Cross-Mediterranean Egyptian migrants: a discursive analysis

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CROSS-MEDITERRANEAN EGYPTIAN MIGRANTS: A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Middle East Studies

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

By Sara Adel Hussein

Under the supervision of Dr. Ibrahim Awad
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Dedication:

To my mother and father, my forever heroes who I love deeply and honor every day. Everything I am able to do is because of your sacrifices as parents, as migrant laborers, and as exceptional human beings.

I would also like to extend my deep gratitude to the people who have made my time in Cairo remarkably fulfilling and wonderfully memorable- my Teta and relatives in Egypt who welcomed me so warmly into their homes, keeping me fed, loved and supported. Much love to my AUC family, whose kindness, graciousness, humor and warmth have been unmatched.
“Earth, who was it who measured and divided you with walls, wire, enclosures?” - Pablo Neruda

“A specter haunts the world and it is the specter of migration. All the powers of the old world are allied in a merciless operation against it, but the movement is irresistible… The legal and documented movements are dwarfed by clandestine migrations: the borders of national sovereignty are sieves.” – Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire
ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates how the Egyptian migrant subject who chooses to cross the Mediterranean through irregular means to reach Europe is discursively constructed in Egyptian media, particularly in the wake of the 2016 Rashid boat sinking. In both official and public discourse, this highly visible and well-documented accident raised questions on accountability and the role of the state in this situation. By identifying and analyzing the themes represented throughout a diverse collected fieldwork corpus of various Egyptian media, statements by public officials and organizations, newspaper articles and editorials, television talk show programming, and popular cultural production, this thesis offers a lens to study the dynamics of Egyptian irregular mobility. This research uses critical discourse analysis to examine the ways in which these individuals have been represented by hegemonic narratives linking them to the material conditions of socio-economics and wider securitization policy that shape the production of knowledge on this issue.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 AIM AND SCOPE

In the past couple of years, footage of overloaded migrants’ boats and tragic death tolls of drownings at sea have become a reoccurring headline. The phenomenon has grown to the extent that the Mediterranean, once associated with being a civilization crossroad, has begun to be associated as “a cemetery for illegal migrants” (Kassar & Dourgnon, 2014, p. 11). Indeed, as De Genova has demonstrated, “the putative crisis surrounding the influx of migrants and refugees in Europe- and the spectacle that it generates- has long been nowhere more extravagantly put on display than in the Mediterranean Sea” (Genova, 2017, p. 3). The Central Mediterranean route to Italy from either Egypt or Libya has become one of the most popular passageways for those chasing the dream of a more promising life in Europe. As of 2017, this route has also been identified as the world’s most fatal migration route accounting for around 14,500 deaths since 2014 (IOM, 2017). Among these individuals risking their lives for hope of a better future in the north are Egyptians attempting to migrate across the sea from Egypt’s north coast via smuggling vessels. According to figures by UNHCR, the number of Egyptians arriving in Italy by smuggling boats has risen from 344 in 2015 to 2,634 in 2016. This was a significant rise in Egyptians attempting to cross the sea to reach Europe in the short time period of one year. However, following events like the Rasheed incident in September, irregular outflows from the Egyptian northern coast dramatically decreased due tightened control and securitization measures (Sayed, 2017).

This thesis will provide an analysis and discussion of the discourse surrounding unauthorized migration of Egyptians who attempt leave their country to cross the Mediterranean into Europe in the local Egyptian context. To understand and identify how the national discourse frames this issue is key in assessing how the subject of Egyptian irregular migration and the representation of the migrant in particular is constructed. Through discourse analysis of mediums explained further below, one can understand how the state relates to its migrants. This thesis studies how the dynamics of this state-society relationship is reproduced and maintained through discourse. Studies on how a country’s media covers their own nationals migrating through clandestine
means are limited. Often studies on media discourse regarding migration are situated from a perspective of countries of the global north that determine how the immigrant from the global south coming into the developed receiving country is portrayed, usually as a threat. This research adds to this limited scholarship in that it approaches a growing current phenomenon in the context of its own local media and cultural productions.

Notes from the Researcher
As a child of Egyptian migrants in the global North myself, I have always found questions of mobility and its contradictions - particularly who is “allowed” to be a mobile subject and who is not- fascinating. The privilege of having a first world passport while most of my relatives did not was an injustice I felt acutely aware of growing up sparking an interest in the discriminatory nature of border control and visa regimes. Perhaps I cannot relate directly to the struggles of migrating irregularly as the subject that this thesis is concerned with is, however as a first-generation immigrant, I understand my parent’s story- a common tale of migrant laborers in the West, in my case, the United States. This is a struggle I intimately connect with as a researcher and thus, becomes a more personal reason for examining and producing knowledge on this particular subject in academic scholarship.

Context of Rasheed Incident Coverage
A boat carrying around 600 migrants sunk off the coast of Rashid or Rosetta in Egypt on September 21st, 2016, killing over 200 people including 43 Egyptians (Ismail, 2016). State response to the tragedy in terms of search and rescue was virtually non-existent as migrants spent hours through the night until the afternoon in the water and local fishermen took up the responsibility of retrieving bodies. The tragic, highly visible and widely documented incident ignited national debate over the figure of the migrant, how to relate to him, and who to blame for his death. “Shouldn’t they have spent that money on some beneficial project, instead of riding the sea?” is a common sentiment expressed in Egyptian talk shows that has permeated among public discourse. This kind of rhetoric mirrors official discourse as exemplified in President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s speech on September 26th, 2016, five days after the Rashid incident, declaring, “I want to tell you that any of our youth, to be able to make this trip, have to pay large
amounts of money that he has to find or borrow. People, people, our country deserves us more. Our country deserves us more. And, honestly, we are not leaving you alone” (Attalah, 2016).

What drives such sentiments and how do they become so proliferated in society? In the wake of a deadly tragedy, official and non-official media speech quickly transformed from mourning to blame. The Egyptian clandestine seeking a better life in Europe suddenly became at worst a greedy fool who wasted a fortune on a “death trip,” an idiot from the countryside who knows not the risks involved with such a journey, and a traitor to his homeland. At best, the migrant became a completely helpless victim to his conditions. What interests are served when such discursive practices are deployed and in what ways does this discourse adopt wider hegemonic securitization of migration language?

In my thesis, I aim to examine the discourse of the current “illegal” migration wave in the Egyptian context and analyze the dynamics that create and sustain the representation of the Egyptian clandestine. I describe and assess how the image of the Egyptian irregular migrant has come to be represented in local and national media and popular culture using newspapers, television talk show programming, and film. How and why this particular image has been cultivated and sustained is a key notion that this thesis aims to explore. In order to do so, questions of power relations between the state and the individual, particular individuals with mobile aspirations, and responsibility toward its citizens are central in explaining the rise of hegemonic discourse regarding the decision by Egyptians to embark on the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean. The state’s address and response of this issue draws on securitization and nationalist discourses. Largely absent from this discourse is the agency and will of the migrant that elects to journey in search of a better future in Europe as voices of the clandestine are mostly excluded.

Discourses that shame and blame the victim illuminate dynamics between the state and the individual. To elaborate, as more Egyptians decide to risk their lives to pursue the dangerous journey across the sea, often resulting in tragedy, it reflects a certain reality of conditions in the country and the effect of marginalization of villages in which the rise in migration is witnessed most clearly. In my thesis I use tools of critical discourse analysis (CDA) to trace how power relations work to uphold certain narratives on the Egyptian irregular clandestine.
Nationalist state discourse helps to absolve the state of its accountability toward providing a livable and instead places the onus and wrongdoing on the individuals who attempt to escape the country. This thesis examines further the purposes served by the migrant-blaming narratives which hide failures of the state and its labor market in providing adequate employment and services to its population, especially in rural areas. Problematizing the various narratives that frame this issue and contextualizing within the wider post-2011 Egyptian social and political context, a greater understanding of the dynamics of these relationships between state and society can be gained. To elaborate, understanding how and why the state discursively engages and frames the Egyptian irregular migrant practice by examining the rhetoric deployed and situating it as part of broader historical discourses of nationalism and securitization, both internal and external, serve as a key lens in understanding how the state relates to its population. In short, the type of discourses and major narratives identified in this thesis surrounding this issue serve important purposes in both absolving state accountability toward providing a sustainable living for its citizen and for maintaining increased securitization and containment of mobility.

Discourse surrounding this issue is important because it crafts a particular reality of how we come to understand the migrant. Furthermore, reoccurring and wide-reaching dominant narratives rooted in a securitization discourse encourage and often call for certain policy considerations. In order to illustrate a wider picture of the Egyptian state’s position toward individuals attempting to cross the Mediterranean, I highlight evolving legal and securitization measures taken to address this issue. A common feature of this discourse is the criminalization of smugglers and brokers involved in this process calling upon increased punishment of those enabling “death trips.” Egypt’s new anti-smuggling law, which criminalizes people smuggling for the first time in the history of Egyptian law, will be analyzed in relation to this securitization discourse. The legal measure, which is an application of the Palermo Protocol 2 on human trafficking, was drafted by the newly established National Coordinating Committee on Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM) and was recently approved by the Egyptian Parliament a few weeks following the Rashid accident. These measures and the discourse surrounding it work in conversation with and in response to wider pressures from the EU to combat smuggling and irregular means of movement to Europe.
It is important to consider the irregular migration of Egyptians in the context of a post-revolutionary Egypt under a military regime in order to properly situate the current migration wave. Indeed, the relationship between revolution and emigration in Egypt is not so different. To elaborate, the “economic (unemployment, underemployment, low wages), political (authoritarianism, corruption, clientelism) and social (socio-spatial inequalities, patriarchy, high marriage costs, etc.) dysfunctions that are among the main reasons for emigrating are, at the same time, the elements that sparked the 25 January 2011 revolution,” as Pagès-El Karoui explains (2015, p. 1). Egypt is not new to major incidents in the Mediterranean; however, the conditions of clandestine migration out of the country are changing in light of regional conflict and domestic economic and political changes. While post-revolutionary Egypt did not become a conflict and war zone like other nation-states in the region, Egyptian migrants were nonetheless joining their Syrian and Libyan and African counterparts in droves risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean. To clarify however, the numbers of Egyptians reaching Europe by unauthorized means remain far less than the aforementioned nationalities. Egypt is an origin point for irregular migration to Europe, a key hub for transit migration. However, the route from Egypt to European shores is not the most popular. Since the 2011 post-Ghaddafi upheaval and the subsequent power vacuum, Libya has become a more prominent site of transit for irregular migration as a viable option for clandestine migrants.

1.2 BACKGROUND ON EGYPTIAN MIGRATION

In this section, I will briefly describe some theoretical approaches to studying migration and the nature and background of Egyptian migration. While irregular migration has recently become a prominent topic in academic literature, there have been few scholarly studies aimed at understanding the phenomenon from an Egyptian perspective, where the major waves of clandestine attempts at migration to Europe from the northern Egyptian coast have been practiced since the beginning of the 21st century (Zohry, Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe, 2006). I hope that my work can serve as a small contribution to this gap in Egyptian migration literature. To provide a foundational background to tackle these issues, I will begin by discussing prevailing literature on migration theory, provide a brief history of migration waves in Egypt,
refer to contemporary migration policy and border control measures, and briefly define and problematize what it means to be an “illegal migrant.”

Theories of migration are diverse and impossible to cluster in a well-defined theoretical paradigm. Although there appears to be a general consensus in the social sciences on the kinds of questions to ask when approaching international migration, answering these questions varies widely across the various disciplines that address them. Migration research is intrinsically interdisciplinary involving sociology, political science, law, economics, demography, geography, psychology and cultural studies (Brettell & Hollifield, 2000). Older literature on migration such as Ravenstein’s “laws of migration” assumes that population growth has a direct correlation with the propensity to migrate (1885). The neoclassical tradition of economic migration theory focuses mainly on wage differentials between states mediated by supply and demand. This theory identifies migration as an individual decision to maximize incomes. New economy of migration theory, on the other hand, considers the wide variety of markets, not just limiting it to workforce, and regards migration as a family decision. This theoretical model arose in response to neoclassical theory, stipulating that wage differentials is not a necessary condition taken into account when people decide to migrate (Stark & Bloom, 1985). Meanwhile, dual labor market theory links migration to the structural conditions of modern industrial economies (Piore, 1980). Another approach to studying migration is called world systems theory which grounds the process as a natural consequence of economic globalization and market penetration across nation-state boundaries (Wallerstein, 1974). Scholars have sometimes employed globalization itself as a thesis to understanding migration in less developed countries. Leila Simone Talani adopts a paradigm that suggests that the new global division of labor, a consequence of the restructuring created by globalization, increases the marginalization of some countries, in her case Egypt, resulting in an outflow of permanent labor migrants to the developed world (2009).

In a famous study from 1936 on the Egyptian population, it was stated that “Egyptians have the reputation of preferring their own soil. Few ever leave except to study or travel; and they always return… Egyptians do not emigrate” (Cleland, 1936). Over eighty years, the dynamics of Egyptian migration, and the means, motivations, and trends of its processes have dramatically evolved.
Egyptians, specifically, began to migrate internationally out of the Arab region from the beginning of the 1960s due to various political, economic, and social developments (Zohry, Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe, 2006). Scholars have identified five major phases in Egyptian migration in the evolution of migratory flows since the 1952 revolution. In the early phase of migration, that is before 1974, Egyptian migrants were very small in number and most were highly educated, upper class Egyptians escaping the consequences of the revolution and the social reconstruction associated with it (Talani, 2009). During the 70s, Egyptian temporary migration expanded significantly to Arab oil-producing countries that desperately needed workers for development. According to Sell, 1973 marked a watershed moment in contemporary Egyptian migration due to a number of different changes affecting migration dynamics (Sell, 1987). First, Egypt’s war with Israel created internal displacement of civilians. Meanwhile, Sadat’s Open Door policies paired with the end of heavy legislative restrictions facilitated emigration. Most importantly, this expansion phase was driven largely by the first oil shock which stimulated migration to oil producing Arab states experiencing job shortages. From 1984 to 1988, Egyptian migration to the Arab world contracted and by the end of the 80s through the early 90s, Egypt experience significant flow of return migrants from the Gulf (Zohry & Harrell-Bond, 2003). From around 1992 onward, the most distinctive characteristic of the development of Egyptian migration is the increase of permanent migration to more developed countries specifically Europe. According to figures from the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, the number of permanent migrants to developed countries increased from 1990 to 1998 on average by 83 percent while migration to Europe increased by about 125 percent (Zohry & Harrell-Bond, 2003).

Since the mid-2000s, the country has developed into a main transit country for irregular migrants (De Haas, 2008). While scholarship on the growing role of Egypt as a hub for regional migration has increased, literature on the nature of irregular migrants in Egypt specifically is limited. This may be because the criminal character of trafficking and smuggling and the inaccessibility to the areas where such migration takes place makes it difficult to conduct independent research.
Irregular Migration: Approaches to Understanding

Studying specifically irregular migration proves to be a challenging endeavor due to the difficulty in acquiring data for an informal process. Indeed, the field suffers from not only a lack of adequate empirical data but additionally from “endemic undertheorizing” (Cvajner & Sciortino, 2010). Often in scholarship, irregular migration is presented and perceived as a “problem” and corresponding research serves to create “solutions” for it. Still, some scholars have attempted to create theoretical frameworks aimed at understanding the clandestine migration (Baldwin-Edwards, 2008). One can trace the longstanding phenomenon of illegal migration to the rise of the nation state in the 19th century (Zohry, 2011). Geographical barriers were replaced by political borders and thus, the determination of who is allowed in and out of these boundaries. The rise of the welfare state in the West accompanied by the introduction of visa systems and border control along with economic marginalization of the global south have increased attempts to overcome such barriers.

In the face of the militarization of national and regional borders, immigrants are forced to take ever more dangerous routes to reach developed countries. One cannot discuss the nature of the migrant without addressing citizenship as a tool for governance. De Genova notes that the securitization of migration is in fact “inextricable from a concomitant securitization of citizenship itself” (De Genova, 2007, p. 440). Tyler argues that citizenship has become “a vast and proliferating bureaucracy from which flow categories of people marginalized by, excluded or disqualified from citizenship and the rights which flow from this status” (2010, p. 70). Thus, citizenship becomes an instrument of exclusion that works to allow the subjugation and abjection of those that fall out its bounds or the “illegal” population through immigration controls. Securitization of migration takes various forms on different levels including “the reduction of legal channels for migration, the proliferation of legislation to limit, hierarchize and scale citizenship, the criminalization of ‘undesirable’ migrants, the emergence of a global business in immigrant prisons and the normalization of detention and deportation” (Tyler & Marciniak, 2014, p. 3). Meanwhile, a “liberal paradox” becomes apparent and complicated as international borders open to flows of capital, but simultaneously remain largely closed legally to individuals from the Global South. This paradoxically creates a migratory pull fueled by the demand for cheap unregulated migrant labor in the Global North (De Haas, 2008). The unjust border policing
and discriminatory immigration control policies of Fortress Europe fueled by securitization agendas force economic migrants and those seeking refuge to risk their lives through dangerous means that often expose the most vulnerable of society to violence of various forms. Identifying the exclusionary legal and political frameworks that effectively facilitate irregular modes of migration to the Global North is crucial for establishing a necessary contextual understanding of the very heart of the issue. Papademetriou identifies four common forms of illegal migration: unauthorized entry, fraudulent entry in terms of false documents, visa overstaying, and violation of the terms and conditions of a visa (2005).

Ayman Zohry, an expert on Egyptian migration, proposes a theoretical framework for approaching illegal migration that seems to be most appropriate to employ in this thesis. The model considers three levels of analysis; the macro level, the meso level, and the micro level. The macro level should highlight the political framework in both countries of origin and destination; the meso level should include analyses on the analysis on migration networks; and the micro level analysis should investigate factors related to the socio-demographic framework in the country of origin on the individual level of migrants (Zohry, 2011).

**Characteristics of Egyptian Irregular Migration to Europe**

One consequence of more restrictive migration policy adopted by the EU such as the Schengen agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty, which imposed a system of requiring a visa, strict border surveillance, and imposing a selective ceiling for work permits, is an increase of irregular migration and smuggling networks, especially through Mediterranean routes. Figures of irregular migration of Egyptians to Europe vary widely due to the challenges in obtaining this kind of data. However, some characteristics are well-known, such as the fact the Italy experiences the highest inflow of Egyptians migrants, due to its geographical proximity to Egypt and ease of traveling to Libya where many boat journeys start (Roman, 2008). According to Talani, the majority of Egyptians entering the EU are undocumented (Talani, 2009). Zohry notes that the current stream of Egyptian irregular migrants to Europe started in the beginning of the 21st century when massive numbers of fresh graduates and low-educated unemployed youth started to make their way to Europe through the Mediterranean via Libya or by over staying tourist Schengen visas (Zohry, 2006). Egyptians crossing the Mediterranean often come from a lower
socio-economic class. Migration of this sort has increased as employment opportunities in the Arab Gulf countries decrease for Egyptians due to the high amount of incoming South East Asian workers in these countries whose labors these states exploit cheaply.

A field study conducted by Zohry explored the dynamics of Egyptian irregular migration of eight governorates that are known for sending high numbers of irregular migrants to mainly Italy and France (Zohry, 2006). This survey clarified several aspects of socio-political and economic push factors and characteristics of this type of migration by interviewing the segment of population (young males between 18 and 40 years old) that forms the pool from which both irregular and regular migrants primarily come from. His study found that the main push factor behind migration based on his fieldwork interviews is the lack of employment job opportunities in Egypt, especially among fresh graduates and the low wages and salaries in their home country. Apart from geographical proximity and structures that facilitated mobility to Italy, established social networks of relatives or acquaintances provided a key pull factor for migrants’ decision to emigrate. While the legal framework for migration of Egyptians to the Arab Gulf countries and that of migration to Europe is quite different, Zohry suggests that Egyptian migration to Europe is in fact a reproduction of the pattern of Egyptian migration to GCC states in that young males migrate to accumulate financial goals and then return to Egypt.

Several scholars have detected a strong pattern of migrants that leave Egypt plan to return to their home country after saving money from labor. According to the population sampled in Zohry’s study, the vast majority of the men interviewed intended to return to Egypt after a temporary stay in the countries of destination. Other studies that included interviews with Egyptian migrants in Italy by researcher Hend Hafez (2010) and Roman (2008) also strongly support that the intention of these migrants is to return home to Egypt after accumulating some savings. In migration studies, this scheme is often referred to as temporary migration. Enacting legal frameworks and bilateral agreements between Italy and Egypt that support and facilitate this kind of migration is often called for in literature on Egyptian irregular migration to Italy (See Fargues, 2008). According to interviews of Egyptian and Italian officials and Egyptian unaccompanied minors in Italy, Hafez describes:
“As evidenced during all the interviews held both in Italy and in Egypt with Egyptian migrants, minors and adults, circular migration would fulfill their main requirements for staying in Italy. During all interviews, the most important goal after making money was that of receiving proper documents, —papers, that would allow them to travel back and forth between Egypt and Italy. Repaying the debt incurred by the expenses of the journey and financially supporting the family were the priorities identified. Once that was accomplished, the goal became one of finding a way to legitimize their stay in Italy in order to continue providing for their families by traveling back and forth legitimately for employment” (Hafez, 2010, p. 8)

Arab Spring and Migration

When it comes to the Middle East, large scale emigration from Mediterranean Arab countries began four to five decades ago (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). Despite European fears that revolutions and conflict across the Middle East in recent years would ignite mass population movement to the North, several studies have indicated that rates of emigration following the Arab Spring have not significantly increased (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012; Awad, 2013). While Arab revolts did not produce any significant inflow of new migrants to Europe, conflict in Libya and Syria resulted in considerable population displacement (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). What has changed due to the political upheavals is the modes and routes of population movement, specifically that of irregular migration. Studies suggest that revolution as a structural change did not spark migration, but rather the opportunities associated with it, such as decreased border control and disorganized policing, allowed for increased irregular migration and marked a change in the modes of irregular border crossing into Europe via boat smuggling. Studies conducted during this period found that revolutions “rerouted existing flows of irregular migration more than stimulated new ones” (Fargues & Fandrich, 2012). While this scholarship attempts to answer key questions regarding rates of illegal migration and the Arab Spring, the work was conducted only one year after the uprisings. Now, six years later, dynamics of migration spurred by conflict have changed. In Egypt, specifically, political and economic turmoil are related to the rise in irregular migration in ways that this thesis explores.

1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research project draws upon a diverse body of literature due to the nature of my project. In this section I first provide a brief introduction of literature on critical discourse analysis (CDA),
which I apply as a theoretical framework to conduct my research on my fieldwork corpus of media production collected on the Egyptian irregular migrant. Next, I examine scholarship on migration discourse that this thesis will build upon.

**Theoretical Framework: Critical Discourse Analysis**

Choosing language, both written text and spoken, as a lens of analysis for social research has a long history in the social sciences. Literature on discourse analysis as a method of research in the social sciences is abundant. There are many different theoretical strands in discourse analysis and the term “discourse” itself has been used and defined several various ways. In this section, I highlight some of the ideas advanced by three major scholars of discourse analysis, Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, and Michel Foucault, that I use in combination to analyze the discourse of the local irregular migrant in Egypt.

This thesis employs Fairclough’s critical realist approach that assumes that the social world is partly constructed by human action, that is to say that there is a social reality that is discursively constructed (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4). Language as an access to understanding reality is in line with broader post-structuralist theory. How semiotics, words, metaphors are used and how various phenomena in society are categorized are critical in shaping thoughts and behavior. We can understand discourse as practices, interpretations and representations that form different ‘regimes of truth,’ that are presented as specific ‘facts’ (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, p. 65). Worldviews are constructed through use of language which also creates the actual social world (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). These are the assumptions that frame the basis of my analysis of discourse research.

Fairclough suggests the role of language and discourse is “an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language” (2003, p. 11). This describes the important relational characteristic of discourse, carrying both internal and external relations with non-discursive objects. CDA then is concerned not with the discourse “in itself”, but rather it is an analysis of “dialectical relations between discourse and other objects, elements or moments, as well as analysis of the ‘internal relations’ of discourse” (Fairclough, 2010, p. 4) This means that
discourse should not be understood as an independent force but rather as a set of relations; in this sense, CDA is an analysis of social relations within and outside of discourse (Fairclough, 2010, p. 3).

Questions of power and ideology are key central elements in critical discourse analysis. Fairclough, like Foucault, views power as a productive force that produces our social sphere and social relations, what gets to be included and excluded in them. Therefore, power is both a producing and limiting force (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Power is capillary in nature, a force not just exercised by agents over passive subjects but as something that is spread across social practices, contributing to knowledge. CDA assumes social constructionist ontology in that it accepts the role of language and social interaction in the production of power relations. In this sense, language use in speech and writing create meaning in the social process; discourse then becomes a ‘social practice’ (Fairclough, 2010). By “describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation, institution and social structure that frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them” (Wodak, 1996, p. 15). Fairclough adopts the concept of semiosis, so that text being analyzed includes not only the written or linguistic communication but other forms of representing the world, for example visual communication. Discourse in this sense becomes a broader way of constructing perspectives of different social actors. To put it schematically, Fairclough describes that semiosis, “an element of the social at all levels,” can be organized as the following (2003, p. 24)

- Social structures: languages
- Social practices: orders of discourse
- Social events: texts

Discourse then, becomes part of the dialectical elements of social practice which can be put into practice by enacting or materializing them. For Fairclough, texts then are the semiotic dimension of events that we can refer to in order to identify and relate to differing discourses and ideologies (Tenorio, 2011). This is to say that it is critical to look beyond the text alone and to engage different types of discourse placing them in a socio-political context in order to understand its dynamics and consequences. CDA’s ideological considerations are a key component in what makes this type of analysis critical. Understanding, identifying, and assessing the ideological
effects of discourse or the ways in which discourse creates and reproduces unequal power
relations between various social groups such as class, gender, ethnic minorities and majority, etc.
an important task of this type of analysis. According to Fairclough, discourse contributes to
ideology if it contributes to the sustaining of power and domination (2010). Fairclough’s CDA
approach aims to uncover unequal relations of power with the purpose of changing them.
According to Fairclough, this is a type of research that aims to uncover how contemporary
capitalism affects human well-being and has a political purpose of emancipation from oppression
(2010).

Van Dijk’s approach to discourse analysis, particularly that of media representation which is a
major focus of this thesis research, concentrates on the systematic description of the “semantic”
and “syntactic” in linguistic analysis. His most prominent research discusses the issue of
reproduction of racism in news sources (van Dijk, 1998). Van Dijk’s framework centers around
the concept of “the ideological square” which employs and is functioned by primarily a
polarization strategy of between ‘us’ and them, “which involves positive in-group description
and negative out-group description (1998:33). So an ideological account would:

1. Emphasize our good properties/actions
2. Emphasize their bad properties/actions
3. Mitigate our bad properties/actions

This framework to analyzing discourse serves as a key conceptual tool in my research on
Egyptian media in assessing discursive patterns in how the irregular migrant issue is presented.
The major contributor of the origins of the idea of discourse as “practices that systematically
form the objects of which they speak,” is based upon or indebted to the work of Michel Foucault
(1969). Foucault largely influenced the formation of post-structuralist intellectual tradition and
his work on discourse has been particularly significant as it provided systemic analysis on a wide
variety of social realms such as crime, sexuality and mental health. In his notable paper on the
topic, *The Order of the Discourse*, Foucault asserts that “in every society the production of
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a… number of
procedures” (1981, p. 52). In a Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, three variables are
most pertinent, namely discourse, power and the subject. The famous French post-modernist’s
concept primarily focuses on questions of hegemony and the power of discourses in creating and
sustaining dominant representations of “reality.” Foucault establishes the idea of the realm of “social practice” that Fairclough emphasizes in that discourse is beyond the text or linguistic speech, but that it is the space where the actors, institutions, and powers interact to maintain, transform, or develop dominant narratives regarding concerns of society pertinent to that moment in time. In this capacity, discourse becomes a force in itself, “a mediator and tool of power through the production of knowledge” (Diaz-Bone, 2007). Foucault further describes discourse as an instrument of “truth-making” by explaining:

> “Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” (1980, p. 131).

The discourse as “truth” can be understood as a mechanism of control by institutions and powerful social actors to reproduce the social in reflection of specific hegemonic meta-narratives.

**Migration Discourse Literature**

One philosophical work of scholarship that contributes to the body of knowledge on migration discourse literature is Thomas Nail’s *The Figure of the Migrant* (2015). This work approaches the subject of migrants and migration with a new conceptual framework that challenges traditional modes of understanding mobility. Rather than viewing migration as an exception to the rule of citizenship, which constitutes a perspective of the state, Nail argues that the migrant is the political figure of our time with more regional and international migrants recorded now than ever before. According to Nail’s theory, society is operated by the dialectic between “kinopolitics,” that is the power of the state to create and regulate mobility, and the power of the migrant to resist and subvert state authority by the force of her movement. In this way, Nail interprets migration from the perspective of movement and the migrant, subverting traditional approaches grounded in stasis frameworks.

This approach is interesting and applicable to my research because it offers a way to uphold mobility as a lens through which I can study the discourse of migration. Nail’s theory corresponds with the agent-centered approaches that I employ such as the concept of autonomy
of migration (AoM). I will be relying on the works of AoM scholars such as Nicholas De Genova, Papadoulous, and Sandro Mezzandra to represent the migrant subjectivities as a foundation for understanding border policies. According to Papadopoulos et al., “To speak of the autonomy of migration is to understand migration as a social movement in the literal sense of the words, not as a mere response to economic and social malaise” (2008, p. 202). However, “the autonomy of migration approach does not, of course, consider migration in isolation from social, cultural and economic structures. The opposite is true: migration is understood as a creative force within these structures” (2008, p. 202). AoM is derived from Autonomous Marxist thought that prescribes a subversive quality to migrants in general, and irregular migrants in particular “on account of their potential to undermine the sovereign order according to which borders are policed” (McNevin, 2013, p. 184). This thesis uses AoM as a way of refuting major discursive depictions of the Egyptian irregular migrant as a rash, young, unaware fool from the countryside to a destitute victim of his conditions that will be discussed in chapter two.

When considering discourses of criminalization and security, I draw upon securitization theory by the Copenhagen School to demonstrate how mobility is continuously securitized through mechanisms that are legitimized by language or “speech-act.” According to the major theorists of this notion, securitization is “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491). I apply this concept when dissecting the ways migration issues are presented in both the Egyptian context and the wider European securitization in which the Egyptian discourse adopts internally.

Concepts of how humanitarian discourse is coopted to work within the wider securitization discourse will also be a tool in examining themes of irregular migration. This has been discussed by a few different scholars but I specifically draw upon the works of Paul Amar (2013) which discusses how security measures and the language of humanitarianism are increasingly coming together in building new ways of human security governance. In these new modes of governmentality Amar argues that the “hypervisibilisation” or the spotlighting of certain bodies as sources insecurity or risk is a tool in establishing securitization (2013).
When it comes to literature on discourse studies regarding migration, much of the scholarship is dedicated to studying the image of the migrant in discursive mediums of the global North, particularly on refugees and asylum seekers. Research in this area often concentrates on exposing the role of the media in legitimizing and reinforcing the marginalization of immigrants and refugees. Drawing upon newspapers, film, advertising, television news, fictional portrayals or “new media,” scholarship has highlighted the consistently limited range of representations of migrants’ identities and social positions (see Pickering 2001; Baker and McEnery 2005; Baker et al. 2008; Lea and Lynn 2003). Much of this literature is dedicated to research on accounts of asylum seekers and refugees in the print media from a linguistic perspective that aims to analyze large numbers of articles to identify commonly used words and phrases. However, these kinds of studies remain surprisingly limited despite increasing media coverage.

Framing of the migrant individual is often dehumanizing and creates “an emotional distance with audiences that may facilitate their consent with regards to anti-immigrant policies.” (Guillem, 2015, p. 5). Many studies examine how hostile migrant discourses seek to serve broader right-wing political aims, elections and security measures. Studies like the one by Charteris-Black analyzed political statements and speeches by right-wing politicians in the UK and found that referring to immigrants and asylum seekers as “boat people” and “illegal immigrants” served as a common discursive strategy to encourage specific marginalizing practices (Charteris-Black, 2006). The phrase “I’m not a racist, but…” also served as a discursive tool found in these political statements employed to construct a view that opposing asylum seeking is not racist, which was also disseminated by anti-immigration groups to legitimize this position (Parker, 2015). These studies analyze how discursive practices maintain the “us” versus “them” dichotomy. Other studies, such as the pioneering interdisciplinary research on migration and media conducted by the Glasgow Media Group, shows how immigration in this context is routinely discussed within an overall framework of “bad news,” associated with terms that invoke crisis.

Often scholarship dedicated to migrant discursive studies focuses on how host communities construct the representation of the immigrant “other,” drawing links between migration discourse
and racism, nationalism, multiculturalism or diversity, drawing upon van Dijk’s well-known research of racism in news accounts (2003). How discourses perpetuate the portrayal of the migrant as a dangerous threat to the western host country’s economy and values is also a reoccurring theme in these types of publications. General arguments made by scholars in the field of migrant discourse examines how discursive frameworks in the media of western countries “capitalize on creating unnecessary state of alarm that can fuel not only anti-immigrant public attitudes, but also discriminatory government actions, as well as racist and xenophobic criminal acts” (Guillem, 2015, p. 6).

Some major themes of coming out of research conducted on media representation of the discursive construction of the irregular migrant in UK and Australian news sources are outlined in a study by Parker (2015) as follows. First, a recurring theme of the “unwanted invader” referring to the refugee or asylum seeker “as actively unwanted; as someone to be fearful of, in contrast to the passive majority of the country,” commonly evoking metaphors of criminals. Additionally, metaphors of water like “flood” and “overflowed” are commonly used to construct accounts of large numbers of people trying to enter the country. The theme of the “dishonest” asylum seeker was also identified in western news reports in which the immigrant’s past history and integrity is questioned such as lying about their age and sexuality to portray a false image that requires asylum. A third theme commonly found in these articles refer to that of the “tragic asylum seeker” as one that needs assistance. According to Parker this account appears “sympathetic to the asylum seeker but also actively warning the reader of the potential arrival of further asylum seekers” (2015, p. 9). Lastly, themes of “keeping them out” and “removing them” were discussed and commonly used for political rhetoric in the asylum debate. Parker’s findings support Pickering’s research which concluded that the migrant was constructed as a “deviant” population through the use of accounts which again differentiated “them” from “us” (2001). This divide evokes the argument made by van Dijk earlier about immigration discourses, redefining the issue in terms of race and immigrants as outsiders that need to be actively kept out.

Studies on how the irregular migrant is conceptualized in local media of countries of origin have been difficult to find. In the context of the Middle East, migration studies often focus on the movement of the forcibly displaced concentrating of push-pull factors and economic and
political strains on host countries often from a policy perspective. When it comes to Egypt, although representation of the Egyptian migrant who crosses the Mediterranean through irregular means has been plentiful in Egyptian media, as irregular migration has been a prominent re-occurring issue in the press, academic scholarship examining this corpus falls short. My research aims to help fill this gap in the literature.

1.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This research builds on existing migrant discourse literature and intends to contribute to this kind of scholarship regarding the Egyptian context. Conceptually, this research brings together different elements of discourse, image, and representation of the specific issue of unauthorized movement across borders using Egyptians that migrate to Europe as a case study. By analyzing the representational realm of this phenomenon, more fundamental questions of power and the relationships between the state, the individual, and the society are brought into focus. In other words, this research uses migration representation as a lens to understanding these wider relationships. While the state may construct the migrant as a criminal, a victim, or an ignorant, it does so for very particular reasons that serve its interests and wider securitization interests of the global North. Media becomes an excellent tool to observe how this relationship is played out, and critically assessing the various narratives that come to represent this issue- which at their core deal with notions power, state-society relations, population control and border regimes, and citizenship- start to become clearer. It is by dissecting this intersection between what the discourse says and the power relations of national and international authoritative figures and institutions that allow for its hegemonic nature that the researcher comes to understand the constructions of the Egyptian irregular migrant and the purposes they serve.

As discussed previously, this thesis is concerned primarily with identifying representations of the Egyptian irregular migrant within the Egyptian context and tracing the production of such discourse by highlighting the power dynamics that allow for the dominance of the identified narratives. In addition to identifying and describing the major representations that have been constructed of Egyptian irregular migrants and their framings, this research complicates and scrutinizes these narratives and the discursive patterns that are observed.
In light of the fieldwork which demonstrates major themes dealing with blame, denial of local job opportunities, accountability, awareness, nationalism, and criminality and securitization, scholarship from various bodies of knowledge will be called upon to problematize and unpack such themes. First, the subjectivity and agency of the migrant is addressed using anthropological literature, specifically scholars of the autonomy of migration field. Second, in order to properly answer to narratives that both deny foundational socio-economic issues as reason for irregular migration and deny the state’s failure to provide a decent living for its residents, I engage prominent economic scholarship on the Egyptian labor market to refute and contextualize such discourse.

To elaborate, in the effort to understand the issue of irregular migration of Egyptian natives, I connect the recent material conditions to wider dominant discourses that reflect and construct a particular discourse of the individual’s desire to emigrate and question what this relationship reflects. This relationship deals with the role of marginalization and the state’s negligence in developing and providing for basic needs and employment opportunities outside the metropolis. I engage with scholarship on relationship between emigration and economics by discussing material conditions of unemployment and underemployment, poverty, and inequality, and poor social services that often drive an individual’s desire for emigration.

Lastly, how the notion of mobility is rooted in a securitization discourse that is framed within criminalization will be put into focus and analyzed using securitization theory. Since discourses do not occur in a vacuum, I will incorporate wider securitization of migration discourses of the global North, particularly Europe. The implications of the ways in which the Egyptian discourse invokes and adopts the European perspective is critically unpacked.

1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In short, I hope to provide a multi-dimensional approach to understanding the following questions:
1. What are the discourses framing the image of the Egyptian irregular migrant, particularly in the wake of the Rasheed capsizing, in Egypt?

2. What is the utility of these narrative constructions for the Egyptian state in the current socio-economic and political moment?

3. How does discourse on irregular migration in Egypt connect to wider migrant-securitization discourse, such as that emanating from “Fortress Europe”?

It is my hypotheses that the hegemonic discourse surrounding that of irregular migration of Egyptians across is one that portrays the migrant-subject as one who brought misfortune upon himself; by blaming the individual migrant for his decision to move, the discourse protects the state from shouldering responsibility toward tragedies like Rasheed, and more fundamentally, for not providing conditions to allow these citizens to live a decent life. I propose that this discourse is the case because unauthorized movement of this sort is threatening for several reasons. First, Egyptian citizens risking their lives by the thousands highlights failures of the state and government neglect in areas of development, employment, social services, and general politics of exclusion of those in marginalized parts of the country. It thus becomes in the interest of those in power to propagate a discourse that shames and blames migrants, invoking a nationalist ethos, to shift accountability away from major state actors and institutions. Secondly, this type of migration subverts the regime of borders and territorial controls, threatening notions of nation-state sovereignty. Due to this relationship, an “illegal” migrant becomes a site of insecurity for the state, and so discourse that presents the migrant and the process of mobility as dangerous serves to aid in legitimizing enhanced policing and border control measures. Finally, the process of the externalization of EU borders and the funding that accompanies it ensures Egyptian adoption of European securitization discourses.

1.6 METHODOLOGY

In this section I will describe the material to be used as data for my research and also explain how the research will be analyzed. I will analyze the representation of a migrant by compiling and drawing upon a diverse corpus of both official and non-official sources that discuss the Egyptians migrating through irregular means, the phenomenon itself, its actors and the role of the
state. First, I plan to use critical discourse analysis method to analyze the Egyptian official narrative on unauthorized migration using sources like statements and speeches made by public officials. Additionally, I will analyze how the Egyptian clandestine has been portrayed and discussed in media outlets, namely television talk shows and the press across the political spectrum along with popular culture productions in order to identify how the image of the Egyptian migrant and the wider migration crisis is depicted and addressed. I will question the relationship between official and media narratives; to what extent does television programming and the press channel or challenge state narratives? By analyzing this discourse, I hope to investigate and elaborate the connection between language use and unequal relations of power (Fairclough, 2003).

The bulk of my research will be assembling and then synthesizing a corpus of official statements, news articles, and clips of television programming that deal with the issue of irregular migrants, and in particular, the Rasheed incident. I will go through official statements (made available on state websites and news sources) made by public officials. Relevant op-eds, editorials, and columns from the Egyptian press that discuss Rasheed and the Egyptian migrant have also been collected from various dailies and weekly publications. Segments of television programming across the political spectrum to build a media corpus on how Egyptian migrant has been depicted will also be used as research data. These are accessed by searching through recordings of programming on satellite television channel websites and video sharing platforms like YouTube.

Discourse is informed also by cultural production, so to allow for a more holistic representation of how the Egyptian migrant is imagined, the film Al Barr al Tani or The Other Side, a recent film by director Ali Idris depicting the journey of three young men from rural villages attempting to cross the Mediterranean to Italy will be critically analyzed. Alongside the film, music and a commercial will serve as sources of cultural production analysis.

Press coverage of the topic of irregular migration in the Egyptian context, including legal and policy developments, coverage on conferences, committees, or initiatives that deal with this issue when analyzing the role of state. Information on recent developments in securitization measures
or national policies regarding illegal migration in Egypt will be collected from online news sources.

To summarize, this research will introduce how the subject of the Egyptian irregular migrant has been discursively represented. The themes and narratives identified in the following major sources will be used as the data for the following contextual critical discourse analysis to be presented in this thesis. This thesis will use critical discourse analysis as a method of analysis of the corpus collected. Descriptions of various text will be accompanied by a detailed analysis throughout the chapters. This thesis is chiefly concerned with drawing deeper connections between text and the wider purposes of the type of production and organization of knowledge it serves.

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1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Discourses of a tragedy: On Blame, Accountability, and Victimization

In this chapter I illustrate a few of the major narratives representing the Egyptian clandestine in Egypt, particularly concerning discourse surrounding the Rasheed event as it generated much public debate. This chapter is concerned with identifying and analyzing some of the major themes found in the fieldwork, such as migrant-blaming and migrant-as-victim constructions. The utility of these discourses in relation to state accountability with regards to irregular migration is discussed critically. This chapter also responds to these narratives by using autonomy of migration theory to address how the migrant’s agency, rationality and right to mobility in these constructions are denied.

Chapter 3: The Nation-State and the Migrant

This chapter covers how nationalist discourse permeates throughout coverage and language used to talk about those who seek to journey across the Mediterranean. Here, I will engage conceptually the rhetorical theme of the homeland and the specific ways in which nationalist discourse is invoked. The ways in which the prospective migrant in this narrative is constructed as committing a kind of betrayal to his country is demonstrated. When examining this discourse,
questions of what the threat of mobility and mobile subjects pose to the nation-state imaginary and sovereignty arise and are analyzed. In the second section of this chapter, I consider the rhetoric of state-industry development that often accompanies and is invoked within the nationalist discourses to deny claims of deep irregular migration-producing marginalization. Alongside the idea of the Egyptian homeland as a lens for mega-development projects by the state are often invoked as a cure-all for rampant unemployment, poverty and inequality. To create a better understanding of the relationship of the state to its society, I offer the unifying nationalist discourse in comparison to the “reality” of socio-economic conditions in Egypt by engaging scholarship on the labor market.

**Chapter 4: Internal and External Securitization Discourse**

In the final chapter of this thesis, I demonstrate how Egyptian narratives on migration are also situated from a securitization discourse. After briefly describing the context of Egyptian endogenous securitization conditions, I examine the speech-act of state and non-state actors which discusses the rhetoric of criminality associated with mobility. Since this discourse does not arise out of a vacuum, it is crucial to connect it to wider discourses of the migration-securitization nexus, particularly border regime security of the EU. I will briefly describe predominant EU security discourse on the need to combat the crisis of the “invasions” of migrants and refugees on the shores of Fortress Europe, and how border spectacles such as the imagery of overloaded boats, shipwrecks, and drowning people fuels expanded border control measures, particularly in the post-2011 timeframe. The adoption by Egypt of external securitization discourse is critically analyzed by discussing some aspects of the political economy of Egypt’s relationship with the EU in terms of bilateral trade and aid agreements that have a role in shaping internal policy and discourse on migration.

**Conclusion**
CHAPTER 2: MIGRANT CONSTRUCTIONS: ON BLAME, VICTIMIZATION, AND AWARENESS

Introduction

In a report for the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, journalist Tom Rollins who has spent years covering issues of migration in the Mediterranean described Egypt’s Rashid incident by saying, “rarely are migrant tragedies so visible, so documented, so human” (2016). The capsizing of the overcrowded boat nicknamed the “Prophet’s Convoy (Mawkeb Al Rasoul)” and the images of humans drowning at sea and families awaiting bodies on the shore have constructed a spectacle rendering visibility to the particular issue of the migrant that often frames the way in which migration is talked about as within a crisis and securitization discourse. The spectacle of the shipwreck serves various discursive purposes. Indeed, the horror of such a spectacle, a “theatre of sublime trauma” as Perera describes, plays a critical role in the reproduction of securitization and humanitarian discourses of migration (2009, p. 79). The ways in which events of “unwanted” migrants drowning at sea on the way to Europe have been produced discursively and how these framings serve specific securitization, militarization and humanitarian action have been conceptualized in various anthropological and migration studies literature (see Amar 2013, De Genova 2017, Perera 2009). How the same spectacles are discursively represented and which purposes they serve in local or sending states, for example the current case study of the perceived “crisis” of Egyptian irregular migration in Egypt, is a concept less approached. This is not due to a lack of discourse on the subject. Indeed, the Rashid tragedy or spectacle featured prominently in the local press, primetime television broadcasting, and public official and celebrity statements and discussion of the event trended as a top hit on Twitter. The “Egyptian” nature of the incident, in that entire Egyptian families comprised many of the passengers, the magnitude and visibility of the tragedy, and accounts of survivors that highlight failures in the state’s search and rescue operations, are all elements that distinguish the Rashid incident thereby catapulting the event into the spotlight of public debate, commanding increased media and legal attention than other migrant issues have in the past (Kashef, 2016). The spectacle of such imagery associated with Mediterranean migrant boats sinking necessitates a response, and generates a dialogue, identifying and critically engaging with which is the interest of this thesis.
The following chapter identifies and problematizes how the subject of the migrant has been represented in different types of mediums in the Egyptian state discourse, media and the cultural imaginary. The purpose of this section is to introduce the fieldwork corpus that has been collected in an attempt to offer a representation of the discourse surrounding the Egyptian irregular migrant and the Rashid incident. This study does not aim to be a comprehensive analysis of every article that discuss the irregular migrant, but rather an analysis of a number of diverse sources in an effort to offer a general analysis of major themes and narratives that depict this issue. Throughout this section I will convey major trends in the narratives of how the issue of Egyptian irregular migration has been approached and discussed drawing on official speeches, press articles, television talk-show programming, and various cultural productions. News articles will mostly be focused on the sinking of the ship off Rashid as it demonstrated an influential moment in producing policy and generating wider public dialogue.

This chapter identifies and defines the different, sometimes conflicting patterns of framing the Egyptian cross-Mediterranean irregular migrant in Egypt. It will analyze hegemonic producers of migrant discourses (official, media, and popular), examining the power relations between social actors and institutions in society. By incorporating CDA and Foucauldian theoretical elements that are relevant for this study in this chapter, I aim to scrutinize discourse as more than just language for description, but rather a process that produces a certain knowledge that influences societal perceptions and behaviors. Migration discourse in Egypt goes through processes of selection, exclusion and domination by dominant institutions and major social actors, resulting in supporting specific perceptions and creates the power to define behavior. Critically engaging with the prevailing discourses (government, media, and popular culture productions) and understanding the ways in which they connect with global discourses on mobility can help to define the forms of power discourse wields. This allows us to use discourse as a lens to understand the dynamics of Egyptian irregular migration to Europe generally.

Discourse of a Tragedy: On Blame, Accountability, and Sympathy

Five days after the sinking of the smuggling ship which killed 204 individuals off the coast of Rashid, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the population in a speech at the inauguration of Geit El-Eneb residential project in Alexandria. A moment of silence was held in memory of
the victims, which included a four-year-old child, before the country’s leader began his speech. In his impassioned one-hour long speech on irregular migration and the Rashid incident that turned into a lecture on the virtues of patience and a resume of industrial project plans, El-Sisi regarded the migrant subject in ways that reflect and create a dominant discourse that is then reproduced in other mediums. Oscillating between sympathizing with the dead and admonishing them and perspective migrants, El-Sisi’s speech provides a crucial lens into understanding the subject-formation of the Egyptian irregular migrant. I will break down the major themes of the Egyptian head of state’s official speech and connect it with wider literature in Egyptian media and government discourse in order to gain a better perspective of the narratives produced. The extent to which these various mediums produce, reproduce, or reject dominant narratives on the migrant Egyptian and irregular movement will be highlighted. Furthermore, discourse on the migrant will be analyzed and put into conversation with historical, political, and economic developments when relevant.

Perhaps most striking in this highlighted speech is how quickly the language and the messages it conveys shifts from a somber tone of remorse and mourning. The president’s opening lines in which a sense of regret is expressed on behalf of the state gives way to an admonishing and patriarchal tone, not unlike that of a father disappointed in his children. El-Sisi begins by saying, “The truth is we certainly do not have any justification or excuse to have lost 160 victims, Egyptians or otherwise…we must confront [this issue] with all of our strength, but I am not just talking about the state, honestly, I am talking about the state and the society” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016). Almost immediately, El-Sisi begins placing the onus on members of society to tackle the issue of migrants drowning at sea. Emphasizing the “impossible task” of securing 500 kilometers of the country’s coastal borders, El-Sisi urges Egyptian society to “work on it” to ensure that such a tragedy does not happen again, declaring that to have just one victim is too difficult to bear.

Sentiments that admonish migrants for spending money on migration while reiterating the state’s support for young people expressed by El-Sisi in the aftermath of Rasheed captures the type of production of knowledge of the Egyptian migrant in the public sphere. Rebuking the migrants who pay smugglers around LE35,000 to cross the Mediterranean in search of a better life in
Europe becomes a familiar discursive framing. It is an important trend in the discourse because of the purposes it serves and in the construction of a particular “truth” it conveys in its repetition in the public sphere. Such rhetoric spotlights the wrongdoing associated with migrant death tragedies to the migrant himself. In effect, the migrant becomes a trifecta of representations: a fool who misallocates funds, a traitor to his country that needs him, and a kind of victim awaiting the salvation of a state that won’t be “leaving [him] alone” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

**Parental Failures**

Blaming society, families, parents, and the individual migrant becomes a common theme that is repeated when addressing the issue of Egyptian migration by smuggling boats across discourses. In an interview, when asked who is responsible for the Rasheed boat tragedy, Ambassador Nayla Gabr, chairperson of the Egyptian National Coordinating Committee on Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM), stated that while she contends that the government is partly responsible, “the family is also responsible, civil society and the business community. We are all responsible for what happens, and it must do its part for young people” (Mamdouh & Hosni, 2016). As far as accountability for the desire for migration, rather than addressing structural socio-economic inequality that prevails in across Egypt, Amb. Gabr advocated that it “is the responsibility of the family and the school” to change young peoples’ minds on migrating. Amb. Gabr goes to admonish local parents for what she perceives is their failure in instilling loyalty and patriotism to their homeland to convince these individuals not to leave. Comparing herself to the local resident of an impoverished village in the countryside or Upper Egypt, Amb. Gabr argues, “We had international job opportunities too, but preferred to stay in my country to serve it here. That’s because my family raised me to be patriotic and loyal to my country” (Mamdouh & Hosni, 2016).

Placing the blame upon the victim and/or his parents is a narrative that also features widely discursively in this context. In an episode dedicated to the Rasheed incident, host Mona Elshazly of the popular prime-time television talk show Ma’kom Mona Elshazly brought survivors and their parents on air (معكم منى الشاذلى, 2016). The coverage features interviews with victims of the Rasheed boat capsizing, information on how the event evolved, deaths, and various testimonials from survivors, families, fishermen at the scene, and an Egyptian official representative from
Milan, Italy. Throughout the programming, Elshazly reiterates her shock of how parents could allow their children to board such dangerous vessels to go live in a foreign country alone. Blatant shaming of the fathers of some of the survivors for their gamble was narrated by the host. Emotional scenes filmed in Rasheed in a video montage featuring the stories of a few of the young victims were produced and shown in the broadcast programming. El Shazly, like Amb. Gabr, the multi-millionaire television host compares herself to the families of those who send minors and often expresses how she as a mother could never imagine placing one of her own children on an overcrowded boat to potentially die at sea. This type of moralizing discourse was invoked by Gabr several times. In a conference on illegal migration hosted by the Wafd Party Gabr said, “Please tell me that you [parents] know that it is forbidden haram to invest in your children to travel in travel abroad just so that they can bring you back a Euro; this is unacceptable morally and religiously” (Issa, 2016).

In one particular segment, an illiterate 15-year old guest on her show expresses his continued determination to return to the sea after three failed attempts, declaring how he seeks an education abroad to be able to learn and work. “Here, there is no opportunity for proper schooling. My classmates and I want to leave.” Elshazly then accuses the child of not attending school and then remarks how she and the viewers have agreed not to judge anyone here on the show, however, her pointed questions demonstrate the opposite. “Why do you think the travel to Italy is such an easy thing?” Elshazly tells the young man’s father, “The person can risk his life, but to risk the lives of his children, is not easy, it takes a very cold heart.” The father, who works to deliver gas cylinders, defends his decisions saying, “I know very well the risks of the sea, I understand perfectly what is at stake, but why aren’t you asking me the reasons why I am taking these risks?” The father argues that boats before Rasheed never carried such dangerously high amounts of people saying that the September 21st incident, was the first time people from their village of El Gezira el Khadra or The Green Island, one that he estimates has at least one or two members from each household as labor migrants in Europe, had ever failed to make it to Italian soil. Defending his son’s position to travel, the father asserts to the host, “I’m sorry, but what do you think? My son lives in a village without any services, he compares life in our village to life in Europe, what would you do? I am to blame as a father, I am not denying that, but please look at the reasons that put me in this position” (معكم مني الشاذلى. 2016).
The way in which figures like Mona Elshazly address the migrants and the parents of the younger migrants, is one that expresses shock, disappointment, and ultimately a pity based in classism due to the rural-urban divide that has long permeated discourse relating to peasant discourses in Egyptian society that will be explored further. Elshazly demonstrates bewilderment at how parents could send their children on these boats. In her often expressed failure to understand how parents and individual migrants alike could take to the sea amid such dangerous conditions, she disregards their rationale and agency in what fuels them to take such decisions.

Discursive outrage at the individual migrant and his parents permeated the public debate on this issue. On Twitter, the famous actor Nabil el-Helfawy stated, “We mourn for victims of illegal migration and for their families’ pain, but our anger towards them and their families is greater” (Aswat Masriya, 2016). A member of Parliament, Elhamy Agina stated that the hundreds of people who drowned off the Egyptian coast “do not deserve sympathy,” adding that “the parents of young people who migrate illegally, get caught trying to do so or die [in the process] should be punished, because these young people are reckless and have not found anyone to tell them right from wrong” (Osborne, 2016). In an episode of “Entebah” (Attention) on Mehwar Channel, journalist Mona Iraqi states of the scenes in Rasheed, “You hear the wailing of mothers even though often it is the very mother who is the reason for the child’s migration” (2016).

Talk show host Ahmed Moussa claimed that youth often migrated through illegal channels without telling their parents and went even further to suggest that this often is the case with what has been known as “forced disappearances” by the state, saying “I know this, kids go from behind their parents back- and then they tell you ‘forced kidnappings or disappearances’” (Moussa, 2016). This provocative claim was supported in at least one major paper. In an article by Youm 7 entitled “After the Rasheed Boat Incident: 7 Facts on Illegal Immigration in Egypt,” writer Mahmoud Abdel Rady also echoes Moussa saying that “there are dozens of young people who have migrated illegally and their relatives have claimed their enforced disappearance” (Rady, 2016). The forced disappearances that are discussed here refer to an alleged pattern of men and women being arrested and detained by security forces abruptly without trial and their whereabouts unknown. Reports by various human rights organization such as Amnesty
International document the ways in which enforced disappearances have been used as an instrument in crushing dissent under the auspices of counter-terrorism by the authorities (Amnesty International, 2016). This practice has been vehemently denied by the state and when the media links migrants to those who have been forcibly abducted, there are serious implications. The extent to which media upholds and reproduces state discourse represents its hegemonic nature. Most importantly, discourse in this case serves as a social practice and is meaningful in that solidifies knowledge, shaping a specific social reality, one that denies forced disappearances by attributing them to migrating youth in this case (Tenorio E. , 2011).

**The Lazy Youth: Denying Unemployment**

A key discursive pattern that characterizes the narrative of Rasheed throughout media coverage and official narratives was the downplaying or outright dismissal of the legitimacy of claims regarding employment reasons for migration. Denial of the high unemployment rate in rural areas that often send migrants features in official state rhetoric by President El-Sisi when he declared, “Truthfully, the homeland will never desert you, why should we leave our country? There are no jobs? I am telling you, I swear, *wallahi*, there are jobs” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016). Almost always, this is followed with blaming the migrant spending money on smuggling and admonishing them for not taking such funds and starting a business. Certainly, this language so often used completely disregards the reality of the amount of capital it takes to start a business and severely overestimates its profitableness and the ability to sustain a household off of it. In this sense, the discourse serves as a type of strategy for answering to or denying economic crisis at home. When the state declares that there is no unemployment problem, it is wielding its power, which is often discursive as in this case, to construct a “truth” that serves its interests in denying neglect on its part on one hand, and on the other hand serves to illegitimize claims of the migrant. The migrant’s rationality in his decision-making is denied. Fairclough’s CDA allows us to understand this kind of language in relation to broader social relations since it is concerned with showing how “texts” of all kinds figure in social processes, social change, in dialectical relations with other elements of the social (2003). Providing accounts of other institutions, namely the media and press, that repeat state positions, one can trace capillary power of the state
discourse in how it permeates through media and local actors demonstrating the power of this discourse.

In his talk show “Cairo 360” on Al Qahera Wel Nas channel, host Ossama Kamal called those “who say life in Egypt is death and so you escape to the sea…I’m sorry, but people who say this are stupid” (Kamal, 2016). Kamal admitted that “people are living in hard times, there is no doubt, but that is another issue,” going on to say, “for someone to go and jump in a boat illegally to go to a different country to live a better life and say, ‘I’m free to do what I want’ well, you are free to do what you want in life, but don’t wait for us to be sympathetic to you.” Media host Ahmed Moussa denied altogether unemployment as a cause for migration on his show “3ala Mas2oliyiti” on Sada Elbalad addressing the Rasheed event. Moussa explained how young men go to Europe in search for employment opportunities, disagreeing that this is a sufficient reason to migrate because “let’s admit there are job opportunities in the country,” commenting that El Sisi has allocated LE200 billion for youth projects. “We need to understand the reasons- you want to work there [Europe]? I am telling you now that there are no jobs in Europe” (Moussa, 2016). Minister of Manpower, Mohamed Saafan, stated in a talk show on al-Nahar al-Youm channel that “Egypt is full of jobs in the private sector and it needs its people to build it rather than migrate. I want to tell [the youth] that we all started small, I personally I used to get LE50 a month on my first job” (Aswat Masriya, 2016). Cabinet spokesperson, Hussam al-Qaweesh, in an interview on CBC channel also dismissed the idea that economic reasons are what cause people to leave saying, “Illegal immigration requires a large sum of money, and I see that with that sum any citizen can easily start a project in his village. This can offer him a good income and save him from participating in these smuggling operations” (Aswat Masriya, 2016).

The repetition of such statements discursively offers a way of organizing knowledge on the particular subject of the Egyptian irregular migrant. Across social media after the Rasheed event common adjectives used to describe the migrants were “lazy” and “barbarians” who “don’t want to work, and don’t have any values,” one user said, “You should die in the middle of the sea and not get even get buried in Egypt. At least the congestion will ease a bit and the lazy ones that hurt the economy will leave more space for others,” (Aswat Masriya, 2016). The collective understanding of this discursive logic and its acceptance as social fact, regardless of the reality of
the migrant experiences, illuminates the power of the order of the discourse in establishing knowledge on a particular way of seeing the migrant experience.

Another side trope often invoked in public discourse is admonishing Egyptian migrants by comparing them to Syrian refugees in Egypt. There is a common sentiment expressed at the perceived “success” of Syrian workers in Egypt due to the proliferation of Syrian businesses in the country post-2011. Although, the relative impoverishment and difficult conditions Syrians face in the country is well-documented in various NGO reports, (see ReliefWeb’s Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Egypt 2016 report, for example) the discourse propagates this myth and it has become adopted by and large throughout Egyptian society. “Syrians are hard-workers who have come to Egypt and embarrassed all those Egyptian youth hanging out all day in coffee shops complaining about unemployment by their flourishing successful businesses. There is a Syrian restaurant in every neighborhood now!” are common sentiments expressed in public and media discourse. This language renders the Egyptian clandestine as lazy and seeking an easy way out. Exemplifying this dimension to the migration debate, Amb. Gabr compares the Egyptian migrant to that of a Syrian, arguing that Syrians and many other nationalities live and work in Egypt, “Why don’t they go drown themselves in the, too? Leh myirmush nafshom fi al bahr huma kaman?” Naturally, the same ideas are found in media coverage. Television host Ahmed Ragab on his show “Mohimma Khassa” (A Special Mission) on Al Hayah channel interviews a survivor of the Rasheed boat, one of the many in the crowd awaiting to receive bodies on the shores of Beheira in the wake of the accident (Ragab, 2016). The survivor, a young man, says that he wanted to go to Italy to seek an education and to work, “there are no jobs for us here in Egypt, we would never imagine travelling if Egypt provided those things,” to which Ragab condescendingly replies, “Do you know how many Syrians are here thriving and found work in Egypt?” The young man countered, “Do you know how many Syrians were with us on the boat?” The statement by the reporter neglects the fact that these other ethnicities do and have for many years boarded boats to leave the country as Egypt has served as major migratory transit hub for years.

The “victim”- blaming trend is rhetoric that is not unique to Rasheed or irregular migration among Egyptian society. Indeed, it has often been invoked especially since 2011. Elaborating on
this trend, researcher on migration at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights Mohamed Kashef has explained that this trend or way of framing accountability has been invoked during mass violence and crackdown on protestors in the revolution. In an interview with Aswat Masriya publication, Kashef states, “Usually with various tragic incidents people pose the question, what brought them here or why would they go there?” (2016). This has often become a state narrative when clashes between state forces and the people occur. Such a narrative of shifting blame onto the individual is reproduced in discourse of the Egyptian migrant taking to the sea. The distribution of this kind of rhetoric has critical consequences that we can understand by incorporating Foucault. As I have demonstrated, a key feature of the public discourse constructs the migrant as a subject that should be blamed, one that is lazy, one that is lying about employment opportunities, and takes financial advantage of those who support his trip. Through repetition of these ideas and statements by major actors, a dominant discourse that warns against migration and vilifies those that attempt to assert their right of mobility is produced and sustained, and ultimately form individual and collective consciousness that influence individual actions and perceptions (Tenorio E., 2011).

According to Foucault, discourses are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak,” thus creating the migrant subject in these specific terms (2003, p. 54). All of these depictions serve to protect the state from criticism of its failure, and more broadly serve to deny deeper inquiry to more fundamental questions of marginalization by globalization under the capitalist system by focusing on the individual’s (or his family’s) wrongdoing. By using a Foucauldian logic, the quest for truth is always discursive and there is a truth effect that is rendered when a certain logic becomes dominant, which is derived by social phenomenon. This social phenomenon includes the production, regulation, and circulation of statements that creates the dominant knowledge- this is a function of the state, to produce a category, regulate it, and circulate statements that create a dominant body of knowledge, in this case the creation of the migrant and the denial of the conditions he faces in order to serve particular political interests.

“Invest Migration Money Instead”: Entrepreneurship as an Alternative to Migration

Accompanying the discourse that denies the lack of employment opportunities is one that encourages private sector intervention and “entrepreneurship” as an easy and beneficial
alternative to unauthorized migration. Indeed, advocating for individual entrepreneurship and investment in the country instead of migrating is a key feature of the discourse surrounding Rasheed and the Egyptian clandestine. This is in line with what Sobhy calls “global discourses of active entrepreneurial citizenship to legitimize intensifying neoliberal reforms and to mask the failures in the functioning of key institutions of the state” (2015, p. 2). This discourse links banks, investors and the capitalist elite as the only path toward sustainable development in the face of gaps and neglect by the public sector, disregarding the potential of local community actors and locally-sourced solutions despite the ingenuity and efficiency often found in grassroots initiatives and in the informal sector. In his speech, El-Sisi reiterates several times the importance of involvement of actors such as banks and top businessmen in ending tragedies like that of Rasheed repeating that “when the banks and businessmen help us out, put their hand with us [the state], we succeed” and praising Bank al-Ahly as the biggest investor in the Geit El Enab housing project. The responsibility of ending poverty is also placed on the ordinary Egyptian citizen, calling on his donations in the “Fakka” or pocket change financial initiative that calls on the population to donate their extra change to fight poverty, rather than any sort of measures that actually work toward fair wealth distribution. While ordinary members of society are asked to donate their livelihoods in the name of both the homeland and religious duty or zakat, policies of deregulation and legislation allowing big businesses and investors to pay less in taxes continue to be enacted (Sabea, 2014).

This clear discursive link is not just limited to official statements, but has been featured in popular media as well. A Banque Misr commercial aired nationally compares the fate of two cousins- one who takes out a bank loan and successfully builds a profitable business venture and the other who migrates on a smuggling boat to Italy (Banque Misr, 2017). Both men are wearing fellahin garb in the first shot indicating they are from a rural area. The advertisement then features in a split screen footage the progression of each character. While Mohamedein joins a ship packed with screaming refugees in the Mediterranean on one side of the screen, it is juxtaposed with a smartly dressed Hassanein taking out a loan from the bank. The narrator goes on to compare the fate of these two young men in their quest for financial success. Hassanein begins a pasta-making business that expands into a series of factories in which he is depicted as becoming a very successful, happy and secure businessman. Meanwhile, Mohamedein is shown
homeless on the streets of Italy while the narrator sarcastically comments that he finds a home and friends in his new friends- his sardonic description of Mohamedein’s plight continues throughout the commercial. As Hassanein works in a professional setting, enjoying his success, Mohamedein struggles in Italy working as a dishwasher and escaping from violence and the Italian police. The commercial ends by asking the viewer- “What will your fate be?”

The commercial is fascinating as a source of the role of financial institutions play in capitalizing off capturing and propagating popular and official discourse that paints the migrant as one who desires an easy way out, not knowing what awaits him on the other side of the Mediterranean, and coopting that rhetoric to pursue capitalist purposes. The language used in the commercial and its purposes demonstrate Fairclough’s argument of the changing nature of the discourse of “new capitalism” (2003). The migrant in the Banque Misr commercial is one that is displaced by a choice that could be easily avoided by a more lucrative option that exists within his country. All he has to do to be a financially secure subject is to indebted himself to the banking industry and all of his ills will be solved. The commercial exposes the common critique trope expressed by social and state actors that emphasizes the capital spent on migration. It reinforces the knowledge that spending money to migrate is an unintelligent choice that only results in misery and not a way out of poverty.

The discourse of entrepreneurship as a means to end poverty, a feature of the discourse on irregular migration in Egypt, does not come out of vacuum- indeed, it been pervasive force in social imagination since the 1980s (Dey, 2016). The discursive link made between entrepreneurship as a solution to late-capitalism’s socio-economic consequences such as abject poverty has long been upheld by some of the world’s most powerful institutions from the World Bank to the United Nations. An example of this is the UN report released in 2004 called “Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor” where then Secretary-General Kofi Annan upholds entrepreneurship as the primary instrument for private sector strengthening in the developing world and advocates that through this, market-driven solutions will alleviate poverty (United Nations, 2004). While there is much scholarship dedicated to the effects of free-market policies and the transformation of labor relations on increasing inequality and poverty an analysis of the discourse of entrepreneurship has been discussed less. John Ogbor
is one of the scholars that has argued of the “ideological control in conventional entrepreneurial discourses and praxis” saying that “the conventional discourse on entrepreneurship reinforces and reifies a mode of knowledge production that serves as an instrument for power” (2000, p. 608). In his postmodernist tradition of deconstruction of this discourse, Ogbor finds that the phenomenon of entrepreneurship discourse is “discriminatory, gender-biased, ethnocentrically determined and ideologically controlled, sustaining not only prevailing societal biases, but serving as a tapestry for unexamined and contradictory assumptions and knowledge about the reality of entrepreneurs” (2000, 605). When examining the narrative in the Egyptian discourse that calls for saving the money spent on smuggling to Europe and spending it instead on opening a business, we can apply Ogbor’s research and understand how it serves positions of power and the neo-liberal status-quo.

To end financial hardship, the discourse often perpetuates the myth of entrepreneurship being an affordable and lucrative option that is accessible to everyone. In reality, criteria for securing a loan from financial institutions is often unmet by those seeking to migrate and in the case that it is, repayment with interests usually drives people into a vicious cycle of debt. Money that is collected to travel is often sourced from personal savings, families pooling together their resources, selling belongings, or loaning from other community members. It then paid in installments to brokers, not in a lump sum. To compare this capital with that of starting a business as an alternative is a myth that neglects the realities of starting a business as a marginalized person and overestimates its profits as a sustainable livelihood, if said business was ever actually able to take place.

In the above section, I have described the migrant-blaming narratives that have dominated the majority of the discourse following the Rasheed issue and the broader local migrant debate. In the following section, I seek to describe and analyze other characteristics of the discourse, namely the other side of the coin of victimization and awareness framing and its implications.

2.3 Humanitarian Discourses: Victimization, Awareness and Agency

On the flip side of the coin of condemnation, reproach and blaming of the migrant in Egyptian discourse is the that of victimization. These framings imagine the migrant in contrast to one who
should be blamed for his actions like the discourse described above, seeking to provide an alternative perspective by creating the migrant subject as purely a victim of his conditions. A humanitarian discourse is employed that focuses on pity and suffering becoming the “oppositional” voice across the migration debate. These descriptions are depicted as more “just” ways of understanding irregular migration. However, the victimization discourse does not actually challenge hegemonic production of knowledge—it becomes a component of it—because it denies the agency of the migrant. Indeed, humanitarian discourse supports not the fight for the freedom of mobility, but rather complements, supports, and works within securitization frameworks.

Victimization discourse is cultivated in several directions—one that drives awareness and humanitarian discourse drawn upon classist discourse that serves to propagate harmful stereotypes of rural migrants and fails to address material obstacles. Most importantly, when there is a victim represented, this means that there must be a specific criminal constructed and then punished. This criminal constructed in this case is becomes the local broker or smuggler, a concept that will be elaborated on when discussing securitization discourse in the fourth chapter of this thesis. Here, I invoke it just to point out one way in which we can understand how humanitarian discourse complements and indeed works within a wider securitization discourse.

In all forms of victimization discourse, the agency and autonomy of the migrant is erased. Ultimately, both migrant-blaming and migrant-as-victim discourses enable a production of knowledge that serves hegemonic interests. When the migrant is cast as a rash young fool whose drowning should not require sympathy, it absolves the state of its responsibility toward affording citizens a sustainable life at home. When the victimization discourse is invoked, as this section will explore, it consequently employs the perception of the migrant as one who does not actively, rationally take meaningful decisions to not only control his life but to subvert nation-state borders in search for a dignified life. In this section, various examples from the fieldwork collected will be included to illustrate the “opposite” rhetoric that has been demonstrated throughout Egyptian discourse. I will draw upon Nail’s theory of the figure of the migrant and literature on the idea of autonomy of migration to support my argument.
Across editorials, NGO rhetoric, official migration legislative committees, and cultural production, the image of the migrant as a victim is common. Naturally, this relates to the fact that there were indeed hundreds of casualties in cross-Mediterranean attempts from Egypt. However, there are critical implications to the victimization discourse that call for a deeper analysis on what purposes it serves.

**Awareness Discourse**

Complementing the rhetoric of migrant-blaming is that of awareness discourse called upon by the state discourse and channeled by NGO discourse, and media and cultural production alike. Like speech that blames the migrant for any misfortune that awaits him at sea, awareness discourse serves specific interests and has tremendous implications on the subject-formation of the migrant. As viewed by the language of state actors and various talk-show language mentioned previously, there is a strong discursive link in employing awareness. That is to say, awareness becomes a common argument on official and non-official levels to say that if only these people attempting this journey only knew what was at stake, they would refrain from doing so. The discourse of awareness is heralded by both state and NGO actors. It is manifested and relates to various awareness initiatives that have been a component of the state’s response to spectacles of shipwrecks at sea.

For example, at an event inaugurating the British-sponsored awareness project called Preventing and Responding to Illegal Migration in Egypt (PRIME) executed by the IOM, Amb. Naëla Gabr said,

> “Trying to convince them through telling them that immigration is wrong and it does not follow religious teaching and we should enter the countries legally and telling them that there is death at sea is not enough – what will convince him is that there are substitutes” (Africa News, 2017).

Here, Gabr’s language reproduces major telling themes of this discourse. First, the wrong use of the term “immigration” is used, depicting a reproduction of the discourse and perspective of countries of destination funding the initiative. This is the incorrect term because for Egypt and Egyptians this kind of movement “emigration”, not “immigration.” Here the usage of this term
becomes important because it demonstrates an adoption of migration language of the global North.

Gabr’s statement also shows that in the subject formation of the migrant, there is always the presumption of a level of political and social consciousness. There is a way of seeing the migrant as a figure who is an idiot, one who is easily duped, one who lacks the capacity to understand what awaits them in Europe. This constitutes a classist discourse which supposes a superiority over those who decide to act on their will to seek a dignified life across the sea. Part of the classism in the case of the Egyptian migrant can be associated with the rural-urban divide. This discourse propagates the stereotype in Egypt that rural residents like those of Upper Egypt or from the countryside villages of the Delta are inherently less intelligent and poor, in other words, these individuals do not know any better than to throw themselves in the sea. Indeed, as Ray Bush and Habib Ayeb support, “It is a truism that modern Arab states, following in the footsteps of colonial powers, have concentrated on the socio-economic development of cities, particularly the capital, and badly neglected the provinces. The rulers and the nationalist intelligentsia tend to see peasants as backward and mired in ‘tradition’ that can only impede the progress toward modernity that the elites desire” (Bush & Ayeb, 2014).

In the quote mentioned above, Gabr acknowledges and accepts discourse appealing to the morality of prospective individuals who consider unauthorized migration. She alludes to religious sanctioned discourse that is used to deter migration. Indeed, appeals to religious morality are used as a key mechanism of NCCPIM awareness campaigns. Gabr does not argue against these arguments that uphold that these individuals lack an understanding of what is right and wrong, but instead qualifies that they are “not enough.” That there is an easy and accessible alternative of entering the EU legally for all who want it is a rejection of the reality of heavy border regulations of the global north and contributes idea of an irrational migrant subject. The migrant subject becomes one that does not “get it,” one that requires convincing by an external actor of the risks involved; he is a victim of his ignorance. Instead of highlighting and calling for a reevaluation of the powerful mechanisms of the global north that prevent safe passage for migration, the state is in line with EU policy.
Other awareness initiatives include the “Baladna Awla be Weladna” (our country deserves our children) project that is funded by the European Union and carried out by Save the Children in collaboration with the Egyptian NGO Youth Association for Population and Development (YAPD) (Samih, 2014). According to its director, Noheier Nashaat, the project targets young people in the Gharbiya, Alexandria, Beheira and Assiut governorates. The first level of the initiative’s mission is “to raise awareness among young people of the dangers of illegal migration by giving them the support they need so that they feel part of the institutions they work in and feel active in society” (Samih, 2014). The NGO also tries to help people find training and work opportunities as a last step in its objectives. Another program by the IOM, the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood, and the NCCPIM targets teenagers across six governorates. This program works with local authority figures “to disseminate key messages to children and youth on the dangers of irregular migration” (IOM, 2017).

In actuality, the individual’s decision to move is not based in ignorance. Despite the multiple claims in interviews with perspective or return migrants where they emphasize their understanding of the risks he places himself in when choosing to embark on the journey across the Mediterranean, a lack of awareness is blamed in the humanitarian discourse. Moreover, this emphasis on awareness ignores the fact that these individuals know intimately what this decision entails much more than the media host or the state official, due to their encounters within their social networks which often include young men that have gone and come back, as most of this kind of migration is circular or temporary and relies deeply on the role of social networks.

Awareness relies on the simple binary that pits migrant victims against dangerous smugglers that prey on their ignorance and dreams. This humanitarian discourse works within a broader securitization framework. The overlap and interwovenness of humanitarian discourse and securitization can be most clearly witnessed in the Egyptian context by examining the language of a document describing the “National Strategy for Combating Illegal Migration 2016-2026” by the Egyptian National Coordinating Committee on Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM). Six pillars are highlighted as purposes for this group including the following:

“1. Enabling Egypt to play a leading role regionally and internationally.
2. Protecting the most vulnerable groups exploited by smuggling and human trafficking networks.
3. Triggering criminal justice by sanctioning and deterring smuggling brokers and networks.
4. Protecting the national security from the infiltration of terrorists through illegal migration flows.
6. Highlighting the political will for combating illegal migration and having a clear national vision in this regards for enhancing our partnership with the international community.” (NCCPIM, 2016)

Additionally, the committee clarifies the aims of its awareness project which are described as the following:

“Messages of the Awareness Campaign
• Risks of illegal Migration (drowning/exploitation and human trafficking).
• Illegal migration’s alternatives (job opportunities/small and micro enterprises/available opportunities of legal migration).
• Importance of work value and proceeding towards achieving ambitions.
• Need for skills development (retraining) which commensurate with the labor market requirements.
• Illegal migration violates the calls of all religions for respecting human life and dignity, with all it involves of evils: forgery, cheating and fraud (fatwa Dar al-Ifta).
• Role of the national bodies (governmental and non-governmental) in addressing the illegal migration phenomenon.” (NCCPIM, 2016)

The discourse of victimization sets up a dichotomy of victims versus smuggler criminals that is to say, as the victimhood of the migrant is established, its narrative works within a narrative of criminality (Andrijasevic, 2007). When the NCCCPIM describes that one of the key pillars of their mission is to “protect the most vulnerable groups exploited by smuggling and human trafficking networks,” this invokes the victimization discourse that denies the subjectivity of the migrant and his realization of mobility by conflating a willing migrant and a trafficked victim. Doing so encourages and legitimizes the need for a securitization discourse against what foreign minister Sameh Shoukry has described as “cross-border gangs” (Sayed, 2017). Text invoking religion claiming that “illegal migration violates the calls of all religions for respecting human life and dignity” is an attempt by the state to situate itself as a moral authority in order to shape behavior in society, in the Foucauldian tradition.
The language used in this document produces the knowledge that mobility is a threat that requires strict government control. Discussing migration primarily through its relation to national security reinforces the notion of criminality. In this way we can understand that while awareness and victimization discourse initially may appear to be more sympathetic to migrants, in fact, it serves the same purposes of increased state control of mechanisms of movement. The representational dynamics of securitization of migration discourse will be examined further in chapter four. Despite perhaps good intentions, these awareness campaigns that aim to advise Egyptian youth of the dangers of irregular migration completely fail to address fundamental issues of highly restrictive EU immigration and labor policies that predominantly create the conditions for risky travel and potentials for exploitation.

**The Migrant and Agency**

Noting and analyzing the silences in the narratives on migration is a key component discourse analysis as they are revealing in themselves. According to Fairclough, it is through their recognitions that whatever can and cannot be said about an issue becomes perceptible (Fairclough, 2003). In all of these representations of the migrant explored above, one aspect that remains missing is the agency of the migrant. In his subject formation through discourse, the Egyptian irregular migrant is many things: a fool, a poor helpless member of the countryside, a lazy youth looking for an easy way out, a leech who spends all of his family’s money, or a victim of his conditions. Indeed, the autonomy of the migrant is replaced by ways of seeing the migrant that are in line with broader state discourse. Their rationality and will is neglected in favor of more palatable representations that attribute a logic that is more convenient to dominant discourses. Even in press language that may appear more “supportive” of the plight of the migrant, the approach contributes to seeing the migrant as a powerless victim. Surely, migrants who have taken to the sea have spoken in the language of desperation remarking that both the sea and life in Egypt is death. However, many accounts throughout televised interviews demonstrate other sentiments. For most, there is the imagination of a better life on the other side and in the articulation of this alternate reality and in the courage to pursue it lies powerful resistance politics.
There are other ways of understanding the figure of the migrant that allows for a break from the binaries of migrant-as-victim and migrant-as-blameworthy analyzed previously. What ways can we view the migrant that emancipates him or her from these hegemonic narratives? Can we view unauthorized migration as a form of resistance to systemic injustice that creates perpetual marginalization and a subversion of denial of the freedom of movement for these members of society? We can understand this outlook by turning to literature of autonomy of migration. This scholarship is applicable to the understanding the experience of the Egyptian irregular migrant as it offers a way to counter the constructions of popular discourse.

When we take into account the Egyptian irregular migrant’s calculated strategic choice on how to reconfigure his life and advance his dreams despite his experiences of possible dispossession, everyday deprivation, persecution, structural violence or various social, economic, or political conditions it becomes clear that this subject is one that exercises what Mezzadra calls a “right to escape” with intention and purpose (Mezzadra, 2004). The Egyptian migrant embarks on this journey with knowledge of the risks involved that is drawn from deep social networks so the view that he is an unaware subject is rejected. Refusing to stay put in the face of restrictive border policies and inaccessible visa channels and instead taking to the sea could be viewed as an act of resistance. From an AoM perspective, this choice travelling through illegalized means is an act of refusal to submitting to administrative categories of mobility regulation. In this sense, the migrant is seen as “part of an assault against arrangements of power that seek to contain and control human mobility” (McNevin, Ambivalence and Citizenship: Theorising the Political Claims of Irregular Migrants, 2012).

Invoking this theoretical perspective here is not meant to romanticize irregular migration. Instead, it is my intention to reject the dominant discourse and advocate for a way of understanding the migrant subject from a perspective that prioritizes his agency. While migrants are certainly pushed and pulled across borders by a variety of external factors, it is important to see their movement as also “the result of subjective decision-making processes, embedded in individual, family and community strategies for survival and prosperity” and that their mobility is a “result of agency as much as force” (McNevin, 2013).

Introduction

In the previous chapter, various narratives of blaming, accountability, victimization and humanitarian discourses were described and analyzed as key elements that shape the discussion of Egyptian cross-Mediterranean irregular migration. This chapter will analyze how the discourse on the Egyptian irregular migrant in part draws on nationalist notions of an imagined homeland, focusing on the relationship between one and his country, and the purposes this rhetoric serves.

When the discursive rhetoric that invokes the homeland and the nation is cultivated regarding migration, it serves several purposes. First, the language used by state actors constructs an imaginary of a nation that is protective over its citizens, a patriarchal and dependable force that cannot accept the notion of its citizens drowning at sea to escape it. Odes to the homeland place a heavy responsibility on the individual to endure any hard times for the sake of the country, constructing a migrant subject as a traitor to his moral obligations as a patriot. Moreover, the nationalist discourse also supports positions of state power in denying worsening socio-economic conditions under the current regime. Grand plans for industrial mega-projects as a measure of success are called upon to prove national achievements and serve legitimizing function in the discourse. In doing so, major reasons for migration such as economic failures of the labor market in absorbing workers, underemployment, poverty and inequality in addition to the lack of quality state services across the country continue are neglected or silenced by these narratives. Utilizing a unifying nationalist discourse helps to absorb class differences rendering legitimacy to the notion that there are no reasons for Egyptians to take to the sea in search of better opportunities.

These ideas are manifested throughout official and popular discourses. In addition to official statements and media discourse, this chapter analyzes the film Al Barr Al Thani as cultural production that channels wider state discourse, serving as a warning Egyptians against irregular
migration by sea to Europe. Moments like Rasheed and the discourse in response to it reveal the threat that unregulated mobility poses.

The Nationalist Imaginary in the Post-2011 Moment

Nationalist discourse in Egypt has a long and well-researched history of scholarship that has traced its making and evolution (see Fahmy, 2011; Gershoni and Jankowski, 1986, Pollard). Due to the limits of thesis, I will not delve into the development of trends in the history, doctrines, and various ideologies shaping Egyptian nationalist narratives, but I want to briefly acknowledge the important role the idea of national belonging serves and major actors producing the Egyptian homeland discourse, particularly in the various stages post-2011 period. It is important to identify that the role of the Egyptian military in as a protector of the territorial modern nation and as fighters for its independence has shaped much of this discourse. The way that nationalist sentiment has been invoked in the Egyptian public sphere shifted after the January 25th revolution. The articulation of nationalist discourse took on different forms at different stages of the transition. In 2013, nationalist notions became a salient tool for reactionary forces that supported calls for a military take-over. Widespread intensification of nationalist discourse accompanied the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi in the form of patriotic songs, official speeches, and pro-regime media, and quickly thereafter that of private media, that emphasized external and internal threats to the nation (Sobhy, 2015). In the wake of the upheaval, notions of national security and the need to fend off the Egyptian state from foreign and domestic conspirators aiming to undermine national interest were and continue to be routinely invoked. This legitimates the need for a strong army in power to serve as bulwarks against instability and chaos in the official discourse.

Identifying and contextualizing the type of nationalist discourse operating currently in society is crucial in understanding its relationship to narratives on migration. As Egypt faces increasingly difficult economic times marked by high unemployment, peak levels of inflation exponentially driving up the prices of goods, and depleted foreign reserves, official statements of enduring for the sake of the homeland permeate. Often, the socio-economic situation of Egyptians becomes blamed on the revolutionary upheaval accompanied by pleas to stand by the country that is being
conspired against. This is in line with both nationalist and securitization discourses. In his speech, the president asserted that the country is experiencing a moment where there is skepticism to any “government achievements” on the ground by conspirators that work to disseminate rumors discrediting the successes and abilities of the military and the state. The leader has chastised the media for failing to highlight the country’s achievements warning against listening to those spreading “fake news” that doubts the accomplishments of the state in attempts to “destabilize Egypt and discredit its authorities,” declaring that “there [is] a fierce attack on the army, in addition to campaigns attempting to discredit the forces and personnel, aiming to make citizens lose confidence in their army—so you should be on the alert” (Sakr, 2016). In this sense, the invoking of unpatriotic forces and the byproducts of the revolution that are conspiring to hinder the nation work to exonerate the state from any failings.

The “nation under attack” argument invoked en masse by political officials and across media platforms is not just described when talking about migration-development issues, it is part of a larger discourse of crisis and conspiracy in Egypt that has constructed a particular reality of national interests being undermined and threatened. An example of this is the common comparison of Egypt to Syria, Libya, and Iraq. The Egyptian state has not descended into a warzone like that of some of its neighbors and for that, the public must be grateful, or so the political discourse goes. Speech-act by state actors and state-friendly media argue that the only reason this is the case is because of the country’s powerful army, but create crisis through speech by constructing an understanding that foreign elements are actively working to de-secure Egypt’s stability every step of the way. The constant invocation that Egypt is indeed at war with supposed conspiratorial powers and also with a militant insurgency in Sinai is called upon when convenient to suppress and reorient public grievances against economic suffering and systemic abuses of political, social, and human rights. In this way, real concerns of the citizen of systemic inequality, unemployment and the massive increase in the prices of goods and services are demoted in importance in this framework. “Egypt refuses to be a country of refugees. You must know, there is pressure to make Egyptians become refugees,” El-Sisi states, a nod at the discourse of the commonly invoked conspiracy of a global plan that seeks the downfall of Egypt (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).
Regionally, crisis is characterized by war and turmoil in the surrounding states such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. Crisis discourse, in addition to lending itself to wide-spread conspiracy knowledge production, “provides the government with a good justification to lower expectations in general and to project an image of stability against the backdrop of regional tumult” (Adly, 2014). Adly calls this type of discourse “conservative nationalism,” a different interpretation to a long tradition of Egyptian nationalism stretching back to the early twentieth century. The author characterizes post-2013 discourse as the following: “This discourse is nationalist in being centered on saving and restoring the Egyptian state authority and sovereignty from chaos and external conspiracies. Meanwhile, it is conservative in being supportive of the reestablishment of the old paternalistic authoritarian state, the adoption of conservative fiscal and economic policies, and the absence of any substantial anti-colonial or anti-imperialist elements often associated with more traditional iterations of Egyptian nationalism” (2014).

We can understand nationalist discourse as a socially constitutive mechanism of legitimization using discourse analysis theories of Fairclough (2003) and Van Djik (2001). Discursive strategies by prominent actors that emphasize the national imaginary in warning against irregular migration serve as important tool of reproductively legitimizing and justifying the state in the face of increasingly hostile societal conditions effectively asserting, maintaining, regulating, and normalizing this particular knowledge.

Nationalism and Migration: The Migrant as a Traitor

Nationalist notions that permeate the migrant discourse are useful for the ruling class and political elite for several reasons. I will focus on what purposes nationalist thought serves with respect to irregular migration narratives discussed in this thesis. First, it supports individual-blaming narratives outlined in the previous chapter. When a tragedy like the Rasheed sinking occurs, instead of attributing the desire to migrate partly due the retreating role of the state in communities that lack services and fail to absorb its residents into the labor market for gainful employment, a nationalist rhetoric becomes an important device in constructing the migrant subject as one who is disloyal to his homeland and thus deserves to face his fatal consequences. According to Ernest Gellner’s theory, a kind of political legitimacy is maintained when leaders and political elites garner public support through the use of a unifying discourse of nationalism.
(Gellner, 1965). When the President pleads to his audience, “Don’t leave your daughters and migrate, you can do it, you can stay and help build Egypt” there is an implicit assumption that the migrant has betrayed not only his family but his country in his refusal to “stay and build.” In this sense, the irregular migrant challenges the nationalist imaginary by actively deciding to risk his life than to continue to be a part of the nation. The state reproaches those who have the desire to journey across the sea using a nationalist framing. An example of this is when the president declared that Egypt will provide full care of these migrants saying that “Egypt desperately needs you” and that “Egypt will not neglect you” (Sakr, 2016).

This kind of discursive construction of the one who leaves as a traitor is not a new concept. Indeed, as the autonomy of migration scholar Mezzanda explains, notions of “escape” have “always been suspicious… it seems to have close connection with betrayal, opportunism and cowardice, all categories that are both antipatriotic and foreign traditional virtues of political action” (2004, p.267). In arguing for the individual’s “right to escape,” Mezzanda goes on to describe escape and movement as “one of the basic tools to refuse banality and repetitiveness of everyday life and its suffocating restrictions… in that way escape has been almost a privileged way to subjectivity, a road to freedom and independence” (2004, p. 267).

The fact that thousands of Egyptians prefer risking their lives at sea than stay in Egypt coupled with its visible spectacle challenges the fragile image of the strength and success of the nation. This was described clearly in the words of Ambassador Nabila Makram, Minister of State for Migration and Egyptians Affairs Abroad, when she stressed at a conference on irregular migration in the Beheira governorate that “illegal immigration reduces the image of the country abroad” (Hefny, 2017). Makram’s appeal for young men to not tarnish the image of the homeland constructs the idea that there exists a particular way that the country is signified and holds the irregular migrant accountable in ruining it. Makram in her position as a public official acts from a position power, making her rhetorical contributions significant in upholding certain values in public discourse.

Ideas of honor and patriotism in relation to the migrant have been reproduced by prominent social actors such as one of the most famous Egyptian actors, Mohamed Ramadan who presented
at the same conference as Makram. Ramadan channeled the state’s narrative describing cross-
Mediterranean migration as a “destructive phenomenon” calling on Egyptian society to “unite in
fighting” it (El Watan, 2017). Ramadan went on to incorporate elements of nationalist honor in
passing judgement on those who migrate saying, “Work is *rizk* (blessing or sustenance given by
God), and it is *ashraf* (more honorable) for the young man to wash dishes in Egypt than to travel
and escape abroad where he can die and drown and return to his family in a body bag” (El Watan,
2017). In saying this, Ramadan appeals to the morality of people, referring to a system of
values that prioritizes one’s perceived “honor”. This moral evaluation could be understood as a
discursive legitimization strategy as theorized by van Dijk.

The Nation and the Egyptian Sea in Cultural Production

Visual imagery and popular storytelling provide another lens in understanding migrant
representations. There is limited scholarship researching the concept of emigration in Egyptian
cinematic production, although it is a theme that featured often in films. In a study on seven
Egyptian emigration films, Pages-El Karoui discusses the identity of the Egyptian living abroad
and finds that the discourse on the theme of “the migrant’s identity, on the personal, familial and
national levels, resonates with the social imaginary concerning migration” and is “dominated by
a nationalist paradigm” (2016, p. 369). Her research demonstrates how “movie directors have
produced a very pessimistic vision of emigration, in a manner that is equally critical of the
countries of arrival as of Egyptian society” (2016, p. 368).

Pages-El Karoui’s conclusions were in line with my analysis of the film *Al Barr Al Tani or The
Other Land*, released in 2016 shortly after the Rasheed incident. The film directed by Ali Idriss
tells the story of three Egyptian men from rural villages who decide to pay a broker and attempt
to embark on an irregular migration journey across the Mediterranean to reach Italy, in search of
a better future for themselves and families (Idriss, 2016). These three men, along with every
other passenger on this ship, drowns and dies in some form after the smuggling ship capsizes. In
many ways this film reinforces state narratives of migrant-blaming and champions concepts of
nationhood. This is no coincidence as it was partly supported by the Ministry of Migration and
Egyptian Expatriate affairs. A note thanking Amb. Nabila Makram, who helped the crew get
permits to shoot in Spain, is featured in the first frame of the film. In the premier for the film, Makram said that she hoped the movie would raise awareness of the risks of unauthorized sea migration (Shimi, 2016).

The film deals with several themes, but the overarching message is clear—stay home in your country, to leave is to die. Leaving the viewer with the notion that to migrate is to submit to a humiliating certain death, that dishonors the migrant, his family, and the nation, *Al Barr Al Tani* is a cautionary tale that echoes official discourse rather than exploring the complex dimensions of this type of migration through art. The film enforces state narratives in warning against undocumented mobility, focusing on the heart-aching melodrama of dying at sea, rather than making sincere attempts to understand the choice in taking to sea from the migrant’s perspective. By channeling wider public discourse, the film neglects the role of the agency of the migrant. The overall take-away message of the film is one that chides young people for gambling away their savings and breaking their families’ hearts instead of enduring and working hard in one’s homeland. Indeed, this sentiment was clearly expressed by those involved with the film such as actress Afaf Shoeib who said, “I sympathize with them [the irregular Egyptian migrants], but I’m also upset with them…Egypt is full of opportunity. They just don’t like their salaries and don’t want to work. You find young people sitting in cafes smoking shisha all day. How can they afford that?” (Shimi, 2016). Shoeib went on to say on Lamees al-Hadidi’s show “Hona al-Asema”, “I hope this film will be a lesson for all Egyptian youth,” echoing the words of Amb. Makram that support the suggestion that this film served in part as a project of awareness in warning against this kind of mobility (2016). Concepts of nationhood are reiterated in this message advocating for remaining a loyal resident of the nation, despite the hardship this life presents, rather than gambling on a life abroad.

Two main figures are depicted negatively that of the brokers and that of the Italian coast guard, who rob each of the passengers in order to let them pass. In this scene, the Italian villains offer a look into what kinds evil awaits them in the Italian mainland, which none of the characters reach. This representation as the foreign as evil supports the general nationalist themes of the film. Portrayals of villains are in line with the discourse of criminalization of smugglers and brokers. The brokers and the captain of the ship are portrayed as vulgar, exploitative characters with a
complete disregard for the lives of the migrants. The very reason for the ship’s capsizing is due to the captain’s decision to buy a cheaper boat with holes to save money. This construction of the crew and brokers is a manifestation of broader discourse of criminalization of the smuggler that will be discussed more in-depth when analyzing securitization discourses in the next chapter.

Much like the film, several songs have been released following the Rasheed incident that also serve mainly as warning. “The Tale of the Last Day” by Hisham Gamal, representing the tragedy of the Rasheed event, and “Fares” by popular artists Zap Tharwat and Ahmed Shiba are two songs that represent the Egyptian irregular migrant. The songs do not differ much from the analysis of the film in that the same message of warning against participating in this mobility is cultivated and expressed. The songs and their music video clips rely heavily on saccharine heart-aching stories of friends and families mourning the loss of their loved ones who gambled away their life for a chance to live in Europe. “Fares,” in particular, proved to be extremely popular, garnering over 3.3 million views when released on the IOM’s Facebook page (IOM, 2018). The song features the tale of a friend coping with the loss of his childhood friend, Fares, who drowned at sea in a migration attempt. Fares is presented as a rash young man who refuses to “estahmel,” to endure his fate in his poor village. While the struggles that Fares faces of not being able to live a decent life and follow his dreams in Egypt are briefly represented, the music video focuses on the friend who must deal with this loss. In this way the audience is urged to empathize with the character that stayed put, ultimately downplaying the reasons that led Fares to take such a risk and to condemn the choice itself as “intihar” or suicide.

The representation of Egyptians crossing the sea in “Fares” is in line with wider awareness discourse that presents exclusively the dangers of such escape and discourages young people against leaving their homeland this way. This is no coincidence as the widely-shared song was produced by the IOM, the UN Migration Agency, USAID in Egypt, US Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, and the NCCPIM as part of a national awareness campaign to support the Egyptian government’s public advocacy efforts to prevent irregular migration. Upon release of the song, IOM Egypt Chief of Mission Laurent De Boeck declared its intentions clearly stating, “This is an important song aimed at raising awareness among the young population of Egypt of the dangers of irregular migration and human trafficking. It is
important to try to make Egyptians see Egypt as a solution instead of contemplating migration as the only opportunity to resolve challenges” (IOM, 2018). By tracing the material production of this song, we can identify how these national and international institutions actively work to create the ways in which we come to understand the migrant and the phenomenon of cross-Mediterranean migration through such cultural production.

To conclude, this section demonstrates how nationalism is a political tool used by the ruling powers to distort or conceal or absorb class differences and inequality. When prominent political and social actors utilize nationalist discourse regarding migrants, they appeal to an imaginary of common identity and positionalities. While emphasizing nationalism is a rhetorical device used in immigration debates among far-right populist political groups to stir fear and serve as impetus for heightened securitization among receiving countries, it is also used in countries of origin for different means. In the wake of tragedy like Rasheed in which Egyptians risked their lives to leave the country, this discourse is used to appeal to marginalized populations. Nationalist discourse serves as a way of discursively absorbing class differences and massive inequality in a society as a unifying mechanism. This connection is supported by literature that has found a significant relationship between nationalism and inequality. Frederick Solt argued that in unequal societies, major political actors “rely more heavily on nationalism to generate solidarity among a materially-disparate population” (Solt, 2011). Relying on nationalist tropes is a response to rising inequality to placate government action or inaction that sustains and extends poverty and marginalization.

Discursively in various representations of the migrant, we can detect that the national imaginary is threatened by emigration. Unregulated mobility here becomes threatening to the legitimacy of the nation-state as it unveils its shortcomings, a notion that will be explained further when assessing wider securitization discourse. This is coupled with the fact that loyalty and sacrifice to the nation is a notion that frames public discourse in a period marked by increased paranoia of conspiracy in the current moment in Egyptian politics.

State Development Discourses: Mega-Projects and Promises
One of the discursive patterns observed throughout official discourse on Rasheed is the emphasis on mega-development projects as a promised solution to issue of the irregular migration of Egyptian youth. “Is there hope? There is hope,” with this phrase that remains a theme throughout the address, the Egyptian head of state launches into a highlight of the state’s role in providing disenfranchised communities with new job-producing factories. El-Sisi describes that this part of the monologue is “directed to places like Kafr el-Sheikh, Birollos, and places that unfortunately send Egyptian migrants to the sea” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016). Work on mega-projects in the form of low-income residential complexes and manufacturing and fishery plants were emphasized throughout the speech and hailed as a natural “solution” to the “problem” of Egyptians fleeing to work in Europe. Mega-project developments are touted as accomplishments and an oft-used discursive tool to argue that irregular migration to Europe is unnecessary since the government will never abandon its citizens in need.

Throughout his speech on Rasheed, the president emphatically counters the narrative of migration due to unemployment, highlighting various industrial projects. “Egypt will not neglect you, and there are many jobs here. I will be held accountable for the death of each person who dies due to illegal migration” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016). The role of the state in accountability of the Rasheed tragedy is features prominently in this discourse. That is to say, the speaker repeatedly highlights the plans for or the establishment of several job-producing opportunities for the youth saying, “I want to say that there is still hope, especially in the area from where the boat departed. A huge ‘fish cultivation’ project will be executed there. This project will be the largest one in Egypt, but its establishment will take time” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

Job opportunities from aquaculture farms in Port Said, Borollos and Kafr el-Sheikh were part of a February 2016 agreement between Egypt and Switzerland called the Sustainable Transformation of Egypt’s Aquaculture Market System (STREAMS) project, which included an investment of 2 million Swiss francs (Mada Masr, 2016). The president called on residents of the Kafir El-Sheikh governorate to actively take part in national construction projects instead of migrating. These projects include Bashayer al-Kheir (“Good Omens”) housing development project, a complex designed to house 1,600 families from Alexandria’s Geit al-Enab informal housing neighborhoods. In Dabaa, another housing project was said to be nearing completion. It
should be noted that this is the same place where state has plans to construct a nuclear power plant with Russian support of $25 billion in loans (Mada Masr, 2016).

To support the government’s efforts in national development, the responsibility is placed on the average Egyptian, to donate for the sake of the homeland. Despite the flows of money from international financiers, the president placed the onus on the population to help fund these projects. National development funds such as the Tahya Masr (Long Live Egypt) fund call upon members of society, most already suffering under the burden of austerity measures, to donate small amounts of cash for development. The president described, “I don’t know how you do this. But the spare change — that is the fifty piasters and the one pounds from your transactions — can be placed in such funds…We are talking about the transactions of 20 or 30 million people. If everybody donates, we will collect LE10 or 12 million.” Invoking religious themes of zakat (almsgiving) and citing a passage from the Quran, El-Sisi stated, “Please, please. I want this money. I don’t know how to take it, but we want to put it away” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

Throughout the address, the president pleads for patience from rural youth for these manufacturing jobs. He theatrically berates some of the sitting audience members, officials who oversee some projects, for their tardiness in finishing low-income housing establishments and calls for patience among members in society to see these projects through. “There is hope, a lot of hope, but we cannot finish all of these projects in a year. We need some time,” El-Sisi declares. In a dramatic gesture, the speaker forcefully declares that “we must break with tradition, bureaucratic obstacles, and rules in order to progress and finish our mission… we must work hard until the projects are done… these are not simple initiatives, [housing unit complexes] are great successes” (Al Nahar Al Youm, 2016).

For years, grand promises of economic development and infrastructure have been routinely invoked by various Egyptian administrations to address poverty. President El-Sisi’s speech fits into this long-standing narrative, adapted to fit the post-2013 political and social framework.

Meanwhile, rural communities in the Nile Delta and Upper Egypt have suffered from endemic underdevelopment and neglect. Mega-projects have long been touted as successful developments
throughout Egyptian history. In *Egypt’s Desert Dreams: Development or Disaster?*, David Sims thoroughly documents the long line of state development failures in desert reclamation projects that have been employed as an easy solution to Egypt’s profound social, economic, ecological, and infrastructure woes. Sims succinctly writes demonstrates,

“For over five decades, desert schemes have consumed massive public funds and private investments and continue to do so. Yet the Egyptian desert is virtually littered with still-born, anemic, and failed projects. In spite of a few successes, the amount of land reclaimed for agriculture remains tiny and its production feeble, most cities and settlements remain ghost towns or playgrounds for the rich, and most industrial areas remain sand-blown empty lots. Not a single proclaimed desert development target has been met, and most are several orders of magnitude out of sync. Moreover, these many efforts have hardly attracted anyone to live in the desert, and thus the national project of populating the desert and relieving the crowded [Nile] Valley remains a chimera.” (Sims, 2016)

More recently, projects such as the “new” Suez Canal, an expansion of the key waterway, along with the $45-billion-dollar New Administrative Capital serve as the latest in mega-development fantasies that enrich private investors while neglecting existing urban and rural areas and the needs of their populations. As Egyptians continue to face a housing crisis, none of the new satellite cities have fulfilled their population targets. State sponsored low-income housing projects, like the Geit el Eneb residential housing unit- the unveiling of which provided the setting of Sisi’s speech on Rasheed, have seldom succeeded. As Sims notes, the idea of leaving home neighborhoods is unappealing to most Egyptians due to the heavy reliance on social networks in densely populated, well-connected areas which constitute various forms of support from families, employment, and informal supplementary income opportunities. Often these housing developments are far from city centers and therefore expensive to live in and reach. Planning for such development suffers from a consistent lack of efforts that take into consideration the lifeworlds of the rural individual and his community. When the state professes new housing developments as progress to alleviating poverty and access to basic needs, as it often does, it neglects the core social assembly of communities that they are targeting. Many of these developments fail to empower these rural individuals due to a state’s neglect of the rural lifeworlds and their spatial-cultural place of being.
Irrespective of the reality on the ground of how these development projects mostly fail to achieve their stated goals, if the project ever materializes at all, the mega-projects discourse continues to serve as powerful tool in political discourse to demonstrate progress in the social imaginary. This is encouraged by a complete void on follow-up reporting on these projects.

As the state continues to spend on high-profile development projects offering little more than symbolic emotive rhetoric as support to the Egyptian periphery, residents of rural areas that many migrants travel from suffer from a systemic lack of educational, health, and other basic needs services. Government neglect and policies of aggressive privatization in service sectors since the 1970s have resulted in dire conditions for the country’s most vulnerable. For example, if we look at healthcare as one quality of life indicator, it can help to further contextualize the phenomenon of unauthorized migration in an effort to refute nationalist discourse of progressive development.

According to figures by the World Health Organization, Egypt allocated just 1.7 percent of GDP to the healthcare sector in the 2014-2015 budget, which is below the three percent minimum stipulated in the 2014 constitution (Bajec, 2016). This figure is extremely low especially compared to many other countries that spend an average of 15 percent of their national budget on healthcare. Patient overload is a nation-wide condition as only 643 public hospitals were serving a total population of around 80 million people in 2011 (Bajec, 2016). According to the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights, Egypt had an average of 14.88 beds in hospitals for every 10,000 people, and Cairo, which has the highest number, had 34 hospital beds for every 10,000 people in 2013. Surveys from the Health Ministry in 2014 found that around 40 per cent of state-run hospitals were unable to provide decent medical services due to poorly maintained equipment and facilities. Public health facilities severely lack well-trained nursing staff and doctors, and medications are not always available. Despite decades of health-care subsidies, inequality in access to quality healthcare abounds as state funds have often been allocated to upper-class university hospitals. Egypt’s health care failures disproportionately affect the rural poor. Low wages in the public health care sector creates low incentive for doctors to work in subsidized hospitals, and hospitals in rural areas are worst off because medical professionals prefer to work in urban areas. Despite the ambitious promise by the president in his post-Rasheed
speech that “by June 2018, 80% of all these rural villages will have public health services,” places like Beheira have yet to see major improvements in healthcare.

Contrasting Official Discourses: The Economic and Labor Market Origins of Irregular Migration

Highlighting the socio-economic dynamics that have marked this period of increased irregular migration by Egyptians allows us to appropriately contextualize this moment. Identifying the economic origins shed a different light on irregular migration through the Mediterranean than that of official discourse. To critically refute the prevailing discourses, it is necessary to unpack the conditions it is operating within to understand the connection between the need for elites to draw upon various blame and nationalist rhetoric. As Fairclough and van Djik posit, discourse is socially constitutive in several ways.

As social stratification between classes and the gap between the wealthy and the poor increases, a unifying nationalist discourse becomes more important than ever for state institutions and actors to mask such differences in the name of the nation in a time of emergency. Now that I have discussed nationalist discourses and how it relates to migration, it is important to refute it by demonstrating the socio-economic and political situations faced by Egyptians, particularly in areas that send a high volume of migrants to Italy and Europe.

Poverty and Inequality

According to Egypt’s official statistical agency that conducts the census, CAPMAS, in 2015, around 27.8 percent of the Egyptian population were living below the poverty line, which is defined as the minimum income deemed adequate for an individual to meet his basic needs (Ahram Online, 2016). The Egyptian poverty line stands at an income of LE 5,787.9 annually and LE 482 monthly, which is actually 48 percent higher than in 2012/2013 (Egypt Independent, 2016). Data from the latest CAPMAS survey indicates that 2015 witnessed the highest poverty levels since 2000, hiking from 26.3 percent in 2012/2013 and 25.2 percent in 2010/2011. The heightened poverty levels of 2016 coincided with the sharp increase of Egyptians attempting to
cross the sea. Rural areas of the country in particular, such as those areas that are considered popular for sending irregular migrants, have the highest rate of poverty. Rural areas also witnessed increased levels of inequality and poverty during the past two years compared to the urban areas where inequality levels decreased and poverty levels stabilized.

Extreme disparity among regions and governorates is noted in Egypt, in terms of extreme poverty rates. Economic inequality based on the rural/urban divide is major feature across the Egyptian economy. In rural areas, often the regions where migrants most frequently come from, the probability of being extremely poor in Egypt is almost 4 times higher than for those in urban areas (Ghanem, 2014). While poverty in Egypt is wide-spread throughout the country, it is more concentrate in Upper Egypt than Lower Egypt. Upper Egypt represents a particularly extensive poverty problem. According to a report by the Economic Research Forum, this region has about 50 percent of the country’s population, but 83 percent of the extremely poor and 67 percent of the poor (2014). Hafez Ghannem writes that “the problem in Upper Egypt is especially serious in the rural areas. Urban Upper Egypt has 11.6 percent of the extremely poor and 11.3 percent of the poor. On the other hand, rural Upper Egypt has 71.5 percent of the extremely poor and 55.8 percent of the poor. Lower Egypt has less poverty. About 30 percent of Egypt’s population lives in Lower Egypt and the region is home to 13.7 percent of the country’s extreme poor and 27.6 percent of the poor. However, it is important to note that the vast majority of the poor and extremely poor in Lower Egypt also live in rural areas” (2014). Rates of extreme poverty according to the 2016 CAPMAS survey indicate that it they are up to their highest levels in the governorates of Assiut (24.8%), Qena (19.5%) and Sohag (12%).

Small farmer households in rural areas in Upper Egypt, particularly the female members, experience the greatest levels of deprivation. Unequal access to wealth and the prevalence of poverty in Egypt are a result of development failures in the past 50 years within the context of state control and then the restructuring of uncontrolled capitalism. These policies have created “a bad mixture” which “has ended up with less accumulation of all forms of capital assets and an uneven access to those assets, which resulted in deprivation of the absolute majority and hence less opportunities, less freedom and low level of well-being. The market-led strategies and policies, adopted gradually since 1974, and reached a peak in the early 1990s, have drastically
affected both urban and rural poor” (Kishk). Redistribution of land and water in favor of big landlords have had serious implications for sustainable livelihoods in rural communities and is considered one of the mechanisms of impoverishment.

Overall, the economic situation in Egypt continues to strain the population financially, with the poorest bearing the brunt of suffering, since a higher percentage of their income goes toward meeting basic needs. Austerity measures, such as the application of the value-added tax, related to Egypt’s latest IMF loan have directly contributed to an extremely high annual inflation rate in consumer prices across Egypt's cities, rising to 19.4 percent in November of 2016, compared to 13.6 percent in October. Meanwhile, the reduction of government subsidies of fuel which affect the prices of gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene, and gas cylinders used in many homes, further worsens the economic situation of many Egyptians. More recently, the flotation of the pound also has led to a dramatic hike in the price of goods and services in almost all sectors and industries. Devaluation and subsidy cuts hit the poor the hardest, 82 percent of whom are not included in the government's social protection system, according to CAPMAS (2016).

**Unemployment**

Persistent high percentage of unemployment and a declining percentage of labor force participation especially among youth is a serious condition of the Egyptian economy. The Egyptian labor market suffers from an insertion problem in that it fails to absorb new entrants into the labor market (Assaad & Krafft, 2015). Youth unemployment must be considered in light of the country’s demographics which brings to attention its large youth bulge. Studies by the Population Council attribute around 61% of the Egyptian population to be under the age of 30 and 40% to be between the ages of 10 and 29 (Awad & Abdel Aziz, 2017). After the 2011 revolutionary upheaval, the country faced continued increase of unemployment and underemployment for young people (Assaad & Krafft, 2015). The labor market can be further contextualized by looking at the relationship between workers and the state in the immediate post-revolutionary period. By April 2013, approximately 4,500 factories had shut down thus leaving thousands of workers unemployed, further compounding the labor crisis (Galal, 2013). According to data from CAPMAS, the Egyptian population overall faces an unemployment rate
of around 12.8 percent. Meanwhile, in 2016, youth (aged 15-29) face an unemployment rate of around 27.3 percent where the male youth demographic made up 21 percent and the females in the same age range made up 46.8 percent of those unemployed (Mounir, 2016). This data also indicates that the youth unemployment rate had increased from a figure of 26.3 percent recorded in 2014. Despite the fact that Egypt is witnessing a decreasing demographic pressures on the labor market due to the aging of the youth bulge population, studies maintain that this has not corresponded to positive developments in the labor market (Assaad & Krafft, 2015). While demographic and education trends should contribute positively to employment rates, economic trends in the wake of the revolution have demonstrated that employment rates have decreased, labor force participation among women has decreased, unemployment has slightly increased, and under-employment has increased substantially (Assaad & Krafft, 2015).

Underemployment has remained a critical condition of laborers which suggests that while the workforce may have retained workers, hours have decreased in the weakened economic environment post-revolution. Wages are an important indicator of the quality of employment offered and understanding the wage differentials between Egypt and the potentials that can be made in Europe is obviously a key link in understanding an impetus for cross-Mediterranean migration flows, especially in light of migration to the Gulf being restricted due to policies that now make it difficult to attain visas and employment there. According to Awad and Abdel Aziz, around one quarter of young wage and salaried employees make a below-average monthly wage and about half of youth who are employed report making within EGP500-999 per month pay range (Awad & Abdel Aziz, 2017). Only about 2.6% of those working are in the highest wage bracket of EGP3,000 and above. Clerks, agricultural workers, and those in elementary occupations were likely to be in the lowest wage range making less than EGP300 or around USD18 per month. Keeping in mind that most migrants come from rural areas where wages are so low, the link between labor, wages and irregular migration becomes clearer.

The relationship between the state and society after the military regime gained power in 2013 has been extremely contentious. An IOM survey in 2013 showed that employment, corruption, security, wages and constitutional reforms were the most important issues for young Egyptians after the revolution (IOM, 2013). However, around 70 percent of those surveyed had difficulty
with work after the uprisings with 30 percent claiming to have lost their jobs and around a quarter were sent on forced and unpaid leave. Hanan Sabea concisely describes this period and its consequences by saying, “rising costs of raw materials, the increased cost of living, curfews, deteriorating environmental conditions, alarming food insecurity patterns, increased precarity in the provision of services—most apparent in road blocks, traffic jams, garbage collection, power cuts, and fuel shortages—and a continually widening gap between elites and the laboring poor, have all culminated not only in the growth of both protests and violent repression, but also in the rising tide of irregular (or illegal) migration and in the loss of life at sea, cycles of attacks on Egyptian workers in both North Africa and Europe, the closing of borders, and crackdown on mobility” (Sabea, 2014, p. 180).

As far as Rasheed and the Beheira governorate specifically, secondary interviews help to elaborate on the labor situation. One Borg Rasheed community leader told IRIN News that economic opportunities do not allow for a livable life, thus making irregular migration inevitable. He stated, “Wages are very low; a young man here can work for 2,000 [Egyptian] pounds ($110-115) a month doing two jobs, but that’s not enough to feed a family. If you have sisters you need to marry off, what are you going to do?” (Haddon, 2016). Addressing the new low-income housing projects, factories and fishery industry projects touted by the president, the community leader argued that “the wages from these projects are not enough to support a family.” Another community member, who once a fisherman who sometimes helps brokers in the process of transporting people to Italy by helping out with safe houses to house prospective migrants told the reporter, “The prices of everything are increasing – water, electricity, cigarettes. There are some jobs in the date palm industry, but they can barely get you 1,000 pounds ($56) a month,” adding that “nothing will stop people going. It’s not just about the money, it’s about a dignified life. Even if you threaten them with death, people will keep going” (Haddon, 2016).

Despite government promises to raise the national minimum wage, the cabinet had reneged on its commitment several times and by January 2014, this had resulted in “a new and massive wave of labor protests between January and March 2014” (Sabea, 2014, p. 180). These street mobilizations were met with “a particularly aggressive deployment of violence and repression,
culminating in the criminalization of protests and strikes in workplaces, the detention (and disappearance) of key labor organizers, and the social demonization of protesting workers as traitors to the nation at a time of national emergency” (Sabea, 2014, p. 180). Severe crackdowns on any forms of dissent culminated in over 40,000 individuals have been arrested in Egypt since July 2013, according to various reports (WikiThawra). While a national minimum wage appeared to be more and more impossible due to the regime’s fiscal challenges, legal obstacles to private investment-related rulings were cut. According to Sabea, a new investment law was passed which had a number of legal loopholes sanctioning corrupt practices.

The importance of highlighting the Egyptian labor market and the challenges of the socio-economic situation facing Egyptian society is to understand the connection between poverty and migration. The purpose of including this survey of unemployment and underemployment rates, high costs of living, and poverty is to provide evidence of the contradictions in discourse of migration that often denies this and instead attributes migration to greed. The nationalist discourse is also used as a way of disguising these serious concerns and state failures. There has been a significant amount of scholarship in migration studies that link economic factors and migration. In Egypt in particular, studies by Awad (2017), Zohry (2006) and Roman (2008) draw links between these issues as causes, combined with the role of Egyptian migrant social networks and the difficulty of finding work in the Gulf, for the rates of Egyptians attempting to migrate to Europe via smuggling boats.

Conclusion

The intent of this chapter was to describe and analyze the theme of nationalism permeating throughout the discourse on the Rasheed shipwreck and ways of narrating the construction of the Egyptian clandestine in relation to the nation-state. Through the use of nationalist language, the state produces itself in a specific way in the cultural imaginary. Official discourse connects the state to ideas of the homeland, one that is committed to the protection of its citizens. Nationalist sentiments serve as a tool to unite society, disguising deep inequalities with patriotic rhetoric and imagery that denies social stratification, poverty, and unmet labor demands. I have traced how in
the wake of national tragedies like Rasheed nationalist discourse and the particular reasons for it, highlighting the ways in which the state discursively positions itself in relation to its society through this kind of language. I have compared this discourse with socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country in order to contextualize the moment this language is operating within, to further elaborate and compare the rhetoric of the pronounced relations of the state to its society with the actual conditions the population faces. In any case, it is crucial to demonstrate the reality of these economic and development failures as a means of analysis of irregular migration of Egyptians, and I have chosen to do so in this chapter in light of the theme of nationalist discourse.
CHAPTER 4: SECURITIZATION DISCOURSE: THE THREAT OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION

Introduction

Any discussion of irregular migration discourse is incomplete without a serious consideration of the concept of securitization and border regimes which constitute a migration-security nexus. Contemporary globalization allows for the ease and speed for flows of money, information, and goods, however at the same time it is also marked by the proliferation of walls, barriers, and surveillance designed to challenge or filter out particular bodies deemed “undesirable”. Without securitized border policing and rituals of immigration regulation, there would be no “illegal” migration. Precisely the reason why people have to go through illegalized and dangerous means of migration to Europe is due to immigration regulation policies that make legal entry extremely inaccessible. Western states have become increasingly fixated on irregular migration by sea which have come to be viewed as an especially dangerous threat. The regulation of migration within securitization logic requires heavy investment in the discursive and representational spheres, which is something that the offshore boat spectacle provides by fueling the construction of crisis (Smith, 2015).

To respond to this manufactured sense of crisis in the post-2011 era and flooding of migrants, Europe has deployed even harsher and more complex measures in migration policies. These policies are shaped and supported by securitization discourse. Therefore, it becomes important to trace and analyze wider external securitization concepts when analyzing the discursive construction of Egyptian irregular migration within Egypt as these discourses do not occur in a vacuum. This chapter engages securitization of migration discourse on two levels. First, it traces endogenous securitization within Egypt, especially in the post-revolutionary context, and how such strategies relate to discourse on the Egyptian clandestine and the increased criminalization of “smugglers”.

Second, EU securitization of migration discourse, and the role that is played by the spectacle of overloaded ships at sea in providing the necessary “crisis” for securitization measures, particularly post-2011 period will be analyzed in connection to expanded border control policies.
This chapter also seeks to highlight the ways in which these two discourses connect and assess the ways in which EU securitization discourse has been adopted in Egypt. To critically analyze the power dynamics of this link, I will discuss the political economy of Egypt’s relationship with the EU that have a role in shaping internal policy and discourse on migration.

Securitization Theory

In order to understand securitization discourse and how it can be identified through the media corpus collected and the ways in which it operates, we must turn to its major theoretical foundations. According to Copenhagen School theorists, securitization is “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the treat” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491). Issues that are securitized go through politicization phase where they are presented as existential threats that require emergency measures, justifying actions that would not be normally acceptable. The Copenhagen School outlines three elements on which securitization is constructed: “the speech act,” “the securitizing actor,” and “the audience.” The key concept of securitization is the construction of the notion of a threat, that need not be necessarily objective or real. This construction is created through “speech act,” which refers to the actual utterance that renders an issue into one of security (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 71). This transformation is often done by referring to the urgency of action posed by an existential threat. According to Wæver, “the word ‘security’ is the act…the utterance is the primary reality” – in other words, there can be no security without the act of saying security (2007, p. 73). This speech of threat is claimed by the securitizing actor who must be in a position of authority and political legitimacy in order to influence the audience, whose acceptance of the posed security threat is important in order to produce actual political effects.

Securitization discourse in Egypt

Endogenous securitization discourse has a long history in Egypt and in the Arab world. Historically, security strategies often rest on a top-down security approach focusing on alleged
external military threats to the state (Korany, Noble, & Brynen, 1993). Also characteristic of these regimes is the use of security reasoning against their own populations (Ayoob, 1995). Securitization rhetoric took on a distinctive quality in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution. Wæver and Greenwood conducted a study to examine the applicability of the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak (2013). Under various periods in the transition phase of the revolution, different leadership all utilized securitization rhetoric for all sorts of political posturing. In a study on the applicability of securitization theory in Egypt during and after 2011, Wæver and Greenwood trace a few of the various existential threats offered by governing bodies in the aftermath of the uprising:

“First, ‘chaos’ was the new threat – lawlessness and economic losses stemming from political instability – and accordingly there followed demands for law and order. In the next round, the remnants of the regime, through the press, increasingly attempted to suggest quite diffuse threats from ‘foreign powers’, by which people were expected to hear the West, Israel and Iran. Finally, in a rather complex constellation, as it sensed that it was quickly losing grip of a position from which to securitize any issue, the regime employed Salafi sheikhs in its war against the revolution to question the patriotism of those who instigated the revolution, arguing that it was an American–Zionist or Iranian conspiracy (Hashim, 2011: 122). The threats drew on untraditional elements, but they are of course hypertraditional: security equals a strong state, law and order, and unified (military) defence against foreign enemies. Internationally, the regime used the narrative of the Islamist threat to securitize the idea that free elections would bring Islamists into power, leading to instability and chaos both for Egypt and for the wider region, jeopardizing peace with Israel. Sacrificing democracy, it was hinted, was therefore a necessary evil to protect stability and peace, which was more important to the world than democracy (Yassin, 2012: 150).”

After President Mohammed Morsi was removed from power by a coalition led by army chief General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi and the constitution suspended, a type of securitization discourse was espoused that deemed political Islamists a threat and justified violent measures to counter them and their supporters. In his first inaugural address as president, after El-Sisi provides a clear example of nationalist-security paradigm in the following quote that has set the tone of policing, conspiracy, and threat used to justify any extraordinary measures, a rhetorical pattern that has taken hold in society and continues to be reproduced:

“This nation has come under a real threat that would have harmed the unity of its people and its territorial integrity but our popular revolution on June 30 has restored January 25 revolution and rectified its course in a bid to protect the homeland and maintain its unity with Allah's grace” (Kerrigan, 2015).
Securitization measures in the name of combatting terrorism and those who are against national interest have intensified. As the Copenhagen School theorists argue, “security is a quality actors inject into issues, which means to stage them on the political arena… and then have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defense moves” (Buzan and Waever, 1998; p. 204).

Using this logic, broad support from the Egyptian public was required for the government to take a number of “counterterrorism” measures in the wake of the July transition of power. In fact, the regime often explicitly expressed desire of authorization from the Egyptian people to engage in its extreme actions against its targets. This wave of securitization discourse was accompanied by policies that severely repress dissent, such as the anti-protest law and its ban of the Muslim Brotherhood. The state has arrested over 41,000 since the ouster of Morsi in 2013, according to reports by the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (Egyptian Streets, 2014). Various civil society organizations have been forced to shut down, the militarization of public space has proliferated, and free speech has all but been completely eliminated under the state’s crackdown. The Copenhagen School scholars argue that security discourses work within and create a specific rhetorical model of survival, immediacy, and urgency in a context of exceptional politics. This was certainly the case here as the model was put into full effect by the state and state-friendly media.

This background of securitization in the current moment of Egyptian history is necessary to contextualize discourse around migration. As this thesis is concerned with media representation of the Egyptian clandestine, it is important to consider the political context that media discourses are operating within. Following the transition of power, the Sisi regime quickly consolidated control of the state media and appointed new chairpersons for all of Egypt’s state newspapers in 2014 (Mansour, 2015). According to a report by Mansour, “the regime has used its media control to demonize civil society organizations, foreign journalists, and the political opposition, and the generous subsidies given to state media indicate that the leadership places a high priority on its ability to shape public discourse in this way” (2015, p. 3).
It’s important to have highlighted the context of endogenous securitization in order to understand migration securitization in Egypt and its acceptance. When it comes to securitization of migrant discourses in Egypt, some research has been conducted on the debilitating effects of the transformation of representation of Syrian refugees as Muslim Brotherhood allied terrorists in Egyptian media (Smith, 2015). I will provide another example of how speech-act on smuggling brokers has often been constituted as a key criminal figure in public discourse on Egyptian irregular movement. The kind of discourse of criminality regarding irregular migration, and in particular the legal developments for the persecution of “smugglers,” should be situated as part of the already overwhelmingly securitized post-2013 environment that corresponds with increased policing and arrests across spaces, spheres and sectors of Egyptian society.

Criminalization of Migration in Egyptian Discourse

After a national tragedy on the scale of the Rasheed incident, there was a need to identify the “culprits.” The broker or smuggler was the constructed villain in the discourse of the shipwreck’s aftermath, becoming the figure that requires heavy criminalization. In the face of such heartbreaking losses of drowning men, women, and children, there had to be someone or something that should pay the price. Almost immediately, language that called for identification, arrest and punishment of the smuggler became a defining theme in the popular discourse.

In an episode of the show “Entebah” (Attention) on Mehwar Channel, host Mona Iraqi embarked on a trip to Rasheed with the explicitly stated purpose of exposing the brokers of the trip, saying, “My whole objective is to find the semsar (broker)” After a diatribe railing against the ills of unauthorized migration, Iraqi asks, “Who is responsible for all this death? The semsar, parents, and the migrants” (2016). At Rasheed, Iraqi literally goes through the streets of Borg Rasheed, searching for the “very rich” brokers who “prey on villages, where there are no services” in a fashion that is not unlike a witch hunt throughout the town (2016).

In an article called “The Actual Criminals in the Rasheed Ship,” Emad Eldin Hussein warns that if “450 people and the crew of the boat move freely without being monitored” throughout the city, terrorists can also move in the same way. Hussein argues that if owners of these ships are
known to authorities, “why are they left to kill people this way? Who protects these murderers and criminals?” (Hussein, 2016). Associating the link between smugglers and terrorism serves as a form of speech act that links free mobility as something inherently dangerous, requiring increased securitization. The connection between mobility and terrorism was also represented by Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry who stated on a panel at the World Youth Forum that “it is necessary to combat the negative aspects related to illegal immigration that represent growing dangers on the lives of youth due to its close links with the crimes of human trafficking committed by cross-border gangs who use their revenues for financing terrorism,” (Sayed, 2017).

In an op-ed in El Watan newspaper entitled “Why Do Our Sons Die At Sea?” journalist Mostafa Bakry calls on “those who caused death of thousands… worthy of execution” (Bakry, 2016) Bakry pleads for increased punishment for “brokers of death,” rejecting “the great calamity” of the law that currently prescribes the punishment for this activity as only three years in jail. Invoking rhetoric of panic, Bakry argues “the crisis in the homeland is worsening, corruption is increasing, and complicity by officials in the executive bodies continues, there is no real punishment for the guilty in this country” (Bakry, 2016).

Advocating for stricter penalties for alleged brokers becomes a common appeal throughout media representations. Hassan Zayed goes a step further calling on not just stricter charges against the broker, but also the migrant himself. In a piece for Rosa El Youssef, he argues that the most important role that the state can play in this issue is in enacting “laws that deter relinquishing brokers and deter migrants… the imposition of severe penalties on migrants and immigration brokers will limit illegal migration” (Zayed, 2016).

Here, I would like to put the above examples of criminalization discourse into conversation with border policing in Egypt. Thousands of people in Egypt have been arrested on charges of illegal migration and trafficking. Numbers vary, but the Egyptian military has said that in 2016 over 12 thousand prospective irregular migrants have been detained from various nationalities (CGTN Africa, 2017). In an interview with Al Ahram, Interior Minister Magdy Abdel-Ghafer declared that since 2017, “103 cases of undocumented immigration were foiled in Egypt as well 361 cases
of illegal crossing of Egyptian borders, and 4419 non-legal migrants have been arrested from different nationalities” (Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, 2018). Controls on mobility is increasingly embedded within security and military apparatus that is justified through legal measures such as the new smuggling law enacted a few weeks after the Rasheed incident. The 2016 law criminalizes those involved with the process of smuggling with penalties ranging from a fine of EGP 200 all the way up to life imprisonment. Legally criminalizing the “smuggler” can be understood as part of a wider process within Egyptian endogenous securitization of expanded securitization measures, militarization of public space, censorship, and corresponding policing and arrests in the post-2013 period. While according to state officials, this law aims to punish only the smugglers, I will critically analyze the relationship between criminalization discourse and law demonstrating the dangerous purposes these categorizations serve.

Language that is used to demonize and punish the ambiguous identity of the “broker” is rooted in a securitization discourse. This discourse focuses on this figure as the main reason why people have drowned at sea, thus society would be safer with this menace locked up behind bars, or even executed. Spotlighting the discussion on the criminality of the broker corresponds with the enactment of the country’s first law against smuggling. This narrative serves very specific purposes. Reducing the complex issues of unauthorized migration to convenient categories of specific subjects i.e. victim/criminal, legal/illegal, etc. works a tool of state control of mobility. Scott Watson argues that the creation of these categories that “remove ambiguity regarding the identity and intention of all actors involved” in this kind of transportation culminates in a “discursive exoneration of the state” for migrant deaths (Watson, 2015). Moreover, the focus on migrant deaths through the lens of the criminalization narrative places the responsibility of the human and economic costs of smuggling entirely on these smuggling criminals. This criminalization discourse neglects that it is the increasingly restrictive border control policies that encourage people to pay for the service of smugglers and toward risky travel.

This discourse is problematic on several levels. First, the ambiguity and slipperiness of defining who is a smuggler creates a situation where arrest can be arbitrary and imprecise. The criminalization of smuggling discourse relies upon and reinforces “oversimplified and pure categories that deny the complexity of undocumented migration” and contribute to “problematic
depictions of organized crime and humanitarian actors, and deny the culpability of the state in the prevalence and danger of smuggling,” according to Watson’s study of criminalization of smuggling (2015). Framing smuggling as an organized criminal network helps to exonerate the state and restrictive migration control policies of accountability toward a path of precarity of sea voyages and migrant deaths. The focus on smugglers as criminals shifts the discourse away from the consequences of human movement controls and their role in producing “populations susceptible to precarious and exploitative employment and to coercive measures such as interception, detention, deportation, and criminal prosecution” (Watson, 2015). In this way, the need to fight against broader systems of injustice and discrimination against “undesirable” migrants are neglected, denying “the possibility of establishing a common ground in struggling for freedom of movement and equal access to mobility” (Tazzioli, 2018).

The discourse of criminalization creates false categorizations that define the smuggler. However, those involved with the procedure of carrying out a smuggling mission are many with varied roles. It is in the interest of the state to narrow and reduce the ambiguity of smuggling by organizing people into strict categories, this allows for increased state control over human mobility. As Watson argues, criminalization of smuggling “is one of a number of mechanisms employed by states that relies on the creation of abstracted and simplified categories to make sense of complex social phenomena and to achieve specific objectives, one of which is controlling human movement” (Watson, 2015). The smuggler becomes an easy target; as a criminal subject, any blame or any punitive measures become valid and encouraged. However, this raises concerns on how the smuggler is defined. It has become popular to describe smugglers as operating in a highly organized criminal network. Even Egypt’s Interior Ministry has blamed migrant deaths on the work of the smuggler “mafia” (Loveluck, 2014). Is the smuggler the local townswoman who takes up the money, or is it the crew of the ship, or is it owner of the ship or he who sells it, or is the smuggler the one in charge of renting the apartment that the migrants are held during the stages between moving from land to sea, or the driver from one place to the other? We can see that the dynamics of smuggling is complex thus simplistic categories that the state declares are not-applicable.
Contrary to the idea established discursively that these brokers work as organized mafia-like crime networks, studies suggest otherwise. In a recent empirical study, Cambridge professor Paulo Campana analyzed the organization of a smuggling ring operating between the Horn of Africa and Northern Europe via Libya (2018). In this “first formal network modelling” analysis, Campana shows that smuggling is not internalized within a single organization but rather its “activities are segmented and carried out by localized and rudimentary hierarchies with a small number of high-centrality actors operating at various stages along the smuggling route” indicating that higher-level smugglers are largely independent and autonomous (2018, p.1). According to Campana, the operations of transporting people through unauthorized means is “a far cry from how Mafia-like organisations operate, and a major departure from media reports claiming that shadowy kingpins monopolise certain routes” (2018, p. 13).

While it is true that smuggling has become a lucrative industry in its own right, the media and political focus on mass migrant deaths at sea fails to accurate portray the dynamics of “human smuggling.” Indeed, as Zhang argues, the majority of smuggling operations do not end in death (2007). It is not my intent to romanticize the work of brokers and smugglers, but it is important to understand the role that smugglers offer, a service of transport to people, in relation to their criminalized perceptions. Migrants who employ the use of a smuggler rarely view their smuggler as a source of danger or a criminal, instead seeing them as “the people who most helped them” (Watson, 2015). I provide this representation not to exonerate smugglers, that is not what this research is concerned with, but rather to complicate the strict binaries of victim/criminal and to demonstrate the complexities and nuances of irregular migration that fail to be captured by media and political discourse. The discursive reliance on shallow categorizations that criminalize the smuggler, whoever that may be in a long complex network of individuals that facilitate unauthorized movement, justifies mass arrests, detention and punishment in the name of security.

EU Securitization Discourse and the Spectacle at Sea

Mobility and the freedom of movement, particularly among members of the Global South, has long been perceived as a dangerous threat, one that global north nation-states should spare no expense at resisting. Although the movement of people from one place to another is a prominent
feature that characterizes this era, mobility becoming the rule rather than the exception as Nail argues, it constitutes “one of the most politicized expressions of globalization, and hence construed as a security challenge in the political discourse” (2015). The process of the securitization of migration to limit mobility for the sake of security is the paradigm driving the design of migration and often, developmental aid policies (Huysmans, 2006). While this process that increasingly embeds migration with security policies has been speeding up since 9/11, I am interested in the shifts it took post-Arab Spring and how the discourse, both language and visual imagery, related to these policies.

During and after the revolutions imagery of people crossing the Mediterranean became prevalent across global media platforms. The spectacle of overloaded boats sinking and bodies drowning at sea serves as a crisis of which the production of humanitarian and securitization discourses rely on. The representation of this spectacle provides the necessary role of crisis that helps to fuel increased human-security governance mechanisms. Explaining what Joseph Pugliese calls “statist regimes of visuality,” Angela Smith remarks that “in order to justify these draconian border policing measures, the state maintains an ongoing project of legitimation that relies upon the visible production and reproduction of particular- and spectacular- images of crisis, terror and horror in relation to the threat posed by irregular migrants” (2015, p. 7). De Genova argues that “what presents itself as a ‘crisis’ of territorially defined state powers over trans-national, cross-border human mobility- in short, what is fundamentally a moment of governmental impasse on the European scale- has been mobilized and strategically deployed as ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’ for the reconfiguration of tactics and techniques of border policing and immigration and asylum law enforcement” (2017, p. 5).

Sometimes discussion of this representation is clear in its securitization rhetoric like when Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi compared cross-Mediterranean clandestine migration “a plague in our continent” (BBC News, 2015). Other times, this spectacle is expressed through a humanitarian discourse that calls for “rescue.” In both of these seemingly opposing discourses lies similar functions, as argued by scholars such as Paul Amar. Amar argues that increasingly, the language of humanitarianism and securitization measures are working in ways that are complementary to each other to establish new human security forms of governing which he
describes “aim to protect, rescue and secure certain idealised forms of humanity identified with a particular family of sexuality, morality and class subjects grounded in certain militarised territories and strategic infrastructures” (Amar, 2013).

One method that Amar argues that is used to legitimize this human-security mode of governance is through “hypervisibilisation,” which refers to “spotlighting of certain identities and bodies as sources of radical insecurity and moral panic in ways that actually render invisible the real nature of power and social control” (Amar, 2013). Hypervisibilisation—like of migrants at the borders of Europe—works alongside securitization, which Amar describes as the “reconfiguration of political debates and claims around social justice, political participation, or resource distribution into technical assessments of danger, operations of enforcement and targeting of risk populations” in human-security governance (Smith, 2015, p. 46).

Calls for expanded rescue missions and humanitarian responses, which are considered “progressive” or “liberal” positions, to visibilized spectacles at sea of migrant boats, are often accompanied by practices of apprehension, indefinite detention, and deportation. As European authorities were quick to announce the April 19, 2015 shipwreck that killed over 800 migrants a “tragedy of epic proportions,” the discourse of the incident “was compulsively preoccupied with ‘illegal’ migration and the ‘criminal’ predations of ‘smugglers’ and ‘traffickers’ as pretexts for renewed and expanded tactics of militarized interdiction, including proposals to bomb the coasts of Libya from which many maritime border crossers depart, or event to deploy ground troops” (De Genova, 2017, p. 10). As is often the case, humanitarian discourse of tragedy invoked by officials supplied the pretext for the reinforcement and expansion of the conditions that escalate migrant deaths, meaning the strengthening of border policing that force people to take ever more dangerous pathways and modes of travel (De Genova, 2017). These are just some examples of how the language of humanitarianism is increasingly working hand in hand with security practices, such that those across the political spectrum all securitization discourse.

These human-security modes of governance have transformed in the wake of the Arab Spring and thus, it is important to trace the developments of increased border regime policies in response. In relying on the spectacle of crisis imagery which conveys a kind of horror which
contextualize the irregular migrant as a source of threat and insecurity, increased securitization and border patrol measures are justified. Discourse of “floods” of migrants “invading” the EU produced knowledge helped to encourage, justify, and normalize legal measures that made it more difficult for migrants to enter Europe.

The migration-security nexus that already characterized EU policymaking prior to the Arab uprisings became even more embedded following the Syrian forced displacement and by 2015 had “undergone an acute securitization turn” (Fakhoury, 2016, p. 67). Although the actual size of the post-2011 migratory flows into Europe were not huge, immediate changes in policies were enacted to stem these flows. As early as May of 2011, the EU reacted to the wave of Arab uprisings by extending the Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security that describes, “Relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries on migration-related issues are strategic, aimed at facilitating mobility but discouraging irregular migration” (Bel-Air, 2016, p. 21). The EU Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) renewed in November of 2011 became the “overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy” (Bel-Air, 2016). While the GAMM regarded migration policy around three major elements of security, economization of migrants, and humanitarian concerns, it was the securitization element that was most prominently emphasized.

Politics of migration since 2011 have been articulated in language of emergency that require exceptional policy measures. Tightened border controls, expanded patrolling and surveillance measures were enacted. The movement of migrants from Tunisia and Libya during this period led to changes of border policy within the Schengen. Border checks were reinstated and countries such as Sweden, Germany, France, Denmark and Austria suspended Schengen temporarily in reaction to refugee flows. Other states like Hungary, Slovenia and Austria tried to block out migrants by seeking to build fences (Fakhoury, 2016).

Meanwhile, the intensification of the externalization of EU migration policy, meaning efforts to outsource policies of migration control to sending countries, through the EU Action adopted in 2012 characterized EU response to the Arab uprisings. According to Bigo, “border externalization refers to a fundamental change in the scales and operations of border institutions,
shifting bordering practices from what Raeymaekers (2014:168) has recently referred to as the ‘stable ground of national checkpoints and territorial lines on maps to make them part of a more fluid landscape built on overlapping, and often contradictory, histories of mobility and exchange’” (Guild & Bigo, 2010, p. 252). There was an increased focus on the clandestine, ways of deterring such mobility through the externalization of border control and on readmission by origin and sending countries of those caught inside and near EU borders. While the externalization of EU border control is not a new concept, the level of investment and intensity of these efforts became significant and a major feature of EU policy transfers to foreign states, an example of this is the EU-Turkey deal. Migration management outsourcing relationships have appeared all over the southern Mediterranean between the EU and Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and also Egypt.

Adoption of EU discourse in Egypt

In Egypt across the migration discourse, we see an adoption of European securitization discourse- in addition to endogenous securitization discourse. Both popular and official discourse on irregular migration in Egypt often redeploy similar themes of EU securitization discourse, gravely warning against movement across the Mediterranean.

In an editorial in the state newspaper Al Ahram, the author writes in a piece titled “The Nightmare of Illegal Migration,” that “countries such as Egypt are facing the flood of illegal immigrants, fleeing the burning wars and the misery of reality in failed states. The developments of the events show how the rising phenomenon of migration is putting pressure on the economic, social and security situation in transit countries such as Egypt and receiving countries such as Europe” (Al-Ahram, 2016). The editorial goes on calling on regional and international cooperation “to address the serious aspects of the most dangerous phenomenon in the twenty-first century.” In a piece for El Watan news, Jamal Taha upholds the positions for European border controls stating, “The European Union has been suffering from the influx of refugees, the infiltration of terrorist elements, which gave the problem a serious security dimension, which explains the severity of the reaction. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
confirmed that the number of migrants on average on their way to Europe rose 30 times more than in 2014, 2015/2016” (2016).

We often see throughout opinion pieces in the Egyptian press the same speech of calling for increased security measures to combat the danger of unauthorized migration as I have mentioned earlier in the chapter. Similar to the European context, this often takes shape in the form of humanitarian discourse, like that of awareness language described in chapter two. As mentioned throughout this research, clandestine travel is often discursively associated with threats of terrorism and crime, a process that mirrors EU discursive themes. Criminalizing the smuggler, as discussed in the Egyptian context above, is a central migration-security concept that is reinforced in European political discourse as well. As Tazzioli states of the political hyper-focus on the criminality of smuggler or trafficker: “One consequence of this is that the reframing of the debate around migrant deaths at sea has lowered the level of critique of a contemporary politics of migration more generally: the fight against smugglers has become the unquestioned and unyielding point of agreement, supported across more or less the entire European political arena” (2018, p. 6).

By identifying the similarities of these discourses, we can witness how the prospect of the freedom of mobility across borders is equally as threatening and dangerous requiring unlimited efforts to combat it for both the nation states of the global north and south. Indeed, several scholars have polemicized explanations as to why mobile subjects are perceived to be such a danger. For example, in her book *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* Wendy Brown argues that mobility and the idea of freedom of movement is a threat to a country’s sovereignty, and the effect of this is exemplified by intensified fortification of border control measures (Brown, 2010). Brown examines wall-building and strengthened border regimes in both the global north and the south under the precarious conditions of global capitalism. The anxiety over “waning” national identity and sovereignty is projected unto borders and the material structures and technologies that are invested in to secure them, according to Brown.

Critical discourse analysis calls on us to examine the discourse as a part of a dialectic, meaning one must analyze the discourse in relation to a particular conditions or in this case, a moment. As
mentioned previously, in order to analyze the Egyptian discourse on irregular migration critically, it becomes important to situate it and put it into perspective with wider more dominant EU securitization discourse. One must examine the connections and the interests served in driving a particular framing of the Rasheed shipwreck and the migrant issue in Egypt and highlight the ways in which it correlates and supports Europe’s border and deportation regime. In order to do this, one must take account the role of the relationship between the EU and Egypt.

The EU is Egypt’s largest regional trading partner and Italy is Egypt’s largest trading partner within the EU and the third largest internationally following the United States and China. The strength of economic ties between the two countries on opposite sides of the Mediterranean should be taken into serious consideration when analyzing the material reality of Egyptian state discourse. Several EU states comprise Egypt’s top importers and exporters. Highlighting the relationship between Egypt and Italy becomes particularly crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the conditions the discourse this thesis is concerned with emanates from or works in relation to. In 2016, Egypt sold Italy $1.47 billion dollars in export and bought $3.42 billion dollars in Italian imports, making Italian state Egypt’s top three economic trade partners (Bloomberg, 2017). Business ties that generate around six billion dollars’ worth of profit for various industries on either side of the Mediterranean prove to be crucial to maintain, at any human cost. This is witnessed at sea and on land. For example, despite incidents that would have otherwise threatened to disrupt the robust Egyptian-Italian diplomatic relationship, like the murder of Italian PhD student Giulio Regeni in Cairo in 2016, capital exchanges prove to be far too crucial to risk.

Within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the main financial instrument of the European Commission is the European Neighbourhood Instrument which allows for direct funding from the EU to Egyptian governmental bodies. Between 2014 and 2016 a total between 311 and 380 million euros have been allocated to support various economic, development, and migration projects (The European Union Delegation to Egypt, 2017). In June 2016, under the EU Trust Fund for North Africa, the project of “Enhancing the Response to Migration Challenges in Egypt” was formulated. This initiative consists of EU funding in the form of a 60 million Euro grant to address “the root causes of irregular migration” (EPSC
Strategic Notes, 2017). Additionally, the Egyptian government recently signed three new financing agreements for “strategic investment projects” with 46 million euros in grants; “leveraging almost €600 million in soft loans from European Financial Institutions” (Egypt Today, 2017). Even prior to the establishment of the European Trust Fund, initiatives financed by the EU and/or member states, especially Italy, were prolific. This supports the argument that in addition to endogenous reasons, the role of external actors like the EU serves as an additional cause for the adoption by Egypt of official discourse on irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

Demonstrating this link is important when we begin to understand from where the Egyptian discourse draws upon and supports as such productions of knowledge do not come from a vacuum. Indeed, similarities across EU securitization discourse and Egyptian discourse on the securitization and criminalization of irregular migration is not a coincidence; the Egyptian state’s many economic ties to Europe (the EU is Egypt’s largest trading partner) all but ensures its cooperation and commitment with the EU in protecting the shores of Fortress Europe, symbolically and politically. We must understand the link of similarities in securitization discourse within the relationship of countless bilateral agreements of externalization involve heavy financing from the EU to Egypt.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have highlighted the dominate themes of securitization that have characterized the Egyptian discourse on irregular migration. Applying securitization theory and critical discourse analysis, the link between discursive practices and the enforcement of security measures have been examined. The strong representation of security and threat in framing issues of migration in Egypt are derived from both an endogenous politics of security and draw upon and are influenced by broader hegemonic migration-security discourse of the global north, particularly in the context of the post-Arab Spring era. In order to demonstrate this link, I first explain the crisis language and imagery of sea spectacles in relation to increasingly restrictive EU border control measures. After describing this relationship, I explain how Egyptian powers
also utilize similar discursive means that help to maintain EU political positions on irregular migration. In order to elaborate on the power dynamics behind the discursive commonalities in shaping the perception of irregular migration, the deep economic ties and funding between Egypt and the EU are discussed.
This thesis has identified prevailing themes that comprise the discourse of Egyptians who leave Egypt and cross the Mediterranean through unauthorized means in hopes of better opportunities in Europe. By engaging Egyptian media, official statements, and cultural production throughout the thesis, I have discerned and traced the roots of the production of common narratives featured regarding this issue, and analyzed their predominance and the purposes these themes serve in connection to the state and wider hegemonic discourse using critical discourse analysis tools.

This research has explained how the Egyptian migrant, particularly in the wake of the Rasheed incident, has been constructed and how the issue of Egyptians crossing the sea to Europe has been framed in Egyptian public discourse. Based on the data collected in this thesis, a few major thematic patterns were observed by the researcher. First, blame was regularly placed on individuals who migrate and their parents for sea tragedies. Victims and survivors of the Rasheed incident were routinely depicted as bringing such consequences upon themselves. Writers, talk show hosts, and public officials frequently denied unemployment as a “real” reason for emigration, instead associating the migrant with being lazy and wanting a quick way out. Often, those who embark on such a journey were chided for not only risking their lives boarding “death boats,” but also for spending a large sum of money to do so, becoming both foolish and selfish figures. Entrepreneurship was lauded as a solution to the social ills where these individuals were encouraged to invest their money in a local business venture instead.

Additionally, it was found that government discourse was predominantly echoed in media outlets and cultural production. State narratives were channeled in the public discourses due to the hegemonic nature of state institutions and social actors to produce a particular kind of knowledge of the Egyptian irregular migrant. In these narratives, the chance to understand the migrant as a rational actor with agency and this phenomenon in its complexities is dismissed. Furthermore, the economic origins that fuel this type of mobility is also downplayed in these representations. In order to refute the common sentiments that deny worsening socio-economic conditions to protect the state from accountability, I reviewed current poverty levels, increase of prices, and labor market dynamics that illustrate the magnitude of unemployment and underemployment. This is particularly relevant since the link between migration and labor is strong- people move to
find work and opportunities, but due to the restrictions of travel imposed on many of the global south, irregular migration often becomes the only possibility.

Notions of nationalist imaginaries played a role in answering to the Rasheed tragedy and the idea of Egyptian irregular migration generally. This was featured most prominently in the language of government actors, such as the president who often invoked themes of a protective homeland that both needs its children and refuses to forsake them. Patriotism as a discursive device was employed frequently as a way of both encouraging people to work and endure in their home country, and to also shame those who leave in precarious ways—here the figure of the migrant becomes a traitor.

Throughout text and speech, the irregular movement of Egyptians to Europe was almost always presented as a problem that needed a solution. Usually the presented solution was either increased awareness initiatives, usually funded by international organizations, or securitization measures. Calls for awareness of the risks involved in this type of migration were prominent in the discourse, by media personalities and government and NGO actors alike. I demonstrated how this rhetoric, which assumes that this decision taken by migrants to cross the sea is based in ignorance, is problematic in that it is classist and denies the agency and knowledge that these individuals possess on the risks involved. Additionally, the victimizing ethos that is characteristic of awareness discourse works within a criminalizing paradigm—if the migrant is a helpless victim then there must be a culprit to be blamed for tragedies that occur, that figure becomes the smuggler.

In chapter four, I problematize the category of the smuggler and criminalization of migration rhetoric, relating it to wider securitization discourse. The links between these discursive practices and the creation and enforcement of new security measures such as the anti-smuggler law were examined. I discussed the representational role that sea spectacles, such as the Rasheed sinking, play in driving crisis language for political means to fortify border control regimes. The ways in which Egyptian discourse on migration mirrors that of the global North were questioned and contextualized by assessing the deep financial ties between Egypt and the EU that help drive such policies and perceptions.
There are several ways in which this research could be further expanded. One avenue to be investigated is the question of the migrant and processes of victimization and re-victimization. Due to the limits of this thesis and the safety and accessibility constraints, the researcher was unable to conduct interviews of current/former/aspiring Egyptian irregular cross-Mediterranean migrants. Research on this particular issue would be significantly enriched by including the voices of these individuals. Although migrant testimonials were included in this thesis from secondary interviews, a deeper understanding of the rejection of state discourse and its ultimate failure could be gained by incorporating and highlighting their voices and logic. Emphasizing only state discourse of this phenomenon runs the risk of potentially re-victimizing the migrant by ignoring other types of representations. It is important to note that state discourse is not all-dominant. Another discourse that should be explored further using such interviews would be the construction of the migrant subject as hero, that is one who migrates and succeeds in life. In fact, there is a disparity between what the state says on this topic and the continuing practice of this type of movement, suggesting that this construction is particularly important for these individuals. However, due to this thesis’s limits in space and time, the researcher chose to focus on the perception and construction of the migrant in the public sphere and how it relates to the ways in which hegemonic powers conceive of their relationship between the state, society and the individual.

In conclusion, identifying, analyzing, and problematizing the construction of the Egyptian irregular migrant subject, as I have done in this research, offers a lens in understanding the dynamics of the issue of unauthorized mobility through its representational prisms. Most importantly, I observed that the discourse operates in a way that limits or eliminates possibilities for a politics of freedom of movement to be discussed or be put into conversation. Dominant narrative productions fail to highlight the fundamental role of unjust, discriminatory and violent border control regimes for the prevalence of risky irregular migration and do not call for their transformation. This is because unauthorized movement that subverts border regimes of regulation is a threatening concept for the nation-state. Therefore, the individual who participates in such “trespass” becomes a site of insecurity, unsettling the state’s demands for population control, igniting more restrictive securitization measures to counter such “flows.”
contentious and violent relationship between government and individuals on the move can be observed by unpacking the discourse. Whether it is framed in clear securitization terms or hidden within the language of humanitarianism, as I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, the hegemonic will of containment policies are enforced.
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في-غيط-العنبر


