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# New Frontiers in the Social History of the Middle East



**Edited by**

Enid Hill

## **Contributors**

Khaled Fahmy

Peter Gran

Joseph Massad

Martina Rieker

Judith E. Tucker

Horst Unbehaun



## INTRODUCTION

ENID HILL

"Clearly people make history," writes Peter Gran, "and they do so where they are"<sup>1</sup> In this issue of *Cairo Papers* are accounts of people making history within the Middle East. One might designate this history-making by ordinary people as the basic premise of social history. In any case, it is a theme that is evident in these articles. The "new directions" of the title is intended to indicate materials that are newly being used to construct social history or material already worked over but used to tell a different story than heretofore, or brought into question and subjected to critique. Also here you will find suggestions to enrich the social history of the Middle East with theory. The articles began as papers prepared for the *Cairo Papers* annual symposium of 1999 where participants were asked to prepare presentations on the theme of 'new frontiers' in the social history of the Middle East. We leave it to our readers to judge the extent to which this charge has been accomplished.

What, then, of the disparate contexts, materials, assumptions, and styles of interpretation presented in these articles? We begin with **Khaled Fahmy** writing on "Medicine and Power: Towards a Social History of Medicine in Nineteenth-Century Egypt." Here Fahmy makes extensive use of the administrative archival records of nineteenth century Cairo, which he situates historically by using commentaries of the period. Given the extraordinary extent and richness of archives in the Middle East, particularly in the areas formerly under Ottoman control, material for future development of social history in the Middle East would seem assured. The challenge is, of course, to make the archives tell the stories of ordinary people embedded in the administrative actions they record.

Profound changes in the nineteenth century in important institutions have not been analyzed, Fahmy tells us. His contribution to this lacuna is "a

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<sup>1</sup> See Gran's contribution, "Modern Middle East History beyond Oriental Despotism, World History beyond Hegel: An Agenda Article," *infra*.



modest attempt to raise some questions and offer some tentative answers regarding the social history of medicine in nineteenth century Egypt.” He suggests how the creation of medical institutions, begun under Mehmed Ali with his French advisers, affected the perceptions and the lives of ordinary people, “how the intrusive, authoritarian institution of modern medicine was perceived by members of subaltern classes,” people whose bodies became objects of intrusion by the state, people who “realized the strong connection between medicine and various attempts by the Khedives to have a tighter control over the societies they ruled.” We glimpse in this account the great possibilities of archival research allied with what in other contexts has been called ‘the sociological imagination’.<sup>2</sup>

Fahmy divides his discussion into three parts: how medicine was *produced*, how *consumed*, and how *enunciated*. To exemplify these three aspects of the reception of new institutions of medicine, peoples’ perceptions and effects on them, he treats, respectively, Qasr al-‘Aini hospital, the public clinics established in urban and rural areas, and forensic medicine—highlighting the use of autopsy.

In Qasr al-‘Aini hospital a different view of the nature of disease was introduced together with an emphasis in medical training on anatomy and the relations of the human organs to each other and to the body as a whole. With the new conception of disease and the innovation of “anatomo-clinical medicine” both social and professional roles of the doctor changed. In Mehmed Ali’s army, for example, widespread cases of syphilis brought intrusive practices where “the power ... [given] to the regimental doctors ... [allowed] a semi-absolute control over the soldiers bodies.” These new doctors “assumed ... moral authority over medical and health matters” and they became “an important element of the rising new middle class in Egypt.”

For the consumers of the new medicine, there seems to have been recourse to the hospitals only as a last resort. They resisted them and resented them, Fahmy writes.

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<sup>2</sup> Other examples of Fahmy’s ability to make the archives speak of the effects on ordinary people of the nineteenth century efforts of the Egyptian state to modernize, and their own role in this project, are footnoted in Fahmy’s article. For reference to his major work on the soldiers of Mehmed Ali’s army, *All the Pasha’s Men* (1997) see footnote 4 of his article.



He gives a partial interpretation as to why: The hospitals were filthy and even Qasr al-<sup>‘</sup>Aini was under-resourced and used medical supplies of bad quality. His documents tell of instances of malpractice in the hospitals and of the reluctance of people to use them. Government hospitals and clinics, it would seem, “were ignored or sidestepped by the average Egyptian.”

The archives also detail how the new medical knowledge was used in criminal investigations and particularly the use of autopsies to identify cases and causes of homicide. Here also we find the intrusive state, which “lay claim to the bodies of its deceased citizens.” Young doctors trained in the new medicine not only worked in the state hospitals but were sent also to “factories, schools, dockyards” and other government establishments, most significantly to the police headquarters in urban and rural areas. There, with the backing of the state, they assumed other forms of control over the lives and bodies of Egypt’s citizens.

Fahmy’s overall argument is that the new medical institutions and practices became “important sites of power and control” by the state and that this affected “the daily life of ordinary people in an unprecedented manner.” He notes, however, that these sites of power could also be used, and were used to advantage, by “young, aspiring doctors [and other health practitioners,” as well as by “the public at large.” Certainly the new institutions and their practices did take hold and medical practitioners, together with their coerced subjects and presumably other clientele, became part of Egyptian social organization. Administrative records and especially police records, by their nature, tend to record instances of deviance. In recording deviance, however, they call attention to practices of everyday life and its problems.

In this contribution Fahmy has made court records and police records of the Cairo archives tell the stories of the ordinary people who were the subjects of the endeavor of Mehmed Ali and his successors to bring Egypt up to levels of knowledge and administrative practices thought to be those underlying the West’s power. He has shown that, while the impulse of modernizing institutions and processes may be heavily imposed from the top, it is the way the people on whom they are imposed utilize them, in the final analysis, which influences and perhaps determines the role they come to play in society, and the utilities they serve.



In "Clientelistic Structures and Political Participation in Rural Turkey" **Horst Unbehaun** presents a study of political behavior in a Turkish village in southwestern Turkey on the coast of the Aegean during the republican era. Unbehaun's interest and main focus of his study is political behavior at the local level. He traces historically the shifts and changes in the relations between ordinary people and those with political power and/or resources at their disposal. To study political behavior at the local level as it was affected by these transitions he sought informants among the old notables, addressed as *agha*, and corroborated the events recollected with local newspapers. Several of these respected gentlemen had held political office in the past under older variants of the patron-client relationship. More recently, their sons have been elected to political office, some (like mayor) very similar to those held by the fathers but with a different political dynamic producing different kinds of political behavior. It was from these informants' identification of the changes in the characteristics of patrons and their clients over the decades of the republican period that Unbehaun constructed the typology he presents of patronage and 'clientelism'.

The old patron client relations transformed during the republican era of participatory politics under one party, then multiple parties, and contested elections into new forms of using personal relations to secure resources and reciprocally provide services. He identifies several forms of patrons of the past and during the transition: the landowner-patron, the merchant-patron, patrons by office, the transitory-type-patron, and finally party-patrons. The latter appears when "one or more political parties reach ... the provincial areas." Under the one party system he was "an instrument of the state in the provinces," not exactly a part of a patronage relation strictly speaking, but more an intermediary, a 'broker'. He was used by the state to get local compliance with its policies from those he had some influence over locally. With the multi-party system, "the situation changes crucially." Local patrons turn to mobilizing votes for the political parties in the rural areas. "Elections in rural regions [are] decided by the parties' success in wooing the most powerful of these patrons," he tells us.

The crucial change to 'clientelism' comes when the patron no longer controls resources of his own, or is not perceived as controlling them. With the entry of the market economy and the central state's involvement in providing resources for the development of the outlying regions, the



political processes devolve onto whomever can insure the participation of the local area in the economic benefits distributed from the center. Patrons become intermediaries in producing benefits for a region, sometimes through the party apparatus, either by election of themselves or those for whom they use local influence to insure election, sometimes directly from administrative sources. With fully developed clientelistic relations political behavior centers on those running for office under banners of political parties and the political participation of ordinary people in the political process through voting. While presented as ideal types Unbehaun makes a point of saying that some types of relations between those with access to resources and those who provide services never completely disappeared and can be found existing simultaneously with newer variants.

Clientelistic relations link the national parties and the central government to the people and serve to produce a distribution of resources to the village. A modern infrastructure now links the village into the national economy and political behavior reflects the direct connection of party affiliation at the local level with national parties in local, provincial and national elections. The people for their part are empowered now with votes through which they influence who holds local offices and whether their village has people with connections to the sources of resources in the central political and bureaucratic administrations. These relations have affected local economic development as the village became progressively integrated into the national economy. Catalysts for economic change that triggered new political relations also came from the development of the area for tourism.

Unbehaun's concern with political behavior and practices at the local level distinguishes this study, he says, from other studies of Turkish politics that do not deal with political behavior at the local level, as most are macro level studies of participation in elections and membership in parties. This study is indeed in contrast to earlier efforts to study 'modernization' and 'the passing of traditional society' in Turkey using national statistics and random surveys.

**Judith Tucker** has inserted herself into the agenda forcefully advanced by Fatma Mernissi who urges reinterpreting the classical texts with greater sensitivity to enhancing the status of women. Tucker notes Mernissi's



contribution to the recommended endeavor with her critique of the Qur'anic interpretation that purports to legislate veiling for Muslim women and the controversies surrounding the interpretation of the life of Aysha, "beloved wife and confidant of the Prophet" who was also "a powerful woman and outspoken political figure." Tucker points out that other studies have sought to "redeem the Islamic message on women and reaffirm her capacities and social role" but also that "the tradition is not contained solely within the early years." Across the Islamic centuries there have been, contends Tucker, "other modes of conceptualizing and interpreting Islam." Tucker herself has contributed a study of flexible interpretation in *fatawa* (authoritative but not binding legal opinions of judges and *muftis*) and court cases from Ottoman Palestine.<sup>3</sup>

Tucker aligns herself with those who have begun to use gender as well as researchers who use legal material to show how historically changed social conditions required and thus produced interpretations of the law that were favorable to woman. She underscores the role that ordinary, usually poor, women played historically in using the law to protect them and to help them. Such occurrences she interprets to mean that judges and *muftis* were sensitive to the position of women in society and their needs in changing social circumstances.

By locating the present article within the field of Islamic law she is trying to understand "along with a number of other social historians ... how Muslim intellectuals and lay people posed questions about gender and devised answers that suited their sense of inherited tradition as well as their immediate needs." She points to recent research that shows Islamic law to be "legal doctrines and interpretations" that have "evolved over time in rhythm with various social changes and pressures." This means, she says, that law in Islamic countries can be studied "as a much more revealing and dynamic factor in any discussion of an Islamic gender system." Therefore she recommends to researchers in the field of women and gender history that they examine such historical records more closely, as such examination can show how over time and in response to changing social conditions, "the Islamic gender system gain[ed] in flexibility and variability."

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<sup>3</sup> *In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (1997), see footnote 9 in Tucker's article *infra*.



One aspect of the social historian's challenge for Tucker is to "deconstruct dominant gender definitions." Studies are now appearing, she says, with this new approach to "Islamic legal gender definitions." Moreover, the sources for such research are many, with court records dating back to the sixteenth century in many regions. *Fatawa* written by Islamic legal scholars link theory and practice in that the jurist or *mufti* interprets the Islamic legal tradition in relation to a particular issue or conflict in a real life situation.

*Fatawa* show "how the Islamic legal tradition shaped, and was shaped by, the exigencies of life" in Muslim communities. Court cases show the law in practice—who brings cases and what the issues are. "Gender sensitive research" can show "how women and men perceived their respective rights and duties," and "what constituted a violation of their rights." Tucker uses examples of a *fatwa* and a court case from Ottoman Palestine to show how the treatment of women in similar personal status issues (marriage and divorce) in these two kinds of sources complement each other. The issues concern women's 'personal status', specifically marriage and divorce and "they pertain largely to ordinary people, largely the poor." The *fatwa* of her example concerns a woman who persuaded a judge to annul her marriage because her husband had disappeared and was not providing support. She then married another, only to have the first husband return and claim her. The opinion was written that the annulment was valid. This *fatwa* illustrates a known practice used by Hanafi judges who turned from the narrow and stringent legal rules on annulment and divorce of Hanafi jurisprudence to "borrowing" from the more liberal Shafi'i (or Malaki) jurisprudence to effect what they apparently considered just solutions. A court case of the eighteenth century referenced by Tucker corroborates this particular perception of justice and practice.

Tucker's research into gendered Islamic legal history shows that "law was not a fixed and immutable system," and that within the several schools there was ample scope for dealing with problems within Islamic law. It also shows that women themselves "negotiate[d] gender roles and power" and that they have been "ever present and active in the judicial processes of the time." These legal materials allow addressing "the broader question of gender in history" which can be seen to be "far more contingent" than is usually believed. The field of gender in Islamic history is complex, she says,



and we are only beginning to explore it; but the field is open and it has very rich materials.

**Joseph Massad** explores the creation of national identity in a colonially constructed Arab state, namely Jordan, for which a colorful British colonel was the catalyst. In "Jordan's Bedouins and the Military Basis of National Identity" we find a detailed description of how John Bagot Glubb's creation of the Desert Patrol within the Arab Legion of the British Mandate of Transjordan during the 1930s served to transform certain features of the Bedouin tradition and mix them with parts of the ethos and practices of British militarism to create a national identity for Jordan, but that had not been his goal. Rather, Glubb's intention was to create a force to protect Jordan's arbitrarily created and thus porous borders. This force also came to be useful in guarding the British owned Iraqi Petroleum Company's pipeline passing through Transjordan. This task they performed brilliantly. For reasons that are not made manifest in the article, the symbols of this military force became those of the Jordanian nation after independence.

The central argument of this article is that the process of co-opting the Bedouin to British rule was by way of giving them a military role within the new mandate-state and thus a stake in its defense; and that this was accomplished by capitalizing on certain characteristics of Bedouin life style "transfigured in tune with British imperial policy." It was "the gospel of the new age," a "process of selective modernization."

Out of this process "a new nationalist pedagogy was born." In the gendered military school system "service to king and country, duty, sacrifice, and religion" were taught. The most directly Jordanian symbols of national pride, however, are identified in various outward manifestations of Bedouin costume devised for the Desert Patrol, and by extension, for the Arab Legion and then the nation, such as its distinctive clothing, and notably the red and white headgear, *hatta*, "as defining Jordanianness." Other features of the Jordanian military of those days such as army discipline and the Confidential Report were of course British. The bodies of the Bedouin in the Desert Patrol were also co-opted to the cause of creating a military force for service to the mandate state through British physical training and persuading them (through a deceit) to give up their long hair. And there are other illustrations of ways of how hybrid features of everyday



life were created. The matter of the introduction of British music—bagpipes—and changes in diet seem peripheral to the project, but they do underscore its hybridity. Thus a “new Bedouin culture” that was to be the foundation of Jordanianness, Massad claims, was substantially in place by the time of independence in 1946.

Massad says initially he is going to show the “productive” nature of the military. This is not new in the context of studies of nation state-building generally. Jordan would appear, however, to be somewhat unique among the states of the Middle East created by the colonizers in that its present national identity owes its origins and much of its substance to a deliberate cross-fertilizing as it were of a selected area of indigenous culture with British military culture. As with all hybrids, we can assume that there was an ongoing process of negotiation between the component parts. However, the inhabitants of the contemporary period are also participants in the making of history. Thus the picture would seem incomplete in the sense of not showing how *after* national independence the negotiating process worked to reinforce the productive Bedouin militarism created by Glubb Pasha, and what was added or subtracted or otherwise changed in its evolving hybridity; also, what must occur for hybridity to be replaced with something that is perceived to be bona fide indigenous?

The role of national armies and warfare in the creation of nation states and their national symbols is, of course, historically ubiquitous. Details of a way of life of a part of a population in *a completely colonially constructed entity* being transformed to create and define a nation upon independence is, by contrast, historically problematic. That colonialism had profound effects on its colonial subjects is not disputed. Nevertheless, one wonders about the extent to which Bedouin characteristics and symbols as developed for the Desert Patrol perhaps owe their present predominance and influence on Jordanian national culture to reinforcement and, most importantly, *legitimation* through deliberate policies and the use of these symbols subsequently by the new nation’s national leaders.

With **Martina Rieker**, in “Reading the Colonial Archive” we have another British colonial experience, this time of Egypt, portraying British views of the Egypt they were colonizing. The British archives on Egypt are voluminous and have been extensively mined for ‘facts’ about that period of



Egyptian history. These are, however, facts compiled by the imperial occupiers and depict an Egypt seen through their eyes. Rieker suggests a reading of these archives that takes this into account; indeed, it orients and animates her discussion. The theoretical assumption here is that there can be no History, only 'histories' that depend on the interests of the writers/observers and their position within the power/knowledge nexus that connects them with those written about.

The argument presented is in two parts. First she deals with the Egyptian colonial archive itself and how it was part of a global process of creating the empire. The second and main section "explores the social and spatial geographies" used in the colonial archive through which Upper Egypt (the *Ss'id*) is characterized ("produced"). It is not so much the data as such that interests Rieker but rather how these archives reflect "modern knowledge/power systems ... [of] the colonially mediated modernity project." Rieker uses the term 'archive' in a wider context than as a reference to the British Public Records Office and other deposits of colonial papers, although she makes extensive use of PRO documents in the article. Her notion of 'archive' would seem to cover *all* writings by various kinds of scribes of Western imperialism. In the present article it is principally those created by British participants in the imperial project such as Lord Cromer who also figures prominently in the PRO archives. She contrasts the approach incorporated into the British view of Egypt with that of the British in India. Egypt is viewed as having suffered a rupture with its classical (pharaonic) civilization by the Islamic conquest, a view that precluded any project "to resurrect and reinterpret" a classical period for purposes of governing, as was utilized in the imperial project in India. (It was perhaps not by accident that Lord Cromer's previous experience with British imperial government had been India.)

Egypt was definitely not India! The colonial archive finds Egyptian society "simple," lacking in hierarchical structure and a ruling class with prestige and authority, it had not "produced thinkers of intellectual and moral eminence," and so forth. Thus governing Egypt was perceived as a much more straightforward matter—in theory. In practice, the colonial archive that Rieker presents oscillates between superficial prototypes and finding Egypt ungovernable.



The predisposition of the colonial archive to view Egypt and Egyptians as simplistic comes most forcefully into focus with the discussion of the *Sa'id* as an area considered "unlivable" for Europeans. The British who were posted there or went on inspection visits are shown as unable "to fully grasp [its] socio-economic texture." What they saw was the poverty and the misery of the *fallahin* of the *Sa'id* where low agricultural productivity and indebtedness were attributed to "cultural imperatives" and "recklessness in fiscal matters." Lawlessness in the *Sa'id* is also a central theme of the colonial archive, but not just brigandage, thefts, and murders in the villages. There are also the Agricultural Bank, Credit Foncier—apparently also attributed to lawlessness.

Another "law and order problem" that animates the colonial archive is the threat of Mahdism coming into the *Sa'id* from the Sudan. There was also the criminalizing of the slave trade, which required policing, harsh punishments, and a blockade on the Sudan. Such contexts of crime were in addition to the inter-communal violence, the major source of which the colonial archive attributed to "women." The region, in a phrase, was "a challenge to public tranquility." The use of statistics by the colonial authorities, except for a few years in the 1890s, showed crime rates in Egypt to be "on the perpetual rise." There was theft, arson, and damage to waterwheels, farm animals, and crops in Lower Egypt (the Delta). The *Sa'id*, however, "continued to distinguish itself by the preponderance of violent crime" where "human life appears to be of little account and the most trifling incidents result in homicide." These were the subjects that interested Egypt's colonial governors, it would seem. Law and order was of course important to colonial governors, and they clearly had difficulty with establishing it in the *Sa'id*.

The statistics produced by the colonial state are potentially a major source of knowledge of Egypt and therefore of power. However, in "forc[ing] the statistics to make sense" the colonial interpreters relied on prototypes, explains Rieker. This meant that understanding the *Sa'id* was reduced to "the *Sa'idi* proclivity for quarreling, spite, and most significantly, revenge." The *Sa'idi* was, in the words of one of the colonial archive's creators, a "sure cause of crime." Rieker's reading of the colonial archive thus illuminates why it is also no accident that Lord Cromer viewed "the apparatus of the modern state" as "useless in the *Sa'id*."



With Rieker the heavily mined, but vast, British Public Records Office documents are examined through a lens of Subaltern studies. However, this particular colonial archive is shown to divulge more information about the colonizers than the colonized. We do not find here the "socio-economic texture" that the British neglected. Here the Subaltern does not speak.

The preceding articles have all been grounded in empiricism of one kind or another. The final article by **Peter Gran**, "Modern Middle East History beyond Oriental Despotism, World History Beyond Hegel" proposes a theoretical shift to concepts that can deal better with world history than the present disjunction of a world history that is Eurocentric while most of the world is not European. This contribution is presented as an agenda article and proposes a revision of the Rise of the West theorem at the same time that it offers an alternative to Oriental Despotism for explaining the Middle East. His proposed shift away from the dominant paradigms that have governed world history and Middle East studies for a very long time is in search of theory with greater potential for explaining national and international factors that have shaped societies historically.

Middle East History is a particular case in that Oriental Despotism (an outgrowth of Eurocentrism) seems to persist, despite articulate criticisms of it. Gran locates the problem of its persistence in what affects world history generally—the continuing orientation of the Rise of the West. His article is thus divided into two parts. First comes a presentation of what a revisionist view of world history; he then suggests how such a revision in paradigm could also offer a solution to Middle East history.

The shift in paradigm for world history Gran suggests is the replacement of the Rise of the West with "the rise of the rich." For Middle East history this means that this region would cease to be isolated intellectually and would join world history on equal terms so that *what* was happening is sought without the present overlay of *where*—that is, without the present presumed exceptionalism of place.

In his first section Gran surveys the problem of world history identified as Hegel's legacy of Eurocentrism and the resulting paradigm of the Rise of the West. The problem is that "the vast majority of people are not elite and they are not in the West." Thus Gran speaks of social history as more than simply part of the growth of knowledge. Rather, it implies "a new logic"



that would "take in the whole of state and society." Gran identifies the main schools "up to now" that attempt to posit new ways of conceptualizing history: the Annales School, the Dependency School, and "to a degree, Marxism." All make contributions and have produced "works of originality and still do." Gran acknowledges that what he is proposing in the second section on the Middle East "owes something to their efforts." However, while all make contributions to the problem of world history, all have shortcomings that do not in the end succeed in constructing a new paradigm that overcomes the basic problem. The Annales writers are unable to valorize the role of particular individuals, or of politics, or of choice in history. The Dependistas, whom Gran credits with making use of "the idea of a modern world market" as a capitalist enterprise, ultimately still locate "all relevant historical agency" in the West. Marxist theory similarly reinforces Eurocentrism. Gran faults professional historians generally for "lack of interest in theory" although he sees signs of some change.

His alternative to the idea of the Rise of the West does not actually reject it, he says, but puts "something else first," namely, "the rise of the rich." His 'rich' are the "capitalistically oriented ruling classes on a global level." Lest this seem to be a rehash of Dependency, it must be explained that his "rise of the rich" goes "beyond Western ruling classes to all ruling classes." The focus of his theory is actually on the relationship between these classes and the instruments of hegemony that the rich use to rule the non-rich worldwide. With these devices the potential for class conflict is kept manageable. Therefore, relations between and among the ruling classes of the world, when explored by historians, can explain many things. Modern history "was never the story of Western ruling classes. ... One always finds Third World ruling classes." What Gran posits here as the basis of social history on a world scale is the interconnections of the rich, their mutual interests, and their collusion in maintaining hegemony. Hegemony, says Gran, "is a central element in modern world history."

Gran turns then from his central proposition in the study of world history to the histories of individual states by formulating a theory of how the rich maintain their hegemony over the vast majority of mankind. They do so, he says, by using one of four "basic approaches to maintaining the needed stratification ... [and] deflecting class conflict." What this means is that "the majority working class" is led—or persuaded—that the system is



not to blame for its hardships but something else is—a “scapegoat.” The ruling classes of the world, says Gran, use *gender*, *culture*, *caste*, or *race*, variously, to maintain their hegemony.

The idea of ‘hegemony’ in controlling class conflict is perhaps best known as Gramsci’s identification of the use of ‘culture’ by the Italian state in his attempt to explain why the poor masses of southern Italy did not challenge their bourgeois exploiters. Thus Gran calls those states that use ‘culture’ to deflect class conflict “Italian Road regimes” and asserts that examples of it, as well as the other forms of hegemony, can be found throughout the world, including in the Middle East.

In his second section (“Modern Middle Eastern History as Social History”) Gran suggests where each of these strategies of hegemonic control can be found in the Middle East. He identifies Egypt as an Italian Road regime, also Syria prior to 1966. Other forms of hegemony he specifies as “rule by caste” (Turkey, Iran and Iraq). Then there are the “tribal-ethnic states” that “play class off against gender” (several examples). Israel is “the main Middle Eastern example” of the “hegemony of race.” In each case he suggests historical details as corroboration.

Gran disclaims that his postulated ‘historical roads’ are Weberian ideal types. The particular situation in each country and “the struggles of the ruled,” he says, “lead to highly divergent outcomes within what is loosely the same set of dynamics.” By contrast, he contends, “ideal types are fixed.”

The *idea* of going beyond Eurocentricism<sup>4</sup> he speaks of as “an epistemological revolution” but what he has presented in this article is “simply a first step.” He believes another generation will take the understanding of social movements out of the nation state “to a more direct approach ... [of] important counter hegemonic struggles” by “mass populations who challenge the hegemony of the world’s ruling classes” as they “search for some new kind of future.”

Here they are, then, the articles themselves, a modest contribution of Cairo Papers to social history in the Middle East.

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<sup>4</sup> The title of Gran’s 1996 book where he first began to develop the ideas contained in this article. See *Beyond Eurocentrism: A New View of Modern World History* (1996) and Gran’s article *infra* at footnote 2.