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Reviewing the ISDF strategy for dealing with slums in Egypt

Basma El Maabady

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The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

REVIEWING THE ISDF STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH SLUMS IN EGYPT

A Thesis Submitted to the
Public Policy and Administration Department
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Public Policy

By

Basma El Maabady

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to put a spotlight on the strategy of ISDF for dealing with slums in Egypt. The Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) is the Egyptian governmental body that is responsible for financing slums redevelopment projects. This study is conducted in accordance to global principles for a successful slums upgrading process in order to examine how successful the program of ISDF is.

However viable ISDF program may appear to be, the study findings indicate that there are some deficiencies in this program that hinder ISDF from effective implementation of its slums development strategy. These deficiencies lie in ISDF relationship with governorates, ISDF methodological approaches for dealing with slums, and the quality assurance of the ISDF implementation process of slums redevelopment projects. Deficiencies of ISDF have been represented objectively from the different points of view of governorate’s Urban Upgrading Units as well as residents of upgraded informal areas.

At the end of this study, there are some recommendations for a successful ISDF program. A key recommendation for ISDF program is to operate within a national large-scale framework.
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Chapter One: Introduction

‘Slums’ is informal areas where their residents “are characterized as having inadequate housing and basic services,” (UN-Habitat, 2002c). ‘Slums’ is considered one of the most critical challenges facing the society. “Approximately half of the population increase is estimated to be in urban slums, approximately doubling the size of the global slum population from 1 billion to 2 billion,” (Payne, 2005; UN-Habitat, 2008). Unfortunately, government officials perceive slums as a cancer in the body of cities, however; slum dwellers are victims of government neglect, lack of proper planning and urban management. Therefore, slum dwellers are not to be blamed for their conditions; on the contrary they should be appreciated, as they are trying to cope with inhumane living and housing conditions because governments did not provide them with other alternatives. In the point of view of government officials, slums have negative social, economic, and security effects on urban development, poverty, social segregation and the economy. A real fact that society should accept, slums and informal areas assist in the draining of resources by allocating funds in the State budget to carry out their development. Informal areas assist also in the shrinking of farmland due to the random urban expansion, which is a great threat to the main source of food in Egypt. Besides, slums lead to more pollution of the environment due to small poor living units, which leads to negatively waste disposal as well as the usage of old methods in lighting in addition to lack of adequate sanitation and absence of clean water.

“Responses to this pressing challenge have been expressed by several international initiatives for improving the living conditions of slum dwellers all over the world. Most noticeable of these is the Cities Alliance4 campaign ‘Cities without Slums’ started in 1999,” (Khalifa, 2011). Accordingly, facing such problems and capitalizing on existing advantages require more concerted efforts to control this phenomenon, as the presence of slums in cities gives the way for such conditions to continue and even worsen. Efforts should not only direct to
prevent the growth of slums, but also to improve the living conditions of dwellers in existing slums, which their presence and spread are undeniable.

“The main policy lesson for policy-makers is not the need to focus on redevelopment as opposed to in situ upgrading…. What is needed is a more differentiated set of policy options. The specifics of the upgrading programs should depend on the local context, including the physical conditions within the settlements that are being upgraded,” (Mukhija, 2001).

**Research questions:**

The purpose of this study is to answer the questions of:

- Is the ISDF strategy successful for dealing with slums in Egypt in a way that fulfils its role?
  - What is the role and mandate of ISDF for dealing with slums in Egypt?
  - What do the best practices offer, as a reference, for the implementation of the ISDF strategy?
  - What are perspectives of other stakeholders involved in and affected by the ISDF implementation program?

To answer these questions, this study focuses on reviewing the ISDF strategy for dealing with slums through investigations with people in charge of Urban Upgrading Units at governorates, and examining its successfulness by interviewing residents of upgraded areas.

This study is divided into chapters. Chapter Two provides global criteria for a successful program. Then, Chapter Three presents literature regarding defining slums in Egypt, and the ISDF performance. Chapter Four discusses the methodologies used in this thesis; followed by
more details of the data collected in Chapter Five. In Chapter Six there are study results; while Chapter Seven provides the study recommendations for a successful ISDF program.
Chapter Two: Conceptual Framework

The argument of this thesis and the plan of investigation are to verify the following hypothesis:

- Dealing with slums has to follow a national strategy that adheres to global best practices.
- ISDF strategy has some defects and obstacles that prevent it from achieving its objectives for dealing with slums.

A. Slums

‘Slum’ is a general comprehensive term under which fall various classifications of settlements, for instance, informal settlements, chaotic squatters, shantytowns, decaying inner cities, and low-income communities. The term ‘slum’ refers to areas of improper and miserable living conditions as well as other main characteristics such as informality (The World Bank and UNCHS Habitat, 2000). Another description for slums: “Slums are neglected parts of cities where housing and living conditions are appallingly poor. Slums range from high-density, squalid central city tenements to spontaneous squatter settlements without legal recognition or rights, sprawling at the edge of cities,” (Cities Alliance Action Plan, 1999).

The common definition of ‘slum’ suggests that it is: “…a contiguous settlement where the inhabitants are characterized as having inadequate housing and basic services. A slum is often not recognized and addressed by the public authorities as an integral or equal part of the city” (UN-Habitat, 2002c). Though, there is a more functional definition of slums developed by the (UN-Habitat 2003): “An area that combines, to various extents, the following characteristics: inadequate access to safe water, inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing, overcrowding, and insecure residential status.” International bodies have adopted this description in any global statistics on slums, however; it is limited only to legal and physical features of settlements, and excludes social dimensions.
Slums are places where health conditions are deteriorated because of the difficulty to access healthcare services, in spite of the great need. Although, living conditions of urban inhabitants have been upgraded between year 1995 and 2007–2009, the percentage of urban inhabitants living in these conditions remains high, particularly in Africa, because more than half of them still inhabit slums.

Because slums continue to exceed improvements, the UN-Habitat Global Housing Strategy starts to help member countries to work towards the awareness of the right to adequate housing. This strategy aims at developing national housing strategies for all member States. Such strategies guide polices of the State, administration and maintenance actions in the field of housing, management of slum upgrading, slum prevention and investment. These need to be organized with a broad involvement of all stakeholders.

Strategies of housing, at state and city levels, are unable to be separated from strategies of infrastructure, land-use and strategies of mobility and local economic development. All strategies combined in the inclusive, participatory and wide-ranging process of urban planning and programming supported by a legal and regulatory context. The anticipated results of the UN-Habitat Global Housing Strategy will reorganize housing within the current international debate on economically feasible, environmentally and culturally sustainable and socially inclusive cities.

B. International Practices for Dealing with Slums

Globally, international practices for dealing with slums tell that nothing should be reached by force. Different options should be given to slum inhabitants to be able to decide about their situations either by upgrading their houses in the same location, or by getting new apartments somewhere else. In case there is only one solution, awareness of residents should be
raised before enforcing it. They should also take part in making the design of their homes or even the standard and location where they will be developed. Thus, professionals, who are able to talk their language, should hold workshops and meetings to explain options and give them the opportunity to express their views.

Because governments alone are not able to work on the slums issue with its various dimensions, stakeholders can play a vital role in this mission. This cooperation is necessary at central, governorates and area levels, and across governmental, private and civil society sectors. For the success of the stakeholders’ cooperation management, the agenda of each stakeholder group and interrelations between them should aim at capitalizing the cooperative relations and resolving conflicting ones. To mobilize their cooperation, stakeholders can coordinate with each other to hold meetings, awareness campaigns and public debates, in addition to formal arrangements for continuous cooperation.

Problems related to informal areas cannot be faced without mobilizing local resources, including slum residents themselves, who provide their resources voluntarily along with their knowledge, (AUC Input for Egypt’s Strategy for Dealing with Slums, 2014). This mobilization of community resources encourages other actors to participate and benefit from community efforts. The main objective of the strategy for dealing with slums should integrate internal and external resources, and should offer interventions in which their inputs are complementary to each other. This needs negotiation to build trust between slum residents and outsiders from one side, and for government and NGOs to find ways to put resources and partners together in the implementation of slum development plans from the other side.

Another important lesson learnt from the best international practices tells that slum inhabitants are willing to pay. Yes, they have the will to pay taxes and to contribute to public
services, a fact that is contradictory to the belief they want everything without charge. It has been showed in several cases that when they pay, they feel ownership and responsibility to guard and protect their infrastructure. Nevertheless, another lesson tells that mobilization of resource is not only financial, but also engagement of multidisciplinary teams such as, architects, engineers, social workers and planners is an essential factor. This includes the participation of NGOs and slum residents with different experiences and skills. To involve a research group from the very beginning of any project is also of high importance to be able to explore the issues that might arise in any process; planning, implementation or monitoring, (AUC Input for Egypt’s Strategy for Dealing with Slums, 2014).

1. **Principles for a Successful Slum Upgrading**

For a successful slums upgrading process, some principles should be followed: (UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 2011).

Upgrading has to be a **participatory process** that focuses, at the first place, on community needs as determined by its members. Participation is the guide to the sustainability of a project. With participation, conditions will improve, people will become satisfied with the performance of their local government, infrastructure developments will be managed and upgrading investments will be enhanced. The more community participation, the more successful the outcome will be. A main feature of this participation is the efficiency in collecting data on settlement by the community members themselves, who are most familiar with it. This is through surveys and other techniques in order to detect the necessary forms of upgrading. “The satisfaction of participants with the end product of the participatory upgrading process… is an important consideration, as if community members are not satisfied with the end product, they
will judge participation itself as a method of achieving housing needs, and as Baan Mankong scaling up is dependent upon community exchange and learning-by-doing, satisfaction in the process and outcomes is necessary. The results demonstrate that for the participants and beneficiaries of Baan Mankong, the upgrading project has largely resulted in improved housing conditions for residents,” (Archer, 2012).

Upgrading has to be carried out in partnership. For an effective and successful upgrading project, planning and implementing processes have to be done by the community in close coordinated effort with the local government. Likewise, Non-Governmental Organizations can present a vital part in supporting community organizations and in offering any needed technical support in developing projects of income generation or designing improvements of housing. “The Building in Partnership: Participatory Urban Planning (BIP: PUP) project was implemented in Kitale, Shimo La Tewa and Tuwan in Kenya.” The project brought together actors from all stakeholders, NGOs, Public sector and slum dwellers. These slums were used as experimental areas, which proved the success of approaches that encourage partnerships in considering needs and concerns of slum dwellers, and in developing sustainable upgrading program, (Majale, 2008).

Upgrading has to provide secure tenure to dwellers. Providing secure tenure plays a crucial role in upgrading communities. Without it, the continuous feeling of exposure to eviction will influence people’s willingness to invest more in their housing and living conditions. After borders are determined and recorded, tenure might be granted to families in the form of lease contracts or title deeds. In some cases, authorizing tenure privileges to the woman family-head instead of the man protects her and the kids from the threat to be homeless, and gives them an asset that can be used for income generation purposes. To a great extent, land tenure should be
authorized to the entire community as a way of avoiding gentrification and strengthening community organization. “Based on their case study of a non-notified slum in Mumbai, Subbaraman et al. (2012) describe that how the lack of tenure security and access to basic services, resulting from legal exclusion, result in deficiencies in health and social outcomes. Expanding social policies to those who have been excluded in non-notified slums would be an alternative approach if legalizing slums is politically difficult,” (Nakamura, 2014).

**Communities have to contribute** to the cost of upgrading somehow. Contribution strengthens the sense of ownership of the community. This contribution can be financial either by paying in cash or by community loans or it can be in the form of labor contribution or construction materials, or a mixture of these forms. The best way for a project upgrading to be done is when contributions of the community are enriched by some kind of subsidy from funds of public projects or grants of donors. This was experienced in Bangkok, Thailand, when “residents accept the increased financial burden as the necessary trade-off to be able to remain in their community, as the landowners want their land to be well maintained. Despite many residents finding themselves with smaller plots as a consequence of upgrading, this is accepted as a condition of participatory,” (Archer, 2012).

Upgrading must be **affordable.** Families’ contributions will help decide the range and size of the upgrading package. Therefore, if upgrading projects are accompanied by user fees or high taxes that people cannot afford, they will possibly not use or provide services, or may easily move away to other settlements where they are more affordable.

Upgrading projects must be **financially sustainable.** In part, sustainability comes from how an upgrading project is financed. The best funding is when various sources are combined together. These combinations include contributions from community members, subsidies and
loans from the State, and possibly support from local or international development organizations. In order to guarantee that the upgraded infrastructure is in an appropriate condition and is well managed overtime, it is essential that the construction of this infrastructure occurs in ways that build unity of the community organization and raise local economic development.

Upgrading should **be part of a larger-scale urban development and/or housing strategy**. Upgrading projects have to be viewed as an essential item of the larger vision of the city future development program. Projects should not be isolated initiatives that are implemented only for emergency, however; it should be part of larger urban management plans that pursue to deal with problems of housing at the citywide level.

2. **‘Dos’ and ‘Don’ts’**

Moreover, there is a list of ‘dos’ that governments should work on, and another list of ‘don’ts’ that they should be aware of to avoid while dealing with slums and slum dwellers, *(UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 2011)*.

For a successful upgrading program, on one hand, **governments have to** promote good governance in urban projects, in both communities and the city. The capacity of local governments must be reinforced to carry out their responsibilities for fair delivery of infrastructure and public services to all residents in urban areas while planning for future growth, and to be able to fight corruption of land markets. In Kenya, reforms towards good urban governance have been initiated through the Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP), which, since the mid-1990s, has attempted to strengthen the local government system so as to transfer financial resources to local authorities, enable them to deliver services and to increase local accountability. Indeed, the governance framework has a strong bearing on the ability of national and local governments to respond to the slum challenge, *(Majale, 2008)*.
Governments also have to encourage informal initiatives of slums inhabitants and recognize the role of women in such projects, in addition to following a more progressive approach in development. An option for a progressive approach is the self-help approach, which involves determining and providing low-cost housing for squatters, creating a management system and techniques of control, in addition to establishing minimum building standards, and negotiating the land acquisition from government. “… Supporting self-help housing construction by households in non-notified slums would be effective for achieving the objective. It is not wise to disregard the self-help efforts of motivated slum residents,” (Nakamura, 2014).

Governments have to integrate the slum upgrading process with employment creation and local economic growth along with implementing and monitoring upgrading strategies of the city for the interest of the poor. When governments consider the poor interest, it will form and design relocation plans, as a final solution, only in absolutely urgent cases, and will combine local funds, cross subsidies and residents contributions together to guarantee financial feasibility of upgrading. Besides, governments have to make land affordable and infrastructure available when establishing new urban cities.

On the other hand, governments do not have to expect that informal areas will spontaneously disappear with economic growth, or to isolate upgrading programs from investment in urban planning and management. Governments also do not have to neglect the needs of powerless groups in the upgrading process, or to enforce impractical principles and regulations that cannot work for them, such as; subsidies or full-cost reimbursement.

Governments also do not have to invest community resources in large social housing programs or provide expensive infrastructure and services that poor people cannot afford, and on
the same time, governments do not have to undervalue the benefit that their contributions and those from local governments, landowners can add to the upgrading process.

In addition, governments do not have to commit discrimination against people in rental housing or support a single tenure alternative, or to consider the issue of slum upgrading only as an urban planning or physical concern and execute illegal evictions. “Forced evictions, as distinct from closely related issues … can be violent and discriminatory in nature, and almost invariably affect the poorest and the most disadvantaged groups in any society where they are carried out,” (e.g. Bombay in India and Bangkok in Thailand), (Leckie, 1994).

3. **Stages of Successful Upgrading Projects**

**Selecting the area** to be upgraded requires balancing priorities. Commonly government planners are those who are responsible for identifying areas that need to be upgraded, much influenced by politics. However, it is better when involving local communities, Non-Governmental Organizations and other stakeholders. In selecting settlements, government planners should consider its specific physical environment, land tenure issues, the willingness of the community to participate, costs and the larger urban development program. Another factor in area selection is attaining a good presentation influence, particularly if the project will be somewhat innovative. Usually, the easiest settlements or slums to upgrade are chosen first. These include areas with well-established local administration, with transferable land titles, or those that are easily connected with infrastructure lines. Instead, slums with the highest deteriorated environmental levels or with the most extreme poverty condition should possibly be the first priority.

**Enhancing the internal organization** of a community is a significant step in the upgrading process. For a successful upgrading, a community should be able to recognize that the
process addresses the needs of all community members, not only small groups of them. Additionally, it should be able to negotiate with local government planners, determine and express its needs and engage in all stages of the process, planning, operation and maintenance. Sometimes, a community does not have any organization. In this case, a community needs to form new organization, as it gives a project a good start if there is sort of community organization already exists. Organizations can take part in the project and give opportunity to community members to be fully involved in the upgrading process. Sometimes, there is more than one community organization included in the project, for example youth groups, parents or elderly groups, minority groups, or dwellers groups. Non-Governmental Organizations can take a very important part in raising the capacity of such community organizations. According to (Boonyabancha, 2005), “upgrading urban poor communities’ relations with the city also involves upgrading relationships within a city; trying to create space in a city in which the local authority, the network and the community can interact and work together…. If the upgrading programme provides that single community with money and power to make change, the community goes ahead with the upgrading programme and the project ends up belonging to the whole city. The network feels that this is part of our work.”

Arranging meetings to involve stakeholders is a very beneficial tool in helping launch the upgrading program. While organizing meetings, it is important to make sure that everyone knows what the program offers, and to set up the techniques that will be followed during the planning and implementation stages of the project. It is important also that these meetings have a flexible agenda with a flexible timeline, so members can speak their minds freely and bring their thoughts to the table. It is not good that a predetermined upgrading program is presented, which stakeholders are only allowed to approve or reject. This might help in some cases when
organizers present a range of schematic upgrading alternatives and discuss them in the meeting as a way of breaking the ice and helping people to think. This helps community members and other stakeholders react with the ideas. Thus, with some technical assistance from community architects and organizers, stakeholders are able to draft their own planning alternatives, with housing ideas, infrastructure, area layout and natural environment.

**Surveying all aspects** of the community in detail and drawing up a good settlement map that shows all houses, water pipes, comforts and problem areas is a useful way to collect accurate physical and socioeconomic data of the existing slum community, which will positively help in the development of upgrading programs. Because community members are the most familiar with their residence area, their organization is the best entity to conduct such survey. Conducting a survey is another method to increase opportunities for people to participate and develop their skills to understand all their own problems. With simple technical support from Non-Governmental Organizations or local government can help residents in designing a good survey, preparing accurate settlement maps and gathering data that is necessary for upgrading. This questionnaire and mapping process arouses the interest of all residents of the community, increases the capacities of community members and at the same time reinforces their organizations. In (Jera, 2012), there is a description of “how a settlement profile, mapping and enumeration of Magada, an informal settlement in the town of Epworth in Zimbabwe, provide the basis for an upgrading programme.”

**Designing all features** of the upgrading project involves preparation of final maps for the community layout and infrastructure, designing houses, arranging the construction timeframe and labor-contracting program, and establishing systems within the settlement to maintain these developments after the project finishes. This step also involves the financial arrangements,
detailed cost estimations and plans for funding the entire project:

- How much each item will cost
- Who will purchase the materials
- Who will pay for what
- How these funds will flow
- How the finances will be managed.

The best way to manage this is when community members, their NGO supporters and local government accomplish all this planning cooperatively. When the community organizes committees in order to manage different phases of the project, this becomes an experimental run for a long-term development process administered jointly by the local administration and the community. The more opportunity there is for community members to take part in this planning, the greater chance for the project to success. A good example of an informal area that followed this way of management is Magada in Zimbabwe, (Jera, 2012).

Accomplishing the actual upgrading work is considered the most interesting step in the upgrading process. In this step, the development is actually done, and a settlement becomes clean and well maintained. This step aims at constructing or upgrading houses, preparing drains, paving roads, raising electric poles, and hiding water pipe networks and connecting them to housing units, (UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 2011). These tasks can be done in many ways. One option is that, a constructor or a Non-Governmental Organization can use tendering to outsource all the work. Another option is that, community members, who are assisted by their labor and can manage all things, can build the entire project. Usually, the final work is done by a combination of the two methods, with the residents doing as much of the work as possible, and outsourcing only the more tough or specialized or technically complicated tasks in the process.
Continue with meetings as a principle for any additional work. In fact, the community upgrading process should not stop when the physical tasks are done. Improvements maintenance is also a very important task for communities to undertake especially because it has to be sustainable services. A well-upgraded area gives confidence to community members and encourage them to plan and accomplish all types of further improvement projects - not only physical work, but also social and economic developments such as community activities, health care programs, sports facilities, community-supervised welfare systems, youth activities and groups for old people are included. Continued meetings of community members can become a principle for ongoing planning and cooperation with their local governments and supporters of a Non-Governmental Organization.

A successful case study for an upgrading process based on community networks is Bester’s Camp in Durban, South Africa, and Luanda, Angola is another successful example for a community that takes the initiative in development, (UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 2011).
Chapter Three: Literature Review

A. Slums in Egypt

In Egypt, slums are known by ‘Ashwa’iyyat,’ which literally means chaos and disorder. The term ‘Ashwa’iyyat’ refers to those informal areas which suffer from accessibility problems, inadequate services and infrastructure, narrow streets, increase in residential densities, and lack of open areas and vacant land (World Bank, 2008).

However, the Building Unified Law no. 119/2008 includes all terms related to urban development and planning, it ignores ‘Ashwa’iyyat,’ which refers to informal areas or slums. As an alternative, it uses ‘unplanned areas’ and defined it as: “Areas developed in contradiction to planning and building laws and regulations” (MTI and GOGPO, 2009).

In fact, local authorities use more functional definition for Ashwa’iyyat which is: “Residential areas characterized by being developed in contradiction to planning and building laws and regulations in the absence of state’s supervision. They, in essence, might lack services and/or infrastructure” (General Administration for Planning and Plan Monitoring, 2008). Thus, it is obvious that official terminology gives settlements, which infringe planning law, much more weight than slums in regard to poor living conditions.

Another definition by (GOPP, 2006) which is commonly used: “All areas that have been developed by individual efforts, whether single or multi-story buildings or shacks, in the absence of law and has not been physically planned. They have been developed on lands that are not assigned in the city’s master plan for building. The buildings’ conditions might be good, however; they might be environmentally or socially unsafe and lack the basic services and utilities.”

According to law 119, unplanned areas in Egypt have two main categories; unplanned areas that expanded on privately owned agricultural land, and areas that need redevelopment, including slums, squatters and unsafe areas. Some of these areas, which need redevelopment, are
formal, old deteriorated areas, and others are cemeteries or marginal squatter settlements on public land. In fact, in its different historical stages, Egypt has witnessed social groups and communities scattered on outskirts or between folds of major cities forming poor areas and slums. The history of these areas and their inhabitants of outlaws have contributed to the consolidation of the belief that slum dwellers are a source of many criminal behavior and illegal practices. However, this belief ignores the fact that these slums are the only solution for the poor of limited or no income to confront the housing crisis. These slum dwellers are incapable to enter the formal housing market due to lack of financial resources that covers adequate legitimate housing.

B. Government Stages of Action for Dealing with Slums

Authorities have difficulties to access roots of Ashwa’iyyat, which originated in cities or on outskirts of degraded areas. Ezbet El-Sa’ayda, in Zamalek, is the first informal gathering that began when Mr. Moneim Asran, from Qena, moved to Cairo and started with some of his family immigrants to create a group of huts. In 1924, the Egyptian authority, at that time, decided to compensate Mr. Asran and his family with a piece of land in Imbaba, as an alternative, to move to it. After moving to Imbaba, Mr. Asran sent to his relatives and acquaintances in Qena, who were searching for jobs in Cairo to rent the huts he previously established in Zamalik. Number of immigrants was enlarged, the population grew steadily, and numerous activities by immigrants were created, and thus, large families were formed. After that, frequent stories happened in different areas; e.g. Ezbet El-Haggana in Nasr City, (Al-Ahram Digital, 2002).

In early nineties, particularly in 1994, government started to prepare plans for developing slums in most of the Egyptian governorates, and in some other governorates in late nineties. The first stage in the developing program of informal areas is the Informal Settlements Development
Program (1994-2004), which works on providing basic urban facilities (water, sanitary drainage, electricity, road paving and municipal cleanliness) for about 325 unplanned areas with total cost of 3.2 billion EGP. The government plan set priorities in identifying projects in accordance with the status of each area and the needs of its dwellers to be able to provide the necessary funds for the implementation of projects for connecting utilities and basic services, and to put a timetable for each step in the plan. In most cases, the plan included:

- Count the number of informal buildings, homes and families in every unit.
- Put regulations and do necessary planning by informing the Department of Urban Planning.
- Connect utilities including electricity, drinking water, sanitation and road paving
- Provide areas for public service (mosques, schools, clinics, green areas …) (IDSC, 2008).

On one hand, the development plan of the Egyptian government, which supports the existence and the necessary connect slums to the cities, is still in progress in the 2000s. On the contrary, there are upgrading projects on city-level, which marginalizing those informal areas by building traffic axes passing over them and preparing visions for the Great Cairo Region which perceive an entire replacement of slums by other usages. In 2002, the Participatory Development Program in Urban Areas (PDP) predicted the population of slums in Greater Cairo to be 8.3 million, a number that was four times the official estimation (2.1 million). In 2005, the General Organization for Physical Planning (GOPP) estimated slums population all over Egypt by 6.2 million inhabitants, of which Great Cairo Region only houses 59%, (Cairo’s Informal Areas-Between Urban Challenges and Hidden Potentials, 2009).

The second stage is the Informal Settlements Belting Program (2004-2008) which focuses on restricting the growth of informal areas by supporting local governments in preparing
detailed plans to facilitate development efforts. In 2007, the Ministry of Local Development estimated the number of slums in Egypt to be 1171 informal areas with a population of 15 million people, of which 6.1 million (41.4%) live in GCR, (IDSC, May 2008). This estimation highlights the fact that slums in Egypt are really a critical issue and not just an exceptional phenomenon, which become a part of public policies as being clearly mentioned in the following:

- The five-year plans of 2002-07 and 2008-12,
- The recent Building and Planning Law #119/2008 included definitions of slums, and
- The presidential campaign consideration regarding slums and guaranteeing proper living conditions for their dwellers.

In 2007 also, the government dedicated all efforts to control any expansion of slums by trying to design the borders and edges of each city before it is eroded by informal growth. In 2008, when a rock fell in Mansheyet Nasser, Cairo, 45 were killed and 57 were injured, the slums issue, particularly unsafe areas, took the priority on the government agenda and media focus.

In October 2008, the third stage, Informal Settlement Development Facility started. In this stage, a national fund was established by a presidential decree (no. 305/2008) under the main objective of supporting local government financially in the provision of safe housing on cost recovery basis. In 2009, priority was given to unsafe areas development. The Informal Settlements Development Facility (details about ISDF strategy and operation will be provided later) is affiliated to the Prime Minister directly, and its board is made up of representatives of: six ministries, the private sector and Non-Governmental Organizations.
The fourth stage was in June 2014 when the new Ministry of State for Urban Development and Informal Settlement is established. Finally, the Egyptian government finally recognized the seriousness of slums and took the decision to establish a Ministry for urban development. The State allocated a special budget for this Ministry and a dedicated team, through a budget of EGP 600 million. In addition, they received grant from Egyptian Banks Union of 2% of its profits, 150 million pounds according to the last year financial report. Moreover, when the estate tax law is enacted, a 25% of it will be allocated for the development of slums, in addition to a negotiable 5% of voluntarily businessmen profits, in case it exceeds million pounds to be added to Ministry financial resources in order to reach 1,200 million Egyptian pounds annually. This fourth stage is focusing on developing slums: unsafe, unplanned and informal markets, and applying an integrated system for solid waste management (domestic and construction wastes), Salem, M. (2014, August 2).

C. ISDF Performance and Outcomes

ISDF changed the Egyptian vocabulary by replacing terms “slums,” “informal settlements,” and “Ashwa’iyyat” to two different names: “unsafe” and “unplanned” areas. Unsafe areas are those areas which are subjected to life or health threat, exposed to tenure risks, or those having indecent housing, while unplanned areas are mainly those which are noncompliant to laws and regulations of planning and building.

On the national level, and as stated in the Presidential decree no. 305/2008 for establishing ISDF, its mandates are to issue a national map for counting and classifying unsafe areas on a governorate-level, and a national map for counting informal markets as well as the unplanned areas. On the area level, it takes too much work, in form of data and maps, to prepare executive action plans for developing unsafe areas. ISDF is responsible for providing detailed
urban, social, economic counting for each area explained by updated GIS maps through satellite image and field visits.

Under the State plan, to provide safe housing for citizens, the Informal Settlements Development Facility in collaboration with Minya governorate worked on developing areas of improper housing in the governorate. In this regard, ISDF prepared an implementation plan to develop Eshash Mahfouz with total cost LE 92.75377 million. This project is based on the resettlement of residents in the same area and on the rehabilitation of the area constructional, socially and economically through the construction of 37 residential building on three stages. The Fund provided the first installment.

ISDF prepared an implementation plan for upgrading the area of Eshash Al-Sudan St. depends on resettlement of its residents in same locations. Needed fund was also provided to finalize the first stage by constructing three buildings of thirty residential units and other thirty business ones, which are delivered for needy people. Moreover, ISDF financed the development of 27 unplanned areas in Cairo and Giza at a cost of 344 million pounds in cooperation with the armed forces.

ISDF finalized the plan for developing fifteen unplanned areas in Helwan, Cairo governorate, where residents are suffering from deterioration of the urban environment and lack of some services, such as water and sanitation, as well as the deteriorating of unpaved streets and lack of street lighting and firefighting networks. The selected area is 445.8 acres houses about 112,000 residents. Development included water supply, sanitation, paving main streets, street lighting, and networks for firefighting and finishing building interfaces. The estimated cost of this development plan is about 260 million pounds funded by the Federation of Egyptian Banks.
Recently, ISDF developed Ezbet Nafie in Maadi, Cairo. This area covers approximately 7.5 acres and has a population of about 4,308 people. So far, interlock tiles for internal streets have been installed in addition to 155 lighting units and three fire hydrants, (ISDF, 2013).
Chapter Four: Methodology

In this study, the research adopted a qualitative analysis, as it is the most appropriate method to such study. Due to the large number of slums and the difficulty to do qualitative analysis in each of them, two informal areas only have been selected to study their cases. The selection of these areas is based on the fact that there is actual intervention by ISDF has been made. These areas are:

1. Ezbet Nafie in Maadi, Cairo. It is considered as unplanned area.
2. Eshash Al-Sudan Street in Dokki, Giza Governorate. It is considered as unsafe/slum area.

Interviews with staff at Urban Upgrading Units at governorates, who work in cooperation with ISDF, are conducted. Interviews are conducted with Dr. Khalil Shaath, the Director of Urban Upgrading Unit at Cairo governorate, and Engineer Mamdouh Kamel, the Executive Director of Urban Upgrading Unit at Giza governorate. In fact, opinions of staff at Urban Upgrading Units is an essential factor in reviewing the ISDF strategy because these units at governorates are the bodies on which ISDF depends in the implementation process. Therefore, their experiences in working with ISDF are valuable. Moreover, units at Cairo, Giza and Qalyoubia governorates were established before the establishment of ISDF, and therefore they are more independent from it than units in other governorates, which have stronger feel of belonging to ISDF due to the fact that it is the initiator of their establishment.

In addition, other semi-structured group interviews were conducted (focus group discussion) with dwellers of Ezbet Nafie and Eshash Al-Sudan. The selection of these two areas was based on being cases of those which have been upgraded by ISDF. Residents of Ezbet Nafie and Eshash Al-Sudan were interviewed to know more about their living conditions, and the availability of facilities and basic services, as well as other needs from their perspective. These interviews are of high importance to this study to know how satisfied they are of services that
have become available after ISDF intervention, and what other needs that were not met. This study has tested the effect of the ISDF strategy and its success in terms of: the existence of these slums and the quality of life of slum dwellers after ISDF efforts.

Key questions/issues:

Group I: ISDF efforts for dealing with slums through governorates programs, and the perception of these efforts by slum dwellers.

These questions ask about residents’ knowledge about ISDF, the method followed in upgrading (resettlement, upgrading, etc....) and the approach to achieve this method. This group of questions also asks about the availability of facilities, such as; gas and power supplies, and sanitation and clean water.

Group II: Impact of intervention and conditions before and after ISDF intervention.

This group of questions asks about the level of satisfaction of residents. Are residents satisfied of the followed method of upgrading? What other preferred option for them? Why do they prefer such solution? Moreover, residents are asked about any other needs they want ISDF to fulfil.

Detailed questions of interviews are available in appendix 2.

Moreover, this study includes some global principles and procedures for an effective program and successful upgrading process. These principles are considered the criteria for the best practice of upgrading programs. Following these criteria ensures a successful upgrading process.
Chapter Five: Informal Settlements Development Facility

A. ISDF Strategy

The Informal Settlements Development Facility (ISDF) aims at counting informal settlements and working on their development. Its main responsibility is to prepare development plans for the improvement of these areas and providing them with basic facilities, such as water, sanitation and electricity. ISDF works on these duties in coordination with local administration, relevant ministries and other governmental bodies, which should provide it with needed information, expertise or any other assistance. ISDF divided informal areas into: unsafe areas and unplanned areas. In June 2014, unsafe areas were 1% of total urban areas in cities; with density 200 people/acre and height of buildings are 1-2 floors, a fact that needs an immediate intervention in the short-term because it does not provide safe housing. Unplanned areas at the same period were estimated to be 37.5% of total cities and 95% of villages, with density 500 people/acre and height of buildings are between 2-14 floors, a fact that provides minimum level of safe housing as well, which need medium and long-term development plan, (ISDF presentation, 2014).

Slum areas are classified according to UN Habitat criteria and ISDF criteria. According to the UN Habitat, slum areas are those lacking accessibility to clean water and improved sanitation, lacking tenure, lacking sufficient living space (more than two people/room) or lacking appropriate housing. By appropriate housing, UN Habitat means those areas, which are built on ruins or geological formation that considered unsafe lands. Slum areas might also be under high voltage power cables, under threat of railways accidents, or in the vicinity of industrial pollution, or their buildings are made of makeshift materials. For the ISDF, criteria of slum areas are same as those of the UN Habitat, however; to ISDF, slums are divided into four grades in a descending order according to the degree of risk:
1. Areas that threaten life: flood areas, geological formation or under threat of railway accidents. In this case, ISDF should move residents immediately to housing units in other areas, or compensates them financially to obtain housing on their own, e.g. Mansheyet Nasser in Cairo - Qellin in Kafr Elsheikh. (Al-Deweiqa and Establ Antar were moved to 6th of October City).

2. Areas of unsuitable shelter conditions: ruins, unsuitable building locations or buildings made up of makeshift materials. In this case, ISDF offers some alternatives for residents, and upon their agreement ISDF may:
   • Resettle dwellers in the same area (e.g. Zerzara in Port Said),
   • Construct alternative housing units on State Property land in another location and move slum dwellers to it (e.g. Al-Teraa Al-Damarenya in Qena),
   • Compensate financially (e.g. Al-Sahaby in Aswan),
   • Redevelop buildings (e.g. Esna in Luxor),
   • Eradicate destructed buildings on the charge of the owner, or
   • Offering loans for developing buildings (e.g. Esna in Luxor), (ISDF presentation, 2014).

3. Areas of health risks: with no access to clean water and sanitation, in the vicinity of industrial pollution, or under high voltage power cables. In this case, ISDF:
   • Moves or transfer power lines to land cables in cooperation with Ministry of Electricity and Energy and governorates (Al-Bossayleya in Aswan),
   • Regularizes situation of industries that pollute environments in cooperation with Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Industry,
• Implements safe water and sanitation facilities according to the plan of The Water and Waste Water Holding Company (e.g. Elwayet A-Sawy, Ezbet Ma’moun, and Mohamed Moshrif land in Fayoum).

4. Areas of instable of tenure: on State land, on territory dominated by central organization, areas on the territory of Endowments. In this case, ISDF authorizes housing tenures with fees, or providing other housing units.

Unsafe areas

In June 2014, ISDF estimated the number of slums (unsafe areas) all over Egypt to be 364 settlements with total area 4569.3 acres that include 217956 housing units. This number of settlements is divided into four types according to the four grades of risk. The distribution of these areas is shown in the following chart:

Figure 1: Number of Slums in Egypt According to their Degree of Risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Unsafe Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>258 Areas (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Areas (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Areas (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Areas (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Inappropriate Housing
- Health Risk
- Life Threatening
- Tenure Risk

Source: ISDF Presentation-2014
In the table below (Table 1), ISDF represents the situation of unsafe areas in Egypt at the time it was establishment.

Table 1: Number of Unsafe Areas in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Risk</th>
<th>Private Property</th>
<th>State Property</th>
<th>Central Authority</th>
<th>No. of Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISDF Presentation-2014

The following table (Table 2) represents the situation of unsafe areas in Egypt in June 2014. When comparing (Table 1) to (Table 2), it can be noticed that number of unsafe areas has become 364 in 2014 after being 422 in 2009. This means that ISDF has developed 58 areas over six years since its establishment. Although the number of unsafe areas is reduced, it does not show a real progress in the ISDF program over such period of time.

Table 2: Number of Unsafe Areas in 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Risk</th>
<th>Private Property</th>
<th>State Property</th>
<th>Central Authority</th>
<th>No. of Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISDF Presentation-2014
Currently, ISDF is working on the implementation of the national plan for developing unsafe areas. Total number of areas that had been developed till June 2014 is 58 settlements of total area 523.2 acres, which include 29,623 housing units (15,683 units of which were already built) with a cost of 1.527 billion EGP housing around 119 thousand people.

Unplanned areas

According to building law 119/2008, unplanned areas are those which established in violation of laws and regulations that govern planning. These areas have been established as a result of non-fulfillment of urban development requirements in cities and villages. They are characterized by high density of population of about five hundred people/acre. Heights of building in these areas are ranging from 2-14 floors. Unplanned areas provide minimum level of safe housing, and require development processes of medium and long term strategies.

Based on the Board's decision dated February 28, 2012, and approved by the Prime Minister in order to prepare a national map of unplanned areas, ISDF started to prepare the base maps of unplanned areas in all cities of Egypt. The number of unplanned areas in Egypt is 226 settlements in 27 governorates reaching a proportion of 37.5% of total urban area. Sohag governorate occupied the highest percentage of unplanned areas reaching 69.9% of the city, and the lowest percentage of unplanned areas was of 2.5% in Port Said, (ISDF presentation, 2014).

In Cairo governorate, as being one city, unplanned areas are 19.8% of total urban area 92,904.8 acre. As shown in (Table 3), the number of unplanned areas to be developed in this governorate is 17 areas that suffer from deterioration in construction environment, and from lack of services and infrastructure in some of them. Total area of these unplanned settlements is 6,598.57 acre.
Table 3: 2013-2014 ISDF Development Projects for Unplanned Areas in Cairo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marg</td>
<td>Al-Petrol St. + Sheikh Mansour St.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ain Shams</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ain Shams</td>
<td>North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Al-Khalifa</td>
<td>Al-Ebageyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Hadaeq Qobba</td>
<td>Ezbet Abu Hasish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Al-Zawya Al-Hamra</td>
<td>Abu Leila + Ahmed Khalil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Manshyet Nasser</td>
<td>Random areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Torah</td>
<td>Sweqat Al-Wahayd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Dar El Salam</td>
<td>Kotsika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dar El Salam</td>
<td>Dar Al-Salam Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Maadi</td>
<td>Maadi Al-Khabiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Maadi</td>
<td>Zbet Nafea’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Shoubra</td>
<td>Al-Assal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Shoubra</td>
<td>Souq Al-Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Al-Salam (Awal)</td>
<td>Taqsim Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Al-Salam (Awal)</td>
<td>Souq Espico</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cairo Governorate, 2014

However, in Giza governorate, which contains 12 cities, unplanned areas are 58.5% of total urban area 26,310 acre. As shown in (Table 4), the number of unplanned areas to be developed in this governorate is 13 areas that suffer from deterioration in construction environment, and from lack of services and infrastructure in some of them. Total area of these unplanned settlements is 666.7 acre.
Table 4: Distribution of Unplanned Areas in Giza Cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>North Giza</td>
<td>Zaki Matar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ezbet Al-Sa’ayda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ezbet Al-Mataar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Warraq</td>
<td>Bahary Al-Balad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ezbet Al-Mofty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Boulaq Dakrour</td>
<td>Abu Qtadah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Agouza</td>
<td>Old Agouza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ard Al-Lewa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Omraneyah</td>
<td>Old Talbeya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Haram</td>
<td>Kafr Nassar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ezbet Gebril</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kafr Al-Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>South Giza</td>
<td>Roqa’a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISDF, 2014

1. ISDF Interventions According to Timeframe

According to the ISDF, it has short, medium and long-term strategies.

   a. Short-term strategy:

   This strategy is the National Plan for Slum Development for 2012-2017. For the ISDF, ‘slum’ is the unsafe area. The main objective of the short-term strategy is to ensure safe housing in all Egyptian cities, and it aims to:

   • Developing efficient information management system,
   • Providing effective development programs and projects,
   • Providing technical assistance and capacity building,
   • Enhancing partnership and cooperation technique,
   • Adjusting a legislative outline.
These goals are focusing on information management, programs and projects, technical assistance, partnerships, monitoring and evaluation processes, the financial plan and risks that might occur. ISDF strategy also included an initiation that benefits residents of slum areas socially and economically.

ISDF initiates new socioeconomic programs to improve social and economic conditions of slum residents. Some of these programs are: women health, job opportunities for youth, literacy of parents, identification cards, combating drugs addiction and savings and loans programs. ISDF provides health services for women who aged between 15 and 40 and are of 20.1% of total population in Egypt. As for job opportunities, ISDF estimated percentage of youth aged between 15 and 40 by 40.8%, and percentage of literacy classes for parents by 51% of total population. Each person in these three programs costs EGP 500. In order to issue national IDs for slum dwellers, ISDF costs EGP 25/each. Moreover, the percentage of drug users among young people is about 9.6% of total population. These people need ISDF help in combating drugs addiction, which costs EGP 3,000/each. Savings and loans also is a social attempt by ISDF to help people in slums. By this program, ISDF is targeting a group of 9.7% of total informal labor sector, which presents 43% of the total labor force. ISDF offers loans of about EGP 3,000/each, and EGP 300/each as savings.

ISDF also initiates the business classification and development program in villages. ISDF works on determining what each village is famous for, and encourage the village to strengthen its business. In the following table, (Table 5) there is a brief on the business classification and development program by dividing them into three groups: vocational, services and crafts:
Table 5: Business Classification in Slums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Teacher</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>1 Seller</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1 Construction</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Farmers</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>2 Driver</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>2 Carpenter</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Nurse</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>3 Administrative</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>3 Steel Worker</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Accountant</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4 Unskilled Labor</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>4 Machines Operation</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Engineer</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>5 Trade Clause</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 Baker</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lawyer</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6 Coffee Waiter</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6 Mechanical</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Artist</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7 Fruits Seller</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7 Tailor</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Doctor</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>8 Electric</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8 Shoes Worker</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Social Worker</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>9 Technician</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9 Lathing Worker</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Athlete</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>10 Butcher</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>10 Metal Sheet Former</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Other</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11 Other</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>11 Other</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISDF Presentation 2012

According to this strategy, there should be a great progress with regard to redeveloping unsafe areas, however; it can be found that ISDF, which was established six years ago, has no real accomplishments, in terms of number of areas to be upgraded or redeveloped. Informal areas that are upgraded by ISDF funding are very limited compared to the total number of slums that should be upgraded in such period of time. ISDF needed to work on resource mobilization in a more innovative way that does not depend only on governmental funding, and to tap on the resources of civil society, private sector and even local communities.

ISDF strategy, in terms of funding, is based on the principle of full cost recovery. Therefore, unsafe areas of first priority, from ISDF perspective, that are selected to be developed are those of prime locations in order to ensure repayment of fund -given by ISDF in the form of
loan- after relocating residents and land sale. Besides, ISDF ignores areas of high risk (Grade 1) where it cannot reconstruct housing units in the same location due to danger to lives and cannot resell the land either, and thus ISDF cannot reimburse costs of relocating. This fact contradicts with ISDF main objectives for which it is established. Mainly, ISDF is established to save lives of citizens who are dwelling in unsafe areas, and to improve quality of their living conditions, in accordance with risk priorities approach that are determined by ISDF itself as internationally agreed. For example, this strategy of ISDF was applied in Awlad Allam settlement in Giza and Boulaq Abul Ela in Cairo due to the high economic values of their lands with disregarding people desires and their resistance to relocation.

In addition, ISDF proposals for social and economic programs are weak and traditional depending on stereotypes in all areas without taking into consideration the needs of each area or the participation of residents. Issuing national IDs for women, youth training and other programs lack exposure to topics and fields that practically affect citizens’ lives and enhance their satisfaction of their transition to new areas. This can be by facilitating access to public services and supporting basic economic activities for residents so that it can be developed in new locations.

b. Medium-term strategy:

This strategy is concerned with development of unplanned areas and informal markets, however; there are some obstacles facing the development of unplanned areas. These obstacles can be summarized in:

- Inefficiency of re-legalization application of unplanned areas, which allows the continuous growth of unplanned areas inside the urban city limits.
• Ineffectiveness of land readjustment and the addition of more land to urban city limits. This is because of the shortage in financial resources for services and infrastructure along with the shortage in governmental land for services and projects.

• Existence of illegal areas outside the urban boundaries that is about 80% of the urban areas, which cause the reduction of agriculture land.

To face such challenges, the ISDF strategy suggests legalizing unplanned areas, applying land readjustment for those lands added to urban city limits according to law # 222/1955, and continuing demolition of illegal buildings.

In the medium-term strategy, ISDF prepares a national map determining the location of informal markets and suggests socioeconomic programs: economic local development program, health care program and education program. These socioeconomic programs include developing 1,099 informal markets by building new markets, offering loans and savings, fighting literacy, providing health care and social insurance systems, improving products and working on waste management. In fact, this program provides 700,000 direct job opportunities and 3.5 million indirect ones, (ISDF presentation, 2012). In addition, the programs include delivery of clean water to unplanned areas in towns and villages. These activities are cost recoverable, however; the cost of the education program costs 300 million EGP. The education program introduces distance learning aiming at delivering education for primary to secondary schools through 15 TV channels for every Egyptian. It provides programs for literacy and training on personal skills, historic and touristic information, and basic knowledge.

For developing informal markets, ISDF provides temporary units with average cost EGP 1,000/unit, works on waste management and collection, improves products with average cost EGP 500/product, and gives loans of EGP 3,000/unit. Moreover, ISDF works on educating
literate vendors with cost EGP 500/vendor, and on covering health services with cost 500/vendor/year.

In this strategy, the scope of ISDF for dealing with slums is limited to markets only. However, there should be a larger scope for dealing with these informal markets as being part of cities. Development of informal markets should be within the development program of the city as a whole.

Moreover, in its medium-term strategy, ISDF represents a plan, which is not applied. In this strategy, ISDF offers socioeconomic programs for owners of informal markets that include healthcare and fighting literacy programs. Why does ISDF intervene and waste funding in such programs, which are not related to its main objective? Wasting funds in these programs will limit the fund allocated to develop/upgrade unsafe and unplanned areas. ISDF also, in its strategy, promises to provide 700,000 direct job opportunities and 3.5 million indirect ones. This number is too exaggerated. How come these programs provide this number of job opportunities? ISDF is not reasonable or realistic in its planning. Instead, ISDF might provide services for sellers, and assist in organizing informal markets associations that help them in some social issues related to, pension plans, healthcare, etc….

c. Long-term strategy:

This strategy focuses on the urban development in Egypt as a whole for 2012-2047. It includes services sector, industrial sector and agriculture sector. According to 2012 ISDF statistics, services sector in Egypt has 64,000 entities with 669 billion GDP and 13 million job opportunities. Obstacle that face ISDF to develop this sector is administrative capacity. In the industrial sector, Egypt has 27,000 factories with 522 billion GDP and 4 million job
opportunities. Its obstacles are energy and scientific capacity. For the agriculture sector, the agricultural area is estimated to be 8 million acre with 186 GDP and 8 billion job opportunities, however; its obstacles are shortage of water and food, which has to be provided for all citizens in the sense of water shortage. Being the approach for urban development in Egypt, the agriculture sector has been studied by the ISDF to determine water resources in Egypt, challenges of urban development and global methods to face them. The ISDF also determines the urban cities and villages that need development, crop distribution and impacts on domestic income.

Recently, ISDF has become a part of the new Ministry of Urban Development and Informal Settlements, which adopted a new vision to its strategy that gives first priority to people and their needs.

In fact, this strategy is dealing with very large-scale issues, in which ISDF deals with development in industrial, agricultural and service sectors without relating them to informal settlements development, as being its main objective. Instead, it should have stated how these development projects will positively affect living conditions of the poor and slums residents. ISDF should represent in its strategy how to develop small villages and some cities by providing more facilities and services in order to encourage residents not to immigrate to big cities and form informal areas in these cities to be close to their jobs or other social services. ISDF should prepare clear and accurate maps for villages and cities to be able to control areas for development. In its long-term strategy, ISDF, in cooperation with Ministry of Agriculture, should also represent a series of policies that regulate informal construction on agricultural areas in order to save these areas.
Inputs Suggested by the New Ministry for Dealing with Slums

- Establish the principle of development in partnership with dwellers.
- Upgrading slum dwellers as input for development.
- Develop an integrated model for slums upgrading that can be generalized to regain the civilized feature of the Egyptian architecture in all governorates.
- Activate participation and community responsibility of businessmen.
- Activate the role of civil society institutions.

2. ISDF Technical Assistance

For the technical assistance and capacity building, ISDF studies the environmental effect of high voltage cables, sewage and water projects and the hazards of geological formation and
floods. ISDF provides technical assistance to governorates to be able to develop action plans corresponding to their needs. Moreover, workshops are held for technical institutes, local authorities and NGOs to be more efficient in providing assistance. These technical institutes are mainly responsible for the preparation of upgrading strategies and action plans, and for supervising the project implementation. Then comes the responsibility of local authorities to implement and follow up action plans, and managing the project as a whole. In fact, there are twenty-four local authority units had been established in governorates for slums development and twenty-five committees for following up and monitoring the development projects. However, NGOs are responsible for assessing community needs, mobilizing civil society and following up the project implementation process.

3. ISDF Partnerships and Cooperation

ISDF has some partners, which cooperate with it in slum development projects. These partners are ministries, government authorities and governorates. Ministry of Finance, for example, supports ISDF financially. Some other ministries cooperate with ISDF by providing their services and facilities for developing slum areas, such as:

- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Housing
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Transportation
- Ministry of Local Administrative
- Ministry of Electricity and Energy
- Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources
• Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs
• Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation

Some ministries cooperate with ISDF in the form of agreements upon property of lands under central authorities, such as:

• Ministry of Culture
• Ministry of Petroleum
• Ministry of Endowments
• Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation

Some other ministries provide their assistance in issues related to socioeconomic programs that were initiated by ISDF, such as:

• Ministry of Interior Affairs
• Ministry of Trade and Industry
• Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs

Government Authorities:

• Adult Education Authority, and
• National Council for Childhood and Motherhood

Both play great roles in the ISDF socioeconomic programs initiation.

• Information Decision Support Center, which provide ISDF with needed data and information related to slum areas.
Cooperation at National Level

- Governorates: (Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Kafr Al-Sheikh, Al-Gharbya, Ismailia, Fayoum, Asuit, Matrouh, Aswan, Qena, Luxor and Sohag).

4. ISDF Sources of Finance

In 2012, ISDF stated that its sources of finance include:

- State budget by 150 million EGP,
- Social responsibility grants from private sector by 100 million EGP,
- International development grants by 100 million EGP,
- Donation by local organizations and individuals by 1 billion EGP,
- National Social Housing Program by 10 billion EGP, and
- Land Based Finance by 17 billion EGP.

ISDF program went through several phases. In 2009, it was the preparation phase of establishing institutions. From 2009-2010, it was the strategy phase that was concerned of preparing the national map and the national action plan. The pilot phase in 2010-2012 focused on
action plans for 60 slum areas. However, starting 2011 ISDF activities were significantly disrupted because of the January Revolution. From 2012-2017 is the national phase of upscaling.

B. Critique of ISDF Strategy

In order to successfully assess the ISDF strategy in slums upgrading, it is important to examine the role of governorates in the process, represent some case studies and conduct interviews with residents in upgraded locations to reflect their views. Both sources will allow a 360-degree assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of ISDF strategy and its programs of implementation.

1. The Perspective of Local Government:

Urban Upgrading Units are units established by the governorates and work under the technical supervision of ISDF. In a way, they can be seen as representatives of ISDF in the governorates. Staff of units at Cairo and Giza governorates, as examples, was interviewed in order to determine the role of governorates in the upgrading process, and to question their experiences with ISDF strategy.

Cairo Governorate

Cairo governorate has around 112 unsafe areas, 24 of which are life threatening ones located in five different districts: Mansheyet Nasser, Dar Elsalam, Misr El Qadima, West of Nasr City, and Sayeda Zeinab. 16,500 families in some unsafe areas of Mansheyet Nasser, Establ Antar and Ezbet Khairallah were already transferred to new locations. People in the unsafe locations of Establ Antar and Ezbet Khairallah were transferred to 6th of October City, and
people in the unsafe locations of Mansheyet Nasser were transferred to Doweiqa. To transfer the remaining number of dwellers in all these unsafe areas, 26,700 housing units with total cost 2.6 billion EGP are needed. Now, 5,100 units of total housing units needed are under construction in Al-Asmarat district located in Moqattam with a cost of 650 million EGP. Therefore, resettlement is the solution in case of unsafe areas, however; upgrading programs is the solution for unplanned ones, such as; Ezbet Abou Hashish in Hadayeq Al-Qobba, Al-Assal in Shoubra, Cotsica in Torah and Ezbet Nafie in Maadi. ISDF finalized upgrading projects in Ezbet Nafie (7.48 acres) in November 1st, 2014. The cost of this project was EGP 3,025,650 that included firefighting networks, street lighting and paving roads.

When visiting Urban Upgrading Unit in Cairo governorate, it was obvious that there is a successful cooperation between the governorate and ISDF. Engineer Khalil Shaath, Director of Urban Upgrading Unit in Cairo governorate, affirmed that the establishment of a body that its main objective is to fund any project related to developing slums is a great success. He tells that there was a call for such notion many years ago, and once it is established, it gave a sense of hope for all people working in the field. The most important responsibility of ISDF is to put national plan for all informal areas in Egypt. After establishing ISDF, the process of developing any informal area in Cairo is divided among three partners: Cairo governorate, ISDF, and a constructing company. The process starts when the governorate prepares a general proposal for all informal areas existing in the governorate to ISDF, then ISDF studies the proposal and takes decision regarding the fund, and then the project is given to a company for implementation, in most cases, it is the Armed Forces. After ISDF approves the general proposal for all areas, the governorate attaches to the general proposal a detailed protocol for a specific area, and afterwards, it sets an implementation plan for developing this area. Cairo governorate is also
responsible for following up and supervising the progress of the project. The director of the unit states that Mr. Galal El Saeid, Cairo Governor, is setting up weekly progress meetings to follow up stages of the projects with site photos to ensure the success of every step. In regard to the work flow inside ISDF, the director of the unit tells that it takes long time, but this is normal because of the nature of such work. Each project is very complicated and full of details that necessitate long time to study and examine. In fact, all these are indications that ISDF is working effectively and efficiently.

However, the director of the unit, states some deficiencies in the ISDF strategy, which can be summarized as follows:

- Centralization in funding decision-making,
- Arrangement of priorities of upgrading unsafe areas, and
- Involvement in socioeconomic and business classification and development programs.

In the opinion of the unit director at Cairo governorate, the small management of ISDF working with all governorates all over Egypt, and the ‘no authority’ staff in Urban Upgrading Units is considered big problems that hinder the process. These problems centralize duties in the ISDF office only, which indicates that the staff at Urban Upgrading Units cannot take any decisions regarding funding. Therefore, ISDF is wasting money and resources by employing people and paying salaries for them with no actual assigned duties.

In addition, ISDF has big deficiency in ordering priorities. In the opinion of the unit director, ISDF funding should be directed to Grade 1 areas as a first priority. However, ISDF might fund projects in areas of low grade of risk, and neglect other areas of high grade of risk. Funding projects in low risk areas is not as necessary as high risk areas. He states that Cairo has
around 26,000 families who are dwelling in areas of Grade 1 risk that needs immediate interventions to save their lives. These people should be number one on the ISDF agenda.

Moreover, the director of the unit criticizes the fact that ISDF intervenes in socio-economic and business classification and development programs and considers this as a waste of its fund. ISDF fund is mainly targeting slums upgrading, so it should be directed to such projects. However, funding socioeconomic and business classification and development programs, in his opinion, are not associated with the main objective that ISDF was originally established for. ISDF should focus more on funding slums upgrading projects within the scope of providing safe housing and facilitating services and infrastructure, however; socioeconomic programs are more related to activities of NGOs and other relevant ministries and national councils.

In order to face such challenges, the director of the unit at Cairo governorate has some suggestions. He suggests that ISDF distributes funding among Urban Upgrading Units. Every unit should be authorized to fund development projects of areas in its governorate. In fact, funding distribution benefits all people in the upgrading process. It relieves top management of some daily problems to be able to concentrate on a higher level of decision-making. At the same time, it gives staff in Upgrading Units an additional experience in making decisions that are often based on more detailed information, which they possess. This also gives greater incentives for these staff to exert more effort to be able to accomplish additional responsibilities, a fact that makes the job more interesting and effective. Besides, ISDF should have better strategy for dealing with slums of Grade 1 risk. ISDF should put these areas as first priority to work on targeting that by year 2020; for example, all high-grade risk areas will have been upgraded.
**Giza Governorate**

In Giza governorate, there are no Grade 1 risk areas, however; risk comes from the construction status of buildings, as said by Engineer Mamdouh Kamel, Executive Director of the Urban Upgrading Unit at Giza governorate. In Giza, there are 44 unplanned settlements of total area 18,007.21 acres. They are located in seven districts: Al-Warraq, North Giza, Agouza, Boulaq Dakrour, Omraneya, South Giza and Haram. In regard to unsafe areas, they are of Grade 2 risk, and they are distributed as shown in (Table 6):

**Table 6: Distribution of Unsafe Areas in Giza**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of Unsafe Areas in Giza Governorate</th>
<th>Private Property</th>
<th>State Property</th>
<th>Central Authority</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Areas</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area in Acres</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>108.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of Units</td>
<td>3,554</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1,734</td>
<td>5770</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban Upgrading Unit-Giza Governorate, December 2012

On one hand, the director of the unit praises the ISDF establishment. He tells that at the beginning, ISDF represented a great assistance with regards to funds, studies and technical assistance. ISDF helped in studies that recognized and determined unsafe areas in the governorate. At that time, all funds were directed to these studies and databases, which were done in cooperation with the governorate. Databases were for informal areas and for markets (civilized-informal-scattered) as well. The director of the unit also praises the potential capabilities and skills of ISDF staff and engineers, which are provided whenever needed by governorates. Moreover, he appreciates that ISDF launched the new business classification and development program, which is concerned with products that every village is famous for, however; this program had no accomplishments.
On the other hand, the director of the unit criticizes ISDF efforts that were not beyond the scope of studies. ISDF made use of these studies to determine State property areas to work on its development neglecting any other areas. This strategy was experienced in Giza governorates when ISDF ignored many areas that necessitate development, and worked only on developing Eshash Al-Sudan settlement, which is on state owned land. Since its establishment in 2008 till today, ISDF did not develop in Giza except this area because of the additional value that will recover construction costs. The director of the unit commented on this by describing it as ‘investment development’ that cares only for additional values and disregards providing appropriate living conditions for people. It also disregards urban, environmental, social and economic developments of other informal areas. This attitude has no relation to the main objective of ISDF, which is concerned with developing existing informal areas and preventing the growth of new ones. The director of the unit also blames on the inequality of ISDF strategy among governorates in funding projects. He added that fund distribution should be equal among governorates in accordance to the number of unsafe areas in each governorate as a first priority.

To face such challenges, the director of the unit has some suggestions for ISDF strategy to be more effective in order to make real achievements. They are as follows:

• Involving dwellers in discussions and giving them the opportunity to participate in the process,
• Working on an integrated development plan that includes services along with construction of buildings,
• Modifying funding strategy to be in the form of grants and not loans, as the budget of governorate is limited and cannot cover such costs. In this case, the governorate can
only organize the process, as it has the mechanism of this, and can also collect rents from people in favor of ISDF.

- Establishing units for supervising the construction of buildings in informal areas, or assigning to Urban Upgrading Units this task but to be paid for that. This payment can be a percentage included in the cost of the project covered by the fund,
- Giving authority for Urban Upgrading Units to be able to implement development/upgrading projects,
- Reinforcing linkage between ISDF and Urban Upgrading Units by launching programs that strengthen skills of their staff, and providing any technical assistance needed,
- Paying rewarding salaries for staff equivalent to the load of work, as most of trained employees left their jobs due to low salaries,
- Setting up an organizational hierarchy in Urban Upgrading Units,
- Studying previous international projects,
- Revising the national budget and allocating special amount for developing slums. Minister Laila Iskander has to submit a request to the Prime Minister in order to allocate certain budget that can cover all slums development programs that are mentioned in the national plan prepared by ISDF.
2. The Perspective of Residents of Slum Areas

The State framework seeks to provide safe housing for citizens. Accordingly, the ISDF in cooperation with governorates planned to develop inappropriate housing and give them support in improving unsafe areas. In addition, ISDF in collaboration with the Engineering Authority of the Armed Forces started to implement improvements to a number of 47 unplanned areas in Cairo and Giza governorates under the supervision of the governorate development. Improvement works include supplying areas with water and sanitation, paving of main streets, tiling and lighting internal streets and setting fire hydrants networks.

a. Case Studies and Field Visits

Ezbet Nafie

Ezbet Nafie in Maadi is classified as an unplanned area, which has been upgraded by ISDF. Ezbet Nafie is of about 7.5 acres and a population of about 4,308. In May 2014, tiles interlock, 155 lighting units and three fire hydrants were installed in internal streets, (ISDF, Programs and Projects). Pictures during and after implementation are included in the appendix.

When visiting Ezbet Nafie and interviewing its residents, it has been discovered that people are satisfied with most of the upgrading work that has been done to their area, for example; paving roads and lighting internal streets. However, they raised the following issues:

• People do not know about ISDF. To their knowledge, developments were done in their area by the local government in their district.

• There is no natural gas supply: people complain that they do not have natural gas supply in their homes, and instead they have to buy gas pipes for EGP 25 or 30/each. People added that main pipelines already exist under roads, but they are not extended
to their homes. Government only extends gas pipelines to those who can afford to pay EGP 20-30 thousands to get natural gas supply to their buildings.

- There is no light in the lighting posts installed in some main streets: people complain that lighting main streets was good only after they have been installed, but they did not work afterwards. The power supply cabinet, which is located in street 12, should supply lights to streets 12, 13 and 14. Unfortunately, street 12, which is not in Ezbet Nafie, is the only lit street. Street 73 mokarrar, which is a main street, is not lighted as well.

- There are no instructions for Hydrants: Hydrants network were built with no instruction on them. People were not informed how to use hydrants in case of emergency. In this case, they are useless. Following is a picture for one of these hydrants:

  Figure 3: Hydrants with No Instruction in Ezbet Nafie-January 8, 2015
**Eshash Al-Sudan**

In Giza, The ISDF provided technical support for the development of Eshash Al-Sudan in Dokki, and prepared an implementation plan, which depends on the resettlement of residents in the same area, and provided the necessary funding for completion of the first development stage.

In 2012, Dr. Hisham Qandil, former Prime Minister, approved to provide a fund of 20.32 million pounds from the ISDF for developing Eshash Al-Sudan in Dokki, which its total area is about 2.74 acres. The residents used to live in narrow streets and in shacks constructed using recycled building materials, sheets and wood ceilings. These buildings are the main characteristics of the urban space in this area. In the context of the Giza Governorate plan to develop this area, a phased construction program is prepared to build 21 apartment buildings in the same area, which will provide 210 residential units and 210 commercial units, *(ISDF, Programs and Projects)*. The Governorate has already begun to implement the first phase of the development.

The first phase of the project aimed at building a number of 3 residential buildings, which provide 30 residential units and 30 commercial units were delivered to people. The necessary funding for the development of the area was provided in three successive stages through an accredited timetable. In this project, the Governorate took advantage of the land, which is close to the area located in north Boulaq Dakroun sub-bus to implement this stage, *(ISDF, Programs and Projects)*.

In Thursday, October 31, 2013, the foundation stone of the second phase was put in the presence of Minister of Local Development and Chairman of the ISDF. This stage includes the establishment of another 10 buildings.
ISDF had developed Eshash Al-Sudan by eradicating all eshash and constructing new buildings in same location for residents of this slum. Visiting this area left a very negative impression on ISDF performance due to bad experiences of dwellers. ISDF role was only funding the construction of housing units, without taking into consideration the people and their needs, or even the quality of housing design and construction work.

When visiting Eshash Al-Sudan, semi-structured group interviews were conducted and some claims of residents were discovered. These claims are stated below:

- Housing units were distributed among residents with legal contracts, which state that residents have to pay EGP 165/month, or they will be forced to leave the unit if they do not pay rents in three months. However, at the beginning of the project, the deal was that these units would be for free.
- The governor, Dr. Aly Abdel Rahman, informed the residents of phase I that if they do not pay the required amounts, delivering of phase II will be refrained.
- New buildings are not of good quality. From day one and after receiving their apartments, some residents found that ceilings are leaking.
- There is no power supply in the new housing units, and in order to have it, each unit has to pay EGP 350. A fact that forces residents to keep on providing illegal power supply to their units as they were previously doing.
- There is no natural gas supply. Therefore, for cooking, residents have to get gas pipes for EGP 25/each.
- Some residents, who are supposed to have new apartments, did not find their names in the list of Phase II up till now.
• New buildings are of 30 housing units, under which there are 18 commercial units. ISDF releases these commercial units for EGP 100,000, as if it is an investment project and not for helping people. Moreover, these market units are of very bad conditions in terms of square area and location (facing a wall and opening to a narrow corridor, which is not inviting to customers and does not seem to be a safe area) in addition to the sewage overflowing, which is in front of them (as per the following photo). That is why they are not sold till now.

Figure 4: Commercial Units Eshash Al-Sudan-January 1, 2015

Most people in Eshash Al-Sudan are very poor and cannot afford paying rents or covering costs for power/electricity supplies. Most of them also are not working, and were depending on simple work in return of very small amount of money to cover only their basic needs of food. Why the project, as designed by, ISDF does not offer training to these people on some simple crafts or trades and enable them to make a living. Following are samples of people in Eshash Al-Sudan who have socioeconomic problems that the project did not put into consideration.
Om Hany is an example of a simple woman who used to bake bread in her simple oven made of clay in her shack. Her family includes her husbands and eight sons and daughters. She works to support them all, as her husband is an old sick man who is not capable to work. Some of her sons are working in very simple trade businesses, but they do not gain much profit to cover all their needs. The project should have been designed to resolve such cases. Why ISDF do not apply socioeconomic business classification and development programs on such cases? Why ISDF did not provide a market unit and help this woman get a modern oven that can help her work effectively and increase her production to be able to cover all family needs?

Another example is Am Abdel Halim who is an old sick man and not capable to work. This man has no income to cover his basic needs of food. Why the project did not help him get pension from the government in order to cover his need for food and medicines?

A final example is a 28 years old drugs addict young man in Eshash Al-Sudan. This young man is married and has three daughters. In its strategy, ISDF has a program targeting drug addictions. Unfortunately, this was not applied to this case. The mother of this person is crying day and night because she cannot afford to treat him.
Chapter Six: Main Findings

1. The Egyptian government strategy for dealing with slums stands alone, and not within a strategic framework. However it is ideal to have a national housing strategy that includes a part on dealing with slums as a type of housing.

2. ISDF, in its statistics, did account only very deteriorated unplanned areas in Giza and not all of them. ISDF have excluded a large number of unplanned areas to reduce the scale of the problem. There were areas in the old register, which are omitted from the new one without being improved or upgraded. This can be very obvious as per the following table, which was prepared by the Urban Upgrading Unit at Giza governorate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Name of Area</th>
<th>Area in Acre</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Name of Area</th>
<th>Area in Acre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Giza</td>
<td>Mostah Al-Nil (Building of Ministry of Irrigation to Ring Road)</td>
<td>64.59</td>
<td>Central Saft Al-Laban</td>
<td>Central Saft Al-Laban</td>
<td>334.05</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behind Moustafa Aly Industry, Orman Hotel school</td>
<td>111.37</td>
<td>Kafr Tohoromos</td>
<td>Kafr Tohoromos</td>
<td>245.79</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Village of Gaziret Mohamed, Tanash and Nazlet Al-Zomor</td>
<td>1042.70</td>
<td>Boulaq Qadima</td>
<td>Boulaq Qadima</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mostah Al-Nil</td>
<td>274.22</td>
<td>Omraneya Qadima</td>
<td>Omraneya Qadima</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bahary Al-Balad-Agriculture Association-Al-Nagah School</td>
<td>220.24</td>
<td>Abou Zarea</td>
<td>Abou Zarea</td>
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<td>Dayer Al-Nahya and Khawala Mosque</td>
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<td>Hod Al-Raml, East of Ring Road, Ezbez Al-Mofri</td>
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<td>Masaken Gaziret Al-Dahab</td>
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<td>Al-Kasabgy</td>
<td>213</td>
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<td>The part belongs to North of Baragil Ezbez Al-Mataar</td>
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<td>Al-Monib</td>
<td>Al-Monib</td>
<td>407</td>
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<td>Al-Monira Al-Gharbeya (1)</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>Talat Tawabezq</td>
<td>Talat Tawabezq</td>
<td>826.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Giza</td>
<td>Al-Monira Al-Gharbeya (2)</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>Kafret Nassar</td>
<td>Kafret Nassar</td>
<td>510.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ard Al-Lewa</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>Kafr Al-Gabal W Al-Manfa (1)</td>
<td>Kafr Al-Gabal W Al-Manfa (1)</td>
<td>1494.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meet Oqba</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>Kafr Al-Gabal W Al-Manfa (2)</td>
<td>Kafr Al-Gabal W Al-Manfa (2)</td>
<td>1494.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nazlet Al-Samman</td>
<td>2550.67</td>
<td>Nazlet Al-Samman</td>
<td>Nazlet Al-Samman</td>
<td>2550.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total unplanned areas</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18007.21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Urban Upgrading Unit-2014
3. With regard to ISDF determination of unsafe areas in governorates and their classification: Some studies to identify unsafe areas were conducted by ISDF consultants without coordination with governorates and district administrations, while they should benefit from local expertise in identifying informal areas by applying the criteria of unsafe areas on them. This is evident in the difference of the inventory list of unsafe areas that the Informal Settlements Development Units at the governorates have in comparison to the ISDF national map.

4. With regard to technical studies and suggestions for unsafe areas development:
   - ISDF consultants prepared development proposals for selected unsafe areas in some governorates, which found these proposals technically very weak. Besides, they are not based on accurate data or factual knowledge of location and residents of areas subject to development.
   - In ISDF development proposals, there is no clear economic feasibility that describes how to use sites, from which residents will be transferred, in an integrated development form. In addition, ISDF does not state how costs will be recovered, while it obligates governorates to recover funds by mortgaging lands in favor of projects. This method puts governorates in trouble if not repaying the fund, and thus the loss of lands in case of inability to manage projects financially in an economic way.

5. With regard to effectiveness of ISDF in developing unsafe areas:
   - ISDF faces many difficulties in coordination, implementation and creation of mutual trust in some governorate (Ismailia, Aswan, Cairo ...) because of its mechanisms in dealing with executive offices in governorates.
- ISDF wastes millions of pounds in the form of consultation fees for technical studies in order to determine unsafe areas, and prepare proposals for their development. In fact, consultation service is needed, but it should be done effectively, and the studies and designs should be of good quality. Consultancies for proposals of area development are covered by values of development projects loans, and governorates then have to recover them from project returns or from their own budgets.

- ISDF do not build the capacity of employees in Urban Upgrading Units at governorates, a fact that makes governorates on continuous dependence on ISDF, in terms of technical issues. Thus, training courses held by ISDF to employees at governorates are only restricted to procedural issues, which do not add to their experiences in integrated management of the development process.

- In its management, ISDF typifies the centralization principle in its finance management with governorates, while addressing problems of unsafe areas requires giving authorization to governorates by maintaining decentralization. This decentralization can be achieved by establishing fund in each governorate for any financial resource; from State budget or from any of its authorities, such as ISDF or any private donations. In this case, each governorate is able to interact with slum areas within the governorate, as it is responsible for safety of its citizens, and bears any consequences related to their lives.

6. With regard to legal and institutional aspects:

- ISDF worked on issuing a decision by the prime minister to include unsafe areas for those areas that applies to law of expropriation for public interest, since the re-
use of the land after the transfer of residents in these areas will often be private investments (to make cost recovery). Thus, this is considered an explicit violation to the constitution and the law because of the absence of the public interest feature after eradicating houses, compensating people and transferring them according to the law.

- ISDF escapes from any criminal liability associated to unsafe areas, in case of death or damage, as a result of the collapse of houses and the need for resettlement. In addition, ISDF loads this responsibility to governorates, although ISDF is the body that was established by the State to provide materials needed for this to remove the risk in unsafe areas.

- For developing unsafe areas do not require to totally evacuate the site in most cases (Grades 2, 3 and 4). This is limited only to areas of Grade 1 risk, which danger lives of citizens. However, in Grades 2, 3 and 4, it is sufficient to partially eradicate houses, and resettle residents in same location. “… most evictions are disruptive and unnecessary, and cause the same impoverishment and destruction of housing investments and social support systems. When an eviction is completely unavoidable, it must be carried out in accordance with both the law and the international standards,” (UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 2011).

However, ISDF is adopting proposals of development that depend on transferring people outside their areas of residence (usually from central areas in cities to new areas far from cities), a fact that contradicts with social dimensions in maintain people interests to stay in the same area, which is often linked to their service and economic interests. This is a contravention to international trends in preserving
the right of residents to stay in their locations, and preventing forced eradication. “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)’s General Comments No. 4 and No. 7 explain the right to adequate housing and to be protected from forced evictions,” (UN Habitat for a Better Urban Future, 2011). This also confirms a negative image of the country for being interested in value of investment in property on the expense of the citizen.
Chapter Seven: Recommendations

The ISDF program is poorly executed and needs improvement in some aspects. Therefore, it is suggested that ISDF strategy should be integrated in terms of the role of central and local government areas of development and complementarity among all actors: public sector, private sector and civil society. It should, as well, reorganize its priorities in redeveloping areas. Grade 1 areas should be of a first priority, and then comes the other areas according to the grade of being unsafe. ISDF should also fulfill promises that are stated in its strategy with regard to business classification and socioeconomic programs.

In cases when cost recovery of slum redevelopment is possible, ISDF should offer housing units in the form of grants for governorate and not as loans. This is supposed to be the principle of funding, as ISDF was mainly established in order to support redevelopment projects financially, and not to invest in such projects. If ISDF funds projects as loans, governorates then collect rents from people who cannot afford to pay. However, in cases when cost recovery of slum redevelopment is not possible, it is suggested to adopt a cross-subsidy strategy, whereby the areas where land reuse generates income can finance the development of the relation projects of Grade 1 areas.

Development process has to be carried out in partnerships. All community has to share its role with ISDF: residents, governorates and NGOs. Besides, ISDF should consider people needs, and involve residents in taking decisions regarding resettlement or redevelopment projects in order to gain their satisfaction. This can be achieved by organizing several meetings with them in their locations, and listen to their point of views before taking decisions. This process has to be documented to ensure that residents are not put under pressure to accept a certain option. When recognizing people’s needs, ISDF then coordinates with local government to negotiate the provision of suitable solution as required case by case. Sometimes, interests contradicts; a group
of people might prefers to be compensated and leave the area, another group prefers to stay in same area after redevelopment, and others might not prefer to leave their homelands. Moreover, ISDF might releases markets in those new buildings constructed in slum areas for residents of these slums in order to help them starting small business projects, as they deserve to get them than others.

In some cases, residents have the will to contribute to the development process in order to have sense of ownership. Thus, ISDF has to coordinate with local government that they encourage and organize this process and work on subsidizing it from the allocated project fund.

With regard to quality assurance, ISDF should hire technical expertise for an effective supervision of the implementation process of constructing buildings is highly recommended in order to assure the quality of new buildings.

Further researches should be conducted on the Ministry of Urban Development and Informal Settlements and its strategy that gives people and their needs a first priority. This ministry is newly established, a fact that makes its accomplishments so limited until this date. These researches should follow and review the progress of the ministry and its strategy for dealing with slums and slum dwellers. Later studies could develop more in depth analysis of its strategy from the perspective of residents in more slum areas, and from the perspective of local governments in more governorates.
Bibliography


Boonyabancha, S. (2005), Baan Mankong: Going to scale with "slum" and squatting upgrading in Thailand. *Environment & Urbanization, 17*(1)


UN-HABITAT, 2002c

UN-HABITAT, 2003

World Bank, 2008
Appendix 1

Following are pictures for Ezbet Nafie during and after redevelopment implementation process:

Paving roads-ISDF

Hydrants Networks-ISDF
Lighting main and internal streets-ISDF

Lighting main and internal streets-ISDF
Following are pictures for Eshash Al-Sudan during and after redevelopment implementation process:

BEFORE

Eshash Al-Sudan, ISDF Presentation-2014

Eshash Al-Sudan, ISDF Presentation-2014
AFTER

Phase I - Eshash Al-Sudan, ISDF Presentation-2014

Phase II - Eshash Al-Sudan, ISDF Presentation-2014
## Appendix 2

### الجزء الأول

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>المدينة:</th>
<th>المحافظة:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. اسم المنطقة:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. منذ متى تسكن هذه المنطقة؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>نسبتهم (%)</th>
<th>6 سنوات من النشأة</th>
<th>10 سنوات من النشأة</th>
<th>15 سنوات من النشأة</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أقل من سنة</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>من 1 سنة</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>من 6 سنة</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>من 10 سنة</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. هل سمعتم عن صندوق تطوير المناطق العشوائية؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رصيف الطرق</th>
<th>أخرى (حدد)</th>
<th>إعادة تطوير المنطقة ذاتها</th>
<th>تشطيب الواجهات</th>
<th>تطوير البنية التحتية</th>
<th>نقل السكان إلى مناطق أخرى (حدد)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. كيف تم تطوير هذه المنطقة من قبل الدولة؟

5. في حالة تطوير المنطقة ذاتها، ماذا اشتمل هذا التطوير:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>المباني؟</th>
<th>الطرق؟</th>
<th>الكهرباء؟</th>
<th>المياه؟</th>
<th>الصرف؟</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. هل يتوفر لك الآن مصدر لمياه صالحة للشرب؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رصيف الطرق</th>
<th>أخرى (حدد)</th>
<th>إعادة تطوير المنطقة ذاتها</th>
<th>تشطيب الواجهات</th>
<th>تطوير البنية التحتية</th>
<th>نقل السكان إلى مناطق أخرى (حدد)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. هل وفرت لك الدولة مصدر كهرباء؟

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>رصيف الطرق</th>
<th>أخرى (حدد)</th>
<th>إعادة تطوير المنطقة ذاتها</th>
<th>تشطيب الواجهات</th>
<th>تطوير البنية التحتية</th>
<th>نقل السكان إلى مناطق أخرى (حدد)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. إن كانت الإجابة ب "لا"، فما هو مصدر الكهرباء الخاص بك؟
صاحب الأرض
وصلة غير رسمية

9. ماذا تستخدم في طهي الطعام؟
الغاز
الكهرباء
الأنابيب

10. إن كان فرن غاز، فمن أيت دعم التوصيلات؟
توصيلات ملك صاحب الوحدة
المملكة (المحافظة أم الحي؟)
توصيلات ملك أحد أفراد العائلة
أخرى (حدد)
الجزء الثاني

11. هل كنت تود الانتقال إلى منطقة أخرى؟

لا

12. إذا كانت الإجابة ب "لا" فلماذا؟

لأنى أسكن هذه المنطقة منذ فترة طويلة خوفاً من افتقد سبيل العيش زيادة التكلفة قرب المنطقة من العمل أخرى (حدد) قريب هذه المنطقة من الخدمات العامة

13. إذا كانت الإجابة ب "نعم" فلماذا؟ للبحث عن مساحة أكبر لل منزل، لإيجاد خدمات أفضل (مياه، صرف صحي، تعليم) لتحسين مستوى المعيشة

14. في حالة تطوير المنطقة ذاتها، هل تحقق الرغبة في:

تشطيب الواجهات

تطوير البنية التحتية

رفع الطرق

أخرى (حدد)

15. هل العيش بهذه المنطقة آمن؟

آمن جداً

آمن

أمان ضعيف

لا يوجد آمن

أمان إلى حد ما

على الإطلاق

16. هل أصبحت حياتك أفضل بعد هذا التطوير؟

لا

نعم

17. ماذا تنتظر من صندوق تطوير المناطق العشوائية لكم؟