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The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

**On the Racialized Self-Production of the Egyptian State:
Hierarchical Structures of Refugee Exclusion**

A Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science

By Hend Ahmed Hussein Ahmed

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Under the supervision of Dr. Shourideh C. Molavi

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science, with
specialization in Development Studies

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to examine the ‘racialized self-production’ of the Egyptian state through the lens of its practices of exclusion against the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities. The study provides an understanding of the Egyptian state’s practices of racialization and its production of a hierarchy of ‘whiteness’. This study argues that the Egyptian racialized self-production and hierarchy of ‘whiteness’ shape the extent and types of practices of exclusion exhibited against the aforementioned refugee communities. This thesis looks at how practices of statehood in Egypt are entrenched in racial hierarchies and ‘structures of whiteness’ and relatedly, the extent to which various practices of exclusion against the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian refugee communities as adopted by the state, reproduce and reveal this racialized self-understanding. Looking broadly at the domains of education, labor market, social integration, legal frameworks of inclusion and media representation, the thesis further argues that race is an important structure and analytical lens through which to explain the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against its various refugee communities. From here, the study holds that the racialized proximity of a refugee community to the Egypt’s produced self-identity, shapes the type and intensity of the practices of exclusion experienced by that collective.

Introduction

1. A Racialized State Formation

The formation of modern nation states in the Middle East and North Africa over time and space is a historical process whose roots are linked to the post World War I period of decolonization. This process is marked by the demarcation of borders in the region, setting the parameters for a system of sovereign states as the main units of politics that includes territory, a permanent population and international recognition (Batatu, 1978, p.76; Williams, 2012, p.449). In this vein, the process of state formation entails the centralization of political power within a well-defined border, where the state is sovereign and has monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within its territory (Guevara, 2015; Weber, 1919).

Moreover, understood here as a process over time and space, state formation necessitates the construction of a homogeneous nation – an imagined community where a sense of unity and belonging towards a certain group is generated even in the absence of direct contact (Anderson, 1983, p.49). Examining state formation, David Theo Goldberg emphasized that “the modern nation-state comes increasingly to be constitutively ordered in and through racial configuration” (Goldberg, 2009, p.70). He holds that, racialization – the production and construction of social homogeneities – contains and generates a conceived sense of familialism and relatedness, which is imperative for the creation of modern nation-states. By extension, however, it deems the racialized Other as the differentiated, unfamiliar, unrelated, and hence unwelcomed (Goldberg, 2009, p.6). This sense of familiarity that originates from racialization generates antagonism and contempt towards those who are perceived as ethno-racially different, which in turn fuels and shapes practices of exclusion, violence, and power relations within a given society (Goldberg, 2009, p.6). Goldberg captures the instrumental connection between race and nation-states by asserting that:

Those whose racial origins are considered geographically somehow to coincide with national territory are deemed to belong to the nation; those whose geophenotypes obviously place them originally (from) elsewhere are all too often considered to pollute or potentially to terrorize the national space, with debilitating and even deadly effect. (Goldberg, 2009, p.7)

The process of racialization, namely, the construction of the positive and homogeneous racialized *Self*, entails that the dominant political actor with monopoly on the exercise of violence, examined in this study as the sovereign state, then defines *itself* against an excluded and often securitized and racialized *Other*. The process of *Otherization* – understood in this thesis as central to the formation of states and the practice of political power – creates a dichotomy between the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in the form of a binary and mutually constructive opposition (Cole and Kandiyoti, 2002; Said, 1978). This constructed notion of the Self allows the sovereign state to decide on who should be included in the body politic of a given society (citizens) – which are thus more protected and have access to a wide range of privileges – and who will be excluded (non-status and non-citizen subjects), which are subjected to violent practices and narratives that leads to their marginalization and disenfranchisement (Goldberg, 2009, p.5). With this, and as this thesis will further explore, *Otherization* often deems these excluded non-citizen Others as sources of instability, and insecurity – a type of exclusion that is then aggravated and intensified when racial categorization and practices of racialization enter the political picture.

Rogers Brubaker, proposed the notion of cultural embeddedness in *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992), he argued that “the historical path a country takes toward nationhood, embodied in distinctive ways of thinking about belonging, informs the ways that a country develops citizenship and immigration policies” (Norman, 2017, p.139). In other words, each state constructs a shared collective Self-understanding, cultural legacies, and develops institutional mechanisms, that affect how it perceives and treats non-citizens. This

shared perception of nationhood can be traced in several characteristics and structures such as race, religion, and language. All of which, can either facilitate or hinder the ability of non-citizens to integrate in the host society, as well as the degree of willingness of the host state and society to integrate them (Norman, 2017, p.140). On a similar note, this study looks at the construction and continuity of the racialized Egyptian Self-identity that developed through the process of state formation over time and space, and how it facilitates or hinders the degree of integration/exclusion of three refugee communities.

It is important to note, however, that the understanding of the racialized Self is not static, as different factors can gradually generate different understandings of the racialized Self and the Other. Among other elements, such processes mobilize schools, media, popular culture, shared language, collective memories, religion, and other institutions and practices of statehood to facilitate the construction of a racialized national identity. Indeed, these elements are partly aligned with what Antonio Gramsci referred to as cultural hegemony, namely, the ability of the ruling elites (state) to shape the perceptions of its citizens along with their values and beliefs using the listed tools at its disposal (Lears, 1985, p.569, 570).

In the case of the Middle East, different states have experienced varying phases of post-colonial state and national identity formation depending on their respective historical and political confrontation with colonial and imperial legacies of control and intervention (Hinnebusch, 2003). In Egypt, post-independence practices of nationhood reproduced racial structures that were mobilized and internalized during the early nineteenth century and the colonization period (Powell, 2003). In *A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the Sudan*, Eve M. Troutt Powell (2003), argues that the Egyptian state borrowed heavily from the Western rhetoric of race and civilization as a way to account for its imperialist and expansionist motives in Sudan. Similarly, in the early twentieth century, it employed the same racialized narrative in its struggle for independence and to reassert its

sovereignty over Sudan under the notion of the Unity of the Nile Valley. In this vein, the Egyptian racialized self-identity asserted Egyptian racial superiority and African inferiority, hence, depicting the Egyptian expansion in Africa and claims over Sudan as a ‘paternalistic’ civilization mission, which strongly resembles the racialized narrative used by the British to justify their presence in their respective colonies. The construction of the Egyptian racialized self-identity involved the development and internalization of a discourse of stereotypes about the Sudan in particular, and Africa in general – a discourse that paralleled the Orientalist imagery of largely British and French colonial observers, all of which helped delineate the Egyptian racial hierarchy (Powell, 2003, p.10; Tignor, 2003, p.6,10). In addition, Renée Worringer (2014), highlighted that the roots of Egyptian territorial nationalism dates back to the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, whereby the idea of Egypt as the heir to the ancient Pharaonic civilization thus having unique culture, heritage, identity, and geographical location, became widely held during the 1920s (p.221, p.222). The British occupation of Egypt solidified the Egyptian anticolonial sentiment against the former and led to an emphasis on the Arab and Muslim characteristics of the Egyptian national identity during the 1930s. These ‘eastern’ characteristics of the Egyptian identity were later intensified in the post-1952 revolution (Worringer, 2014, p.223).

On a similar note, Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski in *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (1986), and *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945* (1995), argue that the writings of Egyptian middle class nationalists reveal that the Egyptian national self-understanding varied between identifying itself with either its pharaonic history or with the Arabic language, culture, and Islam. Taken together, their research contends that there was little emphasis on the African characteristics of the Egyptian identity. Furthermore, Gamal Abdul Nasser’s *Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution* (1956), demonstrates that Egyptians had little trust and were suspicious of

‘foreigners’, as a result of the frequent invasions and colonization of Egypt on part of the Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Islamic conquest, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, Ottomans, the French, Mohamed Ali Pasha’s dynasty, and the British colonizers, all of which made Egyptians perceive their land as coveted by foreigners (Christie, 1998; Nasser, 1956).

Building on the extensive literature above, this thesis sheds light on the continuity of these discourse on racialization in the contemporary Egyptian nation-state. With this, the forthcoming excursus aims to examine whether and how the embedded racial structures that developed with the formation of the Egyptian modern nation-state are reflected and shape the practices of exclusion conducted against three different refugee communities, namely the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian, based on their position in the Egyptian hierarchal structures of racial inclusion and exclusion.

2. Understanding the Structure of ‘Whiteness’

Frantz Fanon, in *Black Skins, White Masks* (1952), adopts a phenomenological understanding of Whiteness by not limiting it solely to physical characteristics, but also by defining it as a racial category of perception and experiences. This category includes White manners, values, culture, music, language, and other areas that perpetuate and sustain racialized and social power relations. Accordingly, Whiteness in his view, is something that can be *acquired* and reflected in one’s experiences and behaviour (Song, 2017, p.51). On a similar note, Sara Ahmed in *A Phenomenology of Whiteness* (2007), argued that whiteness should be understood as “an ongoing and unfinished history, which orientates bodies in specific directions, affecting how they ‘take up’ space” (Ahmed, 2007, p.150). Whiteness is thus reflected through habits: if White bodies dominate a specific space that space will acquire the shape of Whiteness, which in turn, makes bodies that do not ‘possess’ Whiteness stand out and find it difficult to assimilate. In light of this, Whiteness is not inherited but rather adopted, so that one can *become*

White. This in turn, broadens the notion of Whiteness beyond the mere physical characteristics of being White.

The ideas of Ahmed shed light on the notion of Egyptians being *Whitened*, namely, those who lived abroad long enough to be tainted with Whiteness – they are perceived as having become White. Moreover, one may further argue that class and Whiteness tend to intersect and become embroidered in the fabric of the modern Egyptian society: elites in Egypt tend to relate more to Western cultural productions (music, films), are often educated in a foreign language, with little emphasis put on learning Arabic, and place more emphasis on Western history than Egyptian one. Highway advertisements in Cairo, often depict people living in expensive gated communities or going to international schools as White bodies. Hence, one's position in the social spectrum determines their degree of Whiteness, so that upward social mobility generates first or second generations of Whitened Egyptians to which the rest of the society aspires to become, as it reflects status, prestige, and power (Shafik, 2007, p.80). Although, looking at the intersectionality between race and class in contemporary Egypt is a useful approach for future research on this topic. Nevertheless, it is utilized here for the sole purpose of demonstrating that Whiteness in Egypt is a structure than can be acquired.

3. Practices of Exclusion: On the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian Refugee Communities

Rinus Penninx (2005), argues that a hostile local society as well as exclusionary state policies and practices towards refugees are major obstacles to local integration. In most cases, these obstacles pressure refugees to create parallel societies to the dominant one. However, if the host society and state are open, cosmopolitan, tolerant, and acceptant of diversity, then refugees are more likely integrate. Penninx (2005) highlights the following:

Refugees may be perceived by the local society as the Other or a stranger based on various attributes: on legal status [aliens], on physical appearance [race], on perceived cultural and religious differences, on class characteristics or on any combination of these elements. (Penninx, 2005, p.141)

National identity as part of state formation tends to impact the culture of the host society – defined as a set of attitudes, beliefs, values, perceptions and practices – this in turn affects the behaviour of the nationals towards specific refugee communities (Keesing, 1974). On a related note, Michel Peillon in *Refugees in Ireland: A Case of Social Closure* (1999) argues that there is a categorization of the racialized refugee Other. He distinguished between the ‘Proximate Others’, ‘Acceptable Others’ and ‘Different Others’ when examining the different refugee communities that were present in Ireland during the late twentieth century. The Proximate Others are those who closely resemble the host state’s racialized identity and are thus less excluded, whereas on the other end of the spectrum, lies the Different Others, namely, those who deviate significantly from the host state’s racialized identity and are this more excluded. On a similar note, this thesis examines whether the proximity of a racialized refugee community to the Egyptian racialized self-identity impacts the degree of exclusion they experience by looking at three refugee communities Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian.

In 2018 there were around 244,910 refugees and asylum seekers registered in Egypt (UNHCR, 2018). The Egyptian state continues to Otherize and exclude the different refugee communities residing in Egypt as evident in its legal framework pertaining to refugees. Egypt has ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its relative Protocol of 1967, as well as, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (the OAU Refugee Convention) (UNHCR, 2018). Nevertheless, Egypt had made reservations on several key articles which guarantee equal treatment for refugees, especially in terms of access to public education and employment (Khallaf, 2014). According to Diana Rayes (2019), Egypt continues to perceive and treat refugees as security and economic

threats. In fact, Katarzyna Grabska (2006), highlighted that the Egyptian government officials deem most refugees as unskilled, incompetent, uneducated, and overall an economic burden who compete for scarce jobs and public services (p.22). On a societal level, the practices of exclusion exhibited towards refugees in Egypt, particularly those that belong to African refugee communities, are often cited in physical and verbal abuse, lack of opportunities, social stigma and marginalization, mistreatment in detention centres, sexual trafficking, racial slurs, and sexual and gender based violence (SGBV), as major obstacles to local integration into the Egyptian society (Equal Rights Trust, 2018, p.262).

This thesis highlights however, that the three communities studied in this thesis do not experience the same degree of exclusion, their proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity and their place in the Egyptian hierarchy of Whiteness determine to an extent the degree of practices of exclusion they experience. As a matter of fact, Federica Raimondi in *Precarious Refugee Protection in Egypt* (2015) notes that:

Hierarchies among refugees became particularly sharp with the beginning of the Syrian exodus...Updates on Syrians refugees dominate the news and the frustration of long-time refugees in Egypt (namely Sudanese, Ethiopian, Somali) who feel forgotten, grows. (Raimondip, 2015, p.35)

In terms of the legal framework, the Egyptian state had made some policy concessions and preferential bilateral agreements for Sudanese and Syrian refugees (especially prior to 2013), but the same has not done for the Ethiopian refugee community. The northern Sudanese and Syrian refugee communities by virtue of their varying proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity, in the sense of having shared history, Islamic, and Arab identities, were relatively better able to integrate into the Egyptian society compared to the Ethiopian refugees (Raimondip, 2015, p. 34-67; Goździak and Walter, 2011, p.12). For instance, unlike Sudanese refugees who are only required to obtain entry visa and register in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Ethiopian refugees must also obtain residency permits,

which are usually extremely difficult to attain (Soliman, 2016, p.22). In terms of access to key services, the Ethiopian refugee children are not allowed to attend Egyptian public schools and respectively have very limited access to employment in both the formal and informal sectors compared to the two other refugee communities (Soliman, 2016, p.21).

On a societal level, Ethiopian refugees cite exclusionary practices such as language barriers, cultural and religious differences, widely held negative racial stereotypes, and growing racially motivated violence and abuse, as the basis for racial stigma and discrimination and explicit antagonism (Soliman, 2016). All of which act as exclusionary compounded obstacles to their integration into the Egyptian society, whereas the two other refugee communities relatively suffer less from these compounded obstacles.

As the most recent refugee community, the Syrian refugees have relatively enjoyed a considerable amount of preferential treatment (less excluded) compared to both the Ethiopian and Sudanese refugee communities especially during the initial stage of the Syrian conflict (Raimondip, 2015). The extensive history between Egypt and Syria, common language, shared culture, and religion to a degree eased and facilitated the integration of Syrian refugees in Egypt (Khallaf, 2014, p.19). Prior to 2013, Syrian refugees, like their Sudanese counterparts, were exempted from prior-to-arrival visa requirements (Khallaf, 2014, p.11; Ayoub, 2016). Under former President Mohamed Morsi, Syrian refugees were given complete access to public services, which included tuition free access to public education and free healthcare (Khallaf, 2014, p.11). Initially, few Syrians registered with the UNHCR, due to the lack of visa requirements, residency permits were easily issued, and Egyptians were welcoming of the Syrian refugees (Ayoub, 2016, p.32). Moreover, it is easier for Syrians to find jobs, either as business owners or working for Egyptians employees, in comparison the two other refugee communities (Ayoub, 2016, p.35). However, according to Ayoub (2016),

Strong nationalistic sentiments were nurtured by the media after 30 June 2013, where the distinctiveness of the Egyptian identity was emphasised and its Arab, African, and Muslim elements were downplayed. National security and the need to preserve territorial integrity were repeatedly invoked to fuel Egyptian nationalism. (Ayoub, 2016, p.35)

The prevalent discourse in 2013 associated Syrians with the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood group, which fostered negative perceptions towards them and lessened their preferential status, however, regardless of this backlash, they continue to be better able to integrate than the two other refugee communities (Ayoub, 2016, p.35). This thesis holds that the Syrian refugee community's proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity help explain their ability to integrate into Egypt compared to their Sudanese and Ethiopian counterparts.

4. Research Objectives and Relevance

Building on the above trajectories, the aim of this thesis is to examine the 'racialized self-production' of the Egyptian state through the lens of its practices of exclusion. Looking broadly at the domains of education, labor market, social integration, legal frameworks of inclusion and media representation, against the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian refugee communities. This thesis aims to understand the ways in which racialization and hierarchies of 'Whiteness' have shaped the extent and types of practices mobilized by the Egyptian state against these marginalized collectives. To this end, the thesis examines how the practices of statehood in Egypt are entrenched in racial hierarchies and 'structures of Whiteness', and relatedly, the extent to which the various practices of exclusion against the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian refugee communities as adopted by the state may reproduce and reveal this racialized self-understanding.

The study works from the contention that race is an important structure and analytical lens through which to explain the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against marginalized communities. As such, two hypotheses are broadly considered: first that the

proximity of a refugee community to the Egyptian racial self-hierarchy of ‘Whiteness’ determines the degree of practices of exclusion they experience; and second, these racialized exclusions are deeply entrenched in discourses and practices of securitization that are intensified and accentuated through racial hierarchies.

As it stands, the literature on refugees in the Middle East in general and in Egypt in particular, focuses primarily on highlighting the benefits of local integration and inclusion of refugees for the Egyptian state, or the possible ways of mitigating the consequences of the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against refugees communities¹. There are very few contemporary studies that theorize or engage with race in the modern Egyptian context in relation to processes of post-colonial state formation² and in relation to its impacts on contemporary refugee exclusion. In other words, few research analyzes refugee exclusion from the lens of race and racialized exclusion. Moreover, there is a shortage in the literature with regards to how the several refugee communities in Egypt experience practices of exclusion differently due to their proximity or deviation from the Egyptian racialized self-identity.

These are the knowledge gaps that my research aims to fill, insofar as the study aims first to outline the racialized self-production of the Egyptian state and then consider whether this historical and political record may be relevant to explain contemporary practices of exclusion towards its varied refugee communities as constructed Others. The study examines the historical production and construction of the Egyptian racialized self-identity, structure of Whiteness, racial stereotypes, and hierarchy by looking at the process of state formation and its modern-day manifestations, It then examines how this translates and relates to modern day refugee exclusion. Finally, it holds that different refugees do not experience similar degrees of

¹ As evident in the work of Campbell (2005), Gozdzik et al. (2010), Grabska (2006), and Penninx (2005).

² Whereas notable exceptions are Powell’s, *A Different Shade of Colonialism* (2003), and Walz and Cuno’s, *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: Histories of trans-Saharan Africans in nineteenth-century Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman Mediterranean* (2011).

exclusion, the discrepancy in how refugees experience exclusionary practices conducted by the Egyptian state can be explained by looking at the proximity or distance of their respective racialized self-identities from the Egyptian racialized self-identity.

5. Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology

Having adopted a post-structuralist approach to the examination of state formation in Egypt, the theoretical frameworks that give shape to this thesis are critical state theory and critical race theory. The former begins with a position of questioning the state as a central unit of analysis, looking at state formation as a set of practices (Thompson, 2017). This theoretical model and approach will be adopted to reveal the multifaceted forms of structural exclusion that are employed by the Egyptian state. Put differently, rather than taken as a given, the thesis begins by examining the state itself as a unit of politics that is formed and (re)produced, in time and space, through active practice and performance. In relation to the case study of the Egyptian state, critical state theory is used here to look at how the state is produced, and from there, the notions and structures of exclusion that are mobilized in its production³.

From here, critical race theory will be employed to examine the racialized structures that are part of this production. Critical race theory proposes that race is seamlessly woven into the fabric of human and political societies⁴. According to this theoretical approach, race is a social construct that reflects power relations, and a tool used to protect and advance the interest of a specific group of people who construct it through legal, economic, and social means that generate and sustain inequality. These theories understand race and racial relations from a constructivist and post-structuralist perspectives. In light of this research, race is constructed in a way to serve the interest of the state in identifying itself against an oppositional – and often

³ Thompson (2017) and Abromeit (2011).

⁴ Martinez (2014), Delgado et al (2012), Solorzano and Yosso (2000), Solorzano and Yosso (2002).

securitized – Other, which is used to justify the practices of exclusion undertaken by the state against those who it deems as non-citizens (Delgado et al, 2012).

The said theoretical framework is complemented in the thesis with the adoption of qualitative research methods depending mainly on secondary sources retrieved from books, academic articles, news articles, and reports. This thesis incorporates ethnographic studies along with interviews, and focus groups presented in secondary sources. Building on these sources, the thesis conducts a critical text, discourse, and policy analysis, focusing primarily on expressions of racio-ethnic identity in texts, speeches, and films from a post-positivist, constructivist, and post-structuralist approaches. From there, the study adopts a comparative approach to compare and map the trajectory of practices of exclusion exhibited on part of the Egyptian state towards three different refugee communities: Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian. With this, the author examines the process of state formation over time and space, focusing specifically on the development of structures of race and racialized exclusion. The above three refugee communities are selected in the thesis given that their experiences and interactions with the structures of state exclusion in Egypt shed light on the discrepancies in the relationship between racialized identities and state practice of exclusion towards the different refugee communities.

6. Outline of Chapters

As mentioned, this thesis argues that race is an important structure and analytical lens through which to explain the often securitized practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against its various refugee communities. As such Chapter One will begin with a review of the relevant literature highlighting the main concepts pertaining to the notions of exclusion and inclusion, racial hierarchies, Otherization, including, hospitality, State of Exception, *Homo Sacer*, and the Figure of the Refugee. From here, Chapter Two, titled ‘Historical Production of

Whiteness, Egyptian State Formation and Self-Racialization’, examines the historical development and production of the Egyptian racialized self-identity. In the context of colonial and imperial legacies of categorization, sovereign exclusion, and ethno-racial hierarchization. Building on this historical record and titled ‘Contemporary Racialization in Egypt’s Popular Culture’, Chapter Three looks at the more contemporary reproduction of the Egypt’s racialized self-identity through an examination of certain elements of Egyptian popular and visual culture including a sport’s event and films. Having laid out the racialized underpinnings of Egyptian self-identity and frameworks of inclusion and exclusion, Chapter Four provides an understanding of how the Egyptian racialized self-identity translates into action/practices of exclusion. It examines the various types of social and political treatment faced by three refugee communities on which this study focuses: Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian communities. Titled ‘Mapping the Trajectory of Racialized Closure: On Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian Refugee Communities’, it highlights the hierarchies of refugee exclusion through the lens of race and considers the ways in which securitization of these communities is further entrenched in racial divides and identity production. Taken together, these chapters culminate in the Conclusion which provides an understanding of the Egyptian state’s practices of racialization and its production of a hierarchy of ‘Whiteness’. In light of this, it holds that race is an important structure and analytical lens through which to explain the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against its various refugee communities. It highlights that the racialized proximity of a refugee community to the Egypt’s produced self-identity, shapes the type and intensity of the practices of exclusion experienced by the examined refugee communities. The Chapter also provides suggestions for future research.

Chapter One | Framing the Citizen and its Other Through Racial Hierarchies

1. Introduction

In assessing the research questions this literature review will delineate and capture the various – and often paradoxical – relationships that exist between the state, as a sovereign entity, and non-state political actors, namely refugees and stateless persons. Focusing largely on literature that examines these political categories and subjectivities in relation to sovereign powers from a critical post-structural lens, the chapter largely engages with the scholarship of Jacques Derrida (2000), Giorgio Agamben (1998), Hannah Arendt (1951), Emma Haddad (2010), Katarzyna Grabaska (2006), Edward Said (1978), Franz Fanon (1991), and Frank Parkin (1974), to bring in concepts like state of exception, *Homo Sacer*, hospitality, Otherization, racialized closure, and the figure of the refugee to frame the discussion of the Egyptian racialized self-identity and racialized exclusion in the forthcoming chapters.

2. The Citizen and its Other

Jacques Derrida's philosophy of hospitality sheds light on the contradictions embedded in the language of hospitality. Social constructivist and post-positivist scholars in general engage in the process of 'deconstruction' or dismantling of text in order to reveal its implicit meanings and concealed contradictions. Derrida mobilized the term and methodology of 'deconstruction' and pushed his reader to think beyond a literal understanding of text that is often taken for granted. In doing so, the inherent structures and relations of power embedded in notions related to state formation and national identity are unlocked and exposed in his writing. In his 1997 lecture on *Hospitality* (2000), Derrida engages in deconstructing the etymology of hospitality, as presented in an epigraph based on Immanuel Kant's "Third Definitive Article of a *Perpetual Peace*", revealing the inherent contradiction and hidden relations of exclusion that lies at the heart of this concept.

Derrida asserts that the notion of hospitality falls within the domain of cosmopolitan human rights, hence it is not a question of morality or politics and should not be considered as an act of philanthropy. Understating hospitality as inalienable human right – given our shared right to earth – indicates a sense of obligation and duty on behalf of the sovereign state. Although, he acknowledges that ‘we [still] do not know what hospitality is’. However, in broad terms, hospitality “means the right of *a stranger* not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory” (Derrida, 2000, p.4), in other words, it is the act of inviting or welcoming a ‘stranger’ to one’s ‘home’ or ‘country’ (O’Gorman, 2006, p.51). This in turn, necessitates the presence of a ‘patron/host’, who ‘invites’, ‘receives’, ‘welcomes’ and ‘approves’ this stranger at home or country. This patron (sovereign state) governs the place of accommodation (host country), which reaffirms that the patron is the master in his/her own country, and thus has the power to identify and dictate the rules of hospitality/welcome.

Consequently, a ‘stranger/Other’ is not unconditionally free to enter or to be welcomed in another state. Hence, Derrida argues that unconditional hospitality/welcome cannot exist – it is an impossible ideal – hospitality in its very essence is always conditional (O’Gorman, 2006, p.51). Put differently, hospitality is granted by the master so long as the stranger meets the threshold or the conditions of welcome delineated by the patron, who has the authority to offer hospitality within the confined territory upon which he/she governs. Moreover, hospitality requires the presence of the ‘Other’, ‘foreigner’, ‘outsider’ or a ‘guest’ (O’Gorman, 2006, p.52). As a result, there will always be an element of hostility in hospitality, which is reflected in the need of the patrons to assert themselves as the masters and maintain their authority by extending hospitality on their own terms (O’Gorman, 2006, p.51). Elisabeth Yarbakhsh (2018), in her article *Reading Derrida in Tehran: Between an Open Door and an Empty Sofreh*, argues that “a right of residence is dependent on the establishment of a treaty between states in which exclusionary and xenophobic restrictions are indoctrinated”

(Yarbakhsh, 2018, p.3). The fact that the state has the power to grant and withdraw of residency yields it great power.

According to Derrida:

Unconditional hospitality implies that you do not ask the other, the newcomer, the guest to give anything back, or even to identify himself or herself. Even if the other deprives you of your mastery or your home, you have to accept this. It is terrible to accept this, but that is the condition of unconditional hospitality: that you give up the mastery of your space, your home, your nation. (Derrida, 1999, p.71)

This reveals the inherent performative contradictions within the term because the foreign is forced to internalize the perceptions of the host (Derrida, 2000, p.5). Interestingly, Derrida (2000), points out that language is a mean of expressing and reasserting the authority of the master over the stranger. The imposition of language on the Other, is in and of itself a form of violence that is inflicted by the host on the guest. Throughout his essay, Derrida (2000) deconstructs hospitality in order reveal its hypocritical and conditional nature, indicating that absolute hospitality means that the host would not impose obligation on the foreigner (O’Gorman, 2006, p.52). Towards the end of his essay, Derrida asserts that “for there to be hospitality there must be a door”, but at the same time if this door exists, then precisely there is no hospitality, because there is a master who is controlling and dictating the laws of hospitality and welcome. This master creates a set of laws that must be meet as conditions for entry and residency (hospitality of invitation which is subject to customs and police checks) as opposed to hospitality of visitation.

Giorgio Agamben’s book titled *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (1998), is an important addition to the study of biopolitics, a term pioneered by Michel Foucault, and employed by the post-modernist school. Agamben begins his book by highlighting a linguistic distinction between two Greek words, namely ‘Zoe’ and ‘Bios’, both which are used to refer

to life, but different types of lives. He explained that “Zoe, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or a group” (Agamben, 1998, p.1). Zoe thus refers to a simple animal-like life (a zoological or barnyard life), whereas bios mirrors the human life in the *polis*, whereby he/she is becoming included and represented in the political machinery of the sovereign state. This, as such makes them entitled to political rights, protection, and citizenship. According to Agamben, those who exist exclusively in the private sphere, namely, women, children, and elders, are leading the life of Zoe because they are excluded from the public sphere and lack political representation and rights. Therefore, they are reduced to an animalistic status or bare-naked life. The Bios, on the other hand, represent the aspired form of human existence since it alleviates the individual out of his/her animalistic status to a more dignified form of existence by including him/her into the realm of politics (David, 2016). This creates dichotomies between Zoe (exclusion) and Bios (inclusion).

The distinction between the Zoe and Bios becomes unclear, when they no longer exist in mutually exclusive spheres, but rather intersect and overlap. In light of this, the author introduces the concept of ‘*Homo Sacer*’, originally this term referred to an individual, who under the Roman law, was punished for committing a crime, thus he/she was stripped from his/her citizenship, unprotected by the law, and deprived of rights as a citizen. In other words, *Homo Sacer* is a figure of law who used to be part of the bios (political citizen), however, after committing a crime, he/she was forced out of this socio-political order and reduced to the status of Zoe. Like an animal, this individual, although cannot be sacrificed in ritual ceremonies, can be killed with impunity and without trial (Agamben, 1998, p.83). In this sense, the sovereign decides on who to have a sacred life and who to have a bare life; a life that is no longer labelled as sacrilege exposes its bearer to death with impunity and lack of protection (Agamben, 1998, p.88). It is important however, to distinguish between *Homo Sacer* and *Zoe*, a *Homo Sacer*

goes through the devolutionary process of having bios being withdrawn (political rights and status/citizenship revoked) and reduced to the status of *Zoe* (bare naked life that can be killed with impunity). A clear example representing the life of the *Homo Sacer* manifests itself in camps (Nazi concentration camps, Guantanamo Bay detention camp, refugee camps). These camps are where a temporary *state of exception* exists, namely, a state of lawlessness and legal suspension of rights (David, 2016).

In this state of exception, the *Homo Sacer* is excluded from the rule of law, thus he/she is constantly at risk of being killed, tortured, abused, and humiliated with impunity and without trial. At the same time, he/she is still subjected to the laws and confinements of the given society that he/she got expelled from (David, 2016). To capitalize on this notion of inclusive-exclusion, Agamben states that “what has been banned is delivered over to its own separateness and, at the same time, consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it - at once excluded and included, removed and at the same time captured” (Agamben, 1998, p.110). *Homo Sacer* are excluded yet included into the society by means of their exclusion. In other words, they physically exist in a society and are required to abide by its rules and laws, nevertheless, they are confined in a sphere of lawlessness where they have no rights; they do not belong to a specific society (exclusion), yet they have to adhere to their restrictions (inclusion) (Agamben, 1998, p.9).

For Agamben rights are bestowed upon an individual by the sovereign, who grants rights only as far as it sees fit but can be withdrawn at any point in time. An individual can have the rights of a citizen and suddenly be reduced and dehumanized to bare-naked life, where any harm can be inflicted on him/her (torture, murder without trial) (David, 2016). Refugees and asylum seekers are often placed in this state of exception, where they are included yet excluded from society, and where the sovereign has the right to legally impose a state of lawlessness on them. For example, in 2005 Egyptian authority’s crack down on the Sudanese

refugees' protest in front of the UNHCR office, which led to the death of twenty eight Sudanese refugees is an clear example of the state reducing the a refugee community to the status of bare-naked lives (El-Rashidi, 2012). In critique of the literature on refugees, Turner (2015), argues that the sovereign tends to victimize and dehumanize the *Homo Scare* and reduce them to animalistic status, where they cannot help themselves and need the an external 'hero' to help and protect them, it deprives them from their agency (Turner, 2015, p.140; Janssen, 2016, p.22).

On a similar note, Hannah Arendt's book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), written after World War II, tackles the paradox of exclusion and the absence of a rights regime for the figure of the stateless refugee. After World War II, the international community has witnessed a spur in the influx of refugees. The lives of these refugees were characterized by a constant feeling of powerlessness and rootlessness which stem from their statelessness. Similar to Emma Haddad, Arendt (1951), highlighted that the problem of the stateless refugees lies in the absence of a political membership, which would ensure that their rights are being protected (their Rights to have Rights). Without a citizenship, the refugees have no entity to uphold and protect their rights. These 'stateless' groups tend to be treated as unwanted groups of people. In "*The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man,*" Arendt provides a thorough critique of human rights, as the nation state fails to protect rights of the stateless minorities. She stated that,

The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion—formulas which were designed to solve problems within given communities—but that they no longer belong to any community what so-ever. Their plight is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them. (Arendt, 1951, p.295-296)

Arendt (1951), supports this notion by pinpointing the fact that the Nazi leaders and officers only started sending Jews to ghetto communities, concentration camps, and gas chambers, once

they stripped them from their citizenship since by doing so they reduced their status to 'second-class', 'rightless' citizens. These actions were also facilitated by the Nazi's awareness that 'no state would claim and protect the human rights of this stateless group of excluded individuals' (Arendt, 1951, p.296).

3. The Figure of the Refugee

In a similar vein, in *The Refugee: The Individual between Sovereigns* (2010), Emma Haddad argues that so long as humans organize themselves in the form of sovereign nation-states, refugees would always exist as an inevitable outcome/failure of this modern form of human organization. She holds that "as long as there are political borders constructing separate states and creating clear definitions of insiders and outsiders, there will be refugees" (Haddad, 2003, p. 287). This is because a system of sovereign nation-states entails clear demarcation of borders and to a great extent identity, it also contains the underlying assumption that everyone should belong to a state, have a nationality, and citizenship.

The *figure of the refugee* is thus created once a sovereign state fails to ensure the protection of its citizens within its specific borders. Accordingly, individuals become forced to leave their nation states and lose their rights to protection as citizens (Haddad, 2003). Concurrently, the international community of states often fail to assign them to a new nation state where they are protected and develop a sense of belonging. Therefore, they are left *in between* borders, where they are excluded from the *normal* citizen-state-territory hierarchy and their identities fail to reflect any of the established nation-states (Haddad, 2003). Rather, their identities are shaped by their constant state of exclusion and lack of belonging to any nation-state. Most importantly, Haddad highlights that "once outside the normal mode of belonging, refugees act to reinforce the imagined construct of the nation-state by forming the Other, the outsider in relation to whom the identity of the nation and its citizens can be perpetuated"

(Haddad, 2010, p.298). The nation-state needs to reassert its identity as opposite of the constructed Other or foreigner, who does not belong. According to Benedict Anderson (1983), nation-states are imaged/constructed communities, Haddad (2010), added that the figure of a refugee is also constructed, in a way that the two concepts reinforce each other; the identity of the refugee Other will always be opposite to the identity of nation-state. Building on the ideas of Carl Schmitt, Haddad (2010) argues that this creates an eternal dichotomy between the friend and the enemy, the Self and the Other, alien, the stranger. In light of this, nationality becomes the defining aspect of membership and belonging in a community.

Katarzyna Grabaska (2006) argues that one does not become a refugee solely due to their ability to escape violence and persecution by means of crossing an international border. Rather a stateless person often goes through a complex and dynamic process of 'becoming a refugee' through their evolving experiences, networks, and relationships in the host country (Grabaska, 2006, p.290). She further claims that in a hostile host state, refugees often experience marginalization, which is mirrored in economic, legal, political, social, and cultural inequality and exclusion. Grabaska (2006), distinguish between three types of marginalization, first, legal marginalization (lack of access to rights, jobs, and services provided by the host government or organizations responsible for delivering assistance for refugees), second, social marginalization (referring to the state of being excluded and discriminated against by the various members of the host society), and finally, self-marginalization by means of intentionally excluding oneself from the host society (Grabaska, 2006, p.290).

4. Constructing a Racialized Other

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), sheds light on the need to construct an understanding of the Self and the Other in order to maintain one's powerful position. In this vein, European colonial powers constructed a binary but mutually reinforcing understanding of the West (the superior

and civilized occident) as opposed to the East (inferior and uncivilized orient), under what Said referred to as the science of orientalism. This artificial dichotomy often required the essentialization and generalizations of the Other (the orient was constantly portrayed as lazy, irrational, uncivilized, primitive, naïve, exotic) whereas, the occident was always the opposite (active, civilized, clever, witty, rational, sophisticated and biologically superior). The essentialization and often dehumanization of the Other, allowed European colonists to define themselves, shaped their behaviour, and fostered unequal power relations towards a romanticized orient. The seemingly refined race of the occident was ‘burdened’ with the responsibility of civilizing the uncivilized, which was adopted as the main reasoning behind colonialism. In doing so, European colonialists moulded the Orientals in a way that fits their preconceived notions of the Other, a process Said referred to as orientalising the orient (Said, 1978).

Building on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault pinpointed the term genealogy and its relation to time and history; he argues that history is often written and reproduced by the powerful, a notion further emphasized in Ahmed Fahmy’s book *‘All the Pasha’s Man’* (1997). In essence, Foucault negates the existence of one single linear progressive and rational history as adopted by the positivist/traditionalist approach to history. Foucault’s genealogy recognizes the multiplicity of the past and attempts to understand the ways by which it affects the present. To this end, he advocates the notion of ‘effective history’, which holds that history is shaped by the ongoing changes in our understanding of the perceived and constructed social reality. Hence, in terms of methodology, genealogy places emphasize on the process of discourse formation and critical discourse analysis with regards to the emergence of certain regimes of ‘truth’ that is specific to a given group of people under a specific time frame, socio-economic contexts, and the power dynamics. In his work, *History of Sexuality* (1976), Foucault reflected the idea that contemporary constructions of ‘truth’ are not

always progressive, especially with regard to the notion of homosexuality, which constructs and portrays homosexuals as being deviants. In short, Foucault genealogy is a critical approach that challenges the sources of knowledge production and encourages the deconstruction of established 'realities'.

Post-colonial scholars, such as Franz Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1991) shed light on how the colonized often internalized and reproduce racial stereotypes, representations, and inferiority complex which are perpetuated by White societies (Fanon, 1991). On a similar note, Homi Bhabha in *Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse* (1984), indicated that the colonized often engaged in an act of mimicry; namely, to imitate the behaviour and culture of the powerful White colonizer. In other words, colonialism was primarily justified on the basis of a civilization mission led by the Western superior colonizer to alleviate the inferior Eastern Other by helping them adopt the Western civilized culture (opinions, taste, intellect, morals). However, if this mission was to succeed, then the enterprise of colonialism will collapse altogether. Therefore, the colonialist projected that the colonized would engage in the act of mimicry whereby they aspire to become White, however they will remain "not quite, not White". This process of mimicry is important in maintaining the discrepancy or binary between the superior civilized Western culture and inferior Eastern culture (Bhabha, 1984).

The construction of a sense of 'nationness' is instrumental for the process of state formation: Homi Bhabha in *Nation and Narration* (1990), argues that states generate,

Narratives and discourses that signify a sense of 'nationness': the *heimlich* pleasures of the hearth, the *unheimlich* terror of the space or race of the Other; the comfort of social belonging, the hidden injuries of class; the customs of taste, the powers of political affiliation; the sense of social order, the sensibility of sexuality. (Bhabha, 1990, p.2)

Furthermore, Stuart Hall (1997), recognizes that the construction of the Other is necessary for the production of meaning, the formation of culture, the construction of social identities, and the generation of a subjective sense of the Self (Hall, 1997, p.238). In light of this, states engage in the process of Othering and Otherization, which entails the essentialization, reductionism and naturalization of binary oppositions (Hall, 1997, p.249).

5. Racialized Closure and the Hierarchy of the Racialized Other

Frank Parkin (1974), defined the term ‘closure’ as,

The process by which social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligible. This entails the singling out of certain social or physical attributes as the justificatory basis of exclusion. Weber suggests that virtually any group attribute – race, language, social origin, religion – may be seized upon provided it can be used for the monopolization of specific, usually economic opportunities. (Parkin, 1979, p.44)

This, in turn, means that there a constructed criterion that either allow people to become members or exclude them from becoming members of a given society. Closures processes create, maintain, and reinforce disparities and exclusion of certain collectivities, because they entail drawing boundaries and constructing opposing identities. According to Max Weber (1978), social closure is the process in which a dominant group maximize/monopolize advantages by restricting access to key resources, opportunities and privileges from those who are constructed as the Other or the Outsiders and are thus deemed as inferior and ineligible for inclusion (Murphy, 1988, p.88). Racial closure examines the means by which members of one racial group monopolize material and symbolic goods in relation to other racial groups who are deemed as ‘outsiders’. Practices and modes exclusion stem from said competition for resources and to preserve the existing racial/status hierarchy. Tools of closure are racialized insomuch as the *outsiderhood* is impeded in perceived biologically and ethnic inherited characteristics (Hiers, 2013, p.259).

The process of racial closure is ubiquitous; it takes place in different forms and impacts every sphere and place in society (Hiers, 2013, p.259). It can take the form of closure institutionalized in law or administrative practice (state-sanctioned racial closure) or closure embedded in social exclusion channelled through daily interactions (language, physical control, symbolic acts, stigmatization, violence, and abuse). All which aim to maintain and preserve existing status/racial hierarchy that corresponds with several advantages and define power relations (Hiers, 2013, p.259; Weber 1978; Roscigno et al. 2007, p.21). State-sanctioned racial closure include crude or subtle practices of exclusion, such as state bans on the settlement of a specific racial group, state-mandated racially segregated public spaces, state administrative and policing practices which constantly breach laws that appear to be racially neutral (Hiers, 2013, p.259). However, racial closures are not always institutionalized or explicitly shaped by formalized rules, they can be a by-product of broader discriminatory societal and cultural, often stereotypical, constructions regarding the racialized Other. In turn, formal and informal social interactions tend to, intentionally or unintentionally, recreate status and racial hierarchies and inequalities (Roscigno et al. 2007, p.45-46). However, Parkin (1974), argued that although dominant groups often take actions (closure) to maintain their privileged status in racial or social hierarchy, subordinate groups are not passive agents, rather they hold some capacity to resist and challenge the prevailing stratification arrangements (Roscigno et al. 2007, p.21).

As previously mentioned, Michel Peillon in *Refugees in Ireland: A Case of Social Closure* (1999) pinpointed that there is a hierarchy of racial closure, which is parallel to the different categories of the racialized Other/foreigners. He distinguished between the 'Proximate Others', 'Acceptable Others' and 'Different Others', among the different refugee communities present in Ireland during the late twentieth century. He defines the Other as,

Someone who in a fundamental way looks different, dresses differently, adopts a different demeanour. They are constituted around such images, which produce a powerful reservoir of feelings and emotions. The "Other" is not the

one who differs, but the one who can be made into an image of difference.
(Peillon, 1999)

For Proximate Others, the Otherness of this category of people is barely displayed; accent sets them apart, but they still share a language, racial, religious and many cultural traits, such as the English, Welsh and Scots residing in Ireland (Peillon, 1999). The Acceptable Others are those that “exist within this peculiar tension of nearness and distance”. For instance, Western European are considered as Acceptable Others to the Irish, given that Ireland has moved closer to these countries in cultural, economic, and political terms. The Different Others are whose language, culture, norms, habits, religion, or race deviate significantly from that of the host community and they retain it in their appearance and behaviour. For example, Muslim Arabs or Russian gypsies that resided in Ireland fit into this category (Peillon, 1999).

The said categories of racialized Other respectively correspond with different processes of racial closure, based on the degree by which their racialized identity (race, ethnicity, culture language, religion) proximate or deviate from the racialized identity and cultural standards of the host state. In light of this, the differences of a specific refugee community shape the way they belong and integrate. Accordingly, the Different Others often face intense practices of exclusion, expressed through rejection, hostility, and intolerance, since they are perceived as a threat, which triggers mechanisms of social closure (Peillon, 1999). In addition, Peillon (1999), argues that official and media portrayal of refugees play an important role in intensifying established hostile/friendly attitudes and negative/positive popular perceptions on part of the host community.

If refugees are portrayed in a negative light, this translates into practices of exclusion and hostility that impacts, limits, and shapes the experience of the racialized refugee. Racial closure mechanism can be observed in verbal and physical abuse and attacks in different domains of public spaces (work, streets, schools), which generate a feeling of lack of belonging and

marginalization (Peillon, 1999). Another important point that Peillon (1999), sheds light on is the argument that the host state and society often express less exclusionary sentiments against those who they perceive as capable of engaging in meaningful participation in the society based on their command of the native language and skill sets, which create a relation of reciprocity between the refugee and the host society, namely, that the host society will be less hostile towards asylum seekers and refugees, if they are perceived as bringing an added value to the society. For instance, Romanian asylum seekers, who were uneducated and unskilled, faced strong hostility in Ireland because they were not perceived as active agents in society (Peillon, 1999).

Chapter Two | Historical Production of Whiteness, Egyptian State Formation and Self-Racialization

1. Introduction

While Egyptian nationalism and state formation reached its peak in the 1920s, many scholars hold that its roots may be sourced in the first half of the nineteenth century when Muhammad Ali Pasha (1805-1848) was adamant on building a modern Egyptian state that emulated the European model (Suleiman, 2008, p.30). Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski book titled, *Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930* (1986), and its sequel, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation 1930-1945* (1995), argue that it was only until the 1930s and 1940s that Egyptians, especially the intellectual middle class, started to identify themselves with the Arab and Muslim identities. By doing so, the Egyptian political and intellectual segments of society shed more light on the ‘Eastern’ components of the Egyptian national identity and associated themselves with an extraterritorial anti-imperialist nationalist movement.

Andrew Delatolla and Joanne Yao in *Racializing Religion: Constructing Colonial Identities in the Syrian Provinces in the Nineteenth Century* (2018), highlight the importance of looking at the intersectionality between race and religion as interconnected markers of colonial difference. Racial hierarchies contained religious categorizations that were socially constructed by European colonial powers during the nineteenth century to assert civilizational difference, all of which served the European expansionist and imperialist enterprise (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.2). The authors argue that racial and religious hierarchies that were a by-product of imperialist Western discourses continue to impact the field of international relations. The process of racializing religion produced a constructed binary between the ‘fanatical Muslim as opposed enlightened Christian’, this was evident in the justification provided by the British for colonizing Egypt (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.2; Powell 2003). In fact, abolishing slave trade,

which was portrayed as barbaric act supported and encouraged by the ‘backward’ religion of Islam, often appeared as in British colonialist writings about Egypt. Accordingly, this became one of the main bases of the British civilization mission in Egypt, namely, to civilize the uncivilized fanatical, culturally, racially, and religiously inferior Muslims by enforcing the termination of slave trade and help modernize Egypt (Powell, 2003). In light of this understanding, this chapter argues that racialization is not solely concerned with presumed genotypes or phenotypical characteristics, rather it often connected to and contains other forms of categorizations such as religion, language, and ethnicity. In this vein, this chapter goes beyond Powell (2003) understanding of racialization by arguing that, phenotypical characteristics operate together with ethnicity (Arab/Pharaonic), language (Arabic), and religion (Islam) as the major interrelated categorizations embedded in the Egyptian racial hierarchy and shape the Egyptian racialized self-identity.

This chapter aims to examine the process of Egyptian state formation over time and space, beginning from the early nineteenth century up until the mid-twentieth century in order to understand the nature and development of the Egyptian racialized self-identity. The chapter holds that various intertwined and mutually reinforcing social, economic, and political factors helped configure the Egyptian racialized self-identity. With an outline of key nationalist figures, discourses, and influences in Egypt, the chapter examines the interrelated categorizations that constitute the main pillars of the Egyptian self-racialization. It points out that examining the process of state formation in Egypt from the early nineteenth century up until the mid-twentieth century reveals language ‘Arabic’, ethnicity ‘Pharaonic/Arab’, and religion ‘Islam’ categorizations and markers of difference are impeded in the Egyptian racial hierarchy of ‘Whiteness’, and they form and shape the Egyptian racialized self-identity. As the chapter outlines below, the aforementioned categorizations are emphasized at different stages of Egypt’s state formation process: they tend to overlap and at times were adopted concurrently

(Powell, 2003, p.95). With this, it argues that the Egyptian racialized self-identity is an interplay between various elements – religion, language, ethnicity, and race – all of which the forthcoming chapters outline as continuing to impact the Egyptian state’s contemporary understanding of its racialized self, which translates into practices of exclusion against racialized Others (refugees).

2. Colonial and Imperial Legacies and the Superiority of the Racialized ‘White’

The process of racialization developed and solidified as a result of the European colonial expansion and imperial legacies into the East in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which necessitated the construction of a subjective binary between the civilized Self and the uncivilized conquered subjects. Colonial and Imperial Legacies utilized racism, racial difference, and ethnic categorizations to generate systematic inequalities pertaining to access to economic, political, and social benefits. They also acted as tools for European colonizers to divide, order, and control the colonized (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.5). Accordingly, in the nineteenth century, race and racial differences appeared in the writings of various European scholars⁵ as a scientific truth, fixed, measurable, natural, and a vital marker of difference and hierarchical category (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.6). As such, the prevalence of European colonizers who were ‘conscious of their whiteness’ forced the colonized subjects to become ‘color conscious’ (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.5). Fanon, captures how colonialism had racialized the colored bodies of the colonial subjects, by referring to his experience as a colonial subject who “was previously carefree in his race, transforms into a Negro’s body through racialization.” (Song, 2017, p.50). Likewise, in *Race and Identity in the Nile Valley: Ancient and Modern Perspectives* (2004), Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Kharyssa Rhodes, argue that modern racial categories/typologies are a by-product of colonialist discourses, which dates back to Carl Linnaeus’ *Systema Naturae* in 1735, who identified four types of race

⁵ Including but not limited to Charles Dilke and Arthur de Gobinau.

(distinguished by skin color), he correlated their physical characteristics with different levels of civilization (Fluehr-Lobban, et al. 2004, p.142; Müller-Wille, 2014, p.597). Although these typologies of race were presented as scientific truth, they, however, served the colonialist enterprise (Fluehr-Lobban 2004, p.146; Shafik, 2007, p.66).

The aforementioned racialization produced racialized colonial discourse of biological and civilizational Standards (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.5). The Industrial revolution and the development of steam power reorganized the international arena along lines of core and periphery. The ideational underpinnings of this restructuring of the international system manifested themselves in the ideas of the Enlightenment, namely, believe in scientific knowledge and human rationality, secularism, positivism, inevitable gradual and linear social and economic progress and modernization, all of which marked the ‘Standard Civilization’, constructed by European colonial powers, against which the periphery were assessed and classified (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.5-9). Colonized subjects that fail to meet these Eurocentric civilizational standards are thus deemed as uncivilized and backward due to different character, such as Islam in the case of the Ottoman Empire. Various colonized states, including Egypt as it will be demonstrated in the upcoming sections, aspired to meet the Standard of Civilization established by Europeans, which shaped and continue to influence the Egyptian phenomenological understanding of Whiteness. Moreover, this section also aims to demonstrate that Egypt has relied and borrowed heavily from Western colonial literature⁶ in order to guide the development of its own racialized self-identity as the median between the civilized West and the barbaric East.

In *Black Skins, White Masks* (1952), Frantz Fanon attempts to theorize about how colonial racial structures and racialized knowledge production impacted the psyche, experiences, and

⁶ Many Egyptian scholars were exposed and influenced by the writings of European colonialist discourses when they were sent on an educational scholarship to the West especially France and Britain.

relations with people of color as colonized subjects. Fanon's work stresses on the importance of problematizing the internalization and reproduction of Whiteness – which he referred to as the epidermalization of inferiority and racial epidermal schema – among the colonial and post-colonial people of color (Song, 2017, p.50). In doing so, he sheds light on the means by which structures of colonial racism can powerfully influence the experiences and the sociopsychology of the colonized subjects. The important contribution of Fanon's work in this study is two folded, his ideas align with Egyptian internalization and reproduction of colonial racialized categorization of 'Whiteness', and the phenomenology/experiences of a black bodies that occupy a space in Whitewashed society, all of which helps outlines the practices of exclusion that these bodies experience. Like Edward Said (1978) and Homi Bhabha (1990), Fanon argued that colonialism constructed a racial binary opposition between the inferior colonized (people of color) and the superior colonizer (White) to serve their imperialist interests and dictate power relations. He draws on personal experiences to illustrate how he experienced racialization and later internalized his racial inferiority that negatively frames black bodies:

The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly, look a nigger is cold, the nigger is shivering...the handsome little boy is trembling because he thinks that the nigger is quivering with range, the little white boy throws himself into his mother's arms: Mama, the nigger's going to eat me up. (Fanon, 1952, p.113)

This detailed account illustrates how racialization limited his bodily existence in a White dominant space and attached racial meanings to his colored body. This process of racialization deemed him as inferior in relation to 'White' bodies. He then adds that "as I began to recognize that the Negro is a symbol of sin, I catch myself hating the Negro. But then I recognize that I am a Negro" (Fanon, 1952, p.17), as reference to how the colonized subjects internalize racial inferiority. Fanon went further as to argue that once the people of color learned and internalized aforementioned binary, namely equating Whiteness with goodness and civility and blackness

with impurity and inferiority, they developed what he refers to as ‘interiority complex’. The state of associating becoming superior with aspiring to become ‘White’. In other words, colonialism generated an ‘implicit bias’ in the cognition of the colonized, namely, the attempt on behalf of the colonized/people of color to assimilate and affiliate with the White culture while negating their own racial identity. This implicit bias strongly resonates with the widely used Egyptian word of ‘Udqet Al-Khawaja’– an implicit bias that is a by-product of colonization that shapes the Egyptian cognitive schema in a way that the Western White figure is often, subconsciously or consciously, perceived as advanced, civilized, modern and beautiful, whereas the opposite negative traits are attributed to the black African figure.

Timothy Mitchell, in his book *Colonising Egypt* (1991), highlights that in order to control and discipline the Egyptian subjects, the British colonizers had to create methods of power that sought not only to capture the colonized bodies, through continuous surveillance and supervision, tickets and document registration, policing and inspection. It did so also by colonizing their mind, a process which entailed the generation of ‘accurate’ information or regimes of truth and description about the nature of the Egyptian often inferior ‘character’, which include indolence, light-heartedness, laziness, lack of the habit of industry, fondness of idling time, and over reliance on others. These essentialist, naturalist, and reductionist construction of the Egyptian colonized Other was reflected in Western literature, such as Edward Lane’s *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (1836), as well as Georg Bernhard Depping’s writings on the character of the less civilized peoples and the cause of their condition, and Edmond Demolins’ *A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons* (1880) (Mitchell, 1991). The notion of *eugenics* put forwards by Francis Galton in 1883 produces a science of racial enhancement by changing racial characters (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.7).

In Chapter Four, titled ‘After We have Captured their Bodies’, Mitchell (1991), demonstrates how Egyptian thinkers in the nineteenth century such as Rifa’ a al-Tahtawi – who was strongly influenced by Depping’s writings – Mustafa Kamil, Ahmed Fathi Zaghlul, Muhammad Omar, Salah Hamdi Hamad and Qasim Amin, were influenced by Western colonialist scholarly and internalized this colonial construction of Egyptian inferiority as opposed to Western White superiority and reproduced it in their own writings by trying to align Egypt with ‘Whiteness’, which influenced and shaped the Egyptian racialized self-identity and hierarchy of Whiteness. These scholars looked at the Western culture with admiration, and thus some encouraged Egyptians to compare their culture with the British one, in terms of knowledge, abilities, customs, and traditions, to understand the origins of Western success (Powell, 2003; Mitchell, 1991). The economic and technological inequality between the Egyptians and the colonizing British paved the way for the internalization of inferiority of the former. As such, the colonial and imperial legacies of racialization thus became the basis of the Egyptian racial hierarchy since, the West and Whiteness became perceived as the benchmark for beauty, modernization, power, rationality, and advancement which Egypt aspires to align itself with (Ulucan, 2018, p.71). Accordingly, Egyptians in the first half of the nineteenth century aspired to be ‘White’, and in the second half of the nineteenth century aimed to assert their ‘Whiteness’ understood here as modernity, belief in science, economic and social development, in their efforts to gain independence from the British. Whereby racialized Egyptian national narratives positioned Africa (blackness) against the Egyptian racialized identity in an antagonist manner, in order frame Egypt as the beacon of modernity/Whiteness (Elsaket, 2017, p.11).

In his book *The Modernization Process of Egypt and Turkey in Selected Novels of Naguib Mahfouz and Orhan Pamuk* (2018), Ozlem Ulucan examined how that the literature of one country can reflect its national racialized identity (Ulucan, 2018, p.45). According to him,

Naguib Mahfouz's Trilogy illustrate the influence of the British Protectorate on ordinary Egyptians, which demonstrate that despite the widespread feels of anger at the British. Yet, they still managed to win the public's admiration without exerting effort due their racialized identity as superior. The irony of this paradoxical attitude is captured by Mahfouz scene of the interaction of one of his characters, Yasin, with a British soldier in one of the *Cairo Trilogy: Palace Walk* (Ulucan, 2018, p.70).

Yasin proceeded to the house almost reeling with joy. What good luck he had had. An Englishmen had smiled at him and thanked him [...] An Englishmen – in other words, the kind of man he imagined to embody all the perfections of human race. Yasin probably detested the English as all Egyptians did, but deep inside he respected and venerated them so much that he frequently imagined they were made from a different stuff than the rest of mankind. This man had smiled ... Yasin had answered him correctly, imitating English pronunciation so far as his mouth would allow. He had succeeded splendidly and had merited the man's thanks. (Mahfouz, 1956, p.423)⁷

This section demonstrates how colonialism and imperial legacies played an essential role in racialization and the construction of Whiteness, that was internalized and reproduced by the Egyptian nationals, all of which shaped the Egyptian racial hierarchy, whereby Egyptian became the median between civilized Europe and uncivilized Africa.

3. Racializing Egyptians as 'White'

Egyptian self-racialization was first ameliorated in the early nineteenth century since race became more articulate in the writings of Egyptians intellectuals and state officials as a result of Muhammad Ali Pasha's military campaign to conquer Sudan in 1820. Muhammad Ali Pasha was strongly influenced by the European ideas of conquest; he believed that having control over Sudan would act as a political instrument that would augment his power in the region, give him access to essential economic recourses that will feed into his plans to modernize

⁷ More examples can be found in Ibid. p.71 and Mahfouz (1956) p.431.

Egypt, as well as provide him with access to important trade routes. All of which would facilitate his eventual independence from the Ottoman Sultan (Powell, 2003, p.40). One of the justifications provided for conquering Sudan, however, was the desire of Egypt to civilize the uncivilized tribes and groups of people living along the river valley (Powell, 2003, p.41).

Accordingly, nineteenth century nationalist scholars and state officials such as, Muhammad Al-Tunsi, Selim Qapudan⁸, Rifa'a al-Tahtawi⁹, Ali Mubarak, engaged in the process of mapping Sudan, not just geographically, but also racially and culturally in order to make it fit into the Egyptian national narrative of a civilization mission – which racialized colonialism and nationalism. Despite minor differences in their views, all four writers regarded race as a vital marker of difference between Egypt and the rest of Africa; racial differences were often associated with skin color, religious attitudes and sexual behavior amongst the Sudanese and other African tribes (Powell, 2003, p.30). This reasserts the intersectionality between religion and race in the Egyptian racialized self-identity, as it created a benchmark of ‘appropriate standards of religious morals and attitudes’ against which a country’s degree of civilization was measured (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, p.4). Their writings contained various stereotypes about ‘dark’ Africans – wild savages, uncivilized, racially and culturally inferior, backward, ugly, barbaric, subjects of Egypt, and sexually lustful – all of which were mixed with new terminologies and categorizations about power, race, and civilization translated from European colonialist texts to produce a racialized nationalist discourse (Powell, 2003, p.30; El-Saket, 2017, p.11). The rest of Africa was thus essentialized and the voices and self-perceptions of its people were not reflected in these writings (Zdamee, 2019).

⁸ Muhammad Ali Pasha sent expeditions to Sudan, which comprised of both indigenous and foreign personnel (engineers, scientists, military officers), with the aim of mapping Sudan and West of Africa (an act of empire mimicry of the French expedition that dates back to Egypt under Napoleon), Selim Qapudan was part of an 1839 expedition to Sudan.

⁹ Rifa'a al-Tahtawi was exiled in Sudan in 1850.

Their writings created a racialized dichotomy between ‘Whitened’ Egypt and ‘Dark’ Africa, in an attempt align Egypt with Europe (civilized, technologically advanced, social and economic development, belief in scientific knowledge and rationality) and away from the backward Africa. If the justification behind Egypt’s expansionist plans in Sudan was to civilize it, then the state needed to produce a racialized understanding of Sudan (Other) that frames it as uncivilized and racially inferior, which in turn help assert the Egyptian racialized self-identity as the complete opposite, and hence authenticates its expansionist claims. For instance, Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, often voiced his entrenched love for Egypt in his patriotic poems *Waṭaniyyat*, he stated that since Egypt is one of the civilized nations that it ought to take its place alongside Europe (Hamed, 1990, p.42). This, however, was juxtaposed by his deep disgust with Sudan (Powell, 2003, p.30-48). He strongly criticized the technological and social backwardness of the Sudanese people as opposed to the civilized Egyptians, and hence was a strong advocate of Egypt’s civilization mission and expansionist policies in Sudan (Powell, 2003, p.53). In describing Sudan Al-Tahtawi stated,

Half of its inhabitants were like beasts and others like stones. The men of the Sudan forced their women into prostitution, and they accepted the progeny of these unions, despite the prohibition of Islamic law. They taught the women to fornicate like beasts. If it had not been for the white Arabs—*law la al-bayda min al-`arab la kanu*— they would have been blacker and blacker and blacker, nothing but blackness—*sawadan fi sawadin fi sawadin*. (Powell, 2003, p.54)

On a similar note, Ali Mubarak often recounts an encounter with a ‘dark-skinned’ yet high-ranking official in Egypt as a life changing experience, since it shocked him and disturbed his understanding of racial and cultural hierarchy where the ‘dark-skinned’ individuals were perceived as racially inferior (Powell, 2003, p. 64; Ali, 2014, p.61). These scholars depended heavily on the racialized discourse of European colonialism (the White Man's Burden/civilization mission) to caste themselves as the civilizing agent with a

benevolent/paternalistic duty of uplifting the inferior African subjects (Lopez, 2012, p.645; Hentz, 2013, p.299).

The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by Khedive Ismail's (1863 - 1879) more ambitious expansionist vision compared to his predecessors, namely, he aimed to bring Egypt closer to civilized Europe¹⁰ as well as to further expand Egypt into Africa (Powell, 2003, p.65). Khedive Ismail claimed that civilizing Africa lie at the heart of his imperialist vision for Egypt. Moreover, he abolished the increasingly criticized act of slave trade in an attempt to demonstrate Egypt's proximity to the advanced Europe¹¹. His ambitious vision entangled Egypt in a vicious cycle of debt and financial instability, all of which paved the way for the British colonization of Egypt in 1882. Grievances and dissatisfaction with Khedive Ismail and his successor Tawfik (1879–1892) started to mount among native Egyptians, fuelled mainly by the unequal treatment of native Egyptians compared to the Turco-Circassian commanders and Turkish elites in the military and society in general¹² (Zdafee, 2019).

This new social, economic and political context produced an altered understanding of the Egyptian racialized self; one which aimed at distinguishing native Egyptians from the British, the Ottoman elites, as well as, the large numbers of Sudanese and Nubians who came to Egypt by the 1870s, at times as slaves, or increasingly as doormen, nannies and gatekeepers (Powell, 2003, p.70). The fact that Egypt was colonized and humiliated by the British brought Egypt closer to Africa and away from Europe since Egypt became susceptible to colonization¹³. This upset Egyptian nationalists who were thus keen on asserting Egypt's cultural, racial, and societal distinction and superiority. They did so by outlining the ethnic, linguistic, and racial

¹⁰ "By building railways throughout Egypt, the Suez Canal, extending the telegraph service, creating more secularized schools, opening of Cairo's first opera house and the promotion of native drama troupes" (Powell, 2003, p. 66)

¹¹ This was one of the reasons why Al-Mahdi eventually revolted against Egypt's rule in Sudan.

¹² This culminated into the failed 'Urabi revolution 1879 to 1882.

¹³ For Egyptian nationalists uncivilized Africa and not Egypt could be subject to colonialism.

differences among the residents of Egypt, in order to differentiate between who is a native Egyptian and who is the foreign Other, it was also reflected in the way they justified 'illegal' slave trade (Powell, 2003, p.79).

First, both the Sudanese and Nubians, were distinguished from the Egyptians by their skin color, customs, and weak Egyptian accent in various essays, dialogues, and stories (Powell, 2003, p.70). In the 1870s, language appeared as an important marker of difference in the Egyptian racialized discourse that intersected with both religion and race. The British and Ottoman elite were distinguished from the native Egyptian not only by their biological genotype and/or religion, but also by inability to speak proper Egyptian colloquial Arabic. For Sudanese and Nubians, although they spoke fluent Egyptian colloquial Arabic given the lengthy time they spent in Egypt, nevertheless their poor pronunciation of several Arabic letter and skin color set them apart from Egyptians (Roshdy, 2019, p.33). Yaqub Sanua (1885-1910), an Egyptian nationalist playwright and journalist, often portrayed the Sudanese and Nubians as the servicemen of the Egyptian nation, they were perceived as the servants, guards, slaves in the military, nannies, and doorkeepers of Egyptian society. They were thus stereotyped as being passive, native, fearful, clumsy, unwise, unwitty, and in need of Egyptian guidance (Powell, 2003, p.72; Zdafee, 2019). These stereotypes of the African Other as being continued to the work of the private informal sphere will continue to impact the type of jobs African refugee receive in contemporary Egypt, as opposed to the Syrian refugees as will be demonstrated in Chapter Four. Accordingly, in terms of racial hierarchy, the Sudanese and Nubians were in subservient positions, helping and supporting Egyptian family and state structures (Powell, 2003, p.78; Elsaket, 2017). For Sanua, one's level of 'Egyptianness' is measured by not only race but also language, accordingly for him,

The strangeness of an accent and the weak pronunciation of Arabic letters delineated the degree of foreignness of the speaking personnel and helped

distinguish the social, economic, national, ethnic, and racial identity of the person speaking it. ¹⁴ (Powell, 2003. p. 80)

Second, although in 1877 Anglo-Egyptian Slave Trade Convention ended slave trade in all territories held by the Egypt as attempt to ‘alleviate’ Egypt’s place to the level of Europe, nevertheless the illegal trade in slaves continued. Those who belonged to the Egyptian middle and upper classes often argued that slavery was beneficial for those who were subjected to it, namely, because it provided them with essential domestic skills and introduced them to Islam. Egyptians nationalists portrayed African slavery in a paternalistic and intimate manner, unlike the abusive type of slavery that appeared in the United States or the Caribbean (Powell, 2003).

The debate over slavery in the late nineteenth century between the Egyptians and British was crucial since the British used slavery as a proof of Egyptian and Islamic backwardness, which in turn justified their presence in Egypt, namely to ensure the discontinuity of this barbaric practice, and to civilize the uncivilized Muslim Egyptians. On the other hand, for Egyptians, slavery constituted a natural and private aspect of the Egyptian family structure and reflected their own civilizing mission towards ‘black’ Africa (Powell, 2003, p.135). Abdallah al-Nadim (1842-1896), captured the intersectionality between linguistic, religious and racial categorization in forming the Egyptian racialized self-identity, when he attempted to indirectly respond to the British slave accusations through a dialogue between two recently freed slaves, one of whom expressed her desire to return to slavery and reminisced how she was treated and cared for like a daughter by stating that,

We came from our country like beasts [*zay al-bahaim*], and it was our masters who taught us about Islam [*al-kalam wa al-hadith*] and taught us about cleanliness, food, drink, how to dress and how to speak properly, since we spoke in a way that no one could understand. (Powell, 2003, p.147)

¹⁴ See Powell (2003) pages 83 to 88 for examples of how Sanua racially and linguistically represented the Sudanese and Nubians as different from Egyptians.

In addition, the question of slavery¹⁵ mirrored the question of who has the right to control Sudan (that Egypt lost in 1881 but with the help of the British regained it in 1899¹⁶). A question that occupied the minds of Egypt nationalists in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. For Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908), Egypt's humiliation was two-folded, first by its loss of authority over Sudan and second by being occupied by the British, which equated Egypt with the inferior position that belongs to the Sudanese (Powell, 2003, p.157-175). Kamil argued Sudan as a natural extension of the Egypt. In this vein, he attached a dual connotation to imperialism, where Egypt's imperialist claims over Sudan were natural, paternalistic, legal and benevolent by means of the Unity of the Nile Valley, whereas Britain's imperialist claims over Egypt and Sudan represented greed and exploitation (Powell, 2003, p.159). On a similar note, Lutfi Al Sayyid, argued that "colonizing the Sudan is the right of Egyptians, and no one else... Egyptians look at the Sudanese as brothers, as a part of their community, so it is their responsibility to look out for their brothers' welfare" (Powell, 2003, p.165). He understood imperialism in the same way as Mustafa Kamil, however for him Islam was not the unifying factor between Egypt and Sudan, rather his discourse focused on the idea shared blood, culture, and historical experience (Powell, 2003, p.167).

This notion of the 'Brotherhood' of the Nile Valley reflected the continuation of the paternalistic racialized relationship that asserted Egypt's superiority and Africa's inferiority until the 1920s (the prime days of Egyptian territorial nationalism). This racialized nationalist discourse was conducive for Egypt's fight for independence from the British after WWI, and its claims of full sovereignty over Sudan. The dark Sudanese were the inferior and uncivilized 'brothers' of the Egyptian nations, that relied on the Egyptians to civilize and modernize them

¹⁵ Captured in the Egyptian trial of the Pashas in 1894.

¹⁶ In 1899, Egypt and Britain established a joint protectorate of Sudan referred to as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899), where Britain was responsible for governing Sudan, while the Egyptian treasury financed it.

(Powell, 2003, p.174-176; AlSaket, 2017). Egyptians continued to be racialized as ‘White’ (modernized, civilized, rational, advanced, educated), as opposed to the Black African Other (primitive, uncivilized, untamed, irrational, backward, and in need for Egyptian guidance).

4. Egyptian Territorial Nationalism: The Descendants of the Pharos

The first three decades of the twentieth century were dominated by Egyptian pro-Western territorial nationalists (Tignor, 1977, p.567). Throughout the 1920s, pan-Islam or pan-Arab movements were gaining substantial support among other Arab countries, however Egyptian intellectuals and politicians preferred to adopt an isolationist approach until the 1930s. When Abdulrahman Azzam, an Egyptian politician and a strong proponent of pan-Arabism, attempted to bring the benefits of Arab unity to Saad Pasha Zaghoul’s attention, he reportedly responded by saying “if you add one zero to another zero, then you add another zero, what will be the sum?” (Dawisha, 2016, p.103). The ‘zeros’ were references to other Arab countries, which in Saad Pasha’s views, were lacking any added value in relation to Egypt’s national interests, namely independence and complete emancipation from the British after 1922, as well as regaining full control over Sudan – which he regarded as Egyptian problems not Arab ones (Chejne, 1957, p.253)

Moreover, Egypt was perceived as culturally aligned with Europe as opposed to Arab states. The origins of this separatist stance partially stems from the fact that Egypt has long been a detached politically from the other Arab states due to the nominal independence it enjoyed from the Ottoman Sultan under the rule of Muhammad Ali Pasha and his dynasty. From 1882 onwards, Egypt was striving for its political and economic independence from the British, whereas, other Arab-speaking countries had different enemies prior to WWI, such as the Ottomans and the French (Chejne, 1957, p.254). More importantly however, the idea about the uniqueness of the Egyptian identity became more popular in the 1920s as a result of the

spur in the sense of pride amongst Egyptians due to the 1919 revolution against British, the Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence (1922), the discovery of the tomb of King Tutankhamun (1922), the establishment of parliamentary democracy in Egypt (1924), the development of Egyptology as a modern branch of knowledge, and the success of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in promoting Turkish nationalism, which influenced the thinking of various Egyptian nationalist (Suleiman, 2008, p.33; Worringer, 2014, p.221). Hence, the 'Pharaonic' movement known as '*Al-Naz'ah al Fireawnziyah*', which viewed Egypt as having a distinctive Egyptian personality that is rooted in its Pharaonic past became more popular in the 1920s (Chejne, 1957, p.254). Prominent territorial nationalists, such as Shaykh Hasan al Attar (1766-1835), Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (1872-1963), Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801-1873), Taha Hussein (1889-1973), advocated the uniqueness of the Egyptian self-identity and explicitly disagreed with the Arab nationalists of the Levant, who associated Egypt with its Arab identity by virtue of shared language and culture. For these scholars, the basis of nationalism was not traced in language and culture, but rather in geography and environment (Suleiman, 2008, p.33). Moreover, Taha Hussein in *Future of Culture in Egypt* (1938) argued that in terms of cultural characteristics, Egypt was, and should be, Western rather than Eastern (Ali, 2014, p.62).

Yasir Suleiman (2008), outlined how language played an important role in defining the Egyptian racialized self-identity in line with Egypt's unique racial and ethnic categorizations. He highlighted that nationalist writers such as Salama Musa (1900-1950) and Louis Awad (1915-1990), believed that Egypt should embark on a process of vernacularization, as means of promoting colloquial Egyptian Arabic '*Ammiyya*', since it was perceived as the language of the native Egyptian farmer '*Falah*', and hence the only authentic and legitimate voice of Egypt. This is particularly the case, since Egyptian Arabic is heavily impacted by the Coptic

substratum¹⁷(Suleiman, 2008, p.33). Salama Musa considered Arabic as a foreign language that came to Egypt as a result of the Arab invasion and occupation (Suleiman, 2008, p.33-37). He also asserted that formal Arabic '*Fusha*' is as not instrumental for the modernization of Egypt and associated Arab with backwardness (Chejne, 1957, p.255). He demonstrates this by stating,

Owing to its desert origin, Arabic is said to embody values that are dangerously at variance with those of the modern world... Arabic rhetoric is condemned as a cultural site of sentimentality, emotionalism, artificiality, linguistic arrogance, outlandish metaphors, and ornate figures of speech (Suleiman, 2008, p. 34).

Therefore, he advocated the institutionalization of *Ammiyya* in Egypt¹⁸, or the disregard of the Arabic language altogether and the revival of Egypt's Coptic language (Suleiman, 2008, p.38). This understanding of the Egyptian racialized self-identity as neither Arab nor African, but rather as having a unique racial, ethnical, and linguistic identity has its roots in its Pharaonic history. It resurfaced during the Presidency of Anwar Al-Sadat (1970-1981), who wanted to break from his predecessors' Pan-Arabism legacy and promote Egyptian territorial nationalism instead (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002).

5. Egyptian Extra-Territorial Nationalism: Egyptians Racialized as Arabs and Muslims

From the 1930s onward Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (2002) argued that three forms of Supra-Egyptian nationalism dominated the Egyptian nationalist discourse respectively; Egyptian Islamic nationalism, integral Egyptian nationalism and Egyptian Arab Nationalism, all of which undermined the dominant narrative of Egyptian territorial nationalism and the

¹⁷ This is the original language of Egypt prior to the Arab invasion in the seventh century, it is heavily impacted by the Egyptian ancient hieroglyphic language.

¹⁸ Louis Awad in the *Muqaddima fi Fiqh Al-Lugha Al-Arabiyya* made a similar argument.

uniqueness of the Egyptian racialized self-identity, which became prevalent in Egypt by the early twentieth century.

Three main historical events partly explain this transformation in Egyptian nationalism and hence understanding of its racialized identity. First, the economic crisis of 1930s, which negatively impacted the Egyptian economy leading to a sharp decline in living standards. This event was accompanied by the fragility of Egypt's new parliamentary system and the escalation of political repression. All which resulted in the weakening of the pro-Western ruling elite and facilitated the development of more radical, anti-imperialist political movements and ideologies. Second, rapid urbanization, namely the growth of cities and schools, allowed the expansion of an anti-imperialist educated petite bourgeoisie '*Effendyya*', which formed and/or joined new mass-based political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ultranationalist Young Egypt. Third, Egypt's gradual involvement in the 1936-1939 Palestinian struggle, which entailed fighting a new common regional enemy (Israel) with the other Arab states, galvanized a more Arab and anti-imperialist political outlook among the majority of Egyptians (Mitchell, 1996, p.450). According to Gershoni and Jankowski (2002), the new nationalist movements of the 1930s, rejected the European model of nationalism – which was widely adopted by the Egyptian ruling class in the 1920s – that was rooted in racism and Orientalism. Instead, the new nationalists attempted to uncover a more layered political identity, one that is not exclusively defined by the geographical boundaries of the nation state (Mitchell, 1996, p.450).

5.1. Integral Egyptian Nationalism

Integral Egyptian nationalism offered a different type of Egyptian territorial nationalism; it emphasized Egypt's unique character and status as a nation in its own right, while at the same time emphasizing Egypt's strong cultural ties and its distained leadership of the Arab and Muslim neighbouring countries (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002, p.98-101; Suleiman, 2008, p.39). Young Egypt movement leader, Ahmed Hussein, stated that although he used to be an anti-Arab Pharaonist, by the 1930s however, he reached the conclusion that the bonds of a shared religion, history, culture, and civilization made Egypt an inseparable part of a larger Arab community (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1999, p.82). In light of this, "Young Egypt claimed an expansionist, even imperialist mission for Egypt as a superior nation destined to dominate the Arab world and beyond" (Mitchell, 1996, p.450).

5.2. Islamic Nationalism

Egyptian Islamic nationalism (*Al-Rabita Al-Islamiyya*), pushed forward by Hassan al-Banna in the 1930s – influenced by the writings of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1839-1897) – proposed ideas that were essential for the construction of an imagined community of the Muslim Brothers (Ali, 2014, p.65). They imagined Egypt as part of a transnational Muslim community (Mitchell, 1996, p.450). This form of nationalism emphasized the Muslim heritage of Egypt and its ties of faith and brotherhood to other Muslim nations. The bond of religion was considered as the most important national bond, which is "holier than the bond of blood or the bond of soil" and encouraged Egyptians to feel sympathy, help, defend, and even go as far as sacrifice themselves and their wealth for their fellow brothers in Islam and the broader community of all Muslims (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002, p.85). In this vein, Al Banna stated that "for every region in which there is a Muslim who says 'There Is no God but God and Muhammad is His Prophet,' is a homeland for us" (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002, p.82). Similarly, Mustafa Ashmawi agreed with Hassan Al Banna by stating that "Egypt has no value as an entity in and of itself.

Rather, its value is in its leadership of the Islamic world" (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002, p.95; Ali, 2014, p.66).

5.3. Arab Nationalism

Arab Nationalism '*al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiyya*', gained more support in the 1930s among Egyptian nationalists, however, it crystalized in the 1950s-1960s under President Gamal Abdul Nasser (Suleiman, 2008, p.39). Pan-Arab nationalist thinkers focused on the cultural and linguistic elements (ethno-linguistic) of the Egyptian national identity and rejected the idea that Egyptians belong to a distinct ethnicity. Instead they maintained that the Arabic language and culture made Egypt part of a wider Arab community – as that of Iraq and Syria (Gershoni and Jankowski, 1999, p.84; Mitchell, 1996, p.450). Abdulrahman Azzam in the 1930s, placed Egypt as part of an Arab national community based on primarily on history, language, and racial affinities (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002, p.120-21). In 1934, he stated that "the call for an Arab empire (*al-imbiraturiyya al-'arabiyya*) is not a dream spawned by a far-reaching imagination, but is based on historical reality and present necessity" (Gershoni and Jankowski, 2002, p.133). Other intellectuals and nationalist journalists such as Muhammad Lutfi, Jum'a, Abd al-Wahhab Azzam, Zaki Mubarak, Ahmad Hasan al-Zayyat, Mahmoud Azmi, called for the dismiss of narrow Pharaonic identity and the focus on Arab and Islamic identities.

There are various factors that encouraged Nasser (1956-1970), to adopt a strong Pan-Arab stance during the 1950s-60s; first, there was an increased contact between Egyptians and other Arab world during the interwar years. Second, Egypt became the hub of cultural exports to the Arab world (films, books, magazines, radio) this accordingly helped in the 'Egyptianization' of Arab culture and the 'Arabization' of Egyptian cultural production (Suleiman, 2008, p.40). Third, there was an increased trade and economic links between Egypt and Arab countries. Finally, the Palestinian question was often regarded as one of the most

important unifying factors amongst Arab nations (Suleiman, 2008, p.40). Unlike the 1920s territorial nationalism, the 1930s forms of nationalisms refused to adopt *'ammiyya* neither for communicative purposes nor as a symbolic national self-definition, hence the position of *fusha* was given greater visibility in Egyptian society, since it was perceived as significant bond that unites the Egyptians internally and externally with other Arabs (Suleiman, 2008, p.39-40).

6. Conclusion

This chapter differ from Powell's understanding of Racialization in that it adopts an intersectional approach to Racialization. It demonstrated that examining the process of state formation in Egypt from the early nineteenth century until mid-twentieth century reveals that the intersectionality between language (Arabic), culture/ethnicity (Arab), and religion (Islam) are important categorizations that interwind with race ('White') as markers of difference and divide. Taken together from an intersectional perspective the categorizations shape and configure the Egyptian racialized self-identity and hierarchy of Whiteness. These structures were respectively an outcome of an interplay of political, social, and economic factors that took place throughout the process of state formation over time and space. Moreover, the chapter highlights that racialization, racial categorization, and Otherization were a by-product of colonial and imperial legacies, since they were instrumental in shaping the nature of power relations, dividing, categorizing, and controlling the colonized.

The Chapter further argues that these racialized categorizations and discourses of European colonialism were internalized and reproduced by the Egyptian statesmen and nationalist intellectuals in order to justify their expansionist ambitions in Sudan, support Egyptian strive for independence and the subsequent claim of sovereign rights over Sudan (ElSaket, 2017, p.15). Borrowing heavily from the colonial discourses of the West, Egyptian nationals, intellectuals, statesmen, and writers used the same colonial tools and reproduced the

same racialized discourse of stereotypes about the Sudan and Africa that paralleled Orientalist imagery (Powell, 2003, p.10). Egypt was thus constructed as an agent of civilization with a benevolent and paternalistic duty of bringing about modernity to Sudan in particular, and the dark African continent in general (Powell, 2003, p.5). Along this vein, 'Whiteness' as a structure produced notions of superiority, advancement, civility, and modernization, whereas 'blackness' was antithetical, in the sense that it produced inferiority, backwardness, uncivility, and primitiveness. On this note, the upcoming chapter sheds light on the continuity of the said structures in Egypt in shaping how the Egyptian state continues to perpetuate the same processes and discourse of racialization. It is important to acknowledge however, that one of the limitations of this chapter is the lack of sufficient resources that examine racialization in relation to Egyptian state formation, the one notable exception is Powell (2003).

Chapter Three | Contemporary Racialization in Egypt's Popular Culture

1. Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted that Egyptian racialized self-identity became more pronounced and defined in the early nineteenth century, this chapter aims to shed light on the continuity of Egypt's understanding of its racialized self-identity, the persistence of racialized imperial structure, and racial stereotypes throughout mid-twentieth century and twenty first century. Although explicit systemic racism became more subtle in the writings of state officials and intellectuals, nevertheless, racialized ideas and stereotypes, continue to shape the Egyptian racialized self-identity, and are especially evident in their reproduction in the Egyptian popular culture. To shed light on this, the chapter focuses primary on popular culture – films and a sport event – to demonstrate the continuity in the contemporary Egyptian racialization, which as will be evident in the upcoming chapter, continues to shape and impact the extend of practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against the three studied refugee communities.

2. Racialization of Egyptian Films from the Mid-Twentieth Century until the Early Twentieth-First Century

This chapter argues that the racialized discourse, categorization, and stereotypes underpinning the Egyptian racialized-self-identity and shaping the Egyptian hierarchy of Whiteness, which developed during the early nineteenth century, continue to be mirrored in contemporary Egyptian cinema productions. Viola Shafik, in her book *'Popular Egyptian Cinema: Gender, Class, and Nation'* (2007), highlights that the racial divide that appeared to distinguish the Egyptian Self from the African Other (especially Sudanese and Nubians) in Egyptian films contained a number of intersectional dimensions, namely spatial (outsiderhood), racial (darker genotypes), linguistic (Non-Arabic/broken Arabic speakers), ethnical (non-Arab/non-Pharaoh), and at times religious dimension (non-Muslims) (Shafik, 2007, p.64). Egyptian film

productions continue to employ the underlying racialized discourse to reassert Sudanese inferiority and Egyptian superiority.

On a similar note, Ifdal ElSaket in *Jungle Films in Egypt: Race, Anti-Blackness and Empire* (2017), highlighted that the jungle films that appeared in Egypt during the 1940s emulated and re-enacted the racialized Western Tarzan movie genre. She captured the continuity of Egyptian racialized self-identity by stating that,

Local Africanism and anti-Blackness, rooted in Egypt's own legacies of slavery, violence against Black bodies, and claims to empire, shaped the jungle genre in Egypt. Broader efforts to present Egypt as advanced and civilized on the world stage tempered and shaped Egypt's imaginary of Africa in the films. (ElSaket, 2017, p.15)

One of the main purposes behind the establishment of the establishment of the Misr Company for Acting and Cinema in 1925 was to counter Western stereotypes of Egyptians as being backward and barbaric, namely to show that Egyptians were not similar to African who these characteristics are ascribed to. Accordingly, in order to assert its modernity, Egypt had to strongly distinguish itself from backward Africa (El-Saket, 2017, p.11; Shafik, 2007). In fact, the mounting anti-imperialist and nationalist sentiments that intensified in Egypt during the 1930s and 1940s as well as the the Unity of the Nile Valley narrative, did not radically renounced the Egyptian racialized imperial discourse and racial hierarchy. Instead, Egypt continued to engage in processes of racialization that continued to reflect Egypt's antagonist, yet paternalistic relationship to blackness (El-Saket, 2017, p.11).

Egyptian films from the mid-twentieth century and early twenty-first century juxtapose Egypt against Africa in a way that frames the Egyptian Self as White, modern, and technologically advances as opposed to the African Other that is Black, backward, and primitive. At times, these films contained referred to paternalistic relationship that Egypt had

as being part of the brotherhood of the Nile Valley, which were used to conceal the profound anti-Black Egyptian sentiments and a claim to racial superiority that helped marking Egypt as modern and White (Elsaket, 2017, p.22; Shafik, 2007). These racialized representations frame Egypt as entangled in a constant struggle of saving Sudan from the fate of other African countries that are not ‘siblings’ of the Egyptian nation, since they have a different language, religion and culture (Elsaket, 2017, p.22; Roshdy, 2019, p.33). Although during the 1950s and 1960s, these racial discourses became more subtle, nevertheless genuine structural changes did not occur (Shafik, 2007; Roshdy, 2019, p.33; El-Saket, 2017, p.29).

Egyptian jungle films such as *Naduja* (1944) and *Africano* (2001), often casted the Egyptian character as the civilized ‘White’ hero and explorers in a pith helmet who was alien to the uncivilized and barbaric African natives, which often live in primitive and exotic African villages or jungles. These films made constant reference to Egypt’s technological superiority, rationality, modernity, and industrial and urban nature which stood in stark contrast with to Africa (El-Saket, 2017, p.18). For instance, this is captured in a dialogue between an Egyptian explorer describing Egypt to a native and a native girl stating that,

Egypt is far, far away. We must ride a ship to arrive in Egypt...Egypt, filled with people, roads, cities, buildings, cars, hoot hoot hoot, trams, clang clang clang, and [newspaper] vendors [yelling] “al-Ahram, alMuqattam, al-Musawwar, al-Ithnayn. Egypt! Long live Egypt! (El-Saket, 2017, p.19).

Other films such as *Rabha* (1943), *Gharam wa Intiqam* (1944), *Mamnu‘al-Hubb* (1942), *Qalbi Dalili* (1947), *Mughamarat ‘Antar wa ‘Abla* (1948), *Bint al-Akabir* (1953), *Dahab* (1954), *Al-Haqiqa al-‘ariya* (1963), *Shams Elzanaty* (1991), *Al-Irhab Wal Kabab* (1992), *Sa‘eedi fil Gamaa el Amrekeia* (1998), *Hello Amrika* (2000), *Al-Tagroba Al-*

Danemarkeya (2003), *Elly Baly Balak* (2003), *Eyal Habiba* (2005), *Alf Mabrouk* (2009)¹⁹. First, all these films essentialized the African Other, while silencing and side-lining their voice by casting them in peripheral roles²⁰. Second, these films often contained racial slurs²¹, ‘jokes’, and representations that mirrored the racial stereotypes that were constructed about Africans in the early nineteenth century, namely portraying the African Other as having weak or incomprehensible Arabic accent, unwitty, inferior, irrational, corpulent women, clumsy, kind-hearted, sexually lustful and unchaste, savages, ugly, naïve, cannibals, and in need for Egyptian guidance (Shafik, 2007, p.68). Third, some of these movies portrayed the African Other as objects of a dominant Egyptian ‘White’ gaze, all of which define power relations between Egyptians and their African counterparts (El-Saket, 2017, p.16; Shafik, 2007).

Fourth, many of the characters in these films appeared in blackface and with exaggerated features, although this racial practice became popular in the nineteenth century United States and has since withered, nevertheless, it continues to be reproduced in contemporary Egyptian cinema production (Al Jazeera, 2019; Shafik, 2007, p.17; Saket, 2017, p.20). Fifth, African characters in these movies were often exclusively assigned domestic/informal professions, such as, house keepers, toilet cleaners, nannies, servants, prostitutes, waiters for Egyptians. This in turn, demonstrates the reproduction of the notion of the black Other being the servicemen of the Egyptian nation (Shafik, 2007, p.68). Finally, Egyptians categorized as ‘White’ (the desired racial categorization) or ‘Whitened’, by being represented as protagonists, rational, brave, chaste, civilized, educated, superior, relatively fair-

¹⁹ Refer to Roshdy, M. (2019). International Law, National Law, and UN Practice: A Study of the Complexity of Black Refugee Women’s Collective Identity in Cairo for more examples of racialized notions in the twenty first century Egyptian films, pp. 33-34. For a more contemporary examples of black face, refer to ‘Blackface Sketch and Racist Attitudes in the Middle East’ which referred to actress Shaimaa Seif wearing blackface on the 2019 TV show named Shaklabaz.

²⁰ With a notable exception of *Shams Elzanaty* (1991), where the dark-skinned character was given a more influential role.

²¹ Such as ‘*Shoukolata*’ (chocolate), *Samara* (the black one), *Abd* (Slave), *Aswad* (black).

skinned and beautiful, and urbanized. In this vein, blackness which is ascribed to the African Other becomes an undesirable racial categorization against which Egyptians make claims to Whiteness as the paternal savior of the African Other and imperial modernizer (El-Saket, 2017, p.22).

All the above-mentioned films reveal a racial hierarchy whereby European-like features, culture, and mannerisms are associated with more socially progressive, intellectually superior, modern, and advanced cultures, whereas the opposite features are associated to their African counterparts. The Egyptian character is often placed in closer proximity to the White European and distant from the African Other. This in turn marks the continuity of Egypt's racialized self-identity, as well as racial hierarchy and stereotypes, which is apparent in contemporary films. These racial hierarchy and stereotypes that appear in contemporary films impact and shape the practices of exclusion that these African bodies experience off the screen in the Egyptian society.

3. Contemporary Racialization in Sports

Since sports are a broad category, this section will only focus on the competition that took place over hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup that was to be held in Africa. South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco were announced as the three finalists. In order to win the bid, these countries had to respectively generate a legitimizing narrative to demonstrate their African credentials to the FIFA committee. To this end, Egypt had to prove its 'Africanness', which stood in a sharp contrast with racialized self-identity (Lopez, 2012, p.641). Egypt's bid ultimately failed to win any votes from FIFA officials; the FIFA officials respectively gave South Africa fourteen votes, ten to Morocco, and zero votes to Egypt (Avdellas, 2019, p.18). Shaun T. Lopez (2012), argued that the primary reason behind Egypt's significant failure in bidding to host the event was its inability to bridge the gap between Egyptian racialized self-identity and hierarchy of Whiteness

– which strongly distinguishes Egypt from the rest of Africa and places it in a comparatively superior position – and asserting its African identity. In other words, the Egyptian state failed to conceal the contradictions between “its claims to an ‘African’ identity and the realities of its [racialized and violent] history and rhetoric vis-à-vis Sub-Saharan Africa” (Lopez, 2012, p.640). The author goes further as to argue that even under former President Gamal Abdul Nasser’s Pan-African rhetoric that intensified in the 1960s, African leaders often continued to be suspicious of where his loyalty primarily lies. For instance, they were critical of his linguistic framings and descriptions of Sub-Saharan Africa, which they believed to be tented with the same racialized narrative and stereotypes that appeared in Egypt by the early nineteenth century (Lopez, 2012, p.639; Hentz, 2013 p.205). In fact, Abdul Nasser’s *Philosophy of the Revolution* (1955), that contains racialized statements such as:

Surely the people of Africa will continue to look to us – we who are the guardians of the continent’s northern gate, we who constitute the connecting link between the continent and the outside world. We certainly cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility to help to our utmost in spreading the light of knowledge and civilization up to the very depth of the virgin jungles of the continent. (Lopez, 2012, p.646)

Moreover, although Nasser played an active role in the establishment and leadership of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and voiced support to various anti-colonialist African movements (Nasser, 1955; Hentz, 2013 p.206). Nevertheless, prominent anti-colonial African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, were repeatedly in disagreement with Nasser’s policy, criticizing him for giving more priority to issues pertain to the Arab world such as, the Arab-Israeli conflict, over the socio-political issues pertaining to African states, which occupied a second place on his political agenda. From the 1970s onwards, under former President Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s diplomatic relations with Africa as well as its role in the OAU significantly deteriorated (Lopez, 2012, p.647). Very few diplomats and representatives of

Egypt attended conferences and public events hosted in Africa, many of them voices concern, displeasure or frustration when posted in Africa.

When presenting their bids to the FIFA World Cup committee, Egyptian officials focused on touting the uniqueness of the Egyptian civilization where many sports were originated, while simultaneously highlighting the inferiority and inability of other African nations to host such an important event originated (Lopez, 2012, p.648; Raab and Khalidi, 2015). This was particularly clear in the fact that, Egypt's bid logo featured Pharaonic themes and colours of the Egyptian flag, likewise its slogan read 'It's Our Turn'. This stood in contrast to South Africa's slogan that read 'It's Africa's Turn', accompanied with a logo that represented the whole continent (Cornelissen, 2004). Furthermore, when reference was made to the Africa by Egyptians officials and sports men, they were usually to highlight the inferiority of Africa by referring to it as inadequate, unstable, unsafe, and underdeveloped space compared to Egypt. Indeed, Egyptian officials cited high crime rates, weak basic infrastructure, the AIDS epidemic and other diseases in the African continent as some of the reasons why Egypt is more fit to host the event (Lopez, 2012, p.649; Raab and Khalidi, 2015). In light of this, an African diplomat commended on the vote by saying "we do not feel that Egypt perceives Africa as its continent" (Lopez, 2012, p.648).

Racialization of sports is also evident in sports reporting and commentary, which often include jokes or statements about dark Africa as uncivilized and underdeveloped. For instance, after Egypt won the sixth African championship, the , Egypt's Al-Ahram Weekly stated "They said it could not be done – an off-White country capturing the Africa Cup of Nations in darkest West Africa" (Raab and Khalidi, 2015, p.30). These examples reflect the continuity in Egypt's racialized self-identity, as well as racial hierarchy and stereotypes in the domain of sports.

This attitude is also reflected in the domain of sports reporting, which positions dark Africa as uncivilized and underdeveloped. For instance, after Egypt won the sixth African championship, the , Egypt's Al-Ahram Weekly stated "They said it could not be done – an off-white country capturing the Africa Cup of Nations in darkest West Africa" (Raab and Khalidi, 2015, p.30). If the World Cup 2010 bidding reflects the continuity in Egypt's racialized self-identity, as well as racial hierarchy and stereotypes in the domain of sports.

4. Conclusion

From the 1940s onwards, Egypt inherited the anti-colonial nationalist discourse of asserting its modernity in order to reclaim its sovereignty over Sudan, as well as authenticate its claims to independence. This was done through the creation of an inferior African Other against which Egyptians would be regarded as modern. Blackness was, and continues to be, aligned with socio-cultural inferiority, violence, and a servitude, that can only be modernized with the help of the enlightened and 'whitened' Egypt. The films and sport event discussed above echo the Egyptian imperial narratives as well as power and racial superiority, that were solidified in the early nineteenth century. These legacies produced practices of exclusion, racial stereotypes, and racial hierarchies that continue to impact the lives and shape the experiences of many African refugees living in Egypt until the present time. These racial hierarchies continued to shape Egypt's contemporary understanding of its racialized self-identity²². The forthcoming chapter examined the impact of the Egyptian racialized self-identity, hierarchy of Whiteness and securitized treatment on the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities.

²² For instance, actor Ali al-Kassar who was widely recognized for his role as 'Uthman' cases as a doorman of darker skin complexion, who is clumsy, poor Arabic accent, kind-heartedness, irrational, unwitty (Shafik, 2007, p.68). 'Uthman' continue to be used in Egypt when referring to a person with darker skin complexion.

Chapter Four | Mapping the Trajectory of Racialized Closure: On Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian Refugee Communities

“The day-to-day reality of being a refugee in Cairo with a dark skin complexion is grim.” (Miranda, 2018, p.21)

“I am even afraid to go the coffee shops because I am afraid of the way the locals look at us” as narrated by an Ethiopian interviewee (Goździak and Walter, 2012, p.15)

“They used to treat us with respect. Now they treat us like cattle” said Bilal, a Syrian refugee cheese shop owner (Hauslohner, 2013).

1. Introduction

Urban refugees in Egypt are subject to different practices of exclusion with regards to gaining legal recognition, having access to adequate services, dealing with a hostile society, guaranteeing protection against arbitrary arrest or deportation, and maintaining livelihoods (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.7). The Egyptian state explicitly refuses to accept local integration as a possible durable solution and imposes legal restrictions that draws a clear distinction between Egyptian nationals and refugees. In this vein, the Egyptian state has been actively engaging in the securitized Otherization of refugees (non-citizens). This chapter aims to map the trajectory of racialized closure against three refugee communities, namely, Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian. The chapter highlights that the securitized Otherization of the said refugee communities, is exacerbated through racialization. In other words, the process of Otherization, entails the securitization of the refugee communities (framing refugees as a threat to the economy, national security, job availability, and/or accessibility to scarce resources). However, when racialization and securitization intersect, this exacerbate and adds an extra layer of exclusion. This chapter argues that there is a hierarchy of racialized closure (exclusion); the proximity of a racialized refugee community to the Egyptian racialized self-identity, shapes the intensity of exclusion experienced respectively by the aforementioned refugee communities.

2. Overview of Key Refugee Communities in Egypt

Unlike several countries in the region, Egypt does not have a policy of encampment, hence it hosts a sizeable number urban refugee population, which settles and interacts with the local population (Jacobsen, et al. 2012, p.12). The vast majority of refugees live in Greater Cairo, Alexandria, and Damietta (Norman, 2017, p.75; Ayoub, and Khallaf, 2014, p.3). Syrians constitute the largest refugee community with a total of 129,957 (123,249 asylum seekers and 6,708 refugees), followed by the Sudanese with a total of 49,042 (26,519 asylum seekers and 22,523 refugees), South Sudanese refugee community stands at a total of 19,675 (4,299 asylum seekers and 15,376 refugees), while the Ethiopian refugee community is smaller in size in comparison to the Syrian and Sudanese refugee community with total of 16,284 (11,472 asylum seekers and 4,812 refugees) (Miranda, 2018, p.7; UNHCR, 2020).

It is important to keep in mind however, that the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees officially registered with the UNHCR reflect only a fraction of the actual total numbers of refugees residing in Egypt. The actual numbers of refugees are projected to be significantly higher than the aforementioned numbers (Norman, 2017, p.75). Moreover, this thesis does not distinguish between Sudanese and Sothern Sudanese refugees because the numbers of registered South Sudanese refugees are questionable, since several Southern Sudanese asylum seekers were granted refugee status before South Sudan became an independent state in 2012. This, however, was not reflected on the UNHCR database. Accordingly, many of those who later acquired the South Sudanese citizenship are still listed as Sudanese in UNHCR's database (Miranda, 2018, p.10).

3. The Otherization of Refugees: A Restrictive Legal and Administrative Environment

Although Egypt acceded to a number of international conventions and protocol that uphold refugee rights, such as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Egypt also participated in the drafting of the convention), and its 1967 Protocol, as well as to the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Nevertheless, Egypt has placed reservations on five articles²³ of the 1951 Convention, which disallow refugees equal treatment with nationals in issues pertaining to personal status, rationing, social services including access to primary education and housing, access to public relief and assistance, several labor legislation and social security laws (Bidinger, 2015, p.81). Likewise, Egypt made reservations on the 1969 OAU Convention with regard to social services (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.10).

3.1. Access to Formal Employment

While Egypt did not place reservations on Article 17 of the 1951 Convention relating to paid employment²⁴. Nevertheless, there are several administrative hurdles that prevent refugees from acquiring work permits. Refugees are treated like foreign migrants when it comes to access to labor markets. According to the 2003 Egyptian Labor Law, in order for refugees – like other foreigners – to obtain a work permit they need to have a legal status, employer sponsorship (\$82 per year), and provide evidence that the job offered cannot be conducted by an Egyptian national²⁵. Employers are also required submit a proof that the refugee candidate is not carrying the AIDS virus²⁶. Moreover, employment of foreigners, including refugees, is

²³ Articles 12(1), 20, 22(1), 23, and 24.

²⁴ Also, Article 54 of the Egyptian Constitution considers refugees as eligible for work permits.

²⁵ In order to halt labour market competition with nationals.

²⁶ According to the 2006 decree of the Ministry of Manpower and Immigration.

restricted to ten percent of the number of workers in any public or private entity. Finally, refugees are not allowed to work as tourist guides, and in sectors like customs clearance or in the export industry (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). These restrictions impose significant administrative burdens on both the refugees and potential employers, accordingly, the vast majority of the refugees residing in Egypt are forced to work in the informal sector, where they are exposed to exploitation as well as physical and verbal abuse.

Under the 1997 Investment Law, refugees, like foreigners, could own businesses in specified fields, however, they cannot hold majority ownership of partnerships, and are required to employ a specified percentage of Egyptians. Moreover, Law 56 of 1988, dictates that refugees cannot own property without the Prime Minister's permission and limits residential property to only 3,000 square meters purchased with convertible currency, wherein they must wait five years to sell it. On a similar note, Law 143 of 198, prohibited foreign ownership of agricultural land (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008).

3.2. Access to Basic Services

Refugees are treated like foreign migrants with regards to access to basic services. In terms of healthcare provision, the Ministry of Health and Population decided in 2005 that refugees have equal access to primary public healthcare and emergency care services as Egyptians. However, only Egyptians are allowed to receive free public health services beyond emergencies, whereas access to public primary curative care is provided for a small fee (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008; UNHCR Report, 2016). To be more precise, “UNHCR continues to provide primary healthcare, emergency care, specialised care, and chronic disease care in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and local partners” (Daily News Egypt, 2018).

In terms of education, Article 5 of Law 22 of 1992, states that any student funded by UNHCR has the right to be enrolled in Egyptian schools (Jacobsen et al. 2012, p.13). Meanwhile foreigners including refugees, are expected to submit birth certificates, letters from their embassies or UNHCR, residence permits, and certificates from previous schools in the country of origin, all of which are often difficult documents to attain²⁷ and act as bureaucratic obstacles (Jacobsen et al. 2012; United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). Also, while refugee children funded by UNHCR are technically allowed to enrol in public schools, the overcrowding of schools and deteriorated educational infrastructure obstruct their access. Legal restriction in addition to the various economic challenges facing Egypt including increased unemployment rates especially among youth, high inflation rates, and population growth, result in increased pressure on education and health system facilities, all of which affect the quality and obtainability of service provision and impede refugees' ability to access their educational rights.

3.3. Refugee Status Determination (RSD) and Legal Residency

Egypt continue to treat the presence of refugees as a temporary matter, although many live in a protracted situation. A 1984 presidential decree established a Permanent Refugee Affairs Committee within the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) to adjudicate applications for asylum under the 1951 Convention. However, under a Memorandum of Understanding (1954) with the UNHCR, the Egyptian government generally delegated responsibilities such as, registration, documentation, and RSD to the UNHCR (Miranda, 2018, p.8; United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). Given the aforementioned reservations, UNHCR became the main actor (surrogate state) responsible for key basic service

²⁷ To overcome this problem, the Ministry of Education in 2000, instructed public schools to accept refugees with UNHCR documentation and government-issued residence permits, but this does not usually happen on the ground.

provision and livelihoods assistance to refugees instead of the Egyptian state (Miranda, 2018, p.8). By doing so, the Egyptian state adopted an ambivalent attitude²⁸ towards refugees.

Most Asylum seekers are subject to visa restrictions. Once, inside Egypt, asylum seekers are expected to register with the UNHCR for protection and assistance. Upon registering, they are granted a yellow card, which allows them to reside in Egypt, until the date of their RSD interview to determine their eligibility for refugee status (a blue card). The time between the registration of asylum seekers and their scheduled RSD meeting is often very lengthily, especially for African refugees compared to Syrian refugees (Miranda, 2018, UNHCR, 2016). Once a person is recognized as a refugee he/she is eligible for one of UNHCR's durable solutions; local integration (the Egyptian state has repetitively expressed its unwillingness to accept this as a durable solution even for those who live in a protracted refugee situation, citing lack of resources and poor economic capacity), voluntary repatriation (this is the preferred solution expressed by some Syrian refugees as opposed African refugees), resettlement to a third country (this is the preferred solution for most refugees) (Zwich, 2020, p.10). However, given the rise of right-wing voices in Western countries the former durable solution has become increasingly unattainable for many refugees. Hence, local integration became the *de facto* solution for many refugees (Miranda, 2018; Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.9). Accordingly, this chapter argues that racialization prevents refugees from integrating equally into the Egyptian society, whereby the Syrian refugees' proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity facilitates their *de facto* integration compared to the two other refugee communities.

²⁸ Attitude of being “aware of the presence of migrant and refugee groups, [yet] a host state chooses not to directly engage such groups. Instead, it relies on international organizations and NGOs to carry out engagement on its behalf, which has tangential benefits for the host state” (Norman, 2017, p.166).

Under the Egyptian law, apart from few exceptions, citizenship is only granted on the basis of descent, hence by virtue of this, all refugee communities are excluded and Otherized by the Egyptian state. In order for the UNHCR registered refugees to legalize their residency in Egypt, they have to register with the Egyptian MoFA, then proceed to *Mogamma Al Tahrir* in order to apply and receive their stamped residency permits valid for six months and has to be renewed, this process is often complex, difficult and lengthily (Miranda, 2018, p.9; Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.9).

This section demonstrated that the Egyptian state engage in the process of Otherizing the figure of refugee. It imposes legal restriction as well as administrative obstacles that prevents the integration and inclusion of refugees. All of which leaves the refugee in a state of exception, where there is a clear legal suspension of rights and lawlessness. Refugees are included in the sense that they are expected to adhere to the Egyptian law but are concurrently excluded from the society and physical protection (as well be further demonstrated in the sections below). As refugees, the rights that are granted on the bases of citizenship are revoked, and their lives resemble that of the *Homo Sacer* (killed with impunity). The upcoming sections will also demonstrate that the Egyptian state, bestows rights only as far as it sees fit, and can withdraw them at any time. All in all, the aforementioned state-sanctioned closure tends to marginalize and Otherize the refugee, by drawing a distinction between refugees and nationals in terms of access to basic rights, citizenship, and protection. The protracted situation which refugees in Egypt are facing, given their inability to repatriate, the refusal of the Egyptian government to facilitate local integration, and shrinking resettlement likelihoods, forces refugees to *de facto* integrate into the Egyptian society. Nevertheless, what the next section will demonstrate is that refugees in Egypt do not de facto integrate equality than other. The proximity or distance of a refugee community to the Egyptian racialized self-identity and their position on the Egyptian hierarchy of Whiteness, can either facilitate (Syrian) or hinder

(Sudanese, Ethiopian) their de facto integration, through the intensity of practices of exclusion they experience in the domains of education, labour market, social integration, legal framework, and to an extent media production.

4. Sudanese Refugees: The ‘Acceptable’ Other

As result of the long history of trade and migration between Egypt and Sudan, there has been strong Sudanese presence in Egypt since the early nineteenth century some of which came as slaves while others came for work or education (Grabska, 2006, p.288). However, the 1990s witnessed an influx of African refugees (Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Somali) as a result of the mounting conflict in the Horn of Africa. The first wave of Sudanese refugees going to Egypt began with the outbreak of the first civil war in Sudan in 1955. The second wave took place in 1983 as a result of the establishment of Islamic Law and the Arabization of southern Sudan, which culminated into the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war and the subsequent 1989 coup (Jacobsen, Ayoub, and Johnson, 2012, p.11; Miranda, 2018, p.6). Moreover, the number of refugees coming from Darfur increased drastically as a result of renewed conflict in Darfur in 2003 (Jacobsen et al. 2012, p.11). In terms of ethnic composition, Nuba and Fur (speak Arabic) are the prevailing ethnicities amongst the Sudanese refugee community. The advent of Southern Sudanese refugees in the 1950s, changed the composition of the Sudanese community in Egypt, whereby there was an increase in the numbers of Christian Sudanese who do not speak Arabic and find it difficult to integrate and interact with Egyptians – predominantly Muslim and Arab (Gabraska, 2006, p.294; Minranda, 2018, p.13).

Prior to 1995, the Sudanese refugee community occupied a more preferential position compared to other refugee communities (relatively less excluded). This preferential status was an outcome of the Wadi El Nil agreement (1976) between Sudan and Egypt; under its conditions Sudanese living in Egypt had unrestricted access to education, property ownership,

healthcare services, and employment on par with nationals (Azzam et al. 2006, p.8; Raimondip, 2015, p. 68). In addition, it allowed Sudanese to enter Egypt without a visa and granted them the right of residency. Accordingly, many Sudanese people coming to Egypt in 1983 had little motive to register with UNHCR. In 1994, the spur in the numbers of Sudanese entering Egypt compelled the government to delegate the responsibility of screening Sudanese asylum seekers to UNHCR (Jacobsen et al. 2012, p.11; Grabaska, 2006, p.295).

Nevertheless, the assassination attempt of former President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995, which was allegedly held by Sudanese Islamists, revoked the Wadi El Nil agreement, and eroded the preferential status that Sudanese refugees received. The deterioration in the relations between the Sudanese and Egyptian governments as well as the securitization of the Sudanese people, intensified the exclusion of the Sudanese refugee community. This situation translated into increased regular security checks of Sudanese, and restricted rights in terms of access to education, health, and work opportunities (Gabraska, 2006, p.294). Visa requirements and residence permit were reimpose on the Sudanese who entered the country, and asylum seekers had to go through the asylum procedures, all of which changed their situation to one that resembles that of foreigners (Sperl, 2001).

Nevertheless, in 2004, the Sudanese and Egyptian government signed and ratified the 'Four Freedoms Agreement', which gave the Sudanese people living in Egypt 'special status', it granted reciprocal benefits to the Sudanese residing in Egypt, by ensuring freedom of movement and residence, allowing Sudanese people the right to access work and education regardless of their residency status (supported by Ministerial Decree No.24), and granting Sudanese the right to own land and property. However, various Sudanese refugees assert that this preferential treatment has not yet been materialized in practice (Jacobsen et al. 2012, p.12; Khory, 2012, p.88, Gabraska, 2006, p. 295, Azzam et al. 2006, p.10).

In 2005, around 2,500 Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers organized and carried out a sit-in in front of UNHCR's office. The UNHCR decision to suspend RSD interviews for Sudanese asylum seekers – as a result of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan – as well as, the mounting frustration and grievances with their living situation in Egypt triggered the sit-in. The protestors presented demands that contained statements such as “because of racial discrimination and no protection from it, and the lack of the right to work, health, and education, we can see no possibilities of our integrating into Egyptian society, even temporarily” (Miranda, 2018, p.23). Unfortunately, these protests were securitized and racialized, and accordingly met with a violent crackdown by the Egyptian security forces. Sudanese protestors were treated as bare naked life that can be killed with impunity. All of which resulted in the death of around twenty-six Sudanese refugees and leaving hundreds injured and around six hundred detained and subject to the threat of forced repatriation (Miranda, 2018, p.23; Norman, 2017, p.115). The media used racialized statements to justify the Egyptian state's actions against the Sudanese protestors, by claiming that the Sudanese protestors were violent and bearers of AIDS and disease (Raimondip, 2015, p.71). Indeed, this follows the same racialized narrative on part of the Egyptian media that criminalize the community and paint African refugees in general as ‘drug dealers’ and a ‘threat’ to the moral integrity of Egyptian society (Grabska, 2006, p.41).

The aforementioned exclusions are further exacerbated by the racialization of the Sudanese refugee community. Giri (2007) highlighted that “the Egyptian culture [had been] shaped by the legacy of race, and by the Sudan as a 'racial Other', long after imperialism and the slave trade had withered away” (Giri, 2007, p.108). Xenophobic attitudes and racial discrimination impeded in the Egyptian society since the early nineteenth century as demonstrated in earlier chapters, further intensify African refugees' sense of structural and racial marginalization, alienation, and exclusion. It impacts every aspect of the Sudanese

refugees' lives ranging from racial abuse from local people in public spaces (streets, public transportations, restaurants, and cafes), to bad and humiliating treatment from employers and exploitation by landlords. In addition, refugees find it ineffective and sometimes threatening to report such abuses to the Egyptian police. Adding the racialization dimension to the analysis of Sudanese refugees, exacerbates the type and intensity of exclusion they face, whereby they are constantly physically and psychologically threatened, their free mobility is hampered, and their ability to sustain decent livelihoods is eroded.

Miranda (2018), argues that there is lack of interaction between the Sudanese and the Egyptian community, even between the predominantly Christian Nuba Sudanese refugee community and the Egyptian Coptic community (Miranda, 2018, p.15). African refugees, including Sudanese refugees, voice concerns over the fact that racism is entrenched in their daily interactions, media representations, and law enforcement. Sudanese refugees, often cite being yelled at with words such as "*Chocalata*" (chocolate), "*Dalma*," (darkness), *Shikabala* (an Egyptian football player with dark complexion) or "*Samara*" (the black one), "*Ya Aswad*" (you black), "*Abd/Abda*" (slave), "*Kalb Aswad*" (black dog) or "*Bonga Bonga*", in the streets or by their employers. Egyptians at times make gorilla noises and throw water, trash, or stones at African refugees (Miranda, 2018, p.21; Roshdy, 2019, p.38). Others mention incidents when Egyptians refused to give them seats in the metro or harassed them with dogs while walking down the streets (Roshdy, 2019, p.33).

African school students and teachers are racially insulted and at times verbally and physically abused and assaulted as they leave school, which in turn restricts their free mobility. As a matter of fact, in February 2017, an Egyptian man murdered Gabriel Tut (a clear example of a *Homo Sacer*), a South Sudanese volunteer teacher, in a Sudanese school in *Ain Shams* after hitting him on the head with a metal rod. The man was arrested, held in prison for only two months, then release on bail without justification, the after very prolonged court procedure the

man was sentenced for seven years in prison (Magdy, 2018; Magdy, 2020). Sudanese refugees often express their fear of sending their children to the grocery store alone or to play in the streets due to harassment and physical assault on part of the nationals. African women, including Sudanese and Ethiopians, are perceived and referred to as prostitutes, they are often sexually harassed and assaulted, and asked to perform sexual acts. According to Menna Roshdy (2019), black African women in Egypt (Sudanese and Ethiopians) are perceived in line of stereotypical images, especially in the media, of being filthy, easy-going, unchaste, and prostitutes who are less inherently worthy (Roshdy, 2019, p.45).

She added that in the view of some Egyptians “raping black refugee women is not as harmful as raping other women, as black women are viewed as women who do not have “honour to lose, therefore unrapable” (Roshdy, 2019, p.45). Rape is used as a disciplinary and coercive tool by Egyptians, like landlords and police, in order to assert their dominant position and the inferiority of the black body (Roshdy, 2019, p.46). These stereotypes of the African Other being sexually licentious is traced back to the writing of Egyptian nationalists during the process of state formation in the early nineteenth century highlighted in Chapter Two, this demonstrates how racial stereotypes that developed in the process of state formation continue that affect behaviour towards African women, since they act as practices of exclusion against African women currently residing in Egypt.

Moreover, the notion of the ‘white gaze’; discussed in Chapters Two and Three, is evident in Amira Ahmed’s, a researcher from Sudan, narration of her experience walking down the streets of Cairo as she feels that people are staring at her in a different way, as an inferior body rather than an equal. She also stated that Egyptians automatically assumed that she does not speak Arabic as they direct racial slurs to her, according to her, these behaviours were a result of her dark skin complexion (Miranda, 2018, p.23). According to Miranda (2013), when Egyptians were asked about their attitudes towards Sudanese refugees they stated that making

fun of them or their skin colour is not considered racism because it is part of the Egyptian culture of humour and they assume that their Sudanese ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’ understood this (Miranda, 2018, p.23). This statement mirrors the paternalistic racialization of the Sudanese Other as was discussed in the previous chapters.

In terms of physical protection, Sudanese, and Ethiopian refugees, are perceived as bare-naked life. They are subject to random arrests, detention, and police harassment. Some refugees were subjected to mistreatment and torture while in detention (Gabraska, 2006, p.298). Lack of trust in the police establishment is common among Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees. For instance, Roshdy (2019), highlighted that although many African refugees experience sexual and gender-based violence either in the workplace or by the landlords and others. They choose not to report it due to the complex legal procedures and conditions for reporting sexual violence, which are hard to meet by refugee women²⁹ (Roshdy, 2019, p.42). More importantly, however, African refugees including Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees, are often at risk of ‘re-victimization’, where they get re-assaulted by policemen when they attempt to report the incident (Roshdy, 2019, p.43). The Egyptian gender and racial stereotype about African women as being sexually lustful, filthy, and unworthy, make them reluctant to view Sudanese women as ‘true’ victims of SGBV (Roshdy, 2019, p.45).

Proper housing is difficult to attain in Egypt due to exponential high rents for refugees compared to nationals, high inflation rates, and low income. This forces many refugees to share apartments and bedrooms, or cut down on other essential expenses (Miranda, 2018, p.19). Moreover, Sudanese refugees have no legal protection against eviction, and are less able to negotiate rents (Jacobsen et al., 2012, p.37). At times, cultural differences and

²⁹ For instance, to file a police report, refugee women need to provide physical evidence. In cases of rape, refugee women are to be examined by the medical doctor chosen by the police within the first seventy-two hours after the incident. Refugee women are then asked to provide the police with identity information of the perpetrator, which is nearly impossible for African refugee to get hold of (Roshdy, 2019, p.43).

misunderstanding often strain relations between Egyptian landlords/neighbours and Sudanese refugees (Gabraska, 2006; Abdel Aziz, 2017, p.24; Miranda, 2018, p.18).

Administrative obstacles hinder the Sudanese refugees' access to the formal employment. Regardless of the 2003 Decree which exempt those employing Sudanese in the private sector from sponsorship fees, and the subsequent 2005 Decree which extended the exemption to Sudanese in the public sector. Yet, the Sudanese refugee community continue to find it difficult to find jobs in Egypt (United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2008). Accordingly, most Sudanese refugees work in the informal sector often as house cleaners, street vendors, nannies, factory workers, henna drawing/perfume making. The informal work that African refugees are confined to mirrors the continuation of the racial stereotypes that appeared in Egypt during 1870s framing Africans as the 'inferior' servicemen of the Egyptian nation (Jacobsen et al. 2012, p.293; Gabraska, 2006, p.299).

In the informal sector, Sudanese refugees are exposed to several types of risks and vulnerabilities including exploitative work conditions, physical and verbal abuse, fraud, lack of job security, workplace hazards, very low pay in exchange of long hours of work, as well as, frequent accusations of theft, which result in them being detained by the police or by their employees (Miranda, 2018, p.15). Sudanese refugees often use the term *slavery* when describing the nature of work in Egypt, a Sudanese refugee interviewed by Miranda (2018) stated "We do not have jobs and cannot provide for our families. And even when we do find jobs, we work like slaves for little pay" (Miranda, 2018, p.16). Given that the demand for female Sudanese house cleaners has surged the traditional gender roles in the Sudanese refugee community has changed (Miranda, 2018, p.16). The considerably few Sudanese refugees who own business in Egypt (cafés, computer shops, etc.) often complain about harassment and physical confrontations with Egyptian business owners who perceive Sudanese business as enemies and competition (Miranda, 2018, p.18).

In terms of education, although Sudanese children are allowed to enrol in Egyptian public schools, they are often reluctant to do so because of discrimination, bullying, and abuse (Miranda, 2018, p.17). One interviewee recounted how a Sudanese family enrolled their children in an Egyptian school, but after a week pulled them out and stated that the Egyptian students in the school “touched the children’s bodies all the time, saying ‘why are you so black?’ ‘What did the sun do to you?’ while at the Egyptian school, the children had been unable to eat and went home and cried at night” (Miranda, 2018, p.17). There is also physical assault as parents report their children being beaten in schools, sometimes with sharp objects, all while the teachers and principals turn a blind eye (Miranda, 2018, p.17). Moreover, some refugees reported being informally told that there are no places available for their children to enrol in public schools by registrar or more bluntly, that they were not welcomed because of their dark complexion (Norman, 2017, p.118). In terms of access to health services, Sudanese refugees’ access health services through Caritas Egypt, which is one of UNHCR implementing partners. Lack of funding and poor quality of service provision negatively impact the lives of Sudanese refugees (Miranda, 2018, p.17).

From a state-sanctioned closure perspective, this section demonstrated that Sudanese refugees are Otherized and excluded. It also demonstrated how the stereotypes that were constructed during the racialization of the African Other in the 1820s onwards, impacted and shaped the practices of exclusion experienced by the Sudanese refugee community (and as will be argued below the Ethiopian refugee community) in the domains of education, labour market, social integration and the legal frameworks guiding their stay in Egypt. Social closure is evident in the hostile and entrenched racist attitude of the host community which has its roots in racialized discourses developed in the 1820s. Social closure restricts refugees’ access to basic rights, impede administrative procedures as well as mobility, and threatens their physical and psychological protection (Gabraska, 2006, p.297). Nevertheless, compared to their Ethiopian

counterparts, the Sudanese, especially Northern Sudanese refugee community has experienced preferential treatment or less exclusion by virtue of the strong historical ties with Egypt, being familiar with the Arabic language and culture, some ascribe to the same religion as the majority of the population (predominantly Arab and Muslim), all of which bring them closer to the Egyptian racialized self-identity presented in Chapter Two. It is important to acknowledge however, that Christian and non-Arab Sudanese refugees find it more challenging to forge positive relations with the wider Muslim and Arab Egyptian community³⁰ (Gabraska, 2006, p.301).

5. Ethiopian Refugees: The ‘Different’ Other

A large number of Ethiopian refugees residing in Egypt are predominantly Christians and non-Arab speakers but have a significant Muslim refugee population as well (Zohry, 2003, p.7; Al-Zawawy, 2016, p.41; Nader, 2016; Soliman, 2016). The Ethiopians escaping targeted persecution, state suppression, systemic discrimination, and violence undertaken by the Ethiopian government often find refuge in Egypt. There has been a noticeable increase in the number of Ethiopian refugees in Egypt, especially of those belonging to the Oromo ethnic group, following the renewal of clashes between the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ethiopian authorities in 2015 (Soliman, 2016). Although, Sudan was their primary area of destination for Ethiopian asylum seekers, however, given that the Sudanese government increasingly extradite asylum seekers back to Ethiopia, they often choose to travel to Egypt. As a matter of fact, Abdi Boushra, the Director of the Oromo Volunteering Association School in Maadi, stated that “We [Ethiopians] never imagined to live in Egypt before because of the different culture and language but we come here to feel safe” (Nader, 2016). However, racialization along with securitization further aggravate the exclusion of Ethiopian refugees compared to the two other

refugee communities, given the fact that they are the furthest from the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of language (non-Arab speakers), race (non-whites), culture, and religion.

Ethiopian refugees in Egypt have no access to education, employment, or personal status (Soliman, 2016, p.23). Unlike their Sudanese and Syrian counterparts, Ethiopian refugee children do not have the right to enrol in Egyptian public schools. They depend mostly on scholarships provided by the UNHCR to help their families, the available alternatives are to enrol in private schools, which they cannot afford, or enrol in refugee schools (Daily News Egypt, 2018). Ethiopian refugee children, however, find refugee schools curricula irrelevant to their identity and language, hence they tend to drop out or resort to under-resourced Ethiopian community refugee schools (Nader, 2016). Ethiopian refugees have access to NGO provided health services in coordination with the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population (Soliman, 2016, p.21).

Their access to key rights and services such as education, healthcare and other UNHCR services and support, are often restrained by the fact that they do not have access to Egyptian public services due to legal restrictions and hostile host society. This in turn, means that they have to heavily depend on UNHCR and its implementing partners and NGOs³¹. However, these entities often lack sufficient funding and availability of services, especially for Ethiopian refugees as opposed to their Sudanese and Syrian counterparts (Miranda, 2018, p.17). All of which makes it very difficult for Ethiopians to live in Egypt given that they must resort to medical and educational assistance provided by the UNHCR, which is often limited and inconsistent (Soliman, 2016, p.23). Zwick (2020), highlights the difference in treatment between the Syrian community and other communities by affirming that while the former benefits from more financial aid and programmes, the latter ones are marginalized (Zwick,

³¹ Including but not limited to, Caritas, St. Andrew's Refugee Services (StARS), IOM, CARE, Terre Des Hommes.

2020, p.13). The said organizations often divide refugee population into “Syrian” and “non-Syrian,” which leads to distinct and unequal programming and interventions. Syrians receive the majority of international assistance, while little is left for the non-Syrian refugee populations, especially the Ethiopian refugee community (Miranda, 2018). In terms of state-sanctioned closure, Ethiopians refugees are considered as the most excluded because unlike their Sudanese and Syrian counterparts, there is no bilateral treaty or political commitment to provide Ethiopians with a preferential treatment. Moreover, they do not speak Arabic, adhere to the majority religion, or have similar culture or race which further exacerbate their exclusion. Their Otherization of the Ethiopian refugees is also accompanied by increased securitization. As a matter of fact, in 2013, the controversy over the Great Renaissance Dam construction between the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments fuelled hostility towards Ethiopian refugees. The Egyptian media played a negative role in framing the way Ethiopian refugees residing in Egypt as security threats, which in turn cultivated a feeling of increased insecurity and exclusion among Ethiopian refugee community (Soliman, 2016, p.23; Grif, 2013). In 2013, Ethiopian Oromos protested in front of UNHCR office and voiced their dissatisfaction with UNHCR RSD policies and the injustices and discrimination they face in Egypt on daily basis. The Egyptian media and officials portrayed them as the enemies that threatens Egypt’s water and national security as well as being bearers of AIDS, this in turn resulted in the intensification of ethnic and racial motivated violence against them (Miranda, 2018, p.23; Grif, 2013).

The Otherization and securitization of the Ethiopian refugees is exacerbated by racialization. Interviews conducted by the Feinstein International Centre (2012), with fifteen Ethiopian refugees, reveals that all participants expressed concerns over racial discrimination, racially motivated physical violence and insecurity, and verbal abuse (through repeated ethnic and racial slurs and harassment) (Feinstein International Centre, 2012, p.22). Like their Sudanese counterparts, Ethiopian refugee allude to daily racism on part of host society as one

of the main causes behind reduced sense of belonging and increased sense of marginalization. Moreover, it threatens their physical and mental security and safety as well as limits their mobility and access to key services (Feinstein International Centre, 2012, p.1).

An Ethiopian participant in the interviews conducted by the Feinstein International Centre stated that “Ethiopians feel discriminated against because of our skin colour, I fear for my safety...after the Nile issue, Ethiopians feel they are perceived as the enemy, as well as often blamed for the Egyptian unemployment and poverty” (Feinstein International Centre, 2012, p.22). Another interviewee described his experience in Egypt by stating,

I don't feel safe here in Egypt...I am even afraid to go the coffee shops because I am afraid of the way the locals look at us. I have heard of refugees who have been robbed and attacked by the locals. Especially our women are subjected to more and more attacks and abuse by the locals and that is very frustrating. We don't have any rights here and we are discriminated because of our skin colour. (Goździak and Walter, 2012, p.15)

Furthermore, Maha Soliman (2016), argues that compared to the Sudanese and Syrian refugee communities, who might find it difficult to obtain work permits in Egypt, it is nearly impossible for Ethiopian refugees to obtain work permits and suffer from comparably higher unemployment rates in the informal sector as opposed to the Sudanese and Syrian refugee communities (Soliman, 2006, p.21). Like the Sudanese, the vast majority of Ethiopians work as domestic workers mostly as housekeepers, but also as babysitters, gardeners, drivers. In light of this, they are often put at risk of exploitation, abuse, and harassment (Goździak and Walter, 2012; Kunna, 2016, p.3). This fits the stereotypes about African refugee communities that were constructed during the formation of the Egyptian racialized self-identity. Ethiopian domestic workers reported having generally poor relations with Egyptian employees – who tend to treat them in a condescending, disrespectful, and humiliating manner. Ethiopian refugees are also subject to sexual harassment, low payments and abuse by employers and landlords (Feinstein International Centre, 2012). Ethiopian women pinpoint that sexual harassment and SGBV is

part of their daily reality, this is primarily attributed to stereotypical perceptions that Egyptians have about African women mentioned in the above section, namely that they are sexually lustful, ‘unrappable’ bodies and indecent (Roshdy, 2019).

Ethiopian refugees in Egypt suffer the most from state-sanctioned and racial closure. They also face comparatively more exclusion than the two other refugee communities, due to their inability to communicate in Arabic and the fact that they belong to a different ethnicity, culture and to a great extent religion, all of which hinder their *de facto* integration. First, in legal terms, unlike the two other refugee communities examined in this study, Ethiopian refugees are not granted preferential treatment by means of bilateral treaties or political commitment to guarantee their access to their rights and services. Second, in the domain of education, different to the two other refugee communities, Ethiopian refugees are not granted the legal right to enrol their children in Egyptian public schools, this exclusion is further exacerbated by the racism and racially motivated violence. Third, with regards to the job market, unlike Syrian refugees, Ethiopian refugees can only find jobs as domestic workers and find it extremely difficult to find jobs in the formal sector. Racialized hierarchies and stereotypes that developed during the early nineteenth century which confined African refugees in a position of a servitude of the Egyptian nation and incompetence, continue to shape how African refugees occupy the Egyptian informal job market. For instance, although there is a large number of African refugees working as domestic cleaners, there is a relatively fewer number of Syrian refugees doing the same job. Finally, in terms of social integration, Ethiopian refugees are comparatively unable to *de facto* integrate in the Egyptian society as opposed to the two other refugee communities. The fact that they deviate strongly from the Egyptian racialized self-identity (Different Other) in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, and race, exacerbates their already securitized exclusion. Moreover, racial stereotypes about African women being sexually lustful and untamed, and about Africans in general being inferior and in

need for Egyptian guidance, continue to manifest themselves as exclusionary practices and behaviour against African refugees living in Egypt, that limits their access to basic rights, restrict their mobility, threatened their physical and mental security, and impede their ability to sustain livelihoods. Unlike the two other refugee communities, Ethiopian refugees face compounded forms of racialized exclusion in all domains examined in this study.

6. Syrian Refugees: The ‘Proximate’ Other

Like the Sudanese refugee community, there are long-standing historical ties between the Egypt and Syria dating back to the early ninetieth century wherein a significant number of Syrian citizens from the Levant came to Egypt in search for better living standards. There were two major waves of Syrian immigration to Egypt; the first wave was between 1730 and 1780, where Syrians traders, mostly Christians, came from the Levant to reside in Egypt. The second wave began in the mid- nineteenth century, it was composed mainly of well-educated Syrians escaping the deteriorating economic conditions in their homeland, in search for better job opportunities created by the ambitious modernization plan of Khedive Ismail (Ayoub, and Khallaf, 2014, p.19).

According to Zachary Lockman (2010), Syrian migrants who moved to Egypt during the nineteenth century in search for better work opportunities and improved living standards, were often perceived as competitors by the educated young Egyptian nationalists, due the significant role they played in the government bureaucracy, journalism, and business, as well as, their implicit support for the British occupation. Accordingly, Syrians living in Egypt at the time were perceived as agents of imperialism and an impediment for Egypt’s attempt to achieved independence, which in turn made them subject to targeted violence (Lockman, 2010). However, from the 1919 onwards, Egyptian nationalists adopted a more tolerant attitude, especially starting from the 1930s as a result of the Egyptian Arab nationalism;

common language and culture allowed Syrians to assimilate easily into the Egyptian society. Moreover, from 1958 to 1961 the two countries united under the United Arab Republic, a process which led to the 'Egyptinization' of some Syrians (Ibrahim, 2017, p.176). As a matter of fact, Syrian that came to Egypt in 2011, were partially encouraged by the presence preexisting personal networks in Egypt that were fostered during the 1950s (Ayoub, and Khallaf, 2014, p.20).

The Syrian crisis that began in 2011 caused a sudden influx of Syrian refugees into Egypt, it reached peak in 2013 and since then has gradually decreased. The large number of Syrian refugees has resulted in a significant shift in UNHCR protection regime away from the African refugees, especially given that significant amounts of the funds are channeled through UNHCR directed towards the protection and service provision of Syrian refugees as opposed to their African counterparts (Miranda, 2018, p.6; Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.3). Ibrahim Kira et al. (2017), argues that the aforementioned historical and identity ties partially explain why Syrians chose to relocate to Egypt, as opposed to Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon, where they find a sense of familiarity, more inclusion, less discrimination and alienation (Ibrahim, 2017, p.176; Hauslohner, 2013).

The proximity of the Syrian refugees to the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of language (Arabic), race (White), culture (Arab), and religion (Islam), explains the initial welcoming attitude exhibited by Egyptians towards Syrian. This was accompanied by former President Mohamed Morsi's strong support for Syrian refugees as well as positive media stance and representation of them. Syrian refugees cited the welcoming attitude of Egyptians as well as the cheaper cost of living compared to other geographically proximate transit countries as the main reasons for choosing Egypt as their transit/final destination (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.17; Norman, 2017, p.112). In certain cases, Syrian refugees mentioned being hosted by Egyptian families for free until they could find a suitable place of residence (Norman, 2017,

p.116). This welcoming attitude was not displayed to the two other refugee communities since they are perceived as distant from the Egyptian racialized identity outlined in Chapter Two.

As part of the overall welcoming attitude, prior to June 2013, Syrians, like the Sudanese, were exempt from prior-to-arrival visa requirements. Upon arrival they were granted a tourist visa at the airport which allowed them to legally stay in Egypt for six months, after which they were required to either extend their tourist visas, change it to work visa after they attain a work permit, provide proof that they are studying in Egypt and receive a student visa, or approach UNHCR for registration – the process of attaining their residence permits was not overly difficult because of their proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity. This open-door policy made it easier for a large number of Syrian refugees to come to Egypt and easily integrate with the local society, all of which limited their need to approach UNHCR (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.11).

From 2012 to 2013, former president Mohamed Morsi explicitly declared Egypt's support for the Syrian revolution³² against Bashar al Assad, in light of this, he announced that Syrian refugees will have full access to public services, such as free health care and education, despite Egypt's reservations to the 1951 convention. In his first speech to the League of Arab States he stated that "Syrian students will be treated like Egyptian students" (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.11; Norman, 2017, p.112). Accordingly, Syrian children could access Egyptian public schools regardless of their official UNHCR status, in addition, Syrian families could access Egyptian public hospitals free of charge, unlike the Sudanese and Ethiopian refugee community (Norman, 2017, p.112 and 113; Hauslohner, 2013).

Nevertheless, the form of exclusion that Syrian refugees faced was intensified once intersected with security concerns. Maysa Ayoub and Shaden Khallaf (2014), argue that the

³² Precisely on June 13, 2012 during his speech at the Cairo University

changes in the Egyptian political environment that took place in June 2003 led to the securitization of refugees, especially Syrian refugees, which in turn had a negative impact on their livelihoods in Egypt. When former president Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in July 2013, the new military government revoked some decisions that granted Syrians preferential status such as imposing visa restrictions. Moreover, the media rhetoric became more hostile towards Syrians, which in turn reflected on the public attitude (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.4).

While the special treatment—healthcare and access to primary education—extended to Syrian refugees under former President Mohamed Morsi was technically upheld by the subsequent military government, the *de facto* treatment of Syrians changed dramatically (Norman, 2017, p.113).

Under these circumstances, the Egyptian security apparatuses became more wary of the possibility that Syrian rebel groups entering Egypt with the intention of supporting the banned Muslim Brother organization. Accordingly, visa restrictions and security clearance were imposed on Syrians on July 8, 2013 (Hauslohner, 2013). Since then, Syrian refugees who attempted to enter Egypt without visa, were detained at the airport until they could afford another flight to a different country of transit (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.18; Abaza, 2015; Bidinger, 2015, p.86).

In light of the changing social and political environment, Syrian refugees often complain about the lengthily and exhausting administrative procedure to obtain or renew residence permits, especially after the imposition of visa restrictions (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.19; Norman, 2017, p.113). As mentioned earlier, these restrictions were accompanied by a subtle change in Egyptian attitudes towards Syrians since they were framed by the government-organized media as a security threat, supporters or terrorists associated with the Muslim Brothers, and as active foreign agents who are negatively mingling in the Egyptian domestic affairs (Norman, 2017, p.113-114; Abaza, 2015).

Egyptian media at the time focused on fueling nationalistic sentiments by overemphasizing the unique Egyptian territorial identity, while downplaying the Arab, African, and Muslim elements of its national identity (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.21). All of which negatively impacted Syrian refugees' ability to engage in economic activities and access critical services (Jacobsen, 2001; Bidinger et al. 2015, p.86; Norman, 2017, p.114).

Like other refugees, Syrians find it difficult to obtain work permits due to the complex and difficult bureaucratic requirements and procedures, and accordingly they search for less-skilled jobs in the informal sector. Nevertheless, Syrians were able to slightly integrate in the Egyptian economy due to widely held perception of Syrians as experienced entrepreneurs and hard workers, especially in the food industry and ability to communicate with the host society in Arabic. Well-off Syrians found it easy start their own business, which were welcomed and supported by the Egyptian society, this also paved way for employment opportunities to poorer Syrian refugees. Furthermore

Syrian businesspersons gain access to ethnic markets, labor and emotional support, enabled them to start first their offerings among their communities to enlarge their economic activities among members of hosting societies, by taking advantage of a common language, familiarity with the culture, and relative peace and stability (Kabbani, 2017, p.8).

Turner (2019), similar to Peillon (1999), further argues that Syrians being perceived as 'entrepreneurs' positions them in a preferable place on the (Egyptian) hierarchy of race; Syrian's strong sense of entrepreneurship distinguishes them from 'African' refugees, who are framed and perceived as passive, impoverished, with no added value to the (Egyptian) economy, and dependent on humanitarian assistance (Turner, 2019, p.137). Syrian being deemed as active 'entrepreneurs' enables them to be perceived as closer to the Egyptian understanding of Whiteness, and thus become more accepted by the host society (Turner, 2019, p.138).

Egyptian employers in the informal sector often employ Syrians because of their reputation as clever, honest, experienced, hard workers, their ability to communicate in Arabic and their understanding of the Egyptian culture. Others work as street vendors or homemade food-delivery. Egyptians often buy from Syrian food vendors to show support to their fellow ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’. Tensions between the two communities started to surface when Egyptian business owners, especially in the food industry, started to perceive their Syrian counterparts as competitors, however, this did not drastically impact their business in Egypt (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.25). Although Syrian refugees, like their Sudanese and Ethiopian counterparts, face exploitation in the workplace, low wages, job insecurity, and mismatch between their level of education and jobs available. Nevertheless, unlike, the African refugee communities, Syrian refugees rarely cite racism in the workplace as a major source of dissatisfaction (Norman, 2017; Magdy, 2020).

Also, unlike the Sudanese and Ethiopian refugee communities, there has not been a drastic change in the gender roles in the family, men continue to be the primary breadwinners. This family structure tends to be respected by the Egyptian society given that they perceive Syrian women refugees, as equal to Egyptian Arab Muslim women in their conservative attitude and religious beliefs – in terms of chastity, dignity, and respect. Unlike their African counterparts, Syrians women refugees are not seen as prostitutes in the Egyptian society, but rather as eligible for *Sutra* marriage, which takes place when an Egyptian Arab Muslim Man marries a Syrian woman to provide her with financial and physical protection. Nevertheless, sexual harassment is often cited as an obstacle to Syrian women freedom of mobility – including Syrian female students – in the Egyptian streets (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014, p.28). With regards to accommodation, Syrian refugees are subject to exploitation and high rent by Egyptian landlords (Bidinger, et al. 2015, p. 88-89).

Although Syrian refugee children have similar rights as nationals in terms of full access to public schools and universities, nevertheless, limited accessibility, unfamiliarity with the Egyptian dialect and curricula, poor quality of education, overcrowded classes, poor infrastructure and inadequate school facilities act as a major impediments to their access to this right (Nassar, 2008, p.13-14). Unlike the two other refugee communities, racism is rarely cited as an impediment to their access to education. Syrian refugees also pinpoint that especially after 2013, school and university registrars would use lack of available places for Syrian children refugees as an excuse not to enroll Syrian students, or make them pay large amounts of money for exam entry (Ayoub and Khallaf, 2014; Hauslohner, 2013). With regards to access of healthcare services, the Egyptian government allows free access to public health facilities and hospitals for Syrian refugees (Bidinger, et al. 2015, p.92). As the political and security environment in Egypt stabilized, the overall situation for Syrian refugees gradually improved. As a matter of fact, President Abdul Fattah el Sisi issued a Decree in 2017, accepting a grant of fifteen million dollars between Egypt and the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, this fund will be channelled to address the needs and improve service provision for Syrian refugees residing in Egypt (this includes increasing health spending, providing municipal services, and undertaking sewage projects) (Egypt Independent, 2017).

This section has demonstrated that the Syrian refugees in Egypt are Otherized by means of securitization and racialization, which triggers practice of exclusion against them. However, it argues that in comparison to the Sudanese and Ethiopian refugee communities, the proximity of the Syrian refugee community to the Egyptian racialized self-identity (Proximate Other), in terms of language, religion, culture, and ethnicity makes them relatively less excluded and able to integrate better into the Egyptian society, all of which paved the way for easier access to services and employment, compared to the Ethiopian refugee community.

7. Conclusion

This chapter examined the process of Otherization that the Egyptian state actively and systematically engages in, all of which brings the status of refugees closer to that of a *Homo Scare*, whereby they become essentialized and dehumanized bare-naked lives, residing in a state of exception. In other words, they can be murdered, raped, humiliated, detained, forcibly repatriated, and harassed by the nationals, police, landlords, with impunity and without trial. Once they fled their countries of origin, their rights as citizens was revoked, accordingly, the Egyptian host state decided when and for whom certain rights will be extended or revoked. All of which leaves refugees in Egypt living in lawlessness and subject to various practices of exclusion.

The chapter also demonstrated that racialization, when accompanied with securitization, can exacerbate the exclusion of the refugee Other. Securitization plays a key role in the process of Otherization of the three refugee communities examined in this chapter, which are often portrayed by the Egyptian state and media as threats to national sovereignty and security as well as economic progress and job availability. This in turn generates practices of exclusion against the three refugee communities. What this chapter added however, that these practices of exclusion become accentuated through racialization. Adopting a racialized lens reveals an added layer of exclusion that intersects with securitization to produce a more exacerbated form of practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state and society against the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities.

Another important finding that this chapter reveals, is that the Egyptian racialized self-identity, racialized stereotypes, and hierarchy of Whiteness that reproduced colonial and imperial racialized narratives during early nineteenth century, continue to impact and shape the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against the aforementioned refugee

communities in the domains of education, labor market, social integration, legal framework and to an extent media production. The chapter further argues that although all refugees are Otherized and thus excluded, nevertheless they experience different degrees of exclusion/preferential treatment based on the proximity or deviation from their racialized self-identity with the Egyptian racialized self-identity³³ and their place on the Egyptian hierarchy of whiteness. In other words, whether the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities residing in Egypt experience differential treatment according to their racialized identities. It argues that exclusion is layered in the sense that its intensity and form matches the place of a certain refugee community on the Egyptian racialized hierarchy of whiteness, which in turn produced a hierarchical structures of refugee exclusion among the three examined refugee communities residing in Egypt. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, Islam, the Arabic language, Whiteness, Arab culture, and ethnicity, constitute the main pillars of the Egyptian racialized national identity. Of the refugee three groups examined in this chapter, Sudanese and Syrians receive *de jure* access to certain services that are not allotted to the Ethiopian refugees and find it easier to integrate in the Egyptian society by virtue of their proximity to the racialized Egyptian identity. Racialization plays a key role in forming the hierarchical structure of refugee exclusion, in fact “the streets of Cairo, a metropolis of some 20 million, can bring new dangers [to African refugees] in the form of racist harassment or even violence in ways that other significant migrant communities here, such as Libyans and Syrians, do not face” (Magdy, 2020).

This chapter argued that the Egyptian racialized self-identity, hierarchy of Whiteness and racial stereotypes that originated from the early nineteenth century process of state formation that took place over time and space, shapes the types and intensity of practices of

³³ Understood in this thesis, as evident in Chapter two, as an intersection between religious, linguistic, and ethnical/cultural categorizations with racial hierarchies.

exclusion experienced by the aforementioned refugee communities in the domains of education, labour market, social integration, and legal framework. First, access to key services such as education, are more accessible to some refugee communities but not for others by virtue of their proximity or deviation from the Egyptian racialized self-identity. Ethiopian refugees find it extremely difficult to benefit their often-restricted access to Egyptian public education system due the combination of linguistic barriers, school curriculum that is aligned to their ethnic identities and most importantly racism and racial motivated violence that threatens their physical and psychological safety as well as limit their free mobility which prevents them from reaching schools. Access to education is relatively better for Sudanese refugees who are more proximate to the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of culture/ethnicity (Arabs), language (Arabic), and religion (Islam), with the expectation of southern Sudanese, but not race (Black), this facilitates their accessibility and integration into Egyptian public schools due to their ability to comprehend and communicate in Arabic, as well as their understanding of the cultural frameworks of the Egyptian society. Nevertheless, deviating racially from the Egyptian racialized self-understanding and being placed on the categorization of blackness on the Egyptian racial hierarchy intensify racialized closures and practices against Sudanese students. Syrian refugees are the most proximate to the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of language, religion, race, and ethnicity and therefore, they do not face the same structural barriers of inclusion as the other two refugee communities in terms of access to education services. On the contrary, their proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity fosters a general welcoming attitude of Syrians in Egyptian schools.

In the domain of the labor market, the place that Ethiopian refugee occupy on the Egyptian racial hierarchy as well as their distance from the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of language, race, ethnicity, and at times religion, makes it more difficult for them to find jobs even in the informal sector. Whereas, the Sudanese refugees proximity with the Egyptian

racialized self-identity in terms of language, religion, and ethnicity, facilitates their ability to find jobs in the informal sector and are thus less excluded in the domain of the labor market compared to their Ethiopian counterparts. Nevertheless, since both refugee communities deviate from the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of race, whereby they are racially categorized and stereotyped as being inferior, incompetent, clumsy, reliant on Egyptian assistance and servicemen of the Egyptian nation. All of which echo and reveal how the racial stereotypes that appeared during the early nineteenth century during the modern Egyptian state formation continue to negatively impact and intensify the practices of exclusion experienced by African refugees residing in Egypt. On the other hand, Syrian refugees by virtue of their complexion and well-known entrepreneurial spirit are often aligned with 'Whiteness' on the Egyptian racial hierarchy and therefore their businesses are more supported and initially welcomed by the Egyptian population. Also, their proximity to the Egyptian racialized identity in terms of language, religion, and ethnicity allows them to be perceived as honest and hard workers in comparison to their African counterparts, which facilitate their access to employment for Egyptian business owners. Since Syrian racialized identity strongly resembles that of the Egyptian racialized identity they often receive support from Egyptians for selling home-made food, whereas very few Syrians work as house keepers and nannies, which are jobs preserved for those who are in an inferior servitude position to Egyptians, namely African refugees. Moreover, unlike the two African refugee communities, Syrian rarely cite racism as a major impediment in the job market.

With regards to social integration, Ethiopian refugees find it more difficult to integrate into the Egyptian society and have the least sense of belonging, due to the fact that their racialized identity deviates significantly from the Egyptian one. Their inability to communicate and express themselves in Arabic, accompanied with difference in ethnicity and religion which makes them less acquainted with the predominant Egyptian Arab culture and further

marginalizes them from society. These forms of exclusion are then exacerbated when it intersects with racial categorizations, whereby they are perceived as the inferior black Other, who is sexually lustful, uncivilized, violent, clumsy, ugly, and unwitty. These compounded pillars of the Ethiopian racialized identity that diverge from the Egyptian one, then translates into daily racially motivated verbal and physical abuses, which hinder their ability to integrate in the society and erodes their sense of belonging. These racial stereotypes increase the societal closure experienced by the Sudanese and Ethiopian refugee communities in comparison to the Syrian refugee community. For instance, Ethiopian women continue to be stereotyped as prostitutes and unchaste, and are therefore, subjected to intensified forms of sexual abuse and assaults, as well as not being taken seriously when reporting these abuses. Moreover, the dark complexion associated with the Ethiopian and Sudanese refugee communities makes them subject to the Egyptian ‘White’ man’s gaze and hostile/unwelcoming public attitude on daily bases, all of which hampers their social integration and sense of belonging since they are constantly treated as align to the Egyptian society. Once these racialized categorization is added to the securitized narratives about African refugees (Ethiopian and Sudanese) residing in Egypt, it in turn exacerbates the forms of exclusion they experience.

For Northern Sudanese refugees, their ability to speak Arabic, adhering to the Muslim majority religion, and awareness of the Arab culture allows them to integrate better in the society and develop a nominal sense of inclusion, that is then hampered as a result of being perceived as racially different from the Egyptian refugee population. The Syrian refugee community are in a preferential position with regards to local integration given their proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-identity in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, and language. Syrian refugees are perceived as ‘White’ which brings them closer to the Egyptian racialized self-identity; this racial categorization is connected with being civilized, beautiful, educated, superior, chaste, and are this often receive a positive gaze and a supportive and welcoming

attitude from Egyptians. Syrian women for instance, are not perceived as prostitutes, a characteristic attributed to their African counterparts, but rather as eligible for the Sutra marriage is more 'dignifiable'. When this intersects with their ability to communicate in Arabic and understand Arab cultural parameters by virtue of their association with Arab ethnicity, as well as adhering to the dominant Muslim religion, taken together, this facilitates their *de facto* integration in the Egyptian society compared to the two other refugee communities. Even with the securitization of this refugee community after 2013, the forms and intensity of practices of exclusion they experience were intense compared to the two other African refugee communities.

In terms of legal framework and as demonstrated earlier, Sudanese and Syrian refugees have access to *de jure* legal privileges (especially in terms of access to healthcare services and education), either under bilateral treaties (Four Freedoms Treaty) or political commitments (Free access to Education and healthcare to Syrian refugees), as opposed to Ethiopians who do not receive any preferential legal treatment (Norman, 2017, p.142-143). In conclusion, the *de jure* privilege of Syrians and Sudanese by the Egyptian government, as opposed to the Ethiopian, can be attributed to their proximity to the Egyptian understanding of its racialized self-identity. All of which demonstrates the presence of a hierarchy of closure (race) in Egypt: whereby the Sudanese refugees become positioned as the Acceptable Other, Ethiopians as the Differentiated Other, and the Syrian refugees as the Proximate Other. It is important to keep in mind that even the Proximate Other, is Otherized and excluded by the Egyptian state, they differ, however, in the degree and intensity of practices of exclusion they experience.

Conclusion | Egypt's Racialized Self-Identity and the Hierarchical Structure of Refugee Exclusion

This thesis has examined the ways in which practices of statehood in Egypt are entrenched in racial hierarchies and 'structures of whiteness'. It did so by mapping and analyzing the practices of exclusion adopted by the Egyptian state against the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian refugee communities. It argues that racialization shapes the degree of exclusion experienced by the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian refugee communities, respectively. Furthermore, this study holds that race is an important structure and analytical lens to explain the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against its various refugee communities.

In order to do so, this study examined the development of Egypt's racialized self-identity and its understanding of 'Whiteness', by looking at the process of state formation starting from early nineteenth century. From there, the study focused on contemporary racialization of the Egyptian state reflected in popular culture to shed light on the continuities of racialized narratives in the Egyptian state formation. Once, the racialized Egyptian self-identity and the Egyptian hierarchy of race is outlined, it proceeded by mapping the trajectories of refugee exclusion, all of which revealed the refugees in Egypt live in a state of exception and are Otherized. What these discussions reveal are the ways in which limited access to basic rights and protection by non-status persons is coupled with and accentuated by racialized forms of exclusion. With this in mind, the study also argues that there is a hierarchy of refugee exclusion, whereby the Sudanese are considered as the Acceptable Others, the Ethiopians perceived as the Different Others, and the Syrians are seen as the Proximate Others – all of which determines the degree of exclusion they experience respectively. This categorization reflects the hierarchy of race present imbedded in the Egyptian society and is determined by the degree of proximity to the Egyptian racialized self-understanding.

1. Legacies of Whiteness in Egypt

The racialized self-production of the Egyptian states constructed an understanding of Whiteness, which amounted to modernity, economic and social progress, technological advancement, beauty, rationality, and scientific knowledge. It is towards this understanding of political subjectivity which Egyptian nationalists aspired to develop, and to which they sought to demonstrate proximity (ElSaket, 2017). In light of this, the Egyptian state was keen on representing itself as the median between the ‘civilized’ West and the ‘non-civilized’ Africa (Powell, 2003). Accordingly, Egyptian nationalist essentialized and racialized the Sudan, which amounted to ‘blackness’, represented as sexually licentious, uncivilized, a poor pronunciation of Arabic, goofiness, naive, and presented as in need for Egyptian guidance. By framing Africa as the ‘inferior Other’, the Egyptian state is thus framing itself as the modernized superior Other.

The study argued that the aforementioned racialization played an imperative role in the process of Egyptian state formation. As outlined above, during the early nineteenth century, Egypt’s expansionist motives towards Sudan, compelled the Egyptian state and nationalists to generate a racialized discourse that created a constructed binary between a ‘civilized’ and superior Egypt and an ‘uncivilized’ and inferior Sudan (Africa). This racialized binary, which was incrementally internalized and reproduced by Egyptian nationalists, allowed the Egyptian state to paint the conquering of Sudan as a civilizing mission borrowing heavily from Western colonial literature (Powell, 2003). Moreover, the continuity of asserting Egyptian civilization, modernity, and advancement as opposed to African’s backwardness and uncivility was essential, since it provided the base by which Egypt asserted their claims of sovereignty in Sudan after 1881 and the Unity of the Nile Valley, and used it as a tool to strive for their independence from the British colonization.

As the preceding chapters point out, this racialized discourse played an important role in the anti-colonial struggle during the 1920 and inspired territorial nationalist elite, who asserted the unique, modernized, and superior ‘White’ nature of the Egyptian Self (the descendants of the Pharos) to authenticate their claims to independence. In this vein, Egyptians stressed the paternalistic, natural, legal, and benevolent relationship that guided their claims over the unity Nile Valley, where ‘Africans’ heavily on Egypt to civilize them. This paternalistic and romanticized power relation accentuated Egyptian superiority and proximity to Whiteness, and African inferiority and anti-blackness sentiments, which laid the basis of the Egyptian racial hierarchies and ‘structures of whiteness’; all of which deemed Egypt as a ‘colonized colonizer’, this was captured by Mustafa Kamil’s rhetoric question: “Is there any other country in the world as suited to be the medium between civilized Europe and fanatical Africa if not Egypt?” (Powell, 2003).

The intensification of the anti-colonial sentiments and independence movements in the 1930s led to the development of extraterritorial forms of nationalism which added more structures to the Egyptian racialized self-identity. Most significantly, this was done by Egyptian Arab nationalism which asserted Egypt’s Arab identity both culturally and linguistically. The second form of nationalism was Egyptian Islamic nationalism, which ameliorated the Egyptian Muslim identity. All in all, this reveals that the main pillars and structures of the constructed Egyptian racialized self-identity are ‘White’ (modern and advanced), ‘Arab’ (linguistically and culturally), and Muslim. And so, this thesis demonstrates that examining contemporary popular culture, reveals that the Egyptian state’s racial self-hierarchy of ‘whiteness’ continues to impact the Egyptian state’s practices of exclusion in the present time. It highlights that the aforementioned racialized self-understanding of the Egyptian state is internalized and reproduced in modern day forms of cultural, visual and social, and eventually political, representation, relations and discourse.

2. Securitization and the Reproduction of Racial-Hierarchies

Taking the racialized foundations of the Egyptian state's self-understanding to the contemporary period, the study examined the extent to which the various practices of exclusion exhibited against the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Syrian refugee communities as adopted by the state reveal the aforementioned racialized self-understanding, and relatedly, whether race is an important structure and analytical lens through which to explain the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against its various refugee communities. After mapping the trajectories of the above three refugee communities, it becomes evident that the stereotypes used to construct the racialized identity of the Sudanese and/or African Other, are still reproduced with the aim of asserting Egyptian superior status in relation with its non-Arab African neighbours.

Having outlined the continuity of the Egyptian racialized identity over time and space, the study holds that race is an important structure and analytical lens that helps in explaining the practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities. While focusing on state-sanctioned racial closure, through examining the legal and administrative environment created by the Egyptian state – including refugee access to essential services such as education and healthcare, media attitude, entry requirements and access to employment and protection – the study has revealed how this form of structural closure is reinforced through a social exclusion that is channelled through everyday interactions on part of the host society. Although, those who have refugee status are allowed to reside in Egypt and are mostly protected from forced repatriation, nevertheless, exclusionary and xenophobic restrictions are reproduced in Egypt through legal and societal frameworks pertaining the treatment of refugees and access to rights and services.

The Egyptian state's attitude towards the refugee population residing in the country was characterized by an ambivalent strategy that is both more inclined towards exclusion rather than inclusion of refugees, and that also involves a state-sanctioned racial closure reflected in the form of legal and administrative barriers limiting access to basic rights and services. As such, and to summarize, the process of the Otherization of non-citizens in Egypt has entailed the securitization of refugees as a 'national security threat'. This securitized argument is projected toward Syrian refugees as a community that undermines the country's political stability, and towards the Sudanese and Ethiopian communities as supposed bearers of dangerous diseases such as AIDS and Ebola. What becomes evident in this representation is that these exclusions are exacerbated when a racialized lens is mobilized, as it adds another layer of violence premised on the marginalization of those who do not 'fit' within the Egyptian state's racialized self-identity. All in all, racialization gives shape to and accentuates the extent and type of exclusion exhibited and felt by excluded political subjects like refugees.

3. Going Forward: Ongoing Reproduction of Racial Hierarchies

Taken together, this study has revealed that the racialized self-production of the Egyptian state is an integral and ongoing process of Egyptian state formation over time and space. Working from these findings, one may project that this racialization will continue to play an essential role in shaping the hierarchical structure of exclusion faced by refugee-Others, along with the approaches that are adopted by the state.

The preferential treatment of refugees is correlated with the proximity of their racialized identity to the Egyptian self-understanding of its racialized identity. In other words, the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities residing in Egypt experience differential treatment based on their racial, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, or religious identities. As mentioned above, Islam, the Arabic language, Whiteness, and Arab ethnicity, constitute the main pillars

of the Egyptian racialized national identity. In light of this, Syrian refugees face the highest level of inclusion, and were followed by the Sudanese, whereas the Ethiopian refugee community found itself denied similar privileges and resources. Of the refugee three groups examined in this study, Sudanese and Syrians receive *de jure* access to certain services that are not allotted to the Ethiopian refugees (Norman, 2017, p.142). Such as, *de jure* privileged in terms of their access education, healthcare and the job market by the virtue of their ability to communicate in Arabic, and for Syrian by virtue of their Whiteness (modernized, educated, entrepreneur) (Norman, 2017, p.143). Their ability to speak the language, sharing the same culture and largely religion, and race (for Syrians means being perceived as ‘White’ which translates into modernized, rational, educated, and have entrepreneurial spirit), allows them to integrate better with the Egyptian society and receive preferential treatments.

Norman (2017), noted that an Eritrean refugee stated “Eritrea has a different language, different culture, so they have a harder time integrating. It’s like, Sudanese, they’re Arab. Like Egypt, like Syria. But Eritrea has its own culture. So, life here is hard for Eritreans” (Norman, 2017, p.142). Another Eritrean refugee added “Yes, there’s some discrimination. For example, if you’re Eritrean and you don’t have your residency visa, they’ll throw you in jail. But it’s not like that for Sudanese or Syrians” (Norman, 2017, p.143). Ethiopians share the same sentiment as Eritreans except that they feel more disadvantaged compared to the other refugee communities not only because of their language and culture but also because of their religion and ethnicity (compared to the Sudanese), in addition to their race/skin color (compared to the Syrians, since blackness translates into backwardness, sexually lustful, uncivilized, and dim-witted, unrapable bodies, servicemen of the Egyptian nation, and in need for Egyptian guidance) (Norman, 2017, p.144). Sudanese refugees, who are considered to be in a more privileged position than the Ethiopians, also share this feeling of inferiority and inequality when compared with Syrians, a Sudanese refugee stated that “Yes, there’s more services for

Syrians, Libyans, Iraqis, *keda*. All the Arab groups”. When considering this statement one can understand that many Sudanese did not perceive themselves as Arab or Arab ‘enough’ when compared with Syrians, whereas Eritreans and Ethiopians perceived the Sudanese as considered by the Egyptian government to be Arabs as opposed to Africans (Norman, 2017). In general, Arabs (Syrian and Sudanese) refugees had better access to hospitals and education compared to African refugees both before and after 2013. Also, in terms of policing and treatment by host state authorities and community, Arabs were more protected and received a hospitable attitude from the host society (Norman, 2017, p.151). Though privileged status was granted to specific refugee communities – the Sudanese and Syrian – that corresponded with their proximity to the Egyptian understanding of its racialized self. Nevertheless, the Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees frequently voice this perceived/real sentiment sense of inequality, citing one of his Sudanese interviewee Miranda stated,

There is a distinction between us and other refugees like the Iraqis and Syrians. They are treated better by the police and by Egyptians because of their color. Why?” I frequently heard the sentiment: “I demand that you or UNHCR take us to refugee populations—the young men readily ad a country that has the same color skin as us.” (Mirana, 2018, p. 22)

On a similar note, Marko Deng a Sudanese community school principle said

Some children stop us [on the street] and say you have darkened the country or you are monkeys, I do not know why some people don't consider us brothers from one continent; why they tell us you have plagued the country, while on the other hand, they welcome the Syrians and help them.” (Mahmoud, 2017)

In the end, this demonstrates how the hierarchies of race that developed during the process of Egyptian modern state formation and that demarcate its racialized self-identity continue to impact the intensity and shape of the practices of exclusion exhibited against the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities. As the discussions in this study reveal, an intersectional approach that considers how race and other forms and practices of exclusion in

the form of securitization is useful for examining the ways in which state behavior affects the lived experiences of communities, pointing out the ways in which these practices and frameworks accentuate violence against marginalized and excluded communities.

This study has attempted to examine the links between the historical productions of racialization in Egypt and the contemporary practices of exclusion exhibited against the Sudanese, Ethiopian, and Syrian refugee communities residing in Egypt. However, since there is a shortage in scholarly work pertaining to racial theorization in relation to refugees exclusion in Egypt and given that academia is built on the notion of accumulative knowledge, scholars may built on this important research further by first, adopting an intersectional approach that examines the intersectionality between race, gender, and class in relation to refugee exclusion. Second, future studies building on this one can examine the development of Egyptian racialized self-production across the process of state formation over time and space under the more contemporary regimes of former President Anwar el-Sadat (1970-1981), former President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), and the current President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (2013-present). The more contemporary examination of the relationship between racialization and Egyptian state formation is crucial because it will link it to present neo-colonial order where colonial and imperial legacies continue implicitly to be racialized, and how this impacts the racialized practices of exclusion conducted by the Egyptian state against various refugee communities.

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