but is indeed not. Authors of the first generation provided long descriptions of revolutionary processes and then described what within certain revolutionary movements fit within their prescriptive process.¹³⁸ Skocpol recognized this difference highlighting that, "...the natural historians also offered...some theoretical hypotheses about the causes of revolution...[however] little attempt was made to use comparisons of historical cases to validate them."¹³⁹ The key difference here, as Skocpol continues, is that comparative historical analysis, "...uses

¹³⁶ B. Abrams, "A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory is Yet to Come."

¹³⁷ J. Goldstone, "Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory."

¹³⁸ See Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*.

¹³⁹ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. 38.

comparisons among positive cases, and between positive and negative cases, to identify and validate causes, rather than descriptions, of revolutions.”¹⁴⁰ Moreover, a historical comparative analysis has the ability to reach across time, space, and even the differing outcomes of revolutionary movements for explanation, something that is also important when considering what cases are chosen for comparison.¹⁴¹ However, it is not comparison alone that makes a case for what does or does not cause a revolution. Skocpol emphasizes that:

...comparative historical analysis is no substitute for theory...it can be applied only with the indispensable aid of theoretical concepts and hypotheses. For the comparative method alone cannot define the phenomenon to be studied. It cannot select appropriate units of analysis or say which historical cases should be studied. Nor can it provide the causal hypotheses to be explored. All of these must come from the macro-sociological imagination, informed by the theoretical debates of the day, and sensitive to the patterns of evidence for sets of historical cases.¹⁴²

This fact is highly important to recognize, that the similarity between historical descriptions is not theory. Theory must stand alone and clear before preceding into comparative historical analysis. However, when done properly, this analysis, “...serves as an ideal strategy for mediating between theory and history.”¹⁴³ In addition, when a theory is robust enough to stand up through the test of such an approach, it could be considered what Abrams found to be missing from scholarship now, “...decidedly revolutionary theorising...”¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ B. Abrams, “A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory is Yet to Come.”

Issues of Comparison:

Perhaps the most glaring issue with comparison is the matter of which cases are chosen. The inherent issue with case studies is that major patterns can be willfully brought forth through which cases are chosen. Perhaps there is a general lack of movement within the theory of revolution due to the use of comparative studies to create generalizable philosophy. This is not intrinsically linked to comparison; however, Beck has summed up the outcomes of utilizing comparison within revolution studies,

At one extreme, it can lend itself to completely portable knowledge through the examination of many cases that are exhaustive of the phenomenon's universe, as in the parallel demonstration of theory. At the other extreme, it can be most conducive to the development of entirely grounded knowledge, where the temporal and spatial boundaries of comparison are paramount, as in the contrast of contexts. In between these two ends lies knowledge of the sort that macro-causal analysis generates, where the conclusions have implications for other cases but are, in the first place, bounded by type or history.¹⁴⁵

This offers another view to why there has been a stall in revolution theory development. Perhaps it is not just the debt owed to such theorists as Skocpol and others, but also which method is utilized to create theory. Beck has gone as far to say that, "...network structure of how cases are compared constrains or enables the development of a field's theoretical sensibilities."¹⁴⁶ The logic of this argument is easy to follow. Beck finds that the inductive method makes certain types of knowledge more likely to collect in its practice.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, Beck comes to several persistently important conclusions about how the field has developed based on its consistent use of comparison as an analytical tool. Beck finds that as revolution is studied, it often is a specific type of revolution and, "...this is driven

¹⁴⁵ Beck, "The Structure of Comparison in the Study of Revolution." 155.

¹⁴⁶ Beck.

¹⁴⁷ Beck.

primarily by geography and era.”¹⁴⁸ This has been quite evidenced within this work already, accounting for the selection of cases by authors reviewed there are patterns emerging, whether that be a focus upon the “third world,” “great revolutions,” or a period of revolutions such as the Arab Spring each covering a specific point in time or geographical locale. Another issue with comparison is the unremovable human factor. Beck calls comparison “highly homophilous,” meaning that there is an inherent nature within comparative study to bring in things that are seemingly similar. This is a pitfall as well, leaving out many cases not to be featured as popularly in revolutionary studies. This forms patterns of selections within the subfield of study.¹⁴⁹ For example, Beck identified that the Nicaraguan revolution was featured more heavily within comparative studies on revolution more than the Iranian revolution, despite occurring in the same year, suggesting that perhaps scholars found more relevance or interest with a “socialist revolution” than a “religious” one.

Patterns of selection within the discipline are made even worse by the rise of further splinter disciplines regarding revolution studies. Similar to what has been covered on the birth of contentious politics and others, Beck also highlights that as authors attempt to carve out a specific contribution to revolutionary studies, they only make the pattern of selection graver. An example of this is conversations revolving around the origins of the Arab Spring group of movements. As each author endeavors to create unique contributions, their fledgling theories are often tied to a set of cases and not applied to others across temporal or geographical lines, creating an inherent lack of transferability. More than a desire for

¹⁴⁸ Beck.

¹⁴⁹ See Beck for greater detail.

unique theory, Beck also questioned to what extent causes of revolution can in fact be generalizable,

The data suggest that the social science of revolution overall has not been, and still is not, well positioned to judge between competing causal imageries. Comparative studies tend to focus on a relatively small number of cases and comparisons that fit a particular image of revolution. Most cases considered revolutionary by scholars are studied only once, and most comparisons between cases have been drawn only once. A case's popularity is determined by only a few characteristics, and the prevalence of certain types of cases in the literature is not merely a reflection of what revolutionary events have occurred. The possible universe of revolution is much more diverse than what has been studied.¹⁵⁰

Upon review of the literature, this pattern referenced here becomes obvious as novel comparisons are rarely drawn between cases, or at least a revisiting of comparisons already made is very rare. It is also true that as each author seeks the "original contribution," discussion over what constitutes revolutions continues to be a focus. These issues culminate in a field that is more characterized by choice of comparisons rather than a growth of revolutionary theorizing. With this plethora of issues in mind, the method remains the same. However, a correction is attempted not only by utilizing existing theory grafted from different cases but applying that preexisting theory to a unique case comparison to solve some of the problems plaguing comparative studies.

Case Selection:

The discussion above highly informs the choices for comparison made within this thesis. Abrams summarizes the critique of comparison so far as, "A crushing absence of difference-driven inquiry in the past decades... has also left plenty of room for novel

¹⁵⁰ Beck. 154.

comparisons stretching across time, space, and culture, through which new insights might be achieved.”¹⁵¹ This thesis aims to reach across those boundaries with its choice of cases.

The Cuban and Iranian revolutions have little in common on the surface. Each revolutionary movement takes place in a different part of the world and in a different era. Though authors have studied each revolution under the context of “third world” movements, this is not a useful categorization. As previously discussed, a revolution taking place in the “third world” was not so different from the historical settings those “great revolutions” found themselves in, with little modernization and highly concentrated power. It is argued that there are often greater international influences within the third world revolutions, such as those of colonialism or dependent economies, this again is not so different from the earlier classic examples.¹⁵² Just as monarchies were isolated from the societies they controlled, so too are colonial dictatorships, often relying on an export economy and the international realm for support.

The combination of the two do indeed provide a novel approach. Beck details that in previous studies between 1970 and 2009, the Cuban revolution was highly compared with Nicaraguan (20 times), Vietnamese (9 times), and the Bolivian (9 times).¹⁵³ Iran was matched, in the same time period, with Nicaragua 13 times.¹⁵⁴ Comparison between Iran and Cuba is novel due not only to these popularity rankings for which cases are chosen for comparison, but also for the lack of literature being found discussing the relationship between the two. The greatest comparisons were made between the following pairs: Nicaragua and Cuba (20 times), Russia and France (18 times), Nicaragua and El Salvador

¹⁵¹ B. Abrams, “A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory is Yet to Come.”

¹⁵² See J. Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*.

¹⁵³ Beck. 145.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

(17 times), and Nicaragua and Iran (13 times).¹⁵⁵ Again, the pattern arising here is an obvious one. For the pairs Nicaragua/Cuba and Nicaragua/El Salvador, there exists the geographical, linguistic, and perhaps cultural similarity. Russia and France have long been characterized as examples of “great revolutions” in their manifestations. The last pair, Iran and Nicaragua, occurred in the same year, 1979. As evidenced, new comparisons stretching across such boundaries are quite uncommon, a dilemma this thesis aims to modify.

Introduction to Case Studies:

Having discussed method, problematic matters with comparative processes, and the selection of cases in the previous chapter, what follows will be the explanation and analysis of the cases selected. Each revolutionary case will be presented in an overview covering the earliest structural changes considered relevant, following the beginning, end, and outcome of the revolution. Within each of these presentations there will be special attention given to structural change, condition of the state, alternative leaderships in opposition to the incumbent regime, and the ideologies wielded by those identified leaderships, or minimally, ideologies present throughout the movement. The analyses to follow each revolution overview will devote extra attention to issues of structural change prior to each movement and to which extent this change affected the state’s stability. Other analyses will focus upon each alternative leadership within each movement also covering the different ideologies deployed by each of the alternative leaderships. Furthermore, this analysis will cover the way in which each of the specific theoretical terms and predications laid out earlier come to fruition within each case, documenting closely the relationship between

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

structural change, state instability, leaderships who take advantage of such instability, and the ideologies utilized to facilitate such action against the state. The analysis will also be used as a “deep dive” into each of the extremely rich ideologies, highlighting the substantiality of each ideology’s effect on the population in which it is utilized. This chapter will be followed by a conclusion and summation of findings throughout each case exploration.

Iran

Iran: Overview

The Iranian Revolution took place between 1978 and 1979. In these years, the Iranian people saw a terribly harsh authoritarian regime replaced by an equally, if not more, severe theocratic government. In the era of Jimmy Carter’s call for peace and human rights, the absolutist Shah ruling Iran, Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, was at the head of a state destined for a dramatic revolution. His great adversary in this radical narrative was the Imam Khomeini. The religious zealot was perfectly positioned to usurp power in the coalescing of a great many factors that directed Iranian society towards such a combustible moment. However, to fully understand how this would occur and how the Imam would run the monarch out of Iran, it is important to examine the series of events that put the Shah into power.

The same U.S. American influence which ultimately hastened the fall of the Shah also was the perpetrator of his initial instillation into power. The Shah would replace Mohammed Mossadegh, the first democratically elected leader in Iran. After Mossadegh nationalized Iranian oil to bring control to the people, British investments evaporated. In a

move that circumvented executive approval, the special interests in Britain retaining oil revenues utilized covert U.S. action which quickly brought the toppling of the Mossadegh government. A little-known decedent of a U.S. American dynasty, Kermit Roosevelt helped overthrow the fledgling democracy with little more than a suitcase of cash. Though the subject deserves a project of its own, the moment was a great indicator of how western interests would be engaged in the Middle East region.

The Shah wasted little time once handed the reins of power in full. Supposedly taking notes from the growing military industrial complex in the U.S, the newly enthroned ally began building a great modern military to solidify his new rule. In addition, this new era saw the formation of a modern and savage intelligence organization, SAVAK. Though the U.S. had close ties to Israel in the region, Iran became the new strongman proxy of U.S. policy in the Middle East. With this close relationship came the flow of U.S. aid, much directed at the growth of the new military apparatus. The budget of the military increased from \$42 million in 1953 to \$187 million in 1962 and added more than 80,000 men to the standing force.¹⁵⁶

The Shah's policy changes did not stop with that of the military. The ruler soon had a movement of his own underway, the White Revolution. This consisted of the wide-ranging reforms implemented by the Shah's ambitious new government to modernize Iran. This comprised most substantially of a massive land reform. The aim of these reforms was targeted at the disparities in land distribution, the privatization of state factories, the creation of profit sharing for workers, and increasing literacy in the countryside.¹⁵⁷ This

¹⁵⁶ Heather Lehr Wagner, *Iranian Revolution: Iranian Revolution*, (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2010). 41.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

modernization mission was followed up by massive public works projects. Supporting these grand projects of roads, dams, railways, airports, and hospitals were the massive new oil revenues flowing in. Desperately thirsty foreign powers were filling the newly absolutist monarch's coffers at an astronomical rate. The gross national product jumped from \$3 billion to \$53 billion.¹⁵⁸

This intensive modernization push and dramatic structural adjustment created waves of social and demographic change that rippled throughout Iranian society. The urban working class grew at a rapid rate. This class also represented a tremendous growth in modern business industries. Workers in transportation, oil, service, and urban construction accounted for only five percent of the workforce in 1953 and grew to 16 percent by 1977.¹⁵⁹ With the increasing modernization of the workforce, there also came a growth in education. In 1953 there were about 14,500 students in university and by 1977 there were 154,315.¹⁶⁰ However, these seemingly harmless and beneficial changes came at great costs as the shock of modernization and development spread rapidly and unevenly throughout the state.

One of the consequences of these ambitious changes was the dramatic widening of the gap between rich and poor. By the mid-1970s, about ten percent of the population accounted for 40 percent of the income, and the urban poor were having to pay upwards of 70 percent of their income on housing.¹⁶¹ No matter what good intentions came with the push to modernize his country, the Shah was soon to face problems for the unevenness of his projects. These structural tensions were aggravated by the way modernization pushes

¹⁵⁸ Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," MERIP Reports. (1980): 22.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Halliday, "THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION," Journal of International Affairs (1982): 194.

were implemented and that the, "...capitalist method of modernization invariably benefits the rich more than the rest of society."¹⁶²

The sheer speed of these developments throughout Iranian society affected the political systems that were in place. As industrialization shook the state, civil society found none of the fertilizer usually deposited by a modernized society in which to develop. The Shah continued his absolutist rule, blocking any opposing voices whilst growing no base of support for his own political legitimacy. Indeed, the Shah continued to elevate his rulership to such a level of aloofness towards a society that was seen more and more as a culture containing, "...corruption, inefficiency, a sense of injustice, and a feeling of moral outrage."¹⁶³ As a new middle class was reaching maturity, so was its desire to have a political voice. However, there was no change from the ruler, and he worked to prevent new social forces from participating within the political system, only stoking the fire of resentment burning within these new social groups.¹⁶⁴ Only to make matters worse was the Shah's fervent use of his secret police and intelligence agency. SAVAK censored media throughout the country, continuously intimidated political opposition, and maintained control over government unions and the entirety of the civil service.¹⁶⁵ And as Iran's relationship grew with the U.S. before the human rights oriented Carter came to power, Amnesty International issued a report in 1975 stating, "No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran...The Shah of Iran retains his benevolent image despite

¹⁶² Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution." 23.

¹⁶³ Bayat, "Revolution without Movement, Movement without Revolution," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (1998): 143.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 77.

the highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts, and a history of torture which is beyond belief.”¹⁶⁶

In the shadows of this repression, uneven modernization, and desires from new classes to be heard, lurked a group ready to pounce if and when weakness appeared. The clergy of Iran had faced much less oppression than other groups had and represented the one outlet through which legitimate discontent could flow. Indeed, the clergy had issue with the Shah sooner perhaps than other groups and were happy to welcome flocks of discontented Iranians into their growing congregations. While the Shah was diligent in his repression of new social groups and in stamping out any potential leaders of the new classes, such as the middle class and urban workers, the clergy had a strong organization that was eager to coopt the desires and anger middle class Iranians had directed towards the Shah. They fell easily into the arms of Khomeini as he began to politicize Iranian national and cultural identities. The clergy mobilized forces ripe for a movement under banners of, “...nationalism, democracy, socialism, Islamic fundamentalism, radicalism, and liberalism...”¹⁶⁷ Society was ripped apart and ready to move. All groups, who had one problem or another with the Shah, such as students, merchants, artisans, intellectuals, workers, and urban poor, came together for the. “...desire for political enfranchisement and for inclusion in the political system.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Amnesty International Report 1975 found in Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*, 77.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran* (Oxford University Press, 1988), 108.

Analysis of Structural Change

Though the main goal of this thesis is to show that structural change alone cannot lead to a full-fledged revolutionary movement, the contextualization of such fundamental shifts is of the utmost importance to understanding what indeed produces revolutionary movements. Though shown in the brief overview above, the structural changes generated grand shifts and major demographic fluctuations within Iranian society. However, more context as to where these changes originated and the effects that truly were felt by the populace is vital to understanding the Iranian revolution as a whole. A more thorough context also provides a superior understanding of what shifts in the day-to-day life, caused by these structural changes, were actually felt by the Iranian people in times leading up to the movement. This section will highlight the economic growth and the changes associated with development leading up to the movement; the White Revolution, which was aimed at land reform and agricultural restructurings and ultimately produced the economic shifts; and particularly the “unevenness” of these changes and other consequences suffered by Iranian population.

The White Revolution

There is perhaps no time throughout the Shah’s reign where the degree of his authoritarianism was felt more than in his “White Revolution.” The White Revolution was the implementation of the Shah’s exacting vision of what the modern Iran was to be. However heavy handed and undemocratic these reforms were to be, the fraudulent referendum which reportedly showed the willingness of the population for change was greeted warmly by the Kennedy administration in 1963:

Congratulations on your victory in the historic referendum on Saturday. Vice President Johnson, following his visit to Iran last August, told me of the warm

reception accorded him by your people and their determination to advance and modernize on a broad front. It is therefore all the more gratifying to learn that a vast majority has supported your leadership in a clear and open expression of their will. This demonstration of support should renew your confidence in the rightness of your course and strengthen your resolve to lead Iran to further achievements in the struggle to better the lot of your people.¹⁶⁹

It is perhaps no better omen for the following reforms instituted by this White Revolution than to have the praise of one of the world's foremost democracies. Indeed, the Shah was so pleased that there followed a message back to Kennedy within two days:

Many thanks for your kind congratulations. The result of the referendum does indeed reflect the wholehearted approval of my fundamental reforms by the well-nigh unanimous vote of the people of Iran. It has increased the faith I have always had in their power of discrimination and their support of my determination to raise their standard of life.

Although we pride ourselves in our glorious past history, we are especially looking to the future trying to march abreast of the most free and happy progressive nations of the world. I know that in the implementation of our social and economic development we can count on the sympathy of our American friends...¹⁷⁰

It was not only the international stage on which the Shah perpetuated the democratizing, equalizing effects of his sweeping reform programs. The Shah wholly sold his vision as such a harmonizing force within Iran, stating that, "...Iran needed a fundamental revolution that could, at the same time, put an end to all social inequalities and all the factors that caused injustice, tyranny and exploitation, and all aspects of reaction which impeded progress and kept our society backward."¹⁷¹ This effort to balance Iranian society whilst reducing inequalities could also be seen in the 12 points the Shah chose to address within the White Revolution. These 12 points were, "Land reform, Nationalization of forests and

¹⁶⁹ Exchanges of messages with the Shah of Iran. The American Presidency Project. (1963 February 13).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972). 140.

pastures, Public sale of state-owned factories to finance land reform, Profit-sharing in industry, Reform of electoral law to include women, Literacy Corps, Health Corps, Reconstruction and Development Corps, Rural courts of justice, Nationalization of the waterways, National reconstruction, Education and administrative revolution.”¹⁷² It was quite clear the framing the Shah was hoping to achieve within his White Revolution. The countryside had been quiet for far too long as the rest of the world saw Red Revolutionary movements taking hold. The Shah concluded this to be the only way to achieve both the quick yet harsh development that needed to take place for his desired economic reform and the safeguarding against a peasant-based movement within his White Revolution. This was clearly evidenced by the emphasis placed on land reform. For the Shah to continue to feel secure in his rule, the monarchy was required to reach into the countryside and take hold of the rural power that had been so quietly at rest. While there had been no direct threatened peasant movements against the Shah, this move to place the countryside securely in the sights of the reforms was necessary to transform the pastoral land economically and to fully bring about the changes the Shah and his advisers so greatly desired.¹⁷³

These desires, no matter how richly clothed in the comforting language of development to bring about growth, came at a cost most greatly paid by those of the countryside, with little return for their sufferings. It is important that the target the Shah sought out was the wealthy landowners, but as we will begin to see here, the benefits of these reforms did not trickle down to those peasants that indeed needed relief. There was great power in the hands of landowners. The property status before the land reform was

¹⁷² Ibid. 141.

¹⁷³ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979). 108-109.

that large landowners held some 56 percent of land with just 37 families holding some 19,000 villages while only five percent of peasants actually owned the land they tilled.¹⁷⁴ The disparities did not need embellishment of any kind. The land reform took place in several phases. The first, which came with much advice from the United States, revolved around four main points: large landowners were limited mainly to one village or six *dangs*; landowners were to be compensated by the state over ten years and the peasants who received land were expected to repay over 15 years plus ten percent with those defaulting for three consecutive years to be dispossessed; land was to be distributed to those who already worked land, with preference going to those who were providing more than just labor, along with a mandate that those who received joined a cooperative; villages that were not redistributed were commanded to end arbitrary dismissal of peasants by the landlords who retained the land along with a small wage raise for sharecroppers.¹⁷⁵ While more reform phases followed and more rules and modifications were implemented, what is more important than the examination of the convoluted language and implementation is the outcome of these reforms.

There was indeed land distributed under these reforms, however, it was not an equal nor was it an effective distribution. There were 910,000 families who received land under the reforms, however much of this land allotted to these families was much too small to serve as viable plots for farming. Sixty-eight percent of the land handed out was under five hectares with the minimal for an effective plot being seven hectares outside the north.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, peasants were just incapable of meeting the demands placed upon them by

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. 106.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. 110.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. 112-113.

the repayment plans.¹⁷⁷ Much more than just not having enough land to be profitable, this whole class of people was forced into a new system for which they were woefully unprepared to participate in. Moreover, those who were able to receive land in the first phase were not always allowed to maintain this ownership. Later legislation as part of the reform efforts to mechanize and modernize farming techniques in the countryside resulted in the creation of farm corporations with a minimum size of at least 20 hectares which required the consent of only 51 percent of the landholders who then received shares in the corporations but lost control of their lands.¹⁷⁸ It seems by the end of these “equalizing” reforms there was indeed less power in the hands of the large landowners, however, it was not in the hands of the newly empowered peasantry but firmly in the grip of the Shah. The state it seems even became exhausted by the effort to keep up the charade of revolutionary balancing the reforms were supposed to undertake, instead, it began making remarks such as, “Iran’s small and relatively unproductive farmers are an extravagance that the country can no longer afford.”¹⁷⁹ However, if one were to define the success of the reforms by the Shah’s goals, it would appear that he obtained exactly what he desired. While land reform was occurring in the countryside, the country as a whole experienced grand structural shifts as well, some due to the reforms and others less related.

Economic Shifts

The economic growth in the lead up to the Revolution was particularly dramatic. The way in which the Shah and his government wielded the massive sums of oil profits and grand industrialization projects sent shocks through not just the Iranian economy but

¹⁷⁷ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 146.

¹⁷⁸ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 113.

¹⁷⁹ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 114.

permeated throughout the rest of Iranian society as well. Economic growth, still widely considered to be one of the best indicators for a “healthy society,” often has unintended consequences. Of these consequences, which are many, the main focus for this work will be on their uneven nature.

Firstly, it is important to recognize the economy of Iran was indeed growing, and it was growing rapidly. By 1970, Iran had one of the highest economic growth rates and it was only second in the world to Japan.¹⁸⁰ The nature of work began to change quite radically as new industries developed. Shifts from rural work to urban were dramatic. “Large factories” which employed over 500 workers, grew from 19 in 1953 to 159 in 1977.¹⁸¹ However, the growth of small factories, 10-49 workers, was also substantial, from less than 1,000 in 1953 to more than 7,000 in 1977.¹⁸² A substantial growth of industrial production reaffirms the dramatic economic development. In 1953, Iran produced 5,000 tons in iron ore and 53,000 tons in cement, in 1977 that production was up to 930,000 tons in iron ore and 4.3 million tons in cement.¹⁸³ Fueling this dramatic shift was oil revenues. In just under a decade, Iranian oil revenue increased from \$90 million in 1955 to \$482 million in 1964.¹⁸⁴ The shift was away from the heavier reliance on agriculture in Iranian society in a move to greater sources of revenue in other sectors. This is reflected in the percent of change in the gross national product. The percentage of the GNP that agriculture made up in 1962 and 1963 was 27.4 percent, while in 1977 and 1978 it fell sharply to only

¹⁸⁰ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 151.

¹⁸¹ Abrahamian, “Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution.” 22.

¹⁸² Abrahamian.

¹⁸³ Abrahamian.

¹⁸⁴ Heather Lehr Wagner, *Iranian Revolution: Iranian Revolution*, (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2010). 41.

a mere 9.2 percent of GNP.¹⁸⁵ Taking its place were oil revenues, which shifted from 12.3 percent of GNP in 1962 and 1963 to 34.7 percent in 1977 and 1978, a rapid change and replacement of what the agricultural sector had been responsible for.¹⁸⁶ The work force also reflected this change quite clearly. In 1962-63, 55.1 percent of the workforce was concentrated on agriculture which dropped subsequently in 1977-78 to 32.2 percent as increases were seen in the oil, service, and industry sectors of the economy.¹⁸⁷ These changes were certainly drastic with consequences being not only the positive increases in economic terms, but also societal changes permeating across Iran. As part of the White Revolution, the Shah implemented the Literacy and Health Corps, highly praised internationally. Literacy rates increased and demands for greater access to healthcare programs were heard in the countryside.¹⁸⁸ Amongst the social changes were changes in school enrollment with kindergarten registration increasing from 13,000 to 221,990, elementary schools from 1.6 million to over 4 million, secondary schools from 370,000 to 741,000, vocational schools 14,240 to 227,000, and college from 24,885 to 145,210 in Iran and colleges abroad from 18,000 to 80,000.¹⁸⁹ The Literacy Corps, which happened to be modeled on the Cuban version, helped increase literacy rates from 26 to 42 percent, and the Health Corps increased the number of doctors from 4,000 to 12,750, clinics from 700 to 2,800, and hospital beds from 24,100 to 48,000.¹⁹⁰ However, as stated earlier, there existed unevenness in this development and not all felt the changes positively.

¹⁸⁵ Homa Katouzian, *The political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism, 1926-1979*. (London: The MacMillan Press LTD, 1981). 257.

¹⁸⁶ Katouzian.

¹⁸⁷ Katouzian. 259.

¹⁸⁸ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 154.

¹⁸⁹ E. Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran: Revised and Updated*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). 137

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

Unevenness and the Results of Development

As expressed above, no matter how democratizing the framing of the White Revolution might have appeared nor how positive economic and social indicators may have seemed, there was genuine suffering in the shifting decade before the Iranian Revolution. Whether it came from those who lost land, were given land and had it taken away, those who were forced into the cities with little in their pockets, or those unreached by economic development, many of the Iranian people felt great growing pains at the forced development the Shah instituted. Indeed, these supposedly well-intentioned reforms did not only leave some behind, but directly subjected others to direct sufferings. Moreover, there came new groups, who upon their births, were forced into a society woefully unprepared for their coming of age and had virtually zero room for new desires to be heard. One of these groups, in addition to those displaced in the countryside who fled to the cities, was the newly created middle class.

Before the full examination of this new class and its sufferings, it is important to discuss the results of the Shah's grand White Revolution. Though, as stated, there were shifts. There were also significant signs of economic growth and land redistribution, though most of that new wealth and redistributed land ended up in the hands of the Shah. Then what, examining the results of the shifts, was indeed the purpose, if not that faux cover of egalitarian development? Bill and Halliday, who were completing their works before the revolution or amid an incomplete revolutionary movement, offered answers to these questions more than the obvious post facto ideas of pure economic gain on part of the Shah. Bill found that, "The White revolution is viewed in terms of an obvious attempt to turn the peasants against the professional middle class and in the long run to preserve the traditional

web-system [patronage system].”¹⁹¹ In addition to the economic gains of the state in the reforms, one could easily argue that the Shah hoped to turn the countryside into a capitalist landscape. Indeed, this is what Halliday has argued was the result of the White Revolution: “In general, one can say that the Iranian countryside is now a capitalist one.”¹⁹² The poor results of the development as whole, while the policies chiefly praised on the international stage, were acknowledged. The International Labor Organization summed up the reforms:

It is widely acknowledged that the recent poor performance of the Iranian agriculture, relative to the other major sectors of the economy, has become one of the major constraints on the overall economic and social development of the country... This relative failure in the expansion of the agricultural output is not only reflected in the recent rise in the food stuff component of the consumer price index and the rapid increase in the imports of agricultural commodities but also in the observed influx of rural-urban migrants into the major population centers of the nation.¹⁹³

Therefore, if the goal of the Shah was to create a fully egalitarian society from his White Revolution, this was indeed a failed policy objective. However, if his intentions were to separate the landed aristocracy from their power sources, obtain much of the land that had been promised to the peasants, and create a society where all power flowed from the thrown outwards, the Shah was indeed initially successful.

Amongst the wealth that poured into the coffers of the state, the already inegalitarian society saw greater forces pressed upon it, creating wider disparities and greater awareness of how irregular the development of Iran was. These reforms were wholly built on the backs of an already poor peasantry, who then also faced the false promise of receiving land. These reforms, “...tipped the already uneven scale further to the

¹⁹¹ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 152.

¹⁹² Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 118.

¹⁹³ Kaneda, H. “Employment and Income Policies for Iran: Mission Working Paper NO. III: Agriculture,” (Geneva: ILO, 1973): 2.

advantage of the landlord and thereby added social tension to rural Iran.”¹⁹⁴ Halliday has argued that the main feature of these reforms, “...was that they were unequal reforms, which concentrated on encouraging a rich farming class.”¹⁹⁵ The ILO report cited above also documented quite coherently the imbalance that the reforms encouraged. In addition to citing the mass exodus from the countryside into the cities by the displaced peasants, the ILO describes the consequences of the reforms:

The direct consequence of this development orientation in the face of the rapidly rising labor force have been the continuing vicious circle in the rural areas of the country, the increasing food deficits, and the annual influx of rural-urban migrants into the major urban/industrial centers. There is now an increasing awareness, however, in the Iranian official circles that these conditions cannot be solved solely in the urban-industrial-service sectors and that the national development objectives cannot be achieved without directly involving the mass of rural population in the plans to come.¹⁹⁶

Perhaps, in addition to these direct land reforms, other reforms only highlighted the already staggering disparities between differing populations in Iran. While there are several instances to cite, the best is that of the Health and Literacy Corps. As Iranians, especially those in the countryside, became more literate, there was only a greater demand of further education and push for the rights to attend secondary and vocational schools, putting more demands on a system that, while presented as improving, was incapable of keeping up.¹⁹⁷ This held true for the Health Corps as well, as, “...the very people who were intended to benefit from such a reform are beginning to make increasing demands.”¹⁹⁸ Though the inconsistency of reform of the countryside is quite obvious, the cities in Iran, being faced

¹⁹⁴ Banani, Amin quoted in Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 144.

¹⁹⁵ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 135.

¹⁹⁶ Kaneda, H. “Employment and Income Policies for Iran: Mission Working Paper NO. III: Agriculture.” 46.

¹⁹⁷ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 154.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

with a mass influx of landless peasants, also saw growing disparities. Those who did make it into the cities found urban development far off track and unable to keep up with the shifting demands with Tehran having no proper sewage or public transportation systems and 42 percent having inadequate housing.¹⁹⁹ Tehran was also a hotspot for newly displaced peoples seeking employment, as the concentration of the industrial sector in Iran reached almost fifty percent of all industrial works in the country.²⁰⁰ An unpublished report documenting inequality levels in Iran between 1959 and 1960 entirely summed up the results of the developments of the Shah, stating that at that time Iranian society would have been one of the most inegalitarian societies.²⁰¹

Diagnosis of State Instability

As discussed, a state could be considered instable if it falls under the categories of inflexible, hyperactive, and overextended. The Shah's government preceding the Revolution in Iran perfectly fit these categories. The state was staunchly inflexible to the changing and discontented society beneath it, despite being the source of that change and discontent. The monarchy was highly hyperactive within economic and social development, capital accumulation, and expenditure of that capital without input of the populace.²⁰²

Taking the basic structure of the Shah's government alone, a monarchy, is sufficient to diagnose the state as inflexible to changing concerns of the people in which it governs.

¹⁹⁹ Abrahamian. "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution." 23.

²⁰⁰ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 176.

²⁰¹ Abrahamian. "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution." 23.

²⁰² This is based on the facts that the Shah implemented vast development strategies resulting in the displacement of people, that the Shah's government controlled the country's natural resources and their production, and the Shah was responsible for how the profits from these commodities were spent.

The monarchy was in no facet equipped to deal with the amount of, firstly, discontentedness that increasingly sought an outlet for expression, and secondly offered little opportunity for new forming groups to participate. Two of these groups were the new middle class and the growing working class in Iran. There is great irony in the fact that these classes were both created by the Shah and repressed by the Shah. This can be clearly seen as the Iranian state encouraged a class consciousness in the working peasants that were to become a new proletariat. Bill reported that, “The government published articles and stories that stressed landlord atrocities and pictures commonly appeared showing the landlord whipping and torturing the peasant. This campaign gradually alerted the peasant to the possibilities that are his and he has come to expect a new life via land reform and literacy.”²⁰³ Noting that Bill was writing in times before the revolution, his analysis is particularly prescient as he continues his description of a growing working and middle class in Iran:

One of the deepest unintended consequences of the White Revolution is the accelerating growth of the professional middle class. Yet this is the same class that threatens the ongoing patterns. And it is the same class that is needed to control and guide explosive reform program. Thus, the dilemma that faces the Iranian political elite inheres in the very reform program that they dramatically chose to reinforce the traditional system. First, the elite requires the participation and commitment of the very class which threatens them, in order that reforms be implemented and controlled. Second, many of those peasants who benefit from the reforms will move into the already expanding professional middle class and here they will join in a new level of criticism and demand. The forces of time reveal the inevitability of the ascendance of the professional middle class in the political systems.²⁰⁴

The unfortunate irony seen in Bill’s analysis of the class changes is that there was no room for any dissenting voices, nor for any new voices at all in decisions of government. As new

²⁰³ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 153.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 155.

middle and urban working classes developed, they found no available paths to participation within the regime. Despite their increasing economic powers and real concerns over issues facing Iranian society for the first time, such as industrialization and wide urbanization, they were allowed no seat at the table. Indeed, as these classes grew, the Shah's hold on the reins of power only tightened. The uninhibited use of SAVAK as a weapon to silence any opposition only worsened the Shah's intransigence. Instead of heeding the calls for societal change from leftist groups, communists, and rulers from the old democratic regime, these individuals were hunted down and confined to prisons, or worse. There was virtually no room for open criticism of the state nor of the decisions made by the Shah's regime. There existed no public discussion or public criticism within Iran's public or civil societies. As the changing society squirmed beneath the pressure of the state whilst suffering the continuous pangs of modernization and uneven development, there was no outlet through which discontent and agony could be expressed.

In addition to the regime's innate inflexibility, it can easily be classified, following Parsa, as hyperactive. The state was heavily involved in capital accumulation, specifically the control of the oil revenues which brought the Shah such decadence and a grand army. However, the best example of the regime's hyperactivity is how invasive the White Revolution truly was. Not only was the land reform a substantial example of mass government expenditure, it also deliberately replaced the landlord in the longstanding landlord/tenant relationship with the direct intentions of weakening the landed aristocracy who represented a continuous threat to the monarchy.²⁰⁵ The Shah intentionally made himself the greatest power in even the farthest-reaching corners of his state. Halliday

²⁰⁵ Bill. James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 145, 147, 153.

continues this analysis observing how the Shah had forcefully inserted himself across the countryside:

...the state has intervened in the village, and is now in three ways the dominant power there. First of all, like all states, it has guaranteed and where necessary created private property in land. In the tribal areas especially, the state has created private property which did not previously exist in a developed form. Secondly, because of the retarded character of the countryside, the state has redistributed land through the reforms; most of the distribution took place peacefully, but where, as in Fars in late 1963, the landlords put up resistance, the gendarmerie and the army intervened to enforce the government's will. Then, in the middle and late 1960s, it became obvious that mere distribution of land to richer peasants and the creation of credit cooperatives was not enough, and the state therefore intervened at a third level, the point of production itself, first through the cooperatives, then via farm corporations and the agri-business enterprises.²⁰⁶

The Shah ensured unambiguously his control of the land, revenue, and production in Iran. This is confirmed in every reform policy within the White Revolution, particularly in the state's organization and operation of its agricultural cooperatives and corporations. However, in assuring that there would be no other competitor for power in Iran, the Shah also solidified himself as the party solely responsible for the sufferings of the Iranian people.

The monarchy can certainly be categorized as overextended in the international as well. The United States saw the Shah as an extension of western authority in the Middle East and the international revenues that flowed so continuously allowed the Shah a high level of insulation from his constituency. This can be seen in who benefited from the oil booms. In 1976, the top ten percent of the population consumed 40 percent which meant that just under a million families truly benefited from the oil boom and the rest of the population benefited from little trickledown revenue.²⁰⁷ In addition, we have already

²⁰⁶ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 119.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 167.

discussed how heavily involved the United States was in both recognition and approval of the Shah's rule to direct advisory and financial assistance in his reform programs. This aloofness provided from oil revenues and international support allowed the Shah to rule with little cultivation of support from those governed. This disconnectedness also enhanced the Shah's ability to be criticized for not only being the sole individual responsible for the sufferings of reform policies, but to also have so long remained aloof and seemingly unaware of such sufferings.

With all these aspects in mind, one can categorize the Shah's regime as instable. The overwhelming decadence and greater association with the international realm shook his already weak sources of legitimacy. The state's hyperactivity left it being the only responsible party for structural sufferings felt by the changing society. Lastly, there was no room for either legitimate expressions of discontent or criticism due to the harshness of rule, nor was there space for greater participation by those newly created social classes. However, it was not the state's instability alone that led to such a revolutionary movement, but it opened the door for alternative leaderships and competition for what an Iranian society should resemble.

Analysis of Leadership, Ideology, and Participants

Before delving fully into the role that leadership and ideology played within the Iranian revolution, it is important to highlight again what position people were in at the time. As discussed thoroughly above, the Iranian people found themselves in a dire moment of instability and structural sufferings. Years of change, modernization, industrialization, uneven developments had displaced not only normal, traditional livelihoods, but also

massive amounts of the population. The urban poor swelled in cities poorly equipped to deal with mass migration. Infrastructure crumbled or was not quickly improved upon. Sufferings extended across classes. A growing middle class found no free area for participation. Universities were overrun with demand. Job growth and more importantly salary growth stagnated. And above all this, reigned a leader who continued to move further away from the people he ruled. Changes to the way of life for such massive sectors of society in such a short manner of time will inevitably lead to sufferings, but also an erosion of normal patterns of operation when the recreation of the status quo by the state becomes impossible or demand has exceeded the state's ability to fulfil new desires. In this moment, Khomeini emerged.

Fragmentation of Norms: Classes and Conflicts

Though much of the fragmentation of everyday Iranian norms occurred as an indirect consequence of uneven developmental policies and changing financial patterns spurred by economic growth, some policies were meant as direct challenges against the everyday life of Iranian population. This work has already discussed multiple targets chosen by the Shah for change. The examples that epitomize this type of effort can be found in the structural change section above and included efforts that attempted to modify how Iranians saw the world and the power structure of Iran. The spreading of both literature and images that directed attention to the landlord-peasant relationship represents a poignant example. The Shah produced propaganda displaying how abusive landlords were of their tenants versus the classic model of the benevolence of the landlord offering the peasant shelter and land to till. The Shah not only used propaganda to achieve these goals. Indeed, the Shah's policies directly replaced the landlord-peasant model with the state-peasant

model, or cooperative/corporate-peasant model. As discussed, the Shah wanted the state as the sole base of power, whether those tenants found themselves in a corporation or not, the state replaced the landlord.²⁰⁸ The transition was summed up as follows:

In the traditional pattern, the peasant realized he could relate to the landlord in a relationship of personal bargaining. The civil and military agents of government, however, constantly drove for the villager's subjection. The land reform, which has substituted government agent for landlord, has thrown the village into the uncomfortable situation of not knowing how to relate with the new group.²⁰⁹

Indeed, this became well recognized by groups outside of Iran as well, as the ILO warned that the struggles of rising food deficits and high influx of rural migrants into urban centers, at that time, could not be solved without actively including the rural population in future development plans.²¹⁰ This was evidently never completed as more and more rural migrants swept into the growing urban centers. Halliday emphasized this stating that, "The single largest group oppressed by the regime is the rural poor."²¹¹ It was not just the peasants who were left in an "uncomfortable situation" in the change. As the Shah took the landlord's traditional role of power, the policies were meant to, "...strengthen and support the peasantry against the professional middle class who represented a fundamental threat to the traditional patterns through which the political elite gained its nourishment and preserved its existence."²¹² This middle class was also striving to make itself heard amongst the shifting patterns in this time. James A. Bill documented an extra pulled from a magazine representing mainstream middle-class interests that captured what individuals from this group desired at the time:

²⁰⁸ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 119.

²⁰⁹ Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 147.

²¹⁰ Kaneda, H. "Employment and Income Policies for Iran: Mission Working Paper NO. III: Agriculture." 46.

²¹¹ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 213.

²¹² Bill, James A. *The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization*. 153.

In democratic systems, thinking individuals grow up with independence, will power, and self-confidence and their countries are never lacking in minds and character. In other systems, however, it is quite the opposite. All the minds will disappear and their country will lack real 'human' beings.²¹³

Amongst these quite overt desires of the middle classes, Halliday also called attention to the working class, which increased rapidly as the landless peasants moved into urban areas seeking work in the expanding, but still insufficient, industrial sectors. Halliday, writing before the revolution in Iran, cannily predicted that:

The enormous objective power of the Iranian working class may therefore find itself thrown increasingly into conflict with the regime, and the opposition of the working class, fragmented as it must be for a time, may well add to the difficulties which the state encounters. A combination of social weight and political conjuncture may then be created in which the Iranian working class, so long denied its place in society, will be able to play a fuller and more independent role.²¹⁴

These accurate predictions did certainly seem to hold true. The Shah not only indirectly created disruptions in the existing fabric of society, power relations for example, but also actively sought to position the state as the main power in all facets of society. This active domination of economic relations and power relations almost certainly disrupted at least some aspect of individual lives of Iranians. Descriptions such as the “uncomfortable situation” described by Halliday highlight just how confused people were in this time of change and the sufferings brought on by such shifts. These class groups be it landowners, rural poor, urban workers, or the developing middle class were not the only groups the Shah targeted.

Paving the Way for Khomeini

Many were already seeking alternative forms of governance or a prescriptive alternative that drove towards something better. Indeed, many had already turned to a

²¹³ 151.

²¹⁴ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 210.

religious leader for answers, Ali Shariati. In many ways, Shariati prepared the Iranian people for a different type of Islamic movement. His works became ubiquitous and could be found on almost every street corner including up to the year of the revolution, despite his imprisonment by SAVAK.²¹⁵ However, this Islam was not the same that would eventually steer Iran towards theocracy. It was decidedly left in its discourse, advocating for, "...freedom and democracy without capitalism; social justice and socialism without authoritarianism; and modern religion without clericalism."²¹⁶ Shariati represented a very modern, yet still religious, voice of opposition to the Shah's authoritarian rule. Mahdavi explains, it was his criticism for the clerics of Iran, accusing them, "...of 'monopolistic control' over the interpretation of Islam in order to set up a clerical despotism...which would be 'the worst and most oppressive form of despotism possible in human history.'"²¹⁷ Shariati's mild approach to religious rectification of Iranian society had a wide appeal as well. Abrahamian highlights that Shariati, "...produced exactly what the young intelligentsia craved: a radical layman's religion that disassociated itself from the traditional clergy and associated itself with the secular trinity of social revolution, technological innovation, and cultural self-assertion."²¹⁸ This modern approach to Islamic reformism, having become widely available in the lead up to revolution, connotated the idea of Islamic revolution as having a meaning reflecting something more secular, worldly, and certainly less harsh than what was to come and followed narratives pushed by other opposition groups yearning for political participation. Mahdavi summarizes Shariati's

²¹⁵ Halliday, Fred. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development*. 219.

²¹⁶ Mahdavi, Mojtaba. "The Rise of Khomeinism: Problematizing the Politics of Resistance in Pre-Revolutionary Iran." *In a Critical Introduction to Khomeini*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 59.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ E. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 473.

position as follows, "...the status quo in Iran was in many ways congruent with the demands of university students, middle class intellectuals, and urban classes of workers and migrants. Shariati's popularity came to exceed almost all other religious and secular intellectuals in the pre-revolutionary Iran."²¹⁹ It would certainly be a mistake to think that the opposition, even the religious opposition, in the lead up to the revolution was approaching anything resembling what Khomeini would eventually mandate in his coming theocracy.

Khomeini and the Hardening of a Narrative

Khomeini was much more than an Imam and what he preached was far greater than religious text. Abrahamian summed up the leader astutely, "Khomeini is to the Islamic Revolution what Lenin was to the Bolshevik, Mao to the Chinese, and Castro to the Cuban Revolutions."²²⁰ How though, was it possible for Khomeini to come to a position of power and act as a counterbalance to the Shah's regime? Firstly, the leader was able to isolate himself through his exile, allowing him to freely critique a regime he was not subjected to. Secondly, as already discussed above, the population of Iran was in a distraught position after facing a decade or more of societal upheaval and uneven development. Moreover, the work done by Shariati had laid some groundwork for appeals in the form of Islamic rectification of monarchical failings. However, it is the argument of this thesis that Khomeini consciously built upon, coopted, and in some cases commandeered the narrative of democratic independence, or minimally national freedom, of Iran from the West and against the Shah already being pushed for en masse. A careful omission of his true beliefs

²¹⁹ Mahdavi, Mojtaba. "The Rise of Khomeinism: Problematizing the Politics of Resistance in Pre-Revolutionary Iran." 60.

²²⁰ Ibid. 531.

and desires or certainly a reformation of radical views carefully positioned Khomeini at the forefront of a liberation movement against the Shah. This careful crafting of a narrative and creating a monstrous enemy of the incumbent regime can be traced through the writing and speeches of Khomeini.

The Khomeini of the 1940's was a differently spoken individual than that of the late 1970's. Tones, choices of words, style, and in particular targets for reform shifted greatly in the Imam's writing and speeches over these decades. In the beginning, his militant brand of Islam was not discretely covered in messages of independence and freedom. Instead, he directly spoke of a government that must be ruled by religious leaders directly in accordance with God's law. This is in no unclear terms shared in an extract from a 1941 publication of his:

The only government that reason accepts as legitimate and welcomes freely and happily is the government of God, Whose every act is just and Whose right is to rule of the whole world and all the particles of existence. Whatever He makes use of is His own property, and whatever He takes, from whomever He takes, is again His own property. No men can deny this except the mentally disturbed...government must be run in accordance with God's law, for the welfare of the country and the people demands this, and it is not feasible except with the supervision of the religious leaders.²²¹

Even this early in his writings before the revolution, one can clearly see where Khomeini might stand on the question of a theocracy and in what manner such a government would be run. He specifically envisions what implications sharia law would have if implemented stating that, "If just one article of the Constitution were to be implement[ed]...specifying that all laws contrary to the sharia are invalid, everyone in the country would join together in harmony..."²²² Beyond his wishes for a change to some sort of clerically ruled

²²¹ Ruhollah Khomeini, "A Warning to the Nation," in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 170.

²²² Ibid. 171.

government based on the sharia, he also had a different enemy as a target in his earlier writings. He goes on to describe his opposition as:

We know that all this is unpalatable to those who have grown up with lechery, treachery, music and dancing, and a thousand other varieties of corruption. Of course, they regard the civilization and advancement of the country as dependent upon women's going naked in the streets, or to quote their own idiotic words, turning half the population into workers by unveiling them (we know only too well what kind of work is involved here).²²³

This written work has an overtly negative tone, one intended to admonish, punish, and blame based solely on a lack of religiosity and adherence to sharia Islam. Moreover, this writing concludes not with a noble call to action or an advocacy of freedom and independence, but a warning and threat that if there is no change, "...you will experience worse times than these, time so bad that the present will seem like paradise in comparison."²²⁴ Even up until the early 1960's, the Imam's main target was still the corruptness of society and government and ensuring a readjustment to Islamic values. This is made clear in an excerpt from a speech given in 1963 to honor martyrs:

The Ministry of Justice has made clear its opposition to the ordinances of Islam by various measure like the abolition of the requirement that judges be Muslim and male; henceforth, Jews, Christians, and the enemies of Islam and the Muslims are to decide on affairs concerning the honor and person of the Muslims. The strategy of this government and certain of its members is to bring about the total effacement of the ordinances of Islam. As long as this usurpatory and rebellious government is in power, the Muslims can have no hope for any good.²²⁵

Until this point, the main problems as identified by the Imam were all framed in a religious manner. However, perhaps noticing a growing discontentedness amongst the population

²²³ Ibid. 171-172.

²²⁴ Ibid. 173.

²²⁵ Ruhollah Khomeini, "In Commemoration of the Martyrs at Qum," in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 174-176. 175.

and growing calls for change, a shift in tone, word choice, and target developed from his later speeches and writings.

Though Khomeini had certainly expressed ideals of radical Islam early on, he began realizing that expressing these ideals alongside his increasingly critical views of the Shah's regime would not be productive. What then became more defining than radical views on Islam's prescribed role in Iranian government were his staunchly critical views of royal corruption, Western domination, and the devastating economic problems of Iran.²²⁶ Indeed, in the build up to the revolution, Khomeini crafted a different kind of ideology that would more greatly appeal to the diversity of groups calling for change and eventually participating in the revolution itself. One can notice the shift of tone between the mid 1960's and late 1970's as Khomeini once again gave a speech honoring Martyrs, except in this speech, there was a clearly defined enemy and it was not those who were unfaithful to Islam:

But see what crimes America has committed against man...America has created disasters for mankind...The imperialists proclaim that man is free only in order to deceive the masses...All these declarations they make, supposedly in favor of human rights, have no reality; they are designed to deceive...The Declaration of Human Rights exists only to deceive the nations; it is the opium of the masses.²²⁷

The tone has clearly shifted from a condemnation for a lack of religiosity to throwing off an oppressor. Not only is a clear target in the sights of the Imam, but he has also adeptly crafted how he speaks with a glaring reference to the followers of Marx in this excerpt, as communists were still playing a role in the opposition to the Shah. He ends the speech not with a dire warning or veiled threat of those who would not follow closely to Islam's

²²⁶ Foran, *Taking Power: on the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. 81.

²²⁷ Ruhollah Khomeini, "In Commemoration of the First Martyrs of the Revolution," in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 212-227. 214.

teachings, but instead a call for action stating to his listeners that, "...we may act like Moses to toward the Pharaoh of our age; let us pick up our staffs and oppose this vile Shah. At the very least, let no one support this regime."²²⁸ Now religion becomes not the law, but the tool for freedom and independence from an imperial leader.

Language regarding freedom and independence grew more poignant in the approach to the revolution. Not only did his language increase in its poetic charm, but also in its scope as he worked on not only bringing the Shah into focus, but so too his resource hungry puppeteers. In late 1978, Khomeini was commemorating those killed in a massacre and identified just who obstructed the path to happiness:

As long as the criminal hands of the oil-hungry superpowers are at work in our country, the gates of happiness and freedom will remain closed to us. My beloved ones, summon up all your strength and break open the chains of slavery! One after the other, remove the treacherous pawns of the Shah from the scene and cut off the greedy hands of those that manipulate them and their like in the Islamic countries. The way to happiness, freedom, and independence is barred by those pawns and those who manipulate them...²²⁹

The focus on a religious uprising or a religious government continued to disappear from speeches and writings of the Imam. More and more commonly were references to independence and a rectification of wrongs. However, it was not just positioning his ideology as a liberating force within Iran, he also presented prescriptive ideological recommendations for his growing number of followers, hoping to shrink the divide between religious, intellectual, student, and peasant freedom fighters. He directly ordered his clerics to work with students and intellectuals, warning that they should not accuse

²²⁸ Ibid. 227.

²²⁹ Ruhollah Khomeini, "In Commemoration of the Martyrs of Tehran," in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 239-241. 239.

these groups of ungodliness.²³⁰ In another instance, he called for unity stating, “Avoid all disagreement, for disagreement is the work of the devil. Continue your sacred movement in unison for the sake of the ultimate goal, which is the overthrow of the corrupt Pahlavi regime...”²³¹ Yet even more, he specifically listed the discontented groups already yearning for, and indeed participating in revolutionary actions. In a single passage, he called upon young people in universities, teachers, journalists, merchants, nomadic tribesmen, and slum dwellers to, “Advance together, with a single voice and a single purpose, to the sacred aim of Islam- the abolition of the cruel Pahlavi dynasty...”²³² Again, the aim here is not the establishment of a theocratic regime run in accordance with sharia law, but the elimination of the monarchy.

The Imam continued to play upon the yearning ears of disadvantaged groups. Having discussed the state of universities and their inability to keep up with the demands of an increasingly educated and growing middle class, the Imam addressed these concerns directly as well. Khomeini stated that, “...our youth cannot receive a complete education in Iran; after being half-educated at home, at the cost of great suffering, they are obliged to go abroad to complete their studies.”²³³ In addition to appealing to the youth in universities, an importantly part of the movement, he also continued his reassurance of women and their place in the society that was to come. He stated in March of 1979 in Qum that, “We want our women to attain the high rank of true humanity...Islam grants woman a say in all affairs

²³⁰ Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions*. 247.

²³¹ Khomeini, “In Commemoration of the Martyrs of Tehran,” 240.

²³² Ruhollah Khomeini, “Muharram: The Triumph of Blood Over the Sword,” in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 242-245. 244.

²³³ Ruhollah Khomeini, “Address at Bihisht-I Zahra,” in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 254-260. 257.

just as it grants man a say.”²³⁴ In another instance, there were promises that, “Women would be free to govern their fate and choose their activities.”²³⁵ Khomeini was clearly courting the women’s support, and for good reason. Two days after his speech in Qum to a group of women, there was a massive women’s march commemorating International Women’s Day. More proof that Khomeini was paying close attention to timing and audience was his speech given on May Day 1979, where he proclaimed, “Everyday should be considered Worker’s Day for labor is the source of all things.”²³⁶ Again, a clear gesture to the leftist and communist groups pushing for revolution.

The Imam’s ability to play upon the needs of the masses is expressed clearly while his true theocratic intentions were omitted and reformatted for a greater, nationalistic push for revolution. His aim at forming a broad coalition of forces against the incumbent regime can be seen early on. His nationalist and populist speeches veiled any notion of what was once an unabashedly militant, conservative Imam. This populism was inherent in his continued assurance to the masses that there would be solutions serving the poor and downtrodden within Iranian society.²³⁷ It was not the structural changes nor state instability alone that could have resulted in such a broad based, coalition forming revolution without the support of alternative leadership utilizing effective ideologies. Marxists, workers, the poor, the middle class, women, and clerics all filed into the street calling for an end to imperialist and corrupt royal rule would not have been possible without a unifying vision. A vision, with an effective voice to articulate it, that prescribed freedom, justice, and

²³⁴ Ruhollah Khomeini, “Address to a Group of Women in Qum,” in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 263-264.

²³⁵ Parsa, *States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions*. 247.

²³⁶ Ibid. 250.

²³⁷ Selbin, “What was Revolutionary about the Iranian Revolution?” 42.

independence from a puppet government controlled by the west. A vision claiming a society of freedom and equity were possible for all, and where women were free to choose their own fate. Only such a powerful vision of freedom could fully conceal the radical theocratic intentions of the voice speaking it.

Evidence of an Effective Ideology Identified in Participating Groups

This analysis thus far should not be confused with a “great man” approach to solving revolutionary quandaries. The focus and discussion above serve not to idealize Khomeini as the singular force which propelled the revolution into fruition. Indeed, this is certainly not the case. Instead, it is only to illustrate the agency in which Khomeini carefully crafted a narrative and how deliberate his intentions were in efforts to reach the greatest diversity of the Iranian population in the lead up to revolution. What needs greater attention is just who was participating in the months of revolution that unseated the Shah and instituted Khomeini. Moreover, what was life like within this moment of rewriting standard myths of operation? What makes people take to the streets when a state becomes unable to recreate the expectations of the population under its control? This is further required to heed the calls for treating revolution as not just dots on spreadsheets but the bloodied and arduous struggles they are, especially for those who participated or lived during such events. Structural change has worked to erode the normal way of life and has shown the state as incapable of fulfilling growing expectations and recreating the status quo. This results in a moment of confusion and a desire for a better choice of narrative.

Based upon the sheer diversity of participants in the revolution, one can argue that confusion and suffering was so great that the alternative vision of society offered by Khomeini became too good to resist. However, it would be an injustice to so briefly

summarize this with a focus only on Khomeini, as without the massive numbers who revolted, his vision would ultimately have never come to fruition. Each group that participated within the movement had a unique set of sufferings, desires, and reasons to participate that eventually became subsumed in the revolution Khomeini came to lead, despite the initial desires of these groups perhaps differing from what ultimately came to be. While one could endlessly analyze each group that participated in the movement, this thesis will choose to focus on only a few to demonstrate the number of structural sufferings that existed, the confusion this suffering caused, and why eventually they acted in support of revolution in the name of Khomeini with a hope for a better future. This section will highlight the struggle of some of these classes, their actions, and their roles within the revolution.

The Urban Poor

The poor was an important group within the revolution that ultimately helped secure an overthrow of the Shah. As already thoroughly discussed, the poor was a growing segment of the population and a group heavily targeted by the Shah's government and by the reforms he instituted. Many of the reforms instituted during the Shah's White Revolution dramatically changed the life of rural Iranians, particularly peasant farmers and those working on large farms. Even when they benefited, as already discussed, the land they received in the redistribution was often not enough to be profitable. This resulted in land being forfeited back to the state. Those who lost land or those who were unable to find work under new agricultural schemes turned towards the cities where new types of work were emerging. However, hopes for fresh starts and new opportunities were often dashed. The cities they found, especially Tehran, were incapable of employing, housing, or

accounting for basic subsistence needs as the populations swelled and poured in from the countryside. As a result of this, shantytowns exploded and informal settlements expanded, particularly around Tehran. Consequently, this new, growing urban poor had not only the Shah to blame for their uncomfortable situation, but indeed their ever-increasing numbers. Much like the rest of this thesis, there exists important analysis already carried out on crucial questions in revolution. This holds true in explaining what this group of poor underwent in the lead up and during the revolution. Bayat has extensively covered the experience of the poor in his *Street Politics*. Most important of his contributions is his understanding that the poor were not just a population to be dealt with and one that existed without much of a direction, instead, Bayat demonstrates that this group, though large, greatly dispersed, and intentionally disconnected, did have desires, networks of action, and indeed resistance to the Shah's regime.

In the lead up to the revolution, the state not only suffered from the consequences of creating this surge of urban poor, but also directly entered into conflict with them. Some of these events occurred in the direct leadup to the revolution. Bayat documented that in the autumn of 1977, hundreds of homes were leveled and there were at least thirteen clashes between the squatters of the informal settlements and government forces which left a dozen dead.”²³⁸ In response to these clearing of settlements, the poor also took the fight to officials. There were many accounts of groups from the informal settlements raiding municipality offices, destroying government vehicles, and physically confronting and sometimes killing demolition agents.²³⁹

²³⁸ Asef Bayat, *Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). 47.

²³⁹ Ibid.

It is easy to call attention to these moments of violence, aggression, and direct confrontation between the urban poor and government officials. However, Bayat contended that this group resisted daily through smaller but nonetheless still rebellious activities. By merely surviving and subsiding within these informal settlements, Bayat argues, was an act of resistance against the Shah's regime. After calls were not heeded for permanent settlement recognition, improvements to the quality of housing, and services including utilities or access to health centers, the poor countered the state's deafness through stealing electricity and water from public utility systems and moved their private homes further out into public alleyways.²⁴⁰ These, as well as other forms of subsistence resistance, eventually took a toll on local municipalities and government authorities. When attempts at eradicating these communities completely failed, appeasement strategies were attempted. In the October of 1977, the government of Jamshid Amuzgar, under pressure from continuing shantytown struggles, began to force owners of empty apartments to rent out some 24,000 units in Tehran with this program seeing some 70,000 applications with 55,000 being from the poor, students, or migrant workers only requesting single rooms.²⁴¹ Following a massacre on September 11, 1978, the government decided to offer squatter settlements electricity.²⁴² However, these changes came too little too late with appeasements and fixes only being offered after violent solutions failed and when it became clear that the poor had indeed been organizing and aligning with Khomeini. This organization took the form of neighborhood councils and Islamic Consumer Cooperatives which began handling the subsistence requirements of the poor, in efforts to neutralize such

²⁴⁰ Ibid. 45.

²⁴¹ Ibid. 49.

²⁴² Ibid.

a large and unstable population while Khomeini fought for control.²⁴³ A large support from the urban poor for Khomeini's movement came from the youth of this class. In particular, these youths formed the street forces of Khomeini's efforts in exchange for basic needs. Bayat states that, "...the underclass youth joined the revolution in its moment of breakthrough, becoming the indignant postrevolutionary critical 'mass on the stage' (mardum-I dar sahneh). They were the street warriors, the thugs, of the clerical figures who in return offered them a regular income, power, and a divinely sanctioned social role, setting the scene for a novel stage in street politics in Iran."²⁴⁴ However, Bayat's analysis did not end with the urban poor, as there was another significant group to analyze.

The Workers

As noted above in analysis describing structural changes preceding the revolution, changes to what jobs were available and what industries were encouraged also shifted. The influx of rural poor and displaced agricultural workers came seeking employment in the growing industrial sectors of the economy. It has been discussed as to what industries were growing and why this was the case, however, it is important to emphasize how large and swiftly growing this group was in addition to what their experiences were in the lead up and within the revolution itself.

As stated, most all these workers left from the Iranian countryside. This is especially so in Tehran itself. In Tehran, 94 percent of the workers had been born in places other than Tehran with a particular example from a metal works factory in Tehran having some 80 percent of its workers coming from a peasant background and having left due to

²⁴³ Ibid. 52.

²⁴⁴ Ibid. 56.

landlessness or insufficient income.²⁴⁵ Moreover, their sufferings were not dissimilar from the sufferings other groups were subjected to, despite their contributions to the quickly growing economy. Much like dissident clerics, political, and intellectual groups, workers also found themselves a target of the Shah's deadly intelligence organization. The Shah aimed to directly control the working class in Iran and carried out this plan with the infiltration of SAVAK agents in not just factories but the organized workers' groups with agents often having themselves elected to leadership positions.²⁴⁶ This was of course to prevent large mobilization of workers, but SAVAK seemed to target individuals for any number of reasons, including the nonpolitical. Bayat details an account of one worker having become ill and approached the representative of his syndicate for financial help only to be ordered to pay bribe, and when he eventually could not meet demands, he was dismissed.²⁴⁷ Besides this direct repression of individual needs, there was an overall lack of attention given to increasingly unsafe factory or industrial work. Though there existed laws supposedly protecting workers against such accidents, most were neither applied nor effective in assisting workers struggling with chemical disease, industrial accidents, or other hazards.²⁴⁸ And, again, there was no organization in which to turn to for relief from such sufferings in the booming industrialization workers experienced as SAVAK controlled all routes for expressing discontent or organizing. With this direct pressure and an ever-increasing growth of workers, it is little surprise that they too would eventually look elsewhere for answers.

²⁴⁵ Assef Bayat, *Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers' Control*. (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1987). 36.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. 62.

²⁴⁷ Ibid. 66.

²⁴⁸ Ibid. 65.

The workers and the subsequent strikes they employed against the Shah's regime are often given large credit in the resulting fall of the monarchy. Though the workers joined their fellow Iranians later than other groups, workers eventually flowed into the streets from every stratum of the class including the oil workers, which represented those workers who had benefited most from the Shah's economic developments. Struggling workers joined the movement with a new wave of strikes in the spring of 1978 which aligned with the initial phase of struggle.²⁴⁹ At first, and much as the urban poor, the demands of the workers remained economic in character in efforts to improve their condition, however, the nature of these demands quickly began to imply political change as well. Bayat found that 35,000, likely more in reality, were striking in September of that year and in addition to these vastly increasing numbers of workers on strike, the nature of their demands continued to shift from the economic to the political.²⁵⁰ The types of demands remained about 60 percent economic in September, referring to things such as pay-raises and improved welfare, and the remainder can be classified as political such as control over funds, ending discrimination between men and women, and the push to expel military and intelligence forces from interference in workplace affairs.²⁵¹ However, it was not just the factory workers and manual laborers who were amongst those striking. As stated, many of the wealthier oil workers were also eventually on the streets, but so too were the white-collar workers associated with the oil industry. In October, these white-collar workers in the oil company of Ahwaz went on strike around the same time as their blue-collar

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 78.

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Ibid. 79.

counterparts in the Ahwaz oil fields, a strike that lasted 33 days.²⁵² As these strikes occurred, it became obvious the need for organization, outside the SAVAK controlled syndicates that already existed to pacify the need to organize. This also became apparent to the oil workers as they formed the Common Syndicate of the Employees of the Iranian Oil Industry, which was to represent both blue-collar and white-collar workers in the oil, gas, and petrochemical industries and mainly operated in Tehran.²⁵³ Again, the demands of this group of workers also quickly shifted to the political. When the oil workers went on strike on October 2nd, they presented their demands as follows:

1. End to martial law;
2. full solidarity and co-operation with striking teachers;
3. unconditional release of all political prisoners;
4. Iranization of the oil industry;
5. all communications to be in the Persian language;
6. all foreign employees to leave the country;
7. an end to discrimination against women staff employees and workers;
8. the implementation of a law recently passed by both houses of parliament dealing with the housing of all workers and staff employees;
9. support for the demands of the production workers, including the dissolution of SAVAK;
10. punishment of corrupt high government officials and ministers;
11. reduced manning schedule for offshore drilling crews.²⁵⁴

These oil strikes had a crippling effect on the Shah's regime. Indeed, the effect was felt worldwide as oil production in late September declined from 5,700,000 barrels of oil a day to zero barrels in November.²⁵⁵ However, what is also important to highlight is the makeup of these committees leading strikes and formulating demands. Jafari identified that though composition of these committees differed location to location, they often consisted

²⁵² Peyman Jafari, "Linkages of oil and politics: oil strikes and dual power in the Iranian revolution," *Labor History* Vol. 60, No. 1 (2019): 24-43, 28.

²⁵³ *Ibid.* 29.

²⁵⁴ Bayat, *Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers' Control*. 80-81.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

of leading members belonging to or sympathizing with the secular left, and while their influence waned in the following months to be replaced by Islamist committee leaders, these more populist leaders too foresaw a need for self-management which ultimately clashed with the post-revolutionary managers.²⁵⁶ This only further exemplifies the trend within the revolution that there were a vast number of diverse voices even among striking committees or organized groups, let alone the revolutionary participants overall. And despite these numerous voices and opinions, the strike committees quickly followed Khomeini's demands for a general strike following their initial strikes on December 2nd.²⁵⁷

While the oil strikers were perhaps one of the most important groups needed to completely weaken the Shah and bring the economy to a halt, they certainly were not acting alone. When they first went on strike in October and before Khomeini called for the December general strike, thousands of others had already put down their tools. In October 40,000 steel workers, 30,000 railway workers, 2,000 brick makers, alongside bus-drivers, newspapers, and other factories all had stopped work.²⁵⁸ As the economy ground to a halt there was little else that could be done than to utilize military force against strikers with resulting bloody clashes on several occurrences. In November and after a break-down of a negotiation with oil-workers there was a bloody confrontation with strikers and the military resulting in the death of two and injury of eleven as one example.²⁵⁹

The plethora of strikers and their diversity led to extremely destabilizing measures against the Shah's regime, especially the ability to cut off the country's oil production. And while there existed struggle with the Islamic regime that followed the Shah's, the workers

²⁵⁶ Jafari, "Linkages of oil and politics: oil strikes and dual power in the Iranian revolution." 29.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Bayat, *Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers' Control*. 79-80.

²⁵⁹ Ibid. 89.

did in the end and despite their diversity in leadership, fall in line with Khomeini's desire for general strikes and apparent open support and recognition of Khomeini's leadership. Why was this the case? As discussed, Khomeini spent much time not only courting workers, but utilizing key phrases of the left to coopt such workers' committees. Moreover, the youth of such legitimate committees, as those before were mostly controlled by the Shah's forces, were inexperienced and did not have the time to solidify leaderships, structures, and more that could have resulted in stronger opposition to their eventual dissolution under the Islamic regime.

Results: Consolidation and its Justifications

Though Khomeini proclaimed national freedom and liberties for all, the consolidation of his government took an aggressive turn against many of the same groups who supported his push for revolution only to find themselves under what could be seen as a harsher form of government after the fall of the monarchy. Quickly after the Imam took power in early 1980, he was warning of counterrevolutionaries and threatening that, "Everyone must obey governmental authorities in government office, and stern action is to be taken against those who fail to do so."²⁶⁰ His immediate shift was also directed at those very groups who were supporting the revolution most fervently. He called on the intellectuals and students to base all their studies entirely on the foundations of Islam and warned, "...that to adopt a syncretic ideology is a great act of treason toward Islam and the Muslims..."²⁶¹ However, while the crackdown of groups that had greatly supported a

²⁶⁰ Ruhollah Khomeini, "New Year's Message," in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*. Translated and annotated by Hamid Algar. (Mizan Press, 1981). 286-294. 290.

²⁶¹ Ibid. 292.

revolution came quickly, Khomeini's government did make good on some of its promises. The new regime reached into the countryside and distributed more than 850,000 hectares of confiscated land to some 220,000 peasant families.²⁶² In addition, rural development came in earnest with farmers having access to roads, schools, clinics and electricity and water supplies.²⁶³ But his path to consolidation was not all paved with positive structural changes and meaningful participation of new groups. Instead, Khomeini continued to consolidate power through exceedingly aggressive means, including a reign of terror that resulted in a spate of assassinations including, "...the speaker of the Assembly of Experts, the chair of the Supreme Court, the chief of the revolutionary courts, the head of the gendarmerie, the editor of the *Kayhan*, four cabinet ministers, ten deputy ministers, twenty-eight Majles deputies, two *imam jum'ehs*, and the new president..."²⁶⁴ The calls for freedom and an end of slavery to a monarchical ruler were not to be fulfilled. Instead, the calls for greater freedom and social equity were unsatisfied and within a few years, Khomeini had successfully consolidated all power from what was initially a multiparty, revolutionary state.²⁶⁵ An aggressive war with Iraq was to follow, which ultimately served to solidify Khomeini's grip on Iran and with it, its hopes of a more egalitarian society were snuffed out and in its place was a radical theocratic state.

²⁶² Amrahmian, *A History of Modern Iran: Revised and Updated*. 184.

²⁶³ Ibid. 185.

²⁶⁴ Ibid. 185.

²⁶⁵ Nikki R. Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Result of Revolution*. (Yale University Press, 2006). 241.

Chapter 6: Cuba

Abstract: This chapter concludes the case studies with the analysis of the Cuban revolution. Within this chapter are subsections covering an overview of the revolution from beginning to end, analysis of structural change, examination of state instability, a section covering agency including participants and ideology, and lastly a brief overview of consolidation and outcomes of the revolution.

Overview

The Cuban Revolution unfolded between the years of 1953 through 1959. Where Iran had oil, there was sugar in Cuba. Indeed, an even greater similarity shared in these two cases is the close relationship to the United States. Though the 90-mile distance between the two states probably led to a greater impact on Cuba than Iran, particularly in economic terms. While Iran had the ability to diversify their oil sales to more than just the U.S., the Cuban economy was heavily molded by the giant's hunger for sugar.

This demand for sugar from the U.S. led Cuba to develop a foreign dominated economy based almost solely on a sugar monoculture. After the Cuban War for Independence and alongside the U.S. intervention to end the war, Cuba was coaxed into signing the Reciprocity Treaty of 1903. This helped revive a previously badly damaged sugar industry following the war. With this seemingly merciful act, the U.S. became an integral and irreplaceable part of the Cuban economy. Even more than becoming a healthy market in which Cuban agencies could sell sugar, the U.S. soon came to own 41 percent of all mills in addition to controlling 60 percent of the sugar harvest outright.²⁶⁶ One of the best indicators of just how dependent the Cuban economy was upon the U.S. as a buyer

²⁶⁶ Marifeli Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 15.

was the Great Depression. In the years of the Great Depression, 1926 to 1940, the sugar output in Cuba dropped to fifty percent productivity as the U.S. demand shrunk with its economy.²⁶⁷ There were also few economic protection mechanisms in place. The Cuban economy was laid bare before U.S. economic interests. This led to a terribly out of balance trading scheme. The Gross National Product consisted of 54.8 percent of imports between 1945 and 1958, which was one of the highest trade rates per capita in the world at the time.²⁶⁸

However, a deeper comprehension than just a label of “dependent developmental state” is required of Cuba to understand the revolution to come.²⁶⁹ Despite this singular view of the Cuban economy, there was industrialization and modernization taking place within the economy and Cuban society. Cuba had long been considered an agricultural society and that sector of its economy has become a central focus for Cuban development. However, shifts were taking place while sugar was continuously emphasized. Some of the most important changes to emphasize were those in the workforce distribution. The percentage of the population working in the agricultural sector fell from 49 percent in 1919 to 39 percent in 1959.²⁷⁰ There was another 39 percent of workers who found new kinds of employment in the service sector with another 22 percent in an industrializing sector, which was the fourth largest percentage of workers for a Latin American country at that time.²⁷¹ Alongside a diversifying workforce, there were other notes of modernization in the Cuban economy. Per capita income was higher than all other Latin American countries, besides

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid. 16.

²⁶⁹ Foran, “Theorizing the Cuban Revolution.” Refers to Foran’s conclusion on the Cuban economy and dependent development.

²⁷⁰ Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. 57.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

Venezuela and Argentina, at around \$400-\$500 a year.²⁷² The development in the Cuban economy led to improvement in conditions throughout society as well. Cuba maintained the lowest death rate in the Western Hemisphere, second highest number of hospital beds in Latin America, and the fifth highest literacy rates in the region.²⁷³ This development came as sugar continued to dominate the foreign income of Cuba. Cuban exports were made up of 80 percent of sugar and Cuba was responsible for providing over half of the world's sugar.²⁷⁴ However, with these seemingly wonderful improvements, as we saw in the Iranian case, did not bring stability to Cuban regime.

Specifically in the years preceding the revolution, quality of life indicators were on the decline. Employment fluctuations played a large role in the coming revolution. One third of the labor force did not hold full time employment in the mid-1950s.²⁷⁵ While on the surface, most would have indicated that the Cuban economy was outperforming most other Latin American economies, and this was true according to certain statistics. However, other indicators would tell another story for those who lived in Cuban society. One of the largest issues unfolding was that of the disparities in wealth and power.²⁷⁶ For instance, Havana was at one point the city with the largest market for Cadillac sales, while in the farmland and rural areas families were forced to eat tree bark in the dead season which spanned eight to nine months.²⁷⁷ This disparity in wealth continued to increase. Estimates state that the poorest twenty percent in Cuba received between two and six percent of the income, while the richest 20 percent were receiving 55 percent of the income.²⁷⁸ However,

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ M. Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*. 27.

²⁷⁶ Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. 59.

²⁷⁷ Foran, "Theorizing the Cuban Revolution." 18.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

situated in this vast divide was a growing middle class which accounted for one fifth of the working population and consisted of professionals, civil servants, merchants, and an urban working class.²⁷⁹ These shifting and dividing social development caused by economic changes soon exacted tolls on the political environment of Cuba.

The longtime ruler of Cuba before the revolution was Fulgencio Batista. The leader shared much similarity to the Shah. Batista's rule was characterized through an extremely personalized rule, deep networks of corruption, and severe repression which eventually weakened his control of the military and alienated the civil society of Cuba.²⁸⁰ With the economic problems developing and a harsh leadership, Fidel Castro's July 26th movement gave a quick and satisfying answer to those desperate for a voice and change. Fidel Castro was able to craft a national narrative in a way to help unify the country under his cause. It should also be mentioned that he was heavily inspired by a revolutionary hero who was staunchly an anti-imperialist nationalist, humanist, and had great sympathy for the poor, Jose Marti.²⁸¹ His job was made easier by the fact Cuban politicians could not withstand the pressure and influence of the United States and this helped promote the ideas of democracy and nationalism, widely appealing throughout the diverse social classes.²⁸² However, this was not necessarily what the outcome of the revolution was. Many wealthy Cubans had paid and contributed five to ten million pesos, but they had only done this on the premise that there would be a restoration of a constitutional government and a respect

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid. 19.

²⁸¹ Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. 61.

²⁸² Foran, "Theorizing the Cuban Revolution," 19.

for capitalism.²⁸³ Despite his authoritarian tendencies, Castro also enjoyed much support from the moderates in Cuba during the revolution.

Analysis of Structural Change

In line with the analysis applied to the Iranian Revolution and the structural changes leading up to it, it is prudent to give the same consideration to the changes leading up to the Cuban Revolution. Though the events happened in different decades and the economic conditions, country size, and geographical locations differed greatly, one can trace similar structural shifts and uneven developments in Cuba as in Iran. This analysis will highlight once again the special economic relationship Cuba had with the United States, what economic and social changes Cuba had been experiencing in the lead up to the movement, in addition to what structural changes indicated signs of uneven development in Cuba.

Many of these grand structural changes, uneven developments, and economic insecurities were hinted at quite heavily in the introduction, however, greater context is indeed necessary to highlight what exactly affected the day-to-day life of Cubans. One of the greatest stressors for Cubans was the Cuban economy's sole reliance on sugar. This devotion to sugar, while guaranteeing a market for goods and a certain time of year for high employment, came with costly disadvantages. These weaknesses meant that though there was a market to rely for this product, this market still fluctuated as all markets will. This placed an incredibly large portion of Cuba's economy at risk when these fluctuations occurred. Thomas reported that, "Changes of a percentage of a cent in the world market price of sugar not only meant the creation of ruin of fortunes in Cuba, but also indicated

²⁸³ M. Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*, 61.

whether ordinary life was intolerable or acceptable.”²⁸⁴ Besides affecting those who had capital in which to be tied or invest, the actual workforce that was involved with the sugar harvest and processing season comprised a large portion of the Cuban workforce. Approximately 500,000 people worked in this sector of the economy, nearly one third of the total workforce that numbered around 1.7 million.²⁸⁵ This meant that for about half a year this massive sector of the workforce must produce and retain enough money to last throughout the rest of the year. This seasonal work additionally meant that there would continuously be some group unemployed. However, much like Iran, this is difficult to reconcile with the claimed positive development occurring in Cuba.

Cuba, in the lead up to the revolutionary movements, was in one of the best positions in terms of economic and social development indicators in all Latin America. Some of these indicators consisted of: having the highest per capita income in the region; having the most television sets; ranking first in telephones, newspapers, private automobiles, and rail mileage per square mile; 58 percent of all housing had electricity; 76 percent of the population was literate which placed Cuba fourth highest in Latin America.²⁸⁶ However, as the World Bank noted, “...for the nation as a whole, the prosperity of the past ten years has tended to obscure the fact that changed world conditions, increased labor costs in Cuba and progress in other sugar-producing countries have reduced her [Cuba’s] capacity to compete in more limited markets.”²⁸⁷ These prosperity markers amongst the certain growth of the Cuban economy, albeit in a single

²⁸⁴ Thomas, Hugh. “The Origins of the Cuban Revolution,” in *Fidel Castro’s Personal Revolution in Cuba*, ed. Lewis Hanke (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 22.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 296.

²⁸⁷ Truslow, Francis Adams. Report on Cuba (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1951)

direction, certainly obscured the struggles and sufferings of a majority of Cuban peoples. The 1950's World Bank report foreshadowed quite accurately the issues that would plague Cuba in years leading up to the revolution. The World Bank further stated that an estimated annual increase of 25,000 persons available for employment was not being seriously considered by Cuba.²⁸⁸ This trend continued until the late 1950's. Perez documented that, "Between 1955 and 1958 only 8,000 new jobs were created in industry, a period in which an estimated 150,000 young men joined the wage labor force."²⁸⁹ Not only were these demands of a growing workforce needing employment, but the population already suffered greatly with large numbers of unemployed. Nearly 60 percent of the total labor force wavered permanently between conditions of unemployment and underemployment.²⁹⁰ What began to exacerbate these conditions was that the Cuban sugar market inevitably began to decline in the lead up to the revolution.²⁹¹ The highly seasonal workers began to suffer even more as wages for sugar workers began declining alongside the market failings. A sugar worker who earned a daily wage of \$5 in 1951 actually earned less, only \$4.35 per day in 1955.²⁹² And as the Cuban sugar market fell, other sectors of the society felt the shifts. Workers in the industries of transportation, tobacco, henequen, and manufacturing underwent an estimated 20 percent drop in wages during the years of 1951 and 1955.²⁹³ That same inflation took its toll on a growing middle class in Cuba. Inflation in the mid-1950's was such that basic foodstuffs in some regions of the island had reached as much

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. 301.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Thomas, Hugh. "The Origins of the Cuban Revolution." 21.

²⁹² Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. 300.

²⁹³ Ibid.

as 40 percent and the thoughts of homeownership for the middle class were quickly fading as the real estate values in Havana began to soar.²⁹⁴

The unpredictability of the Cuban sugar market and its sweeping effects on the rest of the country was only made worse by the stark contrasts across the island. Many of the disparities were represented by either regional lines or vast rural/urban divides. The praiseworthy positive development indicators above overshadowed these divides. Though 58 percent is indeed a high per housing number to be electrified, only 9 percent of rural homes had been electrified compared to the 87 percent of all urban housing units.²⁹⁵ Havana was a particularly arresting example of the divide between rural and urban. Ibarra noted that, “Although Havana residents made up only 26.3% of the total population, they lived in 52% of the urban homes with electricity, 60% of those with running water, and 65% of those with indoor toilets. In contrast, people in the countryside lived in flimsy houses without water (85%), indoor toilets (54%), or electricity (93%).”²⁹⁶ Furthermore, that same percentage of the population in Havana lived on just .5 percent of the national territory but accounted for 80 percent of all construction, 60 percent of all automobiles, 73 percent of all telephones, and overall 62 percent of the salaries and wages.²⁹⁷ However, the gaps were not limited to infrastructure or positive signs of economic development.

In indicators for access to healthcare, access to education, and education itself, there were also great disparities. Sixty percent of the country’s physicians and 62 percent of the dentists worked in the Havana with a hospital bed for every 195 inhabitants.²⁹⁸ This divide

²⁹⁴ Ibid. 298.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. 302-304.

²⁹⁶ Jorge Ibarra, *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), 161.

²⁹⁷ Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. 302-304.

²⁹⁸ Ibarra, Jorge. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958*. 161.

certainly surfaced in the health of rural Cubans as well. An astonishing number of rural children were plagued with intestinal parasites and about half of all Cubans registered some degree of undernourishment, with rural workers having an average of a 1,000 calorie deficit and 16 percent registering under the average healthy weight and height.²⁹⁹ This rural urban divide pervaded similarly into the realms of education. Rural illiteracy was four times greater than in the cities.³⁰⁰ A further example is the divide between enrollment rates in Havana versus the rest of the island. Havana's school registration had reached a high 74 percent while the other regions of the island suffered dramatically high illiteracy rates with Oriente reaching a 35.5 percent illiteracy rate.³⁰¹ This was further exemplified by the sheer concentration of the educated population living in Havana. Sixty percent of the country's secondary school graduates, fifty percent of the island's vocational school graduates, and seventy percent of the university graduates of the island all resided in Havana.³⁰²

In addition to these, there were more aspects that characterized the uneven nature of development in Cuba. Class structures differed greatly across the rural urban boundary.

Ibarra summarizes this divide as:

The economically active population above fourteen years of age in the capital included 20.6% of persons employed in industry, 6.2% in transport, and 6% in construction – sectors composed chiefly of the working class – whereas 42% grouped in the services and 18% in commerce represented essentially the middle class...In the rest of the country, 15% of the economically active population was employed in the industry, 4.3% in transport, and 2% in construction, making up the working class (primarily urban), whereas only 13% worked in services and 9% in commerce, constituting, in broad terms, a middle class. Meanwhile, 54% of the economically active population in the countryside labored in agriculture.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ M. Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*. 29.

³⁰⁰ Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. 302-304.

³⁰¹ Ibarra, Jorge. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958*. 162.

³⁰² M. Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*. 30.

³⁰³ Ibarra, Jorge. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958*. 162.

Besides the shocking disparity between rural and urban divides in education, infrastructure, ownership, and class structure, there were also other forms of suffering plaguing the population in the lead up to the revolution in Cuba.

The underemployed, unemployed, unemployable, and poor began to weigh heavily on Cuban society in the lead up to the revolution in addition to these disparities. Perez provides a summation of the sheer amount of those suffering from poverty in Cuba:

Urban slums ringed the capital. The neighborhoods of Luyano, Jesus del Monte, and Las Yaguas were crowded with tens of thousands of poor, unemployed, and unemployable, living in squalor and destitution, eight to a room in hovels of tin sheeting and cardboard without sanitary facilities, garbage collection, sidewalks, or street lighting, and increasingly without hope. Many wandered about aimlessly, without work and some without motivation, many crippled, maimed, and ill, living off public welfare and private charity. Many were petty criminals, peddlers, and panhandlers, or, at best, bootblacks, newspaper vendors, car washers, and dishwashers. More than five thousand beggars walked the streets of Havana in 1958.³⁰⁴

When consideration is given to the shocking disparity felt in Cuba, only vaguely veiled by the positive development indicators, and especially felt along the rural and urban divide, it is shocking that the discontent from these developments had not boiled over into a revolution earlier. These small victories of development, such as greatest number of television sets or automobiles, may have temporarily covered the authoritarian regime in the international realm, but Cubans suffered heavily under that same regime so strongly supported by the United States government. However, the Cuban state was becoming increasingly unstable beneath the massive burdens of both underdevelopment and uneven development across the island. What little tokens of development offered to the people of Cuba quickly became an insufficient payment to maintain power.

³⁰⁴ Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. 304.

State Instability

The Cuban state before the revolution was not so different from the Shah's regime. Aloof, disconnected, isolated, and militaristic, Batista was also a U.S.-backed authoritarian leader who guaranteed an endless supply of, not oil, but sugar. It is impossible to examine state instability without accounting for the United States' sugar demand and the market thereof. Perhaps the U.S. weighed more heavily in the Cuban Revolution due to the shorter distance between the U.S. and Cuba versus Iran. Being only 90 miles from the tip of the Florida Keys, the U.S. was an ever-present influence. The sugar market, almost wholly dictated by the United States' economic demands, directly translated into how the Batista regime governed. Moreover, all the actions of the state reflected a shoring up of the sugar market for the United States while having little regard for securing its own legitimacy from the Cuban people. The regime was harshly oppressive against any demands for popular participation alongside being highly interventionist within the Cuban economy, placing the regime in a position of sole responsibility for failing in the economic, structural, and social development across the island. This remains true in this analysis, as the Batista regime in the lead up fits all the criteria of an oppressive, inflexible, and hyperactive state.

Though the Cuban economy had been determined by the desire for sugar of the U.S., the Batista coup and subsequent regime that followed were the overt institutional manifestation of such a desire, as the United States quickly approved and then supported the military regime. Perhaps the best indicator for just how the United States viewed Cuba, and therefore what leadership was best suited for Cuba was a quote by acting CIA director Allen Dulles in 1959, "[Cubans] had to be treated more or less like children... they had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of almost

anything.”³⁰⁵ This quote exemplified both the indifference the United States government had for Cubans, and secondly demonstrates the attitude the United States government took in dealing with Cuba. This position of control or domination of Cuba by the U.S. was certainly an effort to keep the massive investments made by the U.S. and U.S. companies under U.S. control. A large percentage of the sugar mills themselves were United States owned in addition to many public utilities in Havana plus banks and the railways.³⁰⁶ Besides these key industries, the United States also controlled many sugar plantations directly and the important Electric Bond and Share, both which received notably large percentages of the national economic surplus, which allowed them to, “...dominate the domestic social classes...” and ensured the, “...subordination and dependent character of the sugar bourgeoisie and domestic industry.”³⁰⁷ This domination of the Cuban economy had deep, longstanding historical roots. After the War of 1895 in Cuba, there began a slow denationalization of the country’s wealth. The trends of this denationalization and “decapitalization followed three trends: the U.S. plantations began receiving the best allocated plots of land from both the quality and geographical view, considering the location of ports. This left domestic sugar plantation owners at a severe structural disadvantage. Most U.S. sugar plantations utilized their own networks of railroad systems leaving the Cuban sugar mills to use public rail and road systems, allowing the U.S. to regulate the commercial value of sugar; and lastly U.S. sugar plantations accounted at one point for 55 percent of the sugar production in the 1930s, allowing them to fix the

³⁰⁵ Lievesley, Geraldine. *The Cuban Revolution: Past, Present and Future Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 11.

³⁰⁶ Thomas, Hugh. “The Origins of the Cuban Revolution.” 21.

³⁰⁷ Ibarra, Jorge. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958*. 14.

commercial value of sugar by lowering production costs significantly.³⁰⁸ However dramatically intertwined the U.S. business interests were with sugar production, this relationship did not exist exclusively with sugar as the U.S. had additional investments to safeguard. Between the years of 1936 and 1958, the U.S. investment in Cuba expanded rapidly in the area of industry and manufacturing, increasing from \$27 million to \$80 million in addition to investments in oil refineries which jumped from only \$6 million to \$90 million and mining which grew from \$15 million to \$180 million.³⁰⁹ These investments did not reflect a U.S. American hopefulness in the future of Cubans, but were direct investments in U.S. American interests competing on the ground with Cuban industries. Ibarra effectively highlights the sheer number of U.S. businesses and their domination of the Cuban economy:

...the Burroughs Flour Mill, supplied 65% of national consumption of flour from 1952 to 1956; the remaining 35% was imported from the United States...Of the 87,000 weaving looms on the island in 1949, the Hedges Company owned 72,000, and 80% of the production of detergents, 67% of laundry soap, 41% of toothpastes, and 31% of bath soap were manufactured by two U.S. monopolies, Proctor and Gamble and Colgate-Palmolive...The Portland Cement Company, a branch of the Lone Star Cement Company, accounted for almost all of the cement production until 1957. Three oil-refining companies, Esso Standard Oil, Texaco, and Shell, controlled the production of gasoline in the country, and the Owens-Illinois Company made most of the glass used in Cuba.³¹⁰

The dominance of the Cuban economy by the United States is vital to understand how the Batista regime was seen in the lead up to the Cuban revolution. As the harsh, militaristic regime was quickly accepted by the U.S., Batista also, perhaps unknowingly, positioned his government to take the blame for the continued intervention of the United States into Cuban affairs. The addiction the United States had to Cuban sugar created a devotion of an

³⁰⁸ Ibid. 14-15.

³⁰⁹ Ibid. 18.

³¹⁰ Ibid. 18-19.

enormous sector of the Cuban economy to its production. Thus, the United States and eventually the Batista regime, became responsible for the continued instability in the Cuban economy. The historical U.S. involvement and the Batista regime are inextricably linked to one another, in addition to the U.S. completely approving of and for some time supporting directly, Batista's rule. In this way, the actions of the United States, and by extension the Batista regime, can be classified as highly hyperactive.

Along these same lines, the Cuban government, even dating before the direct dictatorship underneath Batista, could also be classified as highly inflexible in responding to developments and the desires of Cubans. While the best example of this is already covered, the continuous indulgence of the U.S. market's need for sugar, there was also the apparent noninterest in stimulating any other sector of the economy. Dominguez argued that, "For the most part, governments under the second twentieth-century political system in Cuba did not have policies for economic growth..."³¹¹ However, the inflexibility of the regime was not just one of apathetic or indifferent actions. Though violence had long played a role in Cuban politics, under the Batista regime it became state-based repression of any new groups desirous of political participation. This repression came in two forms: the Batista government's choice to restrict freedoms of press, association, and political activity; and the other was the harsher repression in the forms of torture and murder of members of the opposition.³¹² Underneath severe repression, restrictions of freedom, inactivity to act on part of the languishing Cuban economy and its subjugation to the United States, the last support from the United States ended when the military was cut off from

³¹¹ Dominguez, Jorge I. *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1978), 0-91.

³¹² *Ibid.* 124-125.

shipments of weapons to the Batista regime.³¹³ This was ultimately the last straw for those left supporting the regime and there was little legitimacy to stand on. The government had developed to a point of extreme inflexibility and that, alongside its continued hyperactivity, eventually brought the Batista regime to its knees through revolution.

Agency, Ideology, and Participants

While it is established that Cuba underwent uneven structural development suffering under an increasingly unstable government, without leadership and ideology a full vision of what occurred in the revolution cannot be gleaned. Castro's leadership and his vision, particularly its interpretation by Cubans, was key to creating a revolutionary movement. Before fully delving into the complete analysis of what ideologies and leaderships were present to help facilitate a revolutionary movement in Cuba, it is prudent to reiterate just how much the Cuban population was truly suffering from structural concerns and uneven development on the island and how these sufferings affected Cubans.

Structural sufferings, be it physical, financial, or otherwise, are stressors that work to make a population susceptible to change. In accordance with the analysis presented in the structural change section, sugar was the main culprit for economic insecurity and instability in the daily life of Cubans. A miniscule change in the sugar market could have had wide-ranging consequences not only in the wealthiest hands of capital investors, but it also determined how tolerable or satisfactory normal life was in Cuba.³¹⁴ It cannot be emphasized enough how uncertain daily life was in Cuba, in addition to a steady increase

³¹³ Ibid. 131.

³¹⁴ Thomas, Hugh. "The Origins of the Cuban Revolution." 22.

and ultimately a boom in factors contributing to a desire for change. Ibarra highlights what mundane concerns were present and what outcome they had on Cuban society:

At the forefront of the tensions were fears of losing or not finding employment, being evicted, falling ill and not receiving medical attention, racial discrimination, and inability to pay the cost of children's education. Cuban workers simply wanted job security, not the living standard of labor aristocracy... at the same time it [Cuban society] found itself threatened by unemployment and poverty, it could identify itself with a popular and national revolution. In any event, there was sufficient social instability and poverty in Cuban society to mobilize 90% of the population in support of a revolutionary project.³¹⁵

This wide range of structural sufferings, as stated, reached all groups and is what ultimately allowed to a broad coalition of forces uniting in revolution. However, this suffering alone was not enough to produce such a movement, but the ideology that Castro employed certainly produced the desired effects of uniting groups across regional and class boundaries.

The Leader and his Ideas

Castro, much like Khomeini in Iran, perhaps did not initially realize how wide-ranging the desire for change was in Cuban society. People were suffering across almost all levels of society, be it those poor, rural peasants seeking basic needs, or the new elites wanting a voice in society. However, much like Iranians leading up to the revolution, there was nowhere to turn for answers, only a repressive regime controlled by a world power. But there was Castro.

Castro, from his early years, was highly influenced by not only radical notions of socialism and communism but also a fondness for all ideology that prescribed an alternative future. This greatly inspired what became Castro's own vision for Cuba's future. The narratives, stories, dreams, and calls for change all revolved around general ideas of change

³¹⁵ Ibarra, Jorge. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958*, 174.

for Cuba focusing on principles holding a broader appeal across demographic lines. Nationalism, reform, development, welfare, and democracy all featured heavily. This contradicts ideas of radical communism or militantism which Castro is more generally characterized with. However, this was an intentional reframing of Castro's campaign to seize control of Cuba. He called upon both historical, national narratives for change and appealed to broad sentiments of discontent with hopeful ideas of a more egalitarian Cuba. This can be traced quite simply through the developments of his speeches and proclamations throughout the revolution into the lead up of state seizure. Even the earliest of radical speeches, Castro's plans commonly presented themes featured heavily in the programs of the Ortodox party of the late 1940s and early 1950s and ideas similar to the intellectual Catholics of the era.³¹⁶ Castro was building upon roots of long held belief, or minimally, ideas that remained to some degree in the national consciousness. Wilkerson documents just this aspect of commonality and tracing of national awareness:

In the Declaration of the Sierra Maestra, Castro restated the primary concepts of all Latin American democratic-reform movements; that is, nationalism, agrarian reform, industrialization, social welfare, political democracy, freedom of the press and speech, and massive public education. Nothing in his program was new to Cubans – it had all been set down before in that comprehensive, particularized, social document, the Constitution of 1940. Castro recognized the likeness and promised to restore the Constitution.³¹⁷

Instead of violent overthrow and radical communism, the main concepts of most documents focused primarily upon political change, legitimacy, and cleaning up of government. Ideas of radical socioeconomic content decreased and thoughts of moderate nationalism and freedom from the heel of the United States resurfaced.³¹⁸ This can be

³¹⁶ Dominguez, Jorge I. *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. 130.

³¹⁷ Wilkerson, Loree. "I am a Marxist." In *Fidel Castro's Personal Revolution in Cuba*, ed. Lewis Hanke (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 42.

³¹⁸ Dominguez, Jorge I. *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. 130.

traced iteration for iteration of new proposals as more specific policies slipped away and were replaced by general goals of nationalism, freedom, and reform. Dominguez documents this slippage of concreteness into something more ambiguous and appealing:

Castro's 1955 "Manifiesto to the People of Cuba" was far less specific about land reform and profit sharing... The Twenty-sixth of July manifesto of 1956, however, was much less specific on these issues. Its social and economic planks emphasized social harmony rather than social conflict and showed a strong Roman Catholic influence in the language and thought... In Castro's 1957 manifesto from the Sierra Maestra mountains, written together with Felipe Pazos and Raul Chibas, the profit-sharing provision had vanished.³¹⁹

Clearly evidenced here was the move away from specific policy goals that Castro had in mind and moved back towards ideas more palatable for a wide variety of groups. Perhaps the best evidence of this is an excerpt from Castro's *History Will Absolve Me*:

What is inconceivable is that there should be men going to bed hungry while an inch of land remains unsown; what is inconceivable is that there should be children who die without medical care; that thirty percent of our campesinos cannot sign their names and ninety-nine percent don't know the history of Cuba; that most families in our countryside should be living in worse conditions than the Indians Columbus found when he discovered the most beautiful land human eyes had ever seen... More than half of the best cultivated production lands are in foreign hands. In Oriente, the largest province, the lands of the United Fruit Company and the West Indian Company extend from the north coast to the south coast... Cuba continues to be a factory producing raw materials. Sugar is exported to import candles; leather exported to import shoes; iron exported to import plows.³²⁰

Broad appeals to emotion, those suffering in poverty, children without medical care, and a reinforcement of a foreign, malevolent presence on the island are all aimed at captivating the greatest number of people, no matter what demographic. In addition to these wide, inoffensive appeals, Castro also fully placed himself in a tradition of martyrs and revolutionaries by evoking these same sentiments.

³¹⁹ Ibid. 129.

³²⁰ Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. 61.

Dynamics of a Movement

As with Khomeini in the Iranian revolution, Castro did not act alone nor in a bubble. There were indeed many events, participants, and signs of revolution and rebellion outside of Castro. Moreover, Castro was not only drawing upon a long lineage of rebellion and political activism in Cuba but that same system that had predated Castro was still functioning as a political counterweight, albeit less insurrectionist than Castro's movement. The remnants of a democratic system and the Auténtico party continued to persist underneath Batista's harsh political repression. In addition to the organized remnants of this party, there were also the leaders outside of Castro's band, which was confined to the Cuban highlands for most of the insurrection and revolution. These "lowland" leaders caused greater harm and proved even more effective than Castro's band of rebels in weakening and eventually defeating the Batista regime which effectively paved the way for Castro to march into Havana. Standing in the shadow cast by Castro amongst the lowland leaders and the *políticos* were also workers and others inspired to independent action, all of whom eventually fade into the background as Castro increasingly becomes the figure of the opposition. However, it is still important to ask why these groups so quickly faded to the background and why was Castro so quickly installed, or at least faced little opposition from these other revolutionaries? The answer to this lies in the already discussed all-encompassing ideology Castro carefully crafted.

The Políticos

Before Batista came to power there existed, as in Iran before the Shah's return, a democratic government. And while this government was overpowered and overthrown by a Batista that would soon be fully endorsed by the United States, the political structure and

a few of the leaders who participated in this government refused to disappear from public political consciousness. These politicians represented the non-insurrectionary opposition to Batista's regime, indeed they often called to abstain from violence altogether. Ameringer goes as far to say that this group, "...represented the spirit of Cuban democracy, standing for the Constitution of 1940, and functioned from the day that Batista seized power on March 10, 1952, until the Cienfuegos uprising on September 5, 1957, when Batista intensified his tyranny."³²¹ While Castro was continuing references to the democratic constitution of 1940, this group continued nonviolent opposition in the face of an extremely hostile regime. These representatives maintained an agenda and continued to speak out against Batista, especially when he refused to follow through on false statements of appeasements following his military coup. They made these oppositional claims in no uncertain terms, often citing the continually deteriorating economic situation in Cuba. In a publication titled "One Year of Dictatorship," the Auténticos blamed Batista for a recession Cuba was experiencing and the misery it caused, accused him of regressing the state of Cuban labor such as benefits and wages, an inadequate sugar harvest, and the fact the Cuban treasury had shifted from a surplus to a deficit despite Batista having increased taxation.³²² They went even further ending their publication with an overt call to action stating that, "In times as these, inaction, silence, or cowardice is a crime."³²³ One of the most important leaders within this group was Tony Varona. Though he would go on to vehemently condemn Castro's regime, he also maintained a staunch and continuous resistance to the Batista Regime. Having served as the Prime Minister of Cuba and later

³²¹ Charles D. Ameringer, "The Auténtico Party and the Political Opposition in Cuba, 1952-57," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 64 (2), 1985. 327-351. 327.

³²² *Ibid.* 333-334.

³²³ *Ibid.* 334.

the president of the Cuban Senate, he very much represented the establishment that had been replaced by Batista. He maintained a careful distance from Castro's activities, particularly encouraging nonviolence. When Castro's revolutionaries attacked at Moncada, Varona confirmed the Auténtico party was not involved but laid blame for the bloodshed completely at Batista's feet and explained that this was the Cuban youth "fulfilling its patriotic duty."³²⁴ Though their power would eventually fade and be supplanted by Castro's opposition to Batista, the Auténticos played a significant role in continually reminding both the Batista regime and the Cuban people that its rule was corrupt and illegitimate. Ameringer summarizes its contribution to opposition:

Throughout its [Batista regime] rule, they [Auténticos] denied its legitimacy and constantly bore witness to its violations of the basic rights of Cubans. They reminded Cubans of their lost freedoms and extolled their virtues as a people concerned with due process and the dignity of the individual. They fostered the attitude that the Batista regime was abnormal, an aberration that would pass.³²⁵

The Lowlanders

Castro conducted much of his insurrectionary guerilla activity from high in the Sierra Maestra mountains far removed from the struggles of the urban worker, peasant farmer, or some of the entrenched and remaining political opposition to Batista. Yet, Castro alone was not the only opposition to Batista. Indeed, the Auténticos had been peacefully pushing back against Batista since the coup. However, there were other groups and leaders that were in insurrection before Castro came down from his mountaintop. Some of these leaders were connected to Castro's July 26th Movement and others were operating independently of his group in the mountains. It is understood that those operating outside of the better-sheltered and shorter-lived highland group, such as those clandestine urban

³²⁴ Ibid. 335.

³²⁵ Ibid. 350.

revolutionaries, suffered greater casualties but were ultimately more effective in damaging Batista's regime.³²⁶ This section highlights some of those often-overlooked actors and groups who fought against the Batista regime.

Of the groups, however, Castro's July 26th Movement (M-26-7) was the best organized and largest opposition movements, especially late in the revolutionary struggle. In 1957, the M-26-7 was particularly strong and well organized in the cities of Santiago and Havana which compared to Castro's section of the group which numbered a miniscule 18 members in January that year.³²⁷ One of the most important leaders of the movement outside of the highlands and Castro's inner circle was Frank País. Martinez-Fenandez details just how vital País was to the movement stating that he, "...stands out in the annals of Cuban history as the individual who most emphatically and successfully challenged Castro's desire for absolute control."³²⁸ País became increasingly important as he led insurrectionist activities out of the highlands and in urban and rural areas across the island. In particular, in 1956, he led a group of insurrectionists in sabotage in Matanzas that derailed a locomotive for the Conchita sugar mill and hit railway branches of Jovellanos in the railroad's main yard.³²⁹ More than his activities in directing and carrying out direct insurrectionary actions such as sabotage, País also played a large role in the organization of the movement especially in the lowland area of the Oriente. He developed workers' cells in order to coordinate large scale strikes as soon as popular insurrection occurred and to teach sabotage skills that could be carried out in manufacturing and production

³²⁶ Luis Martinez-Fernandez, *Revolutionary Cuba: A History* (University of Florida Press, 2014). 30.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid. 31.

³²⁹ Gladys Marel Garcia-Perez, *Insurrection and Revolution: Armed Struggle in Cuba, 1952-1959* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1998). 72-73.

industries.³³⁰ Not only were his efforts directed toward reaching those outside of the movement, but he also strove to establish a greater coordination within the movement as well. For example, in 1957 he notified Castro the lowlands based National Directorate would establish policies and strategies for the future of the movement, therefore subordinating Castro's highland revolutionaries.³³¹ Moreover, País was the impetus behind the development of the Civic Resistance Movement (MRC). The MRC was aimed at attracting and gaining the support of professionals, businesspeople, intellectuals, and industrialists who otherwise may be weary of acting as outright insurrectionists.³³² While the movement had already comprised groups from all classes and backgrounds, this was directed solely at the middle to upper classes. These more affluent and connected members of the movement would become, "...valuable and responsible leadership, to be trained to assist with the middle class in the dissemination of propaganda and collection of funds."³³³ However, in July of 1957, País was gunned down by army officials in Santiago, leaving a void. This left only Castro to impose complete authority over the movement and, having lost a charismatic potential challenger, Castro quickly, "...appointed new leaders who lacked the independent spirit of País and the popularity and stature that had allowed País to keep Castro's authoritarian inclinations in check."³³⁴

Other Groups

The M-26-7 movement was not alone in opposition to Batista's rule. Besides sporadic actions amongst the Cuban citizenry as the revolutionary struggle progressed,

³³⁰ Ibid. 85.

³³¹ Luis Martinez-Fernandez, *Revolutionary Cuba: A History*. 31.

³³² Gladys Marel Garcia-Perez, *Insurrection and Revolution: Armed Struggle in Cuba, 1952-1959*. 85.

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Luis Martinez-Fernandez, *Revolutionary Cuba: A History*. 33.

there were also other organized movements taking place. One in particular was the Student Revolutionary Directorate (DR) headed by José Antonio Echeverría. The DR conducted operations also in mostly urban centers and was at one point even larger than the M-26-7 in Havana.³³⁵ At the height of its size and influence, the DR even staged an attempted insurrection themselves. In March 1957 the DR, having gathered enough weapons to carry out a drastic action, attacked the presidential palace and the Radio Reloj station in an effort to spark a greater people's revolution. However, this "arguably suicidal" assault on the presidential palace did come close to its objective and the radio station was briefly captured, the effort ultimately ended in failure and 29 rebels were killed in the gun fight.³³⁶ After this, the DR dispersed and joined other insurrectionist guerilla groups.³³⁷

Another figure acting as a counterweight to Batista and to balance Castro's movement was ex-president Prío. Prío was not just a public figure and recognizable face, but also had considerable support. He was backed by the more radical faction of the remaining Auténticos and commanded the Directorio Obrero Revolucionario (Workers' Revolutionary Directorate).³³⁸ His armed wing of supporters, called the Organización Auténtica (Authentic Organization, OA) even attempted forming a guerilla force of their own. However, on a way to secure a base for the formation of this new group in the Oriente Province, government forces intercepted and killed many of the rebels including their leader Calixto Sánchez.³³⁹ This was an effort to establish a group by Prío to rival Castro's group as his influence began to grow.³⁴⁰ Though his intention here was to combat Castro's

³³⁵ Ibid. 30.

³³⁶ Ibid. 32.

³³⁷ Gladys Marel Garcia-Perez, *Insurrection and Revolution: Armed Struggle in Cuba, 1952-1959*. 29.

³³⁸ Luis Martinez-Fernandez, *Revolutionary Cuba: A History*. 30.

³³⁹ Ibid. 32.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

influence and present a rival armed force, it was also Prío who provided the funds a month earlier for Castro to purchase the yacht *Granma* to transport Castro and his rebels back to Cuba from Mexico.³⁴¹

Evidence of Effective Ideology

It is the opinion of this thesis that all these groups would not have operated simultaneously towards the same goal without the ideology crafted by Castro. Minimally, Castro's effectiveness can certainly be seen in, if not how much direct help he received in the revolution, but how little opposition he faced in the end. Perhaps with an amount of help from wide-ranging structural discontentedness and insecurity, there came a broad support for change across differing demographic lines. It is well established now that perhaps some of the poorest struggled most, such as those permanently caught between unemployment and underemployment, seasonal workers, and those in slums ringing the cities or left behind in the countryside. However, the middle class and indeed some of the upper classes were caught into similar patterns of insecurity and uncertainty as the rest of the island. The middle class was in full crisis and by the mid-1950s suffered from political violence and personal insecurity with the, "...apparent affluence enjoyed by Cuba, however, concealed tensions and frustrations that extended both vertically and horizontally through Cuban society... and, together with an uncertain economy, contributed to eroding the security of middle class Cubans"³⁴² Besides the indirect suffering of frustrations, there were those who were directly choosing to help the fighters and those who consciously chose to withdraw their support of the Batista regime, something happening exponentially fast in the lead up to the fall of the government. It is documented that most of the fighters

³⁴¹ Ibid. 28.

³⁴² Perez, Louis A. Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*. 296.

were directly supported by the lower middle class and workers of Cuban society, but the hastening of the fall also involved those upper-middle class and upper-class sections and their withdrawal of support with evidence of organized departure at the upper-class levels.³⁴³ These organized notions of either direct withdrawal or at least a begrudging support of the revolution can be recognized in structures outside of the state establishment. For example, the Havana Bar and National Medical Associations attempted to make peace with Batista with a goal of ending the regime, but after the efforts were exhausted, they slowly began to support revolution.³⁴⁴ However, if there was one class with the greatest effect on how the revolution unfolded, like Iran, it was the working class. Ibarra highlights this:

Despite the position of the stable working class in the 1940s and 1950s, in the long run it was part of the oppressed strata of the national popular Cuban historical bloc and could not extricate itself from its political and social determinations. Thus, workers from large industries and public service enterprises finally emancipated themselves from the threat of dismissal and replacement by playing a decisive role in the 1958 general strike that helped to overthrow the Batista dictatorship.³⁴⁵

Ultimately, the economic conditions presented in almost every stratum of society partnered with such appealing ideologies gave way to a revolution supported by much of society, or at least garnered enough support or a withdrawal of support for the incumbent regime to fall. Moreover, the ingenuity of Castro and his movement cannot be underestimated in how their specific policies, which could be considered radical, shifted, and gave way to broadly appealing notions of reform, democracy, and freedom from the domination of the United States. Though ultimately there came little of what was promised than perhaps an eviction of the United States from the island, the promises and appeals to old, deeply held egalitarian

³⁴³ Dominguez, Jorge I. *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. 125.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁵ Ibarra, Jorge. *Prologue to Revolution: Cuba, 1898-1958*, 103.

ideals of the Cuban people and older revolutionaries propelled Castro to the top of a new regime following the revolution. Perhaps without these ideals, the inflated evidence of development and economic growth could have been enough to stop such a movement, however, this was not the case.

Results: Consolidation

Cuba did indeed undergo a series of changes following the revolution and the takeover of revolutionary Castro. While no war followed the revolution, the disengagement with the United States was swift and harsh, with relations remaining soured. However, there was improvement in some areas that made good the promises echoed throughout the revolution. Quality of life indicators improved, especially in the sectors of employment and education. In between the years of 1962 and 1969, an unemployment estimate was made around 4.7 percent, a great improvement from the 1950s.³⁴⁶ In addition to this, education and health indicators improved greatly.³⁴⁷ What was not delivered upon were the calls of inclusive governance or a more egalitarian political system. Though there was a wide swath of the population participating in the revolutionary movement and most importantly the strikes that eventually toppled the regime most effectively, a democratic transition was not in the making for Cuba. Instead, there was not a plan but Castroism. Perez summarizes the situation astutely:

Its [the revolution] socialist character was apparently neither intrinsic to its original ideological content nor essential to its initial political ascendancy...Fidel Castro was not from the outset a communist, that leadership was based on charismatic authority and in part legitimized by a rising swell of nationalism, served to obscure the implications of Cuban radicalism.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ M. Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Courses, and Legacy*, 91.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. 92-93.

³⁴⁸ Louis A. Perez Jr., *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*, 332.

This was made clear by the eventual formation of a communist party to lead Cuba and to completely forgo the idea of a democratic, socialist society. Those groups, especially the middle classes lacking any effective political institutions or ideologies with which to defend their interests themselves and seeing that there would be no inclusion as originally promised, fled by the tens of thousands to the United States.³⁴⁹ With massive outward movement, this meant any counterrevolutionary movement came from outside the island. This essentially closed any possibility for an internal, sustainable challenge to the revolution.³⁵⁰ Sadly, any outside push against the revolution ultimately ended up as an extension of United States' foreign policy, with the CIA funding much of the action, and as Perez puts it, "Their ultimate demise was nothing less than a function of their original ascendancy."³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ Ibid. 335.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. 336.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

Chapter 7: Findings and Conclusion

Abstract: This chapter serves as the conclusion of the thesis. Reiterating some of the aforementioned points within the thesis, the chapter also covers the merits for analysis of each case, potential weaknesses found in this type of analysis, and covers once again the purpose of study. Following this section is a bibliography detailing the sources of this work.

Reiterating the map of revolution within the theory section of this thesis: it is supposed that wide-ranging structural change leads to state instability, or the inability of a state to recreate the status quo or integrate fresh demands for participation, creating an advantageous moment for competing leaderships and the ideologies, imaginaries, and stories they craft to seize power in or through revolution. The conclusion of this thesis is that the supposition above does indeed hold true for the two cases examined. Evidence has been presented and discussed documenting the sweeping structural shifts that unfolded in the months and years preceding the revolutions in Iran and Cuba. Iran saw not only extensive economic development from booming oil revenues and the subsequent industrial growth, but also the vast and deliberate jarring effects of the Shah's White Revolution which indeed intended to more than suggest a shock of cultural and economic upheaval to Iranian society. Tens of thousands of Iranians felt these effects, whether they be those forced into shantytowns surrounding Tehran as family lands were torn from underneath their feet, or others who belonged to newly created groups such as industrial workers or the urban poor who languished under the Shah's iron heel of rule as they became ever more desperate for a determining role in decisions of their future. Cubans found themselves no better off. Cuban society in the lead up to revolution was characterized by insecurity and inequality. U.S. investment and sugar profits filled accounts of many wealthy Cubans in

Havana, leading to some of the greatest wealth indicators such as high numbers of televisions, automobiles, and more as much of Cuba outside Havana toiled in dramatic underemployment in the sugar industry, often being employed for only the harvest, or just plain unemployment altogether. One bad harvest, one drop of investment, or one shift in the U.S. economy and it was felt across the island. So too in Cuba were shantytowns forming, a middle class growing, and a desire for participation rising.

Moreover, both Cubans and Iranians found themselves pressed against an inflexible and intolerably totalitarian state authority. Neither population had any means to vent frustration from the ever-increasing pressure placed upon them by burgeoning development, displacement, and doubts of the future. Both the Shah and Batista wielded their intelligence agencies with impunity and as an invaluable weapon of preventing the development of new leaderships or organizations motivated for change, or minimally hoping to highlight escalating struggles. Ironically, much of this suffering and pressure was directly caused by the state, only sealing its fate as a government incapable of compliantly adjusting to demands for change and the integration of these new groups. This only left the states in vulnerable positions with both becoming susceptible to alternative leaderships and ideologies for the recreation societal needs.

These vast shifts in society from development, modernization, industrialization, and all the displacement it caused began to break the norms by which people operated. Evidence of this can be seen as patterns of work changed, rural populations quickly became urban ones, or people saw themselves facing the demands of factory work when neither they nor the system that should protect them were prepared. People found themselves complaining, organizing, striking, and both passively and actively resisting the state. As

these norms and patterns broke down, Cubans and Iranians began searching, both consciously and unconsciously, for a new story that more closely resembled what they then needed. Ideas that would allow greater freedom of speech, independence from western domination, and solutions to widespread poverty, inequality, and other structural sufferings.

Castro and Khomeini appeared, or at least stood alone, at the height of this desire for change and the moment of greatest state instability. They crafted narratives and spoke of solutions, albeit in grand nonspecific manners, which greatly appealed to the masses. They spoke of national independence, food for all, an end to poverty, guarantees for workers, housing for the poor, rights for women, and most importantly, an end to the reign of corrupt authoritarian rule. Quickly, and correctly, they highlighted both regimes for the puppets they were. They drew support not by specific policy proposals they made but, and importantly so, the general democratic and populist ideals they preached. Through this, both Castro and Khomeini found themselves at the end of turbulent revolutions, alone on the thrones with tight grips on the reins of power.

This is not to establish that both revolutions were identical or that all others are as well. It is the proposal of a process or a course the revolution follows. This served to underline the most important structural indicators which produce revolutionary tendencies. Additionally, it explores by which terms and notions a state becomes inflexible and instable. It also emphasizes the ideologies utilized by leaders which bring the greatest numbers of supporters into the streets when the saturation for suffering is reached. There are indeed weaknesses to this type of explanation and analysis, however, it is also prudent

to reiterate the choice of these two revolutions once more and in what ways they were similar and dissimilar in the lead up to, moment, and culmination of revolution.

Merits for Analysis: Similarities and Differences

While similarities, if examined thoroughly enough, can soon become overwhelming in their abundance, upon first examination both revolutions appear to be significantly different. This is evidenced in the variety of labels and explanations offered to both cases. As discussed, Iran is often classified as a religious, Islamist revolution while Cuba as a communist revolution. This is a very logical classification if one operates on the assumption that the revolution preceding a certain form of government must necessarily be of that same ideology. It is indeed correct that both revolutions culminated in governments characterized by dramatically different ideologies on the surface. A theocracy dominated by Islam versus a communist governed regime are certainly distinct. Both revolutions also occurred in different geographical, cultural, and temporal contexts. However, it is perhaps because of these continuously emphasized dissimilarities that both cases merited additional, and still require more, analysis and explanation.

Because the Iranian revolution is so commonly characterized as an Islamic one and the Cuban as communist necessitates more analysis. It is difficult to comprehend how similar the developments of these revolutions are with the interference of these labels. Further labels, such as third world or anticolonialist movements are also unhelpful. These detract from the parallels of structural changes, ideologies, and leaderships that all contributed to the revolutions. Both Cuba and Iran experienced dramatic structural development and modernization in the lead up to their movements, albeit in a very uneven fashion. This unevenness highlighted longstanding inequalities in both countries.

Moreover, though both existed in a greatly differing geographical and cultural setting, they both were greatly influenced, if not dominated, by U.S. policy and economic needs. Both governments functioned to serve as an extension of U.S. authority and power in their respective regions. Additionally, both were highly dependent on U.S. economic support and investment, Iran through oil sales and Cuba through sugar. Similarities persisted in forms of governance before the revolution. Though Batista represented a militaristic dictator and the Shah a monarch, both were highly authoritarian and operated an extremely repressive state apparatus. Both leaders were also isolated, relying on little support from any sector of the population. This increased the likelihood that no one else could be blamed for the sufferings and repression of the population. Similarities extend to the leaderships that replaced both incumbent regimes. Both focused on populist rhetoric emphasizing freedoms, equality, and other democratic and economic reforms. Both Castro and Khomeini also deliberately withheld during the revolution ardent beliefs that were clearly expressed in both their earlier careers and certainly following their consolidations of power. Neither leader would ultimately fulfill all the promises made during the revolution.

Furthermore, the history of Cuba and Iran had more distinct similarities. Cuba and Iran in an earlier time mutually experienced a democratic government. Though both ultimately were extinguished with the approval of the U.S., the memory of these governments and the experience of democracy persisted in both Cuban and Iranian national consciousness. Another development shared by Cuba and Iran was the growth of a thriving middle class. This is often noted as an important indicator not only in modernization and economic growth, but also in democratization studies. Indeed, when viewed from beginning to end and especially considering experience with democratic governance, Cuba

and Iran were on track for a democratic revolution. This is especially true considering the multitude who turned out in protest, the diversity of strikers, and the overwhelming calls for freedoms of speech and desires for a more inclusive form of government. Why was this not the result? There are a multitude of reasons. One of the most important is that the development of new participating classes came so swiftly and repression remained constant so that there existed no incubation time for alternative, democratically minded leaders from these classes. Both Batista and the Shah maintained a push for development and a constant repression on any forms of participation. Upon review, these revolutions appear less as communist or theocratic in nature, but as democratic revolutions that were followed by authoritarian consolidations. This reason in itself is a substantial argument to bring analysis back to both revolutions.

Potential Shortcomings

This thesis was not an attempt to rewrite the book of revolution scholarship. Indeed, this study carefully follows the prescriptions made by previous experts and scholars in the field. With this historical approach, it enables greater emphasis of just how flesh and blood a revolution truly is and how much human suffering exists and must exist to force a revolution. This ends the reduction of a complex and stressful human movement into a set of data points and charts. Though these are important, it is equally important to understand what revolutionaries must have felt in these moments. To strive to understand how and why they might have put down their tools, went on strike, and went into the streets. With this type of analysis and the explanations given of structural sufferings, it is impossible to fully comprehend how much insecurity there existed without also understanding how much

human anxiety also existed. This allows us to connect more, to relate more, and ultimately understand more why these people acted.

More than the human element of revolution, this thesis also worked to follow through addressing other calls for adjustments to the discipline. The case selection itself is one. The cases, as stated, represent a more unique comparison than is found amongst other comparative studies. This selection reached across barriers that usually draw the lines for which cases can and cannot be compared. Though they are not notably called “great revolutions,” they deserve the same amount of attention and represent the same amount of intrigue as those of the French, Russian, or any others. Additionally, this thesis addresses the calls to “bring back in” issues of ideologies and leaderships that are often overlooked in the pursuit of highly structural explanations. However, there remain areas overlooked or other issues that could be addressed.

Considerable attention is often given in the analysis of the Iranian revolution of the clergy’s role and the importance of the mosque infrastructure within Iran. Indeed, more consideration should be given to the role of the clergy in Iranian revolution. The clergy were in many ways one of the only structures in existence after the Shah’s continued repression, one of the only legitimate outlets for speech and expression of discontentedness. However, caution should be taken when giving weight to the clergy’s role. Reasons for this caution are the multiple personalities within clergy and, until very late, Khomeini was not the least bit the only clergy member with influence. Also true is that if the clergy had played such a large role in the revolution and its ultimate consolidation, the new regime would appear quite different from what eventually emerged.

Another under observed aspect of the revolution in both cases were the multitude of seemingly spontaneously created groups which helped propel the revolution forward. Some of the most important groups were those of the workers who organized strikes and showed some of the first signs of an organized opposition. Additional parties also consisted of special interest groups who tried to negotiate with the incumbent regimes before ultimately supporting revolution. The dynamics of how these groups formed, who they consisted of, how they were led and organized all deserve much greater attention than can be given in this work. Striking white- and blue-collar workers played an invaluable role in both revolutions. However, what remains true is that each of these groups and their leaderships eventually followed the demands of either Castro or Khomeini or fell out of power as soon as each revolutionary leader took control.

What certainly deserves greater attention is even more analysis of the human experience in the lead up to and during the revolution. Greater focus on personal accounts, media, and literature of that time all would work towards a deeper understanding of just why someone may find themselves protesting in the streets. Though, this is true for every revolutionary movement. The closer to understanding the single, personal experience of revolution, the closer the discipline is to understanding the phenomenon as a whole. Moreover, it is true that every individual within such a revolution has their own reason for ceasing work and protesting. And each of these reasons forms a personal narrative or imaginary. However, it remains that there was substantial participation in both revolutions from every demographic of society. It is perhaps that the speeches and writings of both revolutionary leaders were so vague, so populist, and called so generally for democratic

changes that everyone who participated saw a piece of their own story represented in the rhetoric.

Purpose of Study

The question of purpose inevitably comes to mind when attempting explanations for revolution. With every event comes special circumstances that seem to signify utter dissimilarity. Every context, temporal, geographical, cultural, and more seem insurmountable barriers in the path of generalizability. This is certainly true when reflecting upon the diversity of explanations provided by the plethora of scholars on revolution, democratization, social movement theory, or other fields or subfields. Perhaps that is why those who are most successful present what could be considered a “grander” or further-reaching, less-specific vision of revolution theory. These more unified or greater generalizable theories serve not as concrete explanations, but useful lenses through which to view revolution. They provide general directions in which to begin a search for answers. They give a framework in which to insert certain indicators, actors, or events. This generalizability also necessitates both the study of agency and the contextualization of the structures in which those agents act and are affected by. One cannot be understood without the other. It is not structural change alone, nor is it the actor who behaves without the influence of structural change. Nor can every reaction to a structural change have a predicated, uniformed outcome. Generalizable theory is the framework upon which contextualization is built to create deeper understandings. Indeed, no movement will present as identical nor follow the same process. However, as theory and tools for analysis develop, so too do historical accounts. And the tradition of asking “why revolution?” is perpetuated.

This thesis has followed a long tradition of attempted explanations for one of the most confounding social phenomena. In this same tradition and following such a work, many have asked themselves, is it useful to attempt an understanding of revolution or create a generalizable pattern for prediction? Perhaps another science provides us with a useful answer. One cannot fully know the perfect conditions of a hurricane. We may know seasons and temperatures. We may know patterns of formation from past hurricanes. These tell us very little though, as the best conditions we may be aware of present themselves and often result in no storm. Then again, some hurricanes take place when no preexisting conditions appear. Even when we have an active hurricane, we can say little with certainty. Some deteriorate from the start. Some form and they look as they may strike, but then head back out to sea. However, some do eventually make landfall. And perhaps that is why we keep searching, contextualizing, and seeking understanding. As another scholar of revolution pointed out, “Who can be quite sure that this hurricane will not sooner or later destroy his [or her] own house?”³⁵²

³⁵² Sorokin, Pitirm. *The Sociology of Revolution* (New York: H. Fertig, 1967), 1.

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