

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Theses and Dissertations

Student Research

5-2001

Is there an Arab state?

Jeneen Hazem Ezzat

The American University in Cairo AUC

Follow this and additional works at: <https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds>



Part of the [Arabic Studies Commons](#), and the [Political Science Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

APA Citation

Ezzat, J. H. (2001). *Is there an Arab state?* [Master's Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.

<https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1849>

MLA Citation

Ezzat, Jeneen Hazem. *Is there an Arab state?*. 2001. American University in Cairo, Master's Thesis. *AUC Knowledge Fountain*.

<https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1849>

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact thesisadmin@aucegypt.edu.

IS THERE AN ARAB STATE?

JENEEN HAZEM EZZAT

2001

Thesis 2001/50

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

1
=

IS THERE AN ARAB STATE?

JENEEN HAZEM EZZAT

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY 2001

The American University in Cairo

2001/50

Is There an Arab State?

A Thesis Submitted by
Jeneen Ezzat

To the Department of Political Science
April /2001

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
The degree of Master of Arts

Has been approved by

Dr. Walid Kazziha

Thesis Committee Advisor

Affiliation-----

Pol Sci

Dr. Bahgat Korany

Thesis committee Reader

Affiliation-----

4/4/01

Dr. Emad Shahin

Thesis Committee Reader

Affiliation-----

Department Chair

Date

5/6/01

Dean of HUSS

Date

June 5, 2001

To Dad—but please, don't expect me to do a PhD. To mom—unfortunately, an MA doesn't mean I am going to get married. To Little Boy Badwawi—who kept me sane. To Hash—who made sure I didn't stay sane for too long. To Lanu—well, it's not a LED Degree, but nevertheless, it is an MA. To Dina—if I can do this, you can too. To Naila—just get university done first. To Khalto Shima and Uncle Aabood—in some way or the other, you guys always inspire me in everything I do.

To Wal—hey, I am recognizing you on your very own line, apart from the rest. Anyhow, I got it done. Told you I would.

By the way, I love all of you guys very much.
Lulu...you most of all.

ABSTRACT

The American University in Cairo

Is there an Arab State?

Jeneen Hazem Ezzat

Dr. Waleed Kazziha

The nature of the Arab state has been one that has perplexed many scholars. Most attempts to define the nature of the Arab state have centered on linking common characteristics shared by Arab states, and making these elements the base in forming the concept of an Arab state. However, amid this generalization of the Arab state, the unique differences that distinguish each state from one another has been lost.

Therefore, this dissertation seeks to redefine the basis upon which the concept of the Arab state has been built. Through examining the regime-society relationship within Arab states, this dissertation shall identify three types of Arab states, distinguished by society's degree of participation in shaping the state.

CONTENTS

DEDICATION	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
Chapter	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
Questioning the Concept of an Arab State	
Redefining the Arab State	
Arab Regimes and Their Respective Civil Societies	
2. THE ROLE OF THE STATE, REGIME, AND SOCIETY	9
The Role of the State	
The Roles of the Regime and Civil Society	
Syria, Egypt, and Jordan: Case Studies Exemplifying the Three Models of Arab States	
3. THE REGIME-STATE DILEMMA	23
The Ideological Foundation of the State	
The Political Foundation of the State	
The Economic Foundation of the State	
Conclusion: Reconciling the Arab State, Regime, and Society	

4. SOCIETY AND THE STATE	40
The Origins of Civil Society	
Defining Civil Society	
The Role of Civil Society	
Civil Society in the Arab State	
The Three Models of Arab Civil Society	
The Dynamics of Regime-Society Relations and its Effects on the State	
5. JORDAN: AN AUTHORITATIVE REGIME AND PARTICIPATORY CIVIL SOCIETY	56
Case Studies of Arab Regimes and Their Respective Civil Societies	
The Formation of the Jordanian State	
The Makings of an Authoritative Regime	
Civil Society in Jordan	
Conclusion: A New Arab State	
6. EGYPT: AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND INCIPIENT CIVIL SOCIETY	86
An Authoritarian Regime: The Nasserite Legacy Continues	
Civil Society in Egypt	
The Call for Political Liberalization	
Conclusion: An Arab State in a Stalemate	
7. SYRIA: TOTALITARIAN REGIME AND NOMINAL CIVIL SOCIETY ...	108
Dynamics behind the Regime-Society Relationship	
Viable Civil Society in Syria	
Conclusion: Breaking through the Syrian State	

8. CONCLUSION	132
Assessing the Regime-Society Relationship in the Arab State	
9. REFERENCE LIST	138

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Middle Eastern comparative politics has sought to explain the phenomenon of Arab states under a comprehensive model of state, based upon general or similar characteristics that Arab states share. But, is there 'an Arab state'? Whether in terms of Arab states' ideology or political and economic structures, little done to distinguish how Arab states actually vary from one another. In fact, the similar ideological, political, and economic foundations of Arab states have been emphasized in order to support the concept of 'an Arab state'. In the process, the important differences among Arab states that make it impossible to conceive of 'an Arab state' have been grossly overlooked.

For example, shared historical experiences have been attributed to be the primary basis of Arab states' ideological foundations. Transnational movements that have espoused forms of pan-Arabism or Islam, such as Ba'thism or the Muslim Brotherhood, have been identified as determinative forces shaping the political foundation of some Arab states. Though this is true to some extent, the fact remains that even as such transnational movements swept through Arab states, they did not penetrate 'the Arab state'. Rather, such movements were redefined according to each Arab state's own particular politics and political interests:

...while Islamist movements are genuine, and durable parts of the social and political landscape in the Arab world, their appeal has not proved to be unlimited. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, for example, have witnessed the growth of a more educated, technocratic middle class, sensitive to its own cultural and religious heritage but refusing to be put into neat social and political dichotomies such as 'traditional' versus modernity, 'religious' versus secularism, and 'authenticity' versus alien cultures. (Weitzman 1998)

Moreover, the matter of political dichotomies of 'traditional' versus 'modern' or 'religious' versus 'secular' have lent to the broad generalizations characterizing 'the Arab state'. Under an orientalist microscope, 'the Arab state' is defined relative to the concept of the Western state. Another problem with viewing 'the Arab state' under this orientalist microscope is that it is confined to being analyzed in Western terms, rather than in light of Arab states' unique historical experiences and influences.

Other scholars have cited 'the Arab state' as the outcome economic development, where certain economic strategies correlate with various shifts in states' political structures. In other words, as economic strategies shift, from import-substitution industrialization to a more open economy, so too does the political structure of the Arab state, thus for instance, transforming from populism, to corporatism, and then bureaucratic-authoritarianism. (Ayubi 1995)

While Arab states have seen their share of shifts in economic strategies and political structures, the degree to which such a correlation holds true is not the same for every Arab state. In fact, it becomes evident through such generalizations that different types of Arab states do actually exist. For example, though Egypt, Jordan, and Syria may have shifted economic strategies to facilitate a more liberal economy, the degree to which each of these states' political structure has changed accordingly varies respectively speaking.

Another postulate legitimating the concept of 'an Arab state' is that all Arab states are *rentier* in nature, where the state's monopoly over economic resources has granted it equal monopoly over political resources. Thus, society is dependent upon the state for the distribution of income that is generated by the rents of state itself, such as oil production, or that is directly given to the state, such as financial aid and loans. (Beblawi 1987) Further, because society remained dependent on the state for the distribution of economic resources, patterns of clientelism and patrimonialism became the prevalent relationship between the state and society. Society in 'the Arab state' trades political acquiesce for economic favors, thereby propagating the uneven distribution of the state's wealth among the segments within its class structure.

The concept of the rentier state cannot be denied when discussing Arab states. However, to categorically label all Arab states as rentier in nature is effectively asserting an assumption that the rentier *behavior* governs the political behavior of Arab states. Such an assumption disregards how individual political situations within each Arab state has lent to the evolution of each Arab state's political foundation, despite their respective rentier economies. For instance, though Jordan relies still heavily upon external rents, the political structure has evolved within the last ten years to encourage participatory politics even as the state remains the primary economic generator of wealth.

In addition, not all Arab states can be labeled strictly as rentier in nature. While most Arab states do rely predominantly on rents in order to generate wealth and are allocative in nature, the majority of Arab states are in the process of shifting to become productive states, relying on the capacity of each state's human resource base or society.

These common characteristics that have often been used to support the concept of an 'Arab state' are valid and legitimately founded. Yet, in the process using these similarities to support the concept of 'an Arab state', the distinct differences among these states have been lost. Or, if distinct differences have been discussed, it has not been adequately done so on a comparative level where several types of Arab states have been developed. On such a comparative level, the individual particulars of each Arab state could be retained without losing the universal characteristics linking types of Arab states in the process.

The question, then, is if Arab states are to be distinguished as being of several types, where does such a distinction begin? In other words, on what basis can several types of Arab states be developed?

Redefining the Arab State

That question is not an easy one. After all, just as there are a plethora of universal characteristics that have made it appealing to revert back to the concept of 'an Arab state', there are a plethora of distinctions that make it intimidating to develop several typologies of Arab states. Perhaps in order to address the types of states present in the Arab world, one must refine what is actually being addressed.

The state as an entity, when in reference to the Arab case, has tended to center around the state as a territory rather than the actors that contribute to the shaping of the state. Therefore, Egypt as a state has been discussed in terms of the Nasserist and post-Nasserist era, centering on the politics of socialist policies. Syria has been deemed as the product of Ba'thism and further cannot even be envisioned as the state it is without

Hafaz Al Asad. And the Jordanian state has often found itself to be deemed the product of the regional circumstances around it, where its survival has been linked to how precariously the Israelis were getting along with the Palestinians.

In such explanations that have accounted for the nature of 'the Arab state', the actors that one way or the other contributed to shaping each Arab state have been ignored. What made Nasserist Egypt was not Nasser or his socialist policies, but rather was the culmination of the relationship that developed between the regime and society. Syria cannot be written off as being defined by Ba'thism, because the relationship between its regime and society has grown to rather redefine Ba'thism in stead of being defined by Ba'thism. Syria cannot even be deemed as Asad's creation; rather, if Asad has been successful at anything, it hasn't been building Syria as much as it has been maintaining an equilibrium in regards to Syria's regime-society relationship.

'The Arab state', to briefly summarize, ceases to be the universal model defining the nature of each Arab state once the focus shifts to the regime-society relationship within each state. Previous explanations of 'the Arab state' have tended to ignore refining the conflict between the state and society to one that is actually between the regime and society *within* the state. What has traditionally been debated as a contentious state-society relationship has less to do with the state in relation to society than the regime's manipulation of the state in relation to society.

Thus, the premise of this dissertation is as follows: Although the concept of 'an Arab state' exists, as an entity manipulated by the regime in order to serve regime, there also

exist several types of Arab regime-society relationships that characterize how these states also differ among one another.

The concluding hypothesis of the several types of regime-society relationship within each Arab state are distinguished or vary as a function of the degree of the participation of society in the shaping of the state.

Participation in the shaping of the state implies that society has access to the state's political resources (such as government institutions and political channels that foster communication between the regime and society) and economic resources (such as access to the state's mode(s) of production). It also implies that society is recognized within the political foundation of the state, contributes to expanding the economic foundations of the state, and is able to achieve its own interests, as constituted by the state, without interference by the state or the regime.

However, society's participation in the shaping of the state is determined by two factors. First, it is determined by the extent to which the regime itself has manipulated the state to serve its interests, thereby detaching the state from its social base. The more repressive the regime, the more difficult it is for society to find itself included in participating in the shaping of the state. Second, society's participation in the shaping of the state is determined by the extent to which society itself demands its participation in the shaping of the state. Unless society is incapable of demanding so, it cannot rely solely on the regime to provide it the opportunity to participate in the shaping of the state.

Therefore, in light of the regime-society relationship as being the primary characteristic distinguishing the types of Arab states discussed in this dissertation, it is pertinent to

now identify the type of regime as well as the type of civil society upon which each of the three types of Arab states are based.

Arab Regimes and Their Respective Civil Societies

This dissertation identifies three types of regimes, and three types of corresponding civil societies that distinguish the types of Arab states present in the Arab world. The three types of regimes are *authoritarian*, *authoritative*, and *totalitarian*. It is important to distinguish between an authoritarian regime and an authoritative regime as the former being a regime based on hegemony and the latter, a regime based upon legitimacy.

Authoritative rule is founded in the legitimacy recognized and derived from society, while authoritarian rule is based on the tacit acceptance of the state's rule by its society.

Totalitarian rule is similar to authoritarian rule in its hegemonic nature, but differs in the sense that totalitarian rule is more exclusive than authoritarian rule. That is to say, totalitarian rule revolves around a cadre of individuals who wield the predominant majority of power and who dominate the government's formal political institutions and channels. Totalitarian regimes further use these political institutions and channels in order to absorb, repress, and monitor civil society.

Chapter two will further define these concepts in order to understand how they will be applied in this dissertation.

The three types of corresponding civil societies identified in this dissertation are incipient, participatory, and nominal. Incipient civil societies correspond to authoritarian

rule, where the ability of such civil societies to identify, express, and lobby their interests are impeded less by the regime's rule than by society's own lack of organizational skills.

Participatory civil societies have the organizational skills in order to identify, express, and lobby their interests, as their authoritative regimes provide the political channels necessary to coordinate regime-society interests and account for society's participation in the shaping of the state.

Nominal civil societies, lastly, possess the organizational skills necessary to identify and express their interests, but are hampered by the totalitarian regime's repressive rule in terms of lobbying its interests vis-a-vis the regime itself. Chapter three will elaborate on these three types of civil societies and as to how they correspond to the three types of regimes discussed in this dissertation.

Again, this dissertation seeks to offer several types of regime-society relationships of Arab states that may contribute to better distinguishing how states in the Arab world vary among one another. While the notion of 'an Arab state' has reinforced the universal characteristics that are common among Arab states, it has ignored the contribution of the role that each Arab state's regime-society relationship has in determining the nature of the state. Thus, it is argued here that, in understanding the nature of the state, it is first necessary to understand the dynamics of the relationship between the actors of the state, or the regime and society.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROLE OF THE STATE, REGIME AND SOCIETY

In order to clarify the conflict between the regime and society within Arab states, this dissertation will first define the state, regime, and society as individual concepts, followed by their relation to one another. Briefly summarized, the state is comprised of an ideological, political, and economic foundation, all of which culminate to create a sovereign entity under whose ultimate authority the regime and society are empowered, regulated, and governed. The regime is a representative body, whose nature and scope of power is defined under the state's code of law, thereby lending legitimacy to the regime's authority. Society is the body represented by the regime, which participates in the shaping of the state, also accordingly within the state's code of law, through the channel of civil society.

The Role of the State

The role of the state is one of a sovereign entity, under whose law the roles of regime and society are defined. Therefore, the state, when properly functioning in its designated role, is autonomous of both the regime and the society. That is, the regime cannot reshape the state in order to tailor its own interests. Both the state's laws and constitution must

be regarded as immutable, save amendments through the proper channels of legislation, by the regime and society.

The state has been explained through numerous theories, defined by the predominant role it has been assumed by many scholars. Hegel viewed the state as the "moral expression of unity over diversity, general over specific, public interest over private interest." (Ayubi 1995, 5) Hence, according to Hegel, the state is a spheres where public responsibilities and private rights are reconciled. Marx on the other hand, perceived the state as the product of bourgeoisie class interests, where the state was essentially 'instrumentalist', and therefore lacking autonomy in itself. (Ayubi 1995) Thus, according to Marx, the state is the expression of bourgeoisie principles projected through its laws and institutions. Lastly, Max Weber bases his theory of the state on the concept of power, where the "state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." (Ayubi 1995, 5-6) Therefore, according to Weber, the state is a source from which the legitimate possession of power is founded.

The theories of Hegel, Marx, and Weber, however, are problematic in explaining the state in the Arab world, simply because they are based on the historical evolution of the state in the Western world. In other words, Marxist thought cannot account for how Ba'th party ideology, as the Syrian state's ideological foundation, has been reshaped over the years in order to sustain Syria's regime-society relationship. Weberian theories of state may suffice to explain how power has been monopolized by Arab regimes, through tradition and charisma for instance. However, such Weberian theories of state fail to

explain how each state's political and economic foundations have evolved detached of society in the process of the regime's manipulation of the Arab state.

At the same time, few theories have been developed in solely explaining the Arab state. Though several *deductive* theories have explained *what* the Arab state is today, few *inductive* theories actually explain *how* the Arab state came to be *what* it is today. For example, many academicians have attributed the evolution, (or devolution), of the Arab state to the conflict that arises from its traditional/Islamic resistance to modernization. However, others, such as Tareq Ismael, have quickly pointed out that the evolution of the state goes far beyond the argument of traditional versus modernization. The issue of modernization is only one of the Arab state's many manifestations stemming from more profound conflicts within the Arab state. That is why it cannot account for the failure of the Arab state today as a sovereign entity:

...most Middle Eastern governments seem to lack, in varying degrees and combinations, at least the minimum requirements of/for legitimacy, political consensus, and/or authority...That is not to say that where governments possess these attributes modernization proceeds rationally and purposefully. Even when long-range modernization programs can be undertaken, there are tremendous problems in their implementation...they are unable to withstand the pressures, frustrations, and antagonisms that such programs are likely to generate. Their energies, instead, are sapped in responding to social changes and the tension generated by those forces resisting change and those promoting it. (Ismael 1980, 112-113)

One of the most frequently cited works discussing the Arab state is that of Hisham Sharabi, who has identified three types of Arab states, based upon the type of government found within each state. According to Sharabi, these are *traditionalist*, *parliamentary*, and *welfare-authoritarian*. Traditionalist states are those in which the

government is based upon an Islamic model of state; parliamentary states are those that have adopted 'modern' or democratic political systems; and welfare-authoritarian states are those which could not sustain the new ideas and programs of the parliamentary model, and therefore succumbed to the ascendancy of military power (Sharabi 1962).

Each of these types of Arab governments reflect 'stages' in the development of the Arab state, where personal power and military supremacy increasingly become the basis of the state's political foundation as the regimes' legitimacy as decreased. Rather than being built upon a rational-legal structure, the Arab state is the product of charismatic and traditional leadership that is both civil and military (Sharabi 1962).

However, while these offer explanations regarding the Arab state, they are not sufficient in explaining how the ideological, political, and economic foundations of Arab states have culminated in forming the state itself. Nor have these theories explained the dynamics of the regime-society relationship of the Arab state. They have either focused upon individual conflicts facing the Arab state, such as the traditional versus the modern, or upon individual actors within the Arab state, such as its type of government. None, though, have successfully explained the Arab state comprehensively, as a product of both its conflicts and its actors, including the role that society has played in shaping the Arab state.

Therefore, through understanding how each foundation of the state has been impacted by the regime-society relationship in each Arab state, it will also be made clear as to how the three types of Arab states identified in this dissertation evolved. The three foundations of the state can be roughly identified as the following:

- 1) The ideological foundation serves as the basis of the state as a 'nation'.
- 2) The political foundation serves as the framework from which the state derives its sovereignty and authority.
- 3) The economic foundation serves as the material, financial, and human capital resource base which facilitates the needed capabilities to the political authority represented by the state.

Analyzing the regime-society relationship in light of each foundation reveals the nature of the contentious relationship between the regime and society as a result of the regime manipulating the state to serve its interest. The degree to which the regime has manipulated the state to serve its interests has consequently affected the degree to which society is able to participate in the shaping of the state. This in turn has led to several types of regime-society relationships.

As Arab states have come to be defined by their respective regimes, they evolved to lack any sovereignty in themselves. Their laws and constitution hence are not immutable, but subject to the interests of their regimes. Therefore the state's laws and constitution fail to reinforce the state as a sovereign power. Rather, the regime is deemed as the sovereign power of the state. Because of this, Arab states have been detached from their social bases, thereby distorting the state-society relationship and straining the regime-society relationship within each Arab state. The regime is viewed by society as manipulating the state to serve its own interests and the society is viewed by the regime

as the internal threat to the very existence of the regime. In the process, the state is weakened as its interests are subsumed in the interests of the regime. Thus, Arab states lack an ideological, political, and economic foundation that has been derived from their social base and are independent of the regime. Chapter three will elaborate further upon these foundations of the state in order to illustrate how the regime's domination of these foundations has allowed the regime to manipulate the state to serve its interests.

The Roles of the Regime and Civil Society

The regime, according to Richards and Waterbury, "...refers not only to a type of government but also to ideology, rules of the game, and the structuring of the polity in a given nation." (Richards and Waterbury 1990, 300) Thus, the role of the regime within the state is, firstly, to enforce the state's laws and govern society within the limit and scope of authority and power granted to the regime by the state's laws. Secondly, the regime is responsible to regulate the accumulation, generation, and allocation of the state's economic resources. Thirdly, the regime maintains the interests of the state and coordinates the state's interests with those of society.

Before identifying the role of society in the shaping of the state, it is essential to define the specific reference by which society will be referred to in this thesis. Society will be discussed in terms of its political collective, or as civil society. As a conceptual component of this dissertation civil society:

...is therefore most concerned with those associations and attitudes that may either have played a role in triggering a liberalization process and/or which may take advantage of the new space offered by liberalization to push back further

the boundaries of the state and, by consequence, carve out an even larger realm for civil non-state, associational activity and for civil rights. (Brand 1993, 152)

Civil society, thus, is a reflection of society collectively acting in order to participate in the shaping of the state.

Civil society also functions to fulfill tasks that the state may no longer be able to accomplish. In the absence of the state's role, civil society aims:

- 1) To provide socio-economic services as housing, health, and income generation;
- 2) To expand an educated population, through heightening the level of awareness and expectations;
- 3) To increase private sector financial resources through the encouragement of the growth of small micro-enterprises; which leads to ultimately;
- 4) To facilitate a greater margin of political freedom, where citizens can circumvent the regime in order to attain access to the political and economic resources of the state. (Ibrahim 1993)

Earlier, it was briefly mentioned that this thesis identifies three types of regimes, as well as three types of civil societies, which classify Arab states' regime-society relationships. These are authoritarian regimes, authoritative regimes, and totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes have spawned incipient civil societies, while authoritative regimes are correlated with a participatory civil society. Lastly, totalitarian regimes have tended to spawn nominal civil societies.

Authoritarian Regimes. This dissertation shall utilize the concept of an authoritarian regimen to be defined as "[a] political system in which the power of the rulers is virtually

unlimited, although this power is not always exercised in all domains.” (Lawson 1997, 549)

Totalitarian Regimes. This dissertation shall also utilize the concept of a totalitarian regime to be defined as “[a] political system in which the authorities have unlimited power and attempt to exercise it over all domains of life; [it is] authoritarianism carried to the ultimate extreme.” (Lawson 1997, 559)

Authoritative Regimes. The concept of an authoritative regime is a term derived from the parenting theory in child psychology, but adapted in this dissertation to identify one form of regime rule. An authoritative parent is one which, although demanding and controlling, is also accepting and responsive towards their child, versus an authoritarian parent which is also demanding and controlling, but fails to be responsive towards their child. (Newcomber 1996) Authoritative parents also “...are high in firm control but also high in warmth...Rather, authoritative parents generally explain reasons for their actions to their children verbally; questions and discussions are not dismissed.” (Newcomber 1997, 208)

In paralleling the parent-child relationship to the regime-society relationship, i.e., both of which are similar relationships of authority, this dissertation seeks to utilize the concept of an authoritative regime to distinguish how certain regimes in Arab states remain demanding and controlling, but yet unlike authoritarian regimes, do not exercise unlimited power, although their monopoly of power permits them to do so.

Further, several characteristics are identified in order to fully understand how authoritarian, totalitarian, and authoritative regimes are distinguished among one another.

Authoritarian regimes consist of a pyramid structure, where a powerful few control the political and economic resources of the state, while mass society is essentially powerless. Because the society under the authoritarian regime has grown so dependent upon the regime's distributive politics, it has itself failed to develop the organizational skills in order to identify, express, and achieve its own interests. Further, in lacking such skills, society is unable to demand its rightful access to the economic and political resources of the state as its citizens. As such, civil society here is classified as incipient. That is, the weakness of civil society is less a function of the regime's repression than of its own lack of organization skills in order to clearly identify, express, and achieve or lobby its own interests. The incipient civil society lacks strength in 'lobbying' its interests. Though it has voiced these interests, it has not followed through in contributing to formulating policy measures that address these interests.

As with the totalitarian regime, the authoritarian regime does monopolize the political and economic resources of the state, but the power base of the totalitarian regime is exclusive, where a cadre of individuals hold the predominant majority of power.

Moreover, while an authoritarian regime uses a combination of persuasive and coercive means to assert its authority upon society, the totalitarian regime uses coercive means exclusively. Thus, an authoritarian regime's rule is based upon a mixture of legitimacy and hegemony whereas a totalitarian regime's rule is completely hegemonic.

Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Gulf states are examples of Arab states with authoritarian regimes and incipient civil societies.

Authoritative regimes. Authoritative regimes, in comparison, are horizontally based. That is, within society are powerful segments that must be represented as part of the power base within the regime. The pattern of power of authoritative regimes is pluralist. In other words, the regime's power is to a certain extent diffused among society. An authoritative regime relies on persuasion, and does not use coercion in deriving its legitimacy from society. Though it may be demanding and controlling, the authoritative regime recognizes the society's right to question and engage in discussion in terms of participating in the shaping of the state.

Civil society under an authoritative regime is participatory, or involved in the shaping of the state, both politically and economically. Participatory civil society has the organizational skills to lobby its interests as well as enjoys the regime's recognition of the society's legal right under the state to participate in the shaping of the state. Jordan and Yemen are examples of Arab states with authoritative regimes and participatory civil societies.

Totalitarian Regimes. The power base of the totalitarian regime is vertically integrated. There is a powerful exclusive cadre ruling over a powerless mass society. However, this pyramid structure includes a middle tier of mediating instruments that 'monitor' society through channels between which the regime and society communicate. These channels, which are dominated by the regime, do not provide society access to participating in the shaping of the state. Rather they are a means to absorb and contain minority or opposition factions with civil society.

Civil society is hence reduced to a nominal entity, or one that is formally recognized through 'token' representation that is symbolic, but is not autonomous in its ability to achieve its interests. Therefore, although nominal civil society may have the organization skills necessary to identify, express, and lobby its interests and participate in the shaping of the state, the totalitarian regime prevents it from doing so. Coercion is used as the primary means to impose the totalitarian regime's hegemonic rule and to absorb or repress segments in society that oppose it. The pattern of power of a totalitarian regime can be classified as elitist, or exclusively based in a cadre of individuals who hold powerful positions in the government's political institutions. Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Algeria qualify as totalitarian regimes with nominal civil societies.

Syria, Egypt, and Jordan: Case Studies Exemplifying the Three Models of Arab States

To further clarify these types of regime-society relations within the Arab state, three case studies shall be examined: those of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt represents the authoritarian regime with an incipient civil society. The regime in Egypt has come to need civil society in contributing to expanding the economic base of the state, especially in the face of driving on with Egypt's privatization program. Egypt necessitates civil society's assistance in developing a social safety net as the regime becomes less able to allocate large portions of the state's budget to distributive politics. Thus, various elements of Egypt's civil society, such as syndicates, unions, and business associations have gained increased access to the state's economic resources. However, although they have opportunity to demand access to the state's political resources, the inability of Egyptian

civil society to do so is less a function of the repression by the regime than the lack of inherent organizational skills within the civil societies themselves. Yes, civil societies are structurally mature, but they tend to be tied up in their own politics, bureaucratic red tape, and lack the organizational skills necessary to identify, express, and lobby their interests.

As for Jordan, it represents an authoritative regime with a participatory civil society. Jordan as a case study was chosen because, firstly, it has maintained relative harmony between its politically and ethnically diverse society. And, secondly, it has provided civil society the access and opportunity to contribute to the shaping of the state. Thus, the regime-society relationship within Jordan has been evolving into one of reciprocity, where the authority the regime is increasingly evolving out of legitimacy rather than hegemony. Also, the role of civil society has progressed to complement the regime in providing services the state cannot offer, therefore being seen as less of a threat to the regime than functioning with it in a reciprocal relationship.

Syria will be examined as the case study representing the totalitarian regime with a nominal civil society. As this dissertation will argue in the following chapters, civil society in Syria is well organized, and although there are political channels through which elements of civil society have expressed their identified interests, such political channels are dominated by the Ba'th regime. Thus, because the regime represses or absorbs civil society groups, and prevents the lobbying of its various interests, civil society is a nominal entity within the state. Civil society remains a form of token-representation, but cannot exercise its right to access the state's political or economic resources, which are

selectively doled when in interest of the regime. Therefore, civil society is prevented from participating in the shaping of the state.

Conclusion

The following chapters will focus on examining and further supporting the purpose of this dissertation, which seeks to identify three types of Arab states that are defined according to their respective regime-society relationships. Though the Arab state as an entity has been manipulated by the regime to serve its interests, the type of regime-society relationship that has resulted within each Arab state is a function of the degree to which society participates in the shaping of the state.

Thus, chapter three of this thesis will be devoted to examining how the regimes of Arab states have manipulated the state to serve their interests, thereby causing a contentious regime-society relationship and rather straining the state-society relationship. By Arab regimes deeming themselves synonymous to the state, the foundations of the state have been manipulated to further justify the regime's over-dominating power and authority.

In chapter four, the role of civil society will be discussed in relation to the state and the regime, as well as in terms of its ability to participate in the shaping of the state. Two aspects here are emphasized when discussing civil society's ability to participate in the shaping of the state. First, there is the degree to which civil society is able to vertically integrate vis-à-vis the regime while retaining its autonomy. Second, there is the degree to which civil society is able to horizontally integrate its various groups and organizations in

order to demand its participation in the shaping of the state. In addition, the distinct three civil societies prevalent in Arab states, or nominal, incipient, and participatory civil societies, will be further defined and clarified.

Chapter five, six and seven will be the case studies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, all of which exemplify each of the three types of Arab regime-society relationships.

Chapter five will cover the case study of Egypt, examining how Egypt's political structure had initially exercised its monopoly of power arbitrarily, facilitated by its incipient civil society's failure to demand its participation in the shaping of the state. The regime is able to monopolize power in the face of Egypt's incipient civil society, as it lacks the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests.

Chapter six focuses on Jordan, as a model of an authoritative regime with a participatory civil society. Although the Jordanian regime does manipulate state to a certain extent in order to serve its own interests, Jordan's regime-society relationship has progressively grown to become one where society is included in the participation of the shaping of the state. In other words, while the regime in Jordan may remain demanding and controlling, it is concurrently opening channels for society to participate in the shaping the state. In addition, Jordanian civil society possesses the organizational skills in order to identify, express, and lobby its interests. Therefore, there is an advanced degree of vertical integration evident vis-a-vis the regime, as well as horizontal integration present among Jordanian civil society itself.

Chapter seven contains the case study of Syria, which represents a totalitarian regime with a nominal civil society. The Syrian regime's manipulation of state is so repressive

that society cannot participate in the shaping of the state. Although Syrian society has the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests, it is unable to do so in the face of a regime that either annihilates or absorbs elements of civil society pending upon the interests of the regime.

CHAPTER 3

THE REGIME-STATE DILEMMA

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how and why Arab states have come to be manipulated by Arab regimes. The regime has done so by equating itself to the state, thereby transforming the state's ideological, political, and economic foundations to serve in its interests. This in turn has caused a distortion in the state-society relationship, and subsequently straining the regime-society relationship.

The most prevalent feature that is common among Arab states is the fact that their regimes have regarded themselves synonymous to the state. These regimes do not rule under the sovereignty of the state, but rather have established themselves as the sovereign ruling within the state, as well as over the state. As such, there exists no difference even between the regime, the state, or the institutions of the state that enforce the laws of the state. This in turn has impacted the regime-society relationship within each Arab state, disabling, to various degrees, society's participation in the shaping of the state.

This thesis defines the state as a territorial entity founded upon a collective ideology constituting that entity's social base, with a common cultural and linguistic affinity (i.e., thus a 'nation' with a shared 'nationhood'). Further, this territorial entity is organized into a political system reflective of its collective ideology, with the primary objective of

accumulating, regulating, and distributing the economic resources of the territorial entity accordingly to its modes of production.

Thus, the three basic foundations can be identified as being the essential components, which make up the state: an ideological foundation, a political foundation, and an economic foundation.

The Ideological Foundation of the State

The ideological foundation of the state is defined here as the collectively shared implicit values and norms among society that serve as the basis of legitimizing the explicit structure of the state's laws and constitution.

There are several theories that have explained the development of Western state's ideological foundations. The German school of thought associated the idea of a community (*Gemeinschaft*) to that of an authentic spiritual essence (*Geist*), which together comprise to be the 'collective soul' upon which the state is built. That is, the state becomes the moral expression of "unity over diversity, of general over specific, of public over private interests". (Ayubi 1995, 5) Language further unified this 'collective soul', serving as the basis of the state's laws as the supreme expression of the nation. (Ayubi 1995)

An alternative European model of the evolution of state is the 'French Revolution' model, which regards the state as evolving separate from society. Whereas the German model related the concept of community to the concept of state, via the concept of the nation, (Ayubi 1995), the 'French Revolution' model, or Napoleonic model of state, is

quite the opposite. It views the state as an autonomous formation functioning to create harmony among a heterogeneous society. The state acts as a sovereign entity that has the three basic purposes of: centralizing a heterogeneous society under a polity, implementing the standardization of the state's code of law, and guaranteeing the rights of its citizens.

In other words, the state coordinates its heterogeneous society to function concordant with one another. While the German model of state stressed the state itself as the expression of society, the Napoleonic model of state stresses the state to be a structural entity representing the diverse segments of society that do not necessarily share a 'collective soul' or essence (as the German Geist). Therefore, the French model versus the German model is more of an artificially erected political entity rather than a process of the natural evolution of society:

... nation formation in modern Europe has never been influenced by determinist criteria. Boundary changes and the concentration of the heterogeneous populations of Europe into states under royal dynasties have been primarily the results of conquests. Thus nations are not manifestations of self-contained homogenous groups of people with constant features of whatever kind; rather they are the historical products of state formation in Europe after the conquests. The heterogeneous populations living in each of these newly emerged entities have adjusted themselves to one another and integrated themselves into homogeneous groups which are usually referred to as nations. The pre-conditions for such integration was that each group forgot its origin and identified itself with the new structure. In this way, for instance, the term 'Frenchman' emerged, which expresses affiliation to a certain entity, although the groups which combined to form this entity by no means share common ethnic, cultural etc. origins. (Tibi 1997, 149)

However, such definitions of state are Euro-centric and thus tend to provide little understanding of the ideological foundation of Arab states, which have their own intrinsic historical roots, despite their arbitrary borders being the result of former colonial

imperialist powers. Paraphrasing the Arab political scientist Hamid Rabi, Nazih Ayubi explains the intrinsic ideological foundation of Arab states to be the consummation of their own historical experience, whose roots are Islamic in nature:

The Islamic model [of state]...has its aspects of political vitality that can inspire contemporary politics...The Islamic polity is not a state in the European sense (i.e., territorially defined) but an organized politico-religious community (*umma*). The purpose of the *umma* is spreading the message (*da'wa*) and the function of power and authority (*sulta*) is to act as the instrument for achieving such a cultural/civilizational mission, (*risala hadariyya*). The Islamic 'state' is therefore a 'doctrinal' state on the merger of ethical principles with political ideals, and on the non-separation of private life and public life. (Ayubi 1995, 18-19)

Although the inclusion of a territorial variable is void in the Islamic definition of the state, there is the presence of a 'cultural/civilizational' entity (*hadara*), resembling a state. In fact, this *hadara* is based upon its own collective soul, and its legitimacy is derived from society, as a representative body of society. Further, society as the *umma*, is united by its set of shared religious values, or the *da'wa*, which thus constitutes its ideological foundation. Moreover, it is the *sulta's*, or authority's, role to translate the *umma's da'wa* into the political foundation of this cultural/civilizational entity, thus being the *risala hadariyya*.

Hence, this 'doctrinal' state has culminated as the *umma*, its *da'wa*, and the *sulta*, under the *risala hadariyya* to be the foundation of a single cultural/civilizational entity integrated within one another. A perfect example of such a contemporary model of the Islamic definition of state is that of the Palestinians. Though they lack the territorial foundation, the Palestinians are a community with a shared set of values politically expressed through the a legitimately recognized authority (in this case, the PLO).

The historical presence of Islam in the Arab world is probably the most prevalent origin of Arab states' ideological foundations. Therefore, the Islamic contribution to the formation of such an Arab 'state' is similar to that of the German *Gemeinschaft* (or the *umma* in the Arab case) and secondly, the *Geist* (*ruh*, or essence of spirit in Arabic). (Ayubi 1995)

The Islamic model of state saw its secularization commencing with the reign of Muhammed Ali in Egypt in the 19th century. Under the auspices of Muhammed Ali, the state was 'modernized', based on the Napoleonic model of state. Inclusive of that modernization was the educational training of all serving under Muhammed Ali's government, right down to the civil servants themselves. Part of those sent to France to receive a higher education were the *ulama*, or Islamic scholars, who had previously revolted against the Egyptian state in 1809, but were reintegrated into Muhammed Ali's government. (Tibi 1997) One of the *ulama* who was educated and influenced by French thought, and thus became an influential figure in developing the ideological foundation of the Arab state, was Rifa'a Rafi' al Tahtawi (1801-1873). Tahtawi, as explained by Bassam Tibi, instilled ideas of the secular state, ironically, through drawing upon parallels between the Euro-centric styled state and its analogous components of the state in Islamic thought:

This emerges clearly from his interpretation of the *lex divina*, the Islamic *shari'a*, where he attempts to show that the *shari'a* has a similar structure to the rationalist Natural Law of modern Europe. al-Tahtawi emphasizes that the ruler is under the codex of the *shari'a*, following Montesquieu's separation of powers, which means that it is impossible that it should be left to the discretion of the ruler. He encourages the *ulama*, as pillars of the *shari'a*, to concern themselves with the study of modern knowledge, which is based on reason, in order to reach

an up-to-date interpretation of the *shari'a*...Hence his interpretation of the *shari'a* is permeated with European bourgeois values: the Muslim is now no longer a subject but a citizen. (Tibi 1997, 86-87)

It is from Tahtawi that the Islamic notion of the *umma* is translated into the European sense. Tahtawi drew upon the concept of the *watan*, or a 'territorial nation' state, therefore politicizing the *umma* into a nation, or a cultural entity with a secular political identity. The *umma* was now a political citizenry, within the *watan*, rather than an Islamic community. Again, Bassam Tibi explains the importance of the distinction al-Tahtawi made in giving weight to the social concepts of the Islamic framework over Islam itself:

For him, the social takes precedence over the religious, and here, for the first time, an Arab is using the word 'nation' in a secular sense...The word *watan* does exist in classical Arabic, but only in the sense of the country from which one originates, or in which one lives. (Tibi 1997, 87)

The state, as al-Tahtawi desired to express it, became transformed from the Islamic 'cultural/civilizational' entity (*hadariyya*) into the 'patriotic/political' state (*wataniyya*)—and the Islamic model of state, in its newly secularized form, became transformed to become the ideological foundation of Arab states.

However, after Arab states' independence from colonial imperialists, the Arab regimes failed to reintegrate the *wataniyya*, or political dimension of the state, with the *hadariyya*, or social basis of the state, lending to the state's ideological foundation. The obstacle laid in the fact that Arab states over-emphasized themselves as bureaucratic entities built to fortify the regimes' authority, detached or alienated from the origins of their 'organic'

social bases, (or the *umma*). In other words, the regimes disregarded society as the primary base upon which the state was formed, while they over-emphasized the institutional bureaucratic element of the state, which thus became the state.

Void of an ideological foundation rooted in its social base, how would Arab states develop their political foundations? In other words: How could Arab states be expressed through the people if they were not of the people for the people and by the people?

Thus, the detachment of Arab states' ideological foundation from their social bases is indeed due to their regimes, which have rather imposed their own various ideological doctrines upon the state relative to their interests. That is, under Nasser, socialism became a convenient and expedient ideology to justify his political agenda of erecting land laws and destroying the private sector; however, Sadat's regime could only survive by reversal of that doctrine. The new ideological doctrine became liberalism, albeit more economic than political in nature. In the same manner, Syria went through similar changes in ideology. After that country's brief brush with socialism, the regime under Asad resumed in incorporating the private sector under a 'state-run capitalism'.

The ideological foundation of Arab states have failed to reflect the collectively shared society's implicit values and norms, which are rooted in the Islamic model of state. Therefore, Arab states lack the ideological foundation which serves as the basis upon which the state's explicit structure, such as its laws and constitution, are legitimized, premised, and enacted. In other words, lacking a solid ideological foundation has impaired the formation of a solid political foundation in Arab states.

The Political Foundation of the State

A state that has developed a collective unity based upon its society's implicit values and norms, thereby forming its ideological foundation, proceeds to build its political foundation. The political foundation is the structural basis which defines the nature of power wielded within the state, as well as limits and regulates the distribution of power between the state's society and regime. If the ideological foundation is the expression of the state itself, then the political foundation is the state in action, or the state acting within itself.

The political foundation serves several purposes. First, it establishes a political framework of institutions and channels through which the society may access the state. Second, it defines the limit and scope of the government's powers. Third, the laws and constitution devised under the state's political foundation ensure the rights of society, vis-a-vis the regime as well as the state, in pursuing its own interests.

If the state's law is founded upon the interest of the regime, rather than that of the state, the political foundation of the state is weakened. This is an extremely imperative point; for it is the distinguishing factor that further specifies the conflict between the state and society to more precisely be analyzed as on between the society and regime. The state and regime, in a stable state, are not one in the same; the state is a sovereign entity whose law is not amendable according to the regime's interests. Rather, the regime must exercise its power within accordance of the state's code of law.

The problem remains for Arab states, though, that the state's code of law is either 1) erected along the party ideology of the ruling regime or 2) overrode by executive decree.

For instance, Syria's constitutional framework bases the source of the state's power from within the Ba'th party itself:

The formal government apparatus is arranged along two parallel lines: the administration and the party. The constitution places the party and its institutions above the state administration, Clause VIII laying down that "the Ba'th Party leads society and the state and stands at the head of the National Progressive Front, which acts to unite the forces of the masses and to mobilize them in the service of goals of the Arab nation. (Zisser 1998)

Therefore, although a code of law exists, as the political foundation of the state, it originates in the regime's party itself. Other parties opposing the Ba'th are not provided the right to participate in the government unless through the National Progressive Front, with the Ba'th party standing at its head. Thus, the state is subject to the sovereign rule of the Ba'th party rather than the Ba'th operating within the limit and scope of power that the state has defined.

In Egypt, the code of law is similarly based upon ensuring the power of the regime, as presidential elections have continued to be plebiscitary rather than competitive. No contender has attempted to run against the incumbent since Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers movement abolished the constitutional monarchy in 1952. (Harik 1994) Also, the law concerning the formation of new political parties has been amended to ban any activities of those parties who have not been approved by the Committee of Parties, which is dominated by the regime's National Democratic Party. (al-Sayyid 1995) The chance for an opposition party to gain momentum or run against the incumbent regime is highly unlikely with legislation that is based on securing the dominant position of the current regime.

Jordan's code of law, in contrast to Syria and Egypt, has come to be based upon the interest of the state and in ensuring the right of society to participate in the shaping of the state. This began in 1989, with the law banning parliamentary elections being lifted due to several factors:

The 1989 parliamentary elections occurred for political and economic reasons. Economically, Jordan increasingly had become dependent upon foreign aid and remittances from its citizens working abroad. Troubles began when the United States ceased its economic aid package in 1980 after King Hussein refused to join with Egypt in signing a peace treaty with Israel. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war that same year led to a decline in monetary assistance from the Gulf states who were diverting revenues to support Iraq. Declining oil prices exacerbated Jordan's problems, and by 1985 the economy was in crisis. Gulf state aid was drying up, with only Saudi Arabia paying its promised assistance to Amman; remittances from expatriates, working primarily in the Gulf states, had declined; the government had increased taxes; and external borrowing had increased. To deal with the economic penury, in 1985 Hussein appointed his close confidante, Zayd al-Rifa'i, to liberalize the economy. Under his leadership, the economy worsened: inflation rose, the budget deficit expanded, and external debt exploded. Political tensions increased, government repression was not uncommon, and charges that the Rifa'i regime was corrupt circulated throughout the country. (Adams 1996)

However, following the repeal of the ban on parliamentary elections in 1989, there had been several attempts to amend election laws in order to favor the establishment of the monarchy's conservative elites and prevent the increasing political influence that the Muslim Brotherhood gained within the state. For example, the parliament proposed the passage of Article 6 to the Political Parties Law, which "...outlawed parties formed on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or gender. If adopted as submitted, this provision would have banned the Muslim Brotherhood from becoming a political party." (Adams 1996)

However, Latif Arabiyat, the speaker of the house and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, cast the deciding vote to amend Article 6 of the Political Parties Law in a

manner to protect the Muslim Brotherhood from being prohibited to participate politically within the state.

Therefore, the political foundation of Arab states is problematic in the sense that:

1) Rather than Arab states' codes of law defining, limiting, and regulating the nature and scope of the regimes' power, Arab states' power is confined to the sovereign rule of their regimes.

2) Therefore, the state's code of law, upon which is the political foundation of the state is based, is manipulated by the regime in order to secure its own stability.

3) Thereby effectively detaching the political foundation of the state from society, just as the ideological foundation has been detached from society as well.

The code of law has yet to be divorced from the regime of Arab states, lending instability to the state with a weak political foundation. The state is the regime, and the regime is the state.

The Economic Foundation of the State

The economic foundation of the state, or its capacity to accumulate, regulate, and distribute wealth, is a significant stabilizing factor in terms of the coordination of the state-society-regime relationship and their respective interests.

The traditional view of the economic foundation of the state has tended to be based on Marxist theories as well as its newborn variations, or neo-Marxist perspectives. Here, the

state is premised upon the economic struggles between socio-economic classes, where the interests of the state are determined by the interests of the dominant socio-economic class, or the bourgeoisie, and hence, is run accordingly to serve this ruling class.

The state, in neo-Marxist theory, is further categorized as either instrumental or structural. That is, the state is not autonomous, but is shaped to function along bourgeoisie principles, or the principles of a capitalist class. As Ayubi summarizes, the instrumental state is comprised of "...an executive committee for the management of the collective affairs of the bourgeoisie, and as such a direct reflection of the interests of this class." (Ayubi 1995, 5) In other words, the capitalist class transforms the state to be the facilitator of its own interests, through impressing its own values onto the state thereby 'legitimizing' its interests. According to the instrumentalist view, the state is political in so far as it is the arena for a political struggle (Lee 1989) between its vying socio-economic classes.

The second neo-Marxist explanation is that of a structuralist view state. As opposed to the instrumentalist view, the structuralist view regards the policies and framework (the 'structure') of the state to be shaped by a capitalist system. (Lee 1989) Whereas the instrumentalist state is the 'master plan' of its capitalist class, the structuralist state is the product of a capitalist system. The state's capitalist class is a reflection of the world capitalist system, and a component of the state's capitalist structure, but not its determinant. That does not diminish from the fact that the capitalist class, or the bourgeoisie, does not dominate the economic foundation of the state. But, this class itself is not what affects the society-regime-state relationship. It is the activities in which the

bourgeoisie class partakes that affect the internal relationship of the state because it is expansive in the sense that the more capital expenditure increases, so does social spending increase.

Arab states' economic foundations, though, are characterized by two distinguishing factors that prevent them from being explained through Euro-centric models. First, Arab states lack a bourgeois class. Rather, the regime has replaced or substituted itself to function in the role of the bourgeoisie class. This has been made possible because of the second distinguishing factor regarding Arab states' economic foundations. That factor is that the primary source of Arab states' income has been generated from non-productive activities—i.e., oil receipts, external financing, and remittances. Therefore, the society does not 'own' the means of production within the state—rather, the regime does. This is the precise manner by which the regime has monopolized power in Arab states—through monopolizing the economic resources of the state. The regime has essentially created a polity where society is allocated economic resources in return for society's political acquiesce, rather than providing society the power to participate in expanding the economic foundation of the state. This phenomenon has characterized Arab states as *rentier states*.

The rentier state can be summarized as follows. The primary source of the state's revenue is earned from oil exports, oil pipelines (as is the case for Syria), external financiers, remittances, and as for Egypt, Suez Canal receipts. With the state's revenues predominantly coming from such external 'rents', the economic mode of production within the state is an 'allocative' one—i.e., revenues are generated outside of the realm of

the state and distributed among society by the regime. The society itself is not generating or creating its own wealth, but must rather depend upon the state to allocate resources to its citizenry.

As the regime retains control of the rent received as the state's revenues, a majority of it is used to import goods, primarily, ones that stimulate mass consumption. Aside from stimulating mass consumption, massive imports penalize existing industries as, first, imports are competitively cheaper (due to prices rising domestically, and inflation occurring) and, second, agriculture suffers while its labor is drawn to higher paying sectors, such as oil.

The allocation bias of rent revenues reinforces an 'anti-production' bias (favoring imports over domestically produced goods) and external revenue production (i.e., such as the oil industry), thus allowing the regime to control the distribution and allocation of rents. (Korany 1993) Further, if there is a decrease in rent revenues (such as a drop in the price of oil), because an 'anti-production' bias has been reinforced, the only alternative to generating revenues is to borrow from supranational financial institutions or rely on unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral loans from the international community. Currency tends to remain over-valued, which leads to greater inflation, thus an increase in the consumption of imports, and a resultant depletion of the state's cash flow. Meanwhile, subsidies increase, as do welfare expenditures, and further borrowing is followed by deeper debt incurred by the state.

By the late 1980s, Arab rentier economies could no longer sustain their 'anti-production' policies, and were forced to implement macro-economic structural adjustment

programs. That is, the adjustment meant devaluation (thus curbing import based consumption) and a structural policy stimulating domestic production for exporting as well as domestic consumption.

Paralleling the rentier economy of the state is an accompanying rentier behavior adapted within the state. In other words, the regime and society are posed vis-a-vis one another in a dialectical relationship- the regime, aside from its role as the state, is also the 'bourgeoisie' class, while the society's ability to own its mode of production becomes a function of that 'bourgeoisie' regime. A lack of economic liberty among society has reinforced a consequent lack of political liberty:

This is a fact of paramount importance, cutting across the whole of the social fabric of the economy affecting the role of the state in the society. The role of the government as the principal recipient of the external rent is closely related to the fact that only few control the external rent. In fact, the 'economic power' thus bestowed upon the few would allow them to seize 'political power' as well, or else induce the political elite to take over the external rent from them without major political disruption. A predominantly rentier state will accordingly play a central role in distributing this wealth to the population. (Beblawi 1987, 52)

Of course, such economic dominance by the regime reinforces the regime's political dominance. Thus, the economic activity of the rentier state transforms itself into a political rentier behavior in the regime-society relationship.

The hierarchy of the state is therefore built in such a manner where power remains in the hands of the regime, with society offered selective access to the state's economic resources, and hence political resources. That is, only where it meets the regime's interests, society is allowed to participate in the 'allocative' state:

The state or the government, being the principal rentier in the economy, plays the crucial role of the prime mover of the economic activity. Rent that is held in the hands of the government has to be redistributed among the population. Special social and economic interests are organized in such a manner as to capture a good slice of government rent. Citizenship becomes a source of economic benefit. Different layers of beneficiaries of government rent are thus created, giving rise, in their turn, to new layers of beneficiaries. The whole economy is arranged as a hierarchy of layers of rentiers with the state or the government at the top of the pyramid, acting as the ultimate support of all rentiers in the economy. (Beblawi 1987, 53)

A significant factor that contributes to the political monopoly maintained by the regime is the weakness of a sound taxation system. After all, in the West, demands for political liberty were justified by taxation enforced by the governments—where there could be ‘no taxation without representation’. In comparison, the Arab state’s rentier polity denies society’s participation in the shaping of the state:

The rentier nature of state revenues thus militates against the creation of a strong state or the involvement of its corresponding society. In this light, the massive revenues accruing to the government in a rentier state are a double-edged sword, allowing the local government to dole out revenues with minimum attention for representation, on the basis of the reverse principle of no representation without taxation. (Vandewalle 1987, 160)

Societies within Arab countries are kept from demanding political participation by the regime, which has divorced the society as source of the state’s economic mode of production (i.e., the state’s economic foundation). If society does not partake in generating revenues within the state, but is simply allocated revenues generated externally of the state, they are not in a position to demand accompanying political participation as well.

Although the regime is currently implementing policies that drive towards economic liberalization, such policies have been rather selective, incorporating segments of society in the economic foundation of the state when serving the interests of the regime. Thus, even if the rentier state is evolving to be productive rather than allocative in nature, where capital accumulation is encouraged over mass consumption, the regime's continued rentier behavior prevents the full integration of society into the economic foundation of the state.

Conclusion: Reconciling the Arab State, Regime, and Society

In conclusion, Arab states have been dominated by their regimes, which have transformed the ideological, political, and economic foundations to reflect their own interests, rather than those of the state's itself. Further, because the foundations of the state reflect the regime's interests, the state has been detached from its social base, therefore distorting the state-society relationship while subsequently straining the regime-society relationship as well.

The ideological foundation of Arab states, rather than reflecting the shared values and norms of its social base, or its society, reflects the ideological doctrine of the ruling regime, and has been subject to change when in the interest of the regime.

The political foundation of Arab states has been designed to secure the regime's power, rather than defining the limit and scope of the regime's power, and guaranteeing the rights of society, vis-a-vis the regime as well as the state, in pursuing its own interests.

Lastly, the regime's rentier behavior has made it impossible for Arab states' economic foundation to be fully integrated into its social base. This has caused, as with the ideological and political foundations of the state, the economic foundation of the state to become detached from its social base, and to ensure the regime's monopoly over the state's resources. Even as Arab states attempt to transform from being allocative in nature to being productive in nature, such a transformation is hindered or impeded by the continued rentier behavior of Arab regimes.

Therefore, whatever power is exercised by the regime, it is not derived from an ideological foundation, political foundation, or economic foundation originating in the social base of the state. The state thus is reduced to an instrument manipulated by the regime to achieve power, rather than a structure from which power is derived, distributed, and regulated. In addition such manipulation of the state by the regime has facilitated the regime's ability to prevent society from its right to participate in the shaping of the state.

In chapter four, an examination of civil society in regards to the shaping of the state shall further illustrate society's role and reaction to the regime's manipulation of the state, thus also contributing to the three types of regime-society relationships found in Arab states. The following chapter will, first, define civil society's role within the state; second, identify the three types of civil society prevalent within Arab states; and, third, discuss civil society in relation to the regime of Arab states.

CHAPTER 4

SOCIETY AND THE STATE

As was stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, one of the most common characteristics found among Arab states is the regime's manipulation of the state in order to serve its interests. This manipulation of Arab states has resulted in the regime and the state to be one in the same. Society's reaction to this manipulation in return has determined the type of regime-society relationship found in each Arab state. Moreover, society's reaction is evident to the degree it is allowed to participate in the shaping of the state. This is a determinant of two factors.

The first factor, discussed in chapter three, is the manner in which the regime has created the state in its image, thereby detaching it from its social base. Thus the regime's monopoly over the state has contributed in preventing society in the participation in the shaping of the state.

The second factor, addressed in this chapter addresses, is the extent to which society is capable to demand its participation in the shaping of the state. After all, the regime will not provide the opportunity for society to participate in the shaping of the state if society itself does not demand so.

Of course, society's principle means of participating in the shaping of the state is through civil society. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to: first, define civil society's role within the state; second, discuss civil society in relation to the regime of Arab states; and third, identify the three types of civil society prevalent within Arab states.

The Origins of Civil Society

Civil society as a scholarly debate has been en vogue especially since the fall of communism in 1989. It was assumed that the political and ideological vacuum left by communism would be filled by democracy, which would bring about a flourishing civil society in Eastern Europe. The crux of the argument was that civil society is essentially a feature of a democratic polity. One cannot have civil society without a democracy, and a democracy cannot be sustained without the presence of a strong and active civil society.

The problem with such an assumption, however, is that it limits civil society to be a strictly Western phenomenon. The fact is, though, that the presence of a strong and active civil society does not require a democratic polity. Rather, it requires a politically liberalized one. It is important here to note the distinction between democracy and political liberalization:

Liberalization refers to reformist measures to open up outlets for the free expression of opinion, to place limits on the arbitrary exercise of power, and to permit political association. In contrast, democratization [is], namely, free contested elections, popular participation in political life and- bluntly- the unchaining of the masses... (Norton 1993, 5)

The point to be made is that the type of polity is not what determines the presence of a strong and active civil society; it is rather the *nature* of the polity—primarily, a polity that provides channels for the freedom of political association. The popular notion of ‘institutional’ democracy is not necessary for civil society to function. In fact, not all society’s have reached a level where “...individuals can exercise the faculties of sound judgment and wisdom required to maintain the well-being of the body politic.” (Orum 1989, 115-116) Such states may not be yet ready for the installment of institutional democracy, if their societies have not yet evolved to understand the concepts of toleration and cooperation. It is through civil society that such behaviors are learned and transmitted to the whole of society. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim notes:

Normatively, civil society implies values and behavioral codes of tolerating, if not accepting, the different ‘others’ and a tacit or explicit commitment to the peaceful management of differences among individuals and collectivities sharing the same public space—i.e., the polity. (Ibrahim 1993, 27-28)

Thus, civil societies can be found in totalitarian regimes, authoritarian regimes, or authoritative regimes as well. Civil society is not correlated to democracies alone. All societies within a spectrum of polities have exercised the commitment to the peaceful management of differences among individuals and collectivities sharing the same public space.

Civil society necessitates several characteristics that are required in order to be active and strong. First, it requires “...civility, without which the milieu consists of feuding factions, cliques, and cabals.” (Norton 1993, 11) Second, there must be tolerance among the various elements and segments within society. Thirdly, such civility and tolerance

gives way for *association*—and association is the means through which mass society is *horizontally* integrated into *civil* society.

Civil society in Arab states is present; but it is not strong. Its weakness lies in two factors. First, while civil society in the Arab World is growing empirically speaking (numbering 70,000 as of 1995), its ties to the state are continually evolving *vertically*, in relation to the regime, at the expense of its autonomy vis-a-vis the regime. This poses as an impetus to civil society's ability in Arab states to integrate horizontally, or in association of its individual groups and organizations in order to reinforce its autonomy in the face of the regime.

Second, because the art of association and organization is absent in Arab civil societies, there is a lack of civil society's ability to identify, express, and achieve their respective interests. That is, in addition to civil society in Arab states being stunted by the regime or being prevented from horizontally integrating, civil society itself lacks the associational and organizational skills to identify, express, and achieve its interests as a collective society. Therefore, they are weak in 'lobbying' their respective interests.

Defining Civil Society

Definitions of civil society have primarily focused upon its role as a channel that reconciles the private and public spheres within the state. Fredrich Hegel's interpretation of civil society involves the coordination of the private and public spheres of the state, but stresses that though the private sphere may function independent of the state, it cannot operate outside the state's legal framework. (Ismael 1997) Max Weber concludes

civil society to be premised upon capitalism and democracy; that is, free enterprise and self-governance are the precepts of civil society, recognizing the private sphere's right to participate in shaping the public sphere of the state. Lastly, Antonio Gramsci offers a Marxian conceptualization of civil society. He argues that civil society is rooted in the super-structure of the state, thereby justifying the bourgeoisie class's interests, which is rooted within the structure, or economic foundation, of the state. Civil society's role, thus, is to counter-balance the state's quest to maximize its authority through preventing the state from encroaching upon personal autonomy. Hence, it harmonizes between the state and society.

Regardless of how civil society has been defined, the thematic concept has been reconciling the relationship between the authority ruling within the state, or the regime, and those ruled under the authority within the state, or mass society. The issue of whether economics, politics, or culture is responsible for how civil society evolved varies in accordance with the individual historical development of each state. A combination of politics and economics may have spurred the growth of civil society in the West, while, for instance, culture may have a greater impact in the growth of civil society within the Arab world:

Middle Eastern states have also been able to manipulate enough cultural norms and premises-- be they Islam or charisma, nationalist sentiments or patrimonialism-- still to retain evocative and emotional ties with broad strata of society...Moreover, while there has been some economic liberalization in the Middle East, it has been neither enough nor in a direction that would result in a meaningful rolling back of the extensive reaches of the state...the [civil society organizations] that are found there (e.g. those belonging to the religious ulema, bazaari merchants, professional associations, etc.) tend to be interested in pursuits other than democratic ones. (Kamrava 1998)

Hence, because civil society's nature may be relative to the individual historical evolution of states, it cannot be defined as solely a democratic institution, or limited to being politically and economically based formations of society. Rather, universal characteristics of civil society can be summarized as follows:

- 1) It is a channel of communication between the ethnic, religious, political, and socio-economic segments of society (thus a horizontal linkage connecting various segments of society).
- 2) It is a channel of communication between the society and regime (thus a vertical linkage coordinating the interests of the society and the regime with those of the state).
- 3) It is an access point through which mass society may draw upon the state's political and economic resources.
- 4) It is a means of allowing the society to participate in the shaping of the state.

A civil society is strong and active if it consists of all of these four characteristics.

Again, the type of polity within which civil society develops may contribute to the pace and direction of civil society. Yet, the type of polity does not have any bearing upon the nature of civil society itself, as civil society is not a political institution. Rather, it is a social form of organization born out of the state's social base that may express itself in the political, economic, or cultural arena of the state.

The Role of Civil Society

Civil society, as a means to create horizontal links among society and vertical links vis-a-vis the regime, fulfills several roles within the state.

Horizontal linkages are important for several reasons. First, it instills a sense of solidarity among society. Therefore, even heterogeneous societies could converge upon a shared interest. This of course enhances intrastate stability as the chances of civil conflicts are lessened and any presence of civil conflicts could be resolved through peaceful channels, such as civil society. Second, civil society is a means to provide public 'spiritedness' within society. The more active civil society is in political association, even among one another, the more they perceive themselves as an active element of the state, contributing to the shaping of the state. Third, civil society reinforces social collaboration, norms of reciprocity, and encourages the emergence of social trust. (Berman 1997)

Forging vertical links, civil society acts as a gap between mass society and the regime. That is to say, civil society *mobilizes* the society to express its interests and the regime to address those interests in coordination with their own interests and the state's interests. It also is a means to *communicate* society's grievances or concerns to the regime and is a 'bargaining' table through which the society and regime may settle disputes. Third, civil society *motivates* mass society to participate in the shaping of the state in such a way where the regime does not have to regard society as a threat to its existence. In other words, it is a constructive platform through which mass society becomes politically involved in a legitimate manner, and within the state's code of law, while respecting the ruling regime's realm of power.

However, civil society cannot be viewed as acting outside of the authority of the regime:

Though elements of civil society are likely to stand in opposition to the government, government must play the essential role of referee, rule-maker and regulator of civil society. Civil society, it needs to be emphasized, is no substitute for government. All too often, there is a tendency to comment civil society as a panacea, but the evidence is compelling that the state has a key role to play. (Norton 1993, 12-13)

Civil society, just as the regime, must function within the scope and limit it has been granted under the state's political foundation, based in its code of law.

At the same, civil society assists in fulfilling the interests of the state. Where the state's capacity to provide basic services has dwindled, civil society has been a key factor in this process: it has assisted in the expansion of the state's economic capabilities and it has stepped in to provide health, housing, and education services to mass society.

Civil society in Arab states has not been enabled, either because of a repressive regime or a weak civil society, to fulfill its role within the state. Thus, the regime-society relationship has been less cooperative than it could be. In order to why and how this has happened, it is pertinent to turn to the historical evolution of civil society in Arab countries.

Civil Society in the Arab State

Civil society in Arab states has earned attention as an active agent participating in the shaping of the state due to:

- 1) The new political order in the Middle East where the immediacy of interstate conflicts have diminished in the face of more threatening intrastate problems and,
- 2) The initiation of economic liberalization programs.

Prior to this, civil society remained as a social formation that was unable to evolve to as a political actor participating in the shaping of the state for several reasons.

Upon achieving independence, the Arab regimes' quests for legitimacy resulted in the encroachment upon civil society:

This quest had a three-fold trajectory. First, they continuously endeavored to neutralize any potentially powerful group or movement that might pose any threat or opposition to the regime by co-optation, intimidation, or elimination. Second, they engaged in mass-propaganda and large-scale ideological campaigns identifying enemies of Arab security. Israel was the arch foreign enemy; reactionary elements were allies to imperialism both within the state and across states. Third, they embarked on grandiose development projects espoused by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. (Ismael 1997)

Therefore, the regime imposed itself onto the society. It did so through repression and monopolizing economic resources, as well as controlling all political organs and institutions. Furthermore, the regime's power was buttressed through two vital bases within the regime that prevented civil society from becoming a political actor within the state—the military and the party. Through the military, repression was the means to stifle civil society. Secondly, the party counterbalanced the military's role by mobilizing support from society through political coercion. (Ismael 1997)

Aside from this 'encroachment', the regime's rentier behavior had disabled civil society to develop autonomously of the regime. This rentier behavior is a result of three factors:

1) erecting a massive bureaucracy, 2) conducting state-led capitalism, therefore putting the society under the regime's patronage, and 3) forming an urban capitalist class that was essentially either part of the regime or related to it. (Kamrava 1998) As the new class of urban bourgeoisie bureaucrats burgeoned by the beginning of the 1980s, Arab states essentially acted as large corporations rather than functioning as states.

Yet, by the end of the 1980s, the 'allocative' abilities of the Arab state began to break down, and it became necessary to focus upon the state's 'productive' capabilities. Civil society thus emerged as an economic supplement, providing services in health, housing, and education. Hence, it met the growing basic needs of society, tapped into the financial resources available within society. As such, its activities began to extend the margins of freedom within the state. (Ibrahim 1993)

The question, therefore, is not one of whether or not civil society exists in Arab states. Various organizations in civil society, such as political organizations, economic organizations, and social organizations have become vocally noted within the last ten years. As of now, there is a resurgence of the growth of political parties in Arab countries, such as the Wafd in Egypt. Aside from this reemergence, there has been a mushrooming of new political parties: 46 in Algeria, 43 in Yemen, 23 in Jordan, 19 in Morocco, and 13 in Egypt. (Ibrahim 1993) Political parties are considered a vital element of civil society, simply because they fulfill the four universal characteristics that constitute what a civil society is. In other words, political parties provide communication among society, as well as vis-a-vis the regime, while act as access points for society to

mobilize the state's political and economic resources, and provide society the opportunity to participate in the shaping of the state.

Professional syndicates have also evolved, extending their organizations to pan-Arab and international levels. (Ibrahim 1993) And because these syndicates are situated in the heart of the production and service sectors, they cannot be so easily dissolved. In addition, traditional segments of civil society in the Arab state have been modified to function in a more participatory manner through becoming urban-centered, though memberships may be based in a certain village, tribe, or religious sect. Also, such civil societies have begun to systemize themselves by having formal registration, licensing, elections, and board committees. (Ibrahim 1993)

Hence, civil society in Arab states is alive. Moreover, civil society's role is expanding from being a social form of association to a political actor of the state, which provides services that the state no longer can, such as housing, health, and education.

The essential issue, thus far, is how strong and active is civil society in Arab states. In other words, does Arab civil society have access to the state's political and economic resources? Second, is it recognized as having the right to participate in the shaping of the state? Third, can it achieve its own interests through cooperation with the regime in power, and function autonomously of the regime's interests?

The measure of the strength and activity of civil society in Arab states reverts back to two points made earlier: how far civil society is integrated horizontally among its individual groups and organizations, and the extent to which civil society is able to forge vertical linkages vis-a-vis the regime. Horizontal linkages are necessary to enhance civil

society's organizational skills in order to identify, express, and lobby its interests, and demand its participation in the shaping of the state. Vertical linkages reinforce a cooperative regime-society relationship by recognizing civil society's right in participating in the shaping of the state and in achieving its interests, in coordination with the interests of the regime and the state.

In Arab states, horizontal linkages among the various elements of civil society are relatively absent. A factor that has contributed to the failure of civil society forming horizontal linkages, besides the repression of regimes, is civil society's own immaturity. It lacks organization within itself. That is, civil societies themselves do not always function democratically, are often ridden in 'good old boys' networks, and are too broad in scope to identify a specific interest which they can express and achieve or lobby.

The vertical linkages forged vis-a-vis the regime in Arab states tend to be ones that absorb civil society groups under the auspices of the regime, rather than reciprocal relationships where civil society remains an autonomous entity vis-a-vis the regime. What happens is that the regime is able to 'appease' these civil society groups in return for their political support in maintaining the regime's own stability. A patronage relationship develops, and vertical linkages become bound through favors rather than merit. The regime strengthens ties with those civil society groups that can fulfill the regime's interests, and civil society groups feed into this behavior by offering concessions to the regime in return for favors for those civil society groups. Any civil society group standing opposed to the regime, on the other hand, will not be able to form vertical linkages vis-a-vis the regime, but rather face being destroyed or banned from participating in the shaping of the state.

As stated previously, the degree to which horizontal and vertical ties are formed within the Arab state by civil society and the regime varies from country to country. However, there are three broad categories under which civil societies fall in Arab states. These categories summarize the extent of horizontal and vertical linkages Arab civil societies forge, as well as the variables that contribute to their ability or inability to create those relationships.

The Three Models of Arab Civil Society

The three types of civil society identified in this dissertation are incipient, nominal, and participatory. Distinguishing among these three types of civil society is based upon three criteria.

- 1) The first of these criteria is *the degree of organizational skills civil society itself possesses, or civil society's ability to identify, express, and lobby or achieve its interests.*
- 2) Second is *the degree of horizontal integration that is present among civil societies within the state.* Or, in other words, civil societies ability to form coalitions and unite in order to achieve its right to participate in the shaping of the state.
- 3) Third is *the degree of vertical links forged by civil society vis-a-vis the regime.* It is through such vertical integration that a cooperative regime-society relationship develops and the interests of the society and the regime are achieved in coordination with the interests of the state.

These three criteria are the basic features that contribute to a flourishing civil society within the state.

Incipient Civil Society. Incipient civil society is one where individual groups within society, be they political, economical, or social, lack the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby their interests vis-a-vis the regime. Further, the lack of such organizational skills reflects civil society's inability to access the state's political and economic resources. Lastly, this type of civil society fails to horizontally integrate amongst one another in order to demand its participation in the shaping of the state. Vertical integration vis-a-vis the regime is also weak, due to incipient civil society's incapacity to express and lobby its own interests.

The reasons for incipient civil society's stunted growth is less a function of repression than civil society's inability to overcome its own undemocratic or unpluralistic nature. That is to say, individual groups within incipient civil society tend to be embroiled in their own bureaucratic "hierarchy". There maybe 'elections' to boards and committees and other democratic formalities. However, nominations tend to be based on a 'good old boys network', where members of the board scratch each other's backs, so to speak.

Nominal Civil Society. This type of civil society differs from incipient civil society in that, first, its organizational skills are well developed. Second, its inability to lobby its own interests is a function of repression than a lack of organizational skills. However, vertical integration vis-a-vis the regime is imposed by the regime rather than founded in a cooperative regime-society relationship, where the interests of civil society can be achieved in coordination with the interests of the regime and the state. Thus, nominal civil

society lacks autonomy of the regime. The regime either absorbs groups within nominal civil society or simply represses them, if they are viewed as a threat to the regime.

Usually, the groups that are absorbed within the regime's political machinery tend to be those that further the regime's interests or secure allegiance to the regime from a certain segment of society.

Participatory Civil Society. Civil society that is classified as participatory is horizontally and vertically integrated at advanced levels, where civil society has found its strength in coalition building, and the regime itself has recognized civil society's autonomy, granting it the right to participate in the shaping of the state. Just as with nominal civil society, participatory civil society's ability to identify, express, and lobby its interests is well developed. Yet, unlike nominal civil society, participatory civil society does not face repression or absorption by the ruling regime. Hence, vertical integration is also based upon a mutual and reciprocal relationship with the regime. Horizontally, civil society groups successfully integrate in order to further lobby their interests vis-a-vis the regime.

The Dynamics of Regime-Society Relations and its Effects on the State

This chapter, as well as the previous two chapters, have attempted to define and explain how the regime and society are responsible for contributing to the nature of Arab states' regime-society relationship. First, chapter two demonstrated how the regimes' manipulation of Arab states has prevented civil society's participation in the shaping of

the state. Second, chapter three explained the extent to which civil society itself is capable of *demanding* its own participation in the shaping of the state.

Civil society's ability to demand its participation in the shaping of the state has been affected by several factors. First, is the extent to which civil society has the organizational skills necessary to identify, express, and lobby its own interests. While some civil societies, such as nominal and participatory have these skills, and have attempted to demand participation in the shaping of the state, incipient civil societies lack the organizational skills to do the same.

The second factor to consider is the presence of vertical integration. Although civil societies in Arab states have successfully forged vertical links vis-à-vis the regime, both nominal and incipient civil societies have done so at the expense of their autonomy. In other words, these civil societies have achieved their interests through the regime's patronage in return for political acquiescence of the regime's monopoly over the state. On the other hand, participatory civil society have forged vertical links while retaining its autonomy. This is a crucial point—autonomous vertical links has enabled participatory civil society the space to horizontally integrate among one another.

Horizontal integration is the last factor contributing to civil society's ability to demand its participation in the shaping of the state. This is imperative in order to strengthen civil society within the state, and secure its autonomy. The regime is less likely to manipulate the state if civil society exercises its right to participate in the shaping of the state, which makes it more difficult for the regime to retain its monopoly over the state.

For instance, incipient civil society lacks the ability to forge horizontal links, therefore allowing authoritarian regimes to effortlessly manipulate the state in order to serve its interests. In contrast, nominal civil society has the potential to forge horizontal links, but regimes that are totalitarian in nature have either absorbed or destroyed elements of nominal civil society, preventing their horizontal integration. Finally, participatory civil society, which forges horizontal links, has done so as the authoritative regime recognizes its autonomy, as well as its right to participate in the shaping of the state.

The point is that the type of civil society within each Arab state contributes to the type of regime-society relationship that evolves. Civil society is just as responsible for demanding its participation in the shaping of the state as much as it is the regime's responsibility to recognize civil society's right to do so.

In order to further examine the three types of regime-society relationships of Arab states, it is pertinent to turn to the three case studies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDIES OF ARAB REGIMES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SOCIETIES

The previous four chapters have laid the theoretical framework defining the premise of this dissertation, as well as defining the concepts that serve to support the conclusion of its hypothesis. To summarize, this thesis makes the argument that as Arab states are manipulated in order to serve the interests of their regimes, depending on the degree to which society participates in the shaping of the state, several types of Arab regime-society relationships characterize how Arab states differ among one another.

Again, *participation in the shaping of the state* implies that society has access to the state's political resources (such as political channels that foster communication between the regime and society) and economic resources (such as access to the state's modes of production). It also implies that society is recognized within the political foundation of the state and contributes to expanding the economic foundations of the state. Lastly, society should be able to achieve its own interests, without interference by the state or the regime.

Society's participation in the shaping of the state is determined by *two* factors. *First*, it is determined by the extent to which the regime itself has manipulated the state, thereby detaching it from its social base. The more repressive the regime, the more difficult it is

for society to find itself participating in the shaping of the state. *Second*, society's participation in the shaping of the state is determined by the extent to which civil society demands its participation in the shaping of the state. Unless civil society is capable to do so, it cannot rely on the regime to provide it the opportunity to participate in the shaping of the state.

For example, Jordan's authoritative regime and participatory civil society has fostered a cooperative regime-society relationship, where society is capable of participating in the shaping of the state. The success of Jordan's cooperative regime-society relationship is due to three factors. First, the state's code of law has been amended in the last ten years to recognize the state as the ultimate sovereign entity, where the scope of the regime's powers has been defined and political channels have been opened for society to access the state's political and economic resources. Second, because the regime recognizes society's to participate in the shaping of the state, civil society has maintained its autonomy while forging vertical links vis-a-vis the regime. Third, because Jordan's civil society has the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests, it has forged horizontal links in order to demand its participation in the shaping of the state.

In comparison, Egypt presented a case study of an Arab state with an authoritarian regime and incipient civil society, where the society-regime relationship has not yet been established as a cooperative one. The inability of Egypt's regime-society relationship to evolve into cooperative one has been due less to the regime's authoritarian rule than to civil society's incipient nature. That is, Egypt's incipient civil society lacks the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests. Thus, Egypt's civil

society has been unable to forge vertical links vis-a-vis the regime, while maintaining its autonomy. In addition, civil society has also failed to form horizontal links in order to demand its participation in the shaping of the state. In the face of a weak civil society, the regime has continued to monopolize the state's political and economic resources, without having to include society in participating in the shaping of the state.

Whereas Egypt's failure to include society in the shaping of the state is the function of a weak civil society, Syrian civil society's failure to do so is the product of its totalitarian regime. Such a totalitarian regime has either repressed Syria's nominal civil society or absorbed it under its auspices as a form of *symbolic* representation, excluded from participating in the shaping of the state. Thus, the vertical link forged have been imposed by the regime, at the expense of civil society's autonomy. Further, Syria's totalitarian regime has prevented civil society from horizontally integrating in order to demand its participation in the shaping of the state.

The regime-society relationship has not, thus, been a cooperative one. Several factors support this observation. First, while the government's formal structure has functioned to lend legitimacy to the regime, by proportionally representing the diverse ethnic and religious segments of Syria's society, its political institutions have served more as a means for the regime to monitor society. Second, the government's informal sub-structure places the state under the sovereign rule of a cadre of Alawi officers within the regime, whose power extends beyond the scope defined within the state's code of law. Third, the Ba'th party has served to be the base of the ideological, political, and economic

foundations of the state, thereby reinforcing the regime as the sovereign ruler over the state as well as its resources.

Syria's lack to include society in the shaping of the state, therefore, is due to its repressive totalitarian regime, versus Egypt, whose incipient civil society is unable to make such a demand. In order for Syria's regime-society relationship to improve, the regime will have to accommodate its nominal civil society in the shaping of the state.

The following three chapters are meant to illustrate the differences between the three types of regime-society relationships found within Arab states that have evolved as a function of the degree to which society participates in the shaping of the state. This depends on, first, the regime's recognition of society's right to participate in the shaping of the state, and second, civil society's own ability to demand to exercise its right to participate in the shaping of the state.

Each of the case studies will sketch the three types of regime-society found in Arab states. Chapters five, six and seven will respectively examine an authoritative regime with a participatory civil society (as is the case of Jordan), an authoritarian regime with an incipient civil society (as is the case of Egypt), and a totalitarian regime with a nominal civil society (as is the case of Syria).

Jordan: An Authoritative Regime and Participatory Civil Society

Jordan presents a case study of an authoritative regime with a participatory civil society. In other words, there is an increasing degree of political liberalization, where both

society has demanded to exercise its right to participate in the shaping of the state and the regime has recognized society's right to do so.

Despite some minor turbulence, since 1971 Jordan has enjoyed relative political stability. As a rentier economy it did not necessitate the productive capacity of society to generate revenues for the state. However, deteriorating economic conditions in the 1980s, the decrease in economic assistance from the Gulf Arab states, and IMF stipulations were rigidly constraining the ability for the regime to continue its rentier mentality:

In short, the IMF threatened the very legitimacy of the Hashemite regime by demanding that it restrict its typical means of securing support. What is more, the downturn in the oil economy executed a secondary effect on the Jordanian standard of living by decreasing the employment of Jordanians abroad. Remittances from Jordanians working in the Gulf states declined and a growing number of workers returned to Jordan, spurring an increase in unemployment and exacerbating tensions between Palestinians and Jordanians. (Roberts 1991)

The ensuing riots in 1989 was the zenith of the economic crisis, catalyzing a process of political liberalization in Jordan:

The implications of the riots were clear. In order to ensure stability and to create public approval for the necessary austerity measures, the government had to respond to public concerns with regard to political participation. The king moved immediately to defuse the situation by declaring that elections would be held before the end of the year and that a new parliament would convene to represent public interests. For the first time in thirty years, public discourse regarding political parties was allowed and the country geared up for a lively political contest. (Roberts 1991)

Simultaneously, political crises posed threats of instability for Jordan. There was the political breakdown of talks between the PLO and Israel in 1986, followed by the Intifada in 1987 and Jordan's detrimental stand during the Gulf War in 1991, which essentially

pitted the state against its donor Arab allies. In conjunction with the economic turmoil facing the country, the political situation made it inevitably clear that the stability of the state, but moreover the regime, could not be maintained without the cooperation of society.

In light of all of this, political liberalization was pursued with caution. The regime engaged in dialogues with ruling members of the opposition and amended election laws and press laws impacting the freedom of speech. The regime then enacted the National Charter in 1991, which became "...a mechanism for outlining the prerogatives of a nonpartisan monarchy and paving the way for the legalization of all parties willing to engage in parliamentary politics." (Mufti 1999) The National Charter's importance laid in the fact that it was a framework formed for interaction between the society and regime, and created the premise for new legislation of political parties and press laws, the return of exiles, and an effective abolition of martial law. (Brand 1993)

Political liberalization in the Jordan of the 1990s has been one not comparable to the other attempts of liberalization in the past. Rather, the current liberalization has been the culmination of changes in the relations between the regime and the society, with cooperation and mutual recognition of each one's political space, while balancing the interests of the state as well. In other words, political liberalization was not installed, but this time emerged as a natural outgrowth from within the state:

For [it has] been imposed this time by the internal social, economic and political changes in the first places while former political relaxation's were dictated by external pressures and challenges, that were reflected, in turn, upon local balances. In addition, the previous limited political relaxation's witnessed by Jordan were not always accompanied by tangible changes in the political

system and the legislative atmosphere, where they were mostly confined to a certain type of coexistence with and acceptances of open activity of the opposition, while the recent political relaxation process was accompanied by government political measures and actions that accepted popular demands and laid down a number of documents and legislation's that created a political and legal framework for democratic transformations. (New Jordan Center 1999)

Political liberalization in Jordan ensued due to the regime transforming from an authoritarian rule to an authoritative one, as well as civil society evolving to be participatory in nature. In order to understand the dynamics of the regime-society relationship within Jordan, it is necessary to examine three factors. First, the history of the Jordanian state will be examined, in light of how its historical roots have contributed to its regional and domestic situation. Second, the phenomenon of "Husseinism", or the regime's strategy to consolidate its power over its ethnically segmented society and gain legitimacy will be assessed. Lastly, the evolution of Jordanian civil society will be discussed in regards to how they have achieved greater power from the regime.

The Formation of the Jordanian State

The historical formation of the Jordanian state is one of the main factors that has contributed to its current journey towards a cooperative regime-society relationship. However, the purpose of this section is less to give a chronological account of state formation in Jordan than to outline the foundations upon which this relationship has come to be built. The state itself was plagued by two specific problems. The first is the 'asabiya dilemma', or the absence of national unity, and the second is 'transnational

regional permeability', or the influence of regional actors upon Jordan's domestic situation.

Following 1948, Jordan saw the basic final delineation of its demographic composition, one that would forever alter Jordan's domestic and regional policies. The pluralistic segmentation of its population was skewed, not only horizontally, but vertically as well:

In the Emirate's early years the segmental composition of the population was differentiated along four, significantly unequal, vertical cleavages: the mode of life and economy, tribal affiliation, ethnicity, and religion. By the early 1960s, as a result of the 1948 War and the subsequent annexation of the Transjordanian-controlled parts of Palestine to the Hashemite Kingdom, Palestinians represented 43 percent of the population of Transjordan, excluding the West Bank population. Moreover, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war caused around 300,000 Palestinians to move to the East Bank. The shift from a population characterized by a vast East Jordanian majority to one with a clear and potent Palestinian majority was effected. The resultant clash of interests and diversity in identities in the new polity engendered a structural transformation in the segmental composition of the kingdom. Henceforth, the most important segmental cleavage in Jordanian society was the sociopolitical and national distinction between the politically dominant East Jordanians and the refugee and immigrant Palestinian communities. As a result, the post-1950 social hierarchy in Jordan was composed of three main segments: the ruling Hashemites; a now expanded Transjordanian community which included, in addition to the indigenous Transjordanians, assimilated Palestinian, Syrian, and Hijazi communities that had moved to Transjordan before 1948; and a large Palestinian community whose loyalty to the kingdom has at times been suspect. This structural transformation in Jordan's segmental composition gave rise to Jordan's two salient, organically linked, and mutually re-enforcing domestic dilemmas. (Salloukh 1996)

Of course, the heterogeneity of the population would pose the problem of consolidating society under the authority of the Jordanian regime. Such heterogeneity, after all, spawned the first of the two domestic dilemmas that contributed to the instability of Jordan. Salloukh identifies this first dilemma as the lack of "asabiyya", or:

...a condition where society is composed of different segments, each with its own 'asabiyya (solidarity) and its specific vision and definition of the territorial entity. The 'asabiyya dilemma is a primary security imperative constraining and shaping the regime's survival policies. A better appreciation of the political and security implications of the 'asabiyya dilemma may be attained by examining the challenges facing a state lacking a single, over-arching, 'asabiyya. (Salloukh 1996)

The obstacle presented by the 'asabiyya dilemma' is that it interfered in strengthening the ideological foundation of the state. The lack of such national unity prevented Jordanian society from cultivating loyalty to the state, where society could regard itself as Jordanian citizens of the state rather than individual ethnic groups within the state. If primary loyalties remained with ethnic groups, the regime would find it difficult to be recognized as the legitimate ruling authority of the state. The regime's authority became secondary to that of the tribe, external organizations, and ethnic affinities, such as was the case with its Palestinian population. As such, it follows that the regime's legitimacy would be contingent upon the approval of these tribes, organizations, and ethnic affiliations. It was necessary to consolidate legitimacy under the regime, which could only be done through consolidating loyalty from society itself.

The second dilemma that faced the Jordanian state was what Salloukh called 'transnational regional permeability':

Transnational regional permeability was most acute in the 1950s and 1960s, when political allegiance in the Arab World tended to oscillate between the simultaneous obligations of the sovereign territorial state and the imperatives of pan-Arabism. The existence of a set of "all-Arab core concerns" forced upon states a certain level of scrupulousness toward these concerns in the formulation of their domestic and foreign policies. Throughout the period under review, Jordan fell victim to the transnational influence of Nasserite Arab nationalism (and, to a lesser extent, Ba'thism). Often, regional imperatives

constrained foreign policy behavior. Other domestic imperatives had a similar constraining effect on foreign policy behavior. (Salloukh 1996)

Because over half Jordan's population is Palestinian, most of whom remained unassimilated as Jordanians, the fear of transnational interference has been key the formulating the state's domestic and foreign policies. For example, coercive institutions dominated by segments of society loyal to the Hashemite monarchy, such as the Arab Legion (or the Jordanian Arab Army as it latter became known) and the secret services, became a means by which the regime kept regional tensions from exacerbating domestic crises at home:

At times of open domestic confrontation (1956-57, 1958, 1963, 1966, and 1970-71), direct military action was taken by the loyal Bedouin regiments of the army. The Bedouin dominated officer corps and the elite Royal Guards -- often drawn from loyal minorities -- shielded the monarchy from many coup attempts. On most other occasions, the regime resorted to more subtle coercive measures against the domestic opposition. The security services, especially the General Intelligence Directorate (Mudiriyyat al-Mukhabarat al-'Aroma), were successful in suppressing political activity deemed threatening to the survival of the regime. (Salloukh 1996)

The oscillations of extreme pan-Arabism in the region, as well as the trends of severe Islamic fundamentalism also have served as periods when Jordan inadvertently found itself in the midst of regional tensions affecting its own domestic stability. One unique feature of Jordan's political position is that it has been embroiled into regional predicaments which itself it has not willingly entered. From Palestinian guerilla activities carried out on its soil against Israel, to having to side with Iraq in the Gulf War, Jordan's foreign policy *positions* have seemed to be foreign policy *impositions* upon the state. As a

result, political stands taken by the state have depended upon the internal vulnerability of the regime itself. The degree of vulnerability is reflected in the sentiment of the Jordanian population whose domestic political opinion directly correlates to current regional tensions:

In general, the regime's decision to confront or accommodate the regional hegemon was governed by the intensity and the origin of the threat to its survival: An accommodationist policy was chosen when the regime faced grave domestic threats, exacerbated by foreign manipulation, to insulate the domestic arena and enable the coercive agencies to restore domestic control. Regional confrontation, on the other hand, was often chosen in reaction to a similar policy by the regional hegemon, usually -- but not always -- when the regime felt domestically secure. (Roberts 1991)

These factors offer an explanation of the Jordanian state's weak ideological foundation. A lack of national unity has, in other words, occurred due to external impediments that have interfered with consolidating society under the guise of a Jordanian state. Moreover, domestic fragility has been magnified by transnational penetration, where regional forces have influenced the shape and direction of domestic policy. Hence, against the backdrop of a state that has been formed upon horizontal and vertical cleavages, the regime would have to consolidate and incorporate its heterogeneous constituents to participate in the shaping of the state if it was to achieve national unity. Such is the historical evolution of the state that consequently lead to "Husseinism" and the beginnings of forming cooperative regime-society relations.

The Makings of an Authoritative Regime

The fragmented Jordanian population could only be consolidated under the regime by creating economic and social channels that diverted society's dependence from the tribe and other ethnic groups to the state, and allowed for a more cooperative state-society relationship. Thus, the regime, rather than manipulating the foundations of the state in its interest, capitalized on its monopoly over the state's political and economic resources in order to create such a cooperative state-society relationship. The monopoly over economic resources, or rather rent-generated state revenues, allowed the regime to secure its economic dominance as the sole allocative distribution center in exchange for political acquiescence from its supporters. Further, the creation of coercive institutions represented by minorities loyal to the king ensured prevention of civil conflicts that may upset political stability. In combination with remaining regionally aloof as possible to tensions escalating in the area, the regime was able to focus on creating a statehood under which it could consolidate its heterogeneous population:

...the survival of the Hashemite regime in power, and the decline of an active Palestinian or Arab nationalist challenge, may be explained by four explanatory variables: a successful insulatory regional policy, the historical process of state formation, the availability of economic resources under state control, and the ability of the state to use its coercive resources without hindrance. The convergence of these factors enabled the Hashemite regime to restructure state-society relations to consolidate social control, mitigate the effects of transnational ideologies on the domestic arena, and achieve an acceptable level of national integration among the different segments of the society gaining the state allegiance from a sizable number, or from strategic sectors, of the population. (Salloukh 1996)

The result was a unique political strategy, "Husseiniism", pursued by the Jordanian regime in order to consolidate its power, achieve legitimacy, and incorporate the society in

the shaping of the Jordanian state. Husseinism, as coined by Bassel Salloukh functioned as:

...a multi-level, interactive strategy that exhibits the role of domestic determinants in shaping regime foreign policy and, consequently, the regime's instrumental use of extra-regional and regional policies to consolidate and legitimize its rule. This allows the regime the necessary domestic space to launch interventionist policies aimed at integrating an otherwise deeply divided society. (Salloukh 1996)

In terms of regional policies, the regime's stand has been based upon what accommodated the current status domestic fragility. That is, the regime proceeded to embark on foreign policies that reflected its regional interest and position, but not before calculating how domestic reaction among its heterogeneous constituents would affect the regime itself.

Extra-regional policies refer to policies that protect the state from the threat of regional military intervention as well as restrain domestic opponents of the monarchy. (Salloukh 1996) The means of asserting extra-regional policies could either be exercised through strengthening the army or improving the economic capacities of the state. The former solution, though effective in the short-term, does not guarantee a cooperative long-term regime-society relationship, seeing that creating national unity through military force would be coercive rather than persuasive, and society would be less likely to respond favorably to the regime.

On the other hand, expanding the economic capacities of the state would spawn a cooperative regime-society relationship and be a basis of creating national unity. Economic expansion would benefit the society and the regime, as well as serve in the interest of the state. In addition, the more the society was incorporated as a productive

element in the economic base of the state, the more likely society would begin to regard itself as Jordanian citizens rather than in terms of tribal and ethnic identities. Lastly, the extra-regional strategy of incorporating society as the productive base of the state would diminish the intervention of transnational forces influencing pluralistic segments within Jordanian society.

Yet, Jordan has difficulties in pursuing economic liberalization reforms. As the Jordan Star summarized it, "[w]hile the adjustment process is progressing, there are still weaknesses. With its narrow, service-oriented industrial base, Jordan is going to be more sensitive than any other country to the internal and external political shocks that the region will continue to generate." (Jordan Star On-Line Edition [Amman], 7 January 1996)

In addition, though the government would like to cut subsidies, the chances of reducing public spending are almost impossible in order not to create political instability.

Nonetheless, the regime has allowed firms to engage in joint ventures with Asian companies in order to encourage the export of fertilizers and chemicals. Also, the development of its pharmaceutical sector has been pursued in conjunction with the medical service sector, which is among one of the best in the Arab World. The truth of the matter is that the economic liberalization occurring in Jordan is on the right track.

Whatever economic woes face Jordan will not be linked to economic liberalization as much as the scarcity of finite resources in Jordan, specifically that of water. And the politics of water will definitely require complete cooperation between the regime and society in order to prevent the fissuring of the Jordanian state itself.

Concurrently, it should be noted that other than economic strategies of creating a productive state, political instrumentation has also played a part in building national unity. John Roberts cites three variables through which Husseinism achieved nationalism, therefore altering the structure of society:

The changes in this structure are most clearly seen in the policies of sedentarization, education and communication. Education, for instance, contributes to expectations of social mobility and opportunity which are not connected to tribal affiliation. New values arise in competition with tribal mores and the ties which bound generations of tribal members disintegrate. Tribal cohesiveness is further weakened by physical mobility; namely, as members move to cities, their physical relations to other members attenuate. Once in the cities, furthermore these newly urbanized tribal members become part of a new middle class of entrepreneurs, professionals and educators. (Roberts 1991)

Sedentarization, education, and communication are means through which the regime has reached into the enclaves of the state and incorporated them under its rule.

Sedentarization has been crucial in forming a center in consolidating Jordan's heterogeneous constituents. By creating a city to serve as the administrative, political, and economic center of the state, Jordan's heterogeneous constituents would develop ties bringing them closer to the state while diminishing ties to their communal origins. Thus, the purpose of making Amman the capital of Jordan, as opposed to already flourishing cities, such as the Irbid-Ajlun area:

In developing Amman as a core area, Jordan has served the dual purposes of state and nation building by transforming an initially ill-equipped region into the preeminent political and cultural center. Amman's emergence as Jordan's primary city resulted from distinct and purposeful policies enacted by the central government and designed to subdue internal opposition and undercut other potential centers of commerce and political activity which might oppose the state. The goal of sedentarization initially might have been limited strictly

to the consolidation of Hashemite power, but its ultimate result has been the transformation of Jordan itself. The consolidation of power in a hegemonic center and the creation of a nascent national myth emanating from Amman have resulted at least in part from these attempts at sedentarization. (Roberts 1991)

Drawing the center of activities away from West Bank cities and other Jordanian towns established a metropolitan core that contributed to national and cultural awareness.

(Roberts 1991) Even through creating an Arab Legion whose base primarily consisted of Bedouin tribes from the south, the regime redirected the seat of power of the tribes, or rather extended it to include the regime in its circle of power. (Brand 1993) Further, it brought vertical and horizontal segments of Jordan's society into contact with one another, thereby bringing about interactions based on mutual interests, which were primarily economic.

Education has equally served to create national unity. A major point of contention between Palestinian and Jordanians has been the gap between their levels of education, thus reflecting upon their socio-economic status. Palestinians often enjoy being employed in the service and business sectors while Jordanians have filled more labor intensive and lower salary jobs. Palestinians have been better educated historically, whereas under the rule of the Ottomans, Transjordanians did not enjoy a similar privilege. Not until after 1948 did the education system in Jordan receive serious attention. Education became accessible to the rural areas, compulsory at primary and secondary levels, and improvements in the teaching profession itself all led to a better educated Jordanian population. Literacy rates have significantly improved as well, through the initiation of adult educational programs that have reached Jordanians in rural and urban areas alike.

The role of communication or media in the creation of national unity has proven to be paramount, and in fact is one of the key factors that has lead to creating horizontal links among groups within Jordanian civil society. Since its official date of inception, in 1939, the Jordanian press has undergone changes that have 'Jordanized' it. Originally, newspapers in Jordan had launched because of external grievances or political campaigns. From Palestinian politics, to the political views of the Muslim Brotherhood, publications in the early years of Jordan's press history were geared on issues not related to the Jordanian state or society directly, but were more regional in character:

Almost immediately, the press lost its Jordanian character. It was early dominated by Palestinians. After the 1948 War, dailies such as *Filastin* and *al-Difa'* were the primary communicators of news. In general, the 1950s saw an expansion of the press with *al-Urdun* becoming a daily soon after the 1948 war and followed by *al-Jihad* and *al-Manar*. *Al-Manar* was the newspaper of the conservative Muslim Brotherhood and illustrates a trait common to many Arab states: the presence of highly specialized political news-magazines marketed to very specific constituencies. (Roberts 1991)

It was not until the after the 1967 that the regime began to demand that newspapers merge, and two of the biggest, *al-Difa* and *al-Dustur*, which were formed by Palestinians in 1968, were taken over by the government. *al-Difa* was transformed into *al-Rai*, and was then turned over to the Jordan Newspaper Company in 1974, while *al-Dustur* remained a loyalist based paper.

The 1990s, however, has seen evident advancement in the liberalization of the press. In 1993, the Jordanian parliament passed the Press and Publications Law, giving journalists and publications greater freedom of expression and protecting their rights in reporting the news. There have been various amendments over the past seven years, and

the Jordanian Supreme Court has overturned government attempts to interpret the law in order to restrain the evolution of a press liberal of government control. The decade has been punctuated with arrests and suspensions of editors and journalists, an increase by the government in the minimum capital requirement for a publication to continue functioning, and debates on the governmental ownership of the two largest papers, al-Rai and al-Dustur. Nevertheless, the point to be made here is that although there are still tremendous obstacles to overcome in liberalizing the press, there is an interactive dialogue between the regime and the society, with society gradually gaining autonomy in imperative areas like journalism.

The fact that even the judiciary is able to make rulings upheld and recognized by the regime as legally binding is much more than is present in other Arab states as well. That is an indication of how the regime has begun to rule under the sovereignty of the state, while society is becoming an increasingly participatory in the shaping of the state and its policies.

What makes the case of Jordan further remarkable is the fact that the recognition of the necessity to form a mutually reciprocal relationship with society has been initiated by the regime. That is not to say that one day the regime woke up and decided to democratize out of good faith, but rather than remain coercive, the regime realized that the only viable option for long term stability was persuasion through gaining legitimacy from the society that it ruled. Where as Syria, as later will be seen, has fought the incorporation of civil society in the shaping of the state, the Jordanian regime has been a pioneer in reconciling itself to the fact that inclusion of society in the shaping of the state is the only means to

meet the interests of the state and for the regime itself. Only then could the regime greater flexibility in exercising regional policies that might have otherwise caused intrastate crises:

The considerations that brought Jordan's leadership to this critical first step in the liberalization process were straightforward and--in the context of the experiences of many other countries around the world--entirely unexceptional: An economic downturn arising from structural weaknesses had generated a level of discontent dangerous enough to warrant a political response aimed at defusing tensions. In Jordan's case, the specific character of this response--holding parliamentary elections--was determined not primarily by democratizing pressure from civil society but by the fact that an electoral opening had already been initiated by the government 3 years earlier for its own (as it turned out short-lived) reasons having mostly to do with Israel and the PLO. When the 1989 crisis struck, therefore, a convenient response lay readily at hand: to reactivate the countdown to elections that had been interrupted after the breakdown of the peace process in 1986-1985. In other words, a device employed in 1986--the instrumentality of which was amply demonstrated by its abandonment when its primary rationale disappeared--became useful again in 1989 for equally tactical reasons. (Mufti 1999)

Thus, the infrastructure of Husseinism, which included building a base of power upon strategic minorities, consolidating power through sedentarization, education, and communications, as well as preparing to economically shift from an allocative rentier state to a productive one, all laid the ground work in order to build a cooperative regime-society relationship where the society participates in the shaping of the state.

The second part to Husseinism has been successfully implemented through the regime explicitly recognizing and including civil society through allowing elections to take place in 1989, amending and restructuring election laws, and bargaining with the opposition elements. In the process of consolidating society under the guise of a Jordanian state, Husseinism has blossomed to be based upon an array of participants both in the regime and civil society:

...in Jordan, the onset of liberalization was shaped by the choices of as few as 20 individuals. King Hussein played the paramount role, intervening decisively to hold free elections in 1989 and resisting subsequent calls to halt the parliamentary experiment. But key actors in his government and in the opposition also made choices at each stage that kept the process alive. Those choices were by no means preordained, so the skills often displayed--by regime liberalizers in keeping the various political parties off balance (sometimes through devious means) while neutralizing the hardliners; by opposition moderates in countering government pressure while checking their more radical colleagues--testify to the importance of virtuosity in political transitions. (Mufti 1999)

Again, the process of political dialogue taking place has been more significant in supporting political liberalization, where the society participates in the shaping of the state, rather than a result in changing laws. Of course actual changes in imperative areas such as the press and elections materialize the weight of political dialogue between the regime and civil society. Yet, the real incorporation of society in the shaping of the state has occurred through civil society exercising its vertical and horizontal links to achieve its interests. One half of the equation of political liberalization has been Husseinism, which has consolidated a heterogeneous society and offered the chance for society's participation in the shaping of the state. The other half of this equation has been civil society's own ability to maintain autonomy in vertical links formed vis-a-vis the regime and develop a mature level of organizational skills and tolerance to forge horizontal ties among its individual groups.

Civil Society in Jordan

What can be said categorically of Jordanian civil society's mature level of organization and tolerance is that its roots are Palestinian in nature while having been founded in tribal origins as well. The ability to identify, express, and lobby its interests, and form coalitions with other elements of civil society is attributed to its historical Palestinian origins. From labor organizations to women's groups, organizational skills and tolerance have evolved from the Palestinian mother civil societies of these now Jordanian groups. Organizations that identified their place of origin, such as the Ramallah Charitable Society could retain their names, however anything that included 'Palestine' or 'Palestinian' was prohibited. (Brand 1993)

These Palestinian groups and societies had evolved from the social base of Palestinian society. Communalism and reciprocal exchange of services had long been a part of the Palestinian culture, and remained so even after annexation of the West Bank occurred. Husseinism 'Jordanized' the character of these civil societies, but their political participatory nature has been an outgrowth of Palestinian grass roots. This grass root outgrowth is what makes Jordan's civil society strong. It developed in spite of the regime, whereas in Egypt, civil society has sprouted as a means for the regime to monitor society (as with labor unions in Egypt). Even when the Jordanian regime erased civil society's Palestinian heritage, through insisting organizations drop the term 'Palestinian' from their names and replace it with 'Jordanian', the structure of these civil societies were not capable of being penetrated or fragmented. Pluralism and toleration remained a pillar that carried Jordan's civil society to become as active as it is today.

Another factor that has contributed to Jordanian civil society's mature organizational skills and tolerance has been the structure of the tribe and family. The tribe and family have served as a buffer between the society and regime. In addition, they also embrace and foster their own tradition of a politically participatory culture:

...it is quite significant that prior to the 1993 elections some tribes actually held their own primaries: each of the major clans or branches made its own choice and then elections were held to determine the tribe as a whole's preferred candidate. While tribes have long been involved in interest articulation, the 'primaries phenomenon' may suggest that the nature of their participation in the political system is gradually being transformed in ways that have important, positive implications for the continued development and institutionalization of the liberalization process. (Brand 1993, 180)

The structure, therefore, and the interactive participation of tribe and family members in consultation regarding elections, for example, demonstrate an inherent base from which organizational skills and tolerance could thrive, develop, and eventually be adopted in the formation of civil society groups.

The Jordanian regime, although reconciling to the fact that civil society would have to participate in the shaping of the state, nevertheless has in the meantime attempted to contain the growth and power of civil society. There has been a fear of the Islamic Action Front and East Bank civil societies in particular, to the point where election laws were changed to one-man, one-vote, in order to diminish the support that the Islamic Action Front might receive. The Political Parties Law of 1992 further prevented the formation of pro-Palestinian parties by stipulating that members of founding parties could not be associated with extra-Jordanian organizations. Funding and endorsement of candidates by unions and other organizations were prohibited as well.

Though attempts have been made to restrain civil society, the culmination of networking of these groups has prevented the regime's penetration in their organizations. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has advanced as a civil society more than any one of its counterparts in any Arab country. They have a healthy growing membership among educated secondary and university students, have spawned social organizations, such as "Jam'iyyat al-Markaz al-Islami", and have expanded by creating 'committees' across the country that function as chapters. These 'committees' as of 1993 were 32, where as the Ministry of Social Development only had 30 branches around Jordan. (Brand 1993)

Political parties as active channels vis-a-vis the regime are nascent in Jordan. Primary expression of participation in the shaping of the state occurred through social organizations that lobbied the government, and expressed their party affiliation through the tribe or family connections that reach into the government. The only political party that has actually successfully rallied for access to the state's political resources and achieved its interests through these political channels 'a la Western democratic' processes is the Islamic Action Front, which is the political arm of Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood. After the 1993 elections, their members had dominated the Ministry of Education and one of its own, Yusuf al-Athm, who became Minister of Social Affairs, used his time in office to register a number of Islamic charitable societies. (Brand 1993)

Generally speaking, political parties in the Arab world have been weak. This has been due to regimes stunting their growth and eventually demolishing their freedom to identify, express, and lobby their interests. As opposition forces, these parties were seen as

threats rather than groups who had the right to participate in the shaping of the state as citizens of the state. After all, the regime in a politically liberal polity is at the end of the day, a body of citizens of the state. The problem has been that in the Arab world, regimes have considered themselves synonymous with the state, thereby granting itself absolute sovereignty, when in actuality sovereignty in a politically liberal polity lies within the realm of the state itself. Thus, all citizens, both society and the regime, fall under its authority.

But because the regime assumed itself the sovereignty of the state, it prevented other citizens from functioning as political entities, which the regime reserved as a realm solely as their own. As such, citizens expressed most of their political interests through professional associations and syndicates. In Jordan, professional associations and syndicates became especially active organizations in functioning as semi-political parties or as being reflective of society's political sentiment:

...in the absence of legalized political parties it was elections for leadership posts in these organizations that citizens...watched in order to gauge the shifting of relative power of the illegal, but nonetheless operative, political parties in the country. (Brand 1993, 166)

Professional associations and syndicates have been instrumental in providing access to politically participating in the shaping of the state. For instance, the National Grouping, or 'al-Tajammu al-Watani', organized in the 1960s resisting Palestinian guerilla activities. The Professional Grouping, also formed of tradesmen and professionals, committed to stopping factional Palestinian movements as well. The Council of Professional Unions

expanded following the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon to create the General Secretariat of Patriotic and Popular Forces.

The formation of such organizations have served as substitute political parties, or at least as a medium through which such skills as organization and tolerance evolved, so as horizontal linkages could form. Their structures were democratic in nature as they institutionalized a systemic and pluralistic forum to identify and express their concerns and interests:

...these unions came to fill the gap in articulation of political concerns left by the absence of legal parties and the suspension of parliament. In the pre-liberalization period, the professional associations were also the only organizations that could attempt to put together broader, non-governmental councils to address the pressing political problems or crises of the day. While they were not immune to regime pressures, they were less vulnerable because of their membership composition: these were men and women who not only were generally not employees of the state, they were largely self-employed and many were quite successful. (Brand 1993, 167)

Though the membership composition of professional associations may have allowed greater leeway in being active in the participation of the shaping of the state, labor unions grew to be almost as vocal in expressing their interests as well. Unions had been prohibited until 1953 when underground labor movements requested that the International Labor Organization press the Jordanian regime to allow unions to surface legally. In 1954 they did as a coalition under the Federation of Trade Unions in Jordan (FTUJ).

The weakening of unions in Jordan occurred in the 1970s when workers turned to alternative channels to express their grievances, such as political groups as FATAH. (Brand 1993) Yet, the vocal outcries of unions to reconcile with Palestinian resistance

groups caused the regime to revise labor laws, giving the government greater power to re-divide and reorganize unions. By the 1980s, unions toned down their political rhetoric. Attempts have been made to quell the activities of labor unions in the 1990s, but they reemerged to be more vocal and active, at least in challenging economic measures that have affected or impacted them. However, the policies that privatization and the IMF have imposed on the economy have greatly weakened labor unions, when cuts have been made in order to downsize companies. Labor unions have internally become weak as well, where workers have lost their confidence in the unions, pro-union leaders have become less democratic, and the weakening economic position of members has allowed the regime the ability to fragment the organization.

One pillar of civil society groups that evolved to participate in the shaping of the state is its women's organizations. The Federation of Arab Women, formed in 1954, advanced the plight of Jordanian women greatly. They won women's enfranchisement, engaged in solidarity work for Egyptian and Algerian causes, and expanded the labor laws to include rurally employed females. (Brand 1993) Though they had ceased to operate by 1957, the activities of the federation continued on in the Women's Union in Jordan (WUJ), from which later the General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW) emerged. The GFJW served as an umbrella organization for existing women's groups and functioned as a liason between the Ministry of Social Development and constituents. (Brand 1993)

The WUJ, which the government had attempted to consolidate with the GFJW, remained an autonomous organization that participated with the GFJW in the National Committee on Women in drafting a 'National Strategy for Women'. By the elections in

1993, the percentage of women voting rose, and Toujan Faisal became the first female elected into the parliament's lower house. The GFJW have also begun to rally tribes and ethnic groups, pressing for state prosecution of crimes such as 'honor crimes'. (Brand 1993) The process has been slow, but it has also moved in the proper direction.

The last element of civil society that has become vocal and active in participating in the shaping of the state is in the media. Upon liberalization, the Jordanian Writer's Association, which had been closed, was reopened, censors were removed from newspaper dailies, and publications, like the Jordan Times, are allowed to include a bit more political analysis.

The most impressive accomplishment of the media in Jordan has been the on-going amendment processes of the Press and Publications Law in 1992. This law originally stated that writers had to be member if the Jordanian Press Association, did not protect a journalist's sources, and restricted what could or could not be published regarding the monarchy or other Arab and Muslim heads of state. However, in the last seven years, the media has won the right to protect its sources and is free of government censorship. Though some editors and writers have spent a couple of nights in jail for supposedly slandering officials, there has also been an increase in the freedom to criticize the monarchy or Arab and Muslim heads of states.

The evidence in civil society's participation in the shaping of the state, by forming horizontal links among one another and autonomous links vis-a-vis the regime, goes beyond the presence of federations or professional associations and labor unions. The achievement of civil society's input in forming legislation and policies is exemplified in

two of the most important laws, the Election Laws and the Press and Publication Laws, that are still being amended and formulated in a joint effort between the regime and civil society.

Both of these laws have been initiated by the regime, but their finality has yet to be determined until both the regime and civil society groups come to an agreement upon certain points of contention. For example, the Election Law, enacting a voting system of one-man, one-vote, was contested by political parties as not being reflective of the country's demographic composition. Thus, in 1997, the IAF and other opposition parties boycotted elections. Since then, the active collaboration among opposition groups has brought the regime to a point where it recognizes a need to reform the article regarding one-man, one-vote, and reach a compromise with these parties. As of yet, a final proposal has not been accepted, but several ideas have been suggested. Proposals have been made to keep the one-man, one-vote system, but in conjunction with dividing the kingdom into 80 voting districts, with one representative each. Others have suggested dividing the voting districts into 50 with two representatives each, thereby increasing the number of the lower house from 80 to 100. Though the regime still refuses to divide districts, as it claims that such divisions would skew the demographic composition of constituents per district, the IAF, whose members won lower house seats in 1997 running as independents, have forged ties with leftist members of parliament to lobby for the change of election laws. As quoted in the Jordan Times, former Prime Minister Fayaz Tarawneh expressed the growing force of oppositions forming coalitions:

Although the opposition is underrepresented in comparison with the 12th Parliament, Tarawneh said these deputies have shown "consistency," in their views on several national issues...He said they were "polite, yet tough" in representing their arguments... "[In this Parliament] you can see tough positions on some issues... They address [the government] with politeness, even though they present their comments in a very tough way in terms of content." (Hamdan 1999)

In comparison with Egypt, where similar attempts have been recently made to demand political liberalization on behalf of a coalition of civil society groups and organizations, Jordan's civil society is able to identify, express, and lobby its interests. In Egypt, attempts of to propose legislation fell apart due to the dissipation of the civil societies' coalition itself.

The media has been gaining its demands to liberate the press, and in fact at a pace unmatched with any other Arab country. The PPL passed in 1998 is still in dispute and the regime has agreed to reconsider the annulment of laws that would end the government ability to suspend a publication involved in a court dispute, as well as government ownership of the two largest newspapers, al-Rai and al-Dustour. The government owns 31 per cent in Al Dustour and 62 per cent in Al Ra'i through the Social Security Corporation and the Jordan Investment Corporation. Also, journalists are pressing for the government to extract itself from being involved in the Jordan Press Association (JPA). The press association is dominated by employees of al-Ra'i, al-Dustour and the state-owned Jordan News Agency, Petra. It is expected to soon include editorial members of the state-owned and operated Jordan Radio and Television Corporation. Journalists are

bound by law to join the association before "legally" declaring themselves journalists.

(Henderson 1999)

These are a few examples of how civil society- be they parties, social organizations, or professional associations, such as journalists, have horizontally linked with one another in achieving its interests. The materializing of their demands has yet to occur, but the fact that they remain steadfast in lobbying their interests speaks much of their strong organizational skills and tolerance.

Conclusion: A New Arab State

The development of political liberalization, where society has participated in the shaping of the state in Jordan, been the product of its regime-society relationship. That is, Jordan's authoritative regime has recognized civil society's right to participate in the shaping of the state, while its participatory civil society is capable of demanding and exercising that right participate in the shaping of the state. In addition, the regime has worked towards coordinating its own interests with society's interests in conjunction with the interests of the state. This has in turn solidified a cooperative regime-society relationship.

Several elements contributed to Jordan's cooperative regime-society relationship. First, the process of consolidation under 'Husseiniism' has successfully diverted ethnic and tribal loyalties to the state itself. Economic liberalization, sedentarization, education, and the role of communications cemented the consolidation of these tribes and ethnicities

to regard themselves first and foremost citizens of the Jordanian state rather than simply groupings within the Jordanian state.

Second, the Palestinian and tribal origins of civil society have meant a natural evolution of civil society to mature in organizational skills and toleration. This has led to, third, horizontal linkages thus having been formed to lobby interests for political liberties for all organizations and parties under civil society, as well as vertical linkages forged vis-a-vis the regime while remaining autonomous of the regime.

These three developments within the Jordanian state have created a political opportunity for civil society to become participatory in nature, and for the regime to relinquish its monopoly over the state's economic and political resources while increasing its legitimacy and own stability. The net result has been a process of gradual political liberalization, where policies and legislation have evolved to secure the rights of society participating in the shaping of the state, as well as an improvement in Jordan's cooperative regime-society relationship.

The success of Jordan's political liberalization experiment, where society has participated in the shaping of the state, will be put to the test as economic reform becomes more stringent in the years ahead. Economic reforms and IMF imposed policies will require that the government drastically become less involved in the economy, including providing important food subsidies. Because Jordan lacks sufficient natural resources, has a weak service sector, and will have to pass through periods of large budget cuts that include a cut in subsidies in order to carry out economic reforms, it is early to affirm that political liberalization has brought absolute domestic stability. However, the

fact that the society participates in formulating policies, and has a hand in the decision making process may, then again, fortify whatever austere measures the regime will have to take in order to meet supra-national demands of economic growth.

In Egypt, political liberalization has not been met with the same advancement as in Jordan. Domestic fundamentalists have expressed their dissatisfaction with the Egyptian regime, and even moderates have questioned the government as an institution adequately representing the pluralistic voices within society. The regime in Egypt has been authoritarian, rather than authoritative, and civil society has not developed to the mature level of its counterpart in Jordan. Whereas Jordan's civil society has developed to be participatory in nature, Egypt's civil society is incipient, or lacks the organizational skills and tolerance necessary to identify, express, and lobby its interests, as well as to forge horizontal linkages among its groups and organizations. Thus, when attempts have been made at lobbying the regime, civil society has remained unable to participate in the shaping of the state and has rather acted as the impediment in achieving its own interests.

The following chapter, therefore, turns to Egypt's dilemma, where the inability of society to participate in the shaping of the state is a product of its incipient civil society's weakness rather than the repression of the authoritarian regime.

CHAPTER 6

EGYPT: AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND INCIPIENT CIVIL SOCIETY

Egypt has long been considered a regional Arab leader in the forum of Middle Eastern politics. From the Arab-Israeli crisis to the Gulf War, perhaps no other Arab country has played such a pivotal role in the region. Egypt has enjoyed being the bridge closing the gap between the Arab world and the rest of the international political community.

In all its glory as a pivotal regional leader, Egypt has not enjoyed the same status of strength in its regime-society relationship. Although political institutions are present, elections take place, and more civil society organizations have sprouted in Egypt than in any other Arab country, the Egyptian state has faced obstacles in maintaining a cooperative regime-society relationship where society participates in the shaping of the state.

In the past seven years of praised economic reform, political instability has become more prevalent. Two assassination attempts upon the president, bombings and terrorist activities against tourists, and the rise in Islamic fundamentalist discontent with the regime have been the products of a breakdown in regime-society relations. The inability of society to access the state's political and economic resources in conjunction with the

regime's insistence to retain power perpetuates a contentious regime-society relationship within the Egyptian state.

Although the regime remains authoritarian in nature, the lack of participation on behalf of society in the shaping of the state is to a great extent the result of society's own deficiencies more than the doings of a hegemonic regime. Civil society, because of its lack of organization and high degree of intolerance, has failed to forge horizontal linkages, which serve to strengthen civil society vis-a-vis the regime. In Jordan, the perseverance of civil society lobbying for reforms concerning election and press laws is what have advanced political liberalization within that state. Had civil society been horizontally fragmented in Jordan, such initiatives would have been stymied and the regime would have continued retaining its monopoly over the state's economic and political resources.

In order to understand the relationship between the regime and society in Egypt, this chapter will discuss, firstly, the origins and nature of the authoritarian regime. The current authoritarian rule of the regime is rooted in the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser, where the state became synonymous to the regime. The office of the presidency, further, became the centerpiece of the Egyptian regime's authority. As a result, it redefined the political structure in Egypt and stunted the growth of political activities.

Secondly, the causes responsible for creating a weak fragmented Egyptian civil society will be examined, primarily focusing upon its internal structure and self-imposed impediments. Lastly, this chapter will illustrate how the society's failure to participate in the shaping of the state is less a function of authoritarian rule than civil society's incipient or immature nature. This weakness is the primary impediment for the

advancement of political liberalization in Egypt, and thus the incorporation of its society participating in the shaping of the state.

It should be noted that the presence and activities of Islamic fundamentalism, often cited to be at the heart of the contentious regime-society relationship within Egypt, will not be included in the following examination of Egyptian intrastate relations.

Fundamentalism in Egypt is the symptom rather than the cause of a contentious regime-society relationship where society is not incorporated in the shaping of the state. The inability to access the state's economic and political resources has resulted in fundamentalists seeking alternative means to wrestle such resources from a regime that monopolizes power:

...on the political level, Islamism has unequivocally established itself as the major opposition force to the regime...whilst the Brotherhood became the regime's major tolerated political opponents during the 1980's, an even greater political challenge emerged from the Gama'at in the 1990's. A combination of disillusionment with the political system, declining social and economic conditions, as well as years of continuing antagonism between the state and the militants, all led to what by 1993 had turned into a war of attrition between the Gama'at and the Mubarak regime. (Terterov 1996)

Islamic fundamentalism is not a factor paralyzing Egyptian society's opportunity to participate in the shaping of the state, but rather a manifestation of society's inability to do so. Therefore, this dissertation, which argues that participation in the shaping of the state requires a cooperative regime-society relationship, does not regard fundamentalism as a relevant element to the present discourse. Fundamentalism is not a variable explaining the causes in the contentious regime-society relationship itself, where society is incapable of participating in the shaping of the state, which is the focus of this chapter.

An Authoritarian Regime: The Nasserite Legacy Continues

Upon assessing the present nature of the Egyptian state, the most prevalent impact has been the legacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The structure of the state, the political culture of the regime, and the relationship between the regime and society that have evolved through the 1970s, well into the 1980s, culminating in the frictional polity of present day Egypt are defined by Nasserism:

Nasser's legacy in some respects actually grew in weight after his death. The bureaucracy, which employed much of the salaried middle class, swelled in size. Acquired populist rights, notably food subsidies, ballooned in cost. The public sector remained the main engine of investment, and import-substitute industrialization the central development strategy at the expense of export promotion. Management of the public sector went largely unreformed. Mubarak inherited crucial Nasserite constituencies, notably public sector managers and unionized workers, which seemed ready to defend Nasser's heritage, as well as a mass public which had been taught it was entitled, as part of a social contract, to populist benefits. (Hinnebusch 1993)

From the nature of an authoritarian regime to an incipient civil society incapable of forming strong vertical links vis-a-vis the regime, let alone horizontal links among its individual organizations, both originate in the Nasserite era.

In 1952, Nasser enacted the 'Corrective Revolution' in order to allow all socio-economic classes access to political and economic resources of the state. The net result of Nasser's revolution was the elimination of elements viewed as corrupting the state and siphoning its wealth (the large landowning bourgeoisie) and the creation a polity where all citizens had access to education, the state's economic resources, and could horizontally as well as vertically become mobile. Though there were initial improvements for the majority

in regards to the standard of living and social mobility among the lower and middle classes, politically, the state deteriorated into a polity bordering upon totalitarianism. Even those who supported Nasser in his Corrective Revolution, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were destroyed. Political parties, newspapers, and private organizations were wiped out and replaced with state controlled organizations, whose aim was to quash society's autonomous political participation in the shaping of the Egyptian state.

Even the creation of associations and syndicates that sprouted during Nasser's reign were less intrinsically established as a civil society, by the society itself, but moreover a means for the Nasserist regime to monitor society:

Authorities encouraged their endeavors because they found such organizations effective instruments for controlling both the middle classes and workers. Thus, the biggest increase in the number and size of membership of voluntary associations took place in the 1950s and 1960s under the tight rule of a military regime that had many features associated with 'state corporatism'. (al-Sayyid 1993, 272)

These 'civil societies' posed as a disguised means of penetrating the roots of society in order to prevent any effective political activity from forming, while simultaneously manipulating the political sentiment of mass society. Moreover, their structures were built upon totalitarian principles, enabling the Nasserist regime to suppress attempts to form autonomous unions or other social and professional organizations:

Both law 91 of 1959 and Law 62 of 1964, for the regularization of labor syndicates prohibited the organizational pluralism that was allowed before. It was legally stipulated that no more than one syndicate could represent laborers in one field, and its related subfields. In other words, only one syndicate was allowed to exist for each occupation. Labor syndicates were supervised by a general union that dominated and strictly regulated their activities. Then all general unions (23 of them) were grouped in one federation of Egyptian labor

Unions. Moreover, labor laws granted the minister of labor affairs a wide range of authorities that allowed him unlimited interference in the workings of the syndicates starting with their inception, administration and ending with their dissolution and reconstruction. Membership in the ruling party system was, here too, mandatory for nominations in the syndicates' elections. (Ibrahim 1999)

The dissipation of Egyptian civil societies into consenting organizations that were passive rather than active, devolved continually so well into the 1990s. It would not be until the 1994 conference of the UN International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo that the rejuvenation of Egyptian civil society organizations would blossom. (Beshara 1999)

Meanwhile, Nasser's charismatic leadership ensured not only Egyptians, but the rest of the Arab world as well, would rally behind him. His political agenda was tailored to appeal to those in society who had previously been prevented political and economic access to the state. Nasser's overwhelming popularity gave him the power to unilaterally replace the Constitution, enact land laws that allowed the state to repossess private property, nationalize industries, and annihilate all political opposition elements. Though the socialist experiment may have ceased and Nasser died over thirty years ago, the legacy of Nasser still lives and accounts for the inheritance of a political culture that exists in Egypt today:

Despite people's disenchantment with Nasser's policies by the time of his death, and Anwar Sadat's conscious efforts to undo many of them, the Nasserist ideology remains a potent force in Egypt. Many of the institutional legacies he bequeathed -- the wide ranging constitutional powers of the presidency, the dominant position of the public sector in the economy and, above all, the role of the army as the final arbiter in Egyptian politics -- still remain. During the last decade there has also been a revival of Nasser's

reputation as the hero of the July revolution, and in private conversations many thoughtful Egyptians bemoan the loss of the predominant position Egypt once enjoyed in the Arab world under his leadership. Even the NDP found it prudent to show its allegiance to Nasser and his policies as an election strategy. (Banerji 1991)

Nasser altered Egypt's political stage for years to come. The immense power he wielded as president made him a one-man show and redefined the nature of Egypt's political system. His legacy set precedent for Egypt evolving into a state based on a 'Presidential Establishment':

The president has enormous constitutional and legal authority...Almost all influential and authoritative bodies of the state machinery are necessarily affiliated to the presidential office, either formally or informally. To implement any new project in Egypt successfully, it has to be endorsed by the president or one of the government bodies or persons affiliated to the 'Presidential Establishment.' (Goodson and Radwan 1997)

Power, thus, does not simply lie in the hands of the regime, but is concentrated in the hands of the president himself.

The Presidential Establishment's role is not simply contained to the military and political, but in wielding the power, it has monopolized the state's economic resources, endowing many government and bureaucratic elite with wealth and benefits. Even the legislative and judiciary branches are at the disposal of the executive:

The legislature and judiciary are too weak to balance the dominant executive branch. Egypt is formally a parliamentary republic, so there actually should be close ties between a cabinet headed by a prime minister and the legislature, but in reality both institutions are dominated by the president. The legislature does not check the executive because the legislature is overwhelmingly controlled by the NDP. After the final round of the 1995 elections and the post-election rush to join the NDP by many successful "independent" candidates, the NDP controlled 417 of the National Assembly's 444 elected seats (94%); as

compared to 348 in the 1990 elections and 346 in the 1987 elections. The judiciary, although relatively independent, has had its influence reduced by the shifting of trials of Islamist opponents from the government to military courts. (Goodson and Radwan 1997)

The judiciary is more independent in that its verdicts are upheld and respected, and interference is not allowed, even from the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for administering the legal decrees made by the state. However, bypassing the judiciary is common practice and justified under the Emergency Laws. It is the dominance of the executive branch that undermines the presence of the legislative and judicial branches, contradicting the process of political liberalization the regime claims to be implementing. The constitution itself is subject to an interpretation supporting imminence of the Presidential Establishment.

Nothing more than the People's Assembly proves evident of the fact that the Presidential Establishment penetrates all aspects of the government. Although constitutionally the People's Assembly retains supervisory and legislative powers, it cannot exercise these powers independent of the president:

According to the constitution, the People's Assembly is the main legislative organ of the state, and the president's execution of some legislative tasks, such as issuing laws through a presidential decree, is limited as stipulated in the constitution (Article 108). Ideally, the government's right to present legislative proposals is complemented by the assembly's right to debate the proposals, introduce amendments, and then issue laws. However, the reality of the lawmaking process demonstrates the hegemony of the executive. (Goodson and Radwan 1997)

Constitutionally, the People's Assembly is a main artery of the government, but in practice, it is limited in the scope of its legislative authority to laws concerning public

housing, health, and education. It does not dare to dabble in issues that include political policy formation, such as national or regional security issues, though it has the constitutional authority to do so.

The constitution necessitates some serious amending to truly provide for the presence of a pluralistic polity and protect the right for society to freely identify, express, and lobby its interests without fearing the regime's intervention. It still espouses socialist values that are the remnants of the Nasserist era. However, the regime's refusal to amend the constitution is based on the argument that Islamic fundamentalism and economic reform make it inconvenient to discuss any constitutional reform.

Lastly, the NDP has established itself as the winning party under which candidates should run if they expect to be elected into the People's Assembly or appointed in the cabinet. Though Egypt does consist of a multi-party system, the weak structure of these parties prevents a thriving opposition from challenging the regime's authority. The closest to such a strong opposition party is the Wafd, which consists of primarily urban-based middle class supporters. As an opposition, though, the Wafd party's weakness stems from the lack of access to political and economic resources, which the members of the NDP control. Nevertheless, the core weakness of parties in Egypt is primarily internal, rather than resultant of external impediments, such as interference from the ruling regime:

...opposition parties are weak, poorly organized, internally authoritarian, and most of them have very limited appeal. Egypt has a multi-party system with sixteen legal political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, an illegal but generally tolerated opposition movement...besides the Muslim Brotherhood, there is no viable legal opposition to the NDP or the Mubarak regime. The

other parties are weak, poorly organized, unable to unite, and discriminated against in campaigning and elections in a variety of ways. (Goodson and Radwan 1997)

Of course, weak parties mean weak elections. The candidates of opposing parties do not express platforms that identify interests appealing to constituents. Constituents have become apathetic to the election process, and implicitly assume that the NDP will continue to be the ruling party in office. Voting has become a futile political exercise, since it is the NDP that shall dominate those cabinets that control political and economic resources of the state. Just as well, the majority of the People's Assembly will never belong to a coalition of opposition parties or one opposition party, but remain primarily to the NDP. No one runs against the incumbent during presidential primaries, and the president seems to always be reelected with over 90% of constituent approval. Thus, the regime's claim of political liberalization is a one that has not been substantiated with evident change of the political system itself.

The degree of political centralization that the regime retains has remained constant. And though the economy is in the process of liberalization, the benefits of such economic reform have not reached the masses and seem to be enjoyed more so by members within the regime, as well as their extended families. The regime has not created channels through which mass society may access economic resources. Revenues from the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have not been utilized to improve social services such as education, health, and housing. Developing a strong taxation system in Egypt has been ignored by the regime, which maintains the rentier behavior, allowing its monopolization

of the state's resources. The call for a strong taxation system has also been shunned. The primary segment of society that has benefited from economic liberalization, which is the businessmen of the elite class, have ties to the current members of the regime, or are ex-members of the regime itself. Both they and the regime have an interest in monopolizing the economic resources of the state:

...the will to make the taxation system work is lacking on the part of both the government and businessmen. On the one hand...the government, fearing that businessmen may be scared away, has no intention of introducing progressive taxation. On the other hand, businessmen, who keep their capital in foreign banks rather than paying taxes, do not seem to be aware of their social responsibility. (Tadros 1999)

Although the regime has relinquished some economic power to members of the elite who are its clients, it remains the dominant economic power vis-a-vis the rest of society. The continuity of such economic centralization is advantageous for the regime, as its monopoly over the state's economic resources grants it a monopoly over the state's political resources as well.

All of these factors lend to the Egyptian regime's authoritarian character. The regime's domination over political institutions and the state's political and economic resources perpetuates its hegemony, to the point that its authority overrules that of the state.

However, a major contributing factor to Egypt's authoritarian rule is civil society's lack of active participation in shaping the state. Even in moments where the government has attempted to relinquish power to the people, civil society has not effectively stepped in:

The Egyptian [government has]...been actively involved since the 1970s in supporting cottage industries and encouraging the formation of small groups and associations. Agrarian reform in Egypt contributed not only to the welfare of poor peasants but to the emergence of new political leaders amongst them. It was also government-induced agrarian reform that created local institutions such as cooperatives and elected municipal councils. (Harik 1994, 49)

There has been little done on behalf of the people, even when given the opportunity.

Participation in the most basic political activities seems to be absent. Even modern associations-- such as business groups, labor unions, and professional and intellectual societies-- have been intimidated by moments of political liberalization, and the apparent swiftness of it. They had gone as far in 1992 in urging Mubarak to slow down, worrying that the same situation which broke out in Algeria would follow in Egypt. (Harik, 1994)

Thus, Egyptian society has remained at the receiving end of the political spectrum and has not successfully been active, let alone reactive, in identifying, expressing, or lobbying its interests. The regime needn't be stringently repressive, as it relies on the weakness of civil society, or its lack of organizational skills and high degree of intolerance, to stunt itself. Though the regime has made minuscule steps toward political liberalization, the issue of political liberalization in Egypt has less to do with the authoritarian nature of the regime than with the apathy and passivity of society itself:

...contrary to the assertions of the opposition parties in particular, the failure of political parties to glean support cannot be attributed to restrictions on their activities. Between the elections of 1987 and 1995, no new legislation was enacted to restrict party activity, while the national dialogue invoked by President Mubarak in 1994 brought about the repeal of several outdated laws. So ingrained are the reductionist tendencies of opposition leaders that their rhetoric has hardly budged in two decades, something those concerned with the health of our political life should consider if they are to assess objectively the

performance of the political parties and the extent to which they have contributed to democratic development. (Nafie 1999)

Be they political parties, social organizations, or NGOs, civil society groups in Egypt fail to be organized, tolerant, and lack structure. Society's failure to participate in the shaping of the state has been hampered by civil society's own weak vertical linkages vis-a-vis the regime as well as its inadequacy to form horizontal linkages among its fellow groups and organizations.

Civil Society in Egypt

The nature of civil society in Egypt is best summarized as stated by Goodson and Radwan, who pointed out that Egyptian civil society is more consenting than participating in nature. (Goodson and Radwan, 1997) Seldom has civil society in Egypt attempted to participate in amending laws or creating laws that not only shape the state, but that give civil society the ability to function more autonomously of the regime.

Many scholars have cited the dysfunction of civil society to be attributed to the severe limitations and suppression placed upon it during the Nasser regime. Yet, though there were hegemonic laws that placed Egyptian civil society under the thumb of the regime, nevertheless, the activities of some of these civil societies were so effective that Nasser himself could neither ignore nor destroy the voices demanding participation in shaping the state:

Despite the restrictions and state control, civil society was not totally paralyzed. This phase saw sporadic moments of enthusiasm by active student movements, especially in the period following the 1967 defeat until the early

1970s. In 1968, large-scale students' protest movements took place. Workers' groups joined forces with the students as an expression of their dissatisfaction with the lenient military sentences against those responsible for the 1967 defeat. The Judges Club also issued a statement in March 1968 reiterating the students' demands for public freedoms. Seeing this civil society commotion, late President Nasser issued the March 28, 1968 Declaration to soothe the angry and the wounded. The Declaration amounted to a "promissory note" for a new social contract to be effected immediately after liberating Egyptian territories occupied by Israel (in June 1967). The new promise was that of a return to "democracy" and power sharing by the people who were to liberate national soil. (Beshara 1999)

Sadat felt an obligation to carry through with the Declaration, and thus embarked on a path of Open Door Economic Policy and political liberalization. A multi-party system was legalized through the passing of the Political Parties Law 40 in 1975. Further economic liberalization into the 1990s also spurred an increase in the number of civil society organizations, though most of its growth and activities has been from businessmen organizations and chambers of commerce.

In 1996, Egypt officially had a census of over 22,000 civil societies. These included 17,000 NGOs, with a membership of 3,000,000; 10 business associations, comprised of a total of 10,000 members; 24 professional syndicates, with 4,000,000 members; 138 advocacy organizations, at 24,000 members; 14 political parties, with a membership of 14,000,000; and 4,853 clubs and youth organizations, with 1,600,000 members. (Beshara 1999) Yet, even as it boasts the largest presence of civil societies in the Arab world, Egypt has not witnessed a proportional participation of these civil societies, in the shaping of the state.

Organizations have blamed the regime for restrictive laws that impede the evolution and autonomous growth of civil society. One such legislative act, the NGO Law passed in June 1999, prohibits the participation of NGOs in political party activities and requires the approval by the Ministry of Social Affairs before accepting foreign donations.

However, these laws alone cannot effectively impede civil society if it took the initiative to lobby such legislation, even in the face of the regime's attempts to exercise as much power as possible over civil society. It is civil society's own inadequate internal structure and exclusive membership base, dominated by an elite segment of society, that lie at the heart of Egyptian civil society being consenting rather than participating:

In order to become effective socializing agents, main criteria such as autonomy, internal democratic structure, accountability, and open recruitment should be at place in civil society associations or NGOs. This is not the case in Egypt where NGOs are not only constrained by administrative and political blockages but are also restricted to the urban elite and westernized intellectuals creating clientele relationships with the state on one hand and their constituency on the other...Egyptian poor conditioned by political and cultural constraints, resort to 'quite encroachment' as an alternative strategy to cooperative and contentious collective action. They regularly rely on kinship and informal leaders as their major source of solidarity. (Beshara 1999)

Political participation is limited to the elite, who essentially uses its privileged access to the economic or political resources to further the interests of its own individual organizations, rather than horizontally integrate with other civil society organizations in order to demand its participation in shaping the state. This has reinforced the clientelistic relationship defining how the regime and civil society interact with one another to achieve each one's respective interests. Even on the level of public sector associations, such as trade unions, members of these unions have become partners with the regime, giving up

the right to strike in return for favors. (Harik 1994) This has made it impossible for civil society as a collective whole to lobby for the right to access political and economic resources in order to participate in the shaping of the state. It has rather perpetuated reliance on clientelistic relations vis-a-vis the regime to fulfill individual interests of various civil society organizations.

Nor have civil societies in Egypt encouraged the political education, awareness, or participation of society as a whole in the shaping of the state. They have not vocalized their desire to be involved with the government in formulating laws and amending the constitution. The irony is that civil society in Egypt has adopted the exclusivity and intolerance practiced by the regime in ruling the state, further perpetuating it as the base of Egypt's political culture. It is the regime's authoritarian attitude that is shared by civil society, making civil society in Egypt the problem rather than the solution. (Harik 1994)

Hence, the core of a spirit of intolerance and weak organizational skills lie in a weak political culture perpetuated within the polity itself. Education is surest means to strengthen the political culture, in order to foster tolerance and organizational skills within society, thereby equipping it to form viable horizontal links among its individual organizations. Yet, the education system itself lacks the ability to stimulate society exercise its mind and think:

Historically, education in Egypt has been strictly based on memorization. There has never been a system to create a curiosity in the minds of the students. Thus it is precisely in this area that non-governmental organizations, the media and civil society components in general can play an increasing positive role in education...Egypt, for the past thirty-five years, has offered free education to every Egyptian citizen. The result of this is that no one is accountable for a ruined and exploited educational system...Students from very

early on are not taught to take initiatives and to be creative. Thus it is through civil society organizations that tolerance, self-initiative and analysis can be taught...democracy is an acquired culture and as such it is much more than a ballot box and the signing of international documents...Thus again civil society organizations and NGOs can assist in creating this culture of democracy. (Youssef 1996)

Education, since the reign of Nasser, has been another means of penetrating the society, manipulating its autonomy, and monitoring its activity. Those who can afford private schooling, again, are an exclusive elite class within Egypt that incubate itself in this exclusivity through detaching itself from the lower classes of society. Therefore, maintaining this exclusivity has resulted in the exclusion of the masses from participating in the shaping of the state through civil society organizations, as its membership base is composed primarily of the elite class. The structure of successful civil societies, whose board members and decision bodies consist of the elite class of Egyptian society, retain authority in their hands exactly through practicing exclusivity.

Though the regime has allowed greater freedom in the press, access to global communications, such as the Internet and the satellite dish, and liberalized the economy, encouraging privatization, all of this yields fruitless results for the Egyptian state as a whole. Without equipping mass society with the knowledge of how to use such assets to increase their autonomy and ability to improve the quality of their lives, there is no way that society can participate in the shaping of the state. The necessary skills of coordinating interests through nurturing a spirit of cooperation and thus, tolerance, are absent among society as a whole. Those who have acquired such means through private education have only perpetuated an exclusive practice in the participation of the shaping

of the state. The elite class, through dominating civil society, seek to do what Egypt's authoritarian regime has done-- relinquish whatever degree of power it has wrestled from the government in order to manipulate mass society in a quest to achieve its own interests.

In the meantime, individual organizations within civil society become entrenched in competing among one another in forming clientelistic relations with the regime in order to achieve their respective interests. This in turn perpetuates the characteristic of civil society being consenting rather than participating. After all, if civil society organizations offer their political acquiescence to the regime in exchange for access to the state's economic or political resources, by definition these groups are consenting rather than participating. This only enslaves civil society to depend on vertical links vis-a-vis the regime rather than to build horizontal links. Such horizontal links not only serve to collectively achieve shared interests among individual civil society organizations, but also allow for the evolution of civil society's autonomy.

In order to illustrate this point, it is now relevant to discuss the recent collective initiative of Egyptian civil society to identify, express, and lobby the regime in expanding and accelerating the current process of political liberalization. The initiative was successfully *identified* by various elements of civil society, which, through forming horizontal links, *expressed* themselves as a collective front. However, the weakness of such horizontal links caused the initiative to fall apart in the stage of *lobbying* the regime.

The Call for Political Liberalization

Prior to the September 1999 presidential primaries, civil societies in Egypt drafted a decree calling for a greater degree of political liberalization. Representatives of various political organizations, syndicates and civil society groups drew up a set of five points outlining a demand for political and constitutional reform. The statement was signed by approximately 300 figures, representing different trends across the political spectrum and was a prelude to a campaign drumming up grassroots support for political and constitutional reform. The statement would later be presented to President Hosni Mubarak to coincide with a nationwide referendum on his election for a fourth term. (Al Ahram Weekly On-Line Edition [Egypt], 2-8 September 1999)

The first point outlined, in this decree calling for greater political liberalization, was to end the state of emergency, release political detainees and declare general amnesty for non-violent political prisoners. The second point was a 'guarantee' from the regime that parliamentary elections be free and fair. The decree affirmed that future elections be free of 'any administrative interference and that political competition on a footing of equality be guaranteed under full judicial supervision.' (Al Ahram Weekly On-Line Edition [Egypt], 2-8 September 2-8 1999) In addition, voters' lists must be revised to remove the names of dead people and emigrants.

Points three and four of the decree called for parallel political freedoms regarding political parties. These demands included the right to freely establish political parties and subsequently the freedom to publish newspapers and own media outlets. Emphasis was also placed upon the necessity of giving political parties and forces the 'equal right to

express their views in all the media channels owned by the [Egyptian] people.' (Al Ahram Weekly On-Line Edition [Egypt], 2-8 September 2-8 1999)

The fifth and last point outlined the necessity of professional and workers' syndicates and NGOs being given full independence 'in order to make civil society capable of contributing to the exercise of democracy.' (Al Ahram Weekly On-Line Edition [Egypt], 2-8 September 1999)

It should be noted this decree is the third attempt in which civil society organizations failed to challenge the regime's authoritarian rule. In 1997, a concerted effort through a committee of political parties issued 'The Democratic Program for Political and Constitutional Reform'. It was supported by 17 of Egypt's leading political party figures representing the Wafd, Islamic-oriented Labor, leftist Tagammu and Nasserist parties, in addition to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and the Wassat Party. But, in the end, it failed to gain a license or support in further lobbying of the reform proposal. Thus, it faded away.

In early 1999, a law passed by parliament stipulating the framework within which NGOs could function, caused great dissatisfaction among organizations in Egyptian civil society. Yet again, the failure to form horizontal links among individual NGOs resulted in the regime ignoring the call for the annulment of articles 11 and 17 of the law, which ban NGOs from participating in political party activity and require the approval by the Ministry of Social Affairs before accepting foreign donations. The continuing pattern of flailing horizontal links reinforces a consenting rather than a participating nature of civil society and reaffirms how much autonomy civil society intrinsically lacks.

In its inception, this latest decree outlining the five points of political liberalization died out. Though this was the first historic initiative where civil society groups of different ends of the spectrum presented themselves as a united front in the interest of political liberalization and lobbied vis-a-vis the regime, the lack of organization brought its downfall. The major opposition parties, such as the Wafd, Labor, and Tagammu, along with the Muslim Brotherhood signed the decree. But its official presentation at the Conference for Political and Constitutional Reform in September 1999, the first step to drum up grass-roots support, was not attended by any political party leader apart from the Tagammu party's Khaled Mohieddin. The Nasserist, Labor, and Wafd parties sent only representatives; some independent political figures were also present. The Muslim Brotherhood boycotted the rally, as the timing was not right because it coincided with the presidential referendum. The Muslim Brotherhood had wanted to postpone the rally, but when the committee of proponents supporting the decree refused, the Brotherhood boycotted it. (Al Ahram Weekly On-Line Edition [Egypt], 30 September - 6 October 1999)

The regime did not have the chance to refuse, postpone, or destroy any demands made by civil society, because civil society did the job for them. In the meantime, the regime effortlessly maintains power and nominally presents intentions for political liberalization without having to substantiate these claims effectively.

Conclusion: An Arab State in a Stalemate

Recalling the case study of Jordan, the cooperative regime-society relationship enjoyed by the authoritative regime and participatory civil society has been a product of society participating in the shaping of the state. Several factors have contributed to this. First, society's historical Palestinian and bedouin roots have instilled the spirit of cooperation and organization. Second, Husseinism, and its policies of education, sedentarization, and communication consolidated a heterogeneous society and paved the way for a pluralistic political foundation. Third, civil society consequently evolved to form strong horizontal links, as well as strong vertical links vis-a-vis the regime. All of this has relatively allowed for a cooperative regime-society relationship, even in the face of the state's current economic hardship.

Looking at Egypt in comparison, whose society is homogeneous, the same degree of political liberalization, where the society participates in the shaping of the state, is absent. Civil society remains incipient in nature, as it fails to foster strong horizontal links among its individual organizations. The vertical links formed vis-a-vis the regime by Egyptian civil society aren't any stronger, and rely on clientelism to further its interests. This in turn reinforces the regime's monopoly of power, allowing it to continue its authoritarian manner of rule.

Whereas elements in Jordanian society continue to collectively bargain with the regime and have succeeded in amending the Elections Law and the Press and Publications Law, Egyptian civil society has not been as successful in comparison. Such a failure is not the product of a repressive regime, but because of civil society's own inability to maintain strong horizontal links in pursuit of shared interests.

Thus, regarding the case of Egypt, society not participating in the shaping of the state is primarily due to society's passive or consenting nature. Unless civil society organizations become organized and tolerant of one another, the state will remain a territory where its actors vie to monopolize its political and economic resources rather than cooperate in its interests. Further, civil society has failed to recognize that unless it forges strong impenetrable horizontal linkages, it will fail to relinquish power from the hands of the regime.

Syria, in comparison to Egypt, presents a case study where society also does not participate in the shaping of the state, but not because of its failure to forge horizontal linkages. In other words, while Syrian civil society has the capacity to demand and exercise its right to participate in the shaping of the state, the regime does not recognize society's right to do so. Versus Egypt's incipient civil society, Syria's civil society is nominal, or a symbolic participant in the shaping of the state. Although it possesses strong organizational skills, Syrian civil society's vertical links vis-a-vis the regime are so pervasive that they have interfered in civil society's ability to form horizontal linkages. Moreover, the totalitarian nature of the regime continues to plague Syria's contentious regime-society relationship. A closer look will now be taken at the dilemma of Syria's intrastate relationship between its regime and its society, and especially at the regime's role in causing such an antagonistic regime-society relationship.

CHAPTER 7

SYRIA: A TOTALITARIAN REGIME AND NOMINAL CIVIL SOCIETY

Chapters five and six explored two of the three regime-society intrastate relationships in Arab states as identified in this dissertation. First, Jordan represents a case study of a cooperative regime-society relationship, where the regime recognizes civil society's right in shaping the state. Jordan's civil society has also been able to successfully forge both horizontal links, as well as vertical links vis-a-vis the regime, that have not jeopardized its autonomy.

Egypt as a case study represents a contentious regime-society relationship where the authoritarian regime continues to manipulate the state to serve its interests. However, society implicitly accepts this as it has not demanded its own inclusion in shaping the state. Egypt's civil society is thus an incipient one, which lacks organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests. These obstacles have further prevented civil society in Egypt from forging the horizontal links necessary to participate in shaping the state. Whatever vertical links Egyptian civil society groups have forged vis-a-vis the regime, have been based on clientelistic relationships, and are at the expense of civil society's autonomy vis-a-vis the regime. Hence, Egypt's contentious regime-society relationship is less a function of its authoritarian regime than its incipient civil society.

The last case study of Syria represents the third type of regime-society relationship found among Arab states. Syria's regime is one that is totalitarian, whose authority is hegemonic in nature. In other words, the regime, through repressing and absorbing the various ethnic, religious, and economic segments of society, as well as exacerbating divisions among them, has imposed itself on the state. Because of this, Syria's civil society has been reduced to a nominal one. That is to say, just as Jordanian civil society, Syrian civil society also possesses the organizational skills necessary to identify, express, and lobby its interests. Yet unlike Egypt, the inability of Syrian civil society to forge horizontal links, in order to demand its participation in the shaping of the state, is due to the hegemony of the regime rather than its own incapacity. Syrian civil society's vertical links vis-a-vis the regime are also imposed by the regime, which use these vertical links as a method to stifle Syrian civil society's autonomy. Syria, thence, as Egypt, faces a contentious regime-society relationship. However, unlike Egypt, the totalitarian nature of the Syrian regime is the distinguishing underlying cause of that state's contentious regime-society relationship. The contentious regime-society relationship faced by Egypt, whose regime is authoritarian in nature, finds its underlying cause in an incipient civil society.

In order to comprehend the dynamics of the regime-society relationship in Syria, this chapter will focus on three contributing factors that have prevented society from participating the shaping the state. First, the political structure buttressing the regime's hegemony, and consequently repressing and absorbing elements of civil society, will be discussed. Second, civil society will be examined in light of its most viable segments, which are the Islamic movement and the elite Sunni businessmen. Lastly, Syria's

economic liberalization will be assessed as a possible catalyst stimulating society's participation in shaping the state.

Dynamics behind the Regime-Society Relationship

The current regime-society relationship in Syria is the product of four characteristics upon which the state's political foundation is built. First there is the formal structure of political institutions. Second, there is an informal sub-structure, where power is retained by a small, powerful cadre within the regime. Third, both of these structures are anchored by the Ba'th party, which has implanted itself as both the ideological and political foundations of the state. Fourth, the regime's simultaneous strategy of inclusionary politics and 'divide and rule', has served to incorporate civil society under the regime's auspices and prevent civil society's horizontally integration.

The formal structure of political institutions has played a key role in securing the monopoly of power enjoyed thus far by Syria's totalitarian regime:

Asad created a ubiquitous state apparatus, consisting of the bureaucracy, political party, and a standing army to maintain what may be euphemistically referred to as enforcing 'law and order'. He consolidated his power base by appointing his most trusted men as well as the party members to key government positions. He secured the cooperation of private enterprises by allowing them to invest in Syria's major industries. The state lifted restrictions on the import of consumer goods and encouraged foreign and national entrepreneurial classes to engage in free trade and business. Asad co-opted the landed nobilities and appointed their elites into the bureaucracy. (Emadi 1998)

The formal structure masks hegemony and lends apparent legitimacy to the regime's rule. Institutions such as the presidency, the People's Assembly, and the cabinet, whose

realms of power are reinforced by the backing of the military, legitimize the regime's absolute authority.

One of the most important formal political institutions is the People's Assembly. It is the government's legislative body, comprised of 250 members elected once every four years by Syria's constituents. The People's Assembly enacts laws, approves the budget, reviews government policies, officially declares state development plans, and ratifies international agreements. However, these duties performed by the People Assembly give a false image of participatory politics in the legislative arena, when in fact:

[P]arliament is little more than a government mouthpiece. Most of its non-party members are businessmen and professionals, from Syria's dominant Sunni merchant families. These are the people who have gained most from Mr. Asad's ten years of economic liberalization. But, despite their economic power, Sunni businessmen are not now seeking political power as well; co-opted by the Alawites, they are doing nicely from the status quo. (The Economist, 22 January 1994)

The People's Assembly thus is evidence of how the political formal structure only appears to foster participation in shaping the state. However, in reality, it is nothing more than another political institution offering symbolic representation to society. In other words, society's role is limited to consenting to however the regime chooses to shape the state, rather than actually being included in shaping the state.

Another formal political structure that appears on the surface to tolerate the pluralistic voices of Syrian civil society is the National Progressive Front. Established in 1972 by the Ba'th and led by the party as well, the National Progressive Front incorporates minority parties and other associations, syndicates, and segments of civil society that

may otherwise stand in opposition to the regime, if granted autonomy. However, as a political institution, it does not provide its members the opportunity to vocally criticize, question, or oppose the regime. There is no political weight attached to the National Progressive Front, as it is primarily a form of symbolic representation. In reality, the National Progressive Front functions as a means to monitor and keep the minority segments of civil society in check.

The formal structure thus fulfills several roles in maintaining the regime's hegemony, ensuring its monopoly over the state. First, these political institutions offer a legitimate front for an otherwise totalitarian regime. Second, they consolidate the various fragmented segments of society, divided along ethnic, religious, and economic lines, under the auspices of the regime. Third, the formal structure provides society only selective access to the state, *when* and *if* in the interest of the regime. Combined together, these three dimensions of Syria's formal political structure have limited power within the hands of the regime.

The informal structure is found in the heart of the formal structure. It is mainly composed of the heads of the security services and senior army officers, which are the men on whom the regime depends for its stability and its future. It is here where the realm of real power lies, is derived and manipulated:

As against all these [government] bodies, the informal apparatus centers mainly on the army and the security forces. Their influence cannot be overstated; it derives most of all from the basic fact that they hold the ruling coalition together. Among its prominent members are 'Ali Duba, head of the military security branch; Ibrahim Huwayji, head of air force security directorate; Bashir Najjar, head of the general security directorate; and 'Adnan Badr Hasan, head of the political security directorate. To their ranks must be added a number of

senior officers: corps commanders and the generals commanding the armored divisions deployed near Damascus. Among them are Shafiq Fayyad, commander of the third corps; Ibrahim Safi, commander of the second corps; 'Ali Hasan, commander of the Republican Guard unit; 'Ali Habib, commander of the "Special Forces" (commando units); and a few others. Together, they are responsible for the state's stability and, in large measure, are holding the key to its future. (Zisser 1998)

The informal structure of Syria's totalitarian regime is similar to the Egyptian authoritarian regime's 'Presidential Establishment'. However, what distinguishes these two from one another is that in the case of Egypt, it is the position within the formal political structure that lend power to the individuals rather than the individuals lending power to the position. In other words, Egypt's 'Presidential Establishment' has survived, even as the regime has changed. However, the informal structure in Syria monopolizes power based on a cadre of individuals within the Ba'th party, rather than the positions that these individuals hold. (Zisser, 1998) Second, while the 'Presidential Establishment' in Egypt does derive its power from the constitution, Syria's informal structure does not. Rather, it is based on an cadre of individuals wielding power void of any constitutional recognition or legal basis.

Although the composition of the formal structure is numerically proportional to Syria's demographic composition, the actual distribution of power within the formal structure is concentrated in the cadre of individuals who constitute the informal structure. In other words, approximately 60% of cabinet ministers, the members of the People's Assembly, and the deputies to the Ba'th's Party Congress are Sunni, which reflects the same percentage of the state's Sunni population. Yet, 90% of the informal ruling cadre is

military officers and top echelons of the security services, which are Alawi, and as a minority group in Syria, only make up 11.5% of the population. (Emadi 1998)

Fortifying the regime's dominance over the formal political structure, the role of the Ba'th party has served to be two-fold: it is the political and ideological foundations upon which the formal structure is erected, and it is also essential in maintaining the regime's monopoly of power:

It falls to the Ba'th party to try to mitigate the inherent contradiction between the formal and informal government elites. It does so by mainly providing the ideological 'envelope' for both. The party lays down the 'correct' political, social, and economic lines binding on all who have a share in power, formal or informal. Moreover, the party furnishes the interface where both elites meet and interact, the arena where the both gather, and the bodies in which both are represented. (Zisser 1998)

The Ba'th party penetrates the formal political structure by retaining 'cells' within political institutions. All 90 members of the Ba'th party's Central Committee occupy key bureaucratic and administrative offices, as well as high-ranking army and high-level security positions.

In addition, through the simultaneous strategies of inclusionary politics and 'divide and rule', the regime has prevented society to participate in shaping the state. Inclusionary politics have incorporated all segments of society under the auspices of the regime, through policies encouraging mass consumption rather than capital accumulation. 'Divide and rule' prevented various segments of society from integrating by providing selective access to the state's political and economic resources. Selective access has been

based on clientelistic relationships between the regime and segments of society that meet the regime's interests.

The Ba'th party's secular economic and social platform has been key in implementing the strategy of inclusionary politics. In fact, the most striking effect of the Ba'th's inclusionary politics is that it stood the class system on its head. The Ba'th Party replaced the landowning bourgeoisie, as well as the urban bourgeoisie, which were the ruling classes of the pre-Ba'th regime, with rural peasants and an urban petty bourgeoisie that have mushroomed and become the backbone of the current state. Minority groups, rural peasants, and the urban lower and middle classes have been incorporated as part of the ruling coalition, attaining government appointments. (Hinnebusch 1993) Second, because of their inclusion, minorities within Syria, who prior to the Ba'th party's rise to power were excluded from the political arena, now felt a sense of security. Thus, minorities as the Druzes, Alawis, Isma'ilis, as well as the rural peasants and urban lower and middle classes, have become the essential base of mass mobilization in supporting the regime. Third, rural peasants and urban lower and middle classes especially benefited, having gained access, albeit selective access, to economic resources, such as education, health, and housing, which improved their standard of living. (Lucas 1994) In addition, the development of infrastructure into the rural areas created linkages between the countryside and remote areas to the Damascene center of the regime.

However, as impressive as the Ba'th's inclusionary politics have been, the parallel strategy of 'divide and rule' simultaneously implemented reveals the large degree to which exclusionary politics is still prevalent. The regime relies on inflaming ethnic, religious, and

economic divisions in order to prevent Syria's heterogeneous society from horizontally integrating, which would pose as a potential threat and challenge to the regime's authority. Tensions between the Alawis and Sunnis have thus remained one of the major ethnic/religious fractures among Syrian society. Asad's rise to power meant for the Alawis a dominant role in the state, as well as in the core of the informal structure in which the nucleus of the power lies. The regime has also played on the resentment of the Druzes, Isma'is, and Christians towards the country's Sunni majority. Even divisions along class lines among the Sunnis have been exacerbated. Rural and urban lower and middle classes being placed in the administration and bureaucracy, replacing the rule of the once powerful urban and landowning bourgeoisie. (Hinnebusch 1993)

The strategies of inclusionary politics and 'divide and rule' has been neutralized by the Ba'th's ideological doctrine of Arabism, which serves to incorporate a heterogeneous Syrian society under a comprehensive banner of Arab unity:

Commitment to the Ba'th doctrine of pan-Arabism became their trademark as well as the surest means of winning over minds of other sectors of the population, particularly the urban Sunnis (who had hitherto been the chief guardians of that idea). Ideological commitment became the glue holding the various parts of the coalition together. The 'tenets' of 'Arabism' were a platform, in deed than that: a program for action, capable of rallying a broad consensus around it. (Zisser 1998)

Arabism has reinforced the totalitarian structure of the regime by first, lending legitimacy to the Ba'th regime as the one defender of the Arab cause. Second, Arabism has downplayed the tensions between fragmented ethnic, religious, and economic segments of society by emphasizing the Arab identity as the primary identity of all Syrians. Third,

Arabism as the foundation of Ba'th ideology has made it difficult for even Islamic movement in Syria, who had originally called for support behind Arabism to challenge the regime's dedication to the Arab cause.

Thus, the dynamics that have dictated Syria's regime-society relationship are embedded in three factors that have secured the regime's dominance over the state. First, the formal political structure has been erected such that political institutions lend an apparent sense of legitimacy to the regime's rule when in reality, these institutions channels are built in order for the regime to incorporate society under its auspices. Second, the informal structure confines power to a privileged cadre within the regime, thus preventing society from participating in shaping the state. Third, the Ba'th party itself, as the ideological and political foundations of the state, places the state under the sovereignty of the regime. Complementing these three factors, the strategy of inclusionary politics and 'divide and rule' have further heterogeneous segments of society under the regime while also preventing these segments from integrating. Thence, the dual strategy has strengthened the vertical links between civil society and the regime, while stunting the ability of civil society to forge horizontal links.

Viable Civil Society in Syria

In understanding the extent of the regime's totalitarian nature, it is clear how Syria's civil society has, first, lost its autonomous character in vertical links forged vis-a-vis the regime, which are actually imposed by the regime. Second, the regime has made it virtually

impossible for civil society to forge horizontal links, thereby the integration of its individual groups and organizations.

However, because civil society in Syria has sprouted from the grass roots of its society, the regime's repression or absorption of its various groups has failed.

Nevertheless, civil society has been able to develop the organizational skills necessary in identifying, expressing, and lobbying its interests. The roots of Syrian civil society originate in the 19th century:

The Ottoman state was a military-fiscal apparatus imposed by conquest on a primordially fragmented society composed of kin groups with patriarchal structures compatible with patrimonial rule. There was a thin layer of civil society between them...Syria had a thriving pluralism of cities and sects, far less amenable to state control than Egypt's hydraulic society. Periodic local revolts and the clientelist connections of communal and tribal leaders to the state deflected arbitrary power. But this discontinuous civil society bridged neither the gaps of a mosaic society or the state-society gulf. Most important, (until the Young Turk revolution) civil society never won power-sharing with the Sultan and his bureaucracy in a parliament. (Hinnebusch 1993, 216)

Into the 20th century, as modernization gave way to newer social formations, and loyalties began to lie with profession, class, and nation, the evolution of civil society forging horizontal links was stunted with the Ba'th overthrow of 1962. Following the Ba'th overthrow, civil society was stifled from horizontally flourishing and in stead became incorporated into the regime through vertical ties imposed by the regime.

Although civil society remained discontinuous, unable to forge horizontal links, it developed parallel to the state, and in some cases, strong enough to withstand penetration by the regime. Small-scale industries in villages emerged where gaps between the society and state existed. The functioning and operation of these industries depended on

communal, social, and familial ties where resources and production were diversified among the members of these ties working between the land, business, and the government or party. Such traditional social relationships, such as kinship, have been paramount in keeping civil society in Syria alive:

...although the regime at times aspired to 'totalitarian'-like control, it never 'atomized' civil society, where family, religious and neighborhood solidarities retain their integrity. Syria is a close-knit society where networks of talk and rumor, informal groups, and personal connections penetrate the state, cut across political cleavages, and often soften the harshness of the regime. (Hinnebusch 1993, 223)

No where is the viability of civil society in Syria more evident than among the Islamic movement. Tensions between members of the Islamic movement, and the Asad regime, which mounted to a point of critical mass in 1982 with the Hama revolt, resulted in a three-week tug-of-war, with the regime leveling the base of the Islamic movement. The Islamic movement suffered a severe setback following the Hama revolt, but still:

...it remains deeply rooted in the *suq* and in the pervasive religious sensibility nurtured by the ulama. With a partially autonomous economic base and a counter-ideology, the traditional city remains the milieu most resistant to state penetration, an alternative society with many aspects of civility. (Hinnebusch 1993, 226)

The Islamic movement is not merely political in nature, but finds its origins in three important factors that lend to its success as a civil society which developed in spite of the regime.

First, the Islamic movement drew its support from the extreme discontentment of the Sunni merchants of the *suq*, or marketplace, which called for a return to capitalism. The

state-run economy in Syria grew rampant with corruption, was burdened by bureaucracy, and was viewed as an attack on business in general:

Political Islam's 'counter-ideology' expressed the anti-statist worldview of the *suq*... Islamic manifestos demanded the bloated bureaucracy be cut, state withdrawal from commerce, and an Islamic economy which would legitimate free enterprise and the 'natural incentives' of a fair profit. Islam, interpreted to exclude socialism, was a natural vehicle of protest against a rural-based regime's assault on urban interests. (Hinnebusch 1993, 225)

Second, the Islamic movement gained momentum as the Sunni *uluma*, or Muslim scholars who ran the *suq*, increasingly grew resentful of the secular-styled regime ruled by an Alawi minority. (Lucas, 1994) Third, because the Islamic movement associated itself with the traditional social and economic base founded embedded in the *suq*, it became virtually immune to the regime's penetration, evolving as the first intrinsic challenge to the regime's authority.

The intensity of conflict between the regime and the Islamic movement peaked in 1982 when members of the movement 'liberated' the city of Hama from the Syrian regime's rule. The three weeks of fighting ended with the Islamic movement being squelched and the regime reasserting its imminence once again. However, the significance of the Hama incident was that it woke the regime into realizing that the incorporation of pro-capitalist Sunni merchants and businessmen into the formal political structure was necessary if it was to maintain its own stability. After all, they supported the Islamic movement and had the social base and economic power to mobilize Syria's Sunni majority, therefore threatening the regime's authority. Meanwhile, the incorporation of Sunni businessmen

and merchants came at a moment when the regime was in dire need of assistance in expanding the economic base of the state:

Syria suffered economic setbacks in the 1980s due to the collapse of world oil prices, loss of its aid revenues and a severe drought that crippled its agriculture. The country was experiencing a severe foreign exchange crisis, which resulted in the shortage of agricultural and industrial supplies as well as consumer goods. There was widespread smuggling, black marketeering and high inflation. Syria's standing army of 400,000, which consumed vast resources, could not be trimmed because of the country's front-line position with Israel, its involvement in Lebanon as well as domestic unrest. To improve its shattered economy Syria further liberalized its economy allowing greater participation of private and foreign investments in Syria. The policy helped the regime to secure the support of conservative Muslim businessmen who harbored ill-will toward the regime and were sympathetic toward the [Islamic movement]. (Emadi 1998)

The regime, thus, restored its hegemony and legitimized its authority through reincorporating the Sunni businessmen into the state apparatus. Yet, in doing so the regime had to avoid upsetting its power base- notably the Alawis and urban lower and middle class, as well as the rural peasants:

The regime's popular or mass base also constrains it. The product of a populist movement against the bourgeoisie, it must protect its popular constituencies, but these--unionized workers, public employees, and small peasants--are the forces most likely to be threatened by economic liberalization while the regime's historic rival, the bourgeoisie, is most likely to benefit. Thorough economic liberalization, therefore, requires a new alliance between state and bourgeoisie, an outcome delayed in Syria because of a certain mutual reinforcement of state/private and Alawi/Sunni cleavages. Since coming to power, Asad has used limited economic liberalisation to advance a *modus vivendi* with the bourgeoisie. But this aimed to protect his autonomy by balancing the bourgeoisie with his populist constituency rather than sharing power with Syria's business class. (Hinnebusch 1997)

Whereas inclusionary politics once meant that the regime was able to amass political support from the urban lower and middle classes as well as the rural peasants, through encouraging mass consumption while neglecting capital accumulation, the economic crisis spawning in the 1980s made such a strategy impossible. At the same time, if capital accumulation was to be encouraged, in order to expand the economic base of the state, a new strategy was needed. The trick was developing such a strategy without, first, relinquishing anymore power to the Sunni businessmen, who had been born out of the pre-Ba'th bourgeoisie that ruled Syria and supported the Islamic movement. Second, this strategy would have to avoid upsetting the minority groups (namely the Alawis) and lower economic stratum of the regime's power base. Lastly, this new strategy would also have to provide incentives for the Sunni businessmen in order to encourage their participation in expanding the economic base of the state.

In incorporating the Sunni businessmen into the state apparatus, the result was the 'military-mercantile' complex. In other words, a new cooperative alliance formed between the 'new' Ba'th state, dominated by Alawi officers and the 'old' private bourgeoisie, who are second generation Sunni businessmen born out of the former pre-Ba'th ruling class:

...Asad deliberately sought in this way to give his regime a class underpinning needed for stability, but these groups have yet to amalgamate into a new dominant class. Certainly, the former sharp antagonism between the state and the upper classes was bridged as the political elite acquired a stake in new inequalities. There is a marriage of convenience between the two. The Sunni bourgeoisie needs political connections to evade regulations or get privileges and contracts. Alawis need the Sunnis for their access to the Western market and Gulf investment money. The Alawis are enriching themselves in business, not just politics, and they monopolize the oil-servicing sector and shipping. There are capital partnerships between Alawi money and regime-allied Sunni tycoons. (Hinnebusch 1997)

The 'military-mercantile complex' has enabled incorporation of the Sunni businessmen under the regime, without the regime relinquishing political power to them. There are several reasons to explain this. First, as an economic class, Sunni businessmen are politically weak. That is, they have not identified a common political platform upon which to build alliances. There are divisions that yet exist within the class of Sunni businessmen, between those who have begun to work in cooperation of the regime, trusting that economic liberalization will not be reversed, and others still resentful of the regime's corruption, bureaucracy, and interference in commerce. Second, there is no incentive for the Sunni businessmen as a class to form political alliances, so long as they are making a profit and prospering from advantageous ties to the regime, which border on clientelism. Third, the Sunni businessmen have not attempted to ally with the Sunni urban lower and middle class or the rural peasants in order to erode the backbone of the Ba'th regime, and thereby weaken the regime.

One of the precipitates of economic liberalization has been the revelation of a certain degree of instability within the government. Although the regime may not be experiencing discontent with the 'military-mercantile complex' from its informal political structure, a division has evidently surfaced within the formal political structure. Liberalization has brought to the fore a conflict between one camp of bureaucrats and Ba'th party member who favor statism, and another camp of cabinet ministers and technocrats herald bourgeois principles fostering economic liberalization. The trick will be to accommodate

both camps, maintain the stability of the regime, and simultaneously pursue the state's interest of expanding its economic base:

The dominant consideration, in fact, has been regime political interests. These require a middle way: while long-term durability requires fuller integration into the world market, short-term stability requires that this be carefully managed, and defending regime autonomy means preventing any one social force--bourgeoisie or bureaucracy--from achieving dominance. Behind this defense of autonomy and reinforcing the incrementalism of liberalization is, arguably, the long time-period it takes to overcome communal barriers to the amalgamation of the old and new bourgeoisie needed to give the regime a stable dominant-class social base. (Hinnebusch 1997)

The pro-liberalization camp, or cabinet ministers and technocrats, stand nothing to lose in the face of economic liberalization, and are some of the major participants in the 'military-mercantile complex'. On the other hand, the party and the bureaucracy are threatened by the repercussions of liberalization. First, as economic liberalization means ideologically shifting away from the Ba'thist socialist platform, the party will slowly lose ground as the ideological and political foundations of the state. Second, the demand of the Sunni businessmen to cut bureaucratic red tape and rid of corruption means that bureaucrats stand to lose their advantageous positions. Alternatively, the positions of these same bureaucrats will be less advantageous as privatization accelerates at the expense of the public sector.

The real threat, though, to this intra-regime division between the pro-liberalization camp and the anti-liberalization camp is not the struggle itself. Rather, the threat to the regime's stability lies in the group of Sunni businessmen who distrust the regime and attempt to capitalize upon the intra-regime cleavages, hence exploiting these cleavages.

Even if Sunni businessmen as a class are not allied, perhaps this is where the Islamic movement could step in. In other words, it is conceivable that the Islamic movement ally itself with the group of Sunni businessmen who distrust the regime in order to restore the Sunni rule of pre 'Ba'th Syria, especially in the absence of a strong regime:

Although Islamic forces are not in a position to pose an immediate threat to the regime in Damascus, they remain a formidable destabilizing force in the years to come. While Asad effectively has established himself as an icon that safeguards Syria's unity, his demise might deprive Syria of a dictator capable of guarding Syria against the unleashing of a political avalanche of rival political parties and the Islamic [movement] in the twenty-first century. (Emadi 1998)

It does not seem so farfetched for such an alliance to occur considering that the Sunni businessmen sympathized with members of the Islamic movement in the early 1980s. If the regime became vulnerable to its internal divisions over economic liberalization, and if the regime upset Sunni businessmen by attempting to reverse economic liberalization or insist on interfering in its progress, why wouldn't an alliance between the Sunni businessmen and members of the Islamic movement recapture the state?

In addition, because the Islamic movement in Syria is not radical, leftist, or social-- but is rather congruent to capitalism and economic liberalization, it could be a political platform upon which Sunni businessmen and moderate Muslims behind the Islamic movement converge. The Islamic movement in Syria is also not anti-Western in sentiment; in fact, most of its supporters are Western-educated and promote a peaceful, democratic form of political Islam. (Hinnebusch 1993) If such a peaceful Islamic movement, which was politically organized, united with the Sunni businessmen, who have economic power, a new social base of mobilization could be formed in wresting power from an already

fissured regime. Though Sunni businessmen have no political ambitions as a social class, nevertheless, they have begun to seek more participation in shaping the economic foundation of the state. Also, as beneficial as the 'military-mercantile complex' is for the Alawis officers and Sunni businessmen, it has not been enough to erase the tensions and resentment among these two religiously opposing groups:

The cultural gap with the Sunnis is kept alive by continual migration from the countryside of poor Alawis with harsh accents and rural ways who attach themselves to Alawi patrons in power. The still limited incidence of intermarriage between the Alawi political elite and the Sunni business elite suggests a persistent lack of social trust. The regime is trying to legitimate itself by co-opting members of old Sunni families into government but, while the Alawis want to keep the upper hand, the Sunnis are looking for full partnership. As such, it is better to speak of an uneasy alliance of rival bourgeois class fragments than a new unified bourgeoisie. (Hinnebusch 1997)

The quiet power struggle between the 'new' state and 'old' private bourgeoisie class is still pronounced. And as the Sunni businessmen are incorporated into the regime through the 'military-mercantile complex', but fail to be included in sharing power as members of informal structure, one question remains. Will the combination of the intra-regime conflict, Sunni businessmen aspiring to have a louder voice in formulating economic policy, and a politically organized Islamic movement result in the total destabilization of an already precarious regime-society relationship?

If civil society in Syria continues to evolve through 1) maintaining its traditional communal, social, and familial ties, 2) participating in shaping the state, through expanding its economic base, with 3) the private sector operating free of corruption, bureaucratic red tape, and government interference, the regime may find itself having to

relinquish a handsome share of its power. As economic liberalization advances, and the regime becomes reliant on society to expand the state's economic base, it will find difficulty in mobilizing support from its minority groups, rural peasants, and urban lower and middle class social base. The essential strategy of inclusionary politics, which has been vital in amassing support from minority groups and the urban lower and middle classes, will be ineffective as the equation underpinning inclusionary politics is reversed. In other words, inclusionary politics is based on encouraging mass consumption among minority groups and the urban lower and middle classes at the expense of capital accumulation. With current economic liberalization underway, the regime's encouragement of capital accumulation will eventually come at the expense of mass consumption.

The simultaneous tactic of 'divide and rule' will also be less effective in preventing the horizontal integration of Syrian civil society as economic liberalization makes way for newer associations. This is what occurred in pre-Bath Syria:

Modernization also generated new classes and occupational groups. A small agro-industrial bourgeoisie emerged and generated a working class which formed trade unions, crucial vehicles for drawing the lower strata into secondary association. Expansion of education, the bureaucracy and the army generated a salaried 'new middle class'; the new associations and institutions into which it was recruited fostered loyalties to profession, class, and nation which competed with those to family, sect, and quarter. (Hinnebusch 1993 217)

Just as new class and occupational associations began to emerge in the 1950s as capitalism matured in Syria, new class and occupational relationships will evolve economic liberalization occurs in the 1990s. Ethnic, religious, and class cleavages that

were once exacerbated by the regime may be smoothed over as Syrian society becomes integrated in the process of economic liberalization.

The survival of civil society in Syria under a repressive Ba'th regime reveals its viability, which is based in ability to retain its traditional social ties that have developed along side the state. Syrian civil society's organizational skills are also well developed, as demonstrated in the Islamic movement. Moreover, the combination of a strong social base found in the Islamic movement and the economic strength of the Sunni businessmen may be the basis of horizontal integration. In addition, a weakened or divided regime will make it increasingly difficult for the regime to maintain its monopoly over power. Sooner or later, the regime is going to have to reconcile its own interests with those of society and the state rather than imposing its interests on society and the state.

Conclusion: Breaking through the Syrian State

The continued ability of the Syrian regime to remain totalitarian in nature is due to four factors, which combined, have prevented civil society from horizontally organizing. First, the formal political structure of political institutions has served to legitimize the regime's totalitarian nature, as well as absorb and repress opposing minorities. Second, the informal political structure has allowed a select cadre of Ba'th members to retain a monopoly of power over the state. Third, the Ba'th party has implanted itself as the political and ideological foundation of the state, thereby creating the state to serve in its interests, rather than the regime ruling under the sovereignty of the state. Lastly, the

were once exacerbated by the regime may be smoothed over as Syrian society becomes integrated in the process of economic liberalization.

The survival of civil society in Syria under a repressive Ba'th regime reveals its viability, which is based in ability to retain its traditional social ties that have developed along side the state. Syrian civil society's organizational skills are also well developed, as demonstrated in the Islamic movement. Moreover, the combination of a strong social base found in the Islamic movement and the economic strength of the Sunni businessmen may be the basis of horizontal integration. In addition, a weakened or divided regime will make it increasingly difficult for the regime to maintain its monopoly over power. Sooner or later, the regime is going to have to reconcile its own interests with those of society and the state rather than imposing its interests on society and the state.

Conclusion: Breaking through the Syrian State

The continued ability of the Syrian regime to remain totalitarian in nature is due to four factors, which combined, have prevented civil society from horizontally organizing. First, the formal political structure of political institutions has served to legitimize the regime's totalitarian nature, as well as absorb and repress opposing minorities. Second, the informal political structure has allowed a select cadre of Ba'th members to retain a monopoly of power over the state. Third, the Ba'th party has implanted itself as the political and ideological foundation of the state, thereby creating the state to serve in its interests, rather than the regime ruling under the sovereignty of the state. Lastly, the

simultaneous strategies of inclusionary politics and 'divide and rule' have unified Syria's heterogeneous society, while keeping them from horizontally integrating.

However, the increasing need for society to participate in expanding the economic base of the state has meant that the regime must incorporate some of its strongest opposing elements into its formal political structure. The resulting 'military-mercantile complex' has caused fissures within the regime itself, weakening it. Of course, such weakness makes the regime vulnerable to the same opposing elements infiltrating the informal political structure of ruling elites. As economic liberalization proceeds, the regime will have to accommodate society's interests in order to secure its assistance in expanding the state's economic foundation.

All of this is not to say that political liberalization in Syria is contingent upon economic liberalization. Rather, economic liberalization has been done on a selective basis, in the interest of the regime's stability rather than in the interest of the state. However, such selective economic liberalization will be more difficult to pursue as expanding the economic base of the state takes precedence:

Syria's economic liberalization is rooted in an economic crisis, specifically a 'crisis of accumulation' aggravated by the 'over-development' of the state...The economic logic of accumulation was subordinated to the political logic of state formation. This strategy eventually exhausted itself and forced the regime to tolerate reconstruction of a capitalist class to replace the state as the main engine of accumulation and to initiate economic liberalization. The easing of economic pressures in periods when rent has been plentiful, such as the early 1990s, has facilitated a strategy of selective liberalization, but in the long run the demands of economic rationality are likely to intensify. (Hinnebusch 1997)

Economic liberalization cannot remain selective for long, as the regime begins to favor capital accumulation over the cumbersome burden of mass consumption.

The significance of economic liberalization in Syria does not lie in the fact that it has fostered political liberalization; rather, it has served three purposes. First, economic liberalization has exposed the vulnerability of the regime, which is divided between a pro-liberalization and anti-liberalization camp. Second, economic liberalization has brought about the incorporation of Sunni businessmen, or the second generation of the 'old' private bourgeoisie ruling class. Though the Sunni businessmen do not have a political platform upon which they may unite and mobilize support, their participation in the 'military-mercantile complex' has allowed them access to the state's economic resources. Third, coupled with regime fragility and the ascension of Sunni businessmen in the 'military-mercantile complex', the Islamic movement could unite with these Sunni businessmen to restore Sunni dominated rule. Together, the Sunni businessmen and the members of the Islamic movement have the economic, social, and political base necessary to challenge a weakened regime.

Incorporating the society in shaping the state, thus, will be contingent upon key segments of civil society capitalizing upon its access to economic resources of the state, as well as integrating horizontally to form newer associations transcending ethnic, religious, and class divisions. Though the Ba'th regime has been successful in the past in incorporating minority groups, rural peasants, and the urban lower and middle class through inclusionary politics, as well as preventing society's horizontal integration through the strategy of 'divide and rule', economic liberalization will mean a necessary

shift in policy. As capital accumulation is encouraged, and Sunni businessmen are incorporated into the 'military-mercantile complex', the regime's backbone of Alawi, rural peasants, and urban lower and middle class supporters may find themselves marginalized by the regime itself. If the regime's backbone is eroded, while Sunni businessmen forged new alliances with the Islamic movement, the regime could easily become the cause of its own downfall.

Further, the absence of certain individuals within the informal ruling cadre may cause an overall weakening of the Ba'th regime. The absence of Asad alone could be the end of the Ba'th regime. After all, the success of the Ba'th regime is credited to Asad himself, who is the center of the regime's axis. Asad has shrewdly manipulated segments of society in the interests of his regime, and seized opportunities during domestic strife to advance his own career. All of this has been done under careful calculation on Asad's part, and through his perspicuous politicking, allowing him to maneuver and maintain his rule over the last 30 years:

...one might well regard Asad's quest for public support and the degree to which he has gained it as a source of strength marking him out from other Arab leaders. It is not, as Clinton seems to have thought, a matter of a higher IQ; rather, it is heightened and informed awareness of the political limitations and weaknesses of his own power, of regime, and of Syria as a state. True, this awareness has rendered Asad cautious, even hesitant, but it also provided the basis on which his accomplishments rest. This is true first and foremost of the achievement of domestic political stability, and thus of Asad's own political survival. (Zisser 1998)

Hence, perhaps a post-Asad Syria is the era in question rather than a post-Ba'th Syria. Asad has interpreted Ba'thism flexibly in times of need, when it comes to securing the

regime's stability and monopoly over power. After Asad steps down, who will arbitrate how and when Ba'thism will be adjusted to maintain the regime's stability? If Ba'thism is not adjusted parallel to the change in the composition of regime's backbone, how will that render the regime vulnerable? Lastly, if the regime is rendered vulnerable, and a struggle for power occurs within the regime itself, how will that affect the state?

These line of questions brings one back to the primary and ultimate question regarding the nature of Syria's contentious regime-society relationship. Once again, transforming that contentious relationship into a cooperative one will depend, not simply upon Asad's shrewdness, but more so on the regime's shrewdness, in recognizing that it must incorporate society in shaping the state.

It is not impossible to imagine the Syrian regime transforming into an authoritative one, given that the necessary institutions within the formal political structure are already installed. If utilized properly as a medium of communication between the society and the regime, rather than as a means of the regime absorbing, repressing, and monitoring opposing elements of civil society, such political institutions could foster a cooperative relationship between an authoritative Syrian regime and its participatory civil society.

Just as well, Syria's civil society resembles that of Jordan's, and is therefore relatively well developed. The only difference between Syria's nominal civil society and Jordan's participatory one is that the former's regime posed as the single obstacle to horizontal integration while the latter's has succumbed to it as inevitable part of a cooperative regime-society relationship. It will be impossible for the Syrian regime to simply transform into an authoritarian one, as is the case in Egypt. If Egypt's regime is able to

remain authoritarian, it is because Egypt's civil society hasn't the skills to horizontally integrate and demand its participation in shaping the state. Yet, because Syria's civil society possesses the organizational skills necessary to integrate horizontally, the regime will have to transform itself in order to meet civil society's demand to participate in shaping the state.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The phenomenon of the Arab state has been defined according to similar characteristics that Arab states universally share. Hence, these similarities have been emphasized in order to support the concept of an 'Arab state' at the expense of the important differences among Arab states that make it impossible to conceive the notion of an 'Arab state'. To understand the nature of the state in the Arab world, one must first account for variations among Arab states that distinguish them from one another rather than the characteristics that.

Hence, instead of looking *at* the state, perhaps it necessary to look *into* the state, i.e., its regime-society relationship. Previous explanations of the Arab state have tended to ignore refining the conflict between the state and society to one that is within the state, between the regime and society. What has traditionally been debated as a contentious state-society relationship has less to do with the state in relation to society than the regime's manipulation of the state in relation to society.

Thus, the premise of this dissertation has sought to establish that although the concept of an 'Arab state' exists, as an entity manipulated by the regime, there exists several

types of Arab regime-society relationships that characterize how these states also differ from one another.

These several types of regime-society relationship within each Arab state are a function of the degree to which there is exists the incorporation of the society in shaping the state. However, society's participation in shaping the state is dependent upon two factors. First, it is determined by the *extent* to which the regime itself has manipulated the state to serve its interests, thereby detaching it from its social base. The more repressive the regime, the more difficult it is for society to find itself included in shaping the state. The second determinative factor is the extent to which society itself demands its own participation in shaping the state. Unless society is capable of demanding so, it cannot bank on the regime to provide it the opportunity.

The case studies of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria have served to exemplify the three types of regime-society relationships found in Arab states, each varying in the extent to which society participates in shaping the state.

Jordan is an example of an Arab state with an authoritative regime and participatory civil society, where the regime-society relationship has transformed into a cooperative one, as society participates in shaping the state. The success of Jordan's cooperative regime-society relationship is due to three factors. First, the state's laws have been amended in the last ten years to recognize the state as the ultimate sovereign entity, to establish a political framework of institutions through which the society may access the state's political and economic resources, and to define the limit and scope of the government's powers. Second, because the regime included society in shaping the state,

civil society was able to forge vertical links vis-a-vis the regime, while maintaining its own autonomy. Third, because Jordan's civil society has the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests, it was able to forge horizontal links and participate in the shaping of the state.

These three factors, which further fostered in creating a cooperative regime-society relationship, were the product of the regime's successful strategies that reattached the state's ideological, political, and economic foundations to its social base. The two strategies that have served to achieve this are 1) creating an 'aasibiya', thereby erecting an ideological foundation where the state became a reflection of its society, and 2) Husseinism, which served as the cohesive agent consolidating society within the political foundation of the state. In addition to the society and regime have formed a mutually reciprocal relationship, in which the interests of the society as well as the regime converge to serve the interests of the state.

In comparison, Egypt presented a case study of an Arab state with an authoritarian regime and incipient civil society whose society-regime relationship has not yet been established as a cooperative one. The inability of Egypt's regime-society relationship to evolve cooperatively has been due less to the regime's authoritarian rule, than to civil society's own incipient nature. That is, Egypt's incipient civil society lacks the organizational skills to identify, express, and lobby its interests. Thus, civil society has also failed to form horizontal links among its individual organizations and groups in order to demand its participation in shaping the state. In addition, Egypt's civil society has

forged vertical links vis-a-vis the regime that are clientelistic in nature, where its interests are fulfilled in exchange for political acquiescence of the regime's rule.

Ultimately, in the face of a weak civil society, the regime has been able to monopolize the state's political and economic resources, and establish the ideological, political, and economic foundations of the state to serve in interest of the regime.

Egypt's Presidential Establishment has become the centerpiece of the state, where power remains in the hands of the executive. As a result, Egypt's ideological, political, and economic foundations have been built in the interest of the regime rather than in interest of the state. Therefore, the state has become detached from its social base, evolving to reaffirm the regime as the sovereign authority superimposed on the state.

Yet, although civil society has been presented greater access to the state's economic resources, its incipient nature has prevented it from participating in shaping the state. Civil society has been therefore unable to lobby for political liberalization, although it identified and expressed as it as an interest common among all its groups and organizations..

This is the distinguishing factor, which differentiates Egypt's contentious regime-society relationship from that of Syria's. Whereas Egypt's is the function of a weak civil society, Syria's regime-society relationship is the product of a totalitarian regime that has either repressed or absorbed Syria's nominal civil society. The regime has included civil society in the state's formal political structure only as a form of symbolic representation without including it in shaping the state. Thus, the vertical link forged have been imposed

by the regime upon civil society, at the expense of civil society's autonomy. Further, Syria's totalitarian regime has prevented civil society from horizontally integrating.

The regime-society relationship has not, thus, been a cooperative one. Several factors support this observation. First, while the formal political structure has lent legitimacy to the regime by proportionally representing heterogeneous segments of Syrian society, its political institutions have actually served as a means for the regime to monitor society. Second, the informal structure of ruling elites within the regime has monopolized absolute power over the state. Third, the Ba'th party has served to be the base of the ideological, political, and economic foundations of the state.

Though the simultaneous strategies of inclusionary politics and 'divide and rule' have consolidated society under the Ba'th regime, while preventing its horizontal integration, civil society has nonetheless demonstrated its ability to identify, express, and lobby its interests. The Islamic movement is evidence of this. Rooted in the *sug*, the Islamic movement developed from a strong social base that the regime could not absorb, repress, or penetrate-- even after the Hama incident, its strong social base has revived the movement peacefully, espousing principles that support capitalism, call for an end to government corruption, and demand society's inclusion in shaping the state. Moreover, because the Sunni businessmen, who were born out of Syria's pre-Ba'th 'old' private ruling bourgeoisie, began to support the Islamic movement, the Ba'th regime found itself practicing selective economic liberalization in order to appease the Sunni businessmen and reincorporate them in the formal political structure.

Although the Sunni businessmen have been reincorporated through the 'military-mercantile complex', they have not been included in sharing power with the Alawi officers that rule over the Ba'th state. Yet, as Sunni businessmen participate in expanding the economic base of the state, they have become economically semi-autonomous of the regime. Thus, coupled with the social and political base that the Islamic movement provides, both the Sunni businessmen and Islamic movement could integrate to be the first effective challenge to the regime. Such a scenario is not so unrealistic, considering that, first, economic liberalization is becoming more of a necessity; and second, the regime is experiencing internal divisions between those who favor liberalization and those who insist on maintaining the status quo.

In order for Syria's contentious regime-society relationship to transform into a cooperative one, the regime will have to allow its nominal civil society to participate in shaping the state.

Returning to the original question of this dissertation, is there an 'Arab state'? Although the 'Arab state' has been characterized as being manipulated by its regime in order to serve its interests, the various regime-society relationships within each Arab state illustrate how Arab states do differ from one another. There may exist in theory an 'Arab state' identifiable by characteristics which are common and universal among Arab polities; but the type of regime-society relationship reveals distinguishing variations in how each Arab state expresses itself.

REFERENCE LIST

- Abootalebi, Ali R. 1998. Civil Society, Democracy, and the Middle East. MERIA Journal On-line (Spring). Available at www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa. Accessed September 1998.
- Adams, Linda Shull. 1996. Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State's Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. *Journal of Church & State*. Available on AUC On-line Data Base. Accessed September 1998.
- Amawi, Aba. 1996. "The Consequences of Choice: Political Liberalization in Jordan." *Civil Society Magazine*, issue 6. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed September 1998.
- Amawi, Aba M. 1994. The 1993 Elections in Jordan. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 16: 15-29. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed September 1998.
- Aoude, Ibrahim G. 1994. From National Bourgeois Development to Infitah: Egypt 1952-1992. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 16: 1-24. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed September 1998.
- Ayubi, Nazih. 1995. *Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Ayyoub, Tarek. 1999. "Premier to Discuss Election Law with Opposition Party Leaders." *The Jordan Star On-line*, 12 September. Available at www.jordanstar.com. Accessed September 1999.
- Banerji, A.K. 1991. Egypt Under Mubarak. *Round Table*, no. 317: 7-22. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed September 1998.
- Beblawi, Hazem, ed. 1987. *The Rentier State. Vol. 1, The Rentier State in the Arab World*, by Hazem Beblawi. New York: Croom Helm.
- Beblawi, Hazem, ed. 1987. *The Rentier State. Vol. 2, Aspects of State Building in Rentier Economies: Algeria and Libya Compared*, by Vandewalle, Dirk. New York: Croom Helm.
- Bendix, R. 1990. "State, Legitimation and 'Civil Society'." *Telos*, no. 86: 143-154. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed September 1998.
- Berman, Sheri. 1997. Civil Society and Political Institutionalization. *American Behavioral Scientist*, no. 40: 62-579. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed September 1998.

- Beshara, Miranda. 1996. "The Egyptian NGO Sector: Prospect and Challenges." *Civil Society*, issue 6. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed September 1998.
- Bowker, Robert. 1996. *Beyond Peace: The Search for Security in the Middle East*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Brand, Laurie. 1993. In the Beginning was the State...The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan. In *Civil Societies in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Norton, 113-143. New York: E.J. Brill-Leiden.Brown.
- Clough, Michael. 1999. Reflections on Civil Society. *Nation*, no. 268: 16-20. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Craig, James. 1992. What's Wrong with the Middle East?. *Asian Affairs*, no. 23: 131-143. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Emadi, Hafizullah. 1998. The 'Infatih' Politics and the Failure of Political Islam in Syria". *Contemporary Review*, no. 273: 290-296. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Esman, Milton J. and Itmar Rabinovich, eds. 1988. *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*. London: Cornell University Press.
- Gilbraith, Martin. 1996. "Civil Society in the Arab World." *Civil Society Magazine*, issue 4. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed August 1998.
- Goodson, Larry P. 1999. Democratizaiton in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or Merely Stalled?." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no.19: 23-67. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Hall, John A. 1998. The Nature of Civil Society. *Society*, no. 35: 32-43. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Hamdan, Dima. 1999. "Senator Opposes Changes to Elections Law, Expresses Reservations on Confederation". *Jordan Times On-Line*, 12 September. Available at www.jordantimes.com. Accessed September 1999.
- Harik, Iliya. 1994. Rethinking Civil Society: Pluralism in the Arab World. *Journal of Democracy*, no. 5: 43-56.
- Haynes, Jeff. 1997. *Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World*. Malden, Maine: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers.

- Henderson, Amy. 1999. "Proposed Amendments to Press Law Still Miss the Mark-Opinion Leaders". *The Jordan Star*, 15 August. Available at www.jordanstar.com. Accessed August 1999.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond A. 1993. State, Society, and Political Change in Syria. In *Civil Societies in the Middle East*, ed. Richard Augustus Norton, 40-75. New York: E.J. Brill-Leiden. Brown, 1993.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond A. 1997. Syria: The Politics of Economic Liberalization. *Third World Quarterly*, no.18: 249-264. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Howeidy, Amira. 1999. "Lobbying for Reform." *Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line*, 2-8 September. Available at www.alahramweekly.com. Accessed September 1999.
- Howeidy, Amira. 1999. "Petitions for Change." *Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line*, 9-15 September. Available at www.alahramweekly.com. Accessed September 1999.
- Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1996. "Civil Society: Advances and Setbacks." *Civil Society Magazine*, issue 6. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed September 1998.
- "Islam's New Egyptian Face." 1996. *The Economist*, 2 March. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed February 1999.
- Ismael, Tareq Y. 1970. The Challenges of Modernization. In *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East*, eds. Tareq Y. Ismael, 20-43. Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1970.
- Ismael, Tareq Y and Ismael, Jacqueline S. 1997. Civil society in the Arab World: Historical traces, contemporary vestiges." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no.19: 77-89. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Ismail, Salwa. 1995. State-Society Relations in Egypt: Restructuring the Political." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 17: 37-54. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- "Jordan: Development in a changing world." 1996. *The Jordan Star On-Line*, 7 January. Available at www.jordanstar.com. Accessed September 1998.
- "Jordan's New King Face Challenges." 1999. Xinhua News Agency, 7 February. Global News Bank. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed February 1999.
- Kamrava, Mehran; Omora, Frank. 1998. Civil Society and Democratization in Comparative Perspective: Latin America and the Middle East. *Third World Quarterly*, no. 19: 893-918. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed

January 2000.

- Kamrava, Mehran. 1998. Non-democratic States and Political Liberalization in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis. *Third World Quarterly*, no. 19: 63. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Kienle, Eberhard, ed. 1994. *Contemporary Syria*. London: British Academic Press.
- Korany, Bahgat, Paul Noble, and Rex Brynen, eds. 1993. *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Lee, Su-Hoon. 1988. *State-Building in the Contemporary Third World*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1994. *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lucas, Ivor. 1994. The Paradox of Syria. *Asian Affairs*, no. 25: 3-14. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Massis, Maher J. 1998. Jordan: A Study of Attitudes toward Democratic Changes." *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 20: 37-65. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Maynes, Charles William. 1998. The Middle East in the Twenty-First Century. *The Middle East Journal*. Available at www2.ari.net/mei/maynes.htm. Accessed July 1998.
- Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Mufti, Malik. 1999. Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan". *Comparative Political Studies*, no. 32: 100-131. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Muslih, M.; Norton, A.R. 1991. The need for Arab democracy. *Foreign Policy*, 83: 3-21. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Nafie, Ibrahim. 1999. "Slowly but Surely." *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 30 September - 6 October. Available at www.alahramweekly.com. Accessed September 1999.
- New Jordan Center, The. 1999. "Jordanian Civil Society in the Nineties". *Ibn Khaldun Center Newsletter*. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed January 2000.

- Norton, Richard Augustus. 1995. Introduction. In *Civil Societies in the Middle East*, ed. Richard Augustus Norton, 1-10. New York: E.J. Brill-Leiden.
- Norbu, Dawa. 1992. *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Orum, Anthony. 1989. *Introduction to Political Sociology: The Social Anatomy of the Body Politic*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Reed, Stanley. 1993. The Battle for Egypt. *Foreign Affairs*, no. 72: 94-109. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Rieff, David. 1999. Civil society and the future of the nation-state. *Nation*, no. 268: 11-17. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Roberts, John M. 1991. Prospects for Democracy in Jordan. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 13: 119-140. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Robinson, Glenn E. 1997. Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan. *The Middle East Journal*, no. 51, 1997. Available at www2.ari.net/mei/robin.htm. Accessed January 2000.
- Rubin, Barry. 1998. The Geopolitics of Middle East Conflict and Crisis. *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, no. 2. Available at www.biu.ac.il. Accessed September 1999.
- Salloukh, Bassel F. 1996. State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in Theoretical Perspective. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, no. 18: 39-63. Available on AUC On-Line Data Base. Accessed January 2000.
- Seale, Patrick. 1998. *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Seligman, Adam B. 1992. *The Idea of Civil Society*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. 1992. Why Radical Muslims Aren't Taking Over Governments. *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, no. 2. Available at www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/j2no2a2.htm. Accessed January 2000.
- Tadros, Mariz. 1999. "In Quest of Social Reform." *Al-Ahram Weekly On-Line*, 7 - 13 October. Available at www.alahramweekly.com. Accessed October 1999.

- Terterov, Marat. 1996. "Lessons from Political Liberalization." *Civil Society Magazine*, issue 5. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed September 1999.
- Tibi, Bassam. 1997. *Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State*. London: MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Tauber, Eliezer. 1995. *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq*. England: Frank Cass and Co Ltd.
- Terterov, Marat. 1996. "Lessons from Political Liberalization". *Civil Society Magazine*, issue 5. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed September 1999.
- Youssef, Shahera. 1996. "Education and Civil Society." *Civil Society Magazine*, issue 5. Available at www.ibnkhaldun.org. Accessed October 1999.
- Weitzman, Bruce. 1998. Middle East States and the Approaching 21st Century. *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, no. 4. Available at www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa. Accessed October 1999.
- Zisser, Eyal. 1998. Appearance and Reality: Syria's Decision Making Structure. *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA)*, no. 2. Available at www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa. Accessed October 1999.

AMERICAN LIBRARY IN CAIRO LIBRARY
3 8534 01093 2725

