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Sister Pauline Richardson, my teacher, second mother, and my guardian angel on earth. She has co-raised me since I was five, put up with all my mischief and taught me life's greatest lessons. I will always be your stick and little devil.

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Hind Alhelou

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Abstract

With the growing rates of involuntary (forced) migration and even traditional migration (movement from one country to another in search of work opportunities, better lifestyle, study, etc.); the movement of these bodies raises their vulnerability to be constructed as threats. The same threat they are fleeing from, is being attached to them as they attempt to seek security elsewhere. This intersection of migration and securitization studies especially emerged because of the interconnectedness of the world that is majorly facilitated by globalization.

Within this context, this thesis examines how Syrian refugees in Lebanon are racialized because of a securitization process perpetuated by speech acts. It also looks at race and racism in relation to colonialism as the root cause for the construction of such notions. Within the Lebanese context, this thesis also looks at nationalism and religion from the Lebanese perspective in an attempt to explain the racist securitizing attitude towards those refugees.

Keywords: Colonialism; Racism; Nationalism; Securitization; Speech Acts; Syrian Refugees; Lebanon

I. Background Information:

This thesis narrates the history of the earliest forms of racism being explicit biological racism. It then explains the evolution of explicit racism and how it became more implicit involving more complex variables to construct racial hierarchies than mere biology. Racism, according to George Fredrickson (2002), is “when differences that might otherwise be thought of as ethnocultural are considered innate, indelible, and unchangeable.” Racism has two components, the first of which is difference and the other is power. It originally came to be from a mindset of a differentiation between ‘them’ and ‘us’ in permanently unbridgeable ways (Scott, 2007, 45). The main idea of racism is that the racializing party and the racialized can never coexist in the same space except when the racialized are subordinated by the racializers. Although processes of racialization are always embedded in other forms of hierarchy, they acquire autonomy and have independent social effects (Bonilla-Silva 2001, 37).

Colonialism facilitated the spread of racial hierarchies among the different colonies. These notions were constructed by colonizing superior powers to differentiate themselves from those colonized, who were seen as subordinate. With explicit racism, the inferior was considered inhuman, barbaric, and were bound to be exploited because they did not have the same features as the civilized colonizers. Scientists desperately tried to justify this explicit racism with science. Back then, the colonizing powers were civilized because they are white. As societies grew more complex, scientific racism could not make do because of the discovery of many sub-ethnicities within the same race. At this point, the superior powers had to rely on more abstract variables to keep the social hierarchies viable. They relied on the difference in culture to instigate biological racism. Racialization then became about the white being so because they are civilized and not the other way around. In this case, the uncivilized were everything else but white. Implicit racism,

evident in the case study chapter also uses another abstract construct which is nationalism. Nationalism allows elitists to set borders around those who are 'similar' and belonging to a nation in order to keep those who do not belong outside. Decolonization may have discredited overt racism and racist regimes, but it is wrong to believe that racism is either dead or dying (Fredrickson, 2002, 141). While formal colonization may have been abolished, informal colonization continues. This thesis uses the case of Lebanon as an example to apply the works of implicit racism on a vulnerable group of people forced to reside in Lebanon, Syrian refugees. Following a chronological order of historical events, I start at the 15th century where the earliest¹ accounts of racism were found, following its traces past colonization into modernity.

Modernity framed racism, exclusion, conflict, etc. against the calls for universality, but imperialism structured the notions of citizenship, sovereignty and exclusion. As a result, the modern discourse of racial hierarchies came to be because of the clash between colonial domination and freedom. People's capability to have freedom or progress was decided upon based on their biological traits. Because of this, colonialism was justified as a natural subordination of some races for being inferior to others. Colonization hence facilitated the rise of racial discourses.

In colonies, heterogeneity was controlled by racializing people and classifying them into sub-categories. Controlling the natives was made possible by combining colonialism and racial differences to establish stereotypes about the natives and encourage their subordination. Traces of these stereotypes survive in the post-colonization time. They allow modern racism to explain the legal and illegal statuses that exist within the same nation.

¹ Geraldine Heng (2020) traces racism to the 1200s as part of the English church's attempt to label Jews by making them wear badges to set them apart from the rest of the population

European colonialism consolidated the subordination of other races because in essence, colonialism is all about differences and race, which was considered the most prominent indicator of difference. Keeping those two concepts tied together works towards legitimizing colonization.

Europe's colonial expansion also consolidated history. Eurocentric progressiveness became the one model of livelihood through time and space. As time passes by, and space becomes less significant, those labeled as the distant other would become replicas of Europeans. In a nutshell, Europe now represents what the rest of the world should be like in the future. Those outside this constructed history, non-nations, do not get granted any rights or freedom, making it justifiable to destroy them by nations that aim to bring about civilization to them. The modern terminology that explains recurring historical events is like Social Darwinism: certain racial attributes can prevent people from evolving towards civilization. This notion of civilization and social evolution coupled with history work together to present colonialism as something legitimate. In the name of the civilizing mission Europe assigned itself, there came a hierarchy of advanced and backward civilizations, hence advanced and backward races. Lebanon is one of the colonies that fell victim to the vicious cycle of racialization and colonization where both concepts still influence policy-making in the country and structure its society within.

Long after decolonization, Lebanon, a former French colony, is still to free itself from the colonial ties France has over it which cause the embedding of racist policy into the Lebanese government's attitude towards the Syrian refugees.

II. Methodology and Case Selection:

The topic of investigation is how securitization produces racism, while looking at how Syrian refugees, in particular, go through a racialization process in Lebanon that makes it easier to frame them as a threat through a process of securitization and ignite racial discrimination

against them. Lebanon is an optimum case study for many reasons. While it is true that Syrian refugees face racism everywhere they go, mainly Europe, yet them being racialized in Lebanon is an interesting phenomenon since Syrians and Lebanese are essentially of the same race. This gives basis to a different kind of analysis for their securitization and then racialization. The French established themselves as trustees over the Christians of Syria and Lebanon to oppose the Ottoman's Muslim rule over the region. As European powers failed to categorize people in this area based on race the way they did in other parts of the global south, they had to resort to adopting a sectarian categorization method instead of a racial one (Delatolla and Yao, 2018, 11). Based on this, the attitude towards Syrian refugees and framing them as threats stems from the fear of an imbalance of power with the flood of Muslim refugees. Religion adds dimension to this analysis in order to understand the racialization process of Syrian refugees. Through speech acts, influential actors in Lebanon frame refugees as a threat to Lebanon's peace and security and this ignites a racialization process that ends with discriminatory policies and acts against them.



The tweet above is one example of speech acts that add the notion of nationalism to religion to legitimize those speech acts. It translates to: “Lebanon is not a homeland of trusteeships, nor is it a homeland of displacement, or refugeehood. Lebanon is for the Lebanese and this is not racism but nationalism and Lebanism.”

To make this relation, this thesis builds on qualitative secondary research to narrate the history of racism starting with the 15th century. It follows a chronology of events that embedded racism in modern Lebanese policies. This process is necessary for the thesis to establish a

relationship between colonialism and the construction of Lebanese identity that allows for the racialization of Syrian refugees, hence the racial discrimination they experience. Primary sources used for this research come from social media, mainly Twitter, to establish a connection between empirics and theory. Looking at the official Twitter accounts of different Lebanese leaders

Process tracing is also used to provide a socio-political analysis of a modern phenomenon that developed through centuries of subjugation, discrimination and racial hierarchy formation. This method also makes it possible to follow the thread of how colonialism expedited the spread of racism to the various colonies and how Lebanon in particular was affected by it and still exhibits forms of colonial subjugation long after independence.

IV. Focal Point of Thesis:

The Syrian crisis is one that has caused issues of migration and refugees. While this may seem like a policy issue, it has much to do with issues of race and racialization. The process of racialization affects millions of refugees and constructs them as a threat to international and domestic peace and security. There are opportunities for populations to cross borders for different reasons like seeking a better lifestyle, studying, or working etc. While these individuals who leave their home country for these reasons face issues of racism, the process of racializing the refugee is different.

Since refugees are forced to leave their countries because of wars mainly, the threat that they fled from continues to be attached to them through a securitization process, thus making them a 'threat' to the state they flee to. These refugees are securitized, then racialized. This allows for tighter controls to be imposed over them wherever they go to keep them out. The consequences of racializing refugees not only lead to problems of assimilation and integration, but also perpetuates a narrative of political trauma.

V. Value of this thesis:

The refugee crisis triggered by the war in Syria that began in 2011 definitely launched a new wave of racism in different ways. From closing borders to those fleeing the war, imprisoning others, leaving many in camps under inhumane conditions, to the calling of how much of a danger they pose and the need to return them back to their war-torn country. All of which are acts with underlying racism. Because of this, it is vital to keep the discussion going in the hopes that policies are encouraged to change and that states would move towards universality.

VI. Structure of this thesis:

The purpose of the second chapter is to briefly furnish the original concept of racism being ‘explicit’ racism when biological determinants were at the core of the racial categorization of people. This, of course, is not to say that the explicit biology-based racism does not exist anymore. It is practically masked by a more abstract form which is the implicit one. For example, with many immigrants moving from former colonies to either England or France normalized the use of the term ‘culture’ as a means to differentiate the unwelcome guests from those who are “pure” British or French instead of using the color to make this differentiation (Fredrickson, 2002, 141). Another concept used in the differentiation is ‘nationalism’, yet another construct just like ‘race’. Building on this, chapter two also discusses the process of racialization caused by social Darwinism and the creation of the ‘stranger danger’ notion to facilitate the securitization of the ‘stranger’. This argument is relevant because securitization is essentially used as a tool to construct Syrian refugees as threats to not only Lebanon’s security but also their national identity. This chapter also introduces speech act theory that explains the

main claim of this thesis which is that refugees are securitized then racialized using speech acts that cause acts of discrimination and racism against them. Speech act theory is a theory that explains the use of words to cause actions and not just convey information. Speech acts also reinforce the concept of implicit racism since speeches of politicians are carefully written in a way that they are racist and insinuate racist feelings and action without using clear terminology of racism.

Chapter three contributes to the discussion by tracing the origins of Lebanese nationalism and pointing it out as a clear construct and those that did perpetuate its creation were motivated by personal goals and agendas contrary to the popular argument of wanting to defy Arabism and challenge the Ottomans' rule. This chapter also explains how nationalism is also an ingredient to the 'us' versus 'them' paradigm that essentially makes it easier to frame 'them' as 'threats' and that 'us' need protection. While refugees are entitled to specific humanitarian rights, they are commonly stripped because of the mislabeling of status. This is especially evident in the penultimate chapter. Refugees are protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and other legal conventions or agreements like the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention². Public calls to deny them refugeehood is evident in speech acts by political and public figures as seen in chapter four. The final section of this chapter explains how France managed to orchestrate the installation of a unique system of power to ensure the division within Lebanon lasts long after independence.

Chapter four includes a section outlining the Palestinian refugees' struggle in Lebanon and how this was also used to inform the public of the mistake that was previously made to allow them to stay in Lebanon. One not to be repeated again with the Syrian refugees. To understand

² <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html>

the magnitude of the issue, a brief timeline of the refugees' flow to Lebanon is included along with the different layers of response at different stages of their arrival. The chapter uses empirics such as tweets, images, and slogans that contain vivid examples of speech acts used against Syrian refugees in Lebanon by both public figures and citizens

This thesis concludes, in chapter five, that it is evident that Syrian refugees securitized through speech acts that stir the public's opinion and causes the refugees to be racialized and discriminated against.

Chapter 2: Race, Racialization and Securitization

This chapter will discuss race as the fundamental aspect to the process of categorization of people. Contemporary dynamics of racism can be said to have begun in modernity with colonialism and still has ongoing consequences. Recent events in the Middle East and particularly in Lebanon force us to take another look at the political dynamics of the country.

Discussing colonialism is important because a western account of non-Europeans allows for an understanding of racial ideology. The modern construction of race during post-coloniality is rooted in colonialism. Conquests and exploitation are as old as the earliest records of historical accounts of racism that we have. This is important for this thesis because it discusses the case of Lebanon, a former French colony, and its relations with Syrian refugees who are citizens of another former French colony, while both essentially belonging to the same piece of land where no such differentiation was made before and rather introduced by colonization.

Ussama Makdisi (2000) explains that Lebanon exhibits a case of sectarianism that was a result of competition between the Ottomans, Europeans and Lebanese on modernization narratives (Makdissi, 2000, 6). Racialization was key in producing sectarianism and essential for its reproduction. The process of producing sectarianism had to involve an imaginary competition between 'races' along with the Orientalist notion that such a competition is and always will be relevant to date (Makdissi, 2000, 184). The different categories or hierarchies produced are essentially constructed by elites (those who have power and monopoly over resources) as they create the model of stratification based on racial aspects.

The construction of ‘race’ and the creation of biology-based determinants of society:

Race and racism refer to a categorization that uses biological attributes as well as behavioral ones to construct a power dynamic. This power dynamic causes a structural social system that imposes social and political hierarchies among people where the more powerful groups are dominant over those less powerful.

According to Mills, (1997), race is rather a modern construct that came to be with the as a product of colonial rule (Golash-Boza, 2016, 130), making racism along with slavery, conquest and colonialism, almost always associated with the early and later stages of building the nation and the move forward to national consolidation. The most popular understanding of ‘race’ is that it exists as a way to be identified based on physical (biological) traits. Whiteness, for one, is not just a race but ‘the race’. European whiteness is a starting point of analysis because every racial category seems to be defined based on what whiteness is or is not. This racism lives on the construction of symbolic boundaries between these racial categories as its binary system of ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ constantly attempts to normalize the difference to create a belongingness and otherness (Hall, 1988, 28). In a western context, ‘race’ is an issue of black versus white. Yet proponents of critical race theory examined the issue beyond the boundaries of the west. Etienne Balibar (1988), for one, claims that there is no unified type of racism but rather many varieties of it (Balibar, 1988, 38-40). In the Lebanese context, sectarianism makes it possible to see how social categories and asymmetrical power dynamics and structures work together to produce racism.

Classification of bodies in Europe began as early as the 17th century since science dominated and so it compelled people to categorize each other based on biological attributes (mostly color) to determine who is an ally and who is an enemy. Then the 19th century unfolded

with European colonialism and its furnishing of capitalist approaches. Both instigated racial discourses to rationalize the contact between the westerners and non-westerners. European dominance was also legitimated as having a God-given mandate to rule as European colonizers were to appear God-like among the natives (Vincent, 1982, 664). In other words, modern racial identities became popular due to European economic and geographic expansion in the 19th century *that brought the whites to the non-whites*. The relationship between them was constructed on the premises of denying or suppressing the subjectivity of the non-Europeans (Krishna, 2001, 410).

Social Darwinism and Stranger Danger:

The following sections explores how and why racism had to take a new form to include not only biological traits but also cultural ones. This change explains modern racism and racist attitudes between people in regions where racism was introduced through colonization.

Because of the desire to establish social order and hierarchies, racialization was born due to the infusion of biology and culture. As a result, racialized groups are singled out for having distinct cultural identities for them to be defined as ‘alien’ which will make them endure discrimination and prejudice (Modood, 2005, 38). This exclusion, as Weber calls it ‘social closure’, involves maximizing rewards by restricting access to any resources or opportunities to a group of chosen people or ‘eligibles’ (Lewis, 2003, 285). The notion of social enclosure fueled the ‘stranger danger’ discourse which is supposed to remind us that the danger comes from what is outside the community we live in as in it is coming from outsiders (Ahmed, 2007,162). The essence of rationalization of minority groups is to keep emphasizing the differences among people (Suzuki, 2017, 289). But not all the strangers who get to the borders, like tourists or immigrants, are seen as strangers. Some of them are seen so because of their origin as in having

the right passport to cross a border does not guarantee that someone will be accepted if they have the wrong name or body (Ahmed, 2007, 162). Race also intersects with class which makes Marxists worry that race is a mask to class inequality which sustains exploitation and capitalism. (Buzaz, 2013, 578). Critical race theory gives the most accurate of the racial reality than any other paradigm as it does not see racism as something decreasing. It was important for the colonizers to establish racial categorization as a political ideology to justify enslavement, genocide and exclusion in the name of white supremacy (Christian et al., 2019, 4). This is why phenotypic racism is considered a foundation for more complicated racism.

Race should be recognized as an unstable notion that constantly reproduces and reconstructs class, gender and other social fabrics (Tabil, 2013, 126). To be able to understand the production and reproduction of racial ideology and structure, one must look at how they are produced on a day-to-day basis (Lewis, 2003, 284).

During the 1980s, with the rise of new ethnicities, a new form of racism emerged as several sociologists and antiracism activists rejected the idea of biological racism especially after the Holocaust. This type of racism is said to have emerged for the first time in Enoch Powell's speeches in the late 1960 but gained popularity in the 1980s (Modood, 2005, 27). The absence of specific desired cultural traits or values or beliefs allowed for the racialization process to continue with this new criterion to make one 'culture' more dominant than the other (Jones, 1999, 466). This new understanding came to be known as Social Darwinism. Charles Darwin's theory of evolution succeeded because it was something that reflected tangible evidence that people can see for themselves. Even though Darwin focused on the biological evolution of species, Herbert Spencer, who coined the term 'survival of the fittest' saw that the same principle can be applied to human societies because they too operate within the same framework of natural

selection as they move from primitive societies to more complex ones (Dennis, 1995, 245). Social Darwinism came to enshrine the idea of European culture's superiority. This is not to say that biological racism does not exist anymore but it just means that it has taken a new disguise to fit the current events. Racism that relied on biology was developed within the legacy of colonialism and modern slavery. It relied on an insufficient ideology based on a pseudo-science and pseudo-scientific theories of racism to explain and justify inequality, exploitation, and establish hierarchies to create a universal order. The other's identity in this kind of racism poses as a warrant to its annihilation because it is considered impure, or insufficient.

Biology-based racism may be sidelined for some time but it will emerge to support cultural racism. In a nutshell, cultural prejudices could eventually trigger color-based racism (Modood, 2005, 37). There is almost no effort in problematizing racism in its different types and putting it into question with regards to ethics or morals (Giroux, 1993, 99).

Racialization:

Racial formation theory explores the social construction of race as something ongoing that varied across time, producing racialization. With no inequality, racial ideologies and race-based domination would have no power, as it would have nothing to justify or challenge (Doane, 2017, 977). Even when the hierarchy among cultures was still then based on biological traits to distinguish three color categories, those categories were also given labels regarding their culture and capabilities: the negro, being the lowest, the yellow race being mediocre at everything, and finally the white race being the superior race (Vincent, 1982, 660). This makes it certain that for one, race is grounded in history and two, it is formed by experiences of the body. Frantz Fanon's work tells us that bodies are essentially shaped by colonial histories that make the world we 'inherited' white. It makes the world ready to be inhabited by chosen bodies that fit. Race then

becomes something social and bodily given, so what we receive from others are the objects that are put within our reach as inheritance of the history mentioned (Ahmed 2007, 153-4). Going back to the root cause of this phenomenon, theorists traced racism and found it in capitalism and colonialism.

When white Europeans discovered people, who appeared different from themselves, they described the new people by comparing them to themselves. The obvious trait was color which was 'not white' and that made whiteness the starting point of describing the 'other. To unravel whiteness, it can be understood as an orientation. It is a 'starting point' that involves the notion of how to 'proceed' from this alleged starting point. This leads to the notion of race as phenomenology that makes us aware of what is around us (Ahmed, 2007, 151). This is important because different relationships and results are produced based on these interactions. In this respect, what our bodies come in contact with are shaped by what we do to them and our bodies are also shaped by what we get in contact with. This makes orientation a form of directions that put some things in our reach and not others (Ahmed, 152, 2007). When we come in contact with the 'other', there is a form of uncertainty and suspicion. There is no standard manual on how to treat this other, so Stephen Walt, a realist, says that ideology shapes perception when there is a form of uncertainty towards the intentions of the other. Europeans are certain about themselves, they are white. But the 'other' that they encountered is not and so what Europeans made of the different people they encountered was based on who they are and what they are like in comparison to the other. This makes whiteness itself a form of orientation, or a definitive starting point of figuring out how to describe and interact with the people who are non-white. In Sarah Ahmed's *Phenomenology of whiteness*, she quotes Frantz Fanon's example to illustrate how whiteness is an orientation. Fanon's account is as follows: "I know that if I want to smoke, I shall

have to reach out my right arm and take the pack of cigarettes lying at the other end of the table. The matches, however, are in the drawer on the left, and I shall have to lean back slightly. And all these movements are made not out of habit but out of implicit knowledge” (Fanon, 1986, 110-111). Fanon described how his body wanted to do an action to get an object. This action is fundamentally an orientation towards the future that exhibits an intention. Since the body is familiar with this object, it is familiar with the action needed to obtain it, not because that action is a mere habit. Even if the cigarettes and matches are there, he did not happen to just be at a reaching point. Instead, Fanon suggests that being part of what he called the corporeal schema is not enough. He suggests thinking of the historical racial schema beneath it. The historical and racial dimensions are beneath the body’s surface which becomes its own orientation (Ahmed, 2007, 153). Fanon’s example demonstrates what the body is like before it is racialized, as in assigned a race to. According to him, race does not interrupt the corporeal schema but mainly forms a structure to the way it operates.

It is a fact that racialization grew with colonization and European state-making expeditions. This role of creating states in colonies institutionalized racialization as it became more like a tool of power that became infused with the making of the state and together constituted modern rule. The Political power and economic structure of the now decolonized and the neo-colonized states, came to be through colonization. Even if the modern understanding of racialization claims that this notion is unlawful, colonialism definitely spread racial differences that became deeply embedded in modern states as they think they gained sovereign rule and nationhood.

Foucault’s account of racism was based on biology as a basis for power relations, while W.E.B Du Bois gives more emphasis on the essential social features of racism because according

to him, biology is a 'badge' of race and does not account for the social interactions. As Omi and Winant argue, racialization then is used to frame the process of formation and change which did not just happen to bodies but also to social relations, institutions and state actions (Lewis et al., 2019, 33). Institutions are also considered as orientation devices because they take the shape and form of whatever is inside them. For example, white bodies gather to create an institution so it is considered white as well because it is formed by whites. Even if non-whites inhabit a white institution, they have to adopt the whiteness if they are willing to stay in this white institution (Ahmed, 2007, 157-8). Racialization hence, involves assigning bodies to racial categories and associating symbols, attributes, qualities and other meanings to the categories. Racial identities are constructed in three steps: first, there has to be a racial label pertaining to the racial identity of the group. Second, they have to have specific norms and roles assigned to them and there would be definitive expectations related to their racial identity. Third, the members of the group accept the racial identity assigned to them. The result of this is that this group acquires a race as a new status. This racial categorization, in turn, decides who is similar or not and who gets a certain opportunity and who does not. More even when it comes to resources, it decides on who gets what. As a consequence of this process, those who are excluded do not only lose material privileges, they are also denied participation in institutions and representative entities because of the categorization (Lewis, 2003, 287). As administrative states formed from the 16th century to the 19th century, governments concentrated on controlling the big masses on their territories rather than the territories themselves. So according to Foucault, modern powers began since then to interfere with the human body as a biological species and called this the power of biopower (Howell and Richter Montpetit, 2019, 4). The people who are prevented from moving across spaces are forced to move in a different way. If racist habits which resulted from racist actions

are inherited like race, then people can also inherit the things that do not become habits as well. For example, inheriting a Muslim name. The body is recognized as “could be Muslim” meaning that it could also be a terrorist. Spaces that bodies can move across do not extend the surface of our bodies and so not being white is not extended by the space we inhabit (Ahmed, 2007, 162-163).

In light of this, superior states can exercise biopower which is a word that combines both race as a powerful tool and race as a historical process. In addition to this, there came the construct of a ‘threat’, for example, the ‘Yellow Peril’ consisting of the Chinese and the Japanese. Along with white superiority came the fear that the superior civilization was threatened by the inferior ones (Vincent, 1982, 661). This leads to no surprises with regards to the racial categorization goal European colonialism had. The reason why white superiority continued was the fear that the poorer races were going to overpower the richer race and ruin the latter’s advancements. The tight immigration laws in rich countries are said to be this way because of this ancient fear (Vincent, 1982, 667), and because of the racist attitudes that manifest in exclusions or partial rights if any.

According to Fenton (2003), since race is seen as something hereditary, it makes people of the same race have a familial relationship with each other because they have shared characteristics forming the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy. This makes biopower see the enemies (those who are unlike us) as threats to the health and wellbeing of the people and being the ‘death’ of the other. Those who are seen as unfit or dangerous have to die so that life would be more healthy and ‘pure’ (Howell and Richter Montpetit, 2019, 5).

Moreover, because race became an idea that was tied to the notions of European superiority or white supremacy, both became concrete ideologies with European colonization.

Philosopher Charles Mills (1997), links ideology and structure as he goes to explain that white supremacy is a unique power that involves both formal and informal rule, socioeconomic privilege and enforces norms that dictate the distribution of wealth and opportunities, etc. (Golash-Boza, 2016, 130-133). Consequently, two major problems arose from white colonialists being in contact with non-whites. The first was the extension of white man's rule in countries inhabited by the non-whites and the second was discrimination against people of color who enter or want to enter non-white people's countries (Vitalis and Shulman, 2010,58), as mentioned earlier. An essential pillar in the logic of white supremacy is slavery which made Black people slave-able by nature since they are considered no better than property (Smith, 2012, 68).

Charles Herriam (1924) claimed that what is shaping contemporary politics, for one, was further development of industrialism and the penetration of the 'backward states' in the world, or, what he refers to as, the invasion of the tropical zone by the temperate one. For another, it was the rise in race problems and how nationalism was at the core of race expression (Vitalis and Shulman, 2010, 59). In addition to this crucial revelation, the work of Rogers Brubaker in 1998 on citizenship and nationhood sparked the narrative that race and racism are essential to the making of a nation (Suzuki, 2017, 288).

Religion also takes a national form in certain conditions within a historical frame as it plays a vital role in the construction of a nationalist movement but it must be paired with national interests. The logic of inside and outside works by actions of splitting looking over the commonalities between the 'self and the 'other' (Blaney and Inayatulla, 2000, 33). If nationalists favor those who belong to their nation and keep 'others' at their borders, then this would make them racists by definition. Even if nationalists do this in the name of protecting culture. It is made and reproduced. Histories of nationalism exemplify that it was not achieved or constructed

without racism or racist intentions. In addition, cultural racism in particular will prove to be particularly harder on minorities who wish to maintain basic elements, at the very least, of their own culture or religion beyond their skin color (Modood, 2005, 39). Since new cultural boundaries were bound to emerge and crossroads with the diversity of the other, the codes that refer to the relationship between the cultural borders have to be rearranged to engage with the cultural differences and the new networks of hierarchy and power struggle (Giroux, 1993, 100). This was the dilemma of the colonized people who were pushed to assimilate and adopt the culture of their colonizers and their language, for the purpose of this thesis, Lebanon poses as a very interesting case that did not follow this rule of thumb. This country demonstrates how class and religious dynamics lead to the construction of an identity with the help of the colonizer, namely, France.

This constructed national identity is deeply embedded in Lebanese history that it is taking a modern form of racism against a particular ‘unwanted’ group, Syrian refugees. What makes this problem worse and gives it a racist form is that Lebanon not only sees itself as superior to other Arab nations, but also acts as if it is ‘white’ and believes in that.

Securitization Theory:

With the growing numbers of civil wars, and conflicts of a geo-political nature, the crossing of borders became an issue of security rather than one of immigration to seek a better life. The movement of bodies from war zones to stable zones has become one particular issue related to peace and security. The securitization process of such people is done by governmental officials, influential elites (those possessing wealth, and can influence a large audience), and of course the media of the receiving state.

A securitization process has a level of subjectivity. Framing something or someone as a threat has no manual to follow. From a poststructuralist perspective, language plays a crucial role in making sense of the world especially that it is essential for politicians to use to garner public support (Hansen in Baylis et.al, 2011, 172). Securitization theory lies at the core of structuring the identity of 'threat' and attaching it to individuals through speech acts. It starts by one group of elites or state leaders with a large base of supporters convincing their constituents that they need protection. When the threat is constructed, normal politics do not apply anymore and thus extreme measures are justified because the population needs to be protected. The rhetoric in this process involves using stereotypes and images to garner support for the abnormal politics being practiced. The use of images and specific features or traits to securitize individuals is the core of racism.

Following the Cold War, questions of security arose and due to those, securitization theory stemmed in the 1980s with Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and de Wilde being the pioneers of the Copenhagen School of security studies, which gave birth to Securitization Theory. These authors created another dimension of security study which previously, dominated by the realist approach, solely focused on threats that come from military power. They included the security of the society as well as the security of the nation. This made the referent object of security is society rather than the state.

According to Waever, when it comes to defending social identities, the Copenhagen School illustrates that threatened societies respond in one obvious way and that is to strengthen their social identity to combat the foreign one. They do this using cultural ways to reinforce their social cohesion and ensure to reproduce their social identity in an effective way (Roe, 2012, 280). Since the Copenhagen school uses the term 'audience', it could be considered as having a

post-structuralist perspective of securitization since the receiver (public) is what matters in this process.

The process of securitization has three key components. Waever, Buzan, and de Wilde identify them in their theory of securitization: referent objects, those that are in the face of an existential threat; securitizing actors, those who say that the referent object is facing an existential threat; and functional actors, those with the power to make an influence (Buzan et al.,1998, 36). The securitizing actor constructs the threat by using speech acts to compel their audience. Securitizing actors describe threats to the identity of the group that is threatened using words like: die, perish, wither, waste, decline, etc. (Roe, 280, 2012).

Yet for the words to be convincing, there needs to be facilitating conditions to make securitization work. This makes the form of the speech act, and the position of the securitizing actor and the history that is associated with the threat, essential for the success of the securitization process (McDonald, 2008, 571). These actors use this rhetoric to design laws and emergency ad hoc rules using words like: to halt, contain, control or avoid a danger, even though these measures taken may go against the constitution or even disregard international human rights norms or even go against what is common sense (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 292). The speech act or the securitizing action do not automatically result in securitization. The act results in such if the audience accepts the securitizing speech (Buzan et al.,1998, 25-31). The crucial role the audience plays is evident in the securitization process since they are greatly responsible for the success of the speech act. There is no specific audience that is targeted but rather several audiences depending on the nature of the threat. The audience is meant to serve two purposes. The first of which is to provide the securitizing actor with the mandate that is usually not within the scope of 'normal politics.' The second is merely giving the securitizing actor moral support.

If they do not accept the securitizing speech, the securitizing actor will have failed in legitimizing the use of extreme measures to deal with the threat that is socially constructed. The word security then is not just a simple word but one with a performance to make. It has the power to transform the social reality we live in (Balzacq et. al, 495-500).

A question arises about why some particular representations of threats work with one audience and not with another? What makes one securitizing actor so powerful and another so marginalized? (McDonald, 2008, 564). Who exactly is benefiting from such a process? A great criticism of this notion is that it relies heavily on linguistics to deliver its threatening messages as opposed to relying on political processes instead. All the issues are part of a plot across three categories which are, non-politicized, politicized and securitized. The first is not considered important and does not need a public debate or public comments and therefore no urgent action needs to be taken. As this issue becomes politicized, it is then debated and is part of public policy such as education and this entails different allocation of resources. If the issue is securitized, it is then an existential threat that requires extreme measures to solve it.

Waever and Barry Buzan found that analyzing the apparent objective threat is not enough. For them, analyzing the process where the press or the executive give the public the news of a threat before elaborating on the counter measures that would be taken is what really matters. The result of this may be an increase in the number of police officers, more armaments, etc. (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 292). Securitization is a call for a response kind of process, where the securitizing actor calls for an action to respond to a matter of security. What matters next is that the audience must accept and believe that they are threatened. The argument has to be framed in a convincing way to achieve the desired support that would justify any extreme measures (Roe, 2012, 281). A securitizing discourse can only be complete if there is an

existential threat that calls for an emergency type of action. The desired result is for a response to take place free of any rules (Watson, 2011, 6). Based on this definition, the 'threat' does not have to be objective or materialistic. This is potentially problematic since literally anything or anyone could be labeled a threat (Robinson, 2017, 506).

According to Grayson, threats should be termed as vulnerabilities because threats are seen as present dangers that require urgent action but vulnerabilities are deemed as future risks that do not have the same sense of urgency or carry specific policy to be made (Roe, 2012, 283). This can be useful in the process of securitization to justify the measures to be taken against those vulnerabilities. Securitization theory was developed as an attempt to break down the process of securitization and look into how and why it happens and to whom or what. To understand securitization, scholars tend to use discourse analysis since securitization is not one individual act but rather a dynamic process and it is usually traced within case studies (Robinson, 2017, 506). Securitized problems can be either managed or transformed. By management, it is not meant that these issues are put back within the framework of normal politics. Managing such issues may give them a sense of normalization but still, securitization language is present (Roe, 2004, 285).

According to the Copenhagen School, security is a core political act and it is something that we should be careful with. It is not only about ruling out a threat or articulating fear, but it is something that could possibly cause abnormal politics or extreme politics to take place. This will bring unforeseeable consequences on everyone (Williams, 2011, 459). This school speaks of threats in a way similar to realism's state of nature concept. Securitization can be a conceptualization of the traditional realist understanding of national security where the speaker and the audience negotiate on the measures to be used which are usually far-reaching (Stritzel

and Chang, 2015, 550). Original securitization studies by Buzan et al. (1998) was based on the differentiation of several sectors, which are political, economic, military, societal and environmental.

With constructivism as an approach, securitization is then the ‘positioning’, with the use of speech acts usually by political leaders, of a specific issue as a threat to the survival of the people. Balzacq (2011) claims that securitization is just practices that are articulated using metaphors, policies, images, stereotypes, etc. by the securitizing actor to make his audience create implications by appealing to their emotions, sensations, thoughts, etc. about an object and give it a threatening aura so that creating a policy to block it an easy job. With the constituents' consent, it enables emergency measures to be taken in with suspending ‘normal politics’ to deal with that same issue (McDonald, 2008, 566). The word positioning is an interesting choice of word here because it conceptualizes how the construction of the threat is subjective and based on what the situation demands. The sense of urgency becomes institutionalized, since institutions are the channels that the actors use, based on the given type of threat whether it was a persistent one or one that is recurring. As a result of institutionalizing the response, bureaucracies are created and or the military is mobilized to respond to the threat. The discursive practices political elites use justify the exceptional measures that violate existing rules. This kind of securitization is largely successful and because it is, it becomes institutionalized (Watson, 2011, 8).

The construction of a threat could also be called ‘framing’ since it is possible that it is subjective and even non-existence. Frames are meant to methodologically interpret what is ‘out there’ to be convincing (Rychnovska, 2014, 15). There obviously remains a choice whether to categorize these bodies out there as a threat or not and their characterization as one often comes from a political leader to their constituents to justify the extreme measures they are about to use

(McDonald, 566, 2008). This comes especially useful when using securitization to analyze the issue of migration and determining that it did not bring with it a human rights crisis (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 290). When it comes to migration issues, governments, religious institutions, the media, academics and experts intervene to convince the public that migration is a threat to security (Trevino-Rangel, 2016, 292).

The framework of securitization becomes exceptionally relevant when it comes to the discussion and analysis of immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers. The same language is used to characterize these people and they are responded to as ‘threats’ through tightening immigration procedures, borders or even use of military power (McDonald, 2008, 566). Political elites along with the media and governments construct immigration as a threat to national security, the stability of the economy and ‘national identity’. Migrants are then divided into two categories; desirable and undesirable. This categorization depends on their skills, their background, education, etc. (Jaskulowski, 2018, 711). In light of this, governments then restrict borders and control admissions of people across them.

One can establish a relationship between securitization and nationalism. If we accept that the concept of a nation is a construct, then nationalism is too. Both are so ambiguous that they provide securitizing actors with dense material to work with. It becomes simple for securitizing actors to associate the nation with matters that their populations care about to force them to accept the extreme measures they want to carry out to face the constructed ‘threat’.

A problem with securitization according to McDonald, is that the ‘form’ of the securitizing act is not properly defined and focuses on speech the dominant actors, usually political leaders, use. According to him, speech acts are not the only tool securitizing actors use to construct a threat but for this study, it is the main focus. The second problem is the context of

the securitization act. It is also defined narrowly since it only focuses on the immediate moment of intervention as opposed to the whole picture. The process of securitization takes time and happens one step at a time and this should be thoroughly looked into. This is why when I make the connection between Lebanese nationalism and securitization, I explain the historical timeline that led to the establishment of the Lebanese identity to give a more elaborate picture. The third problem is concerning the framework of securitization as in the nature of the act of securitization. The act is always defined by the existence and in relations to a threat (McDonald, 2008, 564). Yet this third problem does not really pose a weakness in the analysis because this kind of interpretation and framing of securitization was greatly supported after the 9/11 attacks. The occurrences of that day serve as a priori for the rest of the states to tighten their border control and regulations while framing migrants as an imminent threat to their national security and constituents (Trevino-Ragel, 2016, 292).

Securitization theory of the Copenhagen school is criticized because it characterizes securitization as a discursive practice and that belittles the role of bureaucracy which allows for securitization to happen. Securitization, however, is not only about speech acts. It is also enabled by a variety of institutional security means that professionals undertake to reinforce their position as protectors of their nation's security and preservers of its peace. They use this discourse as a decoy to their own failures so as to manage their constituents' grievances (Bigo, 2002, 65). Theorists of the Paris School, stress on the importance of the possibility of institutionalizing security threats. This school highlights the role of the systems that security professionals use to give power to their practices more than what the Copenhagen School concentrates on which is speech acts and extreme politics (Bigo, 2002, 65). Even though the focus on linguistics may be problematic as it undermines the other aspects of securitization like images and the different uses

of in in the securitization process (Williams, 2003, 179-196), for example, the role of the audience according to the Copenhagen School is poorly outlined. It is perhaps because the theory focuses on speech acts more than the audience (Balzacq, 2005, 171-201).

Even though the Copenhagen School is also criticized for its lack of consideration when it comes to the context and the role it plays in creating the speech act, a sociological perspective of securitization, applied by some scholars, gives a more holistic overview. Such a method allows analysis to incorporate social, cultural, political and historical factors to analyze the securitization process of refugees. Balzacq argues that the audience along with the context and political agency play a crucial role and that it is wrong to overlook them as often happens because they essentially guide the analysis of linguistics that construct threats (Balzacq, 2005, 173). A sociological approach puts securitization into a pragmatic framework as it is seen as a result of certain circumstances, a specific context, a specific psychographic of the audience and the power of the audience and the securitizing actor. All of which interact to make securitization happen (Balzacq, 2011, 1).

This theory in particular is relevant to this research because it explains how the Lebanese government with the help of the media acts as a securitizing actor to frame Syrian refugees as an existential threat to the stability of Lebanon's security through speech acts. These speech acts convince the audience that the securitizing acts are in their own benefit to save them from the threat they framed.

Speech Act Theory:

The securitization process of Syrian refugees in Lebanon relies on the socio-historical context of Lebanon and is facilitated by speech acts. Speech acts along with historical, cultural, political, economic and geographic elements work together to contribute to the racialization and

securitization of those refugees. All these contributed to the creation of the element of fear among the audience (Lebanese population) which in turn allowed governmental and elitist figures to construct those vulnerable bodies as ‘threats’ to Lebanon’s security, as well as national and cultural identity of the Lebanese through various media.

Speech act theory is originally a philosophical theory that is concerned with the ways in which language is used. It is now a theory that is used in many other disciplines, mainly linguistics. For the purpose of my thesis, I intend to bring it to center stage and use it to explain how securitization is evident, even if subtly, in racist speech acts that are broadcasted on several kinds of media platforms against Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Michael Halliday sees that scholars intend to overlook which is that linguistic theories have social values and that they are determined by ideology (Pratt, 1986, 59). Halliday is saying that linguistic theories sometimes produce ideologies because through dialogue, people can gather others’ beliefs and ideologies and make them up for recognition, use or critique (Pratt, 1986, 59).

A politician’s speech, for example, is concerned with persuading others to make them believe what they are saying and so Speech Acts play a fundamental role for this reason. (Dylgjerii, 2017, 19). The Speech Act theory is best described as ‘How Things are Done with Words Theory’ because it has roots in the works of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) (Dylgjerii, 2017, 21). John Langshaw Austin (1962) began the engagement with speech acts philosophically when he corrected his previous understanding of performative utterances. Before, he underestimated the meanings that the acts a person can perform have and convey while making them, he argues that words are tools that can be used for different purposes (Verschueren, 1978, 69). He originally saw that not all utterances can be accounted for using a logic that is truth-conditional (Pratt, 1986, 60), he takes utterances out of the ‘true’ and ‘false’

dichotomy to put them in the category of a ‘performance’, meaning that speech acts that are not stating facts cannot be interpreted as true or false but are evaluated in a different way . He goes on to explain that when someone says something, called a locutionary act, he is also doing something by saying it. This doing is called an illocutionary act. According to him, speech acts are split into three categories: A locutionary act that means actually saying something as in uttering words, an illocutionary act which is the core of any theory on speech acts and a perlocutionary act which is the influence on the feelings, opinions, thinking or actions of the audience. Illocutionary acts of the speech hold the intentions of the actor in their speech (Dylgjerii, 2017, 19). A perlocutionary act can encourage, persuade or promise the listeners. Levinson (1981), says that the perlocutionary act is practically the intended or the intended results of the speakers’ words (Dylgjerii, 2017, 21).

While Austin left things in an abstract way and focused on the three categories, John Searle, Austin’s student, tried to bring together the loose ends Austin left. He adds that everything the actor says has a meaning (Niesen, 2018, 58). Being a bit skeptical of Austin’s three-category analysis, Searle distinguishes between a proposition’s content and the force or role it actually plays and that is what is called an illocution instead of between what is said and the action done. He solely focuses on the illocutionary act. Searle also puts the illocutionary act in five categories: Assertive (description of the state of affairs), Directive (requesting, commanding or advising), Commissive (promising, talking of an act that would be done in the future), Expressive (excuses and sympathy) and Declarative (saying something and making it happen like declaring a war or saying someone is guilty), (Dylgjerii, 2017, 21-22). A directive speech act for example is meant to make the listener do something, but a suggestion, however, is a speech act that has little force. A command, for example, has the strongest force. So for Searle,

the illocutionary aspect is what is central in his analysis. Yet both Searle and Austin emphasize the effect speech acts have on people as in the way they have the power to make someone feel happy or scared by saying the exact same words.

What matters too is the position and profile of the speaker as in if someone is to claim that they are to christen a ship or give orders to a person to do something, they need to have a certain social role or else the conditions for success are not fulfilled. This is because Speech acts always refer to the speaker and the audience along with the inferences and assumptions from the perspective of those two components (Pratt, 1986, 61). If a speech act achieves its illocutionary goals it is considered a successful one. As in, the actor is convincing and credible enough for the listener (audience) to accept what is said, which is something the actor cannot predict or ensure beforehand (Niesen, 2018, 61). For the same reason, speech acts and the locutions performed both are dependent on the speaker's intentions within a given context where he utters the propositions (Dylgjerii, 2017, 20). The content of the interaction is decided upon based on the intentions, individuals have and the quality of these interactions are dependent on the qualities these individuals have. For example, rationality, consistency and so on (Pratt, 1986, 62). Sometimes, the speaker would make a speech acts as part of some group or as a distinguished rank in a particular hierarchy or may at other times speak for himself depending on the situation and intention (Prat, 1986, 63).

In this respect, H. P Grice (1976) claims that in order for a person to utter something and mean it, they must intend three things at least. The first is that they must be seeking a specific reaction from their listener. The second, is that their intention is recognized and the third is that the recognition of their intention serves as a reason for the listener to react in the way the actor intends (Niesen, 2018, 60). Since political discourses have specific structures and strategies that

make them functional (Dylgjerii, 2017, 20), they can be analyzed from this perspective because they are all about doing an action with words and lexical items that effectively place emphasis on the political attitude and the speaker's opinion. They also manipulate the public's opinion and harness their consent to gain legitimate power (Dylgjerii, 2017, 20).

It is possible to determine how forceful an utterance is by the choice of words used. Employing certain indicators of force can allow the speaker to make it clear what kind of illocutionary act their utterance is giving. Austin and Searle still emphasize that linguistic actions are based on triggering the literal meanings in a serious or genuine expression. They say that the nonstandard use of language is 'parasitic' as in it draws on the standard use of linguistics. On the other hand, not every speech act complies with the requirements that make explicit or literal utterances. For this reason, Searle concerned himself more with the results since Political speeches, for example, do not necessarily succeed because they have truths in them but their success is rather more dependent on how the arguments are presented and so political speeches are rather considered an 'output' and a process which is either spoken or written (Dylgjerii, 2017, 21). If we take this as true, then Habermas is right when he insists that in every instance, language can be examined in terms of the three following functions; giving a proposition, creating an intersubjective relation and finally articulating intentions. Strategic acts like threats or bargaining and even commands are a lot more difficult to assess because they do not focus on reaching agreements from the audience but their success relies heavily on the speaker and their status (Niesen, 2018, 62).

Searle's focus on the illocutionary act will be the main focus of this chapter as well. In the case of speech acts against Syrian refugees in Lebanon, we are looking at the output of those speech acts which is the prediction of racism.

Chapter 3: Lebanese Nationalism

Lebanon is an Arab country whose population consists of mainly Muslims, Christians, and Druze. This chapter looks at the presence of the Palestinian refugees first because Lebanon's policies towards their presence in Lebanon set priorities to the policies that target Syrian refugees who are the main focus of the next chapter. Analysis of the Lebanese context in terms of the relationship between Syria and Lebanon, and Lebanon's sociopolitical environment will provide an understanding of the securitization of Syrian refugees in Lebanon since 2011. It will demonstrate how Lebanon-Syria relations, historically, have created a particular sociocultural context that has facilitated the success of securitization. Examination of the context will highlight the most significant securitizing actors, the audience, and the various securitizing speech acts and policy within a holistic framework. This will illustrate the dynamic between relevant actors in the securitization process, as well as the facilitating factors that have enabled securitization.

Having a legal document that declares a person's citizenship is essential when you are living outside your home country. It is so because it determines a person's belonging. It also determines a person's identity and so a citizenship and a national identity are meant to be fixed attributes that are ascribed by others or sometimes self-ascribed. The problem that Palestinians in Lebanon have is that many of the basic civil rights are unattainable since they are internationally labeled as stateless. Those who have been naturalized and are now Lebanese citizens, for them, their national identity (Palestinian) is something and their acquired citizenship (Lebanese) is something else.

Nationalism and its contribution to the Us and Them Paradigm:

Policies along with institutions and state frameworks of border control are a result of social and political struggles that are produced and shaped by contradicting structures related to migration in a racist and capital system. Nicos Poulantzas (1978) explains that migration policies are relationships that are materialistically condensed between various actors and social forces. With such an understanding one can comfortably say that policies and institutions of such regimes (illegality, residencies, etc.) can be denaturalized and historicized (Georgi, 2019, 100).

The Nation:

The ‘nation’ is an accepted social and political construct that allows for the analysis of how easy or difficult it is for a person to move from a specific national group, to gain membership of another national group, and to have equal rights of citizenship (Kaplan, 1981,16). “It is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson, 1983, 5-6). Constructivism is used to build this concept as it is concerned with how norms impact the community. Norms are these intersubjective beliefs, reproduced by people, about society and the natural world of the ‘actors’ (those who do the constructing) and their institutions (the channels they use to communicate their construction) to determine the best course of action (Farrell, 2002, 49). If the construction is successful, it turns into a norm that gets embedded in the consciousness and culture of the people just the way the term ‘nation’ came to be. Because of this, many doors were opened not for people but for ideologies that spiraled out of control and caused more harm than good. Historian Ahmad Rida defines the nation as one body whose life is unity, whose power is religion and whose voice is language (Firro, 2006, 537). This understanding of the nation tells us that a nation does not own a state but with national aspirations, the sense of nationalism assigns a national identity to a particularly

geographic piece and creates a socially constructive structure on it (Gellner, 1983 in Eriksen, 2010, 10).

Nationalism:

Nationalism makes nations possible to create. Just like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses on the notion of cultural similarity, hence by application, creates boundaries that make the other, alien or outsiders. In other words, the core of nationalism by definition is its relationship to the state (Gellner, 1983 in Eriksen, 2010, 10).

It makes sense to think that the issue of nationalism should concern political scientists most since the nature of the nation and what constitutes one is a core interest and area of research. Both nationalism and national movements are phenomena that should not be studied on their own. As in one must take into consideration the social and class structure of the society they take place in (Berberoglu, 1999, 79). Nationalist movements are unique political movements that strive on the assumptions of nationalism and thrive in a society where nationalism is a cultural aspect that is rooted deep in it (Gelvin, 2009, 12). For nationalist movements to thrive, the community should believe in them.

Nationalism postulates that because of common interests, classes within a particular ethnic group, people of a 'racial' minority should stand together economically and politically to achieve their collective interest against other 'nations' or races (Berberoglu, 1999,79). Historically speaking, nationalism is an ideology that emerged as a promise of 'protection' of citizens' rights against monarchies. It then turned into an ideology that political actors use as a justification to human rights violations (Yazici, 2019, 147). National struggles in the Middle East have taken the form of anti-colonial fights just like in India, China, Algeria and Cuba (Berberoglu, 1999, 78), as national sovereignty is the only thing that can ensure the protection of

the citizens' and nation's interests (Gellvin, 2009, 11). John Breuilly claims that the origins of nationalism stemmed from a focus on Rousseau's advocacy for popular sovereignty and from Herder's claim that every nation has its unique culture (Storm, 2018, 114). Another term came up right after from observations on how diverse entities could unite and become one like the unification of the Dutch East Indies to form Indonesia. This form of nationalism came to be called national unification (Storm, 2018, 114). This type of unification is not exactly what we are looking at since in the case of Lebanon, it was not that several clusters wanted to unite but the opposite. One cluster wanted autonomy. Yet it is still relevant because of what political scientist Gat Azar argues about that it is within people's inherent nature to prefer people who are closer to them than strangers. In the past, people identified with others from their tribe, ethnicity or nation to collaborate and expel the aliens or foreign 'invaders'. In addition, religions, especially churches, were the hub of national organization (Storm, 2018, 115). This comes to no surprise since religious institutions were serving as the political driving forces as well.

Nationalism provided states with an ideological doctrine that centralized the state and allowed it to control their citizens. Sociologist Andreas Wimmer argues that the idea of a 'nation-state' emerged from political modernization. With the political sphere becoming more complex, elites could not depend on themselves and their fellow elites anymore but had to mobilize at least a part of the nation to fulfill their needs (Storm, 2018, 116). In 1995, Michael Billing published 'Banal Nationalism' where he expressed that nationalism does not only appear in wars, holidays or revolutions. But it is also visible in many other aspects like food, travel, social activities and especially mass media (Storm, 2018, 117).

Nationalism needs barriers to be able to group the 'other' and keep them away. Barriers dictate what an alien must do to be naturalized. Political structure, culture, language and race are

all examples of barriers that prevent an immigrant from becoming a citizen (Kaplan, 1981,16). When nationalism conforms with protectionist or political ideas it becomes closely related to culture which is why nationalism still manages to prosper under corrupt regimes. Political nationalism creates many obstacles for naturalization. The potential citizen would have to go through a process to learn the language, cultures, customs, etc. before they become legitimate citizens. And there is no guarantee that they will be even after going through the naturalization process.



The first tweet above calls refugees ‘guests’ and Lebanon a ‘host’. In a sense, this alludes to temporariness of refugees’ stay in Lebanon. Bassil is essentially saying that mass displacement causes divisions among the guests and host and causes radicalness which leads to ‘terrorism’. He says that both radicalism and terrorism are synonyms to oppressing religious freedom. Racial nationalism is one type that is especially relevant to this discussion. For this type of racism, each person belongs to a community just because they inherited certain traits that give them a permanent ethnic identity (Kaplan, 1981, 17-18). Collective identities create sufficient conditions or ‘social security issues’ (Roe, 2012, 284). The second tweet above uses the word ‘threat’ to distinguish the ‘other’. Bassil says: “the biggest threat to the ‘Lebanese’ formula is

Syrian displacement and Palestinian refugeehood to *our land*.” In the name of nationalism and national interests, the group of people considered as ‘others’ become securitized and labeled as a ‘threat’ to ‘national peace and security’. The way the current international system works is dependent functionally on the suspicion of the ‘other’ that is located outside the borders of a state. Within a given state, on the other hand, there is an assumption of ‘sameness’. Despite this sameness, the other still lurks outside somewhere (Blaney and Inayatulla, 2000, 32). But the question is, how to understand or deal with the ‘other’ that enters the boundaries? The state that determines it has the ‘other’ on its land, replicates the way the international order deals with the ‘other’ within its boundaries. First the aliens are racialized and then become securitized and looked at as a threat’ as well.

Lebanese Nationalism in Context:

Lebanese intellectuals began to weave nationalist ideas that were meant to transform later into Arab, Syrian and Lebanese nationalisms (Firro, 2006, 535). With the massive intervention of Europe, the Ottoman Levant was forced to enter the realm of nation-states. The discourse of the nineteenth century was all about ‘Al Taifa’ as a nation. Yet nationalism was still a foreign idea that was adopted by the Europeans who helped the elites make it a concept of their own (Makdisi, 1996, 25).

Historically speaking, Syrian elites have always viewed Lebanon as belonging to ‘Greater Syria’ during French Colonialism and even to after Lebanon’s independence in 1943. Various political parties and religious groups challenged the validity of Lebanon’s confessional system, as sectarian tensions along with religious grievances solidified this notion. This, with foreign intervention, played a major role in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975. Syria was one major intervenor that financed and armed militias that eventually took hold of political power and

positions in the government. Hizbullah being one important actor that has much authority over the country as Syria was one large supporter and ally of Hizbullah. Syria's authority over Lebanon's internal policy-making processes rendered the Ta'if Accord which was signed in 1989 and meant to end the civil war, difficult to implement. anti-Syrian sentiments paired with a rise in Lebanese nationalism in the late nineties manifested in the alliance of Christian and Sunni March 14 who, together, called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon (Dionigi, 2017, 23). Syria's intervention in the Lebanese affairs and post-war transition was not supposed to last long after the end of the civil war yet it did long after the anticipated two-year period. Syrian troops only withdrew in 2005 after immense international pressure that was especially heightened with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri since Syria was blamed for it. Relations between the two countries worsened in 2004 after the Syrian intervention and influence that resulted in the extension of President Emile Lahoud's term in office (Geukjian, 2014, 524).

The awakening of the nationalists after the First World War was too caught up in the ambitions and the desires of the elites. The Europeans insisted on highlighting the differences between Christianity and Islam which provided a crucial step in legitimating their intervention in the Middle East. The French interest in separating Lebanon from Syria became more obvious (Makdisi, 1996, 25). In 1919, the Marseille Chamber of Commerce held a 'scientific conference' on Syria that included specialized French scholars. Among those were Chukri Ghanem and George Samneh. For Ghanem (a Christian), separating Damascus from Arabia would be a violent act to the land where history came to be. The fact that Samneh was a Greek Catholic may be why he rejected the idea of a Greater Lebanon as opposed to Ghanem who was a Maronite from Mount Lebanon as the Maronites were the leaders of the construction of the Lebanese

national identity. Carol Hakim (2013) holds personal motives and economic goals as the origin of the construction of Lebanese nationalism. Contrary to the works of many historians, the reason is not because of tradition or origin, but to use nationalism as a tool to suit personal purposes (Hakim, 2013,16).

Maronite clergy men established 'Qaaem maqamiya' as a regime in 1842 after making Mount Lebanon a political unit in 1840s. then because of the sectarian massacres in 1860 (Hakim, 2013, 107-108) and a new regime came in place called the Mutasarrifiyya in 1861 (Firro,2004, 15). With the Mutesarrifate being established in Mount Lebanon, it meant that the Lebanese identity was legally defined and so the Lebanese can enjoy 'citizenship' (Salibi, 1971, 78). To encourage Muslims to cooperate, Christian-Lebanese leaders modified 'Lebanese nationalism' to adapt it to multi-communal status. The search for a common denominator thus began. The main person steering this search was Michel Chiha who studied at the Jesuit schools. In 1921 he joined the group of supporters of the French mandate to create a political party with the slogan of 'For Lebanon with France' and also joined 'The New Phoenicians' headed by Charles Corm. With the French's help, Lebanon could achieve its desire to evolve its national framework its history has been emphasizing (Makdisi, 1996, 24).

Those who framed the mandate actually thought that it would be an improvement on colonialism. The outcome, however, was not at all as they intended (Sluglett, 2014, 425). During the early years of the French Mandate, Lebanese nationalists tried to promote Lebanon as a refuge and a place of freedom as an alternative to Phoenicianism (Salibi, 1971, 85). Creating Lebanon could not have been possible without the support of the elites, in name, the Maronites who strongly stress on their French character. They used their historical ties to the French and held themselves superior and the natural leaders on an independent Lebanon. Chiha realized that

it is important for economic reasons to alternate people's behavior. In 1926 during the Syrian revolution (1925 to 1927), Maronite intellectuals along with Maronite leaders had a fear that the French might reverse the territory plans to favor the Muslims. Chiha was in charge of drafting the Lebanese constitution. A draft of the constitution was presented in May 1926 to the Representative Council. Without giving the members enough time to negotiate the draft, the High Commissioner approved it as a final version (Firro, 2004, 17-18).

The Republic of Lebanon:

The Lebanese Republic was created in 1929 giving the Maronite elites the biggest share of power that was supplemental in 1943 by a National Pact that gave Lebanon its formal independence (Makdisi, 1996, 25). The National Pact, which was the result of compromises by the elites, legitimated the patronage system and the division of the spoils among those elites (Makdisi, 25, 1996). The Maronite elites were given the presidency, the Sunnis the prime ministership and the Shi'ia the speaker of parliament position (Makdisi, 1996, 25). The constitution was supposed to create a base for sharing in the process of nation-building. Chiha thought that Lebanese nationalism which was articulated by Christian intellectuals during and after the First World War could possibly unite the multiple loyalties into one 'nation'. This history tells us that the Lebanese are descendants of many 'races' and not just the Phoenicians. Different races merged with the Lebanese throughout the centuries, so they are neither of Semitic race nor a Semetic culture. Chiha envisions the revival of the characteristics of the Phoenicians who are a mixture of races that equally nurtured the national identity through Mediterraneanism. The Arabic language is the language of the Lebanese but even though Lebanon was Arabic speaking, they insisted that their country plays a role in bridging the East and the West as well as

servicing as a safe haven for religious coexisting. For this, it was essential for Lebanon to remain bilingual (Gordon, 1979, 7).

Lebanon's bilingualism directly contributed to the problem of the split personality Lebanon has (Sayigh, 1965, 122). Its chameleon-like behavior towards the East and the West is what contributes to its constant search for its identity. For Chiha, Lebanese nationalism is about more than a mere ideological construct to evade Arabism and eliminate its alleged 'threat' of turning into the national ideology of modern Lebanon. Perhaps it started this way and got out of the hands of the elites due to the French control. Lebanese Christians and the French ones consider Lebanon a Mediterranean country acting like a bridge between the East and the West without being wholly one or the other. In the case of other bilingual or even multilingual countries like Belgium or Switzerland, languages are not rivaling each other unlike the dynamics in Lebanon (Sayigh, 1965, 122). Farjalla Haik wrote a book called 'Dieu est Libanais' in 1946 that is a resource for anyone trying to understand the kind of special relationship between Lebanon and France. In his book, he is adamant on describing the Lebanese as 'white' (Sayigh, 1965, 127). His description of Lebanon's whiteness is relevant in the racist process of securitization against those deemed as 'threats' to their non-existent whiteness that rules their current identity.

The Lebanese territory in the mandate came to be in its current form as a result of persistent history in its core area, Mount Lebanon (Faruki, 1974, 24). Today, it is impossible to draw a line between politics, religion, culture and language. History shows us how religious loyalties turned into political ones. Even though Lebanese Christians are a minority in Lebanon, they believe and carry themselves as a majority (Sayigh, 1965, 120). Adding to their consideration of themselves as 'white' and non-Arab speaking per se. Decades after gaining

independence, Lebanon is still lacking consensus over its history. Not having one unified recollection of origins leaves Lebanon in an ideological crisis (Hazran, 2009,460).

Chapter 4: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

In 2011, Syrian refugees fled the civil war in Syria. The scope and rapidity of their exodus grew at an alarming rate to become called a 'Syrian refugees crisis'. While it may have been that they were obliged to leave the country in fear for their life, their movement into other countries created consequences that affected the host countries.

Migrant or Refugee Debate:

Securitization shifted the political discourse on refugeehood and migration from having a humanitarian perspective to be framed as a security threat. This shift influenced policies on immigration and asylum seeking to the extent that the humanitarian concern about the well-being of individuals crossing borders from war-torn countries was replaced by a different perception. One that sees those migrants/refugees or asylum seekers as threats to the well-being of the citizens of the receiving state. The migrant/ refugee issue has been given much weight especially in the media and it has certainly been politicized. The civil wars that took place in the 1990s and caused a large influx of migrants had significant implications on the receiving states whether politically, economically or socially (Lohrmann, 2000, 4). The securitization of migration is a mere expressive means of linking migration to terrorism to globalize security and attempt to deal with terrorism and security threats post 9/11 incident (Humphrey, 2013, 179). The discussions on migration and security in Europe focused on the securitization of asylum seekers and about the burdens refugees and migrants pose as on national identity (Loescher, and Milner, 2005, 29). Such narratives resulted in the securitization of vulnerable peoples who were framed as a source of both direct and indirect threats that take multiple forms including, terrorism, economic

instability, and social instability. Lohrmann explains that even if migrants do cause instability, there is a difference between real and perceived threats. Fears of migration and refugeehood can be exaggerated yet the perception of threats is what influences policies that try to curb migration related issues (Lohrmann, 2000, 6).

Based on this, the process of securitization of migrants is purely political and rooted in foundational suppositions and ungrounded fears towards an unwanted population in the host state. Immigrants and refugees are mostly portrayed as a danger to the collective livelihood. The attitudes that add fuel to the fire are heightened by intense alienation that establish a stronger sense of belonging and union among the receiving population to protect their collective identity and face the existential threat that is perceived (Huysmans, 2006, 47). This framing of migrants as an existential threat is an essential political tool that works to reinforce unity of a community (Huysmans, 2006, 49). Bigo suggests that there is a direct relation between security and migration that is essentially political and adds that the word 'migrant' is a label that deems someone a threat to the values of the host state (Bigo, 2002, 71).

The debate on what constitutes a refugee and migrant is an ever-recurring one. Those two words were created to describe an individual that moves from one place to another along with their living conditions (Sajjad, 2018, 42). Migrants and refugees have entailed laws, statutes or practices that constitute those international borders in an attempt to govern or regulate the movement between those borders (Czajka, 2014, 158). Examining this phenomenon shows a complicated political dynamic between the power to make someone legitimate and giving them access to their rights based on how 'worthy' or innocent they are instead of this process being an objective means to granting people sanctuary.

Lebanon is one of the host countries that was affected by the refugee flow. This should not sound as an exaggeration given the geographic proximity, and the historical as well as social ties. Yet these same connections dictate the attitude and sentiments of the Lebanese towards the issue of the refugees. The Lebanese government has always been adamant to adopt a policy of 'disassociation' which was expressed time and again in the media especially by Saad Hariri. The objective was to stay out of the conflict while preventing the spill-over effect the conflict may have which could result in the destabilization of Lebanon. The rationale behind this policy is well understood among regional and international powers given Lebanon's precarious ties with Syria. However, Hizbullah's involvement in the Syrian conflict makes it difficult for Lebanon to disassociate itself at least politically. With the great number of refugees living in Lebanon, the state cannot distance itself. Since the beginning of the Syrian civil strife, Lebanon's policy of neglect has shaped the de facto relationship of the Lebanese government towards the humanitarian crisis of the refugees. The basic needs of shelter, education, access to health services and so on have been provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) without Lebanese government being involved in the process whatsoever. The Lebanese government gave permission to different NGOs and religious charities to take care of providing the refugees with assistance along with UNHCR which added fuel to the sectarian fire already existing in Lebanon. The religious charities were unsupervised and dominated the provision of aid to the refugees while approaching the refugees with sectarian strategies.

Lebanon, according to UNHCR, does not have any legislation on how to deal with either refugees or asylum seekers. The refugees face risks of detention, arrest and deportation in addition to having very few legal means to support themselves and their families. Without a legal framework, the refugees are left with little choice and high dependence on UNHCR. Practically

speaking, the local charities along with the municipalities give the most efficient aid given that they are on the ground with the refugees playing their host communities. With no clear legal framework, Syrian refugees have no legal sources to base their claim to basic rights and protection within Lebanon making them recognized as 'illegal bodies'.

The shared history between Syria and Lebanon ever since the domination of the Ottoman Empire and later the division that came with the French mandate shaped the current relationship between both states. Geography also brought Syrians and Lebanese close along with inter-family relations and migration. Since 1943, after gaining independence from the French occupation, Syria would not recognize Lebanon as an independent state with its own sovereignty. What made matters tense later was the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990 when Syria's army was in Lebanon. The final retreat of Syria's army eventually happened as resentment grew more in 2005 after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. As a result, there are two prevalent political blocs. One is March 14, who is against the current Syrian regime and March 8 who is pro the Syrian regime. What constitutes a fear of the refugees is the Sunni Shi'i tension especially in the Beqaa Valley and also the Sunni Alawite rivalry in Tripoli. Both areas are hosts to the majority of refugees.

The history and the current history that is being made are tangibly translated in speech acts produced by the Lebanese against the refugees and their presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has politicized the refugee crisis framing them as security threats and calling for their return to Syria. After being constructed as such, there is pretty much no limit to methods used to terminate this threat. Political elites who are considered credible in the eyes of their audience play the role of the securitizing actor and need to convince their constituents of the existence of the threat to gain legitimacy for the measures they plan to use against the threat. The

threat is usually constructed as one to the nation's identity, a threat to the livelihood of the community or any other social entity. After this is achieved through speech acts, the abnormal measures taken against the threat are legitimized because the audience accepted the existence of the threat and authorized the securitizing actor to end it.

Even though Syrian refugees fled their country in fear for their life, they are subject to the process of securitization in Lebanon. International organizations present refugees as victims of war who are forced to leave their home country to escape persecution. UNHCR defines a refugee as somebody who was forced to flee their home because of persecution, war or violence. Persecution includes reasons like race, religion, political views or being members of a given social group. In most cases, they cannot return or are merely afraid of doing so (UNHCR). Issues related to refugees are considered issues of human rights and considered embedded in international law. This definition paints the picture that a refugee is a victim who escaped persecution and needs protection. In light of this, a refugee status and security issues are not exactly to lines that run parallel but intersect as cause and effect with security or lack of it is the cause for the existence of refugees. **For this, the case of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon is an optimum one to study the contemporary discourse of securitization and how racism is produced through securitizing speech acts against those refugees.**

Lebanon and the Palestinian Refugees:

Lebanon's past experience with and sentiments towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon set a priory to the current attitude and policy-making towards the Syrian refugees. So far, the concept of identity has been explained as a mere social construct and it is possible to be imposed for political reasons and that the aspect of national identity is one dimension of a person's identity. Identity can also be defined separate from what is on passports and identity cards. It can

be considered a tool that allows people to make sense of themselves in their social environment. It is a means that individuals use to understand who they are in the social context they belong to (Elbedour et al., 1997, 217). Identity, in short, gives people a sense of belonging as well as providing opportunities and even setting constraints.

Lebanon fears that Syrian refugees would become permanent residents just like Palestinian refugees and this fear is the active factor in the way refugees are perceived and accepted as a threat to Lebanon's national and social security. Lebanon faced a great influx of over 120,000 Palestinian refugees due to the 1948 Nakba (Russel, 1985, 18). Palestinian militias gradually grew in power financially and politically influencing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) which caused tension between secular groups and political ones in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Cairo Agreement that gave administrative autonomy to Palestinian camps allowed for attacks on Israel from Lebanese land creating more fear among the Lebanese population and Christians in particular. The perception of the Lebanese towards Palestinian refugees was that of death of Lebanese life and destruction of its society, which turned the Palestinian cause to a Palestinian problem. This made the Lebanese call for the prohibition of Palestinians from having either political or social rights.

Until this day, the Lebanese are bitter towards the PLO and the role it is playing. This resentment manifests through discrimination against close to half a million registered Palestinian refugees. After the Lebanese civil war, discourse involving the Palestinian refugees was intensely securitizing and political. The Palestinian refugees were portrayed as a catalyst of de-stability to the government's confessional system of power that barely balanced the power between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon (Czajka, 2012, 243). The political discourse that dominates regarding the Palestinians' situation in Lebanon among the political elites and the

Lebanese population involves denying the refugees any civil or social rights since this can be seen as a political concession to Israel (Czajka, 2012, 244).

Becoming a Racialized Other:

Palestinians, like the Syrians who are the focus of this thesis, belong to a socially and politically constructed category called the Arab race. With their nationality being Palestinian, their status deemed stateless and their acquired label 'refugees', they become subject to institutionalized racism. The Lebanese government reinforces this kind of racism through processes of expulsion and alienation. The Lebanese authorities separated the Palestinians according to sect and class. The middle class were given the privilege of freely settling in Lebanon and were able to gain civil rights and get jobs. Christian Palestinians were able to obtain the Lebanese nationality easily. On the other hand, middle-class and poor Muslim Palestinians had a much different experience. They were excluded from the privileges their Christian fellow nationals had (Siklawi, 2010, 599).

Exodus for Lebanon:

In 2011, Syria started its crackdown on the uprisings. As this happened, Lebanon, a multi-sectarian country with 4.5 million people, received more than a million Syrian refugees (Fakhoury, 2017, 682). The war in Syria created one of the greatest outflows of refugees since the Second World War (Kaushal, 2019,138), and because of Lebanon's open border policy with Syria, a large number of Syrians took refuge there (Azzam, 2015, 71). Empirically speaking, Lebanon is a fragile state with regards to its political, economic and social sectors. The geographic proximity between Lebanon and Syria and the historical pre-existing tensions between different religious and ethnic groups made it even more vulnerable with the spillover of refugees (Young et al, 29, 2014). In 2010, the Failed State Index ranked Lebanon 34 out of 60

compared to Syria which ranked 48 (Young et al, 2014, 29). Even if it is not that high in rank as a failed state, it may as well be considered one because unlike other neighboring countries, it is not completely sovereign, as in there is not one entity that totally monopolizes power in Lebanon to force border control (Salem, 2012,3). This lack of total sovereignty sometimes brings a deadlock in policy. What added oil to the fire already was the influx of refugees that began to cause a tilt in the sectarian balance in Lebanon, which in turn sparked the historical hatred pre-existing between Sunnis and Shi'is (Young et al, 25, 2014), with the Christians caught in the middle of it. A minority for sure, but a very powerful one.

Since Lebanon opened the country for the refugees, the international community has been praising the Lebanese generosity and resilience. Other experts, however, have dubbed Lebanon's strategy with the refugees as shortsighted and 'the policy of no policy' (Fakhoury, 2017, 682). Statistically, the Syrian refugees exist in almost 1,600 informal settlements where sixty percent of those registered with a refugee status settled in northern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley which are two of the poorest areas in Lebanon (Azzam, 2015, 71). The first wave of refugees crossed the border on May 11, 2011 fleeing the town of Talkalakh and settling in Akkar (Salem, 2012,8). Tens of thousands crossed the border to stay with friends or in hotels or rent apartments and made the country their temporary home (Salem, 2012,8).

From 2011 to 2013, Lebanon kept an open-border policy while calling Syrian refugees as 'displaced' or in Arabic 'Nazihoun' that needed assistance. Lebanon at that time formed a 'low-intensity' type of governance to refugee governance with the increasing number of border crossings (Fakhoury, 2017, 685). Lebanon was about to be shaken soon as there has been a rise of violent acts by Lebanese citizens against Syrian refugees following the crisis of Aarsal (Azzam, 2015, 72). This crisis took place on August, 2, 2014 after the arrest of the commander of a Syrian

rebel group connected to al Qaeda's Jabhat Al Nusra (Nusra Front), Imad Ahmad Jumaa. Allegedly, Sunni militias entered Aarsal, a town close to the Syrian border, and kidnapped 30 Lebanese policemen and soldiers to execute 4 of them and release only seven. Human Rights Watch documented a total of eleven attacks during August and September, 2014 by Lebanese citizens on Syrians. Those attacks include shootings and arson, targeting the informal refugee settlements (Azzam, 2015, 72). On September 19 and 25, 2014, the Lebanese army raided several refugee settlements and arrested 450 refugees for allegedly participating in terrorist acts with 30 of them currently in prison. Then in October 2014, the Lebanese government decided to enforce a strict policy of displacement and even stricter border control to curb the influx with the exception of humanitarian cases (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). On October 23, 2014, the government decided it would not allow any Syrian refugees except for pressing humanitarian cases (Azzam, 2015, 71). The Lebanese government's policy of October 2014 was supposedly aimed at preserving the stability and security of the Lebanese state and to make sure that the Syrian refugees remain illegal (Favier, 2016, 1). The government eventually approved a Policy Paper on those displaced that was meant to reduce their number within the country by increasing the laws regulating their stay (Favier, 2016, 2).

On December 6, Syrian refugee tents were burned down by locals after demanding that Syrians should leave their village. These attacks are seen to have religion-related reasons since most of the Syrian refugees are Muslim Sunnis, according to UNHCR that estimates a figure of 96% (Azzam, 2015, 72). Then on December 7, 2014, an unidentified male set fire to a refugee settlement in Akkar. The policy that was decided on in October was eventually effective in January 2015 after General Security closed the borders to introduce the new Entry and Renewal of Residency Permit. These new regulations left almost 80% of Syrian refugees without a 'legal'

residency permit (Favier, 2016, 2). In addition, when it comes to long term residencies, Syrians who could not register with UNHCR as refugees had to find a Lebanese citizen who would be willing to be their 'guarantor' or 'Kafil'. And those who are already registered with UNHCR before May 2015, must sign a pledge not to work (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). This 2015 policy classified the refugees into three large categories: a small minority that is wealthy enough to get a 3-year residency permit, refugees who have been registered with UNHCR before this policy took effect and are not permitted to work and finally unregistered refugees who work in agriculture, construction or environment sector. These have to have a sponsor (Favier,2016,2). By May 2015, UNHCR stopped all processes of refugee registration based on the Lebanese Government's request. After that, different forms of visas were to be issued for the following categories: tourist, students, medical, short-stays, transit and business. These categories do not cover the status of a refugee which requires a lot of and difficult paperwork to obtain or renew residencies (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). The lack of this legal document for the majority of the refugees immensely in. As a result of this policy, there have been temporary arrests, detentions and even imposition of curfews in some communities (Favier ,2016,2). The negative sentiments against the refugees could not have been developed if it was not due to the unique political system in Lebanon. Yet those negative sentiments that were manifested in the speech acts against the refugees may not have had the impact they do if it was not for the unique power structure in Lebanon.

Each sector or political bloc of the Lebanese government has a different stance towards the refugees and takes a different approach in talking about them, addressing them, and dealing with their situation. Lebanon's controversial power sharing system requires formations of coalitions governments between a Maronite as a president, a Sunni as the Prime Minister and a

Shi'i as the leader of legislature (Fakhoury, 2017, 682). Political motivation along with ideological one among Christians and Shi'i see the 'implantation' of a majority Sunni population of refugees poses a challenge to the balance of the political system in Lebanon (Favier,3 ,2016). Along with the displacement rose the fear that law enforcement entities would not be able to rule out terrorists from refugees and the fear that the help the refugees would be getting could end up helping terrorists instead. In light of this, refugees are looked upon as opportunist terrorists in hiding (Kaushal, 2019,138). The Lebanese President, for one, expressed caution that Lebanon is dealing with a 'survival crisis' because of the overpowering influx of refugees (Azzam, 72, 2015). Because of this, since 2016, political framings of the Syrian refugees' living in Lebanon as a 'threat' to the power-sharing system lead to having the issue of their repatriation in the center of political proceedings (Fakhoury, 2017, 689). Michel Aoun's party (the Free Patriotic Movement) and their representative were one of the main users of the anti-refugee discourse. Aoun said that "there would be no solution in Syria without the Syrian refugees' return to their country" (Favier,2016, 1).

Political parties got heavily divided between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian categories which in turn created a deadlock in policy and postponement of the elections (Young et al, 2014, 26). As the number began to increase dramatically to become destabilizing echoing the issue of the Palestinian refugees and Lebanon's experience with them in the 1970s (Salem, 2012, 8), the depiction of the refugees as a 'threat' to the country's national fabric began with Amin Gemayel who is the former leader of the Kata'ib party. He called for the establishment of camps at the Lebanese Syrian border to control the 'haphazard distribution' as he puts it (Fakhoury, 2017, 689). Lebanon refused to build official camps and this does not reflect on their desire to include refugees but their refusal has economic and security rationale (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). To be able

to legitimize their discourse regarding the economic and security reasoning, Lebanon's political elites cite their experience with Palestinian camps and the threat of refugee camps turning into a hub of conflict (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). Marwan Charbel, Lebanon's former, Minister of Interior, stressed that some refugees happen to be rebel fighters and so they pose a threat to Lebanon's security (Azzam, 2015, 72). Just as the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban called the refugees' migration to Europe a 'Trojan horse of terrorism' (Kaushal, 2019, 139), and then, Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator said: "This is the problem. You allow 10,000 people in and 9,999 of them turn out innocent but one of them is a well-trained ISIS fighter" (Kaushal, 2019, 139), The leader of the Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea emphasized that the experience of Lebanon with Palestinian refugees militarization back in 1975 must not be replicated (Fakhoury, 2017, 689), Even though the flow of refugees is more regional and to a large extent confined to neighboring countries of Jordan and Turkey as well, the fear and the suspicion that were ignited by the large flow to Lebanon aggravated anxiety that stems from fundamental domestic issues the host countries already have (Kaushal, 2019, 139), as the negative discourse initiated against the refugees is rooted in the historically complex relationship between the two countries (Favier, 2016, 3).

The troublesome relationship started with the assassination of former Lebanese Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 that turned the Lebanese on the Assad regime in Syria and their presence in Lebanon. The March 14 coalition along with Christian and Druze parties formed the anti-Syrian coalition and demanded the Syrian troops' withdrawal from Lebanon. In the meantime, Syria's allies in Lebanon headed by Hizbullah formed the March 8 coalition along with Shi'i Amal Movement and other parties to support Syria backed by Iran (Salem, 2012, 3). In this respect, it is not surprising for such rivalry to result in detrimental impact on Syrian refugees

residing in Lebanon. Sectarian tensions have peaked rapidly during this time (Salem, 2012,4). To make matters even more daunting for the refugees, public surveys further showed that Lebanese citizens perceive Syrian refugees as a factor of insecurity (Fakhoury, 2017, 686). These surveys express that the flow of refugees created dilemmas of both moral and national security (Kaushal, 2019,140). In Lebanon's fractured elite model, securitized discourses contributed to the plethora of negative stances against the Syrian refugees' presence which in turn led to the Syrian file being seen as an instrument to push different agendas (Fakhoury, 2017, 690). Policy makers for example have explained the lack of resources to the outstretched Lebanese capacity because of the Syrian refugees. Unemployment and the deterioration of the economy were also justified by their presence (Fakhoury, 2017, 690). This hatred caused violent clashes on the Syrian Lebanese border and even bombings in Beirut (Young et al, 2014, 26).

In addition, Lebanese Christian political parties sought to consolidate their position as protectors and defenders of the rights of minorities and Christians in the Middle East in general and their communities in particular (Fakhoury, 2017, 693). March 14 actors along with March 8 ones used the Syrian refugees as a trump card for their political arrangements (Fakhoury, 2017, 693). "In a statement, the Lebanon-based Access Center for Human Rights called for "the Lebanese authorities and political forces to neutralize the Syrian refugees file in the political arena, and not draw it into the popular protest movement. And to not use the Syrian refugee file as a reason for the lack of success of the Lebanese government in the rescue of the Lebanese people" (Syria Direct, paragraph 6).

March 14 coalition, who is anti-Syrian, blamed Miqati's government for failing to protect the Syrian opposition figures living in Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2017, 693). As for the Lebanese state as a whole, it used the displacement of the refugees as a leverage point in the

international community as a state that is ‘keeping those migrants away from the West’ making it emerge as a useful partner of the European Union (Fakhoury,2017 693,). Christians play a crucial political role since they hold the key position of the presidency and head of the army which both helped keep a middle ground between the Sunnis and the Shi’i (Salem, 2012,8). Nevertheless, and even if it appears like the government has it together, because of this system, elite leaders are prompted to try to outbid each other and take care of growing external alliances to maintain their position (Fakhoury, 2017, 682). For example, in April 2016, former French President Francois Hollande visited Lebanon. Maronite Christian figures who compose the Maronite League wrote a letter to Holland asking France to do what is necessary and side with the parties that propagate the Syrian refugee’s return to safe zones in their home country. Their letter illustrates how the presence of the Syrian refugees is a factor that could disrupt Lebanon’s political settlement postwar that depends heavily on the delicate balance between the Christians and the Muslims (Fakhoury, 2017, 689).

The Christian community is playing an interesting role as a buffer between the Sunni and the Shi’i. Part of the reason is geography as the armed Sunni groups are in the north and the Shi’i in the south leaving the Christian stretched from south Tripoli to east Beirut (Salem, 2012,8). An interesting example of the Sunni Shi’i clash is the direct spillover of refugees that is clear in Tripoli between the Sunni neighborhood of Bab Al Tabbana and the Alawite dominant neighborhood of Jabal Mohsen (Young et al, 2014, 28). What is interesting and disproves the generalization of the link the government makes between the refugees and military attacks is that the friction between both these neighborhoods was there before the existence of the Syrian refugees because Bab Al Tabbana would initiate skirmishes against the Alawites in Jabal Mohsen (Young et al, 2014, 28).

Sunni leaders who were originally for the policy of hospitality in the beginning have warned about the security threat the presence of the refugees represents. International funding and Lebanon's reliance on it made matters worse and rather changed into a topic of contestations among the different political parties (Fakhoury, 2017, 692). Some of these parties lobbied to get more international funding to ease the strain of the refugees' presence while others expressed the negative impact such funding has on Lebanon as a host community (Fakhoury, 2017, 692). Preferential treatment on the international community's part of the Syrian refugees created tension between the refugees and their host communities (Young et al, 2014, 28). Different communities that resented the existence of the refugees among them started to drive them out to areas where ethnic divisions are uneasy thus making them even more vulnerable against sectarian conflict (Young et al, 2014, 28).

As a result, different Lebanese political parties chose to provide refugees relief if they adhere to their own political orientation on some occasions. Sunni parties, for example, have not been helping refugees who are supporters of Assad's regime. Former Minister of Interior and member of the Sunni party Future Current Nouhad Machnouk threatened the Syrians who are living in Lebanon would have their refugee status stripped from them if they returned to Syria to vote in the 2014 Syrian presidential elections. His reason was fear of politicization and friction (Fakhoury, 2017, 689).

Lebanon has developed a historical commitment since the Ottoman empire to adopt a decentralization strategy (Boustani et. al, 2016, 11). Back in 1977, a progressive decentralization law was passed that enabled municipalities to have financial independence, responsibilities and authority that echoed this commitment (Boustani et. al, 2016, 14). Municipal officials of bordering communities implemented even harsher procedures policing the refugees living within

their municipalities to the extent of restricting Syrians' movement and gatherings (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). Religious institutions, through their agencies like churches and mosques, have upheld the politics of humanitarianism (Fakhoury, 2017, 690). Moreover, the commitment gave municipalities the power to exercise prerogatives within the municipality itself (Boustani et. al, 2016, 11). The restrictive movement and hardships in issuing residency papers have led to the status of 'illegality' among migrants.

Lebanese municipalities resorted to enforcing law and order within their local areas by imposing arbitrary curfews for example. Young men of the different neighborhoods were the ones regulating municipal measures and interactions between the local Lebanese citizens and the refugees in the area (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). The lack of a legal status made it impossible for refugees to move around freely and at the same time made it difficult to get access to education, health services as 70% of these refugees, in 2015, lived below the extreme poverty line (Favier, 2016,2). Due to such hardships and difficult living conditions that left 90% of refugees in debt, they resorted to move on to a third country like Turkey where they can transit there on their way to Europe. Then in January 2016, Turkey also implemented new regulations like making it mandatory for Syrians coming from Lebanon to have a valid visa to enter Turkey whether by air or sea (Favier,2016, 2). With that, Syrian refugees in Lebanon felt trapped and had only one option left which was to return to Syria or go to a handful of countries where they do not need a visa to enter like Malaysia and Sudan (Favier ,2016,2). In light of this, the international community has urged Lebanon to review and monitor the municipalities' decisions regarding the refugees and the curfews imposed on them (Fakhoury, 2017, 691).

Different framings also constructed the Syrian refugees as an economic burden as well. Statistically, Lebanon has the highest concentration of refugees per capita in the world (Favier,

,2016). The ratio of refugees Lebanon is hosting is one to four Lebanese citizens (Boustani et. al, 2016, 7). Hassan (2016) says Lebanon is estimated to have economic losses that amount to 10 billion dollars which made the government urge the international community to send more aid to the country (Boustani et. al, 7, 2016). After the Qaa bombing in 2016, where Syrian bombers blew up themselves in Lebanese villages in northern Lebanon, the Lebanese army began to crack down on Syrian settlements in suspicions of military movements (Fakhoury, 2017, 687). The Lebanese Crisis Response Plan Documents (LCRP) since 2015 created a road map to coordinate politics, NGOs and international actors' efforts. This document had lofty rhetoric, it clearly expresses that Lebanon's capacity was way overstretched along with the negative effect the spillover of the Syrian refugees had on the country. It also calls out international funding for targeting Syrians only while neglecting the needy Lebanese families (Fakhoury, 2017, 688), because the jobs Syrian refugees compete with Lebanese citizens over are jobs that are considered low-skill (Azzam, 2015, 71).

Historically speaking, refugees have proved it possible to integrate well in their host communities. On the other hand, this integration happens at a rather slow pace if they are banned from working. The best way to ensure integration is to treat refugees and asylum seekers as immigrants. They should be allowed to work and become financially independent (Kaushal, 2019,149). Those who got to fully integrate in their host society stopped being refugees but those who remained in settlements or camps still hold the status of a refugee who is banned from integrating with the community. The ones that remain in camps give the impression that it is impossible for refugees to integrate (Kaushal, 2019,149). Gebran Bassil, the current leader of the FPM party, says that the money that goes to the Syrians has a much negative effect on Lebanese farmers. Nevertheless, political coalitions in Lebanon leveraged the issue of Syrian refugees and

received benefits from the loose response towards them in Lebanon. The leaders' instrumentalization of divisive issues, along with the consolidation of sectarian and external loyalties is essential to the survival of the model of governance of Lebanon (Fakhoury, 2017, 692).

Empirics and Analysis of Refugees in the Media:

Speech acts and policies that securitize migration and the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are largely orchestrated by Lebanese politicians and government officials. The political discourse that involves refugees is a negative one. This is not the first time Lebanon finds itself in a dilemma related to refugees as previously explained. The Lebanese discourse regarding the Palestinian refugees is a political one that is established on the basis of security in the same way the Syrian refugees' discourse is. The language the government uses is largely hostile and always worked within the frame of security and social threat. Syrian refugees are portrayed as an existential threat to the homogeneity of the Lebanese society and culture, their collective identity and the security of the state as a whole. A large part of this narrative continuously blames the Syrian refugees for already existing issues within Lebanon.

Politicians in Lebanon are well connected with media platforms. Thanks to these connections, the media facilitates the securitizing discourse politicians push on its various platforms. These platforms play a major role in spreading hate speech, xenophobic among the Lebanese population. The media's coverage of issues related to refugees was dominated by a fear-mongering approach that creates stereotypes to frame the refugees in a negative way.

In 2015, a study by UNDP on the Lebanese media's coverage of Syrian and Palestinian refugees was released containing analysis of such coverage based on a large amount of surveyed material. This study discovered that Lebanese print media largely focused on issues of security,

and how burdensome asylum is, as opposed to focusing on the humanitarian issues pertaining to the condition of the refugees³. The same was found about TV coverage where much time was allocated to frame refugees as security threats, criminals accused of rape, drugs, and assault⁴.

The Syrian and Palestinian refugees' presence in Lebanon has always been a reason for rising tension among the Lebanese population. This tension is manifested in the discourse the media helps spread which results in discrimination and fear-mongering against strangers or 'aliens'. It also spreads hate speech that uses narratives like identity politics, cultural differences and national security to add fuel to the fire⁵. Lebanese media helped facilitate the production of racism by labeling the migrants and refugees as an issue to the cohesion of the Lebanese society⁶.

The majority of the media coverage of security has a negative attitude as issue of security are always connected to refugees. Stories on Syrian refugees often involve using specific terms like 'security, threat, fear'⁷. Anchors and influential personas delivered stories with clear bias and hate to frequently accuse Syrian refugees of ridding Lebanese people from job opportunities, committing crimes against Lebanese citizens to justify crimes and discrimination against those refugees⁸. Narratives such as those are spread throughout the nation for citizens to accept and when they do, the people help spread false stories about the refugees hence solidifying the claims in the media. This makes it easier to securitize refugees in the name of having to deal with this imminent threat with extreme political action. Racial prejudice and bias against refugees are

³ <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2017/10/fear-loathing-syrian-refugees-lebanon-171028121205744.html>

⁴ <https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf>

⁵ <https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf>

⁶ <https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf>

⁷ <https://www.maharat-news.com/Temp/Attachments/6e546361-c10b-448c-b019-19490547bc99.pdf>

⁸ <https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2017/08/refugees-and-media-lebanon/>

dominating all media platforms marginalizing Syrian refugees and making them feel at risk all the time. These refugees have continuously been treated with immense hostility as large populations rally to promote their evacuation and call for violence and tighter control over them.

The presence of the Syrian refugees and the racism produced against them served and still serves as a mask of the government's inability to govern. New cultural spaces or borders, identities and so on have started a wave of panic among the dominant groups and who control modes of representation (Giroux, 1993, 105) in Lebanon. Within this context, it is obvious that if the refugees were to disappear right now from Lebanon, the different governmental coalitions would still find another way to consolidate their position as ruling elites. Wissam Matta, a journalist and political analyst, says in a report⁹ "The phenomenon of racism or hate speech towards the Syrians in Lebanon is not new; it has always been present in the country, especially in some sectarian environments, and particularly the Christian communities, which have obsessions about 'the minority' and show high sensitivity when it comes to what they label as 'the stranger', although such sentiments of dismay at different communities are not limited to 'the stranger' who holds a different nationality. Rather, they are particularly directed at Lebanese people belonging to different sectarian groups. Racism is therefore a multifaceted phenomenon in Lebanese society, and it is sectarian in essence." As a result, evoking language and images of national unity helped the conservative (Lebanese) government attack multiculturalism and deem it as a threat to their own culture and identity. They did so with slogans and media campaigns that highlight the differences they have with the new occupants.

To be able to look at what is explained so far, I looked at what different politicians said on either traditional media platforms or on social media.

⁹ <https://fanack.com/refugees/racist-rhetoric-against-syrians-in-lebanon/>

Former Minister of foreign Affairs Gebran Bassil, for one, has always been vocal about the ‘burden’ of the ‘displaced’ Syrians as he puts it as he often makes controversial statements regarding this. He makes sure he is explicit when talking about Syrian refugees calling them a ‘threat’ to Lebanon¹⁰. He also explicitly said that Lebanon does not accept Syrians as ‘refugees’ but rather as ‘migrants and ‘displaced’ as he pushes for talks of their repatriation¹¹. In 2019, Bassil posted a video on Twitter that showed Lebanese people protesting because a restaurant hired Syrian workers. His caption partially reads: ‘You love Lebanon...hire Lebanese’¹².

Bassil has previously been accused of hate speech and especially criticized for being involved in a xenophobic campaign targeting refugees for political purposes. With supporters of this discourse, Bassil argued that his efforts are no more than attempts to pressurize those who violate the labor law that prevents Syrians from having access to jobs¹³. In addition, many other political figures referred to the refugee crisis as an issue that is ‘choking’ Lebanon¹⁴.

Both domestically and internationally, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri also emphasized how much of a burden Syrian refugees are on Lebanon’s limited resources and feeble infrastructure. He warned about the severe consequences in March 2019 and asked for \$2.6 billion at the third Brussels Conference on Supporting the Future and the Region from the

¹⁰ <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Oct-28/320611-refugees-posing-existential-crisis-bassil.ashx>

¹¹ <https://www.thenational.ae/world/gebran-bassil-lebanon-does-not-accept-syrians-as-refugees-1.773658>

¹² https://twitter.com/Gebran_Bassil/status/1137350356931928064

¹³ <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/anti-syrian-refugee-sentiment-rampsincreasingly-unwelcome-lebanon>.

¹⁴ <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/09/02/547906231/in-lebanon-syrian-refugees-met-with-harassment-and-hostility>

international community to help with the repatriation of the refugees. In his speech at the conference, he insisted that the ‘only’ solution to the refugee crisis is their return to Syria¹⁵. Lebanese politicians have called the international community for support in dealing with the refugee crisis. Lebanese authorities even threatened to return refugees back home with force if the international community does not provide them with the necessary funds while arguing that refugees have had detrimental effects on the public services and economy since they cause many Lebanese citizens to be unemployed¹⁶. The requests to repatriate Syrian refugees have often been expressed with little to no concern to the unstable situation the refugees would be sent back to in Syria¹⁷.

Syrian refugees have also been securitized by being framed with reference to environmental issues. Lebanese politicians and governmental officials have avoided facing those issues and being blamed for them by blaming the refugees for the environmental crisis. Tarek Khatib, Lebanon’s Environment Minister, called the Syrian refugees a ‘ticking bomb’ and blamed them for the pollution in the country. He claimed that since the polluted river, Al Jaws, is in the north, it is the Syrian displaced who loitered it by throwing waste in it instead of using the waste bins provided for them¹⁸.

In response to this, Khatib suggested raising the level of security by giving municipal authorities and police more resources to carry on surveillance missions and inspect the refugee camps¹⁹

¹⁵ <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2019/Mar-14/478803-hariri-arrives-in-brussels-for-conference-on-refugees-future-of-syria.ashx>

¹⁶ <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/lebanon-funds-hosting-refugees-170405082414586.html>

¹⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/lebanon-funds-hosting-refugees-170405082414586.html>

¹⁸ <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Jan-08/432886-syrian-refugees-responsible-for-river-waste-pollution-environment-minister.ashx>

¹⁹ <https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Jan-08/432886-syrian-refugees-responsible-for-river-waste-pollution-environment-minister.ashx>

These suggestions along with evictions of Syrian refugees made by the Minister and other officials reinforce the securitization discourse and allows it to disseminate when the government frames the refugees as a burden and threat.



The tweet above was taken from Lebanon’s former Foreign Minister’s official Twitter account. In an interview with The National, Gebran Bassil said that “they should feel at ease to go back and (we) have to stop encouraging them to stay in Lebanon. The return of refugees has to happen gradually, we are talking about different categories of refugees, some are economic migrants.” He also said that “Lebanon does not accept Syrians to be refugees” The tweet above from June, 2019 says: “We have created our own understanding of our Lebanese belonging and put it before any other belonging, and we said it is genetic and that is the only explanation to our similarity. We endured and adapted together because we are flexible and solid and because we were able to come together on one hand and refuse refugeehood and displacement together, on the other”. Bassil has been at the forefront of calling for the illegality of refugees and their repatriation. He does not even refer to the refugees as such but uses the word ‘displaced’ instead because the word ‘refugee’ as defined by UNHCR entitles them to be protected and taken care of. Instead, for Lebanon it is preferable to not call them refugees in an attempt to lift the obligation of being host and aid providers.

Bassil has popularized the term “Lebanon above all,” while warning of an “international conspiracy” to settle Syrians in Lebanon, like what happened with the Palestinian refugees. The influx of Palestinian refugees, who fled or were driven out during the 1948 war surrounding the creation of Israel, upset Lebanon’s sectarian balance, and armed Palestinian factions were a key factor in the 1975-1990 civil war. After decades in Lebanon, the Palestinians’ numbers have dwindled to about 175,000, living in squalid camps with no access to public services, limited employment opportunities and no rights to ownership or protections (AP²⁰, Paragraph 17)

The words Bassil uses in the tweet below play on the idea of belonging and that Lebanese are biologically similar. He insinuates that refugees and those displaced are different from the Lebanese citizens and clearly tells his constituents that they came to be as one because they refused the other. This tweet manifests the fundamental biological understanding of racism.



On September 20, 2019, Bassil used the Lebanese nationality in his call to the citizens to be aware that ‘strangers are trying to gain the Lebanese nationality and they will never get it’. In a report²¹ by Reuters he said: “Our procedures against UNHCR begin tomorrow, and they will escalate to the maximum extent that sovereign Lebanon can achieve toward an organization which acts against (Lebanon’s) policy of preventing naturalization and returning the displaced to their homeland” (Reuters, paragraph 5).

²⁰ <https://apnews.com/0a77b3506e6d4c12a877ef059fdc4f4a>

²¹ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-syria-refugees-unhcr/lebanon-foreign-minister-says-will-take-measures-against-un-refugee-agency-idUSKCN1J32R8>

He also used the hashtag: ‘Lebanon is for the Lebanese’ which came as a slogan used in protest against the presence of the Syrian refugees as shown in the image²² by Bilal Jawich/Xinhuanet.

The banner on the right says
Lebanon is for the Lebanese,
we want to return the displaced.
Bassil was much criticized for
initiating racist discourse every
now and then. In the first tweet
below, he says: “It is normal for
a state to differentiate its



citizens from others meaning the foreigner

and this is not racism but what the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination says; the local law is the one that dominates.



²² http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/29/c_138593483_4.htm

Then he defends himself in the second tweet by saying that some (people) accuse him of being racist and he understands because the Lebanese belonging of those who say so is not strong enough to feel what he is feeling and that these people have another belonging that may be more important to them. But this is not the first time he uses the notion of nationalism and belonging to make an argument.

Speaking in an interview²³ on Mayadeen TV on April 29, 2018, Bassil said: “Isn’t it enough that Lebanese prefer foreign interests to their own? Isn’t it enough for Lebanon that there are people who are throwing out its identity this way? Every time it is this way. What state in the world did the humanitarian deeds Lebanon did? We always see Lebanese people preferring the Palestinian cause instead of the Lebanese cause, the Syrian cause instead of the Lebanese one. The Gulf cause instead of the Lebanese cause. The American cause instead of the Lebanese. Why is it that Lebanon always comes last? What international conspiracy is this that encourages Syrians to stay in Lebanon when they can return?”




Political actors are divided regarding building official camps for refugees and those who oppose the idea use the Palestinian refugees’ militarism as a priori to potential militarism of Syrians if they are hosted in official settlements. Marwan Charbel’s tweet above says that he had endorsed the ‘containment’ of Syrians in camps since the beginning of the crisis but this proposal was declined in the parliament so that the crisis does not turn into the same as the Palestinians’

²³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t-W4FF2kIPk>

situation. Another prominent political figure Naji Hayek, a member of Lebanon's Free Patriotic Movement, said in a June 10, 2019 interview²⁴ on Al-Jadeed/New TV (Lebanon): We have had a very bad experience in Lebanon with the Palestinian refugees who came in 1848 and who started just as the Syrians today. They changed in 25 years to a 'gun for hire', a gun that struck and killed the Lebanese people and used to destroy the Lebanese people and the Lebanese state".

"Those 1.5 million that came here in 2011, we opened our doors to them for humanitarian reasons but it is not acceptable that 200,000 or 300,000 of them are military". "Those who do not want to return to regime held areas should go back and fight the regime and carry on their mission not come stay with us 'on our backs' (meaning to exploit us) and say I am against the regime. Those 1.5 million will begin to have weapons and once they do Lebanon will be destroyed"

Religion is never absent when it comes to speaking against the presence of the refugees. Christian Maronite President Michel Aoun said "the Christians of the east are not temporary on this land and are not foreign congregations in it and cannot allow under any circumstances or suffering to pull them out of it. They are its people..."



In the same manner Marwan Charbel confessed to Kalam Ennas that he asked the French Minister to help Lebanon with the issue of the displaced Syrians and that this issue should be discussed in Geneva 2.

²⁴ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbXJJjrE_XM



Speech acts by political figures are just words if they do not achieve their illocution. Every interview given, every tweet and declaration urge the Lebanese citizens to look at the refugees in a specific way. Politicians have managed to make the majority of their constituents do their bidding without calling

overtly to be racist against Syrian refugees. The graffiti²⁵ originally read: “to every despicable Syrian, leave” then the word Syrian was crossed and ‘racist’ was written in green instead. The photo²⁶ on the right



also shows the public’s reaction in a demonstration against Syrian refugees. In these protesters’ defense, Samy Gemayel, the President of the Lebanese Phalanges Party, said in a July 26, 2019 interview²⁷ on Al-Hurra TV (U.S.): “It is only natural for people to say today, we don’t care how or when or where but we want this problem solved and all states must bear the burden with us. Our only fault as Lebanese is that we are bordering Syria...the Syrian crisis has nothing to do

²⁵ Graffiti from BBC article <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26871736>

²⁶ Photo taken from Xinhuanet http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-11/29/c_138593483_4.htm

²⁷ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TH9UUk5nexA>

with us, we did not cause it”, because according to Bassil "Lebanon is the victim of a conspiracy ... for settlement of the displaced Syrians in Lebanon, and there is a media, financial and political system that is working to encourage the displaced to stay and is attacking us for our demand for the return of the displaced," he stated over Twitter. He added, "Someone who talks about the return of the displaced is neither a racist nor a fascist, and those who accuse us of racism are either benefitting or conspirators.



Just as Searle stated, speech acts succeed when the illocution act is achieved. The racist political discourse prominent political figures of the Lebanese government started is now translated in the citizen’s racist acts against the Syrian refugees. From local municipalities recruiting their local citizens to restrict the refugees’ movements, to work lords paying refugees less than minimum wage just because they cannot work legally, all prove that racism is achieved. One of the goals set by UNHCR²⁸ was to ensure that Syrian refugees are protected and are able to obtain a legal temporary residency permit as well as registering newborns and protecting them from forced repatriation. One of the most prominent campaigns²⁹ initiated by the Lebanese government to halt the recruitment of Syrian refugees and making Lebanese business owners pay fines for hiring them. Lebanese business owners complained of not being able to find Lebanese workers who would do the same kind of job for the same pay. Researcher Nasser Yassin said³⁰

²⁸ <https://www.unhcr.org/ar/4be7cc278c2.html>

²⁹ <https://cutt.ly/ZxpECDC>

³⁰ <https://cutt.ly/ZxpECDC>

that Syrian refugees are a burden on Lebanon with regards to the health and education sectors, yet they do contribute effectively to its economy. In Aarsal, a Lebanese town in the north, the municipality force Syrian refugees to destroy their own concrete homes to be replaced with tents so as to make sure that they do not find permanent residence in the country, according to Human Rights Watch twitter account³¹. Amnesty International reported³² falsification of the Lebanese government's claims that Syrian refugees are voluntarily returning to Syria. In actual fact, the government, according to Amnesty International, has been causing the refugees tremendous grief that ultimately forces them to return to Syria. An example of which was the destruction of an unofficial refugee camp in Darb Alahmar. Local villagers attacked the camp and set fire to some tents while threatening the refugees "حلوا عنا - جَوَيْتُوا لَنَا أَرْضَنَا - ع جَهَنَّمَ الْحَمْرَا إِذَا احْتَرَقْتُوا أَوْ لَا", translating to: "leave us- you trashed our land- to hell with you whether you burn or not." Hours after the incident, the same village along with neighboring ones released a statement calling for the refugees to leave the area for 'their protection'. Itihad Alshaab Alloubnani³³ is a Facebook page dedicated for local updates and spread of many calls for movements against the refugees and their naturalization. Such a page often calls refugees as 'Dawaish' translating to (of) ISIS or saboteurs' and some other times 'informants.'

According to local newspaper 'Alsafer', the municipality of Tartej belonging to Jbeil forced Syrian refugees to dedicate a day of service to cleaning the town. In 2014, according to ICPS³⁴, the Lebanese government issued new laws to limit the number of refugees entering Lebanon or staying in Lebanon. There were three principle goals to the new laws. The first was

³¹ <https://cutt.ly/WxpIRQN>

³² <https://cutt.ly/TxpOqme>

³³ <https://www.facebook.com/%D8%A5%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-333203090445525/>

³⁴ <https://www.icps-lebanon.org/featuredArticle.php?id=41>

to prevent refugees from crossing the borders except for exceptional circumstances. The second was to mandate the internal security forces and municipalities to regulate the entry of refugees. The third, is to apply tighter control and application of laws over refugees to ‘protect’ the Lebanese in the labor sector. The Minister of labor issued the jobs and positions to be filled by Lebanese citizens only in an attempt to make it harder for Syrian refugees to fill any vacancy.

The dynamics among Lebanon’s elite political figures and coalitions influence Lebanon’s politics with regards to the issue of refugees. Lebanon’s non-existent refugee regime and elitist speech acts concerning the issue of Syrian refugees have become greatly securitized allowing racism to take over. The refugees serve as a straw man to the many existing problems whether economic, political, access to health and education or employment, the Lebanese government failed to address. On social media, hashtags concerning the refugees reveal mixed sentiments regarding their presence in Lebanon. Many activists are battling hate speech that causes racism but as long as politicians use their popularity to spread hate, those activists will have a difficult job convincing their fellow citizens otherwise.

When looking at the laws, tweets, slogans, etc. from a linguistic perspective, the common denominator between all these forms is a securitizing language. In those that do not explicitly call Syrian refugees a ‘threat’, the words used are mainly: illegal; saboteurs; informants; protection of Lebanese; our/their; etc. the goal is to make sure that the image painted in for the constituents is that they need ‘protection’. The reason given for the extreme measures that result from the securitization process, the refugees end up racialized and discriminated against.

Securitizing refugees has worked toward the objective of deflecting social malcontent for the broad range of development and governance issues Lebanese citizens face, as well as the objective of securing much needed development funding from the international

community. In this way, despite the rhetoric and policy that frames Syrian refugees as national and social security threats, the securitization of this population is less about national or social security but more about achieving broader political objectives. This securitization has ultimately influenced the perceptions of the Lebanese public, increased tensions between the Lebanese population and Syrian refugees, and has resulted in human rights abuses and protection gaps for both groups.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

By examining Lebanon under colonization and its long history post-colonization, we can establish a better understanding of the continued influence of the colonial legacy France left behind, not only on Lebanon but also on its relations with its neighbors. This colonial history that created Lebanon's borders still affects Lebanon's politics. Colonialism created the current Lebanese sectarian political system described as confessionalist and Lebanon's nationalism in order to establish a 'balanced' system of power on religious basis. Both the governmental system and Lebanese nationalism are the legacy of France that still affects Lebanon's political relations with the rest of the Middle East. The colonial period of Lebanon began with the fall of the Ottoman Empire by the end of the First World War. The French and British were able to divide the region according to the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement that put Lebanon under French rule during the period of colonization and under its 'informal' trusteeship post-independence. Lebanon became an independent state in 1943 but retained the political and social characteristics that were defined by the French. Socially, Lebanon was put in a category of neither being Arab nor fully Western. Politically, the official nationalism of Lebanon is the ideology that Lebanese people are distinct with a common history, culture and values. This nationalism relies on the social category to create a different identity, essentially white, that competes with the common Arab nationalism as well as other types of nationalism especially the Syrian one inside Lebanon. What is unique about Lebanese nationalism is its hybridity in meaning. It does not only entail political ideology but also has a sentimental sense.

The political ideology refers to the desire to identify the nation and practice sovereignty over it to fulfill certain political and cultural desires on its behalf. The sentimental aspect refers to the feelings of loyalty and relatedness to the nation and to one another among members that belong to the nation. In this sense, Lebanese politicians found no issue in using both aspects in the racialization of Syrian refugees to securitize their existence within the Lebanese nation and deem it a threat. Even though the Lebanese nationalism that was established during the colonial era was based on the argument that Lebanese descended from a Phoenician tribe that contributed to the Western society has been disproved, the post-colonial nationalism drew from that argument to create the modern form of nationalism and identity as being ideologically white.

In spite of the Lebanese government's tedious efforts to contextualize Lebanon as a distinct entity that has not ties to its surroundings, Lebanon became a 'host' since 2011 for Syrian 'newcomers'. The actual practice of hospitality was extended due to family ties at times and the necessity to deal with a local crisis so that they could reclaim their home and maintain order. The humanitarian dimension was given to the notion of hospitality to avoid the tension (Carpi and Şenoğuz, 2018, 127). Defining Lebanon as host gives it power to exacerbate human capital exploitation, creating the divide among classes and friction on the borders. This tension between the social groups is the doing of the host country that promotes its own nationalism and stereotypes. Lebanese politicians used this tension to restore the country's power as the host, as the discourse of generosity and rights allow the host state to gain a better grip on the social fiber and eliminate any 'threats' to the people and the resources. There is the worthy and unworthy among the refugees in relation to the economic status of the receiving state. If the businesses by the refugees had a good relationship with the host state, those refugees could be labeled worthy.

If they are deemed so, this would be thanks to the morality of the community. In the same logic, those refugees who are seen as a burden are seen as political and as economic threats.

The hospitality narrative in the shape of a humanitarian toolkit leaves a large number of refugees out of both the humanitarian and political agenda. In light of this, the hospitality discourse leads to sanctioning those unworthy of help because they do not possess the assets or the capacity and social status they need to deserve to be noted as *welcomed guests*. The unconditional hospitality was justified because of the close ties and unresolved border between the countries. But this unconditional hospitality was only for a time. When the number of Syrians continued to increase, Lebanon started to face a crisis. Over a million refugees were registered making a quarter of the population in Lebanon Syrian. Initially, refugees were depicted as vulnerable in the media but this representation quickly changed to become called ‘refugee crisis’. Lebanese politicians refer to the refugees as ‘displaced’ which allows them to politicize their presences and mark them as aliens belonging to a different place. Refugeehood, on the other hand, entails certain humanitarian rights that Lebanon does not adhere by because to the government, Syrian refugees are not refugees to them.

Lebanon has fallen into the type of ‘nation’ that existed in the nineteenth century when this concept was built on requirements like that people living within the borders of this nation have to be similar to each other in every way: looks, culture, socio-economic background, etc. This way, society would be cohesive and these similar attributes would contribute to the ‘us and ‘them’ notion. With this in mind, the Lebanese government politicized the issue of the refugees and worked on securitizing them to be racialized and deemed as threats that need to be eliminated. Through carefully structured speech acts, refugees were associated with the same danger they fled their country because of, terrorism. Not only are they framed as threats to

Lebanon's peace and security but also as dangerous to the cohesion of the society that Lebanese people think they created themselves.

In its approach towards the Syrian refugees, Lebanon is wearing a white mask that is affecting its policies within its borders as well as its foreign policy. Due to the lengthy colonization period of this country and the continued white French influence on at least the Maronites who hold the presidency in Lebanon, Syrians would never be seen as belonging or deserving to belong in Lebanon even for humanitarian reasons. To Lebanon, Syrian refugees are different in every aspect and do not fit in the Lebanese national or international scene. The image of the Syrian person changed from the despised soldier that was physically present fifteen years ago to the now unwanted terrorist, thief, and even rapist, etc. Racializing refugees strips them from their basic rights of a good life and security and makes them targets for discrimination and inhuman treatment.

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