Unequal citizens: Cairo between gated and informal

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UNEQUAL CITIZENS
CAIRO BETWEEN GATED AND INFORMAL

A Thesis Submitted to
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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
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By Hend Ibrahim Muhammed Aly

Under the supervision of Dr. Ibrahim Elnur
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ABSTRACT

The conception of citizenship which accompanied the emergence of the nation-state, in essence, relates to ‘a territorially bounded population with a specific set of rights and duties.’ Such a conception of citizenship assumes that all the members of the nation have exactly the same set of rights and duties. I am interested in studying Cairo. Unfortunately, it is particularly far from this normative definition of citizenship, as its citizens are not equal. For that reason, I am keen on studying citizenship in practice, as a relation between citizens and state.

I argue that state practices, represented in urban planning, are constructing distinct communities based on spatial segregation and inequality which constitute different citizenships within the same society. These different conceptions of citizenship imply that the citizens of the same nation have distinct visions on their roles as citizens and the role of the state towards them. Consequently, the state-society relations are framed differently by both the citizens and the state, based on the citizens’ discrete social, economic and political realities.

I am specifically interested in answering the question of how does state-citizen relations differ from gated communities to informal areas? And what are the implications of these different conceptions of citizenship? In an attempt to answer this question, fieldwork has been conducted in two selected neighboring areas; Uptown Cairo representing a gated community and Manshiyat Näsir representing an informal area.
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Chapter One
Introduction

Driving around in the streets of Cairo, the horizon is blocked by billboards advertising the ‘good life’ offered behind the walls of the gated communities, which the majority of the population cannot afford. On the other hand, informal areas have been growing in Cairo since the 1950s, housing more than 60 percent of the city’s population. Informal areas and gated communities are expressions of inequality and manifestations of segregation and exclusion. Such disparities between the citizens living in Cairo are expressed in spaces, services, citizens’ everyday life, as well as state’s practices of developing the rights.

The conception of citizenship which accompanied the emergence of the nation-state, in essence, relates to ‘a territorially bounded population with a specific set of rights and duties.’ This is reflected in consecutive Egyptian constitutions, which stated that all citizens are equal; the 1971 constitution, which lasted until 2011, stated that ‘the state shall guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens.’ And the current constitution added ‘without discrimination’ to the article (Article 8/1971; Article 9/2014). However, I argue that state practices, represented in urban planning, are constructing distinct communities based on segregation and inequality which constitute different citizenships within the same society.

Each of these distinct communities has its own defined borders, sets its own rules and regulations, shapes its self-supplying nature and develops different conceptions of citizenship. Consequently, the state-society relations are framed
differently by both the citizens and the state, based on the citizens’ discrete social, economic and political realities.

Illustration 1.1: Billboard on the Ring Road

Billboard on the Ring road advertising Emaar’s gated community by the Mediterranean Sea standing in an informal area and some of its residents are standing on the road waiting for public transportation.

Source: Photograph taken by the author.

This research is specifically interested in answering the question of how do state-citizen relations differ from gated communities to informal areas? And what are the implications of these different conceptions of citizenship? This translates into three sub-questions:

- How do state policies and strategies of policy implementation differ from gated communities to informal areas?
- How does living in different areas imply a different set of rights and duties?
- How does this process of forming distinct communities shape the state-citizen relations and the citizen-citizen relations?
In an attempt to answer the proposed research question, four hypotheses have been drawn:

- The relation of the state to the residential areas is entirely different in character for gated communities and informal areas.
- The inhabitants of the informal areas are in a contesting relation to the state.
- The inhabitants of the gated communities are more likely to buy the service rather than claiming the right to it from the state.
- Living in different residential areas forms distinct communities which impacts the inhabitants, ‘citizens’, mutual perception.

Informal areas and gated communities are relatively recent phenomena in Cairo. Clearly, gated communities are much more recent than the informal areas. For that reason, I present a brief historical development of the expansion of the city of Cairo in an attempt to understand how the two urban setups came to existence. Then, I narrow down the scope to my two selected case studies; an informal area and a gated community. In addition, I specify the methodologies I have employed to study the two areas. Finally, I present the thesis outline of what is contained in the following chapters.

**The City of Cairo**

Cairo is one of the largest cities in Africa and the Middle East. It has been growing over history; the continuous expansion of the city is one of the important factors of its make-up. This part discusses the emergence and development of new cities, gated communities and informal areas as products of urban planning of the city of Cairo. Moreover, it seeks to understand their role in the make-up of the city. It also looks at how these urban setups were dedicated to certain groups of citizens since their creation; paving the way for the main argument that these communities are based on inequality and segregation.
The growth of the city is in parts a product of moving its center, which is usually a reflection of the vision of new political leadership. ʿAmrū ibn al-ʿAāš replaced Coptic Cairo as the center of the city by building al-Fuṣṭāṭ north to it. Later, the Fatimid built the new center Northeast of al-Fuṣṭāṭ. In the 19th century Khedival Cairo was built replacing Old Cairo. Neo-liberal figures have also invested in expanding the city. In the early 1900s, Heliopolis and al-Maʿādy were established by two big companies as examples of the very early satellite cities around Cairo. Both developers had different views on how a new city should look. However, they agreed on the importance of mobility and connectedness to the city.¹

The idea of moving the center continued in the post-colonial era. President Nāṣir started planning and building Naṣr city presenting it as the new capital city. The city was constructed. But, it did not attain the status of new capital. President Sādāt also planned for a new administrative capital named after him which did not become the new administrative capital. Lastly, a new administrative capital was announced in 2015 as one of President al- Sīsī’s mega projects.

In the mid-1970s, Sādāt’s Open Door Policy showed a clear tendency and interest of the state in developing new cities in the desert. This was followed by a boom in private investment in real-estate under Mubarak and the governments that followed after the 2011 uprising. In 1976, the city of Tenth of Ramadan was announced. In the following two years, three other new cities were declared; the Sixth of October City, al-ʿUbūr City and Fifteenth of May City. By the end of the 1970s, the New Communities Law was made which created the New Urban Communities Authority

According to the new law, NUCA enjoyed a significant authority over specified zones of land to develop and sell to private developers (Sims 2010, 76-79).

During the 1980s and the 1990s, four new cities were established; Badr City, New Cairo, al-Shrūq and al-Shaikh Zāyd. All of them had in part public housing (Sims 2010, 177-186). The expansion of the city continued, as a big number of newer cities have been emerging. New Heliopolis is being built by the same company which built Heliopolis as well as al-Mustaqbal city which is neighboring the new capital. Although most of these cities initially were built to help industry to boost and attract the lower classes outside of the city, many of them, later dedicated large parts of the land to private investments and luxurious residential areas. Such developments predominantly target the upper and upper middle class. The Sixth of October City, New Cairo, al-Shrūq and al-Shaikh Zāyd have within them a large number of luxurious gated communities.

The construction of gated communities only started in the second half of the 1990s in which a number of gated communities were established like al-Qaṭāmyah Heights and al-Reḥāb in New Cairo, and Dreamland and Beverly Hills in the Sixth of October city. Almost all the gated communities are located in the new cities around Cairo, except for Uptown Cairo on al-Muqaṭṭam Mountain which is located ‘in the heart of the city’, as its developers advertise it. In the last couple of decades, gated communities became a popular and attractive urban setup among those who can afford them, but also for those who can only fantasize about them.

Currently, real estate in Egypt is considered as one of the most profitable and safest investment activities. The developers range from very big companies, some with government or military involvement, to small investors. The market has also been
attractive to Egyptian and foreign investors. Gated communities in Egypt vary in terms of size and price range. These communities could be as big as al-Reḥāb which is being built over 10 million m², or as small as the 50000 m² Jewar compound in al-Shaʾikh Zāyda. There is a wide range of prices offered by the different developers. An apartment in al-Reḥāb can cost a few hundred thousand Egyptian pounds, while it costs about a couple of million pounds in Uptown Cairo, where the value of a large villa exceeds 40 million EGP.

Such developments are targeted primarily at the upper and the upper middle classes and are attracting them to move out of the city. On the other hand, the city has been expelling the poor who cannot afford to live there. A significant number of informal areas have been constructed inside and on the fringe of the city since the 1950s. The informal areas provide the only affordable lifestyle inside of the city for the majority of its inhabitants. The informal areas are almost continuously growing. Most of them are being built either on private agricultural land like in al-Zāyah al-Hamrā’ and ‘Azbat al-Nakhal or on state-owned desert land like ‘Azbat al-Hajānah and Manshīyat Nāṣir. Such areas are called informal as they “lack urban planning and building control” (Sims 2010, 95-99).

Only in the early 1990s such areas started to be labeled as ‘Ashwāʾyāt (haphazard), in which Dorman pointed out that imposing such a label reinforce the marginality of these areas. However, this contradicts the reality as, according to Sims, informal areas house more than 60 percent Cairo’s population (Dorman 2009, 272). In addition, they are physically not on the margin of the city. In many cities around the world, informal areas are concentrated on the fringe of the city. In Cairo, however, a larger number of informal areas are neighboring the most luxurious neighborhoods. For
instance, Ramlit Būlāq is neighboring al-Zamālik, and ‘Azbat al-Hajānah is located between Heliopolis and Naṣr City. However, being that close does not necessarily mean better understanding of each other's existence.

Most of these areas are self-constructed which means that the residents have probably built everything from scratch, not just the buildings, but also the basic services. In many cases, water was being carried from the closest source outside of the area, electricity was inexistent or illegally taken from electricity lines, and sewage was dug and managed by the residents. Over time these conditions have been changing. The residents of the informal areas in Cairo are either immigrants from all around Egypt in pursuit of a livelihood or sliding segments of the city’s lower and lower middle class. They are also a mix of very poor uneducated people, middle-class highly educated, or very wealthy families.

The government has been inconsistent in dealing with such areas. For a long time, it has not been clear whether these areas should be removed as they are illegal or be provided with some basic services with or without legalizing their status. Consequently, many of these areas were subject to development plans, partially in cooperation with international institutions. And many others were subject to removal plans in which a very small number of cases was successful.

In 2008 the government announced the Cairo 2050, a mega urban development plan. Two strategies were proposed by the plan to deal with the high population density in the city, which was presented as one of the biggest urban development challenges. The first one was relocating the inhabitants of the informal areas to outside of the city, such as replacing Manshīyat Naṣīr with a huge touristic housing resort. The second one was encouraging the investment in the satellite cities which targets the upper and the
upper-middle class thus attracting them outside the highly populated city. Although this plan was interrupted after the 2011 popular uprising, the proposed urban planning strategies by consecutive governments since then are, in principle, considered by many as a continuation of the Cairo 2050.

Importantly, informal areas, satellite cities, and gated communities are products of urban planning. According to Sims, Cairo before the 1950s was composed of only formal neighborhoods. However, the city was becoming increasingly inaccessible to the poor immigrants who came to Cairo seeking a livelihood (Sims 2010, 50). This was the beginning of the existence of the informal areas which provided its inhabitants with affordable living. The state at the beginning ignored their existence. A 2009 statistic shows that more than 60% Cairo’s inhabitants live in informal areas (Sims 2010, 91).

In the 1970s, the state tried to persuade the lower classes to move outside of the city by building satellite industrial cities around Cairo. In the 1990s, a shift occurred by which the state began to encourage investors to build upmarket developments to attract the upper and upper-middle class to move outside the city. Moreover, mega urban plans such as the Cairo 2050 aimed at beautifying the city rather than enhance the living conditions of its citizens. For instance, it announced the replacement of some informal areas with luxurious constructions without mentioning to where these millions are going to be relocated. Roy in her study on informal areas in Calcutta, referred to this process of modifying the city as qualifying the city to be the ‘Gentleman’s City’ (Roy 2004).

To conclude, Cairo has been expanding for hundreds of years. The expansion took different shapes and routes and was undertaken by different actors. This continues with the political leadership building a new capital, new satellite cities built by public
and private developers, and informal self-constructed areas by the people of the city. There are many perspectives which can be used to look at the expansion of the city. If the national resources perspective is employed, it becomes clear that the national resources were directed to the expansion of the city rather than in developing the existing city which has been suffering from the lack of attention and resources. This is not just noticeable in the poor neighborhoods inside Cairo, but also the rich ones.

Case Studies and Methodologies

All of the plans I have previously discussed demonstrate how the state has been categorizing the citizens of the city. It is specifically illustrated by the Cairo 2050 Plan. For my study, I have selected two neighboring areas; an informal area and a gated community. They represent two totally different urban setups, which are the products of the urban planning mentality I have discussed earlier. Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo are located on al-Muqaṭṭam Mountain. The first is one of the largest informal areas in Egypt, which was first established in the 1960s, whilst the second one is of the most luxurious gated communities in Cairo, which only came to life after 2005.

Manshīyat Nāṣir is an interesting case which shows how inhabitants of an area claim their rights, such as the right to land, services, work and recognition. However, Uptown Cairo residents, who depend on the developer as the main services provider, have also developed their ways of perceiving their rights and accumulating them. Studying these power networks, which are formed as a consequence of a chain of actions and reactions between the state and the citizens living in the two areas, provides interesting answers of how state-citizen relations are shaped, and how citizenship is practiced in the every-day life.
The Cairo 2050 Plan was an extension to the strategies of favoring some citizens over others. Obviously, the aspirations of the Manshīyat Nāṣir’s residents, unlike the Uptown Cairo inhabitants, are not in line with state’s plan for the city. The map below clearly illustrates how the plan sets different urban categories and decides on their future accordingly. This shows how the relationship between the state and the neighborhoods is entirely different in character for gated communities and informal areas. As depicted in the map below the area of Manshīyat Nāṣir is replaced by a huge green touristic housing resort, while Uptown Cairo is the only area which appears on al-Muqāṭam Mountain.

Map 1.1: Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo in the Cairo 2050 Plan

The Cairo 2050 Plan replaces Manshīyat Nāṣir with a touristic resort as the only neighboring area to Uptown Cairo on al-Muqāṭam Mountain

Fieldwork has been conducted over seven months in the two areas. The first step was to contact those have worked on Manshīyat Nāṣir before, like architects and development practitioners. Then, I interviewed community-based NGOs representatives who I had my first long walk through the area with one of them. In the
case of Uptown Cairo, I contacted the company and visited the area as a customer who is looking for a future house. This allowed me to get to know how the houses are being sold, to gain entrance to a number of units and to have a drive along the compound. This first step allowed me to familiarize myself with the two areas before interviewing the residents. Later, I have conducted interviews with the residents of both areas. I have also interviewed a number of responsible international organization and state institution representatives. In total, I have conducted over 30 interviews. Moreover, observation as an analytical tool was employed to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of each of them.

Outline

In this chapter I aimed at introducing my thesis. I first presented my main argument and question. This was followed by linking my thesis to the historical expansion of the city of Cairo. After that I narrowed the scope down to my two case studies and discussed the methods employed in studying them. The final aim of my introduction is to map the next chapters.

The following chapter reviews the rich literature which has studied the city as a domain in which politics is practiced on a daily basis; concentrating on informal areas and gated communities. I have also drawn on the conceptual framework which informs my study based on Foucault’s conception of government, power and subject, and Holston’s take on citizenship.

The third chapter looks at the urban setup and the social fabric of the two neighboring areas. It also tries to understand their location in relation to the rest of the city and to each others, looking at the manifestations of segregation on the al-Muqaṭṭam
Mountain. The third chapter paves the way for the following chapters which look more closely at how the state-citizen relations are formed in the two areas.

Chapter four discusses a number of basic services and legal rights as fields in which citizenship is practiced. In each of these fields the state, in Foucault’s words, tries to “structure the possible field of action of the others” through its governing strategies. However, on the other side, the citizens of both areas develop their own ways of framing their rights and practicing them.

Chapter five attempts to bring all the different issues discussed together under three levels of analysis; perspectives on the community, the society and the state. It looks at the dynamics of each of the two communities, in addition to their mutual perception of each other. It also tackles how citizens relate to the society as a whole. Lastly, it discusses state-citizen relations through looking at state presence and intervention in the two areas as well as citizens’ acts of engagement and avoidance of the state.

Finally, the conclusion highlights how the collected data and the analysis offer an answer to the proposed question; putting together the hypotheses, the analysis and the findings. In addition to evaluating the hypotheses and relating them to the main question, I aim at evaluating the whole research process presenting the positive aspects and the difficulties of conducting such research. Lastly, I share my views in regards to what needs to be further addressed.
Chapter Two

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

State-citizen relations in the city are the main focus of my study. My aim here is to review the rich body of literature on the city and its people. Chapter two draws on the insights of the literature on informal areas and gated communities, and thus proceeds with what has been already accomplished by the scholars studying the subject. Then, it builds the conceptual framework of the research on Foucault’s conceptions of government, power and subject, as well as Holston’s definition of citizenship, paving the way for the next chapters which analyse the collected empirical data.

Literature Review

The literature review mainly concentrates on the studies that tackle two specific urban setups, informal areas and gated communities, as domains in which citizenship is being practiced. It is an attempt to see how state-citizen relations are being framed when studying a given urban setup. For that purpose, the literature review is divided into two main parts. The first one covers informal areas, whilst the second one is dedicated to the gated communities. Finally, I conclude by looking at studies which brought together more than one urban setup, arguing that such studies and analytical frameworks are required.

In an attempt to get a broad view of the literature on both informal areas and gated communities, the review brings in writings on the matter from different disciplines; political science, sociology and anthropology. It also looks at studies covering different experiences and areas around the world, like studies on Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East.
Informal Areas

This part depicts three of the main scholarly debates on informality and the urban poor. The first debate deals with how the urban poor are being studied concentrating on the concept of marginality. The second one is about citizens’ practices. Lastly, the third one covers the debate on how the state deals with informality. The common factor between the three debates, is that all are trying to see how state-citizen relations are being formulated within informality.

The first debate revolves around the concept of marginality, not just as a way of framing informal areas by the state, but also within academia. Dorman in his study on the informal areas in Cairo pointed out that in the early 1990s such areas started to be labeled as ‘Ashwā’yāṭ (haphazard). He argued that the label entails marginality which contradicts the reality of the city of Cairo, as according to Sims more than 60 percent of Cairo’s population is living in informal areas (Sims 2010, 91). This means that informal areas represent a core part of the city rather than its margin (Dorman 2009, 272).

The marginality debate is one of the ongoing debates in academia. AlSayyad and Roy in their book Urban Informality, a study on the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia, pointed out that the Latin America scholars’ early works on informality are considered a break-through in the field; bringing in the spatial aspect to the study and reviewing widely used concepts such as marginality and the ‘culture of poverty’ (AlSayyad and Roy 2004, 1-3). Bayat mentioned that for a long time Oscar Lewis’s culture of poverty has been very dominant in academia and influential in policy making in the United States, but also developing countries. He asserted that Lewis’ culture of poverty entailed both marginality and passivity in the study of the poor. Bayat agreed
with AlSayyad and Roy that Latin America scholars played a big role in criticizing such concepts and in bringing in alternative ways of studying the urban poor and informality (Bayat 2004, 81-84).

Perlman, among other Latin America scholars, aimed at deconstructing such concepts and criticizing their usage among academics and policy makers. In her study on the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, she showed how the concept of marginality is empirically detached from reality, arguing that marginality is a myth. She asserted that poverty is the product of the system not a specific set of characteristics or attributes of the poor. She said:

“The Favela residents are not economically and politically marginal, but are excluded and repressed; that they are not socially and culturally marginal, but stigmatized and excluded from a closed class system.” (Perlman 1976, 195)

According to Perlman, marginality basically means being both exploited by the system and excluded from its benefits. She maintained that the existence of such paradigms within academia justifies inequality in the society and the state’s inability to provide a group of people with the basic services because, their poverty is blamed on it being part of their culture and one of their characteristics (Perlman 1976, 248).

Debates on marginality brought the concept into perspective; proposing questions like what does it mean for a group to be marginal and what are the consequences of such a label. The second debate brings people’s practices in focus. The issue of the urban poor is being studied from different lenses and perspectives, all of which agree that the inhabitants of these areas live through a day-to-day struggle to claim their rights and to meet their needs. However, they disagreed on how people relate to the state in their struggle. Some scholars propose that the process of claiming rights
is based on invisibility, on the contrary, others argue that it is based on visibility and pursuit of recognition.

Bayat described the practices of the urban poor as ‘quiet daily struggle’ (Bayat 2010, 5). He developed the concept of quiet encroachment to study such a day-to-day struggle; defining it as “the non-collective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and families to acquire the basic necessities of their lives in a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion.” (Bayat 2010, 45) According to him the quiet encroachment is the mechanism of the urban poor to claim their rights which is essentially based on being invisible to the state, like the case of the street vendors.

Singerman, in her study on Cairo, also proposed that the “the popular classes” under authoritarian rule are usually oppressed and excluded from the formal channels of participation. Instead, they form alternative informal ways to accumulate their needs and claim their rights, which are meant to be invisible; in her words “avoiding the notice of the state” (Singerman 1995, 3). Both Bayat and Singerman agree that the inhabitants claim their rights and challenge state’s control through keeping their activities quiet and invisible.

On the other hand, scholars like Das and Chatterji asserted that the practices of the inhabitants of the informal areas seek state’s recognition and attention. Das, in her study on Noida, an informal area in Delhi, India, argued that ‘citizenship is a claim’. She maintained that the struggle over housing is a claim to the right, but also is a claim to citizenship (Das 2011, 330). She asserted that people in such areas always seek the recognition of the state as a way of assuring their permanence (Das 2011, 324). Unlike Bayat and Singerman, Das proposed that such practices of accumulating rights are practices of visibility.
Chatterji also considered slum housing as an expression of citizenship, in her study on Dharavi in Mumbai. She framed state-citizen relations as a network of power which is constituted by both state practices and citizens’ actions, arguing that power is not concentrated in the hands of the authorities (Chatterji 2005, 198). According to Chatterji being visible or in her words ‘acquiring a voice’ is an important part of the process of claiming the right to housing and practicing citizenship (Chatterji 2005, 201). Interestingly, the concept of citizenship has also been extensively used in the literature on gated communities in framing the state-society relations.

As the thesis demonstrates, whether these practices are seeking visibility or invisibility, they all aim at claiming rights. The state on the other side aims at enforcing control, which results in contestation over power between the state and the inhabitants of the informal areas. Dorman in studying state intervention in informal areas in Cairo, mentions that the actions of the inhabitants, whether quiet or not, form bottom-up resistance which makes it difficult for the state to intervene in the informal areas (Dorman 2009, 274-275). Understandably, residents’ behavior is one of the explanations of why and how the state deals with informality. However, considering other factors related to the state functionality and mentality is very important in understanding the role of the state and its position. That is the function of the last debate on informality; bringing together different academic perspective on state’s intervention in informal areas.

Dorman, in his study on the informal areas in Egypt and how they are handled by the state, proposed the question of why the Egyptian State is unable to intervene effectively in the informal neighborhoods. His suggested answer was that the state does not effectively intervene because neglect is so embedded in the authoritarian rule. He
argued that because the consecutive authoritarian regimes were able to rule without ‘bottom-up consent’, their capacity to penetrate and manage the society is so limited as they barely rule it. In other words, their disinterest in societal consent over their role, limited their knowledge about it and, consequently, their ability to rule it (Dorman 2007, 22).

Kuppinger as well argued for the incapability of the state, rather than its will, in maintaining order and penetrating the society. In her study on Al-tayibin, an informal area in Giza, she argued that the state seeks order over individuals and the society through controlling their space (Kuppinger 2000, 29). However, the inefficiency of the state’s strategies of power and control gave the chance to the disadvantaged to enforce their own strategies of power and practices in their self-created spaces (Kuppinger 2000, 43).

Harders argued against the incapacity thesis. She proposed that state tolerance towards informal areas and practices is rather a tactic than incapacity. In her piece on the state and the urban poor in Cairo, she presented a new informal social contract replacing the Naṣrist social contract. Whereas, the Naṣrist social contract was based on welfare in exchange for loyalty to the regime, in the new informal contract welfare was replaced by informal access to resources through clientelistic relations (Harders 2003, 192). Harders proposed the new social contract as an analytical unit to better understand the relationship between the urban poor and the state in Cairo. Importantly, the practices of each of them, I believe, are better understood in relation to the practices of the other.

Within the frame of the new informal social contract, tolerance does not necessarily mean that the state is not capable of enforcing control. Harders asserted that it is rather a way of “controlling the boundaries of the informal social contract.” For
instance, leaving some open space for informal practices, provide the urban poor with alternative ways to acquire their basic needs than joining demonstrations (Harders 2003, 200). Unlike Dorman and Kupinger, Harders argued that the state leaves the space for informal practices to take place as a strategy of control rather than incapacity, inefficiency or neglect.

**Gated Communities**

Gated Communities are not a recent phenomenon. They have first emerged in the US as part of the country’s ‘suburban development’. They, then, appeared in Europe in the early 19th century in cities such as Paris and London, providing the ‘new industrial bourgeoisie’ with better quality life than the city (Webster and Le Goix 2008, 1195). Gated communities have been spreading all around the world as an urban setup. The study reviews literature on gated communities in different parts of the world looking at the different approaches which have been employed to study them. The economic approach and the spatial approach are two of the most commonly used lenses in the study of gated communities. In both approaches the social and political dimensions are remarkably present. The review is composed of two sections; the first one tackles the studies which employed the economic approach and the second one looks at how the spatial approach is used in studying gated communities.

Mitchell is one of the early scholars who wrote about gated communities in Cairo. He argued that the neoliberal policies that the Egyptian State started to adapt in the 1970s brought such constructions into life. He described gated communities and the other manifestations of neoliberalism as “the most exuberant dreams of private accumulation and chaotic reallocation of collective resources.” This is very obviously shown in the booming number of developments around the city. The state has been
encouraging private investors through offering them public land for low prices and building road networks in short periods. Not just that, the state itself is playing an essential role as the army is one of the biggest builders in Egypt (Mitchell 1999, 28-9).

Other studies from different parts of the world have also connected the neoliberal policies and involvement of private investors in the housing sector to the emergence of gated communities. Kovács and Hegedűs, in their study on gated communities in Budapest in Hungary, maintained that under communist rule, housing projects and city planning were predominantly controlled by the state which put some effort into limiting inequalities in housing. The private developers started investing in this sector only after 1990 as a part of the transition, where the aim was to meet the demand for luxurious housing. Such a transition from state control to market economy enforced the physical segregation between those who can afford prestigious housing and those who cannot (Kovács, and Hegedűs 2013, 200-03).

Obeng-Odoom and others conducted research on gated communities in Malaysia and Ghana. They also have demonstrated that gated communities are a recent phenomenon in both countries. They have appeared after the state allowed private developers into the housing sector (Obeng-Odoom, ElHadary, and Jang 2014, 549-50). Interestingly, these three studies which are conducted on four different countries; Egypt, Poland, Malaysia and Ghana connected the emergence of gated communities to the adoption of neoliberal policies. The developers in the four cases, turned housing into a for-profit market, serving mainly those who can afford an opulent life style.

In the studies discussed above, I mainly concentrated on how the economic factor was framed as the cause for the existence of the gated communities. Various
authors have also been interested in the effects of gated communities, which I will present in the following paragraphs.

Ruijtenberg, the author of one of the most recent studies on gated communities in Cairo, as well tackled the consumerism culture which evolves with the gated communities. He argued that they are presented and consumed as profitable commodities. In many cases, the customer buys a unit mainly to sell it later for a much higher price, rather than living in it (Ruijtenberg 2015, 43). This, he argued, does not just produce profit, but also a consumer; a consumer who buys and sells house to make profit and who leaves Cairo behind with all its problems and opts to buy the ideal lifestyle offered by the market (Ruijtenberg 2015, 52).

Ghanam was also interested in this process of consumer formation. In her study on how the gated communities are advertised as commodities, she demonstrated that the production of a ‘desiring subject’ is so central to publicizing the product. She argued that the advertisements not just match the demand of the market but also create the subject which would desire what they offer, like: exclusivity and distinction, healthy and safe life, and a special location which is far enough form the problems of the city but at the same time well connected to the city (Ghanam 2014). The study of advertisements and the employed discourse by the developers is noticeably present in the literature on gated communities.

Studies on gated communities went far beyond the idea of buying into a luxurious life. Many studies have demonstrated that the residents of the gated communities also are paying-off to enjoy exclusive political liberalization behind the walls. Denis argued that in a country like Egypt which lives under political deliberalization, the residents of gated communities enjoy direct democracy. He
mentioned Mena Garden City compound in Cairo as an example in which private democracy is practiced. The residents organize the shared spaces, monitor the maintenance money and take decisions regarding all related issues to their compound (Denis 2006, 60). Low as well in her study on gated communities in the US named this phenomenon as private government. She pointed out that the residents form councils which do not just organize the community but also reinforce the boundaries between the insiders and the outsiders. She argued that such practices assure democracy for the enclosed community. It does so while undermining the basic conception of democracy (Low 2003 65-6).

The literature reviewed above is drawing upon the economic causes and effects of gated communities. Neoliberalism was framed by many studies as one of the main causes for the emergence of the gated communities, while consumerism culture among the residents was presented as one of the effects reinforcing factor of the existence of gated communities. Such a consumerism culture embedded a belief that anything the city lacks, even democracy, could be compensated through being bought. As my research shows later, the residents of Uptown Cairo opt for buying their rights from their private provider, rather than calling for them as citizens.

The next part then tackles the literature which looks at how the spatial approach is employed in studying gated communities. One of the main interests of these studies on gated communities is reaching an understanding of what is gatedness as a construction; how and why the idea came into life in the first place and what are the implications of such a construction on the individual living behind them and on the society as a whole.
Low studied gated communities in the US. She concluded from the narratives of the residents she had interviewed that fear of social diversity is one of the main reasons behind their preference to live behind the walls (Low 2001, 55). The fear of others has also appeared as one of the reasons for living behind gates in Ruijtenberg’s study on gated communities in Cairo. He argued that the gates and the walls represent protection in the inhabitants’ imagination. The gates in that sense carry the function of protecting whomever is behind them and separating between them and those who do not belong to the place (Ruijtenberg 2015, 41-45).

This poses the question; is it really safer inside gated communities than outside? According to Low, studies showed that there is no proof that gated communities are safer (Low 2003, 24). She suggested that walls, gates and guards provide what she called a ‘false sense of safety’; a form of emotional security rather than a physical one (Low 2003, 10-11). On the other hand, it negatively affects those who are not living in gated communities, as such a desire in private security lessens the collective interest in a safe city for everybody (Low 2003, 18). Low and Ruijtenberg, in their studies on gated communities in two different countries, agreed that gates shape the residents behind them, they develop a feeling of belonging and protection, to the extent that the residents could not imagine not living behind protective walls.

Seeking prestige is also one of the important reasons to live in a gated community. Caldeira in her study on São Paulo, argued that gated communities grant their residents prestigious status and makes them feel distinguished in the society (Caldeira 1999, 119). This is an important part of the function of the gates to keep the other out, not just the criminals but also those who cannot afford being in.
The effect of the gated communities on the whole city is tremendous. Both Caldeira and Low in their studies on different areas mentioned that not just the houses are exclusively for the residents, but also the public spaces such as roads and gardens, etc. This affects the circulation in the city as some roads are not available for public transportation and private cars which belong to outsiders. Caldeira proposed that this changes the nature of public interaction and the landscape of the city (Caldeira 1999, 118; Low 2003, 12). Not just that, she argued that gated communities represent a threat and an obstacle to democracy and citizenship as both concepts are based on the acknowledgment that everybody is equal and have the same rights. However, the core idea of gated communities contradicts such conceptions, as they meant to separate the unequal (Caldeira 1999, 136-37).

The conception of segregation is crucial in the studies on gated communities. Many studies looked at the gated communities as a form of residential segregation. While other studies tried to widen the concept of segregation, framing it as spatial segregation, not just residential. Villaca in his research on São Paulo, defined segregation as “a form of social exclusion and domination that has a spatial dimension.” In his analysis he also included multiple aspects of segregation not just in terms of residence but also considered segregation on multiple levels like jobs, businesses and services (Villaca 2011, 41). Importantly, Villaca emphasized the connection between segregation and inequality. Villaca argued that segregation is an ‘expression’ of inequality in the Brazilian society. In addition, it is a way of social domination. Noticeably, he related domination more to class than to the state (Villaca 2011, 37-39).

In conclusion, my study aims at bringing the two urban setups together under one analytical framework. My observation of the current body of literature suggests
that such attempts are limited. One of the examples is Lemanski’s work on Cape Town; she looked at the mutual perception between one of the wealthy gated communities and its neighboring poor area. Although, the neighboring poor area represented in the study is not an informal area, the study offered an interesting view on the mutual perception between the two areas and its implications (Lemanski 2006, 397-99).

Sims, in his book *Understanding Cairo*, tried to map Cairo according to its residential areas. He argued that Cairo is composed of three forms of residential areas: the formal city, the informal city and the desert city. He sought to understand the complicated developments of Cairo as a city, which until the 1950s only included formal neighborhoods. He brought these different urban constructions together in one study and tried to understand how they function within the city (Sims 2010, 45-50).

For that reason, I believe that a range of studies which brings the different urban constructions together is needed; studies which analyze them as various communities that differ but could also resemble each other in addition to looking at how their existence affects the social fabric and state-citizen relations.

**Conceptual Framework**

As the literature has shown, various approaches and conceptual frameworks have been employed to study the issues of informal areas and gated communities. Each of these frameworks contributed to our understanding of both urban constructions. In my perception, Foucault’s conceptions of government, power and subject, in interaction with Holston’s definition of citizenship, provide an insightful conceptual framework for my study.
In Foucault’s words, to govern means “to structure the possible field of action of others.” (Foucault 1982, 790) In that sense governing is a process of shaping and influencing the actions of the governed or what Gordon has called ‘the conduct of the conduct’ (Gordon 1991, 5-6). This conception of the government goes in line with Foucault’s definition of power. He said that power is:

“A total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.” (Foucault, 1982, 789)

According to this definition, power is not imaginable outside of a relationship, a system of actions and reactions in which power is articulated. Actions of power are meant to shape, control and constrain a possible action, which is followed by a reaction of power. This network of power relations helps my study on state-citizen relations to break away from the narrow perception of power as only owned and exercised by the state over the society. Instead, it provides a wider view on the practices of both the state and the citizens, framing them as actions of power shaping state-society relations.

Foucault, in his analysis on power and subject, insisted that the subjects are not just on the receiving end in power relations, as such relations take place only when the subjects as well as the ruler have the capacity to take actions. He said that “power is exercised only over free subjects.” By freedom he meant the capacity to take an action. In that sense, he said, “slavery is not a relationship of power”. This makes the subjects’ ability to act, an important element in exercising power. Freedom and power, then, are not opposite to each other, on the contrary, freedom is a precondition for power (Foucault 1982, 790). Foucault argued that one cannot fully comprehend power relations without studying subjects’ actions and reactions towards. (Foucault 1982,
This, then, poses the question of what does subject mean given that context of how Foucault framed the process of subject formation and lastly how this can relate to my study on informal areas and gated communities? He said that:

“This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word “subject”: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugated and makes subject to.” (Foucault 1982, 781)

Foucault framed the process of subject formation as a part of power exercise, in which people are categorized and such categories are being enforced through labels. These labels then start to be recognized by one’s self and the others. All these images of subject formation are reflecting on the informal areas and the gated communities; how the people are categorized and labelled, and how such categories are reinforced themselves within the society and defining their relation to the state. Importantly, Foucault’s perception of power relations includes the study of the state’s performance and its tactics to impose power, but also, people’s practices and actions in dealing with the state.

While Foucault demonstrated that power cannot be imagined outside of a relation, Holston articulated citizenship also as a relationship. Holston broke up the normative definition of citizenship, which is based on a territorially bounded population with a specific set of rights and duties, into two forms. The first one is ‘formal’ citizenship which is based on the membership of a specific nation-state, while the second one is substantive citizenship which is about the distribution of rights on the members of the nation-state. He argued that having the first one does not guarantee the second one, that is thanks to the existence of social differences in the society creating
different kinds of citizens. In his words:

“This formulation of citizenship uses social differences that are not the basis of national membership—primarily differences of education, property, race, gender, and occupation—to distribute different treatment to different categories of citizens. It thereby generates a gradation of rights among them, in which most rights are available only to particular kinds of citizens and exercised as the privilege of particular social categories.” (Holston 2007, 7)

For that reason, Holston presented citizenship as a state-society relationship. He argued that the state has reinforced the existence of privileged citizens through “legalizing social difference and legitimizing inequality” in the society. However, the emergence of what he called ‘insurgent citizenship’ resists the existence of such conditions (Holston 2007, 7). Framing citizenship as a relationship allowed him to study the practices of both the state and the citizens; how rights are developed by the state and at the same time how citizenship is practiced and expressed in the actions of the citizens. Holston has also provided the concept of ‘differentiated citizenship’ which does not equate all citizens, but rather differentiates among them (Holston 2007, 3-4). Such a conception of citizenship explains the two urban setups I am keen on studying; gated communities and informal areas. I look on both of them as mechanisms of managing social differences which produce and reproduce inequality and segregation in the society.

Both Foucault and Holston provided an analytical framework which brings state practices and citizens’ resistance together in a relationship. The first one is articulated as power relations, while the second one is presented as citizenship. The combination of both approaches to state-society relations supports my research on both informal areas and gated communities, and how state-society relations are constructed within the two realms.
Chapter Three

The Neighbouring Informal and Gated:

Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo

Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo are two neighbouring areas; the first is one of the biggest informal areas in Egypt, while the second is one of the most luxurious gated communities in Egypt. This chapter discusses the emergence and the growth of each of them. Then, it tackles their urban setup and the social fabric, in addition to going through the relation between the make-up of the space and the everyday life of its people. Lastly, it looks at how the mountain is segregated with each area being exclusively to its inhabitants. The chapter is predominantly based on my own research; including observation, experts as well as residents’ interviews and collected documents. One of the aims of this chapter is to provide basic understanding of the two areas, paving the way for the following chapter which looks at how citizenship is practiced within these two urban setups.

Emergence and Growth

Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo are located on al-Muqaṭṭam Mountain. The mountain also accommodates another informal area called El-Arab and the formal neighborhood of al-Muqaṭṭam. Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo emerged in totally different conditions. They are about five decades apart. In addition, the logic of construction of the two spaces is so dissimilar. In this part, I will discuss the emergence and the growth of Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo.
The limestone workers formed the first community on the mountain. In the early 1960s, Cairo governorate decided to evict a group of families from al-Jamālyah in Old Cairo. After negotiations with the families, they were resettled on al-Muqatam Mountain, a state-owned land which was later called after President Nāṣir. The families moved to the mountain regardless of the tough environment and the inexistent infrastructure to found Manshīyat Nāṣir. These families were originally coming from Upper Egypt and the community kept on growing mainly through attracting more families from Upper Egypt. This benefited the newcomers who were seeking a livelihood in the city. It was also one of the strategies to tame the mountain and make life possible in such an environment (Shorter, Tecke and Oldham 1997, 144-46).
In 1972, the governorate resettled another group of families working on garbage collection which was also originally from Upper Egypt (GTZ et al. 2001a). They first came to Cairo seeking a livelihood during the 1940s and they settled in the periphery of the city and worked on garbage collection. Under Sādāt they were resettled, some of them were moved to al-Muqatām Mountain, where they constructed a garbage village (Iskandar 1994, 1-5). Later, in the early 1990s, the government built temporary housing in al-Duwayqah for those who lost their homes during the 1992 earthquake. More than 25 years later, people are still living in these temporary buildings. Over time, self-constructed buildings were built in al-Duwayqah.

Notably, the state has not just relocated big groups to Manshiyat Nāṣir, but it has also constructed two building complexes as public housing in the area; al-Ḥirafiyin (Artisans) Buildings and the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. The first consists of five-storey buildings with workshops in the ground floor. The second was partially built on a piece of land belonged to the Central Security Forces close to al-Duwayqah. It was later called the New Duwayqah (GTZ et al. 2001a). Except for the two building complexes built by the state, it is a self-constructed area. It means that the residents have built everything from scratch, not just the buildings, but also the basic services and work environment.

Now, Manshiyat Nāṣir is one of the biggest informal areas in Egypt. It covers around 6.5 km². It has been gradually growing since it was founded in the 1960s. Although, the state is the one which has relocated the founders and later other groups in the area, it is considered as an informal area in that the people own the buildings, but the land is owned by the state. The state policies on informal areas have been

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2 According to the governorate, it covers 15.22 km². However, tadamun, which cited the governorate pointed out that Manshiyat Nāṣir spreads over 7.9 km². My calculations on google earth show that both are a bit inflated, as it is around 6.5 km².
inconsistent. For a long time, it has not been clear whether they should be removed as they are illegal or be provided with some basic services with or without legalizing their status. This was one of the main reasons why the state is hesitant about providing basic services.

Manshīyat Nāṣir witnessed the first development plan in 1977 by a World Bank upgrading project. This project provided the government with funds to install sewers and water pipes to replace the poor community solutions to deal with human waste, in addition to building a number of social buildings and a school. Moreover, the project attempted to legalize the status of the residents by selling them the land their buildings are built upon. However, the project totally failed in that regard (Shorter, Tecke and Oldham 1997, 160-61). It was followed by other land ownership right recognition attempts, but none of them were successful.

Since then, the area has witnessed many big, medium and small scale development programmes by local NGOs and international organizations in cooperation with the Egyptian government. As Akl, one of Tadamun’s architects who worked on the area, pointed out to me “The people there became development professionals.” (‘Aql 2016) In late 1990s, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Techische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) started its Participatory Urban Development Program in Manshīyat Nāṣir in Cooperation with the Egyptian government. The first project took place in ‘Azbat Bakhīt, in which the GTZ was present in the area for many years, that children were joking that “The Germans have occupied the area.” (Āly 2016). At the same time, the Egyptian Ministry of Housing was developing al-Duwayqah with financial aid from Abu-Dhabi Fund for Development.

Then, a five-year plan was put to develop the rest of Manshīyat Nāṣir’s areas in the period 2002-2007. It tried to get the residents to take part in participatory workshops
to express their needs and priorities. The program contributed to planning the area; in which Manshīyat Nāṣir was divided into nine areas, ranging from MN1-MN9 (GTZ et al. 2001a; GTZ, Cairo Governorate and Manshīyat Nāṣir Municipality 2001b; GTZ and Cairo Governorate 1999). Manshīyat Nāṣir previously followed different administrative municipalities. Currently, it has its own police station and municipality, which is composed of the mentioned above nine areas and two historical areas on the other side of al-Naṣr road, Barqwuq and Qāytbāy. The program provided infrastructure for water, sewage and power; building hospital, schools and some other social buildings was also part of it. The reports on the workshops mentioned land ownership as one of the residents’ top priority. However, this was the least successful among the other recommendations (GTZ et al. 2001a; GTZ, Cairo Governorate and Manshīyat Nāṣir Municipality 2001b).

Map 3.2: Manshīyat Nāṣir

Manshīyat Nāṣir is one of Cairo’s biggest informal areas.
Source: Map drawn by the author and Moritz Mihatsch based on Google Maps.
In 2008, a rock in al-Duwayqah was dislodged and killed a large number of residents and destroyed many buildings in al-Duwayqah and ‘Azbat Bakhīt. The rock-fall prevented any further development plans to take place, as the governorate decided to first list all the unsafe areas. The government, then, started to relocate those who lost their houses into the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. Others were moved to 6th of October City, which is considered as “in the middle of nowhere” by the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir. Since then, the government has been removing people from the unsafe spots in Manshīyat Nāṣir. Recently, a number of them were moved to al-Āsmārāt neighbourhood, a recently finished neighbourhood was opened by President al- Sīsī, which is located outside of Manshīyat Nāṣir, but not far from it.

Since then no large-scale development plans have taken place. Only relocation is happening. When I asked Khalīl Sha’t, Cairo Governor’s advisor and head of Cairo governorate’s informal area upgrading unit, and a senior policy advisor at GIZ, about future plans for the area, his answer was:

“If your glasses are broken what are you going to do? You will go to your father or mother to ask them to fix it for you, no? The physical budget in Egypt is so centralized; it comes from the ministry to the governorate. The budget for informal areas development is mostly for streets lightening and roads. Now, the Informal Settlements Development Fund helps the governorates to conduct some projects. However, it is very limited as it gives only 500 million EGP per year; covering all the governorates. This means about 10-30 million EGP to each of them. We need decentralization; we need to balance between authority and responsibility. You cannot say that the governorate does not perform while you do not give it the money.” (Sha’t 2016)

What Sha’t has said basically meant that there are no current or near future development plans for Manshīyat Nāṣir, as the ministry is not providing the governorate with the budget needed which stressed the importance of decentralization for the development of the informal areas.
In 2008, a mega urban development plan called the Cairo 2050 Plan was announced. Manshīyat Nāṣir appeared on the map as a big green area labelled as “Tourist resort: previously Manshīyat Nāṣir”, without any indication about to where the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir will be moved. South of the “tourist resort”, only Uptown Cairo was labelled on al-Muqāṭām Mountain. On the map, Uptown Cairo, which was under construction, looked like a piece of the future, while Manshīyat Nāṣir was represented as the forgotten past (See Map 1.1).

Uptown Cairo is one of the real estate projects by Emaar Properties, an Emirati company which developed Burj Khalifa in Dubai which is the tallest tower in the world. In 2005, Emaar Misr was established to conduct projects in Egypt (Namatalla, 2007b). Cairo Heights appeared to be one of the first real estate projects by Emaar Misr and it was a joint venture with El Nasr Housing and Development Company (Abaza 2005, 38), which was established in the 1960s by President Nāṣir. It has been responsible for developing Nāṣr City and later al-Muqāṭām Mountain (El Nasr Housing and Development Company 2016). The name of the project was later changed to Uptown Cairo as a project by Emaar Misr on its own. Elshahed claimed that the land was sold to Emaar Misr for 92 EGP per square meter when it was worth 2200 EGP during the time (Elshahed 2011).

Notably, part of the land belongs to the army. For that, Mohammed El-Dahan, the previous CEO of Emaar Misr, said that in exchange

“The company paid 72 million EGP for modifying the conditions of the units affiliated to the armed forces in the project area. In addition to spending 60 million EGP to build alternative military facilities in return for using their part of land of Uptown Cairo.” (Farid 2014)

Importantly, there is still a military site neighboring to Uptown Cairo.

Emaar Misr is the developer of three gated communities in Egypt namely Uptown Cairo on al-Muqāṭām Mountain, Mivida in New Cairo and Marassi on the
North Coast. Furthermore, it is developing a large mall which includes hotel, schools, work spaces and places of worship. It is located on the Cairo-Alexandria road and is called Cairo Gate (Emaar 2016). In 2014, Emaar Misr, the Cairo governorate, the Ministry of Defence, Investment and Local Development signed a protocol to build Emaar Square in Uptown Cairo (Farid 2014). The square is planned to comprise shopping and entertainment areas, restaurants, and workspaces (Emaar 2016).

Map 3.3: Villages of Uptown Cairo


Uptown Cairo is located on al-Muqata‘am Mountain, south of Manshīyat Nāṣir. It covers about 4 km² (Namatalla 2007a). It is composed of a number of so-called villages; smaller fenced communities. Construction work is still ongoing, some villages are finished and inhabited like Eliva, some are inhabited but still have minor construction work like Alba Spendia, and others are still to be delivered. Uptown Cairo is one of the most luxurious gated communities in Egypt as it has a golf course, tennis courts, a spa, a gym, an International American school and restaurants. In addition,
every village has its own “mini supermarket” and a community center which has indoor and outdoor space, and a swimming pool.

Map 3.4: Facilities in Uptown Cairo

Urban Setup and Social Fabric

As I have discussed earlier the logic of the construction of the two areas was very different and the urban setup and social fabric of the two spaces are also dissimilar. In this part I will tackle the urban and the humane components of the make-up of the two spaces; one as a self-constructed place and one as a planned luxurious one. It is an attempt to understand to what extent the space shapes the everyday life of its people, but also how the everyday life of the people is making-up the space.

Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo are both located on al-Muqāṭam Mountain. The mountain has always had an important role in defending the city in that two citadels were built on the mountain. Until today, the mountain still hosts military camps. Before the founders of Manshīyat Nāṣir were moved by the governorate to the mountain, it had

no value as a residential area. Overtime, Manshīyat Nāṣir attracted a big number of poor immigrants mainly from Upper Egypt and the sliding segments of the city’s lower and the lower middle class. Later, the state-owned El Nasr Housing and Development Company started developing the mountain, constructing the formal neighborhood of Muqṭam, which attracted the middle class to inhabit the mountain. As discussed, Emaar Misr, lately, planned the construction of one of the most luxurious gated communities in Egypt on the mountain.

Now, the inhabitants of the mountain consider themselves in a very central area of the city. Although the three urban setups are neighboring; each has its own level of connectedness to the rest of the city and its own means of transport. Manshīyat Nāṣir is located parallel to al- Naṣr road and Salah Salem; two of the most vital roads connecting the different parts of the city, which insures its connectedness to the city. Its residents are using the small Suzuki microbuses, a community-organized means of transportation, to commute to ‘Attabah and Islamic Cairo, as a big number of them are working there. In addition to the public buses offered by the state and the residents’ privately-owned cars. Emaar is advertising Uptown Cairo as the heart of the city. It enhanced the connectivity of the compound differently. The company has built three private roads connecting Uptown Cairo to Naṣr city (as a route to downtown), Maadi and New Cairo, as the residents only way of transportation is their privately-owned cars.

Manshīyat Nāṣir is made up of a number of areas which have organically grown over the decades; Uptown Cairo, on the other hand, was planned to be divided into smaller fenced communities referred to as villages. Accordingly, they have different stories of construction. The founders of Manshīyat Nāṣir were concerned with the security situation, so they built their shelters closely to each other in one area. The
community kept on growing, which translated into the growth of the existing areas and the founding of new areas around them. The newcomers from Upper Egypt were clustering around the residents who belong to the same village in Upper Egypt. For instance, Luxor street in ‘Azbat Bakhīt was founded by a group form Luxor and more and more people from Luxor joined them.

In addition, the government resettled groups. The garbage collectors, for instance, constituted a coherent group, as most of them originally coming from Upper Egypt and they are working in the same industry. So, they clustered in one spot. However, the resettled group which lost their houses for the earthquake were less coherent; they belonged to different areas of the city and the only common thing which brought them together in al-Duwayqah, the public temporary housing, was the earthquake.

Consequently, the social fabric of the different areas varies. Raḍwā, one of my interviewees, has lived with her family in ‘Azbat Bakhīt and later she moved to the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. She moved to live with her aunt who lost her house to the rock-fall in 2008 and was compensated with an apartment in the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. She noted that:

“People living in ‘Azbat Bakhīt are more conservative than the people of Suzanne Mubarak. In Bakhīt they are still carrying the traditions and customs of Upper Egypt. Now I live in Suzanne Mubarak, I can go back home late in the evening without being of a bad reputation, while in Bakhīt that was not possible.” (Raḍwā 2016)

While Āḥmād who is living in al-Mazlaqān, one of the oldest areas in Manshīyat Nāṣir, said that:

“al-Duwayqah lacked the values, the manners and the social system which other areas in Manshīyat Nāṣir have. That is because of the way the area was constructed. It was originally temporary housing for people who lost their houses in 1992 all around Cairo. The government brought them together there. Not just that, in many cases, more than a family would be located in one apartment. This led to lots of scandals.” (Āḥmād 2016)
Raḍwá and Āḥmād pointed out to the different value systems of the people living in the different areas of Manshīyat Nāṣir. The Residents are very diverse in many regards. Like other informal areas in Egypt, they are a mix of very poor uneducated people, middle-class highly educated, and very wealthy families. Against the common visions on informal areas, Manshīyat Nāṣir is not a space which is occupied only by poor people. Although slum-style buildings exist in the area, it is not the dominant style. There is a big number of high apartment-buildings. Some of them are very fancy; with shining entrance areas fully covered of expensive marble. In my conversation with Tamer, a son of one of the richest families in Manshīyat Nāṣir which works in textile production and owns many shops in ‘Attabah (Downtown), he said:

“Yes, my family affords living in a fancy area, but my father and uncles decided to build a nice building in Manshīyat Nāṣir, instead. We are emotionally connected to the area. I personally like the area. I grew up here. We know everybody, and we are very famous here. All my friends are living here. I do not think I am going to move out of the area, when I get married.” (Tāmer 2016)

Moreover, Manshīyat Nāṣir has Muslims and Christians. Except for Zabālīn (Garbage Quarter) which has a majority of Christians, they are both distributed over the whole space.

The areas on the other side of al- Naṣr road are mostly composed of graveyards. Each graveyard consists of an empty piece of land, in the middle which is surrounded by rooms. Underneath the empty land, there are rooms in which the dead are resting. On the ground rooms surround this piece of land, there are families living; in most of the cases they the guards of the graveyards. In addition, there are apartment buildings spread around the area. Haga Zenat said that:

“My father in-law was the guard of this graveyard. My husband inherited his job and the family has been living here for three generations. All my sons have got married and left the area. Only one of my sons got married in Manshīyat
Illustration 3.1: Houses in Manshīyat Nāṣir

Big apartment buildings and slum-style housing.
Source: Photograph taken by the author.
The other side of al- Naṣr road is mostly composed of graveyards and historical mausoleums which house a big number of people.

Source: Photograph taken by the author.
Nāṣir; the area here is old and has no space for new families, that’s why he decided to live up the mountain (referring to the other side of al- Naṣr road).” (Zīnāt, 2016)

As Muḥammad Kamāl, the previous head of the National Democratic Party office in Manshīyat Nāṣir and the guard of Muḥammad ‘Aly’s family graveyard referred to it:

“It is expelling area.” He clarified:

“The area has neither the space nor the capacity to attract new people to it, not like the other side. Currently, it is expelling not attracting area.” (Kamāl 2016)

Uptown Cairo, on the other hand, comprises of a number of so-called villages; smaller fenced communities. Each village has its own style, housing unit type and price range. For instance, Alba Spendia is one of the villages which only has small villas and they cost around seven million EGP each, while Eliva is composed of twin-houses which value about three and half million EGP. There are also apartments which cost slightly above two million pounds and big villas which could reach 40 million EGP.

The financial capacity is one of the main differences between the residents of the different villages. Haytham used to live in Eliva but then he upgraded to Alba Spendia. He said:

“I first lived in a twin house in Eliva. But the community there was very bad. So I decided to move to Alba Spendia; seeking a life with better people. As you know, I am not evaluating people with how much money they have, but those who pay three million EGP are not like those who pay more than seven million EGP.” (Haytham 2016)

Being one of the most luxurious and expensive gated communities in Egypt, means that only very rich people can live there. The residents I meet are very different, in terms of professions and education. They also belong to various cultural and social backgrounds. The common factor which brings all of them together is being wealthy.
Each village houses a specific kind of building such as apartment buildings, twin-houses and villas.
Source: Photograph taken by the author.
In this part I aimed at constructing an image of the two neighboring spaces in respect of where they are located in relation to the city, what is the urban composition of each of them and who lives there. This image was being built over the time of my fieldwork in the two areas. The final aim of this part is to bring all these observations together and try to understand the relationship between the make-up of the space and the everyday life of its people.

Some literature on informal areas and gated communities aimed at studying this relationship. Khalil and Kuppingger in their studies on informal areas in Egypt looked at how the people of al-Ţaybyîn and Ramlit Bûlâq appropriate the space to their everyday life; their daily needs and rhythm (Khalil 2014; Kuppingger 1998). Ruijtenberg, on the other hand, in his study on gated communities in Cairo, noted that the residents of the gated communities opt to “preserve the built environment”; they reinforce it, rather than changing it (Ruijtenberg 2015, 10-11). In other words, they tend to comply with what is offered by the company and adapt their lives accordingly, not the other way around.

Looking at Manshīyat Nāşir, one clearly notices that the construction of the space is based on a continuous process of appropriation of the space to day-to-day lives of its inhabitants. It is noticeable in the use of the public space, how the women would sit in front of their houses or by their windows to breath some fresh air and chat with their neighbors, the children playing in the street, men sitting together in the coffee shops which usually occupy a big part of the street, etc. The public space is also used for economic activities, such as women with Pepsi fridges and some snacks in front of their houses and the big market in the middle of Manshīyat Nāşir.
It is also interesting to see how the streets are being used in the garbage area. The whole space appears as a large workshop. As Michel one of the garbage collectors noted “what you can see around in the streets is not rubbish but rather well-organized precious material.” The appropriation strategies are not only visible in the public space, but also the private one. For instance, the families would build extra floors on top of their houses for their kids to be able to get married in the house of the family, as it is much more expensive to look for a new space.

On the contrary, the make up of the space in Uptown Cairo is based on how the company imagines, what it calls, the “world class life” should be. Consequently, reinforcing the existing organization of the space, assures as person as belonging to that class. The company put a strict and broad set of rules, instructing the residents about what they are allowed to do and what they should not do, not just in the public space, but also inside their houses. Each of the residents of Uptown Cairo is provided with a “Homeowners’ Manual” to get instructions about the rules of the place. There are clear set of rules and penalties for the proper use of such spaces; like littering, pets, kids, noise, graffiti, commercial activities, use of roads, etc.

In addition, the manual provides the owners with very detailed instructions on how to use their privately-owned space. For instance, it bans storing anything in the garage and the balconies. Importantly, the owners need to request a permit from the company in order to be able to do any modifications of their houses. In the request, they need to include a list of documents, among them the exact scope of work, detailed architectural drawings and the contractor license. Unsurprisingly, the request could be rejected. Talking to the residents some of them are satisfied with the service provided by Emaar and others have problems with the quality and communication. However,
most of them agree that putting such restrictive rules has its value; mainly to avoid chaos and the presumed bad taste of the nouveau-riche.

**Illustration 3.4: Advertising Uptown Cairo**

Uptown Cairo is advertised for being a prestigious place which offers its residents a world class.

Each owner gets a manual which includes instructions to the residents of Uptown.

Illustration 3.6: Instructions on Home Internal Modifications

The Manual includes rules organizing the public space as well as the private space.

As shown in the last few paragraphs, I think that Khalil and Kuppingers’s thoughts are applicable to Manshīyat Nāṣir and Ruijtenberg’s argument fits Uptown Cairo. However, I believe that the relationship between the make-up of the space and the everyday life of its people anywhere is not one-way. In other words, one can see the impact of the space on people’s life style and the other way around in the two areas; both patterns exist with different degrees in the informal and the gated. It is interesting to see that although the residents of Uptown Cairo support and reinforce the rules of the company, they still challenge and ignore them on many occasions. For instance, some owners decorated the facades of their houses in a way which obviously breaks the rules set by the company. Also, children are not allowed to be on their own without adults’ supervision in the public space. However, many of families let their children cycle between the villages and enjoy their time at the pool without being around. Such actions represent practices of appropriation, though, adaption to the system enforced by the company is very prevalent.

On the other hand, there is a degree of adaption to the built environment in Manshīyat Nāṣir. A number of the people who lost their houses for the rock-fall in 2008 used to live in one-story houses. Then, they were moved to the Suzanne Muabarak houses, which are five-story apartment buildings. Raḍwā said that:

“In al-Duwayqah people, especially women, used to sit in front of their houses in the evening to chat with their neighbours. After they were moved to the apartments in the new buildings, sitting down in the street started to be much less noticeable, as it is more complicated to just open your door and sit in front of it. In addition, the new apartments have better ventilation.” (Raḍwā 2016)

The people adapted their life to the new built environment, although they lived almost all of their previous life trying to adapt the space to their lifestyle.
So Close and Yet So Far

Looking at the map, the mountain seems to be a large urban space. However, a closer look shows that the mountain accommodates three highly segregated urban communities: the informal, the gated and the formal. Each of these spaces is segregated from the other two. Segregation can be seen in the big wall separating Uptown Cairo from Manshīyat Nāṣir and the formal neighborhood of Moqattam.

The inhabitants of the mountain, who happen to be living outside of the wall, feel segregation in their everyday life. Every time, they are on their way to or back home, they are not allowed to use the roads which already exist, but are not for their use. They are built exclusively to make the life of the Uptowners easier, not to enhance the city road network neither to enhance the connectivity of the mountain. Karam, a long-term resident in the formal neighborhood of al-Muqātam, said:

“I was happy about the road construction work by Emaar, as it is going to make my life easier and lessen the congestion of al-Muqātam main roads. However, I was very disappointed when I knew that not everybody can use the roads, only the residents of Uptown Cairo.” (Karam 2016)

Uptown Cairo is advertised as being the “heart of Cairo”. It is true that it is the only development located inside the city, not in the satellite cities around Cairo. However, this did not make it less exclusive than the other ones outside of the city. On the contrary, Uptown Cairo is one of the extreme cases of exclusivity in the city. It does not only have walls around it, but also walls within the walls fencing the different villages and, finally, for the first time in Cairo, walled private roads. The residents enjoy both mobility and exclusivity, as it is well-connected to most of the vital areas in the city. They can easily move around the city but at the same time they have their own exclusive residential space.
Illustration 3.7: Walls Segregating Uptown Cairo from Manshīyat Nāṣir and al-Muqaṭṭam neighborhood

The wall photographed from Uptown Cairo, Manshīyat Nāṣir and al-Muqaṭṭam. Source: Photograph taken by the author.

Map 3.5: The Unique Location of Uptown Cairo

Segregation is not just represented in walls. Manshīyat Nāṣir is in a very central location; in addition, it is accessible from al-Naṣr road and Salah Salem road. This means that a large number of the city people pass by the area on daily basis. However, the knowledge about the area among them is very weak. Manshīyat Nāṣir, like many other informal areas and poor neighborhoods in Cairo has a very bad reputation. Many of the people of the city would consider it as a dangerous area. Consequently, they would not consider it as a place to visit. Although, the area does not have fences around, it is segregated.

Although the residents of the two areas are living only a couple of hundred meters away from each other, the chance to see each other is very limited. Practically, they do not use the same means of transportation, neither do they go to the same shops, schools, hospitals, clubs, etc. The life on the other side of the wall is more an imaginary world than a reality. Segregation does not only demark the spaces and define the relation between those who are inside and the others. But also, define the relation between the state and the different demarcate areas, as the state intervenes differently in each of them.

**Conclusion**

Studying the nature of Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo is one of the early steps on the way of understanding how state-citizen relations are framed. In this chapter, I sought to build up a body of knowledge of both areas. First I tackled how both areas emerged, developed and grew in different period of times and contexts. Then, I studied the urban setup and the social fabric of the two area, in an attempt to understand the spatial and social dynamics within each of them. It was interesting to see how the inhabitants of Manshīyat Nāṣir are continuously adapting the space to their lifestyle. In contrary, the residents of Uptown Cairo adapt their lifestyle to the setup of the space
provided by the company. However, actions of adapting to and adapting the space still exist to some extent in both areas. Finally, the chapter looked at manifestations of segregation between the different areas and their role in demarking the whole mountain.

This basic understanding of Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo within the larger frame of state-citizen relations demonstrated that the two areas have emerged and grew during different times, conditions as well as distinct forms of intervention by the state. They also represent two distinct communities in terms of both the urban setup and the social fabric. Lastly, the chapter showed how the two unequal communities are separated by looking at the manifestations of segregation on the mountain. This paves the way to the following chapter which discusses more in-depth how citizenship is practiced by the state developing rights and citizens practicing, pushing and giving up on rights. The next chapter specifically looks at how citizenship is practiced in a number of fields such as basic services and legal rights.
Chapter Four

Citizenship in Practice

This chapter aims at understanding how citizenship functions as a day-to-day practice of the different citizens of the city and the state. Based on the collected data *Citizenship in Practice* tries to empirically answer the main question posed by my thesis of how does state-citizen relations differ from gated communities to informal areas? And what are the implications of these different conceptions of citizenship? This chapter brings together fields in which citizenship is practiced like urban utilities, health and education and security as basic services provided by the state and guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution for everybody. It also looks at legal rights like ownership and personal recognition.

All these fields in which the relation between the state and the citizens takes place are studied drawing on Foucault’s power relations and Holston’s conception of citizenship. Foucault’s power relations depicted power as a network of actions and reactions of power which happens between those who govern and the governed. Most importantly, he stressed that power can only be practiced on subjects who have the space and capacity to react; otherwise it could not be defined as power relation. Such a conception of power applies to the relationship between the state and the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo, as the state plans and acts; and on the other side, the citizens of both areas react and deal with the state, interestingly, in different ways. But, they all have the capacity to act and react in this power network.

Holston’s conception of citizenship as a relation between the state and the citizens also provides an insightful framework of my study on these different fields. Holston has differentiated between two definitions of citizenship, one is based on the membership of a specific nation and the other is a substantive definition concentrates
on the distribution of rights on the members. According to him, the first one does not necessarily guarantee the second one. This is clear in many state’s practices which differentiate between the citizens of the nation; creating what he called ‘differentiated citizenship’ which does not equate all citizens, but rather differentiate among them. Notably, social differences were very present in Holston’s study on citizenship.

I believe that social differences do not just shape citizens’ relations to each other, but also affect state-citizen relations. As this chapters shows, the state has been intervening differently in the two areas; distributing rights based on citizens’ discrete social, economic and political realities, rather than their mere membership in the nation. As mentioned before this chapter digs through a number of rights to see how they are distributed by the state, but also how they are perceived and practiced by the citizens of both areas.

**Basic Services**

Although, geographically it is one area, the logic of providing the services is different. Manshīyat Nāṣir was established in the early 1960s. For decades, the residents have suffered from the lack of the basic services, it took them years to tame the mountain to make life possible and years of struggle with the state to get it to provide the basic services. Uptown Cairo, unlike Manshīyat Nāṣir, is a planned area in which the space, the streets, the buildings, the green areas, the different facilities, the capacity of the infrastructure, and the estimated numbers of the residents are pre-planned. The difference between a self-constructed area like Manshīyat Nāṣir and a planned luxurious place like Uptown Cairo is, understandably substantial. For that purpose, I will be more specific, I look at a number of urban utilities, education and health and security as basic services provided to both areas.
Urban Utilities

When people first moved to Manshīyat Nāṣir in the 1960s; the mountain lacked all the required basic services. The first thing the government has provided, after the people moved, was three taps of water along the main road, which were the only source of water in the area. For a long time, carrying the water home was part of the daily life. At the beginning, kerosene lamps were the only source for lightening. This has changed over time because the Electricity Authority provides the households with meters regardless their legal status (Shorter, Tecke and Oldham 1997, 145). The community has managed the human waste for a long period of time; the poor applied solutions are believed to be among the reasons behind the rocks instability in some spots on the mountain. Development plans carried by international organizations like the World Bank and the GTZ in cooperation with the Egyptian government provided the area with some of the needed basic services.

Uptown Cairo, on the other hand, was equipped with all the required urban utilities before it was even occupied. The services were provided according to an estimated number of the residents-to-be. Emaar is responsible for the existence and the sustainability of these services in Uptown Cairo, although they are provided by the state. The residents refer any problem with the services to the company not to the state institutions which provide the service. The company as a mediator between the citizens and the state is responsible for pushing the state institutions to provide the services.

Moreover, the residents receive the bills through the company, not directly from the state institutions. Normally, a state institution employee comes to the door and checks the meter for consumption. Later, an employee comes back with the bill to collect the money. However, in Uptown Cairo things go differently. Every household
has its own financial account; in which such bills and other dues are adding up. The owners can pay whenever they feel like it; not on monthly basis like anywhere else in Egypt. This system also fulfils the company promise of keeping outsiders away, as the state employees do not enter the gates, but the company collects the money for the state from the citizens.

In the next few paragraphs, I concentrate on electricity, because the delivery system in Uptown Cairo is unique comparing to the other services. In Uptown Cairo, like any other place in Egypt, electricity is provided by the public Electricity Authority. However, there is a mediator between the state as the provider and the citizens. The Qalaa Holdings is co-founded and headed by Āḥmād Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, the son of Heikal, a prominent journalist and influential politician. The Qalaa Holdings own shares in a big number of companies; Taqa Arabia is one among them (Taqa Arabia; Qalaa Holdings). Taqa Arabia plays the role of the mediator between the state and the residents; it is responsible for distributing electricity in Uptown Cairo. The company distributes the electricity for exactly the same price the government sets, however, it takes it from the government for cheaper price, as it saves the government the cost of issuing the bills and collecting the money. In my conversation with Haitham, an Uptown Cairo resident, he said that:

“Taqa company is an intermediate between the government and the residents. Part of the expenses they make us pay because we are living in an elite community is bring us an interface instead of dealing directly with the government. The company gets fees; it agreed with the government to sell the electricity according to the governmental prices, because it is forbidden to sell public services more than the set price. The government sells the electricity to the company for cheaper prices than it is normally given to the people. The company then makes money from that difference. They tried to also collect fees from the residents. But, I have refused and told them do not bother yourself I will go directly to the government. We do not have the meter of the government; Outside of the houses we have a meter which I bought from Taqa for incredibly
high price. I get the service from the government same price like everybody through a company which sends me a receipt and I can see the consumption and the expenses on my laptop, fancy services for the money I am paying. They do not collect the money on monthly basis, I can pay every year if I want. Every now and then, I check my account and see how much money I owe them. For instance, they say you need to pay 50 000 EGP, I give them a check and that’s it.” (Haitham, 2016)

Around Egypt, the government has information about electricity consumption of each and every household. In Uptown Cairo, the state can only generate knowledge on the overall consumption of the whole space. Only the company has this kind of information. Therefore, the state has more capacity to generate information on the rest of the city and even informal areas than gated communities like Uptown Cairo. Since the emergence of the nation-state, developing knowledge on the population has been one of its essential functions. However, in this specific case, the state gives up on this ability.

Across the road in Manshīyat Nāṣir, people lived for decades without electricity. They had to pressure on the government to get it. Moreover, they, as anybody else living in Egypt, except for Uptown residents, need to pay monthly bills. If they stop paying, the government cuts the service until they pay. To sum up, Uptown Cairo residents do not have to pay month by month, but the inhabitants of Manshīyat Nāṣir do, otherwise the service will be cut. The electricity is given from the source ‘the state’ to the mediator ‘Taqa’ for less price than it is given to the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir. Moreover, electricity is provided in Uptown Cairo before the residents even moved in, while Manshīyat Nāṣir’s residents had to struggle for decades without electricity.
The state offers public schools and hospitals to all the citizens. However, anybody who can afford the private services would never opt to public schooling neither to the public health system. All the residents of Uptown Cairo I have interviewed said that they have never been to public hospitals and all of them send their kids to private, mostly international, schools. While all the participants from Manshīyat Nāșir, except for three, send their kids to public schools. They also mostly go to public hospitals.

Development plans, religious institutions and the government brought hospitals and ḥūdāt šīḥyah (health care units) to Manshīyat Nāšir. For instance, al-Shaikh Zāydh hospital was built as part of developing the area of Dwiqa. In addition, the Saint Samʿān Church in Zabālīn Quarter and al-Daʿwah Mosque by al- Naṣr road have their own health care units. There are also governmental health care units. When I asked about the quality of the health service in the area, Karīm said:

“One day I injured myself; I got treated in al-Shaikh Zāydh hospital. It was fine, but I would only go there for simple things. The hospital is big and fancy, but unfortunately there is a shortage of doctors.” (Karīm 2016)

Shady pointed out that there is a difference between the hospitals inside and outside of the area. He said:

“When I was a child I had a big accident, in which I needed an immediate operation. My parents took me to al-Ḥussīn Hospital (a public hospital in Old Cairo) and they have not even considered any of the places inside of Manshīyat Nāṣir because everybody knows that they are not equipped to deal with dangerous cases.” (Shady 2016)

Raḍwā also stressed on that difference; saying that:

“Only needy people visit doctors in Manshīyat Nāṣir, those who can afford public hospitals and doctors’ private practices outside of the area would never consider the health services in the area.” (Raḍwā 2016)

Obviously the quality of health services inside Manshīyat Nāṣir are even worse than the average quality of the public health services offered outside. To put it into perspective, the public hospitals which only the well-off residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir can afford, would never be considered by the inhabitants of Uptown Cairo for its low
quality. Uptown Cairo does not have hospitals; so the residents predominantly use private hospitals and practices outside of it.

Emaar’s announced plan for Uptown Cairo includes an American International School. When I asked some of the residents about their kids education, international schools seemed to be the only option. Salmá has got married recently; she has been to an international school and she plans to do the same with her kids. She said that:

“I have heard about the international school in which Emaar is going to build. It will be great to send my kids to a school which is five minutes away from their home. If it is international and good school, I will definitely send my kids to.” (Salmá 2016)

Manshīyat Nāṣir has elementary and preliminary schools, but it does not have high schools. Lots of the residents send their kids to the schools inside the area. However, some of them send their kids to public schools outside of the area seeking better quality education. The young men and women I have met in Manshīyat Nāṣir have complained that they did not learn much in the school. Complaining about the quality, bad treatment and high cost of education is common among the residents I have interviewed. Noticeably, a big number of the residents had at least elementary and preliminary education, while lesser numbers went to a high school and university.

Mu’taz is currently a worker in a cloth factory. He went to a public technical school in Abbasia, a nearby neighbourhood, where he studied electricity. He said:

“Unfortunately, I did not learn there what makes me a qualified electrician. For that reason, I have not worked as an electrician. But, at least I learned how to read and write. My younger brother is now in his fifth grade, but, he can barely read and write.” (Mu’taz 2016)

Not just Mu’taz has noticed that bad education has deteriorated even further. A large number of them mentioned that they used to go to private classes given by their school teachers for money after the school day. Now, it is even worse, for the last couple of years, the teachers started to give obligatory private classes for money inside the class room during the school day. Raḍwá studied English language in Ain Sham University. She said:

“During my bachelor’s studies, I volunteered to work in a school in Manshīyat Nāṣir as an English teacher. I was the only English teacher in the whole school. I had a very bad experience; it was too much work as I had to teach English for
all the students in the school. Moreover, the school wanted the students to copy and memorize texts to be able to write something in the exams, not to learn the language. They were also asking me to give extra classes for money during the school day time. I did not feel comfortable with forcing my students to pay money for something they should not pay for. I eventually quit.” (Raḍwá 2016)

Shady is a toktok driver in Manshīyat Nāṣīr. He also mentioned that the cost of education is too high in addition to the bad treatment by the teachers. He told me:

“My teachers were not nice to me neither to the other students. They kept on insulting me until I was not able to take it anymore and I decided not to go to the school again. My sister, on the other hand, is in her last year in the high school. She really insists on finishing her studies and our mother encourages her. But, my brothers and I are against it. If you calculate it, her private classes cost us almost 12000 EGP a year. It is too much for us and nobody else has finished his studies.” (Shady 2016)

Basic education is mentioned in the Egyptian constitution as a granted right for all citizens. In theory public schools’ fees are very low. However, in practice, the students need to take expensive private classes to be able to pass the exams. This makes even basic education in public schools unaffordable for a big number of people.

Security

Security systems in the two areas are different. Manshīyat Nāṣīr’s security system is based on the community, as the state presence in the area is very recent. When people first settled in Manshīyat Nāṣīr, they were aware of the fact that it is their job to secure their lives in the mountain. Recently, state institutions like the police station and the municipality were built in the area. In Uptown Cairo as well, the state is not the main provider of security. Like many other gated communities, a private company, not the state, is responsible for securing Uptown Cairo.

Uptown Cairo is surrounded by walls from all sides; it has only three gates. Moreover, it is composed of smaller fenced communities; each has its own gate and
guards. The three private roads connecting Uptown Cairo to the rest of the city are also walled and gated. Within the walls, security men and their cars are distributed around the whole space; having cars labelled as police, some of these cars are four-wheel drive with armed guards. Remarkably, there is no presence of the state police in the whole area.

Watching and experiencing the strict security system in Uptown Cairo, brings to my mind the question of keeping whom out. Every time I tried to enter through the gates, I felt that I need to prove that I deserve to be let in; that I somehow belong to those who live on the right side of the wall. In my conversation with Haitham, who lives in Uptown Cairo and owns a beach house in Marassi, Emaar’s gated community by the North Coast, he told me about a fight he had with the head of the security in Marassi because one of his guests was mistreated at the gates. He said:

“It was a big fight. I went into the security office with my guest and I was so frustrated. The head of the security was also angry he asked me: why are you angry at me? I am doing my job; I am protecting Marassi from becoming Jamaṣah.” (Haytham2016)

The head of the security referred to keeping the vulgar poor people out to save the prestigious Marassi as the elite’s beach. Interestingly, the safety of the place and keeping the outlaws and the criminals out was not even mentioned. Jamaṣah is a town by the North Coast which has public beaches and visited by the those who cannot afford private beaches. Using Jamaṣah as the opposite of Marassi, showed the binary between the bad public for the poor and the fancy private exclusive for the rich.

Although fear of crime is one of the main reasons of living in gated communities in many areas around the world, this is not the case with Uptown Cairo’s residents. All

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3 Jamaṣah is a town by the sea which has public beaches and mainly used by the poor.
the participants in my research were living before in none-gated fancy neighbourhoods in Cairo. When I asked them if they moved to a gated community for security reasons, the answer was no. However, most of them feel satisfied with the security system offered in Uptown Cairo. Low’s “false sense of safety” (Low 2003, 10-11) applies on the case of Uptown Cairo, as the existence and the visibility of walls, gates and guards provide an emotional sense of security which does not necessary translate to real physical security. The walls in the residents’ minds are a protection from threats which they did not really face when they lived without walls.

From the first moment, the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir realised that being surrounded by people is the only way of being safe and secured. The emerged community organized itself on many levels. For a long-time, their activities like buildings construction and business went unnoticed by the state. The community developed itself outside of the state and its roles. Later, the state started to pay attention to the existence of informal areas including Manshīyat Nāṣir; its intervention in many ways was not welcome by the residents.

Almost all the participants pointed out that the police are representing a burden rather than a source of security. For instance, all the toktok drivers I have interviewed complained about the policemen abuse of authority. Manṣūr, a toktok driver said:

“The last week my partner was arrested and the toktok was seized in Zabālīn Quarter. They took him to al-Muqatām not Manshīyat Nāṣir police station. I went to pay the fine which was about 5000 EGP to get the driver out and take back the toktok. You can imagine, the fine is quarter the price of the toktok. Not just that the cassette recorder and other things were stolen from the toktok at the police station.” (Manṣūr 2016)

The area is facing some security issues like drugs. It was mentioned a lot in the interviews; they have all said that the police know the drug dealers in the area but they
either do not care or share the profits with them. Even if this not true, it does reflect clearly on the residents’ perception of police and the level of trust of the provided security system. I have also heard lots of complaints about the Manshīyat Nāṣir police station; in Raḍwá’s case they refused to open a case against somebody who harassed her sister in the street. A big number of the participants also believe that the police are aware of the existence and benefit from the al-Balṭajīyah (thugs), who forces the microbuses and toktoks to pay money to be allowed to safely pass. Some of them even think that the al-Balṭajīyah work for the police.

The state position on both areas is apparently different. In the case of Uptown Cairo, the state willingly gave up its monopoly over power to a private company to manage the whole area. The residents have also given up on their privacy in exchange for their security; allowing the company in many ways to control their lives. Uptown Cairo is advertised as the prestigious and exclusive place to be. The security system is just the tool of implementation of the promise of the gated community. Manshīyat Nāṣir, on the other hand, is an area which functioned for a very long period of time out of the state; this put the regulations of the state and the roles of the community in confrontation.

Ultimately, according to the constitution, education and health are granted as basic rights to everybody. However, the quality of the public schools and hospitals kept on deteriorating and at the same time high cost private alternatives were gradually allowed. Those who can afford the private services opt out from the public ones. This means that the services started to be offered only to those who cannot afford otherwise, which in itself creates another reason for the deterioration of the public service. The same logic applies on many urban issues, people who opt to live in gated communities
separate themselves from issues of the city like housing, public spaces, and public transportation, etc. The retreat into gated communities, affects the quality of living in the city, as those who can go jogging in their compounds would never walk in the streets inside the city and would not care about their level of security and cleanliness.

In consequence, the quality of the public services and the quality of living in the city turn from being a public issue to the issue of the ‘poor’. They are the ones who are consuming, so it is their role to push the government to enhance the quality of the public services. The rich, on the other hand, have the financial capacity to access alternatives. So, they instead buy the better life. Moreover, reducing taxes to those who do not consume the public services start to sound legitimate because they spend huge sums of money on basic services such as education and health, which should be cut from their tax base, as Haytham has framed it (Haytham 2016). Finally, we end up with two groups of citizens, one is practicing their citizenship as the only way of living a better life and another is giving up on their rights because they have the financial capacity to buy them; rooting Holston’s ‘differentiated citizenship’ which does not equate all citizens, but rather differentiate among them.

**Legal Rights**

I concentrate on two specific legal rights to analyse the state’s strategies of on the one hand developing these rights, and on the other hand how these rights are practiced by the citizens, especially the ones which are denied these rights by the state. The first right is ownership, which is one of the common problematic issues of the informal areas, but granted as a right in Uptown Cairo. The second legal right I present is what I called self-recognition by discussing the status of the male residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir who do not fulfil their obligatory military service.
Ownership

Ownership in Uptown Cairo is a guaranteed right. However, it is a field of struggle for decades in Manshīyat Nāṣir. In order to purchase a house in Uptown Cairo, a contract is signed between the costumer and the company. Payment is either in one cash instalment or on instalments over a period of time. Once all the instalments are paid, the property and the land can be legally registered in the state notary office. Ownership in Manshīyat Nāṣir is not as straightforward. Although, the state relocated the founders and later other groups in the area, they are not granted legal tenure.

When the people first moved to Manshīyat Nāṣir, they began a system of claiming the land. Each family claimed a piece or more of land. The newcomers either claimed the available land or bought a claim from one of the “earlier claimants”. The claim is strong as long the claimant builds a property on the land and resides in it. Over time, the people have been developing and strengthening their houses to be permanent buildings. Until that time, the people own the buildings, but the land is owned by the state (Shorter, Tecke and Oldham 1997, 146-47). The people have been pushing for their right to own the land, which they have been living on for generations.

More than one official attempt took place to legalize the status of the residents and register them land titles, but none of them succeeded. In the late 1970s, granting legal titles to the people was introduced as a part of a World Bank upgrading program in cooperation with the Egyptian government. It proposed that the residents buy the land their buildings are standing over for an adequate price equivalent to the cost of installing the infrastructure the program is carrying. However, this attempt failed because it was very difficult to agree on how and who decides on the price of the land and what is a fair price of the land (Shorter, Tecke and Oldham 1997, 154). Later, in the 1990s, another attempt was proposed as an aspect of the participatory upgrading
programs carried by the GTZ in cooperation with the Egyptian government. Having legal titles was one of the most important points the residents participating in the programs raised. However, this attempt has also failed because of land pricing. Since then, no progress has happened in that regard; the state concentrates its efforts on resettling the residents living in unsafe areas (Zahlân 2016; Sha’tth 2016).

Not only the residents of the self-constructed buildings are facing problems with legalizing their status but also the residents of state-constructed buildings like the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. After the 2008 Dwiqa rock-fall, the state has relocated a number of the residents of the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. The families who were relocated received a letter from the government authorizing them to move to a specific unit. Then, an office was established in the area to sign the contracts. The contracting process involved paying an amount of money at signing the contract and then paying a small amount of money every month.

According to Zahlân, a former member of the local council and a current employee of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), the first two phases of the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings had better contracts, as they were ownership contracts, not rental contracts, and the monthly payment was phrased as instalments. However, the last two phases, the contracts did not state the right of ownership and referred to the money paid on monthly basis as rent. Raḍwá and her family moved to the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings in 2009. She said:

“The letter was issued under my grandmother’s name. When she was alive we tried more than one time to sign the contract in the office in the area, but we could not find the responsible employee in the office. Later, my grandmother died and things became more complicated. I remember that my parents saved the contracting money once more after my grandmother passed away, but they could not find the employee and the money was spent. Now, we only have this letter, we are not able to apply for an electricity or water meter under our name because we do not have a contract. We also do not pay the monthly rent. We
are not the only case; lots of people did not sign the contract because they did not have enough money to.” (Raḑwá 2016)

None of Raḑwá’s family was injured during the rock-fall. However, Ismael and his little brother lost their parents and their siblings as well as their house. They were moved to the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings; they signed the contract. But, then Ādḥām decided to stop paying the monthly instalments. In our conversation, he said:

“I lost all my family in 2008, the government have given us this apartment as a compensation, but they ask us to pay for it. This apartment is too little compensation comparing to losing my family and house. I paid at the beginning with the help of one of the NGOs in the area. But I decided that it is my right and I am not going to pay for my right anymore.” (Ādḥām 2016)

In his view, the apartment he is living at currently with his brother is their right. He clearly mentioned that for him there is means of pursuing the right. However, buying the right is not of them.

**Self-recognition**

During my interviews with male resident of Manshīyat Nāṣīr, I noticed that a significant number of the participants do not fulfil their obligatory military service in the army. This means that they are denied many rights like travelling abroad, legal official work contracts, health insurance, etc. The army does not take any immediate actions against them. But rather they are treated as if they do not exist until they are 30 years old. Then, some of them pay a fine to the army; apparently they are not requested to the army service after the age of 30. They represent a different case than those who start their service and then escape. Those face harsh punishment and are tried before a Court Martial. In this part I only bring up cases from Manshīyat Nāṣīr, as it is not relevant to Uptown Cairo. All the participants had no problem with their legal status concerning obligatory army service.
When I asked about the reason of not doing their obligatory services. The answers varied between economic factors and reasons related to bad treatment inside the army. Maḥmūd said:

“I did not do my military service because at that time I had lots of financial obligations towards my family. I owed people lots of money, so I had to work hard to be able to pay back. I could not leave all that behind and go to the army. As a result, I am not able to work for a company. Once I worked for a marketing company, but without a contract or a health insurance. Moreover, I cannot travel to work abroad. Now, I regret it. I advise everybody I meet to do their service to be able to live normally.” (Maḥmūd 2016)

While Ḥāmīd pointed out that it was a mix of financial pressures and fear of the army. He noted:

“One of my friends was doing his army service. But he could not bear the bad treatment and the humiliation he faced inside. They were also punishing him by not letting him to take his vacations so he could not visit his family for a long time. Then, he escaped. Nobody knows where he is. If he got arrested, he is going to be taken to a Martial Court. When I was younger I was excited about serving my country in the army, but then I got scared. I also stopped going to the school very early like my friend, which means that I will be serving as a very low rank and I will be even more humiliated.” (Ḥāmīd 2016)

On the one hand, those are citizens who are not carrying one of the main duties the state is expecting them to do. However, they are not punished for it. But rather, they are ignored. They live without many of their basic rights until they are 30 years old; First, they are either forced to be part of the informal businesses or to be abused by the formal sector which would illegally hire them with too little rights. In addition, they are not allowed to travel abroad and their movement around Egypt is so limited. The issue of army conscription is not brought up in the studies on the urban poor. However, it is interesting to see how the well-educated and better-off are positioned in the army while
doing their obligatory army service compared to those who lack educational advantages.

**Conclusion**

On the one hand the state has followed a different logic in providing the basic services and the legal rights I have discussed thereby rooting what Holston labelled ‘differentiated citizenship’, which normalizes inequality among the citizens. The citizens, on the other hand, developed their own mechanisms of dealing with the state and practicing their rights. This chapter aimed at seeing citizenship in practice through the actions of both the state and the citizens living in Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo. The residents of each area developed their own specific ways based on their distinct realities; visualizing Foucault’s notion of power which is composed of actions and reactions of power.

What was granted for the residents of Uptown Cairo was a struggle for Manshīyat Nāṣir’s inhabitants to obtain. Moreover, the citizens living in Uptown Cairo have the luxury to buy some of these rights through private providers using their money. As I have demonstrated, the retreatment behind the walls and refrainment from using the public services drastically affects the quality of both public services and living in the city. On the other hand, the citizens living in Manshīyat Nāṣir have to deal with the quality of the services provided by the state, as the alternatives are not affordable. As I have pointed out before the two urban setups are manifestations of residential and spatial segregation which is a product of urban planning. These disparities in the distribution of rights is another form of segregating the citizens and enforcing inequality among them.
Chapter Five
Perspectives on community, society and state

The community, the society and the state are three domains in which relations between the different actors take place. More importantly, such relations construct and are being constructed by these domains. This chapter employs the community, the society and the state as three levels of analysis in an attempt to see how the residents of each area relate to the community, to each other, to the larger society and to the state. It first poses the question of whether there is really a community or not and how it is being formed in Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo. Second, it studies the relation between the two communities in addition to the relation to the larger society. Lastly, it brings back state-citizen relations elaborating on state presence and citizens acts of engagement and avoidance.

Community

The community has been one of the significant aspects in the studies of the informal areas and gated communities. Community is a loose concept which has been defined with certain common elements. For the purpose of my research, I define it as a group of people with shared territory, values, customs and culture. Most importantly, I am interested in finding out whether a sense of community exists or not. In Manshīyat Nāṣir, the community established the physical space to be accommodated and housed. On the contrary, Uptown Cairo was built and planned by a company which aims at bringing in people together.
The founders of Manshīyat Nāṣir and other groups which joined later were already established communities before even moving to the mountain, as discussed previously. The closer you get to Manshīyat Nāṣir, the more communities you see. Some of these communities are based around one large old family from Upper Egypt such as Țawabyah. Others revolve around the village of origin and job such as the Zabālīn Quarter. On the other hand, some of these communities have developed after the residents were relocated such as al-Duwayqah and the Suzanne Mubarak Buildings. It is noticeable that the sense of community is stronger in some areas than others. However, a shared understanding of the way of living and a sense of community can be noticed in all of them. Although, the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir make-up and belong to different communities, they all relate to Manshīyat Nāṣir.

The community plays a significant role in the life of the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir. The community in Manshīyat Nāṣir has managed to create a social system which provides emotional, material and physical safety. Singerman in her book *Avenues of Participation* tackled the role of the informal networks in such a self-constructed area specifically in composing informal saving associations “jamʿayāt”4 as a mechanism of material security (Singerman 1995, 154-56). In Manshīyat Nāṣir, jamʿayāt are very common. Almost all the participants in the study have taken part in jamʿayāt. Shady told me that he had to participate in a jamʿayah to be able to buy his tokotk. Maryan has also mentioned that she successfully prepared for her marriage thanks to a jamʿayah with her cousins and neighbours. The community is also responsible for the security of the area, as the police are only called when things get really out of the control of the community.

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4 A number of people forms an association; they pay a certain amount of money on a monthly basis. In return, each of them take the whole sum of money once based on their turn which is formerly agreed upon.
Uptown Cairo, on the other hand, is advertised for the “fully integrated and serviced community” it provides. Each of the villages inside Uptown Cairo has its own community center which gives the residents a space to get together. It also provides other facilities such as a gym, spa, tennis court and other sports activities which also bring the residents together. In addition, in my conversation with Dr. Laila who owns a house in Alba Spendia, she mentioned that some of the ladies gather on a weekly basis in the community center of Eliva, one of the oldest villages of Uptown Cairo. These are all potentials for the building up of a community. However, getting closer to the residents and asking them how they relate to each other, gave me the impression that there is barely a sense of community.

Marām is living in Alba Spendia. She joins the ladies’ gatherings every week. When I have interviewed her, she mentioned that she has a good relation with only one or two of them. She has referred to one of her neighbours as Āṭāṭā (a very ugly and poor women featured in one of the Egyptian movies by a male actor). I asked her at the end of our conversation if she would recommend one of them to be interviewed later, she said: “No.no. no. They are really nothing; I highly advise against seeing any of them.” (Marām 2016) Marām’s reaction showed how she feels about the community surrounding her and tried to prove that she does not belong to it.

Haytham stressed in our conversation on the cultural differences and the distinct value systems of the residents. Haytham was living in Eliva and then he moved to Alba Spendia seeking a better community as the price of the units is higher. He said:

“In Eliva, one day I came out of the bathroom to my bedroom to find one of our neighbours sitting on the bed and greeting me. She just went into the room through the garden door. She considered herself as part of the family, she can come in whenever she feels like. Not just that, you know the place is composed of families. When you go the pool of the village during the week-ends you see some of the neighbours sitting in their bikinis, regardless the families they are surrounded by.” (Haytham 2016)
The two incidents mentioned by Haytham demonstrated that the residents of Uptown Cairo are culturally different to the extent that they disagree on the usage and the boundaries of the private as well as the public space.

The question then is whether the gates which bring some people in and keep others out is capable of developing a community. Drawing on my research on Uptown Cairo, I believe that the residents of Uptown Cairo are relatively homogenous only in terms of their financial capacity. While talking about the neighbours, Salmá said:

“Yes all my neighbours are rich, but some of them are the rich Arabs coming from the Gulf and this is not necessarily the community I want.” (Salmá 2016)

Obviously, money and gates on their own can bring people in together but are not necessarily able to create a community.

**Society**

In this section I am interested in studying how the two communities relate to each other as well as how they both position themselves towards the wider society. Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo are neighboring informal area and luxurious gated community. The interviews I have conducted clearly show that there is very limited knowledge about the existence of each other. Moreover, the participants from both areas did not consider the residents of the other area as a threat. However, this does not mean co-existence, but rather the opposite, one could term it “sine-existence”.

When I asked the Uptown Cairo residents about Manshīyat Nāṣir and whether being that close was one of their concerns about living in Uptown Cairo or not, the answers indicated weak knowledge but strong opinions on Manshīyat Nāṣir. Marām said that she does not know where the area is. Whilst Salmá said:
“No, it was not one of my concerns. It is mainly historical grave yard, no? except for the informal part. In addition, I am very distant. I do not see them from my window. If I do, I would not have bought the house.” (Salmá 2016)

On the other hand, Haytham said:

“Yes I have considered it, because I imagined that it is connected to al-Duwayqah. But, when I visited the place, once you are through the gates, you feel that you are in Dubai. Moreover, there is no accessibility between us and them, there is no connection as they are down the mountain……I have an opinion in that regard, I think the government is going to do that one day because it’s the only solution. These areas should be displaced and they add a value to the land. If you empty such a land of al-Duwayqah and the graveyards on the other side and move them somewhere else, this land is the heart of Egypt, build villas and compounds on it. Can you imagine the added value to this land and the price of the meter? A step by step, they have already started.” (Haytham 2016)

On contrary, Salmá suggested developing the area. She said:

“I support developing such areas instead of removing them. Because I need people from these areas. I do not just lock myself in the compound, I need a maid, a driver.” (Salmá 2016)

On the one hand, Haytham proposed removing the informal area to build luxurious housing on the land, which is a more representative heart of Egypt. Salmá, on the other hand, referred to the importance of such areas because they house the people whose main source work is to serve the rest of the society.

Manshīyat Nāṣir’s residents did not really have a better knowledge of Uptown Cairo. Many of the participants said that they have never heard about Uptown Cairo not they know what is Emaar. Jamīlah told me that she had seen their advertisements everywhere, whilst Naṣr said:

“Yes, yes. I know it. Isn’t it on al-Muqāṭam? We can see it from al-Duwayqah. I am not interested in it. It does not offer something for people like us.” (Jamīlah 2016)

When I started my field work I was curious to know how the residents of each area imagine the other area and its people. I expected to hear fantasies as they probably
have not seen each other before. I have also considered panicked reactions because I imagined that each of them represent a potential threat to the other, such as the threat of being moved out by the will of the rich and the threat of being robbed and killed by the poor. However, to my surprise, most of them have barely heard of each other’s areas before. They live in the same location but nothing brings them together. In effect, they sine-exist.

In my opinion, the bad reputation of Manshīyat Nāṣir has a significant role in shaping the residents’ relations to the wider society and the position of the society towards them. Some of the participants in my research maintained that they do not tell people that they belong to Manshīyat Nāṣir, because they are ashamed of its bad reputation. Others say that they are very attached to Manshīyat Nāṣir and they are not ashamed of it. However, they feel bad about how the area is perceived although people do not know much about it. On the other hand, except for development practitioners, nobody of the people in my circle have ever been to Manshīyat Nāṣir and they consider my visits to the area as putting myself in risk. However, I have never felt that it is less safe than any other area in Cairo.

On the other hand, being the elite defines the relation between the Uptown Cairo residents and the wider society. Exclusivity puts the boundaries between them and the ‘other’ and also defines the ‘other’. In my conversation with Dr. Laila, she said:

“You are conducting a research to say that people in Egypt are building up gated communities and outside there are lots of informal areas. And that is classist. Right? But I want to tell you that the people living in informal areas are even richer than us. They like to live in haphazard areas. If you move them out they are not going to be happy. People are repeating and making use of the story of the “poor miserable citizen”. However, it is not true, it is a choice. Jobs are there but they are lazy.” (Laylá 2016)

Dr. Laila’s comment on my research reflects how she imagines the “others” versus “us”, arguing first that they are richer anyway and that nobody is miserable, as poverty
is a choice in an attempt to legitimize the “us” position, and deny any kind of responsibility towards the miserable because they chose to be so.

Recently, a crime has happened in one of the gated communities in the city of 6th of October. Despite of all the security measures, Nevine Lotfy the CEO of the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank was robbed and murdered in her house. The crime has provoked a debate around the efficiency and the safety of the gated communities. Interestingly, some were calling for more exclusivity in the next days to be safe.

The post below is taken from Facebook, among other things it asks people to be carful and not to talk about their spendings in front of drivers, servants and security guards. In addition, it was stated employees were not to be over-trusted, over-sympathized and unconsciously given money. This is because, these talks can reach people who can harm, kidnap and kill us. One of the comments on the post stated: “We do not talk to just anybody but to friends from our class.” This comment has also mentioned the disparity between the people serving in the gated communities and their residents; mentioning that three delivery orders from MacDonald’s is roughly equal to their average salary.

Both the post and the comment on it reflect the disparities between the residents of the gated communities and their workers. They present these disparities as a threat to their personal safety. Consequently, the solution they proposed is to only talk to those from your class and never build a humane relation with your workers because they envy you to the extent that they might kill you. They have approached the problem only as a security issue. If it is caused by disparities in the society as the comment presented it, then it needs to be rather addressed as social, economic and political issue.
Chapter four captured the state-citizen relations in Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo by studying a number of the basic services and legal rights provided to the two areas. I looked at the logic of providing the service and on the other hand how the citizens practice, push and gave up on their rights. In this section my aim is to elaborate more on the state-citizen relations. I analyze how the citizens position the state and interact with it through acts of engagement and avoidance. Moreover, I look at the presence and the intervention of the state in the two areas.

One of the academic debates around the informal areas and the practices of the urban poor I have presented in the literature review is whether they aim at being visible or invisible to the state. I argue that the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir seek both
depending on the situation and the necessity. The state’s intervention has been demanded and resisted by the citizens on different occasions. The same applies to the citizens living in Uptown Cairo as although they opt for private providers to avoid the state, in many cases they desire state intervention. Here, I am interested in presenting actions and occasions of engagement and avoidance of the state’s presence and intervention.

Manshīyat Nāṣir is a self-help area. It already had an established social system organizing the life of the citizens, even before the state started to give it any kind of attention. This created a continuous contestation between the community-established system and the regulations of the state. Avoiding the state’s attention is one of the strategies of dealing with it. This could be seen in building extra floors overnight and slowly expanding the areas where driving toktok is allowed. In both cases residents’ needs and what they perceive as their right contradicts with state’s regulations. They still practice them but through “quiet encroachment” as Bayat described it.

The case of the toktok drivers demonstrates that invisibility sometimes is desired by everybody. According to the toktok drivers’ understanding of the government’s regulations, the toktoks are only allowed inside the area. If they get out of the area, they are punished by arresting the driver, seizing the toktok and paying a fine. However, the boundaries between inside and outside are not clear for everybody. Furthermore, the area does not have a petrol station, which means they have to drive out on regular basis to get fuel. The state knows that, but it does not ban the import of the toktoks. At the same time, it does not license them. This signals that driving a toktok is allowed, as long it is invisible to the state.

On the other hand, the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir called for planning and legally recognizing the area (Zaḥlān 2016). They have also called for their right to basic
services like electricity, water and sewage until they were provided. They have pressured for having schools and hospitals. The quality of education inside the area is one of the common concerns among the residents I have interviewed and they all formulate it as their right to which the state must pay attention to. The people have been also pressuring on the government to get legal tenures, because they think that the land is their right and that they are not violators of their rights.

The inhabitants of Manshīyat Nāṣir are also aware of the importance of being properly counted in the national census. Zaḥlān is a resident and an employee of the CAPMAS. In our conversation on the census, he said:

“Manshīyat Nāṣir is massively undercounted in all the previous censuses. Before the 2006 census, they banned any employee from working on the census in his own area. I requested to be allocated in Manshīyat Nāṣir in the 2006 census. I argued that the area is not well-counted because those who are responsible for counting do not know it. I was given the responsibility of the census in Manshīyat Nāṣir. I have announced it in the area and called on the young people to apply in the CAPMAS to participate in the census. Together with them, I formed a team to reach closer numbers to the reality. In my opinion, it was much better than the previous ones but still had lots of problems and the area was also under-counted. I am responsible for the 2016 census in Manshīyat Nāṣir and together with the youth we are going to properly count the area.” (Zaḥlān 2016)

Later, I talked to Āḥmād who participated in the 2006 census and he will participate in the 2016 National Census. He said:

“The group of young people who participated in the census were aware that being under-counted means the access to less services. We wanted to be properly counted to get enough subsidized wheat, enough seats in the schools, etc.” (Āḥmād 2016)

All these practices are actions of visibility in which the community seeks to be recognized and properly represented. As I have demonstrated, the relation to the state is complicated. Its presence is both desirable as well as undesirable based on the context. Moreover, people who are trying to avoid the state in their everyday life, also seek recognition by the state.
The residents of Uptown Cairo avoid the state by opting for private providers of different services. The house, the streets and the infrastructure are all provided by Emaar. Even the public services which the state provides are guaranteed by Emaar. If any problem occurs, the residents refer it to the company not to the state institutions. Moreover, they send their children to private international schools and never use public health services. Security is also provided by a company authorized by Emaar. The company and other private entities guarantee all the rights that should have been provided by the state to the citizens living in Uptown Cairo. The citizens buy these services to avoid the low quality provided by the state and the hassle of pushing the state to provide the rights.

Generally, the intervention of the state is neither required nor desirable. However, in my conversations with some of the residents, they mentioned the state on more than one occasion. Dr. Laylá told me that one day she was going back home when she saw a security guard in her garden. She said:

“He claimed that he has noticed a movement inside while he knows that nobody of us is home. I told him if I see you again inside my house I will call the police to come and arrest you.” (Laylá 2016)

Although the company is the main provider of security in Uptown Cairo and its presence and security systems make the residents feel secure, the state is still desired by the residents to carry this function. Haytham has also referred back to the state at least once such as when Taqa Arabia, the company which distributes electricity to the residents, asked for fees for distributing the service. He refused and told them: “Do not bother yourself, I will directly go to the state and I do not want your service.” (Haytham 2016)

In Uptown Cairo, the state has willingly given up on its monopoly over power and other aspects of its authority over people. However, some conflicts take place between the company and the state. In 2008, after the al-Duwayqah rock-fall, the Cairo
governor suspended all construction work on al-Muqata‘am Mountain. Emaar refused to stop its construction work and the CEO of Emaar Misr released a statement saying: “In Egypt, Emaar Misr….is already one of the largest foreign direct investors, and we are committed to implementing all the projects announced so far.” (Hussein 2008) This shows how the company positions itself towards the state as questioning and contesting its authority on the land which is not any longer owned nor organized by the state.

The residents of Uptown Cairo avoid the state as much as they can. But, still its presence is essential and desirable, especially when conflicts take place between them and the company. Interestingly, there are many similarities between the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir and the residents of Uptown Cairo in terms of how they both position the state. They both develop their own strategies to avoid state’s intervention in organizing and regulating their lives. However, in many regards, state’s role and presence is desirable by the residents of the two areas.

In studying informal areas and gated communities, many scholars argue that the state retreats in both urban setups and that its intervention is undesirable anyway. However, the study on Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo demonstrate that such an argument does not fully explain state-citizen relations in the two areas. Such relations are very complex, in which both the state and citizens do not have a one solid position on the role of each other. This brings visibility, invisibility, desirability, undesirability, engagement, avoidance, presence and retreat together in one relationship.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I drew on the relations within the two communities, between both of them, to the bigger society as well as the state-citizen relations. I believe that studying the relations between the different actors is essential for the understanding of the actors
themselves and the surrounding environment. I have first looked at how the relations are constructed in both Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo. Studying both areas shows that the nature of the relations among the residents of each community is significantly different. Moreover, the relation between the two communities demonstrates that they are not in conflict, neither do they co-exist. They rather sine-exist.

I have also demonstrated that the bad reputation of one of them and the elitist position of the other shape their relation to the wider society. Lastly, I aimed at providing an understanding of the nature of the state-citizen relations in the two areas. I have presented some practices of the citizens living in the two areas towards the state. These practices have shown that the citizens are simultaneously trying to avoid the state, but also engage with it. On the other hand, the nature of the presence of the state and its intervention varies from Uptown Cairo to Manshīyat Nāṣir.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

Informal areas and gated communities in Cairo are both expressions of inequality and manifestations of segregation. Urban planning created these urban setups which are relatively recent in Cairo. As I have discussed in the introductory chapter, the informal areas appeared in the 1950s, while gated communities started to exist only by mid-1990s. I have based my research on the argument that urban planning has been constructing distinct communities in the society based on segregation and inequality which produces unequal citizens. In the attempt to examine this argument of the unequal citizens, I have decided to study Manshīyat Nāṣir, an informal area, and its neighbouring gated community, called Uptown Cairo. The disparity between the two areas is very obvious. However, I was curious to see how state-citizen relations differ from Manshīyat Nāṣir to Uptown Cairo and what that implies.

I developed four hypotheses drawing on the nature of state intervention and presence in the two areas, residents’ practices in dealing with the state and finally the mutual perception of the residents of the two communities. When I set these four hypotheses I thought that they would give a satisfying answer to my question. One of the main aims of the conclusion is to see if the collected data and the analysis provided gave an answer and how far the hypotheses explain state-citizen relations in Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo. After that I discuss the research process and present the positive aspects and the difficulties I have faced. Finally, I present my thoughts on the contribution of my research to the social studies on urbanity and the politics of the city, posing more question that need to be addressed by the scholarly debates.

The first hypothesis stated that the relation of the state to the residential areas is entirely different in character for gated communities and informal areas. As I have
demonstrated earlier in chapter one and chapter two, the urban plans brought these unequal segregated urban setups into existence. Over the decades, they have become common and ‘normal’, the informal areas in Cairo house over 60 percent of the city’s population, and on the other hand the numbers of gated communities and luxurious residential areas are continuously increasing. The Cairo 2050 plan has explicitly reinforced the inequality between these urban setups by categorizing them and offering different destinies accordingly.

The relationship is expressed particularly in the provision of the services and distribution of rights in Uptown Cairo and Manshīyat Nāṣir. As chapter four demonstrates, the logic of providing basic services and distributing rights differ in the two areas. What is granted for the inhabitants of Uptown Cairo costs the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir years of suffering in the mountain and is only obtained by putting pressure on the state. This includes urban utilities like electricity, water and sewage, but also basic rights like health and education, and security. Moreover, although legal rights such as ownership are granted by the constitution to everybody equally, the inhabitants of Manshīyat Nāṣir have not been granted that right yet. All what have been mentioned above are basic rights granted by the constitution to all the citizens. However, state practices in distributing these rights differentiate between the citizens rather than equating them, establishing what Holston described as ‘differentiated citizenship’.

The second hypothesis proposed that the inhabitants of the informal areas are in a contesting relation to the state. Manshīyat Nāṣir is a self-constructed community with a functioning system organizing the life of its inhabitants, which does not totally go in line with state’s regulations. This creates contestation between the community-based
rules and state’s regulations. The practices of the inhabitants of Manshīyat Nāṣir show that their relation to the state is neither based on resistance, nor avoidance, but rather contestation. Contestation could be seen in the every-day life practices of the citizens living in Manshīyat Nāṣir, in regards to housing, education, traffic management, security, ownership and recognition.

As discussed in detail in chapter four and chapter five, construction work in the area, ownership and the right to be properly counted in the national census show citizens’ understanding of their rights and practice of citizenship. They also represent fields of contestation between the state and the citizens such as the contestation between the state’s construction regulations and building style which is based on expanding the houses to serve the needs of the inhabitants. Such practices by the state and actions by the citizens formulate networks of power, in which the state reinforces its power and presence in the area, and the citizens on the other hand practice and push for their rights.

My third hypothesis concentrated on the practice of the residents of Uptown Cairo saying that the inhabitants of the gated communities are more likely to buy the service rather than claiming the right to it from the state. Chapter four discusses how the residents of Uptown Cairo opt for buying a better quality life rather than lobbying pressuring on the state to provide the service. Even in the case of the public services which are predominantly provided by the state such as electricity and phone landlines, the private company guarantees access, distribution and quality to the citizens. Also, the citizens living in Uptown Cairo do not consume education and public health services, as they send their children to international private schools and private hospitals and practices.
The analysis further complicated the hypothesis, arguing that the retreat in gated communities and the avoidance of public service, affects the quality of living in the city and the public services. Public issues such as walkability and safety of the streets and the quality of public schools and hospitals turns to be the issues of only those who cannot afford the better quality alternatives. Furthermore, some citizens demand that their taxes be reduced because they pay huge sums of money on private education and hospitals rather than consuming the public service. All these practices contribute to the deterioration of the quality of the life of the rest of the society.

Lastly, I hypothesized that living in different residential areas forms distinct communities which impacts the inhabitants, ‘citizens’, mutual perception. Uptown Cairo’s inhabitants and Manshīyat Nāṣir’s residents’ mutual perception is connected to the community and the class they belong to. As presented in chapter three and five, each community has very limited knowledge on the other, as they have never been to each other’s areas and they never met in person. The image they construct on each other is only based on their imagination of how the world on the other side of the wall looks like.

This is how the city functions, based on segregation of services, spaces, schools, entertainment, transportation, etc. The city is designed in a way that the wealthy and the poor do not meet. This is except when the poor are needed to serve as maid, driver or security guard. The relationship between the residents of the two areas lacks an essential aspect of citizenship which is recognizing the others as co-citizens. I have discussed earlier that the residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir seek both visibility and recognition by the state as well as invisibility to the state. Uptown Cairo’s residents also practice visibility and invisibility, however not towards the state, but rather towards
the society. They seek invisibility by limiting their lives to behind the walls of their residential areas, beach resorts, malls and private cars. However, they aim at being visible through their prestigious status.

Segregation is not a new phenomenon in Cairo, which was only brought by the construction of gated communities in the 1990s and the informal areas in the 1950s. Cairo have always had its own rich and poor neighborhoods. Although they were not physically segregated by gates and walls, each of them housed a specific class. The invisible gates which existed between Būlāq and Zamālik did not prevent the residents of Būlāq to walk around, work and use the public spaces of Zamālik. However, such invisible gates made it clear that they do not belong to Zamālik, but to Būlāq. This shows how the manifestations of segregation and forms of inequality are getting more extreme over time. The invisible gates between the rich and poor neighborhoods have been growing to be physical boundaries reinforcing social differences; not only separating citizen’s in different residential areas, but also in schools, universities, hospitals, beaches, markets, roads, streets, entertainment spaces, etc.

In effect, the question of how state-citizen relations differ from gated communities to informal areas was answered by addressing state presence in the two areas, and on the other hand by studying the practices of the citizens in Manshīyat Nāṣir and Uptown Cairo. First, the thesis has demonstrated through studying a number of basic services and legal rights that the state intervenes differently in the two areas and the citizens’ perceptions to their rights and their way of pursuing them also differs from Manshīyat Nāṣir to Uptown Cairo. This supports my argument that constructing unequal and segregated communities like informal areas and gated communities constitute different citizenships within the society and create unequal citizens.
I have learned many things throughout the research period. I dedicated the first couple of months to literature reading. During this period, I came across many insightful theoretical works and empirical studies which exposed me to diverse range of experience around the world. Through my fieldwork, I rediscovered my city, through visiting and talking to different people on how they live the city. I have also faced some difficulties. The biggest one was to convince the residents of Uptown Cairo to participate in my research. I have invested lots of time and effort to interview them. The residents of Manshīyat Nāṣir, on the other hand, were very helpful and enthusiastic about my research.

In my opinion, Manshīyat Nāṣir has witnessed many development projects and was previously studied by a number of scholars. In effect, the residents at least roughly understood what I am doing and had hopes, as expressed by some of them, to be better known and represented in the society through such writings. On the contrary, my study is the first academic work on Uptown Cairo and it was hard to convince people that talks about their life would contribute to an academic research. This was not the only difficulty, as Manshīyat Nāṣir is very complicated area. I only knew it through writings not life experience. In effect, I had to visit the area multiple times, talk to experts who worked on the area and chat with some of the residents, in attempt to familiarize myself with the area and build knowledge on it to be ready to conduct interviews.

Lastly, I share my thoughts on what needs to be further addressed. Notably, gated communities in Egypt have become popular urban setups and they are massively increasing in numbers. However, they are under investigated. This could be a result of many factors such as being a relatively new phenomenon, as they only started to appear in the mid-1990s. From my research, I suggest that the residents’ lack of understanding
of the importance of social research also affects the quality and the ability to study gated communities. In effect, giving more academic attention and conducting further in-depth studies on gated communities, helps scholars to build up knowledge on such an urban setup, but also introduces the relevance of conducting such studies to the society.

Moreover, as I have mentioned before, there is a rich body of literature on both gated communities and informal areas. However, there is a lack of theoretical and analytical framework which brings the different urban setups together. I believe that such frameworks are needed to study mutual perception, state-society relations and the politics of the city. My study aimed at contributing to fill this gap. I think that theoretical frameworks and a range of empirical studies covering different cases around the world enhance our understanding of how cities function and how state-society relations are constructed. Even more importantly, I believe that only through studies which cover the spectrum of inequality and segregation, we can capture the present of the unequal citizens and how they became so, which hopefully help in the future to approach a citizenship closer to the normative ideal as presented in the constitution.


