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**School of Humanities and Social Sciences**

**Department of Political Science**

**Master's Thesis**

***Evaluation, Coordination and Execution: An Analysis of Military Coup  
Agency at Instances of Successful Coup D'état***

A Master's Thesis Submitted to  
The Department of Political Science  
In Fulfillment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Master of Arts

**By**

**Karim Ezzat El-Baz**

**Under the supervision of**

**Professor Dr. Holger Albrecht**

**Associate Professor  
Political Science Department**

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*For Mom, Dad, Wessam*

*&*

*C.M.E.P.S*



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Acknowledgment.....	I
Dedication.....	II
CHAPTERS	
CHAPTER 1 – Introduction.....	2
CHAPTER 2 – Theory.....	10
CHAPTER 3 – Military Coup Agency Dataset.....	24
CHAPTER 4 – Instances of Mixed Military Coups D'état: Thailand 1991 and Turkey 1980.....	46
Chapter 5 – Instances of Infantry Military Coups D'état: Haiti 1991 and Niger 2010.....	59
CHAPTER 6 – Summary, Conclusion, Recommendation.....	72
Codebook.....	78
Dataset.....	79
Bibliography.....	82

*“A military with no political training is a potential criminal.”*

*Cpt. Thomas Sankara*

*President of Burkina Faso From 1983-1987*

*&*

*The Coup Plotter of the 1983 Coup*

## Chapter 1

### 1. Statement of the Research Puzzle

The increased occurrence of military coups d'état after the Second World War, more specifically in the 1960s and 1970s, gave rise to a growing interest in academia to study this phenomenon. This rising academic trend was spearheaded by Samuel Huntington, Samuel Finer and Morris Janowitz who embarked on studying different administrative reforms that can help in submitting coercive apparatuses such as the military institution to the civilian political will as a tool to limit coups d'état. Coups d'état were framed as a radical involvement of the military institution versus the regime incumbents. According to Edward Luttwak, a coup d'état is the infiltration of a small, yet a critical segment of the state apparatus to oust the government and deprive it from controlling the state apparatus.<sup>1</sup> Whereas Curzio Malaparte argued that a coup d'état is an instant where its essence lies in its technical problem; it is the knowledge of when and how to overtake telephone exchanges, water supplies or even the electricity generators besides the accumulation of political power.<sup>2</sup> Coups d'état were conceptualized differently among scholars, yet most of these conceptualizations shared a common perspective about the military institution. This perspective entailed that the military institution is a cohesive unit that is defined by bounding its members to sustain one will, one organization and one mission.<sup>3</sup> Military coups, regardless of their different conceptualization, were similarly affiliated to the military institution as one unit.

Evidence on this perspective could be found in the classic civil-military literature introduced by Peter Feaver, Luttwak, Huntington, Zoltan Barany and others who dealt with the military institution as one cohesive unit of analysis. The aim of this thesis is not to challenge this perspective, yet to offer a micro-level analysis to the military institution when it comes to radical military involvements in the civilian hemisphere such as the case in military coups d'état. Henceforth, this analysis would not perceive the military as one unit, but as an institution built upon the interactions of its members. The nature of these interactions, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, could entail the cohesiveness or the dividedness of the military institution. By extension, I would assume that cohesiveness of the military institution, as one unit, might not always be the case, especially at moments of coup d'état.

Understanding the military institution as an institution based on the interaction of its members would entail categorizing the interacting members of the military

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<sup>1</sup>Edward Luttwak, *Coup D'Etat: a Practical Handbook- a Brilliant Guide to Taking Over a Nation* (London: The Penguin Press, 1969), 12.

<sup>2</sup>Maurice Blanchot, *Political Writings, 1953-1993* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), xii.

<sup>3</sup>W. Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), 9.

institution in terms of their military posts and their service branches that includes: air force, navy, ground force and paramilitary force. This thesis would argue that at moments of military coup d'états, the cohesiveness of the military institution as one unit might not necessarily exist. A preliminary micro-level analysis of successful instances of military coups between 1980-2013 d'état gave rise to a classification of coups military coups into two coup types. The first coup type was entitled as "Infantry Coups". The coup agency formation of these coups included, whether intentionally or unintentionally, only members who are affiliated to the ground forces. On the other hand, the second category was entitled as "Mixed Coups". The coup agency of these coups included at least one member who is affiliated to a different service branch in comparison to his fellow coup plotters.

Theoretically, members of the ground forces are the normal coup plotters as they have sufficient training and equipment to accomplish the objectives of a successful coup. Henceforth, what is quite puzzling is mixed coups. These coups include other officers from other service branches; taking into account, the ability of ground forces to execute the coup without the interference of other service branches. Therefore, the question is why would the coup coordinator involve those whom he would not tactically need for the coups' execution. This is only one side of the puzzle that asks why and how a mixed coup agency is formed. The second side is why would ground forces officers prefer to act alone in other cases? These variations with regards to coup agencies raised questions about the variables that can influence the coup agency formation. In this dissertation, I would assume that the coup agency formation is primarily dependent on two factors: First, the ability of the main coup plotter to liaise between different military service branches. Second, the presence of a state of social unrest that could be utilized by the main coup plotter, who can liaise between different service branches, to convince officers from different service branches to jointly execute a coup as a means to end "chaos".

## **2. Research Significance and Method**

The research has two significances of both a qualitative and a quantitative nature. Qualitatively, this thesis would identify a research gap within the civil-military relations literature on the military coup agency. The aim of this thesis is to identify this literature gap, to bridge it and to extract possible knowledge from bridging it. The gap lies in the conventional literature perspective on the military institution as one unit. Bridging it would be through considering the military institution as an entity based on the interactions between members who represent its service branches. Whereas the knowledge extracted from the bridging process would be analyzing the factors that influence the coup agency formation. The presence of different military coup types signifies another question that is: Why is it important to distinguish between different coup types? The importance of classifying military coups into different coup types lies in perceiving the military institution as an institution that might not be necessarily coherent. As if the military institution is coherent we would

have only one military coup type that represents the “cohesiveness” of the military institution. On the other hand, this dissertation would question the military cohesiveness through investigating the military coup plotters behavior at moments of successful coup.

Quantitatively, this thesis would introduce a new dataset that compiles information on the coup plotters of the successful instances of military coup d'état between 1980 and 2013 with regards to their military posts, ranks, and affiliations to service branches. Through this new dataset, one can test the theoretical assumptions proclaimed in the qualitative part of this thesis. Building on this mixed method analysis (quantitative and qualitative), one might abstract some factors that influence the coup agency formations. The variable the thesis would highlight is the impact of social unrest on coup agency. This does not mean that other factors such as military professionalism, military social formation and others do not have an influence on coup agency.

### **3. Service Branches**

In order to obtain a distinct understanding of a micro-level perspective on the military institution, one must comprehend the military formations in terms of service branches. The service branches symbolize the different affiliations of the coup plotters that are discussed in this thesis. These branches/affiliations are: Ground Force– Air Force– Navy – Paramilitary – Police.

#### **3.1 Ground Force**


The essence of any standing armed forces lies in its ground force. Historically, ground force had been regarded as the first service branch ever introduced to the military institution before the introduction of the navy and air force.<sup>6</sup> Contemporarily, this service branch became more sophisticated and included specialized divisions such as: Artillery, Infantry, Special Forces, Cavalry and Mechanized Corps among other divisions. According to Frank Newport and Alec Gallup, the success of any warfare is purely dependent on the existence of a strong coherent ground forces that can perform its tasks.<sup>7</sup> Other for other service branches such as the air force and navy; their objectives are mainly of a logistical nature. In other words, they mainly provide transportation, naval and aerial protection besides their other offensive objectives.<sup>8</sup> The members of the ground forces are trained and equipped to accomplish these following objectives:

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<sup>6</sup> Frank Newport and Alec M. Gallub, *The Gallup Poll Opinion 2004* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 220.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 221.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., 220-221.



- Dislocate, Isolate, Disrupt and Destroy the Enemy:

This objective entails dislocating the enemy from strategic positions, isolating the enemy from both supply and communication, disrupting the enemy's transportations and if necessary destroying the enemy.<sup>9</sup>

- Seizing Large Urban Lands:

Only ground forces have the capabilities resembled in armor (tanks), infantry and communications that allow them to take over a city and simultaneously maintain control over it.<sup>10</sup> In times of turmoil, there is a need for the ground forces to be spread in populated cities for keeping order, and just in case to eliminate any rebellions within this city with a minimum damage compared to air bombing or naval shelling.

- Seizing the Enemy Territory:

Members of the ground forces are highly trained to occupy areas in which the presence of a militant state or non-state actors is perceived as a threat to the military institution.<sup>11</sup>

One can notice that members of ground forces have sufficient equipment and training that enable them to execute a successful coup according to Blanchot's coup definition. In addition, the primary dataset analysis proved that ground force was the

<sup>9</sup> Norman Wade, *The Army Operations & Doctrine Smartbook: Guide to FM 3-0 Operations & the Six Warfighting Functions* (Lakeland: The Lightning Press, 2008), 39.

<sup>10</sup> William G. Roberson, *Block by Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations* (Kansas, Command and General Staff College Press, 2003), 214.

<sup>11</sup> Chanakya, *Kautilya The Arthashastra* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 619.

only service branch that can execute a coup d'état without the involvement of the other service branches.

### 3.2 Air Force

Aerial vehicles were first utilized in warfare with the introduction of Zeppelin-crafts by Britain and Germany in the late 1880s.<sup>12</sup> Almost three decades later, France and Italy integrated military grade aircrafts to their militaries by 1909.<sup>13</sup> Of the 170 independent countries of the world, about 135 countries have integrated air force into their respective military institutions. Air force is believed to be the most sophisticated service branch within any military institution. Its members are required to receive advanced trainings to empower them to achieve the following objectives:



- **Air Supremacy:**

The primary objective of the air force is to provide air supremacy to the other service branches within the armed forces. Air supremacy could be defined in terms of providing aerial support and protection for strategic positions, ground force and navy.<sup>14</sup>

- **Destroying/Weakening Enemy's strategic:**

The second objective of the air force regiments is to destroy power centers. This objective is the opposite of air supremacy, as the air force is required to destroy the enemy's strategic positions. These strategic positions could entail enemy's military camps, air bases, ports, naval fleets and symbolic structures such as the parliament or the presidential palace. According to Milan Vego, the ability of the air force to

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<sup>12</sup> Robin Higham, *One Hundred Years of Air Power and Aviation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972), 19.

<sup>13</sup> *Australia Air Force Handbook: Strategic Information and Weapon Systems* (Washington DC: IBP, 2013), 249.

<sup>14</sup> Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2000), 65.

destroy the enemy's strategic positions could entail destroying the will of the enemy to fight, as the case in the Six Days War between Egypt and Israel.<sup>15</sup>

According to the primary dataset analysis, air force members were involved in the coups d'état, yet these members were not able to execute a coup independently without the aid of other service branches, more specifically, the aid of the ground forces. An explanation for this finding might be due to the lack of sufficient training and the required equipment to execute a successful coup independently.

### 3.3 Navy

Navy is the third major armed forces service branch. It represents a fleet of waterborne military vessels that is specifically designed for naval warfare. Navy as an armed branch could be dated back to the days of the ancient civilizations such as the Greek, Egyptian or Roman.<sup>16</sup> Navy has its distinctive feature that separates it from other armed service branches as its uniqueness is related to naval warfare. By extension, its members are primarily trained and equipped to accomplish the following objectives:



- Sea Supremacy:

Sea supremacy is a term used to refer to the dominance of naval warfare through two main aspects: 1- protecting the naval borders of a country. 2- Destroying / Occupying enemy naval assets such as frigates, carriers, or enemy's ports.<sup>17</sup> The term, sea supremacy, came up due to the presence of advanced naval warfare assets difficult

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<sup>15</sup> Milan Vego, *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 71.

<sup>16</sup> David Abulafia, *The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 209.

<sup>17</sup> Craig L. Symonds, *The Naval Institute Historical: Atlas of the U.S. Navy* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 178.



such as submarines, naval mines and torpedoes; therefore the term was coined to emphasize the sea supremacy as a duty of the navy against all these difficulties.<sup>18</sup>

- **Destroy Enemy Strategic Position:**

The second objective of the naval forces is to provide support for the ground forces in terms of destroying the enemy's strategic positions that might stand as a hindrance against the main ground force. This objective might include shelling military camps or even applying a naval blockade that cut the supplies for the enemy's forces.<sup>19</sup>

Some successful coup instances included coup plotters from navy. However, navy coup plotters were not able to execute a successful coup d'état independently without the involvement of the ground forces between 1980 and 2013. An explanation for this could lie in the lack of sufficient training and equipment for navy personnel to execute a successful coup independently.

### **3.4 Paramilitary**

Paramilitary force could be defined as groups or entities that might be distinct from the military forces, yet it resembles the ground force branches in the sense of organization, some equipment and training.<sup>20</sup> Paramilitary forces might be under the command of the police such the Central Security Forces in Egypt or directly commanded by the President.<sup>21</sup> These forces are properly trained, yet are dominantly used for specific types of warfare such as counter-terrorism, riot control or providing security for executive officials who do not trust the military.<sup>22</sup>

Some successful instances of coups d'état recorded the involvement of the paramilitary forces such as the case in the Turkish 1980 coup. However, there were no successful instances that were fully executed by the paramilitary force in the presence of a standing military institution from the year 1980-2013. The only exception was found in the coup case of Lesotho in 1986, and by 1986 the paramilitary force of Lesotho was the only active coercive apparatus besides the police force in Lesotho.

### **3.5 Police**

Police is a civilian constituted body of the law and the state that aims at enforcing the law, protecting property and limiting civil disorder. To do so, they have legitimate

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<sup>18</sup> Milan Vego, *Naval Strategy and Operations in Narrow Seas* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999), 111.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 111-112.

<sup>20</sup> Judith McCloskey and Harold Johnson, *Balkans Security: Current and Projected Factors Affecting Regional Stability* (Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing, 2000), 9.

<sup>21</sup> Anthony Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 185.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 185-186.

use of force. In some states, like Egypt, the police might have under its commands special forces or paramilitary forces.<sup>23</sup> In other cases, it is an independent body from other service branches. The assistance of the police would be a bonus for coup execution and success; yet, it is not a decisive factor due to the presence of stronger coercive bodies such as the other military service branches and paramilitary forces.

#### **4. Thesis Overview**

The work is presented in self-contained chapters. Chapter 2 would present the thesis's theoretical framework. This framework would conceptualize a three-level processes associated with military coups as wells as proposing different theoretical hypotheses that address the variations in coup coordinator's behavior at the moment of recruiting the coup associates. In chapter 3, I would present the new coup agency dataset and utilize it to check the validity of the hypotheses proposed in chapter 2.

The fourth chapter would introduce two successful moments of mixed military coup that took place in Thailand 1991 and Turkey 1980. Both cases would illustrate the different processes and hypotheses proposed in chapter 2 and later tested in chapter 3.

The fifth chapter would present two successful moments of infantry coups that took place in Haiti 1991 and Niger 2010. These two cases had different coordination levels as well as different pre-coup statuses. These cases would give examples on how infantry coups are evaluated, coordinated and executed in two distinct circumstances with regards to the presence/absence of social unrest.

The case selection for chapter 4 and 5: the cases of Turkey 1980, Thailand 1991, Haiti 1991, and Niger 2010 was designed to encompass several aspects to accurately represent the studied sample in the new dataset. First, the case selection covered different case studies that represent the geographical distribution of the sample in the three continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Second, the selected cases studies covered the studied timeframe from 1980 as in the case of Turkey, 1991 as in the case of Haiti and Thailand and 2010 as in the case of Niger. Third, the case selection covered different regime types such as constitutional monarchies as in the case of Thailand or republican systems such as the case in the other cases. Finally, the case selection regarded social unrest as a determinant factor in explaining the different coup agency formation, and by extension, showed how and why a specific coup type was influenced by either the presence or absence of social unrest.

Finally the sixth chapter would conclude the thesis through offering a summary to the quantitative and qualitative research applied in the thesis. In addition, it would signify the importance of studying the military agency in studying civil-military relations in general and coup d'états in specific as well as addressing limitations of the thesis.

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<sup>23</sup> Anthony Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*. 185.

## Chapter 2

### Theory

Edward Luttwak regarded the coup as a battle in which a segment of the state apparatus would infiltrate and oust the regime incumbent through applying tactical techniques.<sup>24</sup> These techniques included controlling the capital, transportation facilities and others. This tactical perspective is outstanding in terms of understanding how coups are executed; yet it is still insufficient to highlight how coups are plotted. Eric Nordlinger perceived a coup as an indicator of some state apparatuses' dissatisfaction with the regime incumbent. According to this perspective, a coup is a form of a referendum instigated by those who intervene in politics to protect their own interests represented in the preservation of institutions, class or authorities.<sup>25</sup> However, this perspective merely tells us something about the motives of the coup and lacked elaboration on the process through which motives such as the protection of interests were translated into a collective action through which a coup is ultimately executed. This thesis oversees the coup as a process that starts with an opportunity exploited by the coup plotter. This opportunity, in order to be fully exploited, should be studied and evaluated by the plotters if they are to succeed. After the evaluation process comes the coordination process that entails the procedures and tactics used by the plotters for the sake of organization. Later comes the execution that is accomplished by the illegal ouster of the regime incumbent through the usage of force. Within these processes, several variations exist and I argued that one these variations, the presence/absence of social unrest can have an impact on the coup agency formation and by extension on the coup type.

#### Step 1: Evaluation

A coup d'état is a zero-sum game; it can either bring the coup plotters to power, or it can result in their imprisonment, dismissal, exile and sometimes death.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, plotters, to ensure the highest probability of success, first engage themselves in an evaluation process. This process is intended to acquire knowledge about the strength/weakness of the regime. Holger Albrecht argued that plotters wait for a moment of fragility that provides them with a window of opportunity through which they can operate and oust the regime incumbent.<sup>27</sup> This moment of fragility could be caused by an uprising, general grievance among the armed forces, civil war, death of

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<sup>24</sup> Edward Luttwak, *Coup D'Etat: a Practical Handbook*, 12.

<sup>25</sup> Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coup and Governments* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977), 78.

<sup>26</sup> Jonathan Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D'etat," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 55, No. 6 (2012): 1019.

<sup>27</sup> Holger Albrecht, "The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coup d'états in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013," *Armed Forces and Society*, (2014): 5.

the regime incumbent or other forms that would give a reason for military personnel to intervene in politics. This intervention is “legitimate” according to the coup plotters, as they consider the armed forces as a “bulwark against chaos and instability.”<sup>28</sup> A hypothesis was introduced by Clayton Thyne stated that the likelihood of coups is directly proportional to the regime fragility.<sup>29</sup> As the regime grows weaker, plotters would have a tendency to make use of this weakness through waiting for the right moment to execute. When the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra interfered with the courts and legislature in 2006, he sparked a social grievance within both the armed forces and the judicial power in Thai. This grievance was further amplified when Shinawatra challenged other opposition parties causing an electoral anarchy; some of these parties refused to take part in the parliamentary election.<sup>30</sup> This chaotic environment could tempt some military personnel to become coup plotters, and this temptation is dependent on the increased probability of the success of the coup that is also dependent on how fragile the regime is. In 2006 Thailand, the military evaluated the anarchy, knew that the regime is ineffective, and made use of the opportunity to oust Shinawatra.

Another form of regime fragility was noticed in Niger by 2009 when President Mamadou Tandja, a former military officer who participated in the 1974 coup in Niger, considered changing the constitution. This change, at that time, entailed allowing the president to run for a third term. On the other hand, the Nigerien constitution only allowed the president to run for two terms.<sup>31</sup> Opposition went to the streets, and Tandja was announced as a dictator. This constitutional crisis decreased the legitimacy of Tandja, and by extension weakened his regime. Plotters considered this weakness as a window of opportunity to oust Tandja. In February 2010, while Tandja was meeting his cabinet, soldiers stormed into the presidential palace and captured the president.<sup>32</sup> Soon after that, plotters declared on television that they reacted to end the corrupted regime of Tandja and to end the tense political situation. The Nigerien coup of 2010 and the Thai coup of 2006 support the argument proposed by Albrecht, Thyne and Marinov that plotters engage themselves in an evaluation process to evaluate the strength/weakness of the regime. Upon that evaluation, they would react whether to execute the coup or to abort/delay their plans. Incidences of

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<sup>28</sup> Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 44, No.4 (2013): 802

<sup>29</sup> Clayton Thyne, “Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitations? The Effect of U.S. Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960—99,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 47, No.4 (2010): 450.

<sup>30</sup> Koompong Noobankong, “Rakadamnoen Avenue: Thailand’s transformative path towards modern polity” in *Transforming Asian Cities: Intellectual Impasse, Asianizing Space, and emerging translocalities*, edited by Wing-shing Tang and Nihal Perera (New York: Routledge, 2013), 47.

<sup>31</sup> Amy McKenna, *The History of Western Africa* (New York: Britannica Educational Learning, 2011), 171.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 172.

weakness presented in 2006 Thailand and 2010 Niger emphasize that the plotters managed to exploit the turmoil in their respective countries to plan their moves.

## **Step 2: Coordination**

As a tactical move, there is an aspect of coordination involved in the coup process. Naunihal Singh emphasized that the whole coup process is based on what he called as a “Coordination Game”.<sup>33</sup> In this game, individuals are motivated to do what others are interested to do. Consequently, the choices of these individuals are dependent on the beliefs that others would choose the same. Plotters react the same way; they would want to convince as many military actors as they need of the coup’s success. How? Through generating common knowledge that the coup is essentially a fait accompli, by common knowledge it is meant that officers know the potential success of the coup and that officers know that other officers know that the coup would be a success and has the support of the majority of the armed forces’ personnel and by extension self-neutralize themselves from either opposing or supporting the coup. To set an example, military coup plotters know that they have hard power in terms of arms, and they know that the targeted regime incumbent represented by the president does not have sufficient arms to stand a chance against the plotters. What is most important for the plotters at this moment is not how they would storm into the presidential palace, as at this moment, the president would have a low chance of resistance and would most likely surrender. On the contrary, what is most important for the plotters before execution is to guarantee minimal resistance from those who are capable of resisting them such other military actors who might be loyalists and have enough arms and men to resist the coup plotters and terminate their plans. Here comes the role of coordination, through guaranteeing sufficient military capability for a successful coup execution. In addition, Coup plotters tend to convince the military actors that the success of the coup is inevitable, and make it really clear that any potential resistance would be minor and would be severely punished by the plotters. Through this coordination, plotters guarantee the neutralizations of those whom they fear most.

The consequences of incoordination might be severe and could result in the failure of the coup and a fatal fate for the plotters. Incoordination can result in what is called as “coordinated attack problem”.<sup>34</sup> This problem is a consequent of miscommunication between potential plotters and those who might resist or support them. An example to the coordinated attack problem would be the coup attempt of Spain in 1981. Plotters thought that seizing control over the Cortes and the strategic locations in Madrid would compel other officers to either join them or stay neutral and that the coup would be a fait accompli.<sup>35</sup> The plotters had an illusion that a swift control over the capital would be sufficient. The main reason behind the failure of this

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<sup>33</sup> Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2014), 6.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>35</sup> Barabara Geddes, “WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION AFTER TWENTY YEARS?,” *Annual Review Political Science* 2, (1999): 128.

coup was of a coordination nature and in fact it was the coordinated attack problem. How? The plotters did not generate sufficient common knowledge that their coup would be a success and focused more on seizing symbolic structures. This gave time to the king to call other officers who were able to resist the plotters. These actors of resistance would not have had intervened if they knew well enough that they stand no chance against the plotters. In addition, the king was able to generate a common knowledge through his resistance to the plotters. This common knowledge, generated by the king, led to the belief that other officers would more likely support the king. In addition, each officer knew that each officer is more likely to support the king. This led to the failure of the coup and a famous quote was said by one of the plotters: “next time, cut the king’s phone line”.<sup>36</sup> The essence of coordination is dependent on several factors, two of which are common knowledge and the generator of this common knowledge. In other words, the higher status the generator of the common knowledge is, the more credited it would be as in the case of king Juan Carlos of Spain in 1981. King Carlos was able to generate more credible common knowledge that shaped the expectation of officers in the military institution. In turn, this expectation led to the failure of the plotters in 1981.

Understanding this step in terms of a coordination game led to a three level analysis, according to Naunihal Singh. These three levels are associated with the status of main military coup coordinator/plotter. Singh classified the coordination levels as follows: coups coordinated from the top, from the middle and from the bottom.

## **2.1 Coordinators from the Top**

Coordinators from the top are believed to have the highest rate of success, as 68% of the coups that were coordinated by plotters from the top ranks of the armed forces were a success.<sup>37</sup> These plotters have the greatest amount of influence within the military institution due to their influential posts in the military institution. Their military posts empower them with exclusive privileges within the military institution that can include: an access to intelligence about the reactions of the different ranks of armed forces with regards to any incident, the ability to disseminate information that they want to spread on purpose within the ranks of the armed forces, and finally the ability to shape expectations for other officers before the coup in instigated.<sup>38</sup> The third aspect is quite important as it leads to the generation of common knowledge favorable to the plotters incase the plotters were from the top. The third aspect is interlinked with the execution, as plotters from the top are dependent on the middle-ranked officers for the sake of executing the coup. Yet before execution, these middle-ranked officers must be convinced through common knowledge that the coup

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<sup>36</sup> Barabra Geddes, “WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION AFTER TWENTY YEARS?,”128.

<sup>37</sup> Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power*, 79.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

has a high success rate, other wise, they might not risk executing an illegal act such as a coup.

## **2.2 Coordinators from the Middle**

Coordinators from the middle represent the middle ranked officers; officers who are in direct command of fighting and armed units. These units can vary from squads to brigades. The distinctive aspect of these coordinators is that these groups tend to be cohesive as a unit on its own, as these units are trained, equipped and mobilized separately from other units.<sup>39</sup> These coordinators' ability of generating expectations and by extension common knowledge to other fellow officers is more dependent on firepower. This is why they would tend to act in secret and start generating expectations within the execution process through seizing control over strategic centers such as T.V and Radio. After they capture these centers, they would generate common knowledge and proclaim a large support for the coup on one hand, and on the other warn potential loyalists that they do not stand a chance of resistance. It is noteworthy to highlight that that the success rate of coordinators from the middle to stage successful coups is 48% in comparison to 68% of coups instigated from the top.<sup>40</sup>

## **2.3 Coordinators from Bottom**

Coordinators from the bottom represent the low-ranked officers such as junior officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted/conscripted men. These coordinators lack the extensive influence of the top-rank officers and the restricted influence of middle-ranked officers. Their motives for coups are primarily instigated due to low salaries or unbearable working conditions.<sup>41</sup> Their ability to conspire is minimal as they meet in large numbers in barracks, and they are always afraid of attracting attentions. This is why they tend to conspire in parties or other social events such as birthdays or weddings to avoid attentions. The ability of these coordinators to generate common knowledge of the coup success is limited. This is why coordinators from the bottom face harsh resistance from loyalists or other officers who reject the coup, as every officer knows that every officer is more likely to stand with the regime.<sup>42</sup> The success of these coordinators is dependent on the outcome of the battles with the loyalists and coup resistance. It is important to highlight that these coordinators have the lowest rate of success, as only 32% of the coup attempts made by coordinators from the bottom were a success.

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<sup>39</sup> Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power*, 108.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 148.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 150.



### **Step 3: Execution**

The step that comes after evaluation and coordination is the coup's execution process. This step is the main tactical move staged by the plotters to transform the plans they already evaluated and coordinated into actions. These moves are composed of the following stages:

#### **3.1 Neutralizing the Armed Forces**

As illustrated in the Spanish case of 1981, the risk of encountering resistance from other fellow officers in the armed forces might result in a fatal destiny for the plotters. Therefore, plotters have a tendency to neutralize the armed forces through identifying the key leaders of important squads or command centers that can intervene and resist the coup plotters.<sup>43</sup> The neutralization could be either active or passive. Passive neutralization takes place when there is a common knowledge of the coup success within the armed forces. This knowledge would entail other military actors would self-neutralize themselves from acting against the plotters due to a belief or an illusion that they do not stand a chance against the organized coup plotters. On the other hand, the active form of neutralization takes place when the coup plotters neutralize any resistance to the coup plans through the usage of force. Active neutralization could also take bloodless forms such as seizing the armed forces high command centers to avoid the generation of counter-common knowledge by the loyalists.

#### **3.2 Neutralizing the Police and Paramilitary Forces**

In order to neutralize these forces, coup plotter have to assess the strength of both the police and paramilitary forces with regards to their numbers, stations, and equipment. Later, the plotters should assess the loyalty of these forces through its attachment to the regime.<sup>44</sup> In case the paramilitary forces and police have enough equipment to make the coup a failure, there would be a need to neutralize them with the same means used by the army through occupying their stations, communications and command centers. Yet, usually, these forces are quite bureaucratic due to their long chains of commands and would most probably stay in their barracks posing no threat to the coup plotters.<sup>45</sup>

#### **3.3 Controlling Mass Media and Tele-communications**

Controlling these facilities by the plotters is important due to two factors. First, it helps the coup plotters to make a fact that the coup is already a success, and this fact is quite important to neutralize potential resistance from other officers to new incumbents. Second, plotters would be in a position to isolate the regime incumbents

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<sup>43</sup> Michael E. Tigar, *Thinking About Terrorism: The Threat to Civil Liberties in Times of National Emergency* (Chicago: ABA Publishing, 2007), 34.

<sup>44</sup> Edward Luttwak, *Coup D'Etat: a Practical Handbook*, 93.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.



from either rallying support from outside the country or inside it at the moment of the coup through using communicational assets.<sup>46</sup>

### **3.4 Neutralizing Political Actors and Power Centers**

Neutralizing political actors and power centers could be represented in arresting the president or the authority figure, put his/her political advisors under arrest and arresting trade unions' and regime's figureheads.<sup>47</sup> Taking over political power centers such as the presidential palace, the cabinet house and parliament has another symbolic mean that is the triumph of the plotters over the regime.

### **3.5 Controlling Roads to and out of the Capital**

Plotters tend to avoid the escape of state executives. Controlling the roads of the capital allows the plotters to arrest the regime executives in case they fled their houses or offices. Controlling roads is usually done simultaneously while taking over telecommunications in order not to allow any of the regime executives to contact other loyalists in person or through any other means.<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the presence of tanks during a coup in the streets and square implies the success of the coup plotters in controlling the city and give a general symbol to the coup plotters that their attempt was a success.<sup>49</sup>

### **3.6 Controlling Airports and other Transportation Facilities**

Controlling airports and other transportations facilities represents the supremacy of the coup plotters in controlling the flow of individuals to the major cities. These facilities are the means of fast transportation that can either bring loyalist troops to the capital loyalist troops or offer an escape window for the ousted regime executives.<sup>50</sup> Almost at all the instances of successful military coup, airports or even navy ports were occupied and all trips were cancelled till further notice. Why? These transportation facilities could lead to information leaks by travellers, and this information leak might threaten the success of the coup, therefore, the plotters tend to establish strict control over these facilities until the plotters' control over the state is ensured.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Catherine Conaghan, *Fujimori's Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere* (Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 28.

<sup>47</sup> Kees Konnings and Dirk Kruijt, *Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy* (London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 24.


<sup>48</sup> Edward Luttwak, *Coup D'Etat: a Practical Handbook*, 122-123.

<sup>49</sup> Ali Rahnama, *Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 218.

<sup>50</sup> Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power*, 110-111.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

The three processes introduced above are the theoretical processes through which a military coup d'état is successfully executed. These processes could be illustrated as follows:



#### 4. Contributing to the Theory

The theoretical approach mentioned above has been previously discussed by Singh, Albrecht, Marinov and Geddes. My aim is to contribute to theory through introducing a better understanding to the coordination process. An elaborate analysis of the coordination process can show us how different coup types happen. I would argue that there are two major military coup types: mixed coup and infantry coup. As previously mentioned in chapter 1, theoretically, members of the ground forces are the normal coup plotters as they have sufficient training and equipment to accomplish the objectives of a successful coup, and that what is quite puzzling is mixed coups. I assumed that the answer lies in the network of the coup coordinator. If a coup coordinator has the ability to liaise between different service branches in the presence of a persuasive factor such as social unrest, it would be more likely that he utilizes his network of connections to ensure that the coup is a fait accompli.

Although the coup coordinator might not tactically need members from different service branches, he would need to neutralize these service branches for a smooth execution process. By extension, if there were an option for the coup coordinator to neutralize these secondary service branches through co-opting members of these service branches into the coup plot, the coup coordinator would choose it to ensure a successful execution process. In case the coup coordinator did not co-opt members of these secondary service branches, then he would have to neutralize them through the

use of coercive means as what took place in the case of Pakistan in 1999. When General Musharaf was unable to co-opt the navy and air force commanders mainly due to his limited influence as the commander of ground forces. Musharaf had to make sure that the military high command and the commanders of the other service branches were neutralized, therefore a part of his forces were ordered to detain the commanders of the other service branches to avoid transforming his coup into a civil war between different branches.<sup>52</sup>

The next section is dedicated to provide a theoretical understanding on how mixed and infantry coup agency formation could be created.

## 5. Mixed Coups

A mixed coup is a coup instigated by military personnel who have different affiliations with regards to their service branches. I presume that mixed coups are contributed to three aspects:

- First, the ability of the main coup coordinator to liaise among coup from different service branches.
- Second, if the coup is preceded by a moment of social unrest.
- Third, the presence of different service branches within the armed forces

The ability of the main coup coordinator to influence other coup plotters from different service branches could be measured by the amount of influence he possesses within the armed forces. If we applied this method to the coordinators' level, we would find that coordinators from the top possess the highest level of influence within the armed forces. Why? Because these coordinators are the general commanders of the armed forces, which mean that they can command more than one service branch at the same time. In addition, they can summon the commanders of these different service branches to meetings where the general commander can propose his coup plans. Consequently, I would assume that coordinators from the top are more likely to coordinate mixed coups than their counterparts from the middle/bottom due to their extensive network that can reach different service branches As for coordinators from the middle/bottom, they would be less likely to coordinate with potential coup plotters from different service branches merely because their networks is usually restricted to their fighting battalions and in the best-case scenario to other fighting battalions within their respective service branch.

However, the ability to liaise between different service branches is one thing, and the ability to convince and influence these different officers who belong to different service branches is another. Even though if a coordinator from the top is the general commander of the armed forces, he could still risk rejection from his subordinates with regards to his coup plans, as the coup is after all an illegal act. Therefore, I

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<sup>52</sup> Sanjay Dutt, *Inside Pakistan: 52 Years Outlook* (New Delhi: A.P.H Publishing, 2000), 63.

suggested that the presence of social unrest could be regarded as a persuasive tool used by a coordinator (who can liaise between different service branches) to convince his fellow coup plotters of the need of this illegal act to restore social peace.

The state of social unrest could be represented in several aspects that generate a general grievance or defiance against the regime. It can be represented in popular uprisings, organized mass protests, civil wars, the sudden death of an authoritarian president and other aspects that can disturb the social peace within the boundaries of a certain state. If this state of social unrest existed, the military coup coordinator can use it to convince potential coup plotters to stand as a “bulwark against the chaos” caused by social unrest.

Due to the impetuous nature of social unrests, the coup coordinator would need to act spontaneously. In other words, he must have the ability to evaluate fast, coordinate fast and execute fast. So who can accomplish these objectives efficiently within the armed forces? I would again assume that coordinators from the top are more likely to react spontaneously than their counterparts from the middle/bottom. These coordinators have enough assets due to their military privileges that enable them to acquire information about the state of social unrest before any of their counterparts. This information could help them to evaluate efficiently, and to represent their coup plans to their subordinates based on credited information in the coordination process. On the contrary, coordinators from the middle/bottom would relatively need more time to organize themselves. As they would relatively need time to evaluate instant moments of social unrest, and even a longer time to liaise between potential coup plotters.

Finally, mixed coups are based on the presence of different service branches within the armed forces. If a given country does not possess service branches such as air force or navy, then officers from different service branches would not exist in the first place. By extension, any military coup that might happen in these countries would be an infantry coup. For example, the Maldives only possesses what they call the defense forces (Ground Forces) and has no records of other service branches such as air force or navy.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, any military coup/coup attempt that took place or will take place in the Maldives would not be a mixed coup, unless the Maldives decided to change its military organizational and introduces navy and air force. This is to justify the need to consider the military organizational structure if we are to study coup types that are classified according to the same organizational structures.

Building on the mentioned assumption, two possible hypotheses could be induced on the condition that the given country possess other service branches rather than the ground forces:


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<sup>53</sup> *Maldives: Doing Business In Maldives For Everyone Guide* (Washington D.C: IBP, 2012), 19.

*Hypothesis 1: Coup plotters are more likely to include officers across service branches when the coup is preceded by social unrest, which represents a persuasive reason that tempts other potential coup plotters to engage in an illegal action such as a coup.*

*Hypothesis 2: Mixed coups are more likely to happen in case the coordinators are from the top of the armed forces due to the ability of the coordinator to liaise between different service branches.*

- Mixed coups could be illustrated as follows:



## 6. Infantry Coups

Infantry coups, like mixed coups, are a product of a specific coordination level, which is in this case a coordination of an exclusive nature among military actors from the ground forces. This exclusiveness is the distinctive nature of infantry coups that differentiate them from other coup types. Infantry coups could only happen in the following cases

- First, if the coup is taking place in a country that has no air force or navy, then the exclusivity of the coup agency is contributed to absence of other service branches.
- Second, if the coup is taking place in a country that has air force and navy, then the exclusivity of the coup agency would be either:

- Intentional: coordinators can influence other service branches, yet chose to act exclusively without the involvement of other service branches.
- Unintentional: coordinators lack the power to influence other service branches, and it was their only option to act alone.

I am willing to investigate here the execution of infantry coups with regards to the second scenario, as in the first scenario there is no option of a mixed coup unless their armed forces included different service branches.

### **6.1 The Intentional Scenario:**

In this scenario, the main coup's coordinator has the ability to influence other service branches such as navy or air force, yet he would choose his coup associates from a specific branch that is the ground forces. Why? There would be an infinite number of reasons that might prompt these coordinators to be selective. For instance, if there were no persuasive reason that can convince the potential coup plotters from other service branch to join the coup, henceforth, why would the coordinator risk unveiling his plans to whom he cannot convince? A second possible reason could be trust; in other words, the main coup coordinator would only generate common knowledge of his coup plans to men whom he trusts. Both examples could entail all the coordination levels, top-middle-bottom, depending only on the ability of the coordinator to influence other service branches that is more likely to be the case with coordinators from the top.

### **6.2 The Unintentional Scenario:**

This scenario entails that the coordinator is unable to influence other service branches due his limited sphere of influence within the armed forces. If that is the case, then we will have to exclude the coordinators from the top and focus only one those coordinators who have limited or no influence such as the coordinators from the middle or the bottom.

Would infantry coups take place at a moment of social unrest? It depends on depends on the ability of the coordinators to make use of the instant common knowledge; to evaluate fast, coordinate fast and execute fast. I assumed before that coordinators from the top such as the Minister of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff are more likely to make use of this unpredicted action such as social unrest. However, this does not mean that coordinators from the middle/bottom cannot make use of social unrest and execute successful coups. However, it is more likely that coordinators from the middle or the bottom be selective and exclude other service branches due to their restricted influence.

Would infantry coups take place when there is no social unrest? I would assume that coup coordinators, regardless of their coordination level, would be less likely to include officers from different service branches due to the absence of a persuasive


reason such as the state of social unrest, which by extension can convince these variety of officers to engage in an illegal act such as coups.

Building on this argument I would assume the following two hypotheses on the condition that the given country possess other service branches rather than the ground forces:

*Hypothesis 3: Coup plotters are more likely to exclude officers across service branches when the coup is not preceded by social unrest.*

*Hypothesis 4: Infantry coups are more likely to be coordinated from the middle or the bottom of the armed forces due to the limited ability of these coordinators to influence other service branches.*

- Infantry coups could be illustrated as follows:



## 7. Operational Definitions:

- *The Military*: An institution whose cohesiveness is dependent on the nature of the interactions among its military members who have different affiliations with regards to their service branches.
- *Military Coup D'état*: a process that starts with an opportunity evaluated the coup coordinator who exploits the opportunity to coordinate among his coup associates for the sake of the illegal ouster of the regime incumbent through the usage of force.
- *Successful Military Coup D'état*: The illegal ouster of a regime for at least one week by the military coup plotters.<sup>54</sup>
- *Mixed Military Coup*: a coup d'état instigated by military personnel whose coup agency formation includes at least one officer from a different service branch.
- *Infantry Coup*: a coup d'état instigated exclusively by members of the ground forces without any involvement of military personnel from other service branches.
- *Military Coup Plotter Agency*: the affiliation of a coup plotter to a certain service branch within the armed forces.
- *Social Unrest*: incidents triggered by a combination of deteriorating living standards such as income inequalities, economic backwardness, lack of political freedoms, alienation of certain segments within the society from certain rights and the lack of political accountability and representation.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 48, No. 2 (2011), 252.

<sup>55</sup> Timo Baher and Mika Aaltola, "The Arab Uprising 76," *FIIA* 76, (2011), 2.



## Chapter 3

### Military Coup Agency Dataset

This chapter would address a new dataset on coup agency to check the validity of the hypotheses assumed in the previous chapter. This dataset is a derivative of “the instances of coup/ coup attempt” dataset introduced by Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne. Both authors gathered significant data on global instances of coup d’état starting from the year 1950. The new data would identify the coup agency formation of each military coups d’état across the data from the year 1980 till 2013 according to Powell and Thyne’s dataset. In the next section, I would present how Powell and Thyne’s conceptualized coups d’état, coup’s success versus failure and coup coordinators. Later on, I would show how the new dataset utilized these conceptualizations. And finally, I would offer an overview of the new dataset as well as testing the hypotheses assumed in the previous chapter.

#### 1.1 Coup

Powell and Thyne conceptualized coup as the instance of ousting the chief executives of the regime through the illegitimate use of force.<sup>56</sup> This conceptualization allowed the author to differentiate between coups and less extreme actions that target the political leadership. For instance, Nepalese police personnel revolted on their superiors in 2008 due to humiliating nutrition conditions. This event could be merely described as a mutiny not as a coup. Why? Because the chief executive Prime Minister Girija Koirala was never challenged or forced to resign by the mutineers.<sup>57</sup> Another example was in the case of Argentina in 1959; the military pressured the president at that time, Arturo Frondizi to impose harsh measures in 1959 that led to an increasing social grievance against the President. In addition, the military high command called for the resignation of his cabinet afterwards. This instance was not coded as a coup, for President Frondizi was able to secure his office due to successful economic reforms that gained the consent of the citizens. In addition, the military did not remove him through the use of coercive means.<sup>58</sup> For Powell and Thyne, a coup/coup attempt is conditioned by the illegality of the coup action. In other words, the act of ousting the chief executives should be an illegal act. This condition permitted the authors to distinguish between coups and political pressures as a chief executive might be legally ousted if a parliament or a court legislated the removal of the chief executive. For instance, in 2009 Honduras, the Supreme Court made a constitutional order that obligated the military to arrest President Manuel Zelaya.<sup>59</sup> This instance, according to the authors, should not be

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<sup>56</sup> Jonathan Powell, and Clayton Thyne, “Global Instances of Coupst,” 250.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 250.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 250

<sup>59</sup> Allan Randolph and Brewer Carias, *Dismantling Democracy in Venezuela: The Chávez Authoritarian Experiment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2.

considered as a coup, as the ouster of President Zelaya was based on a legal framework. Therefore by adding the illegality aspect to instances of ousting executives, one can differentiate between instances of coup/coup attempt and political pressures or judicial sentences that also might lead to the ouster of the regime incumbent.

## 1.2 Coup Coordinator

For Powell and Thyne, coup coordinator is a category that might include civilian, military or mercenary actors who participate in the coup process as long as the coordinator is a part of the state apparatus.<sup>60</sup> Identifying the plotters in such a way allowed the authors to have three advantages. First, it allowed them to exclude coups d'état from other anti-regime actions. For instance, a popular uprising or a revolution could be instigated by members who are not necessarily a part of the regime and still oust the regime. If the definition of the coup perpetrators is broad enough to include actors outside the regime, as Janowitz had suggested before by stating that the perpetrators need only to be organized, then domestic actions such as popular uprisings or a revolution could be conflated with coups.<sup>61</sup> Second, this conceptualization does not conflate between coups and radical changes enforced by international powers. For instance, the Iranian coup of 1953 was unlikely to happen without the endorsement of the CIA, yet it was Iranian agents within the state apparatus who executed the coup, and this is why it was counted as a coup. On the other hand, the U.S invaded Iraq in 2003, yet this instance did not constitute a coup because the foreign powers were the primary actors who ousted the regime. Third, widening the definition of a coup coordinator to include non-military actors would avoid potential biasness contributed to a narrow perspective on coup coordinators that is only limited to military actors.<sup>62</sup>

## 1.3 Coup Success/Failure

Some coups attempts were instantly put down by loyalist forces on their onset. These attempts were easily coded as failures due to instant counter-attack of the loyalists on the coup plotters. Other instances were coded as a coup attempt, and were not put down instantly such as the case in the U.S.S.R in 1991; the plotters were able to successfully depose Gorbachev for 3 days, yet ultimately they were defeated. Conceptualizing a coup's success/failure is academically debatable due to the arguments over what stands for a coup's success or failure. Consequently, the authors preferred to conceptualize the coup's success using a definition that was commonly agreed upon in the academic hemisphere. This definition was introduced by William Thompson and it argued that a coup could be counted as a success if the post-coup

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<sup>60</sup> Jonathan Powell, and Clayton Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups," 251.

<sup>61</sup> Mauris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Countries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 49.

<sup>62</sup> Jonathan Powell, and Clayton Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups," 251.

regime was able to survive for at least a week.<sup>63</sup> By extension, if this regime was incapable of surviving for at least 7 days, then the coup would be counted as a failure. Other scholars such as Rosemary O'Kane argued that coup's success or failure could be determined by the ability of the coup coordinators to install a government of their own choice.<sup>64</sup> For the authors, this measurement would be quite arbitrary, for it would be illogical to label a coup as a failure based on the plotter's failure or inability to install a government of their own choice. For instance, in 2005 Mauritania, the military coup plotters deposed El-Taya regime, and prevented any military member, including themselves from participating in politics or choosing the government.<sup>65</sup> If one applied O'Kane's perspective, then what took place in 2005 Mauritania would be counted as a coup attempt. Henceforth, the authors opted to use an empirical value to measure either success or failure. This value is counted in days to avoid arbitrary interpretations of coup success or failure that are based on qualitative understandings.

In the next section, I shall introduce the new dataset and how it was conceptualized.

## **2. The New Dataset**

The new dataset identifies the coup agency as a tool to apply an in-depth analysis to coups d'état. Different sources were used to gather the new dataset. These sources included national constitutions, autobiographies, news articles, and academic literature available on the respective instances of coups d'état. Although the new dataset is a derivative of the dataset introduced by Powell and Thyne, there are some noteworthy differences that I must state. First and foremost, the new dataset was limited only to 33 years, from 1980 till 2013, instead of the 63 as offered by Powell and Thyne. In addition, it selected only successful instances of coups d'état and that limited the dataset into 77 successful instances of coup d'état.

### **2.1 Data Gathering**

The new dataset was gathered through a case-by-case research on the 77 successful coup instances that took place from 1980-2013. This research was dependent on the availability of literature on each case. The literature used in research encompassed constitutions, national court sentences, newspaper articles, autobiographies, released intelligence documents, official reports by Ministries of Defense, United Nations Resolutions and secondary source that included books and academic journal articles. The research focused on gathering the following aspects:

- The name and ranks of the military coup plotter/plotters
- The coups' coordination level

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<sup>63</sup> William Thompson, *Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (California: SAGE, 1973), 6.

<sup>64</sup> Rosemary O'Kane, *The Likelihood of Coups* (Aldeshot: Avebury, 1987), 37.

<sup>65</sup> Jonathan Powell, and Clayton Thyne, "Global Instances of Coups," 252.

- Coordinated by a military coordinator from the top
- Coordinated by a military coordinator from the middle.
- Coordinated by a military coordinator from the bottom.
- The commanding post of the coup plotter/plotters at the instance of the coup, if existed.
- The affiliations of the military coup plotters' to a military service branch, if existed.
- The coup status: whether the coup was preceded by social unrest or not.

The next section would show how these aspects were conceptualized as well as the distinctions between the conceptualization of the new dataset versus the conceptualizations offered by Powell and Thyne.

## 2.2 Military Coup D'état

The conceptualization of the military coup d'état in the dataset is partially similar to the conceptualization of a coup d'état offered by Powell and Thyne in the sense that it is the instance of an illegal ouster of the chief executives. However, the new dataset conditioned that the coup instance must be plotted by at least one military actor. This condition was a necessity to differentiate military coups from other coup types. By extension, coups that were purely instigated by civilian or non-military actors were excluded. On the other hand, this exclusion does not mean that civilian or non-military coups are not as important as coups instigated by military actors. But this exclusion was applied to avoid conflating a military coup d'états with other coup types such as a paramilitary coup, police coup or palace coup. The exclusion was possible through analyzing the coup plotters' agency in the 77 instances of successful coup d'état from the year 1980-2013. Due to this exclusion, the number of cases decreased from 77 instances of successful coup d'état to 68 instances of successful military coup d'état. One of the excluded cases was the case of Qatar in 1995. The former Emir of Qatar Prince Hamed Bin Khalifa, deposed his father in 1995 in what was commonly considered as a palace coup. It was a coup evaluated, coordinated and executed by a royal family member with no records of any military intervention in the coup process. Emir Hamed took the advantage of his father's visit to Geneva in July 1995, and made a speech on the national T.V. that some circumstances forced him "to take the reins of power in the country".<sup>66</sup> The Qatari case was excluded due to the absence of the military coup agency regardless of the coup type. Another example is the successful coup instance of Lesotho in 1986. The coup was instigated by Major General Justin Lekhanya who ousted President Leabua Jonathan.<sup>67</sup> By the year 1986, Lesotho did not possess any regular military institution, and its security was dependent on its paramilitary force that was led by Major General Lekhanya at that

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<sup>66</sup> Patrick Cockburn, "Emir of Qatar Deposed by his Son," *The Independent*, June 28, 1995.

<sup>67</sup> Ian Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 192.

time.<sup>68</sup> This case was excluded due to the same reason for excluding the Qatari case that is absence of the military interference and coup agency, however the absence in this case is due to the absence of a military institution.

## **2.3 Successful Military Coup**

The conceptualization of the successful instance of military coup is similar to the conceptualization of the successful instance of coup by Powell and Thyne. The success/failure is conceptualized empirically; if the coup plotters were in a position to oust their predecessors and sustain the survival of their post-coup regime for 7 days, then the coup instance is a success. This empirical conceptualization helps in avoiding arbitrary qualitative understandings of coup success or failure. Limiting the new dataset to the successful instances of military coup d'état is a major limitation, however it was justified due to the availability of information on the coup agency at moments of successful military coup in comparison to moments of unsuccessful military coups.

## **2.4 Plotter/Coordinator**

The new dataset adopted a partial conceptualizing of the coup plotter/coordinator offered by Powell and Thyne, that the plotter should be a part of the state apparatus in order not to conflate coups d'état with other actions such as civil wars and revolutions. However, the new dataset conditioned that there must be at least one military coup plotter among the coup plotters. This limitation does not ignore or reduce the importance of civilian or non-military coup plotters, yet it only considers them when there is a military interference in any of the coup processes as a means of understanding the “military coup agency”.

## **2.5 Service Branches**

The service branches were classified into the universal service branches of the armed forces such as Ground Force, Navy and Air Force. In addition, the new dataset identified other semi-military service branches such as the paramilitary forces or coercive state apparatus such as the law enforcement forces.

## **2.6 Coordination Level**

The new dataset offered a categorization for the coup leader with regards to his military job description as a means to measure the coup plotter's/plotters' sphere of influence as discussed in the previous chapter and its effect on coup type formation.

### **2.6.1 Coordinators from the Top**

This category included only military coup leaders as Ministers of Defense or Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces. It was assumed in the previous chapter that only those who held these two posts have the highest levels of influence within the armed

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<sup>68</sup> *Africa South of the Sahara 2004* (London: Europa Publications, 2003), 585.

forces. This conceptualization had two advantages. First, it allows separating the two most influential posts in the armed forces that enable its holder the ability to liaise between different service branches, from other influential posts with less influence such as a service branch commander. Second, the new dataset avoided a hierarchical categorization that is dependent on the military rank; this is due to differences in universal military ranking. For instance, scholars such as Singh suggested that categorization could be done through categorizing the military ranks. Now let us consider, as Singh considered, plotters from the top as those senior officers who have the rank above the rank of a colonel.<sup>69</sup> This would make any plotter with the rank of a colonel or below a colonel a plotter from the middle or the bottom. Now let me apply this conceptualization to the coup case of Mauritania in 1980. The Mauritanian military institution did not offer any rank above the rank of a colonel before 2011.<sup>70</sup> In 1980, the colonel's rank was the highest military rank known in Mauritania. It was the minister of defense, Colonel Mohamed Haudallah who ousted El-Louly's regime.<sup>71</sup> If we applied a rank categorization to the case studies, then the case of Mauritania in 1980 would be coded as a case coordinated by a plotter of a middle rank, even though the coordinator in this case lies on the top of the military institution. Henceforth, the new dataset opted for a job description categorization such as the minister of defense or the chief of staff regardless of the plotter's rank.

### **2.6.2 Coordinators from the Middle and Bottom**

This category conceptualizes military coup coordinators who are not either Ministers of Defense or Joint Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces. This category as discussed in chapter 2 is less likely to be capable of liaising between different service branches. Yet, these coordinators possess more hard power than their counterparts from the top due to their direct contact with their fighting battalions. Both coordinators from the middle and the bottom were combined in one category as they share a restricted influence within the armed forces if compared to their counterparts from the top.

## **2.7 Social Unrest**

The new dataset conceptualized social unrest as a moment triggered by a combination of deteriorating living standards such as income inequalities, economic backwardness, lack of political freedoms, alienation of certain segments within the society from certain rights and the lack of political accountability and representation.<sup>72</sup> These reasons can instigate general resentment that is channeled into an intensified contagion effect. This contagion is facilitated by the shared resentment

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<sup>69</sup> Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*, 10

<sup>70</sup> "Ro'tbat Liwaa' Fi Mauritania baa't yihamlihaa' Thamana'yaa'" *Amjad*, March 28<sup>th</sup>, 2011.

<sup>71</sup> Harris Lentz, *Heads of States and Governments Since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 544.

<sup>72</sup> Timo Baher and Mika Aaltola, "The Arab Uprising 76," 2.

among society members and is translated from a personal resentment into a shared popular resentment. A spark might trigger this general grievance and transform it into a social rebellion such as a sudden death of an authoritarian incumbent who left behind a power gap, civil war, or minor incidents such as transformed into a catalyst for a wider scale rebellion such as the incident of Bou-Azizi in Tunisia. This conceptualization has two advantages. First, it encapsulates different factors that were discussed as preconditions of coups d'état by scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Luttwack. Second, this conceptualization avoids conflating coup instances preceded by social unrest with coup instances preceded by a relative political and social stability. The new dataset coded the moments of social unrest that preceded the coup instance, regardless of the coup type, through investigating the presence of any form of social unrest mentioned above on the condition that this form of social unrest lies within a timeframe of at least one year prior to the coup instance.

## 2.8 Instances of Mixed Coups


Instances of mixed coups were conceptualized as the coup instances that were plotted by a heterogeneous composition of military coup plotters who have different service branches. In case the composition of the military coup plotters included at least one plotter from a different service branch, then the coup plotters' composition is heterogeneous and by extension the coup is coded as a mixed coup.

## 2.9 Instances of Infantry Coups

Instances of infantry coups were conceptualized as the coup instances that were plotted by an exclusive composition of military coup plotter whose service branch is only related to the ground forces. In case the composition of the ground forces coup plotter did not include any plotters from other service branches, then the coup is coded as an infantry coup.

## 3. Dataset Overview

The data analysis covers 68 successful instances of coup d'état. 24 of which are successful instances of mixed coups and 44 cases are infantry coups. 68 cases were not restricted to certain geographic regions. The geographical distribution of the sample is as follows:






47 cases took place in Africa, 10 cases in Latin America and 11 cases in Asia. In addition, the dataset noticed no successful military coup instance in both North America and Europe from 1980-2013.

### 3.1 Coup Agency

The coup plotters' agency covers different service branches within the armed forces, law enforcement forces and paramilitary. The average percentage of coup plotters with regards to their affiliated service branches could be illustrated in the following diagram




90.2% is the average percentage of the ground forces' coup plotters in the successful instances of military coup d'état from 1980-2013. On the other hand, an average of 4.2% of coup plotters belonged to the air force. The navy coup plotters marked an average of 3.9%. As for the paramilitary forces' coup plotters, they scored an average of 1.6%. The coup plotters who came from the ranks of the law enforcement forces, police, scored an average 0.1%.

Only one service branch was able to score a 100% of coup plotters in some of the cases, this service branch was the ground forces, and these cases were coded as infantry coups. This analysis entails two hypotheses; first, ground forces are able to execute successful military coups d'états independently without involving other officers from other service branches. Second, other service branches such as air force and navy are less likely to execute successful military coups without the assistance of the ground forces. The above diagram showed an overall percentage of coup plotters



agency across service branches; however, the analysis of the main coup leader, the head of the coup plotters, showed a different percentage.





98.5% of the coup leaders were affiliated with ground forces in successful instances of military coup d'états; whereas only 1.5% was affiliated with the navy. The 1.5% represents the two cases of the island of Fiji in 2006 and 2000. The two coups were evaluated, coordinated and executed by the same military personnel admiral Frank Bainimarama.<sup>73</sup> It is remarkable to notice that no coup leader came from the ranks of the air force, navy, police or paramilitary in these successful instances of military coup d'état. An explanation to this note could lie in the inability of these service branches to fulfill the requirements of executing a coup efficiently as coup plotters from the ground forces. This efficiency has all long been a product of the military capability in terms of equipment and special training for each specific branch to accomplish certain objectives. How about the 1.5% scored by Navy? The explanation for the 1.5% scored by the Navy was due to the military post of the Fijian coup leader before the coup. Admiral Commodore Frank Bainimarama was appointed as the overall commander of the Fijian armed forces before the 2000 coup. This means that Admiral Commodore Bainimarama, regardless of his service branch, Navy, assumed control over the whole armed forces as a general commander.

As illustrated in the case of Fiji, the military post assumed by the coup leader could indicate his control over other service branches regardless of his primary service branch. This urged a need to analyze the coordination hierarchy in the dataset: whether coordination from the top, or coordination from the middle or bottom. The

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<sup>73</sup> John Henderson, "Pacific Island States," in *International Security and The United States: An Encyclopedia Volume 2*, edited by Karl R. DeRouen and Paul Bellamy (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2008), 578.

categorization of the main coup plotter status with regards to the 68 cases analyzed by the dataset could be illustrated as follows:




Across the 68 cases analyzed by the dataset, 42.6% of the cases, 29 cases, we coordinated by either the Joint Chief of Staff or the Minister of Defense. On the other hand, 57.4% of the cases, 39 cases, were coordinated by military personnel who ranged from service branches' commanders to non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The difference in both percentages was not sufficient to mark a correlation between successful coups and coordination hierarchy.

### 3.2 Coup Status

Instances of coups d'états were labeled by many scholars such as Luttwak, Huntington, and Derek Lutterbeck as a product of some preconditions such as


economic backwardness, political instability, authoritarian mode of governance, and other forms that can catalyze social unrest.<sup>74</sup> As a result it was crucial for the new dataset to check if there is a correlation between social unrest and the 68 cases.



63.2% of 68 cases were preceded by social unrest. On the contrary, only 36.8% were not preceded by any form of social unrest.

### 3.3 Coup Type

Military coups were classified in this dataset into mixed coups and infantry coups as discussed above. The categorization of the coup types could be illustrated in the following diagram:



64.7% of the cases are infantry coups with a number of 44 cases. Whereas mixed coup scored a 35.3% percent of the coup cases with a number of 24 cases.

## 4. Data analysis

Some assumptions were discussed theoretically in chapter two with regards to the influence of social unrest on the coordination class and by extension its impact on the coup type. These assumptions were crystallized in 4 hypotheses in the previous

<sup>74</sup> Edward Luttwak, *Coup D'Etat: a Practical Handbook*, 13-16.

chapter. This section would test the validity of the 4 theoretical hypotheses empirically through the successful military coup agency dataset from 1980-2013.


#### 4.1 Coup Status and Coordinator Class

Social unrest moments are moments of general grievance or defiance against the regime that might be caused due to various reasons. The variation of these reasons is not the core of this dissertation, yet what this dissertation is interested in is the absence or the presence of social unrest before the coup. In the previous chapter, I assumed that it is more likely for coordinators from the top to coordinate a coup at moments of social unrest (regardless of the coup type).

In order to check these two aspects, I generated a simple cross tabulation between coup status (whether the coup is preceded by social unrest or not preceded by any of the forms of the social unrest) and coordination class (whether the coordinator is from the top as the Minister of Defense /Joint Chief of Staff or from the bottom/middle to represent the rest of the military institution). The  $H_0$ , null hypothesis, for this cross tabulation is that coup status is not associated with the coup coordinator class. Whereas the  $H_1$ , the alternative hypothesis would assume that there is an association between the two variables:

- $H_0$ : There is no association between coup status and coordinator's class
- $H_1$ : There is an association between coup status and coordinator's class

Preceded Coup Status * Coordinator Class Cross tabulation					
			Coordinator Class		Total
			Coordinator from the Top	Coordinator from the Middle/Bottom	
Preceded Coup Status	Social Unrest	Count	27	16	43
		Expected Count	18.3	24.7	43.0
		% Within Preceded Coup Status	62.8%	37.2%	100.0%
		% Within Coordinator Class	93.1%	41.0%	63.2%
		% Of Total	39.7%	23.5%	63.2%
	No Social Unrest	Count	2	23	25
		Expected Count	10.7	14.3	25.0
		% Within Preceded Coup Status	8.0%	92.0%	100.0%
		% Within Coordinator Class	6.9%	59.0%	36.8%
		% Of Total	2.9%	33.8%	36.8%
Total			Count	29	68
			Expected Count	29.0	68.0
			% Within Preceded Coup Status	42.6%	100.0%
			% Within Coordinator Class	100.0%	100.0%
			% Of Total	42.6%	100.0%



Chi-Square Tests					
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.403 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction	17.228	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	22.088	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	19.118	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	68				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.66.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures		Value	Asymp. Std. Error <sup>a</sup>	Approx. T <sup>b</sup>	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.534			.000
	Cramer's V	.534			.000
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	.534	.088	5.133	.000 <sup>c</sup>
Ordinal by Ordinal	Spearman Correlation	.534	.088	5.133	.000 <sup>c</sup>
N of Valid Cases		68			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

62.8% of the coups preceded by social unrest, regardless of the coup type, were evaluated, coordinated and executed from the top. On the contrary, when the coup was not preceded by social unrest, the percentage of coordinators decreased by 54.8% (62.8% - 8%). As for coups coordinated from middle/bottom, it jumped to 92% in the absence of social unrest and decreased by 54.8% in the presence of social unrest.

The Chi-Square test,  $\chi^2$ , is used here to measure the significance degree of associating the two variables.  $\chi^2$  scored a value of 19.403 with a degree of freedom =1. The P-Value scored 0.0001, which explains a significant relation between the coup status and coordinator's class knowing that the P value is  $< 0.05$ . Testing the strength of a correlation between coup status and coordination class through Cramer's Phi resulted in the presence of a significant correlation between the coup status and coordination class with a value of 0.534 on a scale from 0 to 1.

Empirically, these results rejected  $H_0$  and validated  $H_1$ . There was a significant association between the coup status and the coups coordination level. There is an explanation behind these numbers, and its answer lies in the efficiency of the coup plotters to execute coups at moments of social unrest. The remarkable variation of percentages represents the efficiency of some coordinators to make use of these moments of social unrest due to their ability to evaluate and coordinate faster than in comparison to other coordinators.

Taking into consideration that both types of coordinators are able to coordinate at moments of social unrest; the answer would be coordinators from the top and this explains the 62.8% of coups coordinated from the top at moments of social unrest. Coordinators from the top can acquire sufficient information due to their military posts that enable them to efficiently evaluate, coordinate and execute spontaneously. On the other hand, coordinators from the middle/bottom would have needed longer time to evaluate and coordinate for the coup execution due to the restrictions they face while acquiring information or summoning potential coup plotters to coordination meetings in addition to potential resistance from the top at the moment of execution. These limitations could be faced by longer time intervals, which by extension enable

the coordinators from the middle/bottom to plan their moves efficiently. These limitations have indeed decreased the odds of coordinators from the middle/bottom to execute coups at moments of social unrest, as they scored 37.2% in comparison to 62.8% for coordinators from the top.

It is crucial to remark two points. First, these percentages do not question the ability of coordinators from bottom/middle to execute successful coups at moments of social unrest. Yet, it questioned the probability (whether it was more likely or less likely) of specific coordinators class to execute coups at moments of social unrest in a limited time frame from 1980-2013. Second, this study does not show those moments of social unrest influenced coup plotters, regardless of their military status, to initiate coups. However, this study analyzed the reason behind the differences in coordination level of coup instances that already took place at moments of social unrest.


## **4.2 Coup Type and Coup Status**

In the previous chapter, it was assumed that social unrest could be utilized by coup coordinators to convince coup plotters from different service branches on the condition that the main coup plotter has the ability to liaise between them. In this section, I shall assume the presence social unrest influenced the coup type (Infantry or Mixed Coups). In order to check any association between the two variables a simple cross tabulation is generated. I will assume  $H_0$  that there is no association between the two aspects. On the contrary, the alternative hypothesis would assume that there is an association between the two variables.

- $H_0$ : *There is no association between coup status and coup type.*
- $H_1$ : *There is an association between coup status and coup type.*

**Preceded Coup Status \* Coup Type Cross Tabulation**

			Coup Type		Total
			Infantry Coup	Mixed Coup	
Preceded Coup Status	Social Unrest	Count	19	24	43
		Expected Count	27.8	15.2	43.0
		% Within Preceded Coup Status	44.2%	55.8%	100.0%
		% Within Coup Type	43.2%	100.0%	63.2%
		% Of Total	27.9%	35.3%	63.2%
	No Social Unrest	Count	25	0	25
		Expected Count	16.2	8.8	25.0
		% Within Preceded Coup Status	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%
		% Within Coup Type	56.8%	0.0%	36.8%
		% Of Total	36.8%	0.0%	36.8%
Total		Count	44	24	68
		Expected Count	44.0	24.0	68.0
		% Within Preceded Coup Status	64.7%	35.3%	100.0%
		% Within Coup Type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% Of Total	64.7%	35.3%	100.0%





Chi-Square Tests					
	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.564 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	19.190	1	.000		
Likelihood Ratio	29.270	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	21.247	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	68				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.82.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures					
		Value	Asymp. Std. Error <sup>a</sup>	Approx. T <sup>b</sup>	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.563			.000
	Cramer's V	.563			.000
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	-.563	.066	-5.536	.000 <sup>c</sup>
Ordinal by Ordinal	Spearman Correlation	-.563	.066	-5.536	.000 <sup>c</sup>
N of Valid Cases		68			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

The cross tabulation entailed that 55.8% of the successful coups preceded by social unrest were mixed coup, between 1980 and 2013. On the contrary, when social unrest was not present no mixed coup took place. Whereas 44.2% of infantry coups were preceded by social unrest, and when it did not exist, this percentage jumped to reach a 100%. Testing the strength of a correlation between coup status and coordination class through Cramer's Phi resulted in the presence of a significant correlation between the coup status and coup type with a value of 0.563 on a scale from 0 to 1.

The Chi-Square,  $X^2$ , is used here to assess the significance of associating coup status to coup type. It scored a value of 21.564 with a degree of freedom=1. The P-Value score 0.00001 and this entails a significant association between the two variables knowing that  $P < 0.05$ .

These empirical results rejected  $H_0$  and validated  $H_1$  stating that there is a significant association between the pre-coup status and coup type. 55.8% of the coups preceded by social unrest were mixed coups, and 100% of these mixed coups took place at moments of social unrest. I assume that the presence of social unrest represents a persuasive tool that could be used by the coup coordinators to influence potential coup plotters from different service branch to join the coup as a means to


end the state of social unrest on condition that the coordinator is capable of liaising between these different service branches. In the previous chapter, I assumed that coordinators from the top could easily fulfill the requirement of leasing between different service branches due to their commanding posts as general commanders of the armed forces. Due to this assumption, I have performed a controlled cross tabulation, where I have controlled the presence of social unrest and excluded all the cases that were not preceded by social unrest. This test could show the association of coordination levels and coup types specifically at moments of social unrest to give an understanding to the occurrence of mixed coups only at specific moments of social unrest.

- $H_0$ : There is no association between coordination level and coup type at moments of social unrest.
- $H_1$ : There is an association between coordination level and coup type at moments of social unrest.

**L<sub>1</sub>**

**Coup Type \* Coordinator Class At Moments Of Social Unrest**

			Coordinator Class		Total
			Coordinator from the Top	Coordinator from the Middle/Bottom	
Coup Type	Infantry Coup	Count	6	13	19
		% Within Coup Type	31.6%	68.4%	100.0%
		% Within Coordinator Class	22.2%	81.3%	44.2%
	Mixed Coup	Count	21	3	24
		% Within Coup Type	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%
		% Within Coordinator Class	77.8%	18.8%	55.8%
Total	Count		27	16	43
	% Within Coup Type		62.8%	37.2%	100.0%
	% Within Coordinator Class		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% Of Total		62.8%	37.2%	100.0%



**L<sub>1</sub>**  
**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.194 <sup>a</sup>	1	.000		
Continuity Correction <sup>b</sup>	11.901	1	.001		
Likelihood Ratio	14.981	1	.000		
Fisher's Exact Test				.000	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	13.864	1	.000		
N of Valid Cases	43				

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.07.

b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

**L<sub>1</sub>**  
**Symmetric Measures**

		Value	Asymp. Std. Error <sup>a</sup>	Approx. T <sup>b</sup>	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	-.575			.000
	Cramer's V	.575			.000
Interval by Interval	Pearson's R	-.575	.125	-4.495	.000 <sup>c</sup>
Ordinal by Ordinal	Spearman Correlation	-.575	.125	-4.495	.000 <sup>c</sup>
N of Valid Cases		43			

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

c. Based on normal approximation.

The cross tabulation included 100% of the mixed coup instances and 56.8% of the infantry coup as these were the only instances that were preceded by social unrest. 21, 87.5%, out of 24 mixed coup instances were coordinated from the top, whereas 3, 12.5%, out 24 mixed coup instances were coordinated from the middle/bottom. On the contrary, infantry coups that were preceded by social unrest were mostly coordinated by coordinators from the middle/bottom with a percentage of 68.4%.

The Chi-Square,  $X^2$ , scored a value of 14.194 with a degree of freedom=1. The P-Value score 0.00001 and this entails a significant association between the two variables knowing that  $P < 0.05$ . Testing the strength of a correlation between coordination class and coup type through Cramer's Phi resulted in the presence of a significant correlation between the coup status and coup type with a value of 0.575 on a scale from 0 to 1.

This result rejects the null hypothesis and validates a significant relation between coordination class and coup type at moments of social unrest. These results showed how coordinators from the top were more likely to use social unrest as a persuasive reason to tempt potential coup plotters from different service branch. The odds for the coordinators from the top were higher than their counterparts from the middle/bottom as the later were only able to execute 3 out 24 mixed coups in comparison to the former who executed 21 out 24 mixed coups. I assume that the reason behind this variation is contributed to the capabilities of the coordinators to influence other service branches. In other words, because the network of the coordinators from the top exceeds a specific service branch, they had more chances in coordinating with different service branches, On the other hand, because of the limited network of coordinators from the middle/ bottom; they mainly recruited whom they can contact, even at moment of social unrest.


As for the infantry coups that took place at moments of social unrest, they were more likely to be coordinated from the middle/bottom as coordinators from the middle/bottom coordinated 68.4% of the infantry coups preceded by social unrest. The explanation for this likelihood lies in the limited network of these coordinators to liaise between different service branches in comparison to their superiors from the top. These coordinators would use their hard power through their direct contact with their fighting battalions and operate quickly at moments of social unrest before losing longer time to contact other service branches knowing of their limited chances to contact them.

It is worthy to mention that at moments of no social unrest, only infantry coups were executed. In the following cross tabulation, I have excluded all the cases that were preceded by moments of the social unrest and its results was as follows:

L<sub>2</sub>

**Coup Type \* Coordinator Class At Moments Of No Social Unrest**

			Coordinator Class		Total
			Coordinator from the Top	Coordinator from the Middle/Bottom	
Coup Type	Infantry Coup	Count	2	23	25
		% Within Coup Type	8.0%	92.0%	100.0%
		% Within Coordinator Class	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Mixed Coup	Count	0	0	0
		% Within Coup Type	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		% Within Coordinator Class	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	Count		2	23	25
	% Within Coup Type		8.0%	92.0%	100.0%
	% Within Coordinator Class		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% Of Total		8.0%	92.0%	100.0%



The reasons behind infantry coups at moments of no social unrest could be infinite. Some could be related to a personal grievance of a certain military general due to the survival of a certain business as the case in Bolivia in 1980.<sup>75</sup> Other infantry coups were executed because of the refusal of a general to be dismissed from the military

<sup>75</sup> Peter McFarren and Fabrique Iglesias, *The Devil's Agent* (Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2013), 309.

service as the case with Pervez Musharaf in Pakistan in 1999,<sup>76</sup> and so on. However, the only shared aspect that infantry coups had at moments of no social unrest was the absence of general grievance such as social unrest that could persuade different officers from different service branch to join a risky illegal act such as a coup.

## 5. Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the dataset of coup agency. The analysis validated the following assumptions with regards to the successful instances of military coup d'états within a specific period from 1980 till 2013.

- *Plotters from the ground forces were able to execute successful military coups d'états independently without involving other officers from other service branches.*
- *Plotters from the other regular service branches of the armed forces, air force and navy, were not able to execute a successful coup independently without the engagement of the ground forces.*
- *Coups preceded by social unrest were more likely to be coordinated from the top*
- *Coordinators from the top were more likely to coordinate mixed coups at moments of social unrest.*
- *Coordinators from the middle/bottom were more likely to coordinate infantry coups regardless of the coup status.*
- *Coup coordinators were more likely to coordinate infantry coups at moments of no social unrest.*

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<sup>76</sup> Sanjay Dutt, *Inside Pakistan: 52 Years Outlook*, 58.

## Chapter 4

### Instances of Mixed Military Coups D'état: Thailand 1991 and Turkey 1980

55.8% of the successful instances of military coup d'états at moments of social unrest were mixed coups. The interesting fact is that all the instances of mixed coups from 1980-2013 were preceded by social unrest. This does not mean that social unrest causes instances of mixed coups, as still some infantry coups were preceded by moments of social unrest, and even some moments of social unrest were not followed by a military coup. However, moments of social unrest preceded all the mixed coup instances from 1980-2013. One had to apply a deeper analysis to find the missing link that specifically links social unrest to coup agency formation. I approached this missing link through looking into the coordination level. In other words, who within the military can efficiently utilize the instant common knowledge resulted from moments of social unrest and can simultaneously influence the coup agency formation? The answer was coordinators from the top, as these coordinators are the general commanders of the armed forces, and this enabled them to evaluate efficiently and spontaneously at moments of social unrest. In addition, their commanding post allowed them to liaise between different branches smoothly in comparison to their counterparts from the middle/bottom. I argued in Chapter 2 that although coordinators from the top are able to evaluate efficiently and liaise between service branches, this does not mean that they can convince their subordinates to execute a risky unconstitutional act such as a coup. Here comes the role of social unrest. Not only does it imply a moment of weakness for the regime, it is also an asset that can be used to convince potential coup plotters, in that case, from different service branches to execute a coup to end social unrest. This chapter would analyze this chain reaction starting with moments of social unrest till the instance of mixed coup through studying the two mixed coups instances of Thailand in 1991 and Turkey in 1980.

#### 1. Case A: Thailand 1991

- **Coup Status:** Preceded by Social Unrest Due To
  - Corruption Accusations to the Cabinet of Ministers
  - Popular calls for the removal of the cabinet due to political and administrative inefficiency
  - Tense relation with the military institution after the resignation of the minister of defense due to the inability of the cabinet to fight corruption
- **Execution Day:** 23.02.1991
- **Belligerents:**
  - Chatichai Choonhavan (Prime Minister)
  - National Peace Keeping Council, NPKC (Military Junta).
- **Coup Type:** Mixed Coup
- **Coordination Type:** From the Top
  - Coup coordinated by the Supreme Commander of The Armed Forces that is equivalent to the Joint Chief of Staff.

- **Result:**
  - The ouster of Chatichai and his cabinet
  - The installment of the NPKC as a ruling military Junta

## 1.1 Prologue

The military has been a vital institution in Thailand since the late nineteenth century and played a remarkable role in the political transformation of Thailand from an absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy.<sup>77</sup> Chatichai Choonhavan, a former military general, became an elected prime minister after his predecessor General Prem Tinsulanond stood down in August 1988. In his term as a Prime Minister, Thailand enjoyed economic investment boom.<sup>78</sup> In addition, Chatichai boosted his popularity through increasing governmental wages and enhancing the Thai foreign relations with Indonesia. However, his era witnessed the rise of business tycoons who started to manipulate the laws to serve their business interests. In February 1991, the Thai military executed a mixed successful coup d'état as a reaction to the popular demands that called for Chatichai's resignation.

## 1.2 Pre-Coup Social Unrest

Chatichai depended on elite businessmen in order to bolster the economic growth in Thailand. Economically, the results were promising in the sense of increasing foreign investments and promoting a free-market economy system. However, this economic growth targeted specific economic players who were at the same time members of Chatichai's Cabinet.<sup>79</sup> These players were able to manipulate several laws to eliminate their business competitors. For instance, the cabinet introduced, discussed and later applied a law to ban logging forests to save the Thai forests from a potential eradication. This law was operational, yet one logging company, Suan Kitt, owned by a senate and a minister, was permitted to operate in lands beyond its granted concessions and protected whereas other many other logging firms were handicapped by the very same law.<sup>80</sup>

In addition to these suspicious monopolies, Chatichai meant to manipulate the political opposition parties through transferring cash sums to the executives of these parties as a means of co-optation. Among those who received these bribes and

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<sup>77</sup> Bidhya Bowornwathana, "History and Political Context of Public Administration in Thailand," in *Public Administration in Southeast Asia: Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Macao*, edited by Evan Berman (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2011), 35.

<sup>78</sup> Frank Frost, "The Coup in Thailand: 23 February 1991: Background and Implications," *Parliament of Australia*, 1991, 6.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 8.



became “unusually wealthy” during Chatichai’s era was Montri Ponpanich, the head of the social action party.<sup>81</sup> Also, Chatichai himself was known for accepting cash sums from several business elites and international investors in order to safeguard their thriving business in Thailand.<sup>82</sup>

Due to these accusations, Chatichai’s cabinet faced popular calls that demanded clarifications on the cabinet’s suspicious policies. Chatichai and his cabinet preferred to be indifferent rather than defending their policies, and ignored all these calls. Even when the national Thai television hosted Chatichai and presented some of the popular demands that called Chatichai to adopt anti-corruption policies, he replied with his famous quote that corruption was “No Problem” in Thailand.<sup>83</sup> The word “No Problem” became a Political Cliché associated with Prime Minister Chatichai. Even the Los Angeles Times took the liberty to give a title to Chatichai as the “No Problem Prime Minister.”<sup>84</sup> Chatichai’s indifferent answers only helped in transforming the popular demands to end corruption into popular demands to oust the cabinet. A sarcastic version of “No Problem” became the titled of a folk song by a Thai singer, Aed Carabao, under the title of “No Plomplam.”<sup>85</sup> Chatichai thought to safeguard his cabinet and the business elites whom he incorporated in his cabinet instead of the traditional military elite. He issued decree No. 42 that safeguarded the business elite and his cabinet from societal pressure or parliamentary enquiries about corruption.<sup>86</sup> Through this decree, Chatichai was able to ban newspapers from publishing any reports on the cabinet’s corruption or the monopolies of the business elites.<sup>87</sup>

The unwillingness of Chatichai to end corruption was later transformed into calls that asked the military institution to oust Chatichai’s cabinet; Chatichai tried to reduce the public tense through appointing the popular supreme commander of the Thai Armed Forces, Chawilt Yongchaiyudh, as a minister of defense.<sup>88</sup> As a minister of defense, Chawalit, tried to influence some reforms, yet he discovered that Chatichai merely appointed him to turn down any military or public calls that demand the ouster

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<sup>81</sup> Ruth McVey, *Money and Power in Provincial Thailand* (Copenhagen: NIAS Publishing, 2000), 262

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 262.

<sup>83</sup> David Murray, *The Coup in Thailand, 23 February, 1991: Just Another Coup* (Washington: Indian Centre for Peace Studies, 1996), 38.

<sup>84</sup> “Chatichai Choonhavan; Former Thai Prime Minister,” *LA Times*, May 7, 1998.

<sup>85</sup> *Southeast Asian Affairs 1991* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991) 304.

<sup>86</sup> Abram Tertz, “Thailand,” in *Censorship: A World Encyclopedia* ed. Derek Jones (New York: Routledge, 2015), 2403.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 2403.

<sup>88</sup> Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991: Classmates, Internal Conflicts and Relations with the Government of the Military” *Southeast Asian Studies* Vol 33, No. 3 (December 1995), 49.

of the government. Consequently, Chawalit preferred to resign rather than giving further legitimacy to Chatichai.<sup>89</sup>

The resignation of Chawalit symbolized Chatichai's inability to either dismiss the corrupted officials in his cabinet or to apply reforms that would grant equal business opportunities. The popular calls that had once called for Chatichai's resignation before Chawalit's appointment were transformed into waves of demonstrations that occupied the streets of Bangkok. Around 20 thousands protestors rallied in the streets of Bangkok to show their willingness to oust Chatichai and even officially labeled him as "The Parliamentary Dictator."<sup>90</sup> These protests were composed of: the lodging workers who went out of business due to Chatichai's concessions, university students and newspapers syndicates who were not allowed to criticize Chatichai's corrupted cabinet due to decree 42, and the opposition parties that were mainly composed ex-military members who were the traditional elites before being replaced by businessmen.<sup>91</sup> For a potential coup plotter, this state of social unrest represented a perfect moment of fragility that could be evaluated for a coup's coordination and execution.

### 1.3 Evaluation

A self-conscious instant common knowledge prevailed due to the state of social unrest in Thailand. This common knowledge was not generated by anyone, yet perceived by everyone because of the nature of the situation of social unrest. Everyone knew that everyone knew that Chatichai's regime is at a moment of weakness. Even members of Chatichai's cabinet were aware of this weakness to the extent that the Deputy Prime Minister Yubamarung Chaloem ordered a mobile radio station to put under the command of the prime minister. He thought that this radio station could help as a backup option to contact regime loyalists in case protestors or the military tried to occupy any governmental structures or ousted the cabinet.<sup>92</sup> General Sunthorn Kongsompong, the supreme commander of the Thai Armed Forces, exploited this moment of weakness and demanded from the intelligence service to submit reports on the social unrest in Thailand, and to predict the potential civilian reaction in case the military ousted the cabinet.<sup>93</sup> Evaluating the potential civilian reaction to a potential coup was quite instrumental for General Kongsompong to ensure sufficient support for his coup plans. The reports came back with positive results and recommended that the military high command should be prepared at any

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<sup>89</sup> Yoshifumi Tamada, "Coups in Thailand, 1980-1991," 50.

<sup>90</sup> Seymour Lipset, *Democracy in Asia and Africa* (California: CQ Publisher, 1998), 181.

<sup>91</sup> "Reverse Takeover in Thailand: Excuse or Necessity," *I Space Thailand*, May 21, 2015.

<sup>92</sup> Yoshifumi Tamada, "Coups in Thailand," 50.

<sup>93</sup> David Murray, *The Coup in Thailand*, 23.

moment to oust the cabinet; otherwise, the protestors might resort to violent means to oust the cabinet.<sup>94</sup>

#### 1.4 Coordination

As a supreme commander, General Kongsompon did not possess any hard power to execute a coup due to his indirect contact with the fighting battalions. General Kongsompon summoned the service branches commanders to a meeting to present his coup plans to them on the 21<sup>st</sup> of November 1990. This meeting was camouflaged under the title of “The Dignity of the Soldiers” to show sympathy for ex-minister of defense Chawalit who preferred to resign rather than giving legitimacy to a corrupted cabinet. In this meeting, General Kongsompong utilized the state of social unrest to convince the commanders of the service branch of the necessity of a military reaction to the political developments in Thailand. He presented to them the reports submitted by the intelligence about the precarious future that Thailand might face in case the military did not intervene.<sup>95</sup> None of those who attended the meeting objected to the supreme commander’s plans. Two days later, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of November, the military radio announced that the military institution with all its service branches had lost confidence in the prime minister and his cabinet.<sup>96</sup> After this announcement, some intelligence reports were delivered to the supreme commander about the intension of the prime minister to dismiss him and the ground forces commander after securing the consent of the king in February 1991.<sup>97</sup> For the supreme commander, the main coordinator, and his coup plotters, everything was set for the moment of execution, and they all agreed to execute before Chatichai meet the king.

#### 1.5 Execution

On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February 1991, Chatichai was willing to fly to Chiangmai to secure the king’s consent over several issues that included the appointment of a new minister of defense, Arthit Kamlangek, and the dismissal of both the supreme commander of the armed forces and the ground forces commander.<sup>98</sup> General Kongsompong knew that if Chatichai was able to meet the king, then he would lose his authority and a loyalist supreme commander would have been put in his place. Therefore, he decided that Chatichai should not be allowed to fly to Chiangmai. The execution plan was dependent on the simultaneous move of the coup plotters forces. Before Prime Minister Chatichai and his minister of defense took off to Chiangmai, air force officers put them under arrest.<sup>99</sup> At the same moment, members of the 1<sup>st</sup> Ground Forces Division and an Anti-Aircraft, AA, Artillery Division secured the mobile radio

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<sup>94</sup> David Murray, *The Coup in Thailand*, 23.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>96</sup> Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand,” 51.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>99</sup> Frank Frost, “The Coup in Thailand,” 15.

station obtained by Minister Chaloem to prohibit the cabinet from any external contacts.<sup>100</sup> Also, these divisions occupied airports, roads, the Parliament, TV, radio stations and other symbolic structures. As for the role of the supreme commander, he headed to the radio to announce the military take over and the ouster of the Prime Minister.<sup>101</sup>

## 1.6 Making A Fact

The process of “Making a fact” is about addressing the people of what happened and who is in charge from the moment of execution onwards. Theoretically, coup plotters, after taking control over strategic structures, are not afraid of the ousted cabinet such as the Prime Minister or his cabinet, as these people possess no arms and they are already under arrest. However, the plotters would be afraid of any potential militant resistance by any militant loyalist. That is why plotters tend, in the “making a fact” process to state that any resistance would be minimal and severely punishable. The supreme commander, while his forces were taking over the prime minister, his cabinet and the strategic structures, he went to the radio to announce the coup success to generate common knowledge of who is in charge. Furthermore, he announced that the state of marshal law was activated; which meant that any resistance to the coup forces would have been dealt with severely using fatal means.

In his speech, General Kongsompong declared the following points:<sup>102</sup>

- Reasons behind the coup
  - Attempt of creating a parliamentary dictatorship
  - Severe Corruption
  - Harassment of Honest Civil Servants
  - Governmental Attempts to disrupt military unit
  - Compromising the police investigation of the 1982 assassination plot of politicians.
- Marshal Laws:
  - Public Assemblies Were Subject To Prohibition (to limit any potential resistance)
  - Press Censorship
- The Abolishment of the Constitution
- The Abolishment of the Parliament
- The Formation a the National Peace Keeping Council, NPKC

The NPKC was the title of the military junta that took over the political administration after the coup. The junta was also named as the Five-General Junta. It included the coup leaders under the command of the supreme commander of the armed forces.

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<sup>100</sup> Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand,” 51-52.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>102</sup> Frank Frost, “The Coup in Thailand,” 15-16.

### 1.6.1 The Formation of the NPKC:<sup>103</sup>

- General Sunthorn Kongsompon, The Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed and the Chairman of the NPKC
- General Suchinda Kraprayoon, The Ground Forces Commander
- General Kaset Rojananil, The Air Force Commander
- General Prapat Krisnachan, The Navy Commander
- General Issarapong Noonpakdi, The Deputy Ground Forces Commander

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of February, one day after the coup, the NPKC announced that an interim civilian government would soon be appointment, whereas the NPKC would only take an advisory role.<sup>104</sup> Frank Frost, a political advisor to the Australian Parliament who was assigned to investigate the 1991 coup in Thailand, argued that the NPKC took this step in order to stabilize their role and to give a civilian legitimacy to their military form of governance.<sup>105</sup> This frame included the appointment of respected technocrats, former highly esteemed bureaucrats and businessmen.

It is noteworthy to highlight the differences between republics and constitutional monarchies at this point. The above steps that lead to the “making a fact” process are quite valid in republics, yet to apply them into constitutional monarchies we will have to add a further point that is the approval of the king. This is why one day after the coup, General Kongsompong, knew that the king’s endorsement is necessary, otherwise, he might face the same failure of the 1981 and 1985 coups d’état.<sup>106</sup> Henceforth, he travelled to Chiangmai and on the same day, a royal command was issued to endorse the coup as a legitimate move by the army against a corrupted government that was not up to the people’s expectation.<sup>107</sup> From this point, the plotters stabilized their role, and a successful mixed coup was executed.

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<sup>103</sup> Keat Gin Ooi, *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, From Angkor Wat to East Timor* (California :ABC-Clio, 2004), 942.

<sup>104</sup> Frank Frost, “The Coup in Thailand,” 16.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>106</sup> Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand,” 55.

<sup>107</sup> Frank Frost, “The Coup in Thailand,” 16.

## 2. Case B: Turkey 1980

- **Coup Status:** Preceded by Social Unrest Due To
  - The multiple failures of political actors to either form a majority government or a coalition government
  - The mass killings of thousands by radical political actors
  - Mass prison breaks
  - High inflation rates
  - Lack of security
- **Execution Day:** 12.09.1980
- **Belligerents:**
  - Sulieman Demierel (Prime Minister)
  - National Security Council, NSC (Military Junta).
- **Coup Type:** Mixed Coup
- **Coordination Type:** From the Top
  - Coup coordinated by the Joint Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces: General Kenan Evren
- **Result:**
  - The ouster of Sulieman Demierel's cabinet
  - The installment of the NSC as a ruling Military Junta

### 2.1 Prologue

The emblem of the Turkish army is designed as a shield with a picture of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the republic in the early twentieth century. Military emblems usually stand for the values and the ideologies military institutions endorse. The ideologies and the values of Turkish army could also be explained in the same terms. The Turkish military regarded itself as a guardian. Yet this guardian is not only guarding the state, it is guarding the values and ideologies of Ataturk, as well. In other words, whenever the Turkish military noticed a deviant political behavior that shifted away from the models drafted by Ataturk, it intervened to bring it back to its original track. This guardian model was not just limited to emblems; it was also incorporated in several Turkish Constitutions such as article (35) from the Turkish constitution of 1961. According to this article, the military is authorized to oust any elected government if the military perceived that this government is violating the Turkish constitution that safeguards the Kemalist values.<sup>108</sup> Through the means of this article, the Turkish military ousted ended the parliamentary democracy in 1980 and installed instead a military junta under the name of the National Security Council, NSC.

### 2.2 Pre-coup Social Unrest

Turkey started witnessing consequent weak governments following the 1973 elections. No party was able to secure two-thirds of the parliament either by gaining

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<sup>108</sup> Vera Eccarius Kelly, *The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy For Freedom* (California: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 126.

the sufficient number of seats or forming coalitions.<sup>109</sup> This fragmentation led to the formation of short-life governments that are incapable of obtaining enough votes to pursue any necessary social or economic political agendas.<sup>110</sup> The June 1977 elections failed to generate one-single party cabinet, and the only resort was to form fragile coalition governments that also were incapable of pursuing any legislations.<sup>111</sup> Thousands of demonstrations were led by rightists and leftists to represent their powers on the streets. These demonstrations eventually turned into street fights and resulted in the death of hundreds.<sup>112</sup> Social grievance was the only aspect shared by the Turkish people due to the political and economic stagnation of Turkey. Political polarization and terrorism became a tool of political participation. In the opening day of the Middle East Technical University, students who were affiliated with the Communist Party refused to sing the Turkish anthem and sung instead The Communist International.<sup>113</sup> As for the economic situation, the value of the Turkish Lira fell from \$1= 25 Lira in 1978 to \$1=78 Lira in 1980, and the real growth rate of the GNP reached 0% in 1979.<sup>114</sup>

Political terrorism became more sophisticated and selective with regards to targeting victims. The right wing formed a terrorist group under the name of the Turkish Revenge Brigade and targeted leftist politicians such as the labor leader Kemal Turkler.<sup>115</sup> As for the left wing, they formed the DEV-SOL or The Revolutionary Front and assassinated the deputy chairmen of the National Action Party Gun Gazak.<sup>116</sup> The same terrorist group DEV-SOL killed later the moderate former Prime Minister Nihat Erim and left a note which reads “We have punished Gun Sazak. We are now Punishing Nihat Erim.”<sup>117</sup> Political parties continued their infighting and contributed to a further public factionalism. Even the police forces were influenced by this factionalism and allowed the prison breaks of those whom they share with the same political ideology whether this ideology was to the right or the left.<sup>118</sup> In less than 22 months, more than 3000 prisoners escaped or were “escaped” by these police officers.<sup>119</sup> Simultaneously, these parties accused each

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<sup>109</sup> Major Burt Vanderclute, *Democracy By Coup: The Turkish Government Under Military Control (1980-1983)*, Master of Military Art Dissertation, Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas, (Publication No. AD-A146860,) 68.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 77.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 74.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>115</sup> “Workers in Turkey Protest a Murder,” *New York Times*, July 24, 1980, 7.

<sup>116</sup> “Rightists Turkish Politician is Slain,” *New York Times*, May 29, 1980, 4.

<sup>117</sup> Marvine Howe, “Ex-Prime Minister of Turkey is Slain,” *New York Times*, July 20, 1980.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.,

<sup>119</sup> Marvine Howe, “Prisoners Rule Turkey’s Jails and Often Flee,” *New York Times*, August 13, 1980.

other of terrorism rather than uniting to form a coalition government to snatch the country out of its political, social and economic turmoil. Consequently, the Turkish political arena became no longer an arena of political contestation, yet an arena of targeted physical elimination among those who did not share the same political ideology.

### 2.3 Evaluation

General Kenan Evren, the Joint Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, who was appointed in 1978 was analyzing the political situation carefully to plan whether the military institution should get itself involved or not. This careful evaluation was contributed to two reasons. First, General Evren's determination to delay any intervention until it was seemed to be no other options but to intervene, as only at this moment, according to Evren, the legitimacy of the intervention would not be questioned.<sup>120</sup> Second, General Evren was aware of the polarized political situation, he thought that an instant uncalculated military intervention, at the onset of the social unrest in 1978 might have had a backfire effect that unites the civilian political parties against the military. General Evren utilized the instant common knowledge of social unrest so that everyone, civilian and military, knows that the regime is weak and is incapable to pursue any social, political or economic policies that could end the turmoil. By extension, he waited for the level of social grievance to increase and for the people to lose hope in the politicians and welcome a military intervention. During these two years, 1978-1980, General Evren gathered sufficient intelligence to evaluate the moment of social unrest. In 1979, General Evren asked General Haydar Saltik from the intelligence to write a report on the political situation in turkey, and to recommend if this situation would require a simple warning from the military institution to the government or a military coup.<sup>121</sup> Six months later, the report came up and suggested that military intervention is inevitable and should not be delayed; otherwise, the country would be heading steadily towards civil war.<sup>122</sup> At this moment, General Evren's evaluation was over, and started the coordination process with his potential coup associates.

### 2.4 Coordination

General Evren, as the Joint Chief of Staff and the General Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces, same as General Kongsompong from Thailand, did not possess hard power under his command due to his indirect contact with the fighting battalions. Therefore, it was essential for him to coordinate with those who possess this hard power such as the service branches commanders if the coup was to succeed. He used his authority as the General Commander of the Armed Forces to summon the

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<sup>120</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 233.

<sup>121</sup> Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 86.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid., 86.



Commanders of the Turkish Armed Forces' service branches to an urgent meeting in the military academy by the 27<sup>th</sup> of December 1979.<sup>123</sup> Evren utilized the state of social unrest to persuade the service branches' commanders of the necessity of a military action. He started the meeting showing them the report written by General Saltik of the precarious future scenarios that might happen if the military was not to intervene. The commanders read the report, yet were hesitant not to imply an instant reaction to the report by supporting General Evren. This reaction proves that even the General Commander of the Armed Forces, regardless of his extensive influence, might fail to convince his subordinates to execute a risky unconstitutional act such as a coup. Instead of approving General Evren's plans, the Commanders voted on giving the political parties a final chance through sending a warning letter to the heads of the two major political parties, Justice Party under the command of Demirel and the Republican People's Party under the command Mustafa Ecevit. The letter, entitled "The Opinion of the Turkish Armed Forces", warned these two leaders that the "division created by the political parties caused anarchy and secessionism and discrimination among the police, teachers and many other establishment .....The Turkish Armed Force, fully conscious of its duties, hereby persistently demand all our political parties to unite in the direction of the constitution and Kemalism."<sup>124</sup> The Joint Chief of Staff and the commanders of each of the service branches signed the letter. Simultaneously, Kenan Evren suggested that a second report should be written to check the impact of the warning letter over the course of the political action. The second report was submitted in March 1980 and stated that the political infighting did not stop. The report recommended a coup without any further delays.<sup>125</sup> By that moment, the Commanders of the service branches were quite convinced by General Evren's coup plans and regarded these plans as a solution to end the political turmoil. After a 2nd meeting, the coordination process was over, and the coup plotters waited for the execution moment.

## 2.5 Execution

In March's 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting, the coup plotters planned to execute the coup on the 11<sup>th</sup> of July.<sup>126</sup> However, they decided to abort this plan as they noticed some trials within the parliament that might restore peace and order if Demirel's government was able to secure a vote of confidence. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of July, the vote of confidence was rejected.<sup>127</sup> On the 26<sup>th</sup> of August, Evren summoned the commanders again to propose an alternative date for execution, and he proposed that the coup would be executed after the conclusion of the Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement on the

<sup>123</sup> Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 38

<sup>124</sup> Major Burt Vanderclute, *Democracy By Coup*, 77.

<sup>125</sup> Ibrahim Dogan, "Evren Had Prepared Two Reports For Impact," *Aksiyon*, September 1, 2008.

<sup>126</sup> Michael Newton, *Famous Assassinations in World History: An Encyclopedia* (California: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 139.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

10<sup>th</sup> of September 1980.<sup>128</sup> At 23:00 on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September, Evren and the commanders headed for their commanding posts one hour before the zero hour of execution: 00:00. The black sedans of the Joint Chief of Staff and the Commanders of the service branches were reported to have been seen moving through the streets of Ankara carrying these commanders to their headquarters.<sup>129</sup> At 00:00 tanks and armored personal carriers, APCs, occupied the streets of the capital. These fighting battalions took over all communications including the broadcasting stations of T.V and Radio. Simultaneously, other battalions took over the transportation facilities such as airports, navy ports and railway stations all over Turkey.<sup>130</sup> At 3:15, fighting battalions surrounded several party leaders' houses including the house of the former Prime Minister Ecevit.<sup>131</sup>

## 2.6 Making A Fact

General Evren concluded his coup through the “Making a Fact” process. This process included the declaration of the coup leader the motives behind the coup as well as the future procedures that would be applied. At 4:15, General Evren reached the main radio station in Ankara and began his broadcast of the events that led to the coup. He said, “ Citizens even in the most remote corners of the country become the targets of attacks and suppression and pushed into the threshold of civil war. The Turkish Armed Forces took the decision to fulfill its duty of protecting and safeguarding the Turkish Republic as laid down in its internal service code.”<sup>132</sup> Later on, Evren declared the following decisions:<sup>133</sup>

- The ouster of the government under the leadership of Sulieman Demierel
- The suspension of the Parliament
- The proclamation of marshal law and curfew throughout the whole republic (to terminate any potential resistance to the coup plotters' forces)
- The Formation of the National Security Council, NSC.

The NSC was the title of the military junta that took over the political administration after the coup. The junta was also named as the Five-General Junta. It included the coup leaders under the command of the Joint Chief of Staff of the armed forces.

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<sup>128</sup> Major Burt Vanderclute, *Democracy By Coup*, 92.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>130</sup> Andrew Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island* (West Port: Greenwood, 2000), 115.

<sup>131</sup> Major Burt Vanderclute, *Democracy By Coup*, 94.

<sup>132</sup> *12 September in Turkey: Before and After* (Ankara: Ogun Kardesler, 1982), 225-226.

<sup>133</sup> Major Burt Vanderclute, *Democracy By Coup*, 94.

### 2.6.1 The Formation of the NSC:<sup>134</sup>

- General Kenan Evren, the Joint Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces and the chief of the NSC.
- General Nurettin Ersin, the commander of the Turkish Ground Forces
- General Tahsin Sahinkaya, the commander of the Turkish Air Force
- Admiral Nejat Tumer, the commander of the Turkish Navy
- General Sedat Celasun, the commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie Forces

### 3. Conclusion

The two cases of Turkey in 1980 and Thailand 1991 were preceded by social unrest. The reason behind the formation of mixed coup agency was contributed to two main aspects. First, the ability of the coordinator to liaise between different service branches spontaneously at the moments of social unrest. Second, the ability of the coordinator to utilize the state of social unrest as a persuasive asset to tempt potential coup plotters who have different backgrounds and service branches to join his coup plans. Both cases, Thailand 1991 and Turkey 1980, were coordinated from the top, by the general commanders of the armed forces, General Kongsompong in Thailand and General Evren in Turkey. These coordinators had direct influence over their subordinates, the service branch commanders, and used this influence to summon these commanders into special meeting where the coup plans were proposed after the main coordinators have evaluated the state of social unrest. In these meetings, social unrest was used by the coordinators from the top to convince the other commanders of the coups' essentiality as means of ending the state of social unrest. Their means of persuasion included submitting intelligence reports on the state of social unrest and the chaos that the country might face in case the military did not intervene. Both coup coordinators were able to convince their subordinates, the service branches commanders, to join the coup. These two cases illustrated how social unrest was associated with mixed coups. However, this study does not entail, at the same time, that social unrest is a causal factor that precedes instances of mixed coup for two reasons. First a moment of social unrest might not be concluded by a coup instance. Second, some moments of infantry coups were preceded by social unrest as would be illustrated in the next chapter.

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<sup>134</sup> William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, 232.

## Chapter 5

### Instances of Infantry Coup D'état: Haiti 1991 and Niger 2010

Instances of infantry coups represented the majority of the successful military coups that took place between 1980 till 2013 with a percentage of 64.7%. 43.3% of these infantry coups were preceded by moments of social unrest, whereas 56.8% were not preceded by any forms of social unrest. As discussed in the previous chapters, the reasons behind an exclusive formation of military coup agency to one service branch could be contributed to several factors including the presence or absence of social unrest. One can categorize the infantry coup agency formation into two criteria. First, an intentional exclusive coup agency formation scenario; In that case the main coup plotter would have the ability to liaise between service branches due to his extensive sphere of influence, yet he would intentionally ignore other service branches and select coup associates from his own service branch. Second, an unintentional exclusive coup agency formation; in that case, the main coup coordinator is incapable of liaising and influencing other service branch rather than his own. Therefore, he would not have any other choices rather than recruiting coup associates from his restricted sphere of influence and end up in having an exclusive coup agency formation. In this chapter, I selected two instances of infantry coup d'état that would represent both scenarios and analyzed the chain reaction that could lead to exclusive coup agency of infantry coups.

#### 1. Haiti 1991

- **Coup Status:** Preceded by No Social Unrest
  - The election of the first democratically elected president
  - Spread of the rule of law
  - Cuts in the governmental budgets for the sake of national development
  - Popular support for the president against the coup attempt of January 1991.
- **Execution Day:** 30.9.1991
- **Belligerents:**
  - President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (Democratically Elected president)
  - General Raoul Cédras (The Military Commander in Chief)
- **Coup Type:** Infantry Coup (Intentional Exclusive Coup Agency Formation)
- **Coordination Type:** From the Top
  - Coup coordinated by the commander in chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, FAD'H
- **Result:**
  - The ouster of President Aristide and his cabinet in October 1991
  - The installment of "The Three Stooges" military Junta from 1991-1994
  - The re-installment of President Aristide by 1994 with the help of the U.S. invasion force of Haiti

- The disbandment of the Haitian military institution by 1995

### 1.1 Prologue: Pre-Aristide Haiti

Haiti, a former French-Hispanic colony in the Caribbean Sea, was the first and only country in the western hemisphere, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, to defeat three of colonial super powers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (France, Britain and Spain) simultaneously during the Haitian Slave Revolution of 1791.<sup>135</sup> On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1804, Haiti gained its independence, its military commander, General Jean-Jacque Dessalines, named himself illegitimately as Emperor Jacques I of Haiti.<sup>136</sup> Ever since, the Haitian military institution has constantly intervened in the Haitian political arena. Between 1986 and 1991, Haiti witnessed three successful military coups d'état. Prior to the successful military coup that had put Haiti under military rule from 1991 till 1994, Haiti witnessed two major political instances. First, Haiti witnessed its first free democratic presidential elections under the supervision of the international community and the military.<sup>137</sup> Second, Haiti witnessed a failed coup attempt orchestrated by members of the Duvalierist ancien regime just after the conclusion of the elections.<sup>138</sup>

The reaction of the military institution was quite exceptional to the two instances. It was noticed that the military institution under the leadership of General Herard Abraham was eager to give up power to the civilians. This eagerness was contributed to 6 years of political turmoil caused the constant military interference in the political arena.<sup>139</sup> As for the coup attempt, the military high command reacted instantly and sided with the people against the coup plotters.<sup>140</sup> Some argued that the instant military reaction was contributed to the pressure exerted by the international observers, the U.S. and France. Others referred it to the unwillingness of a wide spectrum in the military institution to support another coup, as they preferred to return back to their barracks rather than having a political role. Regardless of the motives behind the military high command's reaction, they had indeed terminated the coup attempt and successfully transferred powers to a democratically elected president on the 7<sup>th</sup> of February 1991. On his first televised speech, just after stating the presidential oath, the democratically elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide announced the dismissal of 6 generals in the military high command as well as a

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<sup>135</sup> Brain W. Blouet and Olwyn M. Blouet, *Latin America and The Caribbean: A Systematic and Regional Survey* (Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 86.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., 210.

<sup>137</sup> Maureen Taft-Morales and Clare Seelke, *Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns* (CRS Report No. RL32294) (Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 3.

<sup>138</sup> Alex Dupuy, *The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, The international Community, and Haiti* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 104.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 104-105.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., 104.

number of colonels and majors.<sup>141</sup> None rejected the presidential executive orders of retirement, and even the military Commander in Chief, General Herard Abraham preferred to resign before being “retired”.<sup>142</sup> President Aristide thought that appointing younger officers in High Military Council would reform the military doctrine and promote military professionalism. The successful Haitian infantry coup of September 1991 proved that President Aristide was wrong.

## 1.2 Evaluation

“*Aristide Ape Kouri Pou Lavalas, li tonbe nan gran riviye.*” In traditional Creole, Haiti’s formal language, these words meant: “Aristide ran away from small flooding water to fall in a big river.”<sup>143</sup> When Aristide promoted General Raoul Cédras to appoint him as the military Commander in Chief, he thought that he could subdue the military institution and avoid further coups.<sup>144</sup> Aristide was wrong; the very same general he appointed orchestrated a successful coup after only two months of his appointment. General Cédras learned the mistakes of his predecessors. He knew that his military post would be threatened as long as Aristide held the presidential post. Therefore, for Cédras, he preferred to oust Aristide rather than being “retired” by Aristide. In the absence of any form of social unrest, Cédras had to plan his steps very carefully to make sure of his own survival even if the coup failed. Consequently, he had to overcome two obstacles, if his coup plans were to succeed. First, Cédras had to surpass the popular support enjoyed by President Aristide that made the February 1991 coup a failure. Second, he had to make sure that his coup plans were discrete within the military institution as some officers, even in the High Military Command, were quite supportive to Aristide and would have been ready to turn Cédras to a court marshal if they had known plans.<sup>145</sup> For instance, in July 1991, navy troops in Port Au Prince declared their support and loyalty to President Aristide, and even went further to arrest their base commander after accusing him of being a Duvalierist.<sup>146</sup> Even though, General Cédras was the Commander in Chief, he was liable to arrest as his coup plans were illegal and incase these plans were unveiled, Cédras would have met the same fate of the Port Au Prince navy base commander. For Cédras, the evaluation process entailed two strategies; first, coordinating and executing the coup before any unpredictable presidential decision of relieving him from duty. Second, coordinating and executing the coup among potential coup plotters whom he trusted.

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<sup>141</sup> Michael Deibert, *Notes From the Last Testament: The Struggle For Haiti* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), 34.

<sup>142</sup> David Nicholls, “The Duvalier Regime In Haiti,” in *the Sultanistic Regimes*, ed. H. E. Chehabi and Juan Linz (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 174.

<sup>143</sup> Rev. Emmanuel Dumay, *The Era of Military Coups D’état: Haiti 1986-1991* (Bloomington: Xlibris, 2011), Kobo Edition, 79%.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., 79%.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 80%.

<sup>146</sup> “Haitian Sailors Mutiny, Accuse Officers of Plotting Coup as Political Trial Starts,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 30, 1991.



### 1.3 Coordination

Due to the presence of a wide spectrum of military cadets who supported Aristide and preferred to keep a distance between the military and politics, General Cédras had to coordinate cautiously without leaving any loose ties that link him to the coup. The coordination strategy of Cédras was actually the main motive behind my choice of this case, as across the 68 coup cases, regardless of the coup type or coup status, the coordination process of this case was the most interesting of them all. General Cédras did not coordinate with the other coup plotters face-to-face, and even other coup plotters were not even aware that General Cédras was the coup's main coordinator. General Cédras was quite aware that he is constantly under the surveillance of the president and other military high commanders.<sup>147</sup> Therefore, he resorted to an old friend of his who retired from the military service. This old friend was the ex-colonel Philippe Biamby who was a personal friend of General Cédras. Both Cédras and Biamby were graduates of the (1971-1973) class.<sup>148</sup> In addition, they had participated in a failed coup attempt against President Avril Prosper in 1988. Cédras advised ex-colonel Biamby to limit his contacts to those who would tactically need to execute the coup successfully. As for Cédras, he, as a commander in chief, made sure that the executioners would not be assigned to serve far away from the capital.<sup>149</sup>

Ex-Colonel Biamby contacted two officers whom he personally known and served with.<sup>150</sup> These officers were: Colonel Jean-Claude Duperval the commander of the *Camp D'Application* and Major Josphe Michel Francois the commander of the *Cafeteria 4<sup>th</sup> Company*.<sup>151</sup> Biamby informed Cédras of the coup plotters names and commanding posts to make sure that these nominees were granted the required facilities and equipment needed for the coup. Cédras as a commander in chief, ordered the transfer of armored vehicles and tanks to *Camp D'Application* in order to grant the coup executioners land supremacy on one hand. On the other, he denied the Presidential Palace Corps any Anti-Tank, AT, weaponry to limit any potential resistance to the executioners.<sup>152</sup> President Aristide became suspicious of the military actions in Port Au Prince, and even asked General Cédras to re-assign Major Francois another post away from the capital. General Cédras, in order not to lose one of his main coup executioners, warned Aristide to act circumspectly over this matter, otherwise, the president might face a wave of military mutinies, especially after his courageous steps of dismissing several generals and colonels.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Rev. Emmanuel Dumay, *The Era of Military Coups D'état: Haiti*, 81%.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 36%.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 85%.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 84%.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 84%.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 86%.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid., 85%.

## 1.4 Execution

Four days after the return of President Aristide from New York, On the 29<sup>th</sup> of September 1991 at 21:00, a mutiny started at the *Cafeteria 4<sup>th</sup> Company* under the leadership of the artillery Major Joseph Francois.<sup>154</sup> The mutineers declared their resistance to Aristide regime. Unlike the coup plotters of the failed January 1991 coup attempt, the plotters did not march towards Aristide's residence. Instead, Major Francois aligned himself with the armored corps of *Camp D'Application* under the command of Colonel Duperval and occupied the main streets in Port Au Prince to overcome any civilian resistance to their coup plans.<sup>155</sup> In the meanwhile, radio stations started reporting violent clashes between some civilian loyalists and the mutineers. President Aristide called General Cédras to inquire about the situation in Port Au Prince. At this moment, General Cédras was playing politics with President Aristide; he reassured Aristide that the military institution would defend the legitimate president and that these mutineers would be easily crushed.<sup>156</sup> It was later known that General Cédras wanted to give the "mutineers" or his coup associates enough time to make sure that the coup was a *fait accompli*.

By the 30<sup>th</sup> of October, Major Francois and Colonel Duperval marched towards the presidential palace accompanied by armored vehicles and tanks from *Camp D'Application*. One of the tanks posed its turret towards the Presidential Palace.<sup>157</sup> The presidential guards who were denied to acquire AT, Anti Tank, weapons did not stand chance against heavy armored troops and fled instantly leaving behind the presidential palace vulnerable to the plotters attacks. The French ambassador at that time, Jean Raphael Dufour, went instantly to Aristide's residential place to protect him. President Aristide, reassured by General Cédras that the situation is under control, headed to the Presidential Palace. On his way to the presidential palace, the Presidential Convoy was ambushed by the mutineers, and Captain Fritz Pierre-Louis from the Presidential Personal Military Escort was gunned down.<sup>158</sup> The mutineers took Aristide into custody. Later on, Aristide found himself standing before the mastermind of the coup General Cédras inside the General Headquarter.<sup>159</sup> Only then, President Aristide and other officers from the High Military Command knew that there was a link between General Cédras and the mutineers. General Cédras informed Aristide that he had nothing to do with the mutiny, and that it would be quite safer for him to leave the country instantly. An escort secured Aristide's delivery to Port Au Prince's Airport to make sure of his safety and departure.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> Rev. Emmanuel Dumay, *The Era of Military Coups D'état*, 84%.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 85%,

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., 83%.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 86%.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., 83%.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 83%.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 83%.



## 1.5 Making A Fact

General Cédras, though he was the Commander in Chief, he still lacked influence over loyalist high commanding officers installed by Aristide such as the deputy commander in chief Colonel Alix Sylva and other members of the High Military Council such as Colonel Marc Charles. Cédras convened with the High military Council and informed them that the military had to take immediate actions to restore stability. At 21:00 on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September, General Cédras broadcasted an announcement to explain to the Haitian people why the military had to expel Aristide out of the country. He argued that these were extra-ordinary measures taken to save Haiti from prominent chaos.<sup>161</sup> It is noteworthy to highlight that General Cédras was unlike the traditional coup plotters who usually declared themselves instantly as presidents. On the contrary, General Cédras avoided assuming presidency in order not to provoke Aristide's loyalists, especially, those within the military institution. He announced the formation of small military council that would be in charge until peace is restored. The council was formed of the following members.<sup>162</sup>

- General Raoul Cédras, Commander in Chief
- Colonel Alix Sylva, Deputy Commander in Chief
- Colonel Marc Charles, member of the High Military Council

In the meanwhile, international reactions were supportive to Aristide and called for the re-installation of Aristide as the democratic choice of the Haitian People. Cédras reassured his fellow colleagues that it was his intention to restore democracy and help in re-installing Aristide as president once more. President Aristide, accompanied by delegations the OAS, returned back to Haiti to Port Au Prince Airport to hold negotiations with the military council that already included two loyalists. The mutineers, Cédras's coup associates, threatened Sylva among other loyalist High Military Council members that they would neither accept the return of Aristide nor be passive about it. The meeting was concluded with the departure of Aristide and the resignation of the threatened loyalists from the military who did not stand a chance against the hard power of the angry mutineers.<sup>163</sup> Only at this moment, General Cédras revealed his influence on the mutineers, after he had taken out the loyalists within the military institution and formed his real junta. He re-integrated Colonel Biamby into the military and granted him the rank of a general and appointed him as a member in the High Military Council alongside with the newly promoted Colonel Josph Francois. As for Colonel Duperval, Cédras appointed him as his new Deputy Commander in Chief instead of Colonel Alix Sylva.<sup>164</sup> Even after getting rid of the loyalists within the military institution, General Cédras did not assume the

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<sup>161</sup> Rev. Emmanuel Dumay, *The Era of Military Coups D'état*, 84%.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 84%.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., 85%.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid, 85%.

presidential post and preferred to install a puppet president, the head of the Supreme Court, Judge Joseph Nerette.<sup>165</sup>

### 1.5.1 Military Posts of the Coup Plotters Before and After the Coup<sup>166</sup>

- General Raoul Cédras, Military Commander in Chief → Chair of the Military Junta (Ground Forces)
- Ex- Colonel Philippe Biamby → General Philip Biamby, Member of the Military Junta and the High Military Council (Ground Forces)
- Colonel Jean-Claude Duperval, Commander of the *Camp D'Application* → Deputy Commander in Chief (Ground Forces)
- Major Joseph Francois, Commander of the *Cafeteria 4<sup>th</sup> Company* → Colonel Josphe Francois, Member of Military Junta and the High Military Council (Ground Forces)

## 1.6 Analysis

Cédras was the military Commander in Chief and by extension he was able to liaise between the Haitian different service branches such as the air force and navy. On the contrary, he, intentionally, limited his potential coup plotters' list to only those whom he can trust and had served with before. The motives behind this intentional exclusive coordination were quite clear, especially, after the naval mutiny incidence of July. If Cédras had naively contacted other military personnel without having a persuasive asset such as social unrest that could tempt the members of the military high council to jointly intervene, he would have been arrested and trialed. Consequently, Cédras coordinated carefully and did not reveal that he is the true coup coordinator till it was late for the military high council to confront him. The infantry coup case of Haiti in 1991 shows that even a coordinator from the top such as General Cédras, regardless of his influence within the military institution, might be discrete about his coup plans if he does not have a sufficient persuasive reason that legitimizes his coup plans to his subordinates.

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<sup>165</sup> Rev. Emmanuel Dumay, *The Era of Military Coups D'état.*, 87%.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., 85%.

## 2. Niger 2010

- **Coup Status:** Preceded by Social Unrest
  - The dismissal of the parliament by President Mamadou Tandja
  - Provocation of the national constitution by President Tandja
  - The marginalization of the political opposition forces
  - Food Crisis contributed to aid cuts by international donors
  - Popular protests calling for Tandja's resignation or ouster to end political marginalization and international isolation
- **Execution Day:** 18.2.2010
- **Belligerents:**
  - President Mamadou Tandja
  - Colonel Salou Djibo (Commander of the 121<sup>st</sup> Artillery Division)
- **Coup Type:** Infantry Coup
- **Coordination Type:** From the Middle/Bottom
  - Coup coordinated by an artillery division commander
- **Result:**
  - The ouster of President Tandja and his cabinet in
  - The installment of the *Council Suprême Pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (CSRD)*, The Supreme Council for Democratic Restoration as the ruling military junta under the leadership of Colonel Saluo Djibo

### 2.1 Prologue

Niger, a West African country, was once a part of the French West Africa group prior to its independence in 1958.<sup>167</sup> By 1960, Niger founded its first regular military institution *Les Forces Armées Nigériennes (FAN)*.<sup>168</sup> The FAN was only composed of two service branches, Air Force and Ground Force, due to the landlocked geographic location of Niger. It only took the FAN personnel 13 years to execute their coup d'état in 1974.<sup>169</sup> Niger has spent 22 out of 57 years as an independent state under military rule.<sup>170</sup> The latest coup executed by the FAN took place on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February and resulted in the ouster of President Mamadou Tandja.<sup>171</sup> The coup was preceded by social unrest contributed social mobilization organized by trade syndicates and political opposition and catalyzed by aid cuts due to Tandja's authoritarian policies. The international reactions that succeeded the Nigerien coup were quite passive as it neither condemned nor opposed the coup.<sup>172</sup> The case of Niger in 2010 stands as a case study for the unintentional scenario of an infantry coup coordinated from the middle/bottom at a moment of social unrest.

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<sup>167</sup> Abdourahmane Idrissa and Samuel Decalo, *Historical Dictionary of Niger* (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc, 2012), 129.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>170</sup> Virginie Baudais and Grégory Chauzal, "Briefing: The 2010 Coup D'état in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics?," *African Affairs* 110, No. 439 (2011), 295.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid., 295.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid., 295-296.

## 2.2. Pre-coup Social Unrest

Before his second presidential term had come to an end, Tandja's supporters rallied in front of the Nigerien National Assembly, The Parliament, asking for a three-year extension term for Tandja so that he can fulfill his developmental plans.<sup>173</sup> Tandja replied back on the 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2009 that he cannot ignore "the popular calls that demanded his stay" and declared a constitutional revision through which he would be allowed to serve more.<sup>174</sup> According to the Nigerien Constitution of 1999, the president was allowed to serve only for consecutive two terms 5 years each.<sup>175</sup> The constitution had prohibited any revisions on the numbers or length of the presidential terms.<sup>176</sup> Tandja declared that he would revise the constitution so that he could maintain his post as president for a third term. On the same day, 8<sup>th</sup> of May, 23 Parliamentary Members asked the constitutional court to rule on the presidential decision. On the 25<sup>th</sup> of May, the Constitutional Court declared that the presidential intention of revising the constitution would be unconstitutional, according to Article 136, and by extension, this would constitute a violation of the presidential oath.<sup>177</sup> The president replied by dissolving the Parliament the next day. One month later, he invoked Article 53 that grants him emergency power and dissolved the Constitutional Court.<sup>178</sup> Approximately ten thousand protestors rallied in the streets of Niamey to call for Tandja's resignation, and for the first time in the Nigerien history, joint strikes took place by the main trade unions and opposition parties.<sup>179</sup> The opposition called the U.S. and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to exert pressure on Tandja in order to restore the democratic order through preserving the constitution and re-installing the dissolved Parliament and the Constitutional Court. Tandja ignored the internal and international calls and announced a referendum on a new constitution that would be supervised by an "appointed constitutional court" of his choice by the 4<sup>th</sup> of August.<sup>180</sup> The opposition and the trade unions announced that they would not participate in the making of a new dictatorship and refused to participate in the referendum.<sup>181</sup> With the sole participation of Tandja and his political allies, the constitutional revisions were applied with the acceptance of 92.5% of the "voters".<sup>182</sup> The ECOWAS among other international organization declared that they would proceed with aid cuts to Niger, which was a strike to Tandja's regime knowing

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<sup>173</sup> Virginie Baudais and Grégory Chauzal, "Briefing: The 2010 Coup D'état in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics?," 298.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 298.

<sup>175</sup> The Nigerien Constitution of 1991, Art. 36.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., Art. 136.

<sup>177</sup> Virginie Baudais and Grégory Chauzal, "Briefing: The 2010 Coup D'état in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics?," 298.

<sup>178</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing, 2012), 477.

<sup>179</sup> "Protests Against Tandja's Bid For Third Term," *RFI*, July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2009.

<sup>180</sup> "Niger Must Return to Democracy," *BBC*, August 10<sup>th</sup>, 2009.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

that foreign aid constituted 7.2% of the Nigerien GDP in 2009-2010.<sup>183</sup> Opposition parties accompanied by tens of thousands of protestors continued their rally in Niamey to end Tandja's unconstitutional third term.

### 2.3 Evaluation

The military High Command, resembled in the Joint Chief of Staff and the Commanders of the Service Branches, was quite co-opted into Tandja's regime. Tandja tended to transfer sizable cash sums to his Joint Chief of Staff, General Bourema Moumouni, along with other top officers in exchange of their loyalty and control over the FAN.<sup>184</sup> Measures as such were a part of Tandja's coup proofing strategy to neutralize the military high command. Therefore, the only possibility for a military intervention against Tandja was through those who belong to the middle or the bottom of the FAN. Colonel Salou Djibo, the coup's coordinator, was the commander of the 121<sup>st</sup> Artillery Division stationed in Niamey's suburbs.<sup>185</sup> As a Division Commander, assessing the chances of success was quite risky. His influence over other fighting squads was restricted to either men whom he had served with before and trust or men under his direct command. In addition, he knew that there would be a very high possibility of a military confrontation with those who were loyal to Tandja. The evaluation process for Djibo entailed two strategies. First, making use of the social unrest and the opposition calls for a military intervention against Tandja. Second, carefully selecting potential coup plotters who could be trusted to execute a successful coup. The first strategy was contributed to a moment of regime weakness that could be exploited due to the popular uprising against Tandja. By extension, this popular uprising would legitimize any military intervention against Tandja and his cabinet.<sup>186</sup> Whereas the second strategy was contributed to reduce any risk of leaking intelligence on the coup plans to the high command for the sake of the coup's success.

### 2.4 Coordination

Djibo's selection of potential coup associates was quite remarkable. Three restrictions shaped Djibo's selection process. The first restriction was his limited sphere of influence. As a Division Commander, Djibo's sphere of influence was limited to either men under his command or those whom he had served with before. The second restriction was carefully selecting within his sphere of influence men whom he can trust and depend on, so that he can avoid any leak of intelligence about his coup plans to the military high command. The third restriction was the tactical necessity, which was about selecting only those whom he would tactically and strategically need to execute a successful coup. Djibo selected three colonels whom

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<sup>183</sup> Abdourahmane Idrissa and Samuel Decalo, *Historical Dictionary of Niger*, 224.

<sup>184</sup> Tommy Miles, "Niger: Coup Against Tandja," *Tomathon*, February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

<sup>185</sup> Stéphanie Plasse, "Niger: Salou Djibo, De'lombre à la Lumière," *Afrik*, February 23, 2010.

<sup>186</sup> Virginie Baudais and Grégory Chauzal, "Briefing: The 2010 Coup D'état in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics?," 298.

he trusted and participated with in executing the 1999 coup. Starting with the first associate, Colonel Djibrila Hima, the Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Defense Zone of Niamey.<sup>187</sup> Colonel Hima's Defensive Division constituted the main defense line for Niamey against any coup plotters. By including Hima in the coup, Djiba secured his troops a safe passage to Niamey. The second associate was Colonel Goukoye Abdul Karimou from the military intelligence. Including Colonel Karimou to the coup granted Djiba an access to sufficient information that he needed for the coup's execution.<sup>188</sup> Taking into consideration that without Karimou, Djiba would not have had access to information, as he was merely a Division Commander. As for the third and last associate, it was Colonel Adamou Harouna from the Green Berets, Special Forces.<sup>189</sup> Including Colonel Harouna alongside his men was a necessity to take over the presidential palace and capture the president with minimal loss of lives.

In a personal interview with *Les Voix Du Monde*, Colonel Djiba stated he coordinated with his coup associates on the execution day.<sup>190</sup> Colonel Djiba might have preferred to generate common knowledge of his coup intentions to his coup associates for security reasons; especially, after he had planned everything. Djiba selected February the 18<sup>th</sup> as the execution day for two reasons. First, there would be a cabinet meeting at the presidential palace, which means that taking over the presidential palace would be same as taking over all the power centers represented in the figureheads of Tandja's regime.<sup>191</sup> Second, Tandja announced a military football tournament in Niamey for the "entertainment of the FAN", and this meant the presence of many military key figures in Niamey to participate in the tournament, and by extension, they were unarmed and would pose no threat to the plotters' force.<sup>192</sup> Djibo informed his coup associates of his plans after summoning them quietly to his base without raising any suspicions to area military commander who might have reported them to the high command. The meeting lasted for a few hours and was concluded by the approval of the coup associates to the Djibo's plans.<sup>193</sup>

## 2.5 Execution

The execution plan was dependent on the element of surprise. In other words, transferring the coup plotters forces to the capital and taking over the presidential palace before the High Military Command mobilizes any forces against the coup plotters. Colonel Djibo loaded his light armored trucks with soldiers for the sake of

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<sup>187</sup> Virginie Baudais and Grégory Chauzal, "Briefing: The 2010 Coup D'état in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics?," 298.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., 298.

<sup>189</sup> Stéphanie Plasse, "Niger: Salou Djibo, De'lombre à la Lumière."

<sup>190</sup> Cristophe Boisbouvier, "Le Général Salou Djibo Répond aux Questions de RFI," *Les Voix Du Monde*, June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2010.

<sup>191</sup> "Niger: 30 Minutes Chrono Pour Faire Un Putsch!," *Le Faso*, March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2010.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Stéphanie Plasse, "Niger: Salou Djibo, De'lombre à la Lumière."

quick mobility and headed for Niamey without any resistance from Colonel Hima's defensive forces.<sup>194</sup> By midafternoon, Djibo stationed his forces around the presidential palace and fight started between the presidential guard and the Djibo's forces. Djibo concentrated his attacks on the presidential palace to secure the coup success and ignored other secondary objectives such as taking over radio stations or airport due to the lack of sufficient men for secondary missions. Eyewitnesses confirmed seeing several corpses from both sides during the fight.<sup>195</sup> While Djibo was engaging the presidential guards to distract them, Colonel Harouna infiltrated with his men to the presidential palace and arrested Tandja and his cabinet including his joint chief of staff General Moumani. It took Djibo's forces 25-30 minutes to take over the presidential palace and arrest the president alongside his cabinet.<sup>196</sup> The plan was executed so swift that it was too late for any of the loyalist forces to reach Niamey and defend the president before his arrest.

## 2.6 Making A Fact

The national radio station was active and reported the hearing of gunshots in the parameter of the presidential palace.<sup>197</sup> Shortly before 18:00, news broadcast stopped on the radio stations and it started broadcasting military music instead. By the late evening, Colonel Goukoye Abdul Karimou headed to the national T.V., surrounded by his soldiers, and declared the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of all the state's institutions.<sup>198</sup> Furthermore, Colonel Karimou announced the establishment of the *Council Suprême Pour la Restauration de la Démocratie (CSRD)*, The Supreme Council for Democratic Restoration as a transitional council led by Colonel Djibo. 6 days later, on the 24<sup>th</sup> of February, the junta, headed by colonel Djibo, justified its intervention by referring to the following points:<sup>199</sup>

- Putting an end to the large scale corruption instituted by Tandja
- Putting an end to political centralization
- Putting an end to the continued poverty

Further more the junta announced its main objectives to:

- Restore democracy through fair and free elections
- Reunite the Nigerien population
- End national disorder

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<sup>194</sup> Niger: 30 Minutes Chrono Pour Faire Un Putsch!."

<sup>195</sup> "Coup D'Etat au Niger: Le Président arrêté et la Constitution Suspendue," *Le Monde*, February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

<sup>196</sup> Niger: 30 Minutes Chrono Pour Faire Un Putsch!."

<sup>197</sup> "Niger: Constitution Crisis Turned Coup," *IRIN*, February 18<sup>th</sup>, 2010.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Virginie Baudais and Grégory Chauzal, "Briefing: The 2010 Coup D'état in Niger: A Praetorian Regulation of Politics?," 299.



- Improve the socio-economic including the Food crisis that threatened “8 million people”
- Ending international isolation

### 2.6.1 CSRD Junta Members

The junta was constituted of Colonel Djibo and his associates from the ground forces. The Junta included the following officers:<sup>200</sup>

- Colonel Salou Djibo, Chair of the CSRD.
- Colonel Goukoye Abdul Karimou, the spokesman and of the CSRD
- Colonel Djibrila Hima, CSRD Member
- Colonel Adamou Harouna, CSRD Member

## 3 Haiti V.S. Niger

The two cases of Haiti in 1991 and Niger in 2010 represent two successful instances of infantry coup d'état. The former case was coordinated by the military commander in chief that lies on the top of the military institution, whereas an artillery company commander coordinated the latter. Both coordinators selected only men whom they can trust and depend on for the sake of the coup's success. Yet, in the Haitian case, the coup coordinator had indeed the ability to liaise between different service branches as his sphere of influence reached all the military institution. Regardless of this ability, he intentionally preferred to select certain coup associates to execute his plans and excluded others. Whereas in the Nigerien case of 2010, the coup coordinator's sphere of influence was restricted, and by extension, he was forced to recruit only men who lie within his sphere of influence. I assumed that the presence or absence of social unrest could determine the coup coordinator's behavior in selecting his coup associates regardless of the coordination type. In the case of Haiti, the absence of social unrest had indeed led General Cédras to coordinate with men whom he trust as he lacked a persuasive reason to recruit members of the High Military Council. This behavior was intentional. As for the case of Niger, social unrest was quite present, yet Colonel Djibo, as a Company Commander, did not possess enough influence that could extend to other service branches. By extension, he recruited coup associates within his sphere of influence to execute the coup in the midst of Tandja's moment of weakness. The above hypothesis, however, does not entail that the presence or the absence of social unrest is the only factor that determines the coup agency formation. Yet, it entails presence or absence of social unrest is one factor that could impact the coup agency formation.

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<sup>200</sup> *Niger: Foreign Policy and Government Guide, Volume I Strategic Information and Developments* (Washington D.C.: International Business Publications, 2011), 76.



## Chapter 6

### Conclusion

The military institution is often perceived as one cohesive unit. Its cohesion is defined by bounding its members to sustain one will, one organization and one mission.<sup>201</sup> This perspective has indeed influenced the study of civil-military relation ever since its inception. By extension, the study of military coups d'état, an aspect of civil-military relation, was impacted by the very same perspective on cohesiveness. The aim of this thesis is not to show that the academic perspective on military cohesiveness is not true. I assume in this thesis that some instances of military coup d'état, more specifically instances of infantry coups, show that military cohesiveness might not be always the case with the military behavior. This assumption is stemmed from perceiving the military institution as an interaction among its members who belong to different service branches according to the structural organization of the military institution. I assume that it is the nature of these interactions that determines the cohesiveness or the dividedness of the military institution with regards decisions such as coups d'état. This was possible through analyzing the coup agency of successful military coup instances in a limited time frame.

Analyzing the coup agency of successful military coups was possible through gathering information on the service branches, ranks, and military posts of the coup plotters with regards to the respective coup instances. The primary analysis showed that there were two categories of military coups. The first category was named as mixed coups. In this category, coup agency formation included members from different service branches. On the other hand, the second category aroused out of a more exclusive coup agency formation; it was named as infantry coups. In this category, coup agency formation included only members from the ground force regiments. The occurrence of infantry coups shows that the military members' behavior might not be of a cohesive nature at some instances of military anti-regime actions such as an instance of a military coup. Therefore, the crux of the thesis was focused on investigating these two categories, mixed and infantry coup, to puzzle out three questions; what are these categories? Why do we have at some instances mixed coup and at others infantry ones? And how mixed and infantry coups are evaluated, coordinated and executed?

I utilized a mixed method research of both a quantitative and a qualitative nature to investigate the different coup types as a means to answer the questions mentioned above. The primary data analysis showed that 64.7% of the successful military coup instances between 1980 and 2013 were infantry coups, whereas only 35.3% were mixed coups. This analysis showed that there were only two types: mixed and infantry coups. This result entailed two assumptions about coup plotters' service branches. First, plotters from the ground forces were able to execute successful

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<sup>201</sup> W. Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat*, 9.

military coups d'états independently without involving other officers from other service branches. Second, plotters from the other regular service branches of the armed forces, air force and navy, were not able to execute a successful coup independently without the engagement of the ground forces.

To answer the why question, I applied a deeper analysis to examine the common aspects shared by each coup type. It was found that 100% of the mixed coup instances were preceded by moments of social unrest. As for the infantry coups, only 43.2% out of the infantry coup cases were preceded by moments of social unrest, and 56.8% of the infantry coup cases were not preceded by any form of social unrest. These percentages did not show any causal relation between moments of social unrest and a specific coup type. 100% of the mixed coups were preceded by moments of social unrest, yet this does not mean that moments of social unrest would cause a coup, as still some infantry coup cases were preceded by moments of social unrest. Furthermore, some moments of social unrest were not even concluded by a military coup. As a result, there was a missing link that associates the absence or the presence of social unrest with coup types. The answer to this missing link was found in the how question; how mixed and infantry coups are evaluated, coordinated and executed?

The exclusiveness or inclusiveness of coup agency formation depends solely on the coup's coordination process. If the main coup coordinator can coordinate and share his coup plans with officers from different service branches, then the coup agency formation would be of an inclusive nature, and by extension the coup would be a mixed coup. On the other hand, if the coup coordinator was unable to coordinate with coup associates from different service branches, whether intentionally or unintentionally, then the coup agency formation would be of an exclusive nature, and by extension the coup would be an infantry coup. In chapter 2, I discussed these possible scenarios through identifying the coup as a process of evaluation, coordination and execution.

The coup's evaluation process was first introduced by scholars such as Holger Albrecht and Clayton Thyne. Albrecht argued that the evaluation process is a process through which the coup plotters evaluate and wait for a moment of fragility that provides them with a window of opportunity through which they can operate and oust the regime incumbent.<sup>202</sup> Thyne went further to hypothesize that the likelihood of coups is directly proportional to the regime's fragility.<sup>203</sup> Once the main coup coordinator concludes his evaluation for the regime's moment of weakness, he would start the coordination process through which he would recruit his coup associates he would need for a successful coup execution. Only at this moment, the coup coordinator would decide either to form a mixed coup agency or an inclusive one.

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<sup>202</sup> Holger Albrecht, "The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coup d'états in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013," 5.

<sup>203</sup> Clayton Thyne, "Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitations? The Effect of U.S. Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960—99," 450.

However, there are some factors that influence the coup coordinator's decision. These factors were the ability of the coup coordinator to liaise between different service branches, and the presence of a persuasive factor such as social unrest that can tempt officers from different service branches to join the coup.

### **Mixed Coups**

I hypothesized that the strong correlation between mixed coups and social unrest was dependent on the two factors that I discussed above. These coups were coordinated by a coup coordinator who had the ability to liaise between different service branches. Those who have this ability are more likely to be either a minister of defense or a joint chief of staff, as these are the only military posts that assume command over all the service branches. Yet, the ability to liaise between service branches is something, and the ability to convince officers from different service branches to join an illegal act such as executing a coup is another thing. Here comes the role of social unrest; it would work as a persuasive asset that could be utilized by those who can liaise between service branches to convince officers from different service branches to execute the coup. The coup coordinator would tempt these officers to join the coup as a means of ending chaos and restoring peace and stability to infer the military role as a bulwark against chaos.<sup>204</sup> At this moment, the coup coordinator and his coup associates would agree on a zero hour to execute their coup. Here comes the next phase, the execution process. In this process, the coup coordinator would execute the coup through seizing power centers such as the Parliament, Presidential Palace among other strategic targets that can include: airports, radio stations, TV stations, communication facilities and roads that lead to the political capital. When they accomplish these tactical objectives, they would announce their coup success and their future plans that could include the formation of a military junta that assumes control over the political scene.

### **Infantry Coups**

Some infantry coup instances were preceded by moments of social unrest, 43.2%, whereas others were not preceded by any forms of social unrest. These coups were coordinated by a coup coordinator who either intentionally or unintentionally recruited his coup associates exclusively from one service branch, which is in that case the ground force. I assumed that the exclusive behavior of the coup coordinator would be intentional; when he has the ability to liaise between different service branches, yet avoid coordinating with any officer from these branches. On the other hand, this behavior would be unintentional; when the coup coordinator does not have the ability of liaising between service branches due to the restricted influence of his military post that can only influence officers from the same service branch. I assumed that intentional scenario might be applied to coordinators from the top, middle and bottom as it only depends on the ability of the coordinator, regards of his military

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<sup>204</sup> Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, "Coup and Democracy," 802.

post, to liaise between branches. As for the unintentional scenario, I assumed that it could be only applied to coup coordinators from the middle or the bottom, as they are less likely to be able to liaise between different branches. In addition, their counterparts from the top have the ability to liaise between branches, so their exclusive behavior could only be intentional. As for the presence of social unrest, it would represent a moment of regime's fragility that the coup coordinator regardless of his military post, a window of opportunity through which he can coordinate and execute his coup.

## **Data Findings**

In chapter 3, I introduced the data gathered for this research to quantitatively test the theoretical framework introduced in chapter 2. The data analysis was concluded with the following findings:

- *Plotters from the ground forces were able to execute successful military coups d'états independently without involving other officers from other service branches.*
- *Plotters from the other regular service branches of the armed forces, air force and navy, were not able to execute a successful coup independently without the engagement of the ground forces.*
- *Coups preceded by social unrest were more likely to be coordinated from the top*
- *Coordinators from the top were more likely to coordinate mixed coups at moments of social unrest.*
- *Coordinators from the middle/bottom were more likely to coordinate infantry coups regardless of the coup status.*
- *Coup coordinators were more likely to coordinate infantry coups at moments of no social unrest.*

The data analysis showed a strong correlation between mixed coup coordination levels, more specifically coordination from the top, with mixed coup cases that were all preceded by social unrest. On the other hand, infantry coups were correlated more with coordinators from the middle/bottom regardless of the presence or absence of social unrest. One of the interesting findings that the data showed, in the successful coup cases from 1980-2013, is that at moments of no social unrest, the coup coordinator tended to have an exclusive coup agency formation regardless of the coordination level. The absence of social unrest, in this case, means the absence of a persuasive reason that could be used by the coup coordinator, regardless the coordination level, to coordinate with officers from different service branches. On the other hand, when social unrest was present, and the coup coordinator was able to liaise between service branches, the coup coordinator tended to have an inclusive coup agency formation that included different service branches.

In chapter 4 and 5, the four case studies of Thailand 1991, Turkey 1980, Haiti 1991 and Niger 2010 were selected to introduce the different scenarios of the different coup types taking into consideration the geographical distribution of the sample as well as the time frame of each case. The two cases of Thailand and Turkey represent the sole

scenario for a mixed coup. On the other hand, the case selection for chapter 5 had to cover both the intentional and unintentional exclusive coup agency formation by the coup plotters regardless of the coordination level. The four cases showed how the moments of mixed and infantry coups were evaluated, coordinated and executed. In addition, these four cases showed how the absence or presence of social unrest was instrumental in the coup agency formation when exploited by coup coordinator.

The cases of Thailand and Turkey that represented two different regime types were preceded by instances of social unrest that presented moments of regime fragility. The coup coordinators of both cases were from the top of the armed forces. These coordinators were able to utilize the state of social unrest to tempt their coup associates, the commanders of the service branches, to execute the coup as a means of ending chaos and restoring peace. On the other hand, the cases of Niger and Haiti represented two different scenarios of the infantry coups that could be executed with regards to the different coordination level of each case. These scenarios were the intentional and unintentional scenarios. The infantry coup instance of Niger in 2010 represented the unintentional scenario. It was preceded by a moment of social unrest due to its 2009 constitutional crisis. Due to the co-optation of the Nigerien High Military Council by President Tandja, the only chance for a military intervention came from the middle/bottom of the Nigerien Armed forces. Colonel Djibo, the Nigerien coup coordinator evaluated the social unrest as a window of opportunity to coordinate and execute a coup at a moment of regime fragility. He, unintentionally, coordinated and shared his coup plans to officers from his own service branch due to his restricted influence on other service branches and ended up with an exclusive coup agency formation. On the other hand, the infantry coup instance of Haiti in 1991 represented the intentional scenario. It was intentionally coordinated among carefully selected coup plotters regardless of the military post of the coup coordinator, general Cédras, as the Commander in Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces. Due to the absence of social unrest in this case, General Cédras lacked a persuasive asset that could have convinced the commanders of the other service branches to join his coup plans. Ultimately, Cédras, intentionally, coordinated his coup exclusively.

### **Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research**

This thesis aimed at giving a new perspective to the military institution. This new perspective entailed considering the military institution as an institution whose cohesiveness is dependent on the nature of the interactions among its military members who have different affiliations with regards to their service branches. Applying this perspective to military coups d'état has resulted in the introduction of two coup categories; mixed and infantry coups. This different categorization of military coups means that the traditional perspective on the military institution as one cohesive unit might not be always the case.

The thesis encountered some limitations. For instance, the data analysis was restricted to a specific time frame, between 1980-2013, and not earlier. This limitation

has constrained the number of case studies to 68 coup cases. Second, the data only focused on the successful instances of military coups d'état instead of focusing on both successful and unsuccessful coups. The reason behind this limitation is that the academic literature lacked sufficient information on coup attempts in terms of the names and the military posts of the coup plotters. This does not mean that the thesis ignored the importance of coup attempts in understanding the military behavior. However, excluding coup attempts was contributed to the lack of sufficient literature on the coup plotters of these attempts. It would be highly recommended for future research on civil-military relation to acknowledge that military cohesiveness might not be always the case. Henceforth, perceiving the military institution as a network interaction might give us better understanding various anti-regime military actions rather than military coups such as defection, mutiny or shirking.

## Codebook

Variable	Description
<b>country</b>	Country Name
<b>ccode</b>	Country codes corresponding to Gleditsch and Ward (1991)
<b>Year</b>	Year of the successful coup moment
<b>month</b>	Month of the successful coup moment
<b>day</b>	Day of the successful coup moment
<b>Groundforces</b>	The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the Ground Forces within the coup agency formation
<b>Navy</b>	The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to Navy within the coup agency formation
<b>Airforce</b>	The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the Air Force within the coup agency formation
<b>Paramilitary</b>	The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the Paramilitary Forces within the coup agency formation
<b>Police</b>	The percentage of the coup plotters affiliated to the Police within the coup agency formation
<b>CoupLeaderServiceBranch</b>	1= Ground Forces; 2= Air Force; 3= Navy; 4= Paramilitary; 5= Police
<b>CoupType</b>	1= Infantry Coup; 2= Mixed Coup
<b>PrecededStatus</b>	1=Coup preceded by a moment of social unrest; 2= Coup preceded by no moment of social unrest
<b>CoordinatorClass</b>	1= Coordinator from the top of the military institution; 2= Coordinator from the middle/bottom of the military institution

## Data Set

country	ccode	year	month	day	Groundforces	AirForce	Navy	Paramilitary	Police	CoupLeaderServiceBranch	CoupType	PrecededStatus	Coordinatorclass
Haiti	41	1986	2	7	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Haiti	41	1988	6	20	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Haiti	41	1991	9	30	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1
Guatemala	90	1982	3	23	70	20	0	0	10	1	2	1	1
Guatemala	90	1983	8	8	75	12.5	12.5	0	0	1	2	1	1
Suriname	115	1980	2	25	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Suriname	115	1980	8	15	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Bolivia	145	1980	7	17	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Bolivia	145	1981	8	3	33.33	33.33	33.33	0	0	1	2	1	1
Paraguay	150	1989	2	3	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Sao Tome and Principe	403	2003	7	16	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Guinea-Bissau	404	1980	11	15	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	404	1999	5	7	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Guinea-Bissau	404	2003	9	14	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Guinea-Bissau	404	2012	4	12	81.818181	9.09	9.09	0	0	1	2	1	1
Gambia	420	1994	7	23	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Mali	432	1991	3	26	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Mali	432	2012	3	22	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Mauritania	435	1980	1	4	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Mauritania	435	1984	12	12	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Mauritania	435	2005	8	3	94.11	0	5.88	0	0	1	2	1	1
Mauritania	435	2008	8	6	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
Niger	436	1996	1	27	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Niger	436	1999	4	9	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Niger	436	2010	2	18	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Ivory Coast	437	1999	12	24	75	25	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Guinea	438	1984	4	3	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Guinea	438	2008	12	23	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2



Burkina Faso	439	1980	11	25	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Burkina Faso	439	1982	11	7	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Burkina Faso	439	1983	8	4	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Burkina Faso	439	1987	10	15	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Liberia	450	1980	4	12	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Sierra Leone	451	1992	4	30	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Sierra Leone	451	1996	1	16	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Sierra Leone	451	1997	5	25	96.55	3.44	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Ghana	452	1981	12	31	75	25	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Nigeria	475	1983	12	31	75	12.5	12.5	0	0	1	2	1	2
Nigeria	475	1985	8	27	90	0	10	0	0	1	2	1	1
Nigeria	475	1993	11	17	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1
Central African Republic	482	1981	9	1	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Central African Republic	482	2003	3	15	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Uganda	500	1980	5	11	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Uganda	500	1985	7	27	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Burundi	516	1987	9	3	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Burundi	516	1996	7	25	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Rwanda	517	1994	4	7	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Lesotho	570	1991	4	30	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Lesotho	570	1994	8	17	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Comoros	581	1989	11	26	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	2
Comoros	581	1999	4	30	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Algeria	615	1992	1	11	75	25	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
Sudan	625	1985	4	6	86.666	6.25	6.25	0	0	1	2	1	1
Sudan	625	1989	6	30	86.666	6.25	6.25	0	0	1	2	1	2
Turkey	640	1980	9	10	40	20	20	20	0	1	2	1	1
Egypt	651	2011	2	11	87.5	8.333	4.16	0	0	1	2	1	1
Egypt	651	2013	7	3	87.5	8.333	4.16	0	0	1	2	1	1

<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	1992	4	15	28.5	0	0	71.48	0	1		2	1	2
<b>Pakistan</b>	770	1999	10	12	100	0	0	0	0	1		1	2	2
<b>Bangladesh</b>	771	1982	3	24	75	12.5	12.5	0	0	1		2	1	1
<b>Myanmar</b>	775	1988	9	18	89.473	5.26	5.26	0	0	1		2	1	1
<b>Thailand</b>	800	1991	2	23	60	20	20	0	0	1		2	1	1
<b>Thailand</b>	800	2006	9	19	71.42	14.28	14.28	0	0	1		2	1	1
<b>Fiji</b>	950	1987	5	14	100	0	0	0	0	1		1	1	1
<b>Maldives</b>	781	2012	2	7	100	0	0	0	0	1		1	1	1
<b>Togo</b>	461	2005	2	5	40	20	20	20	0	1		2	1	1
<b>Fiji</b>	950	2000	5	29	80	0	20	0	0	3		2	1	1
<b>Fiji</b>	950	2006	12	5	50	0	50	0	0	3		2	1	1

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