Muslim Brothers in Egypt: politics of generational gaps

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Muslim Brothers in Egypt: Politics of Generational Gaps

A Thesis Submitted by

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To the Department of Political Science

May/2012

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

The degree of Master of Arts

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to Allah who gave me the interest in what I did and the power to keep going till the end. Psychology confidently explains how introvert people get the power and satisfaction from their inner egos, however, humans, both introvert and extrovert, would not go on their way without others’ support and help. Thus, I am immensely thankful to many people to get this study done.

I am grateful to my thesis advisor Professor Heba Raouf for her wise advices and insights especially at critical times of thesis writing. I appreciate her trust in my capabilities, skills, and optimism that I would be able to get everything done on time. I am so thankful to my academic readers: Professor Ashraf Al Shrief, and Professor Ahmed Abd Rabou for their critical insights and comments.

I am indebted to Abd al Rahman Ayyash for his insights on my drafted proposal and help in reaching most of my key informants. He tireless answered all my inquires and was a true supportive assistant. Gratitude should be delivered for Somaia M.El Sayed for her sincere advices and help during the editing phase. I owe my informants who welcomed all my questions and provided me with all required materials. I also would like to thank Mrs. Dina Hosny for her dedication and sincere help in all paper work associated with my Master’s degree. She was always ready to make my life easy and never get tired of my frequent questions.

Of course, I devote special thanks to my parents and lovely sister who believed in me and did their best to make me who I am. Without the love and guidance of some close friends I would not be able to overcome many hard times; I deeply owe you.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to address the politics of generational gaps within Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt since mid 1980s till 2011. It sheds light on patterns of generational interactions, issues of concern, and their impact on the future trajectory of the Movement. It conceptually employs the Generational Unit Model, drawn largely from the work of Karl Mannheim. In doing so, the study applies focused semi-structured interviews with the movement’s affiliated members from antagonistic generational units. The study addresses the socioeconomic and political context that shape the consciousness of two generational waves within the movement. It descriptively addresses the nature of generational relationship between some of the 1970s generation, young Brothers, and the movement’s leadership. It denotes reasons behind the establishment of new political organizations including The Center party (Al Wasat), The Egyptian Current Party (Al Tayar al Masry), and The Renaissance Party (Al Nahda Party). The study highlights different perceptions and schools of thought shared by Brothers towards social reality, and tools of reforming the movement and the Egyptian political system.
CHAPTER I: A BACKGROUND

1.1 INTRODUCTION

“Each generation imagines itself to be more intelligent than the one that went before it, and wiser than the one that comes after it” George Orwell.

Generally, the continuity of any movement is assured by enduring the commitment to that movement's ideology and principles, but as the recruitment process moves on, newcomers may share different inspirations and perceptions of social reality, which result in that movement’s change\(^1\), renewal or decay and dissolution. The same is applied to the impact of emerging generational waves and schools of thought on the movement’s course and trajectory. This thesis seeks to tackle this phenomenon of movements’ change, from a generational perspective based on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s experience.

Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Al Ikhwan al Muslmin, is one of the powerful Islamic mass movements; it proved a strong capacity to mobilize people and develop popular appeal among Egyptians from all walks of life. Debates and exchange of ideas via media and newspapers for the last decade, throughout a liberal façade assured by Mubarak’s regime and post revolutionary era, put many problematic issues, including Shari’a application, democracy, Copts and women’s rights in front of the movement.\(^2\) These heated issues, in addition to other internal dynamics, brought MB’s generational gaps to the surface pushing for an academic interest to analyze the phenomenon's roots, reasons, patterns, and influences.

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The history of Muslim Brotherhood has been shaped by emerging distinct intellectual trends intertwined by significant political events in Egypt. Generational disputes date back to late 1930s, and continued with different degrees till this moment.

As per Khalil Al Anani’s classification, MB witnessed four successive generations: a) the first generation is the “Old Guard” or the veteran generation, referring to those who were in the movement during the 1950s and 1960s and held the upper ranks in the movement, b) the second generation is the “pragmatists”, who joined the movement during the 1970s, c) the third generation, are the “neo-traditionalists”, who have been running most administrative issues since the 1990s, and played a major role in maintaining the movement’s secrecy and underground structure against Mubarak’s coercion, and finally d) the fourth generation consists of young members in their 20s and 30s.

While both of the old guard and the neo-traditionalist are ideologically and religiously conservative, the fourth young generation is ideologically more critical and open. Exactly like the third generation of pragmatists, the fourth generation tried to integrate the movement in the political and civil life, and transcended their third immediate predecessors by providing a modern Islamic discourse to the movement.

Apparently, Al Anani’s classification seems to be, however important, simplistic because he depended on age intervals which set breaks between each age group. Associated with this classification another setback, which is the discontinuity of ideas in the groups. Logical wise, the young age groups are not assumed to receive, interpret or process the intellectual springboards which bed-rocked the movement’s way in the same conceptions as the founders or the old aged group’s member. Anani’s categories can be best considered as a time-line for the membership characteristics’ evolution of the movement.
This thesis adopts more anatomical perspective to explore intellectual variations within each age group and how such inter-group variation contributes to the overall generational gap along the historicity of the movement. Building upon Al Anani’s age intervals, I intend to stratify the intellectual tides and eddies, continuity and discontinuity, respectively, in the movement. For analytical purposes, generational unit will represent the main conceptual framework, which is developed, as per the literature review, to examine the intersection between vertical time-line analysis and horizontal intellectual evolution of the movement. To clarify the concept, the figure below has two axes: the horizontal represents two dichotomies of age group (Youth-18 to 40- and the Elders above 40) and the vertical axe represents the two dominant thought-lines since the movement’s birth (Outbist and reformists).

Figure 1. Different Generational Units within the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s movement represents an umbrella for different intellectual trends and religious schools, ranging from religious liberalism to Salafism.\(^3\) There are mainly five major Islamic trends, or schools: Hassan al Banna, Qutbist, Salafist, al Azhar, and post Islamist. These schools conflated with two main trends in the movement’s structure: the Reformist and the Organizational stream.\(^4\)

Al Banna’s school advocated a holistic gradual approach for reform, which is bottom-up, based on integration with all segments of the society. He was influenced by Muhammed Abdu’s project of reform, and Rashid Reda who represented more Salafist trend. Al Banna strongly perceived Islam as a total system that meets people’s spiritual and material demands, and transcends space and time. Islam has an answer for humanity’s problems, and is superior to all human made ideologies. He empirically crystallized the Azharite enlightened school and Spiritual Sufism in the movement’s structure.\(^5\)


\(^4\) The security apparatus had been established in the early 1940s at Muktam Hills in Cairo. This date has been stated by many authors, though according to Omar al Talmasany, the security apparatus had been created in 1936. See Omar al Talmasany’s autobiography in Ibrahim Ka’oud, *Omar al Talmasany shahdan a’la al a’asr: Al Ikwan al Muslimeen fe darat al hakika al ghaba* [Omar al Talmasany Witness on Age: Muslim Brotherhood in the Circle of Missing Reality] (Cairo: Al Mokhtar Al Islami, 1985), 63. For Mahmoud Abd al Halim, it had been established in 1940 when Al Banna invited Salih Ashmawi, Hussain kamal al Dein, Hamed Sharet, Abd al Aziz Ahmad, and Mahmoud Abd al Halim to discuss the issue, Mahmoud Abd al Halim, *Al Khwan al Muslmun Ahdas San’at al Tarikh Rouya men al Dakhel* [Muslim Brotherhood Events Made History: A Vision from Inside], First Vol 1 (1928-1948), (Cairo, Dar al Da’awa, 1979), 258-259. It had been known among Muslim Brothers by the Special Section (Al Nizam al Khasa), and among outsiders as the Secret Apparatus (Al Jihaz al Sirri). A number of military officers joined the apparatus, and some of them became part of the Free Officers Movement later on. The security apparatus was created to fight British and Zionists troops. Ibid, 30-33, and see also Youssef H. Aboul Enien, “Al –Ikhwan Al Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood”, Military Review, July- August (2003): 28. The apparatus had been dissolved in 1954 after a failed attempt to assassinate Gamal Abd al Nasser. Members of the apparatus share the culture of obedience (sam’a wa’ta’a), secrecy, and less integrated in the society. This culture affected members’ perceptions and political choices. Al Banna, actually, defined three stages of loyalty and obedience: 1) Acquaintance which is mainly for general activities that do not necessarily require obedience to leaders, 2) Formation is for jihad activities and it requires strict obedience, 3) Execution of jihad where absolute obedience is necessary. Obedience is correlated with confidence in leaders’ decisions, and disciplinary measures against members’ violations. Disciplinary procedures include warning, fining, suspension, and dismissal. Richard Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 300-301.

he was against isolated spirituality. The sort of spirituality, Al Banna called for, is a social active spirituality.

Al Banna defined MB as an Islamic Movement (Haraka Islamiya) which has a mission of active engagement in the public life. He described his movement as a Salafi call, a Sunni approach, a Sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic organization, and a social idea. He stressed the universal nature of Islam and blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and social life. His vision of reform relies upon education, learning, and Jihad. Al Banna defined three linear stages of reform: individual (self), family, society, and state. Changes in each of those areas should be gradual and peaceful, based on education, and derived from Islamic traditions. He admired Muhammed Abdu and Rashid Reda’s experience in “Dar Al Da’wa and Irshad” school, and how this school represented a kernel for an Islamic educational project that protects the ummah identity.6

Al Banna, following his Azharite Sheikhs, adopted an open-minded interpretation of shari’a application, and tried to avoid controversial issues that would divide the ummah. He said “let us cooperate on those things on which we can agree and be lenient in those on which we cannot”7. He asserted the flexibility of Islam, and recalled how legist shaf’i gave different rulings to similar cases due to different contexts.8 He encouraged Sayyid Sabik to write his volumes about Islamic schools of jurisprudence to open the way for different understandings of Islam; he did not ask his followers to follow special Islamic schools of jurisprudence. Al Banna gave high priority for the unity of ummah, and this justifies why he was against parties and Sufi orders as signs of factionalism and disunity. His focus was mainly on general guidelines and principles

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6 Ibrahim al Bayoumy Ghanem, Al Fikr al Sayasy Imam Hassan al Banna [The Political Thought of Hassan al Banna](Cairo: Dar al Tawzé’a wa al Nashr al Islamya, 1992), 327-330
7 Quoted in Mitchell, 217.
8 Ibid, 237.
and avoided going for details. Al Banna’s justification was that details would lead to different schools, schisms, and conflicting interpretations and his movement is not mature yet to go for this phase.9

The Azharite School includes many religious figures who were affiliated to the movement or were in good relations with it. This school is not confined to members with Azharite backgrounds (Sheikhs), but rather the adherents of the enlightened Azharite school of thought with different professional civil backgrounds and religious education. The school includes Sayyid Sabik, Muhammed al Ghazaly, Hassan al Baqoury, Yusuf al Karadawy, Hassan al Houdaiby, Abd al Qader Awda, Omar al Talmasany, Farid abd al Khaliq, and other members. The Azharite School represents the reformist trend that emerged at the late nineteenth century and bedrocked the way for religious renewal and ijtihad.10 It is also known as the Islamic project of the center (Wasataya), or mainstream Islam. The school has intellectual lineages with other current Egyptian scholars, including mainly Tarik al Bishry, Fahmy Huwaidy, Yusuf al Karadawy, Selim al Awa, Muhammed al Ghazzaly, and Ahmed Kamal Abou al Magd. Raymond Baker, in his profound book *Islam Without Fear*, descriptively analyzes the intellectual contributions of those scholars. This group of intellectuals represents a trend known in literature as neo Islamist, who provide modern solutions for current political challenges in Egypt, including Copts and women’s political rights. For instance, Yusuf al Karadawy draws an analogy between party politics and Islamic schools of jurisprudence (madhahib). El Bishry, Al A’wa, and Fahmy Huwaidy address the notion of citizenship and advocated full political rights for

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9 Yusuf al Karadawy, *Al Ikhwan al Muslmun 70 A’aman fe Al D’awa wa Tarbia wa al Jihad* [Muslim Brotherhood 70 Years in D’awa, Education, and Jihad](Cairo: Wahba Book Store, 1999), 119.

10 The Egyptian historian Tarik al Bishry described this reform movement as the second traditional renewal movement in the Muslim world. The mission of this movement was to preserve the Muslim creed against westernization challenges, Al Bishry, 10-11.
Christians Their manifesto was published in 1991 entitled “A Contemporary Islamic Vision which elaborated the intellectual base of Islamic order.” Intellectual contributions of this school represent the source of reference for the 1970s generation and the Wasat Party.

The Qutbist trend is associated with Sayyid Qutb’s scholarly works. Qutb was arrested in 1954 and spent fifteen years in prison under brutal torture. Under such circumstances, he managed to finish his most influential literary works: Fe Zilal al Quran (In the Shade of Quran), and M’alim Fe al Tariq (Milestones). Qutb’s writings established the philosophical base for Islamic militancy during the 1970s and 1980s. Qutb and other Brothers were engaged in heated discussions over his writings and interpretations. Some of the Brothers adopted Qutb’s ideas of Hakimiyyah (Sovereignty) and Jahiliyya (Ignorance) marking the start of a Qutbian/Takfir trend. Qutb was influenced by the Abu A’la al Maududi concept of Hakimiyyat Allah and Al Nadwi’s conception of Jahiliyya. For Qutb Shahada (Muslim Profession of Faith) and Tawhid (Oneness) do not only have theological meaning but also a commitment to bring God’s Sovereignty into action. According to Qutb, tawhid has three dimensions: firstly, submission to God’s Sovereignty and not to anyone else (Hakimiyya), secondly, revolution against tyranny, and thirdly, the belief that giving up freedom and being subordinate to others is a crime. Tawhid, in this way, is a positive declaration for action, rather than a negative theological philosophy. Al ‘ubudiyya (worship) demands Muslims to recognize God as the only and ultimate legislator. All laws and legislations are stemmed from what is revealed by God. Qutb justified that by the

12 Qutb was appointed as the Cultural Advisor of the movement after the 1952 revolution and he assumed a seat in the Guidance Office. He was the Head of the Propaganda Section, and the editor of Al Ikhwan al Muslimeen weekly newspaper. He had diverse intellectual contributions which include poetry, autobiography, and literary criticism, Barbra Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hassan Al Hudaybi and Ideology (UK: Routledge Studies in Political Islam, 2009), 50-51.
14 According to Mawdudi, hakimiyyah of Allah is the opposite to Man authority, rahaniyyah (divinity) is the odd of man servitude, and wahdaniyyah is against relying on other sources of knowledge for legislation, Ahmad S. Moussalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 2006), 151.
Quranic verse “wa man lam yahkoum bi-ma anzal allah fa-ulaika hummu al Kafroun”, whoever does not judge by what Allah revealed, such are infidels. Based on this interpretation, modern state systems and legislations are illegitimate; they reflect the state of jahiliyya. Jahiliyya is not a historical period (pre Islam period), but rather a status that transcends space and time; it is associated with the presence of other sovereign human-made authorities. True Muslim society should reflect absolute submission to God’s sovereignty, and legislations (Al hokum wa al amr la Allah). There is nothing called half-Islamic society and half Jahiliyya society; according to Qutb, absolute submission is the criterion, and true believers should not accept compromises, or patching up. A small group of true believers or vanguard (Tali’a) of Islamists is in charge of accomplishing this task, through an Islamic method (minhaj). Qutb determined thirteen years to get the task done and he referred to three stages in this regard. The first stage is minhaj and it includes the profession of faith and submission to God’s sovereignty. The second stage is ubudiyya which entails seeking knowledge to apply God’s laws. People will start to join members of the vanguard, who may still weak to be engaged in any kind of confrontation with the Jihaliyya society. Thus, Qutub advocated withdrawal (hijra) from the society in order to launch the third phase, which is Jihad; the actual confrontation with Jahiliyya rule. Tali’a/ members of the vanguard, in their struggle, are inspired by the goal of bringing justice and shari’a into action. However, true Muslim society should firstly be established before applying Islamic jurisprudence. Shari’a should not be forced on people; people should firstly demand it.

Al Banna and Qutb share together a linear perception towards Islamic revivalism, though they differ regarding the content and tools. Jihad, for Qutb, is not defensive but rather a proactive struggle to establish an Islamic state. It has two dimensions: 1) “serious realism” which entails d’awa against incorrect beliefs and concepts of Jahiliyya, 2) “active realism” including material

15 Zollner, 54-60.
preparations for jihad. Jihad is also a continuous movement that may take faces like writing, teaching, and self-discipline. The last feature of jihad is the regulation of relations between Muslims and non-Muslim societies.\textsuperscript{16} It should be noted that Qutb’s writings did not explicitly call for the use of violence against society and rulers; militant groups followed a reductionist reading for Qutb’s ideas, giving priority to violence rather than education.\textsuperscript{17} 

The body of the Brothers’ movement repudiated the idea of violent jihad adopted by militant movements; nevertheless, Qutb’s ideas conditioned the discourse and consciousness of the 1965 group who later dominated MB’s upper ranks. The idea of vanguard (unique Quranic Generation in Qutb’s words) that is distinct, or emotionally detached from the society, strong Islamic leadership (qiyyada), and preserving the solidarity of the group, reflects the essence of the organizational trend that is currently running the movement. The Qutbian stream is presented by the 1965 group including Muhammed Badie, the Supreme General, Mahmoud Ezzat, and Gom’a Amin.\textsuperscript{18} The 1965 group did not have the chance to meet Hassan al Banna, and truly understand MB’s ideology and reform discourse. They provided their own interpretation to Hassan al

\textsuperscript{16} Moussalli, 203-212.
\textsuperscript{17} According to Farid Abd al Khali, Qutb was not violent and he did not call for terrorism. His writings have many faces; in other words it can be interpreted differently. Thus, I asked Hassan al Houdaiby not to publish Qutb’s book. An interview with Farid Abd al Kahliq by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 12, 2011.
\textsuperscript{18} Between 1957 and 1958, young members of the Brothers established a new formation of the movement outside prisons. The group was named by the regime as Nizam 1965(Organization of 1965). Founders of the 1965 group were Abd al Fatah Ismail, Muhammed Abd al Fatah Shrief, Ahmad Abd al-Majid, Awad abd al Mot’al Aly, Fathy Rafa’i, Sabry Arafa al Komly, Aly Ashmawy, Amin Shahin, and Mubark abd al A’zem. Goals of the group were firstly to step down Nasser regime and assassinate him; later on, they narrowed their goals to consolidating bonds among the movement’s members. Members of the Guidance council at that time were skeptical about the group and afraid of the consequences if Nasser’s regime detected it. Sayyid Qutb agreed to be the group’s spiritual guide; he was in charge of the intellectual formation of the group. The educational curriculums of this group included Qutb writings, Abul al-A’la al Maududi, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Hanbal, and Ibn Taymiyya. The group was detected in 1965, and Qutb was hanged with Muhammed Hawash, and Abd al Fatah Ismail. The detection of the group did not end the presence of the Qubist stream in the movement. Some of the 1965 organization were released in 1971 and assumed high administrative ranks in the movement. For details about 1965 organization, see: Ahmad Abd al-Majid, Al Ikhwan wa Abd al Nasser... Al Kasa Kama l Tanzeem 1965 [Muslim Brotherhood and Abd al Nasser...the Detailed Story of 1965 Organization], http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%81_%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A3_%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85_1965 (accessed December 14, 2011), Muhammed al Saroury, Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Tanzeem 1965,... Al Zaal zaal wa Al Sahwa, http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86._%D8%A7% D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%88%D9%86._%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85...%281965 %29._%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%84%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84...%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%A D%D9%88%D8%A9.....%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF._%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%8A, (accessed December 14, 2011). Barba Zollner, “Prison Talk: the Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle During Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Persecution, 1945 to 1971”, Int. J. Middle East Stud 39 (1998), 419-421.
Banna’s diaries, and their philosophy was established on detachment and confrontation with state and society. The group started to penetrate the movement by the 1970s, whilst Hassan al Banna’s students and other Azharite members remained at the margin or were excluded.\textsuperscript{19}

The Qutbist school is contrary to Al Banna’s trend promoted societal withdrawal and confrontation.\textsuperscript{20} Al Banna did not ask for patching up status quo with Islamic values; but also was against total destruction of the old system. His way is based more on compromises and coexistence; changes should be gradual through d’awa and education over long periods. He believed that the role could be played by state authorities in reform is salient compared with individual initiatives. He advocated from- within reform approach, and accepted parliamentary participation as a way to emphasize the peaceful nature of his movement, and to be involved in institutional reform. Al Banna participated in parliamentary elections in 1942, 1945, and planned to participate in the 1950 elections.\textsuperscript{21} The peaceful approach of the movement, under Al Banna’s leadership, was indicated in his refusal to the Shabab Muhammed group, and Ahmed Raf’at’s perception towards the role of the movement and means of reform. Al Banna also renounced violent activities by the security apparatus in 1949.

The Wahabist waves found their way to the Brothers by the 1970s. Many members had to flee the country to escape Nasser’s brutality. Saudi Arabia was the main destination for many of them, especially for those released, later on, during Sadat’s era with no jobs, and financial support. The Brothers played a significant role in the modernization project of Saudi Arabia, and they were influenced by the Wahabist environment there. They also participated in a number of institutions that have a Salafist base, like The International Seminar of Islamic Youth. However, this new version of Salafism is different from Hassan’s al Banna’s Salafist call. The latter

\textsuperscript{19} An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 7, 2011.  
\textsuperscript{20} Al Bishry, 23.  
\textsuperscript{21} Ghanem, 382-388.
avoided dogmatic controversies, and called for rational interpretations and understanding of Quran and Sunna. Some of Al Banna’s students played music, wrote poetry, and smoked. Their wives and sisters were modestly dressed. They operated in an open intellectual environment consisting of liberals, nationalists, and Azharites; this openness influenced early members’ perceptions and attitudes towards the (other). This was not the case in the 1970s, the state abolished religious courts and stretched its control over Al Azhar, and endowment (awqaf). The richness of intellectual life was undermined due to state control over newspapers, magazines, theaters and other cultural institutions. Journalists, preachers, and intellectuals became employees for the state. This strong control interrupted the flow of genuine, and critical intellectual ideas. This paved the way for Wahabism to spread, relying heavily on the Gulf financial support. The Salafist writings became embedded in the Brothers’ curriculums during Nasser’s prison era in order to establish strong bonds of solidarity and spread the culture of patience among prisoners. The first edition of the “Basics of the Salafist Approach” book written by Mostafa Helmy was published by Dar al D’awa House which was owned by Brothers during the 1970s. Dar al Da’wa Magazine started to include controversial issues, such as the transgression of building churches, the necessity of applying shari’a laws, and the sinfulness of music and singing in its subsequent issues. The burqa became apparent among many Sisters, and many Brothers acquired beards. Some Salafist sheikhs in the movement became prominent in TV channels like Safwat Hegazy, and Ragheb al Sergany. Sheik Muhammed Hussein Eissa, who was the head of the movement’s office in Alexandria, wrote more than forty books on fiqh (Jurisprudence) and other social issues. He contributed to the movement’s educational

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22 Asef Bayet, Making Islam Democratic Social Movements and the Post Islamist Turn (California, Stanford University Press, 2003), 80-81.
23 Religious lectures and TV programs of Salafist Sheikhs have been widely circulated on Facebook groups affiliated with MB and visited by thousands of its members like “Nabd Ikwan” (Ikwan Pulse), and “ANTA A’yal Ikhwangy” (You are Ikwan) groups.
curriculums by adding some Salafist components to them. The Salafist trend is apparent among young members, especially those with rural roots.\textsuperscript{24} This was enhanced by the increasing number of mosques and welfare associations controlled by the Ansar al Suna Salafist movement. It should be noted that the current Salafist trend among Brothers reflects a conservative mode of thought rather than a scientific intellectual school. This conservatism appears from time to time over issues, like women’s and Copts’ political rights.

The Post Islamist trend is a response to the failure of political Islam. According to Asef Bayet, it represents both condition and project. Conditions of the emergence of this trend are justified by internal contradictions and societal pressures against Islamists’ discourse. Post Islamist has the project of rationalizing/ modernizing Islam in social, economic, and political domains. In this sense, it is neither an anti Islamic nor a secular project, but rather a different cultural alternative to modernity.\textsuperscript{25} This trend seeks to accommodate democratization, pluralism, women, and minorities’ rights with modern religious discourse. In this way, it advocates a secular state that protects and coexists with religion in the public sphere. The post Islamist trend does not use religion in political mobilization or political controversies.\textsuperscript{26} Adherents of this trend believe that people’s free choice is the higher source of reference, and societal religiosity should be preserved and encouraged. The Al Tayar al Masry newly established political party represents this trend.

\textsuperscript{24} Hossam Tamam, “The Salafization of the Muslim Brothers: The Erosion of the Fundamental Hypothesis and the Rising of Salafism within the Muslim Brotherhood: The Paths and the Repercussions of Change”, Futuristic Studies Unit (Bibliotheca Alexandrina), 2011.

\textsuperscript{25} Asef Bayet, Making Islam Democratic Social Movements and the Post Islamist Turn (California, Stanford University Press, 2003), 11. According to Salwa Ismail, Post Islamism entails the individualization of religious practices, and differentiation between citizen and believer, Salwa Ismail, Rethinking Islamist politics : culture, the state and Islamism ( London, Tauris, 2003), 161.

\textsuperscript{26} Ismail Al Alexandrani, “Post Islamist from Theory to Organization”, (Unpublished Paper for Arab Alternatives Studies Center, 2011).
Those preceding intellectual trends resulted in disputing perceptions towards the movement, political regime, other political forces, and political reform among the MB’s members. They summarize much of the reasons of difference among MB’s different generational groups.

In reference to the Muslim Brotherhood’s history, there are four main generational gaps, reflecting blurred patterns, and issues of concern. The establishment of Ahmed Raf’at’s group in 1939 and the secession of the Muhammed Youth group (shabab Muhammed) at the same year marked the first generational gap. Ahmed Rafa’at was a young educated member in the movement, who refused Al Banna’s approach and offered another interpretation to the relationship with the political regime and non religious segments of the society. Rafa’at criticized Al Banna for his way of addressing the government and the palace. He thought the movement should be more radical and adopt violent ways regarding issues of morality and women’s dress codes, rather than focusing on religious and spiritual peaceful messages. For the Palestinian cause, he thought that the Brothers’ efforts should not stop at the level of propaganda, but rather the direct involvement in fights against Zionist groups was to be a priority. Rafa’at succeeded in attracting a number of adherents, especially from young newly affiliated members. Al Banna and other members refused some of Rafa’at’s radical ideas, especially those related to women, and advocated a gradual approach regarding the Palestinian cause, and their relationship with the government. Al Banna, based on Mahmoud Abd al Halim’s plan27, managed to isolate Rafa’at and his group and proved the invalidity of their ideas. After six months the group was dissolved and some of its members joined the Brothers later regretting their actions. Raf’at refused to re-join back and he traveled to Palestine where he was mistakenly killed by resistance groups there.

27 Mahmoud Abd al Halim was one of the early members in the Muslim Brotherhood Foundation Committee, and he became later the first Executive Head of the Secret Apparatus in the early 1940s.
Shabab Muhammed group was also established by young newly affiliated members who rejected some of the movement’s internal mechanisms of decision making process (shoura principle). They believed most decisions were taken only by Al Banna, and that shura was not really applied. The group also adopted a radical perception towards the existing political system, and other political forces. They peacefully withdrew from the movement, and continued to exist independently till the death of the last group’s head Muhammed Attia Khamis in the 1980s. Al Banna’s reaction towards Shabab Muahmmed Group was not aggressive, rather he congratualted them for the establishment of their group.

Under severe torture during Nasser’s era, the second generational dispute found its way with the emergence of the Qutbian trend. Some young Brothers adopted Qutb’s ideas of Hakimiyah. 1967 witnessed a split between two groups: the Qutbian radical group including: Shukry Mustafa and other young members, and old members led by Al Houdaiby. In a reaction to the young group’ interpretations of Qutb’s writings, Al Houdaiby wrote his book Du’at la Quda in 1969, and other seven public letters denouncing Takfir approach/ post Qutbian trends, and use of violence against the political system. Shukry Mustafa withdrew from the movement, and established his own group al-Jama’at al-Takfir w’al-Hijrah. The same for Muhammad Abdel Salam Farag, who established Tanzim al Jihad, and wrote his ideas in a book entitled “al-
Farida al-Ghaiba” (The Neglected Duty), which provided a base for other militant jihadist movements.32

The third generational gap was between the 1970s generation of student movements’ leaders, who firstly joined the group in 1974, and the old guard. Al Talmasany, the Supreme Guide at that time, was able to bridge the gap between the two groups. By his death, tensions emerged, especially when Mustafa Mashhour, a former member of the security apparatus, became the Supreme Guide after Hamid Abou Al Nasr. Discontent reached its peak with the resignation of A’sam Sultan, Abou al A’la Madi, and other 26 members who established the Al Wasat political party in 1996.33 The dispute showed up again with expelling Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, because of his nomination for presidency in 2011, and resignations of many 1970s members including Tharwat al Kharabwy (2001), Mukhtar Nouh (2001), Ibrhaim al Z’afarany (2011), and Haithm abou Khalil (2011).

The concurrent generational schism was sparked by the 2005 parliamentary elections, and is between young affiliated members, and the MB’s high and middle administrative ranks. Young members rebel in their blogs against the rhetoric and organizational make up of the movement; revealing some of the movement’s secrets and internal dynamics.34 The old guard seems unable to inspire youth and adopt their suggestions and strategies; the conflict continues due to the lack of institutional channels through which youth can express their opinions and play a role in the decision making process.35 Tensions became acute when some of the young

35 Khalil Al-A’nani, “The Young Brotherhood in Search of a New Path”, Ibid.
members formed their own parties, including Al Tayar al Masry Party and the Justice Party (Al A’dl), and refused to join the newly formed party of Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice Party FJP) Al Hourya w al A’dala. Young members keep publishing their critique on the movement’s performance, and religious and political rhetoric.

Actually, the preceding generational gaps do not exist in separate historical packages, for instance, the generational interactions with the 1970s generation overlaps with the concurrent generational dispute, providing it with guidelines and inspirations. They share similar concerns, arguments, modes of thoughts, and tools of action. It should be noted that there is no blank space in mind where new ideas come to the young, or forerunners without any influence of old modes of thought. There is rarely an automatic progression of ideas. Thus, any historical classification for this ongoing generational conflict should not undermine the continuity between consequent generational waves on one hand, and on the other hand, the role of cultural, intellectual schools, and political changes in social movement’s ideology and tactics transformation should not be overrated. This way of analysis opens a window for analyzing the movement’s future trajectory based on historical experiences, distinctive trends and schools, rather than providing a snapshot analysis associated with short term quantitative studies. The study employs the Generational Model which provides good description to details of generations’ interaction in relation to the sociopolitical context. It highlights the stratified nature of political generations and level of analysis, represented in inter and intra- generational conflicts.

1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM

The study traces generational gaps in Muslim Brotherhood since mid 1980s till 2011. It seeks to understand why, how, and over what these gaps emerge. It addresses differences and

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similarities among generational disputes, and their impact on the trajectory of the movement. Based on that, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

- Why did those generational gaps emerge?
- What are the main issues over which disputes come out?
- What are the major similarities and differences among consequent emerging generational disputes? (Continuity and discontinuity in the movement generational history).
- What is the impact of these generational gaps on the future trajectory of the movement?

1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Generational Unit Model

The study is conceptually designed around the Generational Unit Model, which encompasses central sub conceptions in generation studies: Interior Time, Age accumulation, Age Elimination, contemporaneity of the contemporaneous, Generations as Actuality, Generational Units, Political Generation, Intra and Inter generational conflicts. In this part I shall elaborate further on each of those concepts throughout historical approach, and then conclude briefly on ways of resolving generational conflicts.

The notion of generation is at the heart of the study of sociology and other neighbor disciplines. It is one of the key sociological concepts through its explicit or implicit presence in studies of social change, value transmission, social mobility, and cultural integration.\(^\text{37}\) Origins of the notion date back to the Old Testament and Greek poetry. Greeks addressed life stages and were aware of its specific characteristics, and their influence on political life. Plato and

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Herodotus perceived generations as an opportunity for political change, and transmission of values. Aristotle also said, “they overdo everything”.

Conceptual analysis of the notion reflects an intersection between two major schools: Positivism, and Historical Romanticism. While the former views it from a biological perspective to the history of mankind, the latter perceives generations as social historical product. A systematic academic study, by both schools, started at the nineteenth century. Attemps, at that time, were mainly to understand conflicts between generations, life stages, and the development of youth’s orientations and attitudes. Tolstoy, Mann, Flaubert, and other novelist used the concept of generation in their literary works. Hume, Comte, Lock, Mill, J. Dornel, Ferrari, Pinder, and O. Lorenz used the notion in reflection to different intellectual interests.

Dilthey provided social analysis to the notion in his volumes about history and human science in the late 1860s. For him, generation refers to a bound between individuals, established upon shared events and transformations. The work of Dilthey received a momentum later on in 1920s. The period from early 1920s to 1933 had been dominated by German contributions, including mainly: Francois Mentre, Jose Ortega Y Casset, Wilhelm Pinder, Hanz Muller, karl Mannheim, Alfred Lorenz, Friedrich Kummer, Richard Alewyn, and Julius Petersen, and Walter Scheidt.

At the Beginning of 1920, particularity 1923, Jose Ortega y published his profound book “The Modern Theme” followed by his work on “Man and Crisis”, in both he asserted the

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43 Jaeger, 277.
importance of intellectual life and ideas in shaping generations. He, also, concluded that a harmony between generations results in an **Age of Accumulation**. Disagreement or a conflict reflects an **Age of Elimination**, in which each generation is trying to eliminate its counter dominance.\(^4^3\) I shall relate this idea to complement Mannheim’s work on generational units notion in the following parts.

Around the same time, Karl Mannheim introduced the most comprehensive sociological study to the notion of generation in his essay “The Problem of Generations”. The Problem of Generations was part of his insightful contribution to the” Sociology of Knowledge”, and continuity to his book “Ideology and Utopia”. Mannheim built his analysis on a critique to both predominant schools: Positivism and Historical Romanticism. The positivist formulation, mainly, presented in the work of Comte, Hume, Cournot, J. Dormel, Ferrari, and O. Lorenz, and to an extent Mentre. Positivist reduced the problem of generation to quantitative (biological) factors, primarily, life span, and life stages. Their perception is based upon a uni linear conception for human progress.

Based on the positivist analysis, the boundaries of generations are arbitrary determined through quantitative measures. This approach is problematic; how boundaries can be drawn, given an endless continuum of generations.\(^4^4\) A quantitative treatment is unjust to social reality, since distinct generations emerge at the same time, and they are not inevitably going to witness sudden changes after thirty or twenty five years.\(^4^5\) In Mannheim’s words:”... they are constant and therefore always present in any situation, the particular features of a given process of


modification cannot be explained by reference to them”\textsuperscript{46}, what is more important for Mannheim is “whether a new generation style emerges every year, every thirty, every hundreds years or whether it emerges rhythmically at all, depends entirely on the trigger action of the social cultural processes”\textsuperscript{47}.

On the other hand, Historical Romanticism which dominated the German mind was inspired by the work of Dilthey. For Romanticists, the social time (qualitative) is distinct from natural time (quantitative), and doesn't necessarily match with it. This is phrased in the concept of \textit{interior time}, developed by Dilthey and employed, also, by Mannheim. According to this notion, the chronological succession of generations is not that much significant, compared with the experience lived by each generation. Time, in this sense, is a subjectively experienced one.\textsuperscript{48} In this sense, Mannheim set the difference between the biological and social time.\textsuperscript{49}

To crystallize the notion of social time, Mannheim refereed to Pinder’s idea of \textbf{the contemporaneity of the contemporaneous}.\textsuperscript{50} It means that different generations can live at the same time, since each has its quiet different experiences. Each of those generational units develops and builds its entelechy. Pinder’s idea is a challenge to the concept of the Spirit of Time \textit{“Zeitgesit”}, which assumes homogenous spirit for each epoch.\textsuperscript{51}

Based on the notion of interior time, the idea of Contemporaneity of the Contemporaneous, and Marx’s notion of class position, Mannheim built his own theoretical analysis to the problem of generations. Generation is not a concrete group the sense of community \textit{“Geminschaftsgebidle”} such as a family or a tribe where each affiliated member has

\textsuperscript{46} Ibd, 312.  
\textsuperscript{47} Mannheim, 310.  
\textsuperscript{48} Mannheim, 282.  
\textsuperscript{50} Mannheim, 283.  
\textsuperscript{51} Ibd, 284.
knowledge about the other. It is not also an association group “Gesellschaftsgebilde” that formed by deliberate act, but it is rather based on social location or position.

In a resemblance to Marx, Mannheim introduced the idea of social location “Lagerung”. Individuals’ positions are defined by certain structures, and social rhythm. According to Marx, class position is defined by economic and power structure in the society. Generational location, in this sense, is based on both the biological existence and experience associated with each location. Each generation has its positive and negative delimitation. Positive refers to the exposure to certain modes of thought, experiences, and feelings; and negative, on the other hand, is the state of being excluded from those modes of thought, experiences, and feelings.^[52]

Generation is not a homogenous unit. It involves the existence of more than one historical and social sub units. This is what Mannheim introduced in his idea about Generations as Actuality. Different and antagonistic Generational units may exist within the same actual generation. A bond between sub units exists through the emergence of formative and interpretive principles that link separate individuals together, without face-to-face connection. It is not necessarily that, youth is associated with progressive attitudes, and older by conservative ones. Such inevitable attachment is unjust to social reality. It is also true that, attitudes of young generation may be developed by ideas of isolated members of the old generation, who is called forerunners.^[53] Thus, the age accumulation, or elimination, based Ortega y’s work, would always emerge at the same time relying on the existence of antagonistic generational units.

Generally, literature on generation uses the notion in different senses, which can be summarized as follows: firstly: generation as Kinship descent. It is employed mainly by anthropologist to examine kinship relations and transformation along generations. Secondly:

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generation as a cohort. It is used more by demographers, and refers to chronological succession of people. In other words, group of people who are born around the same time. Thirdly: political generation. It mainly refers to the existence of unique consciousness, motivating a group of people to take certain action, or being adherents of certain ideas. This study focuses only the notion of political generation.

The work of both scholars, Ortega and Mannheim, influenced the emerging notion of Political generation in the 1930s, which was employed, later on, in studies of student and youth movements in Europe during the 1960s.

Marvin’s Rintala, in her important article “Generations: Political Generations” published in the international encyclopedia of the social sciences, defined political generation as “a group of individuals who have undergone the same basic historical experiences during their formative years”. The uniqueness of each generation is based upon historical events that play role in the formation of each generation.

Braungart used the Generational Unit Model in his analysis to youth movement, and he primarily draws his analysis from Mannheim and Rintala’s work. The Generational Unit Model combines elements from both the historical and generational perspectives to the study of youth movements. The generational perspective involves conflict between generations over controlling or changing reality, and the historical perspective focuses upon external factors that shape and surround this conflict, such as social, political, and cultural changes. The chronological succession of generations would not inevitably shape relations between generations, but rather surrounding circumstances, modes of thought, and the development of generational

55 Richard G. Braungart, 103-106.
**consciousness.** Generational consciousness is the key factor for shaping inter generational and intra generational conflicts.

**Inter generational conflict** refers to tension between two different generations or age groups. It has two processes: the deauthorization of the old generation domination, and the authorization of young generation’s style. It finds its way into existence through a gap between the young’s aspirations and the old’s achievements, or when a discontinuity in authority emerges. This kind of conflict ends by different ways; firstly: problems fade away or resolved through institutional reforms, secondly: any of the competing partners loses their leadership, mobilization, or solidarity, thirdly: unexpected cooperation emerges between both sides, fourthly: the old generation opts their young counter one or crushes it, finally: youth movement topples the old leadership. In the case of MB, the old guard (organizational trend) still has a control over the movement, and no indicators for cooperation in the horizon.

**The intra generational conflict** is inspired by the preceding one. Old generation, consciously or unconsciously, has an influence on youth, resulting in conflicting sub units within the same actual generation. Sub units usually compete over the legitimacy of values, and goals. In a similar way to intergenerational conflict, intra generational tensions are resolved through agreement over controversial issues, the victory of one over the other, lack of resources, leadership and solidarity to keep the struggle on.\(^\text{57}\)

In conclusion, the concept of generation (Political Generation) applied combines political experience, and modes of thought shared by different age group. It refers to how different age groups share common values, attitudes, consciousness, and imagination towards the political authority and social reality, which is due to witnessing certain events, such as wars, revolutions, etc., or following special intellectual school.

\(^{57}\) Braungart, 106-115.
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study applies in-depth semi-structured interviews\(^{58}\) with MB’s affiliated and ex-members who belong to different generational units and age groups, during the period from November 2011-March 2012.

The study uses selective autobiographies, blogs’ content, Facebook groups and published books written by those members, in addition to other interviews conducted by other scholars.\(^{59}\) These selective diversified resources are used to overcome the dearth of scholarly work and published materials about the movement’s internal dynamics, and different perceptions within the movement. Informants were chosen based on their age groups, special experience and occupation in the movement, and the extent to which each of them was a key player in certain events and circumstances.

A number of preliminary interviews were conducted, in order to explore the field study, with Abd al Rahman Ayyash (MB’s blogger), Farid Abdel Khaliq (one of the early members of MB, and member of the Founding Committee of the movement), Ismail Alexandrani (young researcher), and other three MB’s members. I also had some spontaneous unstructured conversations with friends who are affiliated with the movement or who have strong friendship and family ties with other affiliated members. This intensified my understanding of MB’s internal dynamics, history, and perceptions. It also helped in opening up contact with some of my informants and facilitated the process of communication. Furthermore, the relatively open revolutionary context in Egypt encouraged many informants, especially ex- affiliated ones, to

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\(^{58}\) Semi unstructured interviews are flexible types which include open-ended questions, and flexible sequence of questions based on participants’ responses. The interviewer can ask for more elaborations, justifications, and adjust his way of asking from one informant to another, see Robyn Longhurst, “Semi-Structured Interviews and Focus Groups”, in *Key Methods in Geography*, ed. Nicholas J. Clifford and Clifford and Gill Valentine (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 117-127.

freely express their opinion, stories, experiences, and perceptions towards certain figures and their mentors within the movement. Interviews and field work notes were in Arabic, and then translated to English. The use of Arabic language facilitated communication with informants and encouraged them to elaborate their points of view without any language barriers.

One of the limitations of this study will be that some informants, from ideologically conservative units, were not encouraged to share their views and perceptions about the movement’s internal crises, and they sought to assert the internal coherence and harmony of the movement. One way to overcome this problem was to conduct those interviews after interviewing other dissatisfied members; this allowed for narrative inquiry about some events, and shared stories in the movement, which some conservative affiliated members would avoid to mention. Another limitation was the involvement of many key informants in political events, elections, and parliamentary sessions; the researcher did not have the chance to meet some of them during the time allocated for thesis writing. Thus, two interviews were conducted via telephone calls and one through emails.

Interviews’ questions were modified and restructured according to informants’ positions and lived experiences within the movement. They are conducted on the basis of oral informed consent, and a copy of the study will be sent to informants after its completion. Names of well-known figures and members are mentioned, as part of “elite interviews”. Other members’ names and positions are anonymous. I made this point clearly at the beginning of all interviews. Elite informants are political figures, founders of political parties, or key MB’s affiliated calibers whose names are circulated in newspapers, media channels, and other scholarly researches.
### Interviews’ participants:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Affiliation to MB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abd al Rahman Ayyash</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>MB blogger and ex- member who split in 2011 after the revolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Abd al Moniem Abou al Fotouh</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ex- Guidance Office member, who is dismissed in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Farid abd al Khaliq</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Early member of the Founding Committee of MB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ibrahim al Z’afarany</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ex- Shura Council member, who resigned in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ismail al Alexandrani</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Young Researcher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Magdy S’aad</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>MB blogger and current affiliated member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Muhammed al Kassas</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ex- active caliber in MB students’ section, who is dismissed in 2011. Founder of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Affiliated active member.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Current affiliated member.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Current affiliated member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Current affiliated member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Current affiliated member and FJP member.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Current affiliated member, who is in charge of the Educational section in the MB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Current duties-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY

The study is divided into two main chapters: The first chapter covers the 1970s generational interaction, and the second addresses the concurrent generational gap. Each of the two chapters is divided into two major sections: the first section addresses the socioeconomic and political context that shapes the consciousness of those two generations. The second part descriptively focuses on reasons of generational disputes, and issues that indicate generational gaps, and different perceptions between members of the movement. Then, the study ends with overall concluding remarks.
CHAPTER II: THE 1970s GENERATIONAL GAP

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The backbone of the MB’s third generational wave is 1970s university student activists. This generation is known as “Wasat”, “1970s”, “young princes”, or “the second founding generation”. The Wasat and the 1970s generation are used interchangeably, though there are implicit semantic meanings beyond them. The use of 1970s generation emphasizes the role of 1967 defeat and Saddat’s era in shaping the consciousness of this generational group. Al Wasat has an Islamic ideological implications, as it refers to the midpoint between two extremes, or what is known as the golden mean. It also denotes a description for this generational group as a bridge or an intermediate generation between the MB’s old guard and young members. In the case of Muslim Brothers, the notion refers to those influential 1970s members who withdrew from the movement since the mid 1990s.60

The 1970s generation has a long experience in political activities, civil society, and professional syndicates. They developed skills of communication with the public and diverse ideological groups. They expressed a high level of pragmatism and flexibility. Most of them have professional and organizational skills, and are inclined to rebel against the political system and coordinate with other competing political groups.61 These characteristics put them in confrontation with some hard-line calibers, particularly 1965 organization members whose consciousness was shaped by Wahabism, and Qutb’s ideas about Islamic vanguard, and emotional detachment from the Jahilyya society. The culture of the secret apparatus was

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60 Ahmad al Touhamy, Al Agyal fe al Syasa al Masrya: Drast Hala Gayel al Sab’aenat [Generations in Egypt’s Politics: 1970s Generation, a Case Study](Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2009), 34-36.
61 Ibid, 47-53.
generally characterized by absolute obedience, secrecy, solitude, and spying on potential enemies and competitors.\textsuperscript{62} Thus, an expected intellectual gap between both groups was indispensable.

This chapter analyzes the socioeconomic and political context that shaped the consciousness and political experience of the 1970s generation. It descriptively addresses the nature of generational relationship between some of the 1970s generation and the movement’s leadership since mid 1980s. It denotes reasons behind the establishment of Al Wasat Party, and political differentiation between its discourse and the MB’s political discourse. It also indicates reasons behind dismissals, and resignations of some 1970s figures.

\textbf{2.2 SURROUNDING CONTEXT}

The 1967 defeat was a shock for most Egyptians and Arabs, and a strong hit for the Egyptian leadership. Nasser lost some of his public appeal, and many young adherents of Marxism started to revisit their ideology and beliefs. Some of them found Islam a way to overcome this defeat, as the religious component was either missed or oppressed under Nasser’s regime. Sadat assumed power in 1971, and contrary to Nasser’s approach, he presented a different political profile as the faithful democratic president. All Islamist prisoners were released in 1971, in an attempt to gain their support and counter leftist forces who resented Sadat’s rule and demonstrated for two days against him in 1972.

According to Talmasany, Brothers were so cautious and skeptical about Sadat’s policies; as he was involved in military trials against Brothers under Nasser’s rule. Thus, Brothers did not fully support him; they were more neutral and ready to witness changes in his policies towards Islamists.\textsuperscript{63} Muslim Brothers enjoyed high level of political tolerance at the early years of Sadat’s

\textsuperscript{62} Al Sayed Abd al Satar al Malegy, \textit{Tagrobyt m’aa al Ikhwan} [My Expereince with the Muslim Brotherhood](Cairo: Al Zahra for Arab media, 2009), 285-288.
rule. By 1976, the Da’awa Magazine, the MB’s official newspaper, was republished again, and the movement was able to act freely with limited restrictions. Islamist groups grow in presence at university campuses. Al Gama’a al Islamya was the most influential group among them. Young students who were deeply depressed after 1967 defeat found their way to the group. In 1977 al Gam’a al Islamya won all student elections, and Islamists started to spread their dominance in factories, where leftists used to have influence.64

Tensions between Islamists and the regime emerged after signing Camp David Treaty in 1978 and the Peace Agreement in 1979. Muslim Brotherhood and Al Gam’a al Islamya constituted a strong opposition coalition against Saddat’s relations with Israel and United States. They also rebelled against liberal economic policies followed since 1974 and shaped the Egyptian socioeconomic landscape till now.

Sadat’s regime attracted foreign investments and declared the law of Open Door policy. The open door policy failed in achieving its goals; few foreign investments were generated, and most of them concentrated in unproductive sectors like banking, tourism, and the service sector. In 1977, the Egyptian government signed the first agreement with IMF for one year to get 105 million of SDRs. In 1978 another agreement has been signed to get 600 million SDRs but Egypt did not get all this amount of money till 1981. Few social segments benefited from these liberal policies and loans; Egyptians suffered from high inflation rates that resulted in 1977 riot against high prices and deteriorating living standards.65 By the 1980s the rate of growth was negative and fell below the population growth. The deficit of the balance of payment increased with high

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inflation rate, and external debt. Egypt was unable to meet its obligations with foreign creditors in 1985, and by 1988 western countries put more restrictions on the lending process. As a result, the Egyptian government, under Mubarak’s rule, signed an agreement with the IMF in 1987 to reschedule its debt at the Paris Club. The government was unable to fulfill its obligations according to this agreement, and the treatment failed by late 1987. Because of continuous western pressures, in May 1991 the government signed a treaty with the IMF, and in November a Structural Adjustment Loan from the WB was received. The government became responsible for implementing all the recommendations of the Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP), including privatization, free trade policies, and restrictions on employment policies. The private sector was unable to absorb the increasing surplus of labour, and unemployment continued to soar. The competiveness of domestic industry was also undermined due to free trade policies.66These economic deteriorating conditions went hand in hand with the penetration of consumerism culture and the emergence of acute gaps between social classes. This economic context encouraged Islamists to provide social and economic services to gain the support of certain economic classes.

Back in 1981, sectarian strife emerged between Muslims and Christians. According to Talmasany, sectarian conflict was made by the regime itself to get rid of its opposition and to turn public attention from the Peace Treaty with Israel. In reaction, Sadat accused the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Gama’a al Islamiya of this sectarian strife, excluded some opposition figures from the parliament, introduced new restrictions on opposition newspapers, and attacked Da’awa Magazine office. After a meeting with Menachem Begin in 1981, 1536 members from different political forces, and religious groups were sent to prisons in June 1981. Sadat’s harsh policies

66Farah, Nadia Ramsis, *Egypt’s Political Economy Power Relations in Development* (Cairo: American University Press, 2009), 44.
against Islamists, liberal economic policies, and relations with Israeli and United States resulted in his assassination on the same year.67

For the MB’s context, the movement was fragile in 1971, with symbolic leadership. There was an urgent need to restructure the movement and establish strong nodes between its scattered cells in different governorates. By 1973, Mustafa Mashhour, and Kamal al Sananery started to approach young students who were active in university campuses under the umbrella of Al Gama’a al Islamiya Movement. In 1974, new fresh blood went through the movement’s arteries. A group of young active members of Al Gama’a al Islamiya, known later by the 1970s generation “geyal el sab’anat” or young princes, joined the group and played a major role in consolidating its internal structure. Among those members were Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, Khairt al Shater, Essam al A’rian, Abou al A’laa Madi, A’ssam Sultan, Helmi Al Gazar, Gamal Heshmat, Khalid Daoud, Hamid al Dafrauy, Ibrahim al Za’farany, and others. Joining the movement caused a spilt inside Al Gama’a al Islamiya, as many affiliated members of Al Gama’a al Islamiya were against the peaceful gradual ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with the existing political system. During 1979 and 1980 tensions emerged between who joined the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist- jihadist trend in Al Gama’a, including mainly: Karam Zohdy, Osama Hafez, Nagih Ibrhaim, A’asem Abd al Maged, A’sam Darbala in Upper Egypt, Muhammed Islmail, Ahmed Farid in Alexandria, and Osama Abd al A’zem, and Abdulllah Sa’ad in Cairo.68

Sadat’s epoch was significant in the movement history; it marked the start of an agreement on denouncing violence and adopting peaceful political measures, especially after the

67 Ka’aoud, 156-189.
68 Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, in his autobiography, addressed in details how he and other members of Al Gama’a al Islamiya joined the Muslim Brotherhood, see Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh Shahed a’la Tarekh al Harka al Islamiya 1970-1984 [Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh: Witness on the History of the Islamic Movement], Edited by Hosam Tamam, (Cairo: Dar al Shorouk, 2010), 88-99.
1981 prisons experience. The tendency has been consolidated under Mubarak’s regime; Mubarak’s first term was mild, based on a policy of non-confrontation with moderate Islamic groups in order to counter Islamic violent groups. Brothers were released in 1982, and got a permission to work and publish the D’awa magazine. The regime over looked the political presence of the movement till late 1980s. In the early 1980s, the movement’s priority was to reconstruct its administrative system at the domestic and international level. Ahmed al Malt was in charge of this task in collaboration with Abd al Moni’em abou al Fotouh. Al Malt’s group was called “Egypt office” to distinguish it from other regional offices for MB. Tasks of the group were to assure coordination between all administrative offices in Egypt, and to set clear organizational rules and regulations for the movement, which were already done in 1987. Mustafa Mashhour, Madi A’kef and Khairt al Shater were responsible for the international organization of the movement. The international organizational ties were restructured and new regulations were introduced in 1982.

According to Abou al Fotouh, clear ideological and organizational framework for the organization was designed in 1989. There was a consensus over two main principles: renouncing violence, and deploring hidden and underground secret activities. The first principle was clearly into action by the mid 1980s, when the movement participated in the 1984 parliamentary election through an alliance with Al Wafd party. In year 1987, Brothers participated in a coalition with Al Ahrara and Socialist Labor Party in the parliamentary election. Parliamentary participation went hand in hand with professional syndicates’ competition. Active student in universities found their way to syndicates after graduation. By the early 1990s syndicates were dominated by Brothers,

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69 Ibid, 124-126.
70 Damasio, 39.
71 Abou al Foutouh, 127-128.
72 Ibid, 128-130.
or at least they were present in most syndicates’ councils. Syndicates have been used as political forums to attract supporters from the educated middle class’s ranks. The second principle was confirmed in one of the movement’s documents that has been approved by the Guidance Office and sent to all movement’s administrative offices in 1987. The movement’s bylaws and structure were finally crystallized under Mamoun al Houdaiby’s leadership in the 1990s.

The blind eye policy of Mubarak’s regime changed since the early 1990s. This change has been associated with Egyptian participation in Gulf War, implementation of ERSAP, and radical Islamist insurgency, as 20,000 jihadist Egyptians came back from Afghanistan. Mamoun al Houdaiby designed MB’s bylaws under such state repression; this consciously manifested in the concentration of power in the hands of the Guidance Office, and the limited authorities of the Shura Council.

Mubarak’s deliberalization policies started with renewing the emergency law, and introducing a new electoral law, in 1989, which cancelled party-lists in favor of the first pass the post method. Due to the new law, Brothers were not able to win any seats in 1990 elections and only one seat in 1995 elections. The government also introduced Law 4/1992 for civil society organizations. Law 4/1992 states that getting foreign fund without state’s permission merits military trials and punishment of seven to fifteen years without the possibility of an appeal. Law 100/1993 for professional syndicates was another restriction, demanding minimum participation of 50% on the first round and 33% percent on the second round to have a valid membership.

Since 1993, Brothers were unable to dominate syndicates; they moved from domination to participation (Mushraka la Moghalba) strategy. The head of the syndicate position was always left to figures accepted by the regime. The government accused the Board of the Doctors and the

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73 Damasio, 40-42.
74 Abou al Fotouh, 130.
Bar syndicates of financial corruption. It also issued executive orders that allowed the judiciary to intervene in syndicates elections in 1995. Some syndicates were put under the supervision of appointed administrators and others’ activities were suspended for years. Since 1994 till 2011, hundreds of MB’s members were militarily tried and sentenced between three to five years. In 1996, three founders of Al Wasat Party were arrested. Most arrests targeted moderate middle cadres in the movement in order to stop cooperation with other political forces, and publicize the image of undemocratic MB.

In such socioeconomic and political context that witnessed the control of dysfunctional and corrupt state institutions, a new kind of generational interaction emerged. Newly affiliated members of 1970s started to recognize the undemocratic nature of their movement, and its failure to produce conciliatory discourse with other political forces. The MB 1970s members’ experience in syndicates witnessed number of failures and mismanagement; this encouraged them to think about new ways of interaction with state institutions. They also questioned the basic roles of the movement, and the decision-making process.

2.3 DESCRIPTION

Ideological Gap

The consciousness of the 1970s generation has been shaped by the writings of Sheik Muhammed al Ghazly, Sheik Sayyid Sabek, Sheikh Bahy al Khouly, and Abou al A’la al Maududi. At the beginning of 1970s they were influenced by the discourse of two Salafist groups: Al Gam’aya al Shar’ia, and Ansar Al Sunna. By 1973, members of Al Gam’a al Islamiya were in contact with Sheikh Yusuf al Karadawy, and Al Ghazaly via summer campuses


76 For detailed records about Brothers’ military trials, and names of detainees, see Abd al Rahim A’li, Al Ikhwan al Muslimen Azmet Taiar al Tagded [The Muslim Brotherhood: the Crisis of the Renewal Trend](Cairo: Al Mahrous Center, 2004), 100-108.
organized by student union members. Abou al Fotouh asserted that “we were religiously conservative, and less open in our discourse when we joined MB; we were inclined to use violence, and hostile to different ideas. We might not join MB if Mustafa Mashhour and Kamal al Sananery, with religiously conservative discourse, did not address us compared with other old open members like Omar al Talmasany”77. In an interview with Abou al Fotouh, he concluded, “We believed in the use of violence and the only difference between us and Jihadist movements at the 1970s, was the timing of its usage. We did not accept some practices like shaving beard or listening to music. We discussed the issue of violence many times with Omar al Talmasany, and we were partially convinced by arguments about peaceful reform until the assassination of Sadat. The 1981 jail experience was crucial to recognize the undesired consequences of the use of violence on Islam, and Muslims. It gave us the opportunity to be engaged in dialogues with many old MB’s members like Omar al Talmasany, Gaber Rizk, Lashin Abou Shanb, and Yusuf Kamal, beside other Jihadist leaders”78.

The ideological discourse of the 1970s members witnessed openness due to their participation in syndicates, and cooperation with other political forces. They were engaged in debates with some religiously conservative voices in the movement and were able to introduce open moderate opinions. In 1987, a controversy over nominating women in parliamentary election emerged when Sheikh Abd al Satar Fathullah Said refused nominating women on Brothers’ parliamentary list with the Labor Party in 1987. Mamoun al Houdaiby and Abou al Fotouh rejected Sheik Abd al Satar’s opinion and formed a committee of religious experts to

77 Abou al Fotou, 95-97.
78 A’li, 160-162.
discuss the issue. The committee concluded that there are no religious barriers for women to be parliamentary candidates and play an active role in politics.\textsuperscript{79}

Omar al Talmasany open-minded personality and close relationship with young 1970s affiliated members was crucial in bridging the gap between some old hard-line and young members during 1980s. He initiated the idea of participating in professional syndicates in 1983, and establishing a political party in 1986 under the title of “Al Shoura Party”.

According to Tharwat al Kharabawy’s autobiography, Al Talmasany appeased new members in order to ease the secret apparatus group’s control over the movement. Members of the secret apparatus and 1965 group were released in the 1970s, and dominated high administrative ranks since that time. Muhammed Bad’ie, Mahmoud Ezzat, Kamal al Sananery, A’rafa al Komy, and Mustafa Mashhour were among those prominent figures. Some of those members travelled abroad and mixed Qutb’s ideas with Salafism. In parallel, some open minded personalities who were close to Hassan al Banna were excluded including Farid Abd al Kaliq, Tawfik al Shawy, Mahmoud Abd al Halim, and Abd al Mot’al al Gabry. The secret apparatus team was religiously conservative, and they paid most of their attention to organizational discipline, whilst the 1970s members were civilly active in universities, and syndicates. The MB acted in these platforms as a political party, and their members acquired satisfactory level of political and professional skills, compared with their leaders.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{79} Abou al Fotouh, 131-132.

\textsuperscript{80} Tharwat al Kharabawy is one the MB 1970s calibers. He was one of the influential members with Mukhtar Nouh who played a role in consolidating MB’s presence in the Bar Syndicate that used to be under the control of liberals and leftists. He resigned in 2002 in reaction to the MB’s political performance and current ideological makeup. He was against the secret apparatus’ ideology that penetrated the movement during Mamoun al Houdaiby’s leadership. He openly criticized the movement for financial and administrative mismanagement in the Bar syndicate, and he was an advocate for the principle of participation not domination. Al Kharawaby criticized MB’s involvement in politics and described that as a source of creating enemies rather than building coalitions with other political forces. He also deprecated the culture of obedience, and the exclusion of calibers who share different perceptions. Tharwat al Kharabawy, \textit{Kalb al Ikhwan Mahakem Taftesh} [From the Heart of the Muslim Brotherhood: Investigation Courts](Cairo: Dar al Hilal, 2010), 21-30.
According to A’ssam Sultan, “The secret apparatus’ mentality was shaped by underground activities associated with secrecy and absolute obedience. Qutb’s writings about emotional detachment with Jahiliya society, and the tribulation phase in Nasser’s prisons formed their perception towards other competitors and the political regime.Whilst we were engaged in political activities with liberals, and leftist; members of the secret apparatus believed that democracy is against the sovereignty of God. They negatively perceived music and art, and identified other political competitors as enemies of Islam.

For example, Sheikh Abd ullah al Khatib, the movement’s mufti and head of the educational section, issued a fatwa to stop a performance at the engineering syndicate played by some of the 1970s members. In addition, the engineering syndicate used to sponsor seminars, conferences, and public lectures for intellectuals. Mamoun al Houdaiby, in 1992, embarrassed some of our guests by saying that they do not enjoy any public support. As a result, guests left the lecture and the syndicate’s board decided not to invite any of the Brothers’ leaders. In 1993, Mamoun al Houdaiby reprimanded me because I managed with a group of youth in the Bar syndicate a dialogue among diverse political forces, including leftists, Nasserist, Communists, Wafdist, and members of the National Democratic Party, Christians, Jihadists and Gam’a Islamya members, without his consent.

Brothers’ leaders after the death of Omar al Talmasany were not interested in dialogues with other forces; their focus was mainly on widening the public base of the movement, rather than improving the intellectual quality of affiliated members. The gap between our political perception and theirs became acute when the Guidance Office refused to sign the “National Consensus” document with other political forces. As a result, some of the 1970s members in the Committee of Syndicates’ Coordination including Abou al A’la Mady, who was a member in the
movement’s Shura Council, signed it regardless of the leadership consent. These events proved to us, we could not continue in the movement and contribute to real change” 81.

For Abou al A’la Mady, the president of Al Wasat party, “I finally resigned in 1996. My group and I had the belief that no organization can keep working outside the existing political legal framework. This situation had undesired consequences such as the ambiguity of goals. For instance, the movement’s leaders did not provide clear answers for questions like Does we want to politically rule or not? Is MB a reformist religious movement or a political party? 82 I believed that both types of organization could not exist in one body. This would be impossible at the practical level, and religion would be used to manipulate voters. You cannot provide services and have a religious discourse, whilst assure fair competition with other parties who do not enjoy the same privilege you have.

Besides the ambiguity of goals, there is lack of transparency, and accountability measures. The lack of transparency had been always justified by security coercion. Thus, Al Wasat group decided to overcome this kind of secrecy and establish a political party; a legitimate legal political framework would assure transparency in managing financial resources, and internal fair elections. This would also allow the movement to abolish the control of the old guard, and its culture of secrecy.

Furthermore, The MB requires an intellectual renewal movement at three levels: History, practice, and ideology. At the historical level, the movement needs to revisit its major mistakes, and admit them, such as the establishment of the secret apparatus, and its violent activities in

81 A’ssam Sultan, “ Kasat Hizb al Wasat Bayen al Ikhwan wa al Hizb al Watney”[Al Wasat Party’s Story between Muslim Brotherhood and the National Democratic Party], Al Youm al Sab’a, September 3, 2009.
82 The same questions were raised by Abd al Satar al Malegy; one of the 1970s calibers who played an active role in the Scientists Syndicate. According to him, if MB is a religious revivalist movement; why its members are not asked to join Al Azhar, and does the movement truly provide them with the required curriculums to perform this task? Al Malegy suggested turning the movement into a legal NGO for culture and human development. Al Malegy, 267-268.
Egypt\textsuperscript{83}, confrontation with Nasser’s regime, ways of choosing Supreme Guide in 1970s\textsuperscript{84}, the way members of the secret apparatus controlled the movement and excluded old respected members, and why the movement wasted the opportunity of forming a political party during Sadat’s era. At the practical level, the movement should decide over its desired legal status and

\textsuperscript{83} MB’s internal schisms emerged in 1947, when Ibrahim Hassan, one of the MB’s oldest members, resigned in rebellion to Al Banna’s influence over the rule of Guidance Council’s decree of dismissing Abd al Hakim Abidin who was the Secretary General at that time. Shortly after the dismissal of Ibrahim Hassan, Ahmed al Sukkari, Al Banna’s deputy and old friend, also split MB due to disagreement with Al Banna over the relationship with Al Wafd Party. The dismissal of Al Sukkari, and Hassan caused an administrative vacuum, and resulted in strengthening the role of the secret apparatus, as the first head of the apparatus became Al Banna’s deputy. The secret apparatus was in charge of violent activities in Egypt, besides other groups mainly Wafdist, and Masr al Fata Movement. Most important events took place with the assassination of Ahmed al Khazindar and Al Nukrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime minister, in 1948 by young members of the security apparatus. Abd al Rahman al Sandi, the second head of the security apparatus, started to consolidate his control, and to work independently from Al Banna. A failed attempt to bomb the courthouse in January 1949 by one of the members of the security apparatus pushed Al Banna to write a letter condemning such actions. The letter has the title of “they are neither brothers, nor are they Muslims”, and Al Banna asked young members to refrain from threatening letters and violent operations. In the same year, the movement was officially dissolved, and a year later Al Banna was assassinated. By the assassination of Al Banna in 1949, new conflicts emerged between, Salih Ashmawi, and Mustafa Munin over negotiations with the government and the Wafad Party in order to restore the legal status of the movement after its dissolution. The conflict ended with the dismissal of Munin in 1950, and harsh campaign against him by Ashmawi. Another controversy in the movement took place over the successor of Al Banna, Salih Al Ashmawi (Al Banna’s Deputy), Abd al Rahman al Banna (Al Banna’s Brother), Abd al Hakim Abidin (the Secretary General), and Hasan al Baquri, (member of the Guidance Council) were most expected figures to lead after Al Banna. Ashmawi was the most ambitious among the four of them, but an agreement was reached to nominate someone else from outside the movement. Hassan al Houdaiby, a respectable judge in good relations with Brothers and Al Banna, was nominated as a new face who is not associated with any of the preceding problems. It was clear that Al Houdaiby did not have the same image of Al Banna in the eyes of some of followers. Al Houdaiby’s appointment was seen, as a violation to Brothers’ internal regulation; as he was not from the Consultative Assembly and did not get three quarters of vote. Conflicts since October 1951, after the official appointment of Houdaiby, proved personal antagonism between him and Al Sandi, Ashmawi and their supporters. Al Houdaiby’s different perception towards the political role of the movement, and refusal of the existence of the secret apparatus, and the secrecy of its activities were among main reasons of such a conflict. He was unable to restructure the security apparatus, and to assure control over it, even after his appointment to Yusuf Tal’at as a head of the apparatus in 1953. Internal divisions continued and Gamal Abd al Nasser managed to make use of it in 1954. Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 36-87.

\textsuperscript{84} After the death of Hassan al Houdaiby, members of the 1965 organization managed a number of meetings and decided to have a secret Supreme Guidance for a short period of time. The name of the secret Guidance was not confirmed, but most likely he was Helmy abd al Hamid. Later on, Al Talmasany was chosen. The secret apparatus group thought that Talmasany is a flexible man; he has good relation with all members, and will not be a strong obstacle against their ambitions. Osama al Ghazawy, quoted in Al Kharabawy, 22. Omar al Talmasany wanted to abolish the culture of secrecy; he addressed university students and encouraged them to be active in the civil and political sphere. He initiated the idea of establishing political party, and wanted to develop a legal framework for the movement. Al Talmasany’s reform approach was not welcomed by the 1965 group. They found their death an opportunity to shift the strategies of work within the movement. Mustafa Mashhour wanted to be the Supreme Guide after the death of Al Talmasany, but he accepted being the deputy of Nasr Abou Hamid due to seniority issue. Abou Hamid was sick old man, and Mashhour was actually in charge of managing the movement. During this period, the 1965 group addressed other members of the group who flee the country because of Nasser’s repression. Those newly affiliated members penetrated the movement, and assumed diverse administrative positions. They were eyes for Mashhour’s leadership. Most of those members came from Gulf countries with Salafist backgrounds, or were from rural areas, especially from the Dakhiliya Governorate where Mashhour was born. The penetration of those calibers led to the exclusion or the marginalization of some 1970s members. They also spayed on 1970s calibers who share revolutionary ideas regarding the role of MB, and its relationship with the political regime and other political forces. It should be noted that spying on others’ activities is part of the culture of the secret apparatus, and one of its considered legitimate activities. During Hassan al Banna’s era the apparatus used to spy over the activities of Masr al Fata movement. Al Sayed Abd al Satar al Malegy, Tagrobaty m’ i a al Ikhwan [My Experience with the Muslim Brotherhood] (Cairo: Al Zahra for Arab Media, 2009), 217-248.
activities. At the ideological level, the movement needs to consider its discourse on Copts and women’s rights, party politics, citizenship, and pluralism”85.

For MB’s refusal to establish a political party during Sadat’s era, Mashhour said, “Sadat was not serious in his offer. He asked Omar al Talmasany to approach the Ministry of Social Affairs, meaning that Brothers would establish social association. This would limit MB’s activities and put restrictions on its actions”. For the movement’s perception on political pluralism, Mashhour concluded, “state’s control over party life should be abolished and political forces should enjoy more freedom. In this case, political parties can appeal against parties that do not respect the constitution”86. Initially, Mashhour’s statements about political pluralism indicated a high level of conservatism in the late 1908s and early 1990s; He insisted that all parties must have an Islamic ideological background. Due to societal pressures, this stance witnessed an ideological shift. In 1994, MB published a document entitled “the Shura and Party Politics” in which it accepted political pluralism, equality among Muslim and Christians. In the same year, another document about women’s rights has been published. The MB declared that it respects and encourages women’s active role in the political sphere. The movement also confirmed equality among Muslims and Christians in another notice entitled “Statement for People” in 1995. In 2004, a Reform Initiative has been drafted in which the MB clearly refused the idea of the theocratic state, and the use of violence.87

A’ssam al A’rian admitted that the movement is in an urgent need for reform at diverse levels. At the educational level, current educational curriculums do not belong to the enlightened era of the 1930s and 1940s but rather to the tribulation era at the 1950s and 1960s. They enhance

86 Ibid, 154-158.
87 Khalil A’nani, Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Shaykhoka Tosar’a al Zaman [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against Time](Cairo: Al Shorouk International, 2007), 138-144.
confrontation with adherents of different ideologies who are negatively depicted as enemies of the MB and Islam. The religious discourse of the movement is also conservative intolerant due to the influence of Salafism that penetrated MB since 1980s.\textsuperscript{88}

The discursive gap between the 1970s generation and the secret apparatus members reemerged in 2007 over the movement political party’s drafted program. In 2005, the movement declared its intention to establish a political party, but it never applied for it until 2011. The idea of establishing a political party remained debatable since the 1990s, when Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh initiated establishing a political party entitled “The Reform Party” in 1995. According to A’ssam al A’rian, “there were ongoing debates over establishing the party. Many questions were not resolved like the reaction of the state towards this initiative, and who is going to lead this party?”\textsuperscript{89}

The 2007 program was so debatable indicating disagreement and different interpretations among MB’s leaders. Controversial issues including women’s and Copts’ rights to run for presidency, the establishment of Religious Scholars Committee, and relationship with Israel were publically contested among MB’s members.

The program does not give Copts and women the right to assume presidency. Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, said, “we are not against having a Coptic or a female candidate for the presidency. We asked Sheikh Al Karadawy, and Ahmed al A’sal; they said there is no any religious restrictions to have a Coptic or a female president”\textsuperscript{90}. For the Religious Scholars Committee, Abou al Fotouh said, “we want an elected committee of Azheriet Sheikhs who

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, 178.
\textsuperscript{89} A’ssam al A’rian quoted in Stacher, 76. According to Abd al Satar al Malegy, the Shura Council agreed in 1995 meeting to establish a political party for the movement, but Mashhour’s leadership did not welcome this proposal. They did not prefer any kind of legal supervision over MB’s internal dynamics. Al Malegy, 225-226.
would choose the Azhar’s Sheikh and acts as consultancy body for the constitutional court, People Assembly on cases that have religious dimensions”. Abou al Fotouh justified debates over the program by the fact that it was not appropriately phrased and written.

A contrasting perspective was simultaneously expressed by Mahmoud Ezzat over the same issues. Ezzat, ex-member of the 1965 group, said, “We would not accept nominating a woman or a Coptic for presidency (Al Walya al A’ma). There is a jurisprudential consensus over this issue. The Scholars Committee would be one of the tools to apply Shari’a according to the second article of the constitution. Its task is to assure that no laws are violating the shari’a through acting as consultancy body for the constitutional court, parliament, and the president”. Muhammed Habib, the ex- first deputy of the Supreme Guidance, initiated the idea of the Scholars Committee as a way to enhance the autonomy of the Azhar. Habib justified his idea by the fact that the parliament already consults the Azhar in religious issue, and having an elected committee for that would promote more autonomy, as the committee would be in charge of choosing the Azhar Sheikh rather than being appointed by the state.

Another contradiction was evident over Camp David Treaty. A’ssam al A’rian said, “Brothers would recognize Israel, and Camp Daivd would witness some changes”. In a response, Mahdi Akkef, the Supreme Guide at that time, said, “Brothers do not recognize Israel as a state and this is against MB’s beliefs”.

The status of women’s and Copts’ political rights to run for the presidential office did not change in the FJP discourse. The Guidance Office declared that they would not nominate or

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91 1971 Egyptian Constitution states that Shari’a is the principle source of legislation.
support a female or Coptic candidate for this position, though the program does not explicitly refer to this stance. It rather confirms the notion of citizenship and equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their sex, color, and religion.\textsuperscript{94} The program also adopted the open-minded interpretation on the Religious Scholars Committee. It will be a consultancy body for political institutions. The Religious Scholars Committee will be elected among the Islamic Research Academy, and Al Azhar Sheikh will be elected from its members.\textsuperscript{95}

It can be concluded that intellectual debates and media attention to MB’s political program pushed the movement to consider its opinions and modify some of them. This is simply a peace-offer to modern societal and political pressures, rather than an inner desire for democracy.

\textbf{Al Wasat Party}

A’ssam Sulțna mentioned, “We secretly started Al Wasat party’s preparations till we openly declared it in 1996. The response of MB’s leaders was aggressive. When Abou al A’la Mady was arrested in 1996 after the rejection of Political Party Committee (PPC) to Al Wasat’s official papers, the MB pressured me to give up Al Wasat’s initiative and join back the movement. Their methods included asking MB’s members to avoid talking with me and sending other figures to ask me not to appeal against the PPC’s rule. They also asked Selim al A’wa, Al

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\textsuperscript{94} Muslim Brotherhood had very reluctant position towards Coptic’s political rights. The movement supported a Coptic candidate in 2000 parliamentary election, but when A’ssam al A’rian was asked about that he said “we did not sponsor but we just supported him. There is a big difference”, quoted in Stacher, 73.

The FJP program asserts that there is no discrimination between citizens on the basis of sex, religion and color in expressing their opinions, running for public offices, joining political organizations, in a way that would preserve the basic values of the Egyptian society. Women should be empowered to enjoy all their rights in a way that does not contradict with the basic values and norms of the society. According to one of young MB’s influential members, “It was meant not to clearly state MB’s stance on women’s and Coptics’ right to run for presidency; It is a sort of political maneuvering”, An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.

\textsuperscript{95} The program is available on, http://ikhwanwayonline.wordpress.com/2011/04/17/%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%AC-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7 (accessed January 3, 2012).
\end{small}
Wasat’s lawyer, not to appeal against the PPC. Al A’wa refused that, because he cannot take any decision without the consent of his prosecutor who was Abo al A’a Mady at that time. To send a clear message to the movement’s leaders, Dr Rafik Habia, one of the founders of the party and I asked Selim al A’wa to appeal on our behalf against this rule. Mustafa Mashhour invited me for a meeting to discuss the issue, and I was clear about my stance not to retreat establishing Al Wasat party. In this meeting, I asked him why he was rushed to be the next Supreme Guide after the death of Hamid Abou al Nasr, while his body was just buried.96 Mashhour answered, “I was surprised by what Mamoun did this day”. My response to him was, so where were the administrative rules, and why they were not applied? Mashhour justified what happened by the fact that God chooses for the movement. My answer to him was Does God Choose only for the movement?! Did Mubarak, Saddam Hussein, and Bashar al Assad came against the will of God?! Actually, God gives us the freedom to make our choices, and if you believe you assumed the leadership in wrong way, how can you relate that to God’s choice and will? I left the meeting and after few days, I submitted written resignation including reasons behind it. This was the first written resignation in the history of Brothers. After the resignation, Mustafa Mashhour asked me to withdraw my resignation but I refused. It was clear that there is a big gap between me and the movement’s leadership”97.

In 1996, A’ssam Sultan, Abou al A’la Mady with other movement’s members decided to develop their own political legal framework. They established Al Wasat party on January 1996 with other seventy-four members; sixty-two of them were from the Muslim Brotherhood.

96 A’ssam Sultan used to describe this situation by “the Graves Allegiance” (Bay’at al Makaber).
97 A’ssam Sultan, Ibid.
According to, Sultan “the 1970s members were ideologically with us, but they were reluctant to join Al Wasat due to practical and administrative considerations at that time.”

According to Abou al Fotouh, “Al Wasat founders rushed in applying for the PPC without the consent of the movement’s leadership. They were motivated by developing a legal framework to stop military trials for many MB’s members. Their initiative was useless during Mubarak’s regime, but I thought the movement should not take any aggressive measures against them. It could be better just to blame them for rushing to the PPC, and nothing more.”

The party was refused by the PPC, and half of the founding MB’s members joined back the movement. In reaction to this withdrawal, Al Wasat Petition was dismissed as the party did not have fifty founding members. In 1998, Al Wasat party was finally rejected by the PPC. Abou Ala Madi submitted another proposal for new party under the title of Hizb al Wasat al Masry (Egypt’s Center Party) with ninety- three founding members, among them two Copts and one female. However, it was rejected again. Since 1996, party founders applied four times to the PPC, but all their requests were refused. In 2000, the Ministry of Social Affairs accepted Al Wasat founders’ request to establish an NGO called Egypt for Culture and Dialogue (Masr Lil Thakafa wa al Hiwar). It comprised Al Wasat members and other intellectuals like Selim al A’wa, and Wahid abd al Maged. The NGO was the platform through which channels of communication among party’s members, intellectuals and youth kept opened.

Al Wasat’s initiative was challenged not only by the political regime but also by Brothers. The state relied heavily on the security approach with all Islamist regardless of their discourse. Moderates and extremists were in the same package. Khalil A’nani summarized three reasons for dismissing Al Wasat party’s requests, rather than co-opting it. Firstly, the Egyptian

98 Stacher, 76.
99 An interview with Dr Abou al Fotouh by the author, February 7, 2012.
100 Ibid, 79.
system perceived Islamists as a threat to national security that should be eliminated by all means. Secondly, the regime was afraid that the newly formed party would be an umbrella for Brothers’ activities, who would join it, forming a strong alliance against the regime. Finally, the regime perceived Al Wasat as a potential strong opposition that would attract masses and other public figures.101

The MB’s leadership stood against Al Wasat initiative. According to A’ssam Sultan, “the Supreme Guidance Office invited early founders of the party and pressured them to cancel their membership in the party. Some of those members did not stand against these pressures and cancelled their membership in 1996. In July 1996, Mokhtar Nouh, and Mamoun Moyasser, two lawyers of the movement, asked the Parties Court to reject Al Wasat’s request. They also accused us of being a proxy for US interest, because Rafik Habib, one of Al Wasat early founders, is the son of the Head of the Evangelical Sect in Egypt. Due to an intellectual disagreement, Habib withdrew from Al Wasat. After that, the MB’s leadership directly addressed him and he joined MB’s Party Program Writing Committee in 2007”.102 Rafik Habib is now the Deputy of the Freedom and Justice Party’s president.

Unease relationship between the Al Wasat Party and the MB continued until now. Al Wasat Party accused the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) of violating electoral laws which state that parties must stop their propaganda campaigns two days before the voting-day. In one of the TV programs, Sultan said, “Brotherhood is suffering from moral decay and should address this problem”103.

102 A’ssam Sultan, Ibid.
103 This was in reaction to FJP violations to electoral laws, see Al Qahira al Youm Tv program video, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nKqA5QdG_u8 (accessed January 2, 2012). Also in …., “Sultan: Al Ikhwan Ywaghoon al Nakhben men khareg al Legan” [Sultan: Brothers Manipulates Voters outside Electoral Rooms], Al Youm al Sab’a, November 29, 2011.
Al Wasat’s program has open discourse regarding the political rights of Copts and women. The party declared that it has no problem with nominating a female Coptic candidate for presidency. Party founders incorporated ideas of Selim al A’wa, Fahmy Huwaidy, Tarik al Bishry, and Muhammed Emara about citizenship, and shari’a application. The party’s program instills elements of Islam in western political structures.\textsuperscript{104} Al Wasat’ stance towards shari’a application is not different from the FJP’s current program; both accepted the second article of the Egyptian constitution and believe Islam provides guiding principles and details should be open for interpretations. Women’s role in Al Wasat is still not that much significant.\textsuperscript{105} The inclusive democratic nature of Al Wasat is apparent at the level of membership that is open to all diverse segments of the society. This character is not applicable in Brothers’ context. For Abou al A’la Mady, “membership in the Muslim Brotherhood depends on your religion; all members should be Muslims, not only ordinary Muslims but religious ones”\textsuperscript{106}.

The Shura Council and the Guidance Office Elections

Another crisis or a hidden dispute between the reformist and the organizational (Qutbian) stream emerged in 2008 under the leadership of Mahdi A’kef. The organizational stream led by Mahmoud Ezzat refused to promote A’ssam al A’rian for the Guidance Office’s membership after the death of Muhammed Halal. For Muhammed Habib, A’rian had the right to be automatically promoted for the Guidance Office because he was the least loser in the last complementary Office election. There are previous incidents for that with the promotion of Mahmoud Ezzat and Khairt al Shater after the death of Ibrahim Sharf and Ahmed al Malt in 1995. Mahmoud Ezzat and other hard-line 15 members were against this legal interpretation. They justified their stance by the fact that the last election was a partial complementary one, and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Stacher, 100, 43-48, 92.
\item Stacher, 99.
\item Ibid, 89.
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five members of the Guidance office were in jail at the time of election. Thus, it would be better to conduct a new election for the whole Office.\textsuperscript{107} Mahdi Akef, the Supreme Guide at that time, declared he was not going to stay in office for a second term. This was a sign of Akef’s dissatisfaction with the opposition against Al A’rian. In reaction to this declaration, some of the Shura Council’s members issued the idea of distributing a survey about the timing of the Shura Council election that would be in charge of electing the coming Guidance Office’s members and the Supreme Guide. According to Muhammed Habib, the survey was phrased in a sneaky way to rush for conducting elections before the end of A’kef’s term. Instead of having two options: to conduct the elections now, or to delay it till the end of the term; the survey had three options. The first one was to rush for conducting election, the second was to conduct it after six months, and the third was to hold it after one year. Voices for delaying elections were divided between the second two options, and the first one got the majority of vote. The Shura Council and the Guidance Office’s elections witnessed the victory of the organizational stream. Al A’rian who got only 40% of the vote in the last Guidance Office got 96% of votes in this election and finally assumed a place in the Guidance Office.\textsuperscript{108} Muhammed Badi’e was elected as the Supreme Guide in January 2010, with two Qutbian assistants: Mahmood Ezzat, and Gom’a Amin. The newly elected Guidance Office practiced strict measures for promotion and discipline within the movement. This was described as “kidnapping” the movement by its conservative wing.\textsuperscript{109} Actually, Muhammed Habib was expected to be the Supreme Guide, but he was not even

\textsuperscript{107} Abd al Mon’iem Mahmoud, “Gadal fe Gam’at al Ilkwan hwl Tas’aed Al A’rian” [Controversy over Promoting Al A’rian],\textit{ Al Dostor}, September 24, 2009. The Guidance Office is the highest political body in the movement, and it consists of 21 personnel elected by the Shura Council.

\textsuperscript{108} According to Muhammed Shams, one of the founders of the Al Tayar al Masry Party, the big difference in results reflects how MB’s members’ attitudes and choices are manipulated or directed. There was a tendency among the upper administrative ranks to have A’rian in the Guidance office after the controversy that emerged over nominating him in 2008. An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, February 7, 2012.

\textsuperscript{109} Tamam, 2011, 38.
elected for the Guidance Office membership. The Supreme Guidance election was excessively contested and gained the public attention due to debates over its legality.

Ibrahim al Z’afarany, one of the 1970s generation’s calibers and ex-member of the Shura Council in Alexandria, refused how the Current Supreme Guide was elected in 2010. Al Z’afarany, in collaboration with other MB’s legalists, lodged an appeal against election. He wrote a memo including violations to bylaws. Firstly, Al Z’afarany rejected the idea of conducting a survey over a legal issue. This would open the way to impose a certain opinion regardless of bylaws and written regulations. Secondly, there was no legal justification to change the time of Guidance Office election. Rushing for election before July 2010 did not allow enough time to assure fair elections. Everything was done in only two days. The database of voters, voting papers, timing, and all details were prepared without notifying the supervising electoral committee. This impulsive process did not give the chance for some calibers to be ready; at the end, they were excluded. Thirdly, the ex-Guidance Office changed the numerical composition of the Guidance Office. The Shura Council was supposed to elect only fourteen members from Egypt and two members from MB’s international branches. The voting papers let members choose 16 members, and a new article was added to keep the membership of members who were in jail at that time. This meant that twenty members were in the Guidance Office: eighteen from Egypt, and two from abroad. Fourthly, the election was a “passing-vote” type, meaning that the electoral committee should go to every member and get his vote. 86 members out of 105 members in the Shura Council had the chance to vote, meaning that 19 members were excluded, which severely affected the result of election. Furthermore, the electoral supervisory committee did not declare the statistics of valid, invalid votes and absences.\footnote{Ibrahim al Z’afarany, “Mozkara Kanonya Tat’an fe Antkhabat Al Ikhwan wa Totalbha bel E’ada”[Legal Memo for Muslim Brotherhood Elections and Asking for Repetition], Islamyoon Net, January 2, 2010.} Al Z’farany concluded that
the last election was legally invalid, and must be repeated. It results in the domination of one trend over the movement. He also asked for the establishment of a small committee of 20 members from the Shura Council to evaluate and supervise the performance of this Guidance Office. Mahdi A’kef underestimated the value of Al Z’afarany allegations and he said if anyone had evidences that the election was fraud; he should feel free to go to the court. Of course, this is non-sense because the MB has no legal status and is not under the legal supervision of state institutions.

For Al Z’farany, the Brothers do not follow corrupt ways to change the result of any elections; however, leaders may influence results through implicitly supporting one candidate and defaming the reputation of another one, or spreading inflammatory information about his opinions. Reformist figures within the movement were publically engaged and busy in many civil activities; this gave the chance for certain organizational figures to spread their dominance within the movement, and establish bonds of support with other members from the Shura Council.111

Hamid al Dafruy described the last election as fraud. He confirmed Al Z’afarany’s critique. Furthermore, Al Dafruy added that he had lodged an appeal against the result of the 2005 election, and it was ignored. Hence, how can those, who were not fairly elected in 2005, monitor the 2009 election, and how can they judge over appeals against their legal legitimacy? There was not enough time to have a neutral committee to supervise elections, and as a result, Al Z’afarany, Gamal Heshmat, and Helmy al Gazar refused to be part of this committee. This undermined the creditability of the committee. In addition, members of this supervisory electoral

committee were at the same time candidates for the Guidance Office.\footnote{Hamid al Dafry, “Hata La Tade’a a’l Moasasya: Mazal Ta’any a’la Al Intkhabat Kamen wa Hazhe Tafseelo”[My Appeal Against Election’s Results, and Here are Details], Islamyoon Net, January 1, 2010.} Al Dafry wrote a memo with all these violations to Mahdi A’kef, and he suggested forming a committee of MB international leaders including Yusuf al Karadawy, Rashid al Ghanoushi, Faisal al Mulawy, and Kamal al Hilbawy to investigate the issue.\footnote{Sharl al Masry, “Muzakret al Kaidy al Ikhwany Hamid al Dafry”[Hamid al Dafry’s Memo], Al Masry al Youm, November 11, 2009. Sobhy Abd al Salam, “Kaidy Ikhwany Youtalib A’kef ba al Tahkik fe Tazwir Intkhabat al Ikhwani”[A Muslim Brotherhood’s Calibre Asking A’kef to Investigate Malappractices in Election], Al Badil, November 10, 2009.}

Abd al Mon’iem Abou al Fotouh, asserted, “The period 2008-2010 witnessed many violations to the movement’s bylaws. The organizational group had no interest in nominating Al A’rian for the Guidance Office. They raised this legal debate over his nomination, though there were no legal barriers for that. According to the movement’s bylaws, Al A’rian had the right to join the Office after the death of Muhammed Hilal without conducting new election. Mahdi A’kef rushed for the last Guidance Office and the Shura Council elections to make sure it was going to be under his supervision. The goal was to exclude Muhammed Habib, nothing more. The last election was not fair, and no one considered lodged appeals. Furthermore, three articles were added to the movement’s bylaws through the “passing-vote” approach. This is legally unacceptable; bylaws should not be modified through the “passing-vote” system. Muhammed Habib and I rejected this method and Habib submitted a memo for that. We believed there should be enough time for discussions and debates before approving new changes. I introduced the first new approved article before the last Guidance Bureau elections, but its content was distorted. I issued that those who spent more than 8 years in the membership of the Guidance Office should not be nominated again for the coming election and this article to be applied retroactively. I insisted that the article should be ex post facto law, and to make sure this is clear, I added the names of old members who should not run for the next election. The article was distorted and its
retroactive nature was disabled. They said that it is going to be applied for members of the Bureau starting from the coming elections, meaning that they can be nominated for two extra terms to meet the criterion of spending 8 years in office. The second article was to let members in jail enjoy the membership of the Guidance Office, nevertheless there is another article that states that members who would miss three meetings are expelled. The reason for adopting this article was to maintain the membership of Khairt al Shater who was in jail at that time. The third introduced article has a ruralization impact on the composition of the Shura Council. The percentage of each governorate’s presentation in the council has been modified in favor of rural ones. The number of Cairo’s representatives has been minimized, and representatives of other rural governorates like Mansoura, and Dakhlia were increased. This gives the chance for many disqualified conservative members who are detached from the politics of the city to be more present compared with other knowledgeable members who have a religiously and a politically open discourse. The motive behind these changes and violations was to exclude those who have different opinions and conflicting ideas. They used laws and values as a cloak for personal goals”.

Recent Dismissals and Resignations

After the revolution, Al Z’afarany resigned in a reaction to ignoring his legal appeal against the result of the election and the movement’s stance from members who joined other political parties and not the FJP. He also rejected the way leaders of the FJP were chosen from the Shura Council of the MB. Al Z’afarany with Muhammed Habib established the Renaissance (Al Nahda) Party after the revolution. The party has a very open discourse that goes

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114 An interview with Abou al Fotouh by the author, Cairo, Egypt. February 6, 2012.
115 Al Z’afarany’s written resignation was published in Eman Abd al Mon’iem, “ Nas Astkalet Ibrahim al Z’afarany ba’ad 45 sana Khadma fe al Ikhwan”[Al Z’afarany’s Resignation: After 45 Years Serving the Muslim Brotherhood] , Al Dostor Al Asly, April 2, 2011.
beyond ideological cleavages. It represents itself as the Egyptian version of the Renaissance Party in Tunisia. The membership of the party is based on two criteria: 1) A good reputation, 2) and a motivation to serve society. Al Nahda Party is still an elitist one with no popular base. There are ongoing attempts to integrate it with Al Tayar al Masry or Al Wasat party, according to Al Z’afarany. For Muhammed al Kassas, one of the founders of the Al Tayar al Masry, “Al Nahda Party is still reluctant to join either Al Wasat or us. They are still unable to decide over their ideological base.”

Haithm Abou Khalil, one of the movement’s leaders in Alexandria and the chairman of Victims’ Center of Human Rights, resigned from the movement few days after attending the MB’s youth conference on March 2011. Abou Khalil submitted a written resignation including eleven reasons. He stated that his resignation is a reaction to a hidden agreement between the movement and Omar Sulieman during January 25 revolution. Based on this agreement, the movement will be allowed to establish its political party and in return, it will not support the revolution. Abou Khalil mentioned the names of MB’s members who attended the meeting as well as its timing. He also pointed out other issues like the fraudulent legal base of the last Supreme Guidance and the Shura Council’s elections, the movement’s arrangements with the

117 A telephone call with Ibrahim al Z’afarany by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 14.
118 An interview with Muhammed al Kassas by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012.
119 The meeting was between S’aad al Katatny (the Head of the Parliament, and ex- Guidance Office’s member) and Muhammed Morsy (ex- Guidance Office’s member and Head of the FJP), and Omar Sulieman. Then there was another public meeting with Sulieman on February 6, 2011 without the consent of the Shura Council. Abou al Fotouh deplored this second meeting in a video and stated that the movement till now did not understand it is a true revolution. Also, Abou al Fotouh did not know about the first secret meeting and he renounced it at the Shura meeting on February 10, 2011. Haitham Abou Khalil, “ Khairt al Shater al Moftara a’lihe wa al Moffiry A’lina” [Khairt al Shater, the Opressed, Who is Opressing Us], Facebook.com, March 21, 2012, http://www.facebook.com/notes%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AB%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%8A%D9%86%D8%A7/-331834273532477 (accessed March 21, 2012).
security apparatus over the 2005 parliamentary election\(^{120}\), and the rigid exclusive nature of the decision making process. Abou Khalil concluded that the movement is dismissing its Crème de la crème, and the promotion process is established on loyalty to MB rather than loyalty to the ummah (Muslim Community) and Egypt. The movement’s Guidance Office neither rejected nor commented on what Abou Khalil said.\(^{121}\) Abou Khalil also criticized nominating Al Katatny to be the President of the People’s Assembly. He justified his critique by the fact that Al Katatny lacks any legal background compared with other MB’s members in the parliament like A’ssam al A’rian. This is was seen by Abou Khalil as an indicator of how promotion is established on loyalty rather than merit.

Abou al Fotouh was expelled from the movement after his declaration to run for presidency.\(^{122}\) The MB took aggressive measures against members who supported him. For instance, the movement conducted an investigation with 40 members from al Bhira governorates who attended and organized an *Iftar* for Abou al Fotouh in Ramdan. The Brothers’ administrative office in Al Bihra accused those members of violating the movement’s bylaws which stated not to support Abou al Fotouh. Among those members were Mustafa Raslan who is a board member in the FJP.\(^{123}\) Muhammed Bad’ie, the current Supreme Guide, justified the

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\(^{120}\) Mahdi Akef, Khairt al Shater, and Muhammed Habib agreed with the security bodies to nominate only 150 MB’s candidates and to leave certain electoral districts for the National Democratic Party. The goal of this deal was to ease international criticism on Mubarak’s regime, and in return avoid military trials of a number of MB’s members. The MB achieved victory in the first round, and the regime was threatened by their popularity. Al Shater was asked by security figures to convince some members to withdraw from elections. He ran negotiations with candidates without the consent of other MB’s members who refused such an action. Al Shater failed in fulfilling his promise and, in return, he was military tried after the Azhar student’s martial act in 2006, Ibid. Also, in 2009, A’kef confessed in one of his newspapers interviews the details of this deal. Al Malegy, 270-271.

\(^{121}\) Sha’aban Hadia, “Istkalet Haithm abou Khalil men Gam’at al Ikhwam al Muslmin”[Haithm Abou Khalil’s Resignation from the Muslim Brotherhood], *Al Youm al Sab’a*, March 31, 2011.

\(^{122}\) Abou al Fotouh said that “ running for presidency office does not violate the movement’s bylaws; I was ready to resign from MB. The movement’s stance against me would be justified if I belong to the FJP which is not the case”, ........, Al Jazeera.net, "Al Ikhwan Touhel 40 men Kaydtha ll Tahkik Bsabab Iftar Abou al Fotouh"[Muslim Brotherhood Conducted Investigation with 40 Members Who Attended Abou al Fotouh’s Iftar], *Al Shorouk*, September 18, 2011.

\(^{123}\) ........, ” Al Ikhwan Touhel 40 men Kaydtha ll Tahkik Bsabab Iftar Abou al Fotouh”[Muslim Brotherhood Conducted Investigation with 40 Members Who Attended Abou al Fotouh’s Iftar], *Al Shorouk*, September 18, 2011.
movement’s stance towards Abou al Fotouh by saying that “Abou al Fotouh broke his pledge to God”, and we told him that the movement is ready to support him as a candidate for the Doctors’ Syndicate but he refused.\textsuperscript{124} Khairt al Shater, the deputy of the Supreme Guide, said that “who is going to vote for Abo al Fotouh is sinful”. At that time, the MB’s leadership declared that it is better for the movement and Egypt not to nominate any of its members to this position.\textsuperscript{125} The Guidance Office also announced it is going to dismiss any member who would vote for Abou al Fotouh or support his electoral campaign. Farid Abd al Khaliq concluded that he supported the movement’s decision not to nominate any MB’s figures for presidency; nevertheless, he believed what happened with Abou al Fotouh was harsh.\textsuperscript{126}

Later on, on March 2012, voices in the Shura Council called for nominating Khairt al Shater for presidency.\textsuperscript{127} This was a contradictory stance to the MB’s early position. In reaction to this new stance, a number of MB’s young members organized a demonstration to express their dissatisfaction with this newly introduced idea and MB’s decision to expel Abou al Fotouh’s supporters.\textsuperscript{128} Mahdi A’kef commented on this demonstration by saying that it had no value and the movement acts according to settled rules and regulations. Mahmoud Hussain, the MB


\textsuperscript{125} Muslim Brotherhood understands western sensitivity towards political Islam movements. However, MB is currently sharing power with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. MB has the majority in both parliamentary bodies; Brothers control most syndicates and are planning to have a strong say in the coming municipal elections. Also, the movement and FJP will also support a presidential candidate who has Islamic Background. Thus, MB is a key player in the current political formula, and not supporting presidential candidate is not a decisive element to ease western skepticism about the future of political Islam in Egypt.\textsuperscript{126} An interview with Farid Abd al Khaliq by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 12, 2011.

\textsuperscript{127} Ahmed Abd al Halim, “ Al Ikhwan Tmnah Forsa Akhera la Mashro’a al Shater Raysan”[Muslim Brotherhood Gives the Last Opportunity for Al Shater’s Presidential Nomination], \textit{Al Shorouk}, March 20, 2012.

\textsuperscript{128} Hamdi Dabash and others, “ Shabab al Ikhwan Yankasmon hawl Tarshih Al Shater ll Rasa”[Muslim Brotherhood Youth are Divided Over Nominating Al Shater for Presidency], \textit{Al Masr al Youm}, March 22, 2012.
Secretary General, said those protestors were no more than 15 persons and they did not belong to MB’s ranks.\textsuperscript{129}

On March 31, the MB’s Shura Council declared its nomination for Khairt al Shater. The decision was not publically welcomed because the movement leadership, including Muhammed Bad’ie (the Supreme Guide), Khairt al Shater (the MB’s presidential candidate) and Mahmoud Ghozlan (Guidance Office’s member), broke its pledge.\textsuperscript{130} The decision of nomination was declared by the Guidance Office, and this was actually against the result of voting in the FJP that refused the suggestion of nominating Khairt al Shater.\textsuperscript{131} This let some activists sarcastically describe the MB’s Shura Council as the political wing of the FJP and not vice versa.\textsuperscript{132} The MB’s decision to nominate Al Shater was a reaction to the SCAF refusal to withdraw the confidence from Al Ganzoury’s government.\textsuperscript{133} The nature of relationship between the military establishment and MB is not clear yet. There are different interpretations for the nomination of Al Shater and whether it is the start of an antagonistic relationship or if the nomination was based on certain political arrangement.\textsuperscript{134} The MB did not apologize for its decision of expelling Abou al Fotouh, 


\textsuperscript{130} Doha al Gendy, “A’am men al Wa’ad al Ikhwany: Lan Nokadem Morshahan Il Rasa”[A year after Muslim Brotherhood’s Pledge: We are not Going to Nominate Anyone for Presidency], \textit{Al Shorouk}, April 2, 2012.

\textsuperscript{131} 81% of FJP Board Committee refused nominating Al Shater. Muhammed Morsy, the FJP president, declared that the party’s opinion is consultancy. Abd al Halim, March 20, 2012.

\textsuperscript{132} See the debate over MB and party politics in chapter II.

\textsuperscript{133} The MB’s statement criticized the SCAF threat to appeal against the constitutionality of the last parliamentary election, and the performance of Ganzoury’s government. The statement has been published on Ikhwan on Line Website, March 24, 2012, \url{http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=212&ArtID=104341} (accessed April 3, 2012). In reaction to this notice, the SCAF published another statement in which it clearly refused MB’s allegations and implicitly referred to 1954 events. This was considered as the start of a rising tidal of hostility between both sides.

\textsuperscript{134} Hany al Wazery, “ Kamal al Hilbawy: Sabry Nafaz m’aa al Gam’a wa Tarshih al Shater ba el Atfak m’aa al A’skary”[Kamal al Hilbawy: I am Impatient with Muslim Brotherhood and Nominating Al Shater was Based on Arrangements with the Military Institution], \textit{Al Masry al Youm}, April 1, 2012. It is evident that the MB leadership’s dispute with Abou al Fotouh was not only due to violations of regulations and bylaws. Abou al Fotouh expressed out ideas about the legality of the movement, and necessity of transparency regarding decision-making mechanisms and financial records. Abou al Fotouh was also against establishing a political party for MB. Those ideas let MB’s leadership thinks that Abou al Fotouh is not loyal enough to the movement, and may take decisions that are against its interest. Mohy al Zayt, who is a member in MB’s Shura Council, concluded that Abou al Fotouh believes MB has no legal status; Thus, He may put Brothers in prisons as Nasser. Mohy al Zayt, “Lamaza lam Yd’am al Ikhwan Ayan men al Morashhen al Islamyeen”[Why Brothers did not Support Any of the Islamic Candidates], \url{YouTube.com}, April 9, 2012, \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=peZY1D0vmBU} (accessed April 18, 2012).
and did not approach him for nomination. The MB decision of nominating Al Shater increased the level of dissent within the movement; a number of old, middle age and young members resigned. Other political forces, who found that MB is trying to monopolize power through assuring majority in the parliament, and the Founding Committee of Constitution’s Writing, and nominating a president, negatively received the decision. The decision raised questions about double standards towards members; Al Shater who agreed on dismissing Abou al Fotouh was nominated to be MB’s presidential candidate. The Shura Council handled three meetings to discuss the issue and voting over nominating one of the MB’s members was repeated to push for nominating Al Shater. The Council also rushed for its last meeting with no declared reasons for that. In addition, the new position reflects the role played by businessmen in the movement. Al Shater, MB’s millionaire, will run MB’s political project in resemblance to the role of NDP businessmen in Egypt’s political life. On April 17, the Presidential Electoral Committee excluded Al Shater from the presidential race. In reaction to that, the movement nominated the FJP’s president Muhammed Morsy. Morsy has humble political experience compared with other MB’s figures. He was appointed in the Guidance Office, and his political experience just started with his nomination to be the head of the MB’s parliamentary group in 2000. Haithm Abou Khalik described Morsy’s nomination as the blurred shadow of Al Shater. He also added that it is the same scenario of Valdmire Putin and Demirty Medvedev in Russia.

136 The constitutional Assembly, that is in charge of drafting the constitution, has been criticized by liberal, secular, and other moderate Islamist voices for the lack adequate criteria of representation, and the domination of Islamists. It seems that the MB and FJP did not recognize the rationale behind such a critique. Sondos Assem one of the FJP members, in her meetings with the White House Officials, concluded that “We believe there is a dire attempt to hinder efforts of the constitutional assembly because its success would mean that we are on the right track, that the democracy is working and government is changing”. William Wane, “Muslim Brotherhood Officials Aim to Promote Moderate Image in Washington Visit”, The Washington Post, April 4, 2012.
137 see research conclusion, page 137-138.
138 Haithm Abou Khalil, “Merci a’la Morsy”[Thank You for Nominating Morsy], April 16, 2012, FaceBook.com, http://www.facebook.com/notes%20/D9%87%20/D9%8A%20/AB%20/D9%85-%20/D8%20/A8%20/D9%88%20/AE%20/D9%84%20/D9%84%20/D9%84%20/D8%A7-
2.4 CONCLUSION

The generational interaction between the 1970s generation and the MB’s leadership raises a number of crucial issues about the future of political Islam in Egypt. The first issue is the relationship between the religious discourse and politics. The MB is a dogmatic movement with a reform project derived from Islam as a system of knowledge. Both generational units in the movement do not advocate a secular perspective for politics, but the use of religion is presented differently in their discourses. The MB’s leadership uses religion to justify its stances and maintain its solidarity. The MB’s leadership draws an analogy between Islam and the Muslim ummah, and the movement’s decisions. Prophet traditions about allegiance and obedience have been used to criticize rebellious members. Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him) said: “One who found in his Amir (leader) something which he disliked should hold his patience, for one who separated from the main body of the Muslims even to the extent of a hand-span and then he died; he would belong to the days of Jahiliyyah”. This hadith was mainly for war leaders, not for other Islamic groups’ leaderships, however, MB’s leaders kept using it to give a compulsory flavor to their orders. Actually, this discourse contradicts with Hassan al Banna’s traditions which viewed MB as a Muslim community among other faithful groups and its interpretations of Islam is not the only valid truthful one. Thus, those who are adopting different point of view should not perceived as enemies or a potential threat to the Muslim d’awa, and should not be perceived as ones living in Jahiliyyah.

The relationship between the MB’s dogmatic religious discourse and political activities is very critical regarding the future trajectory of the movement. Al Wasat party founders and the newly resigned 1970s members advocated a separation between the movement’s socioreligious...
grassroots organization and party politics. Al Z’afarany and Aboul al Fotouh criticized the organic relationship between the MB and the FJP. It is better for the movement to be involved in politics as a pressure group for diverse political parties. Attaching the movement to certain political party would undermine the movement’s missionary activities and reform goals. Hassan al Banna advocated a similar approach; he supported Al Wafd party at the beginning, and later on he turned MB’s support to the National Party.139

The difference between the MB and the wasat generation’s discourse at the political and organizational level is not yet apparent. MB publicizes itself as a moderate political force that respects laws and human rights. The only clear difference between its political program and Al Wasat party is women’s and Copts’ right to run for presidency. It also should be noted that Al Wasat spent 15 years to get a legal approval. During this period, founders had the chance to draft detailed socioeconomic and political program compared with other newly established parties.140 However, still what truly differentiates Al Wasat party is its split from the MB’s administrative realm, and statements of Al Wasat figures regarding certain political incidents. Al Wasat introduced itself as an Ikhwan- alternative or an anti Ikhwan, rather than a unique Islamic project.141 The FJP program incorporates concepts of democracy, pluralism, and human rights. The concept of Shura has been written beside the concept of democracy, between brackets, as if they are synonymous. The FJP did not yet clarify its intellectual position regarding these conceptions, but there still no obvious differences between them and Al Wasat’s political

140 Details of Al Wasat program has been drafted and introduced in Rafik Habib, Awrak Hizb al Wasat [Al Wasat’s Party Papers](Cairo: 1996), 22-102. See also, Abou al A’la Mady, Rouyat Al Wasat [Al Wasat Party’s Vision](Cairo: Al Shorouk International, 2005), 63-68.
141 Al Wasat figures’ harsh critique for the MB’s performance and internal dynamics undermined its popularity among many MB’s members, and made many of them hesitant to join Al Wasat. An interview with Ismail al Alexandrani by the author, Cairo, Egypt, November 20, 2011. Muhammed Shams emphasized the same issue; he also criticized Al Wasat internal organization for being so traditional and bureaucratic. Al Wasat failed in attracting supporters along 15 years. This did not encourage many MB’s members to join it after the revolution. An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 7, 2012.
discourse. Al Nahda’s political project, on the other side, is still in the process of preparation without a strong presence in the political and public sphere.

It can be argued that Al Wasat is incapable of designing a solid democratic organization. On March 3, nine members of Al Wasat cadres resigned in reaction to the last internal election within the party. They described the first internal organization election as fraud. They also deplored the promotion process within the party for its reliance on loyalty to founders rather than merit criteria. Al Wasat’s members and parliamentary candidates’ opinions were ignored regarding electoral campaigns. Despite this internal resent, the party conducted an internal election for which presidential candidate should the party support, and it was abided by its members’ preference. Based on this internal democratic vote, the party shifted its strategy from supporting Selim al A’wa, the intellectual guidance or the God father of Al Wasat, to Abd al Mon’iem abou al Fotouh who gained 63% of members’ vote. This position was surprising to many due to the influential role Al A’wa played in the early years of establishing Al Wasat. The FJP and Muslim Brotherhood, on the contrary, did not conduct such a vote in spite of internal dissent of nominating one of MB’s ranks to presidency. This indicates how Al Wasat managed a relatively democratic structure compared with MB.

The MB is still unable to resolve the problematic nature of its relationship with the FJP. Spokesmen from the FJP and the Guidance Office emphasized a separate financial and administrative relationship between the movement and the party, nevertheless the political link between the two partners is apparent. MB’s members participated in electoral campaigns and the

142 Tarik al Malt, Al Wasat Party’s media spokesman, denied receiving any resignations from members. The resignation has been published by one of the members’ Facebook page, but it was not confirmed if it was officially submitted to the party or not. However, the official submission does not overlook internal resent form the party’s performance. Gehad al Shebiny, “Astkalit 9 men Kaidat al Wasat Ahtgagan a’la al Shalalia” [The Resignation of 9 Members from Al Wasat Party in Opposition to Clique Politics], March 3, 2012, http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2012/march/3/asd.aspx?ref=extraclip (accessed March 21, 2012).
MB’s banners were used to support the party. Young children affiliated to the movement’s religious activities were used as publicity for candidates. On January 14, the Shura Council delegated the Guidance Office to coordinate with the FJP over managing the transitional process. Young and resigned elder members perceived such an action with cynicism, as Board members and leaders of the FJP were chosen by the movement’s Shura Council rather than being elected by the party’s founders. Muhammed Morsy was nominated as the chairman, Al A’rian as the deputy and S’aad al Katatny became the Secretary General. Al A’rain’s revolutionary attitudes were contained in the party structure, and despite his political experience, the party nominated Al Katatny to be the President of the Parliament.

Most of Al Wasat’s members criticized the dominance of secrecy and the culture of obedience within the movement. According to Sultan, the interest of the movement is at times prioritized over the interest of the nation and Islam itself. Al Z’afarany also asserted that loyalty should be to the state first not to the organization of the movement. The organization is part of the state and not vice versa.

In reaction to recent confrontations between the movement’s members and protestors heading towards the parliament, Hamid al Dafrauy criticized having a security cordon of young

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144 Violations for the electoral law by the MB, how the movement’s resources were used by the FJP, and critique of ex and affiliated members for the movement’s stances, and performance were documented by the Facebook page “Do not Debate or Argue You Are Ikhwan”, available on, http://www.facebook.com/pages/%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%89/203236909698465 (accessed January 21, 2012).
145 "Shura al Ikhwan Yufawed Maktab al Irshad Il Tafawed m’a al Hurya wa Al A’dala"[Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council Delegates the Guidance Office to Negotiate with the Freedom and Justice Party], Tahrirnews, January 14, 2012.
147 "Ikhwan Masr Yurashhon al Katatny la Rasat Al Parlaman”[Brothers in Egypt Nominates Al Katatny to be the President of the Parliament], CNN, January 17, 2012, http://arabic.cnn.com/2012/egypt.2011/1/17/katatni.parl/index.html (accessed January 22, 2012). It should be noted that Al Katatny, Morsy, and Ghozlan are among members with close relationship with the Supreme Guide (Bad’ie), and his deputy (Khairt al Shater).
MB’s members around the parliament. He criticized the culture of absolute obedience in the movement and lack of self-critique.\textsuperscript{149} In addition, he refused the movement’s statement about the issue, and he concluded that protestors were peaceful, did not attack the parliament, and MB’s members were not in the demonstration as one of the young Brothers said. For Al Dafrauy, this incident is an indicator for spreading the seeds of despotism in the movement, and lack of openness towards other forces. Tharwat al Kharabawy’s book, From the Heart of the Muslim Brotherhood, provided two reflective examples about the culture of obedience: 1) An investigation was conducted on Amr al Talawy, one of the MB’s leaders in Cairo, when he refused to obey the leadership’s order of voting for Mustafa Mashhour in one of the 1980s Shura Council election, 2) Fawzy al Gazar was dismissed from the MB because of his wife’s critique of one of the political statements of Mustafa Mashhour.\textsuperscript{150}

In his autobiography, Abd al Satar al Malegy concluded that there were measures to exclude 1970s members who share open religious and political discourse. The 1970s members were excluded from running Student Sections in the MB, and were sent to work in Syndicates. The MB’s leadership recognized the salient role of the Student section in shaping rank and file members’ consciousness. Hence, there was urgent need to control this section by loyal members who share leadership’s modes of thought. The leadership started collecting information about all MB’s calibers and their intellectual and political orientation. This was discovered in 1992 after the security attack on Salasabil Electronics Company owned by Khairt al Shater, and Hassan Malek. This database was supposed to be used for categorizing members and assessing their

\textsuperscript{149} Young Brothers established a cordon around the parliament to protect the parliament from protestors. This led to confrontations between both sides. MB issued a statement criticizing some political forces who called for attacking parliamentary members. The MB declared that the withdrawal of the SCAF would result in a security vacuum and chaos. The movement also asked the SCAF and the Ministry of Justice to release the information they have about individuals and groups who received foreign funding and trainings. Muslim Brotherhood, “Bayan men Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Bkhosos Ahdas Magles al Sha’ab” [A Statement from the Muslim Brotherhood Regarding the Parliament’s Incident], Ikhwan online, http://ikhwanonline.com/Article.aspx?artid=100478&secid=212 (accessed February 10, 2012).

\textsuperscript{150} Al Kharabawy, 96-97.
loyalty to Mustafa Mashhour’s leadership. In 1995, many of 1970s active syndicates’ calibers were military tried; MB’s leadership instrumentally used that to replace those members with other conservative calibers with a strong loyalty to leadership’s discourse. Appointments were based on loyalty rather than expertise. Those newly appointed members were in charge of financial and administrative mismanagement, which negatively affected MB’s image among syndicates’ members.\footnote{Al Malegy, 222-223, 219.}

The January 25 Revolution brought many of al wasat generation’s concerns to the surface. The movement is pressured to legalize its status, and to provide regular records about its financial resources, and administrative dynamics, nevertheless, this is not achieved till this moment. Abou al Fotouh concluded that the major obstacle that is facing the movement is \textit{legality}. There should be a legal framework for its activities. The movement leadership should accept the existing legal framework and being part of it; later on, they would have the right to advocate further changes within existing organizing laws.\footnote{An interview with Abou al Fotouh by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 6, 2012.} The movement would not be able to justify any of its previous stances by security coercion or harassment. Women should be presented in upper administrative ranks; measures of accountability and promotion should be clearly set and applied. The exclusive nature of the decision-making process within the movement should be addressed, with more representation for youth and women. The Shura Council’s delegated authorities are still limited and heads of the MB’s administrative sections are not presented. Al Z’farany said that “there should be a separation of power within the movement. The Guidance Office authorities should be limited and there should be a body for legislation and
another for accountability. The last Guidance Office’s elections violated many bylaws and there are no channels to address electoral appeals and monitor elections by a neutral body.

The FJP’s criteria of promotion and tools of ideological indoctrination are still confusing. The FJP came from the womb of the MB whose members and influential figures are the backbone of the party. Recruitment is based on the religiosity of members; 75% of MB’s members joined the movement only for religious purposes. The popular base of the FJP is attached to MB’s members, and other Muslim Egyptians; it is not clear how the FJP would be able to recruit Christians, what are the adopted tools of indoctrination, and would Christians be able to assume high ranks in the party? It seems that the MB did not take the required measures over these issues. It is also unclear how the movement would assure consistency between its religious discourse, moral claims, and the FJP’s political agenda, and how it would react towards political pluralism within the party.

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153 Ibrahim al Z’afarany quoted in Eman abd al Mon’iem, Ibid.
154 Khalil A’nani, Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Shaykhoka Tosar’a al Zaman [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against Time](Cairo: Al Shorouk International, 2007), 75.
155 Ibid, 132.
Chapter III: THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD YOUTH AND THE CONCURRENT GENERATIONAL GAP

3.1 INTRODUCTION

“They overdo everything”, Aristotle.

The current generational gap between young Brothers and the movement’s leadership conflates to a significant extent with preceding generational interactions. They share common concerns, ideas, and perceptions towards the MB and political reform. Muslim Brotherhood youth refers to young members who are at their 20s and 30s. They do not present a homogenous or a monolithic generational unit, but rather diverse intellectual trends. Some of MB youth do not have clear political and ideological orientations; they share religious conservative discourse, and reflect high level of organizational discipline. Other young members are ideologically open, reflecting a post structural and ideological mode of thought established on diverse sources of knowledge.

The ongoing generational interaction is more acute, revealing and criticizing many issues about the ideological makeup of the movement, internal structure, reasons of existence, and positions towards the state. This young generation has been in contact with liberals and leftists; they worked with human rights organizations, diverse NGOs, and recognized the importance of collaboration with other political voices. They are inclined to learn from various experiences especially the AKP’s experience in Turkey and the current open discourse of Al Nahda Party in Tunisia. Many of them are well educated and open to western ideologies and political experiences. The consciousness of many active young MB’s members has been shaped by writings of contemporary Muslim thinkers including Yusuf al Karadawy, Muhammed Emara, Rashid al Ghanoushi, Khales al Galby, Fahmy Huwaidy, Malek Ben Naby, Abd Allah al Nafisy, and Tarik al Bishry.
The intensity of communication over the internet, through Facebook, Twitter, and virtual groups, allowed them to share ideas, express feelings, navigate other ideologies, and coordinate with other political activists from different ideological walks. Young Brothers are calling for an open and flexible religious discourse that addresses the needs of modern society. They are demanding inclusive decision-making process, merit based standards of promotion, higher level of transparency about the movement’s administrative and financial internal dynamics.\textsuperscript{156}

The January 25 revolution was a critical point to manifests young generation’s dissatisfaction institutionally through the establishment of the Egyptian Current Party (Al Tayar al Masry). Mustafa al Naggar who was one of MB’s bloggers is currently one of the founders of the Justice Party (Al A’dl). Others joined civil apolitical initiatives, and kept declaring their disappointment with the movement’s political decisions after the revolution.

The ongoing generational interaction between young members and MB’s leadership is introducing a broad map of issues ranging from educational curriculums to the movement’s political role and future structure. This chapter tries to highlight the map of issues over which this generational interaction is taking place. It sheds light on shared critique and ideas among young Brothers for the movement’s future discourse and structural reform.

\textbf{3.2 SURROUNDING CONTEXT}

The current generation suffered the most from the deliberaizatation political policies of Mubarak’s regime. The economic context characterized by high cost of living due to indirect taxes, high prices of intermediate and consumers’ goods, and high interest rate. Unemployment was estimated by 25-30\% and poverty rate is about 40\%.\textsuperscript{157} The neo liberal policies of the state


\textsuperscript{157} Nadia Ramsis Farah, \textit{Egypt's Political Economy Power Relations in Development} (Cairo: American University Press, 2009), 31-45.
resulted in the boom NGOs and charity associations as a compensation to well off segments. Islamists penetrated different societal levels through these socioeconomic activities that have a religious cloak.

This active Islamic presence resulted in a high level of societal religiosity that apparently expressed itself in the public and economic sphere since the early 1990s. The number of private and state controlled mosques, and preachers increased. The market of religious publications, dress codes, cassettes, and leisure flourished as well. Religious symbols and expressions infused the public sphere through greetings, fashion, TV and radio programs, songs, and educational curriculums.\textsuperscript{158}

 Actually, the conservative societal religiosity was the outcome of the failure of militant Islamism and security repression to moderate Islamists. Islamists shifted their project from the Islamization of the state to ethical commitment and global injustices. They shifted the strategy from “frontal attack” to the “war of positions”.\textsuperscript{159} Personal piety was not only obvious among Muslims; Christians also showed a high level of religiosity. Religious cassettes, Christian symbols, and icons became apparent in the public sphere, and many Christians NGOs that provide services based on sectarian standards flourished.\textsuperscript{160}

 The religious discourse became no more associated with Azharie sheikhs since the late 1990s. Young and middle age lay preachers with shaven beards and elegant suits became a main source of reference for many young Egyptians. Amr Khalid, Mo’az Mas’aoud, Mustafa Hosni, and Khalid al Gendy were among those well known religious and spiritual figures. The discourse of those preachers is designed to meet the needs of upper and middle class who seek for ethical

\textsuperscript{158} Bayet, 32-48.
\textsuperscript{159} According to Asef Bayet, this means Islamists shifted the strategy from assuming power through direct confrontation with the state to a gradual reform project at the political, moral and socioeconomic level. Bayet, p 136.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid, 148-151.
salvation without political obligations. A’mr Khalid\textsuperscript{161}, the most known and beloved preacher for large segments of youth in Egypt, provided an open religious and spiritual discourse that focused on personal piety and societal activism. Khalid’s discourse conciliates power and wealth with religious piety.\textsuperscript{162} In parallel, the Salafist discourse found its way to Egyptian publics through religious publications, TV conservative satellite channels like Al Nas (The People), and Al Hikma (The Wisdom) channel. The Salafist discourse is apparent among urban poor segments, whilst other poor and rural sectors are engaged in Sufi orders, and religious folk practices such as \textit{mulid}.\textsuperscript{163} Personal piety actively manifested itself in charity and socioeconomic activities that absorbed the energy and anxiety of many young people.

The conservative religious tone is a reaction to intellectual stagnation. Enlightened Islamic ideas introduced by Tarik al Bishry, Selim al A’wa, and Yusuf al Karadawy remain at the margin shared by few intellectual circles. The intellectual life has been characterized by cultural nativism, and narrow-minded perspective of social reality. Journalism, artistic life, books’ production witnessed degeneration compared with the richness of the intellectual life during the 1930s. Intellectual discourse points out the lack of confidence and courage to modify and exchange ideas. Conspiracy theory is used as an explanatory framework for most failures and shortcomings. This cultural nativism uses the veil of authenticity to justify its discourse and attack on other cultures.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{161} Amr Khalid is an example of a nick tied preacher with civil educational background. Khalid’s discourse was designed to address the ethical and spiritual needs of affluent classes in Egypt. He provided very simple moral messages that avoided controversial religious debates and issuing fatwa. His lessons were publicized on TV satellite channels, where he maintained face-to-face interactions with females and males without gender segregation. He also initiated many societal and cultural activities under the umbrella of Life Makers (Sona’a al Haya) initiative.
\textsuperscript{163} Bayet, 150.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 174-180.
Despite the anti-intellectualism spirit, Egypt witnessed a strong political and social activism since the late 1990s. The coordination between political forces for one cause started by the Egyptian Popular Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) in 2000, and later on the Egyptian Anti-Globalization Group and the National Campaign Against the War on Iraq, and the Committee of the Defense of Workers’ Right. New pressure and protest groups emerged within all institutions including the Popular Campaign for Change, the Youth for Change, the Women for Democracy, the Journalists for Change, the Workers for Change, the College Faculty for Change, the Street is Ours, the March 9 Movement, the National Alliance for Reform and Change, and other groups.\textsuperscript{165} The most two important loose movements were Kifya (Enough) in 2004, and April 6\textsuperscript{th} in 2008. Kifya was a rage scream against the deteriorating economic conditions, police violations, corruption, and engineered succession of power to Gamal Mubarak. Both groups, Kifya and April 6\textsuperscript{th} organized a number of demonstrations asking people to overcome their fears and go to streets. April 6\textsuperscript{th} movement organized two major strikes in 2008, and 2009. Members of those diversified pressure groups came from different ideological and political backgrounds.

From March to May 2005, the MB organized a number of demonstrations against constitutional amendments\textsuperscript{166} and emergence law. Later on, the movement gave up its critical discourse and demonstrations against the regime. There were different interpretations to this position; among those interpretations is a hidden agreement between the regime and the MB. According to this deal, MB would stop protesting, supporting other movements like Kifya, and in return MB’s prisoners would be released, and the government would introduce a number of

\textsuperscript{165} Rabab El Mahdi, Enough! Egypt's Quest for Democracy, \textit{Comparative Political Studies} 42, no. 8 (2009), http://cps.sagepub.com/content/42/8/1011 (accessed February 27, 2012).

\textsuperscript{166} In 2005, Mubarak’s regime issued a constitutional amendment to article 76 to allow for multicandidate presidential election. New amendments were actually designed to maintain the power of NDP and assure a legal smooth succession of power after the death of Mubarak.
political reforms. Based on that, MB participated in the 2005 parliamentary election and was able for the first time in its history to assure 20% of parliamentary seats. It was clear that the MB’s leadership is ready to bargain and accept certain political compromises with the regime; even if this would be at the expenses of street political activism.\textsuperscript{167} In addition, 2005 witnessed the establishment of the “Free/Shadow Student Unions” in reaction to the fraud Students Unions’ elections in public universities.

Furthermore, the public sphere witnessed the release of new mediums and channels, for expressing opinions, and circulating news, including independent newspapers like Al Masry al Youm in 2004, Al Dostur in 2005, and diverse private TV satellite channels. In parallel, there has been strong virtual activism through blogging activities, Facebook groups, You tube, and chatting rooms. These mediums provided spaces for sharing ideas, circulating news, and documenting state violations.\textsuperscript{168} Facebook groups and You Tube have been used as tools of mobilization and documentation. The role of social media was undeniable during the January 25 revolution.\textsuperscript{169} “We Are All Khalid Said/ Kolana Khalid Said” Facebook group launched the first call for demonstrations on January 25. Young Brothers were active players in calling for demonstrations in collaboration with other political forces including April 6\textsuperscript{th}, Kifya, National Association for Change, leftist Youth, young members of Al Ghad Party (The Tomorrow Party), and the Democratic Front Party, and The Christian Youth Front. Young politicized Brothers were in daily interactions with other political forces through their blogging activities, experiences with student unions, and involvement in many diverse pressure and protest groups.

\textsuperscript{167} Khalil A’nani, \textit{Al Ikhwan al Muslmin Shykhoka Tosar’a al Zaman} [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against Time](Cairo: Al Shorouk International, 2007), 222-229.
\textsuperscript{168} Marc Lynch, Ibid.
Brothers’ coordination with other political forces was manifested during the revolution through the establishment of the Youth Revolution Coalition.170

By the step down of Mubarak from power, new phase in the Egyptian history emerged. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces assumed power until the election of a new president. The post revolutionary scene witnessed the rising political power of Islamists, particularly MB and other Salafist Parties and groups. The FJP assured 47% of People Assembly seats and 60% in the second parliamentary body (The Shura Council).171 The Al Wasat party assured only 10 seats. Al Tayar al Masry participated through independent candidates with other political parties, forming together “The Revolution Continues Coalition”. The Coalition achieved a victory of only nine seats, due to limited financial resources, shortage of man power, low profile for revolutionaries among Egyptian masses and defamation campaigns, and temporal suspension for electoral campaigns during Muhammed Mahmoud bloody confrontations.172

The post revolutionary phase witnessed a number of bloody incidents between protestors, and the army and police forces. Bloody confrontations included Israeli embassy protest on September 12, 2011, Maspero on October 9, 2011, Mohammed Mahmoud Street on November 2011, and February 2012, Al-Qasr El-Einy and the Cabinet on December 2011. Resent voices against military rule soared after these bloody events, virginity tests for 27 female protestors on March 2011, and the continuity of military trials for civilians until January 2012. The transitional phase pointed out a mix of political openness and repression. A fair parliamentary election was held, despite few violations regarding propaganda and electoral campaigns, and many forces


were able to establish their political parties including MB, and Salafists. Repression was indicated in attacks on peaceful protestors, military trials for civilians, slow approach for power transfer, defamation for certain political figures, media men, and political groups, intimidation of human rights organizations.173

The political scene has been characterized by the polarization between Islamists and other secular groups. This polarization expressed itself in the debate over the constitutional declaration on March 2011, current political calls for writing the constitution after the presidential election, and the political formation of the Constitutional Writing Committee. Most political forces resent current military rule with different degrees. The MB expressed conciliatory tone towards SCAF violations. The main strong Islamist protest was against the Supra Constitutional document planned by the prime minister deputy Al Selmy in February 2011. The document proposed special political and economic status for the military without being accountable to other state political bodies. Al Selmy’s document was an indicator for the bottom-line that Islamist would accept regarding the future status of the Army in the political game. However, MB and the FJP did not strongly criticize military trials, virginity tests, Maspero incident, and refused to participate in a number of protests since May 27, 2011.

The dynamic political context since the late 1990s shaped the political consciousness of many young Brothers. Their political participation in the revolution and other political initiatives changed their perception towards the role of the MB, ideological make up and political stances. However, other young members’ consciousness was highly influenced by stagnant Salafist discourse in Egypt. They remained trapped in the cage of MB’s educational narrowed curriculums and socioreligious activities.

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3.3 DESCRIPTION

Muslim Brotherhood Bloggers

Blogging activities were mostly dominated by liberal and leftist voices. In 2006, young Brothers joined the virtual space sparking new generational gap in MB’s history. Brothers used this platform to reveal state’s human rights violations, and the military trials of the movement’s members. Later on, blogs turned into spaces for self-critique, and sharing ideas. The first MB blogging campaign addressed the trials of Al Azhar students who participated in martial act in 2006. Young Brothers launched a website to support and spread information about their case called “Yala Talba” (Come On, Students). Later on, the website started to address students’ problems in general. This initiative encouraged other blogs to emerge like “Ensaa” (Forget), “I Am Ikhwan” (Ana Ikhwan) and “It Does Not matter” (Yalla Mesh Mohem).

Brothers’ Blogging activities went through three stages: 1) Exploration; it was a response to the domination of blogging activities by leftist and liberals. It started with the blogs of “I am Ikhwan” by Abd al Mon’iem Mahmoud, “Whatever, It Does Not Matter” by Magdy S’aad. They addressed diverse issues about Egyptian politics, and MB’s internal dynamics, using Arabic language. This stage was salient in breaking stereotypes about Brothers as conservative cogs in the machine of Brotherhood. Brothers expressed an open religious and a postmodern culture. They shared their favorite movies, songs, and wrote freely about their personal life and dreams. 2) Civil Resistance; it was mainly devoted to Brothers’ military trials in 2007. Among prominent blogs at this stage was “Forget” which provided news about military trials. Children of arrested Brothers’ leaders, Khairt al Shater, Anas Malek, and A’ssam al A’rian, launched their own blogs to support their fathers’ cause and spread news about their military trials. Brothers’ bloggers practiced online journalism, and were active in virtual forums, posting comments, and videos on
YouTube. 3) Self Criticism; it relied heavily on critical contributions by Mustafa al Naggar, Magdy S’ad, Mahmoud Abd al Mon’iem, Abd al Rahman Ayyash, Muhammed Hamza, and Abd al Rahman Rashwan on MB’s discourse and political positions.\footnote{A’nani, 2008, Ibid. see also, Marc Lynch, Ibid.} Critical posts introduced a new culture to the MB’s community; many other members who preferred secrecy and developing internal channels of communication did not appreciate this new tradition.

Bloggers’ critique addressed diverse issues. Mustafa al Naggar’s blog “Waves in a Sea of Change” criticized standards of promotion within the movement and how it relies on mentors’ approval rather than merit based standards. Al Naggar split from the MB in 2007. He was against arrangements between the movement and security apparatus before the 2005 parliamentary election. He pointed out that the promotion process is not established on personal qualities, experience, and skills; the movement does not adopt the democratic procedures of selection, and no one is allowed to run for a position through an electoral campaign or a well defined program. This is implicitly interpreted as seeking for personal gains. This culture is religiously justified by the prophet tradition: “By Allah, we do not appoint to this position one who asks for it nor anyone who is covetous for the same”. Based on that, no one nominates himself; all duty-paying members are candidates and voters at the same time. They write the name of the person they want to choose, and the one who gets the majority is elected even if he does not want to serve in this position. The major weakness of this system is that selection is never based on merit but rather on organizational discipline within the movement. Mentors of the educational section determine who are loyal to the movement and who are not, based on obedience to decisions. They can recommend someone who would gain the support of other members, whilst others are on the black list regardless of their qualifications. He criticized the idea of emotional detachment and Muslim vanguard that dominated MB’s educational discourse. For Al Naggar, MB’s
discourse is established on the idea of *Ostaziat al A’lam*; they believe in their superiority to other paradigms and cultures. This prevents any kind of fruitful interaction with other ideologies and intellectual discourses. He concluded that the goal of dominating the world should change to coexistence and cooperation with other cultures.175

Al Naggar’s blog documented all critical writings about the movement and published them on his blog. His insights addressed the dominance of emotional loyalty and culture of obedience. He refused mixing religious discourse with politics to achieve certain political gains at time of elections. He criticized nominating popular religious Sheikhs in the 2005 parliamentary election with no prior political experience. He shed light on the exclusive nature of the decision making process, and how file and rank members are excluded from playing any active role.

Abd al Rahman Mansour and Abd al Rahman Ayyash, two young MB’s active bloggers, also described the process of promotion as an outdated. Any MB’s member should get the approval of an elder member (mentor) to be nominated for a higher position. Nomination, here, is not established on merit but rather on loyalty to the leadership; rebellious members or those with different opinions most probably would be excluded.176

The blog “Waves in the Sea of Change” published a brief research by Mos’ab Rageb about the 2010 Guidance Office elections. The study summarized legal violations and many shared critical ideas to the MB. I will use Rageb’s piece as a model to reflect many of those shared concerns.

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175 A telephone call with Mustafa al Naggar by the author, Cairo, Egypt, March 18, 2012.
Rageb’s brief paper documented MB leaders’ opinions about last elections and compared what exactly happened in elections with MB’s written bylaws. He summarized violations in the following: 1) rushing for elections before its actual time. Bylaws state that if the Supreme Guidance would leave office before the end of his period, the position will be handed over to his deputy until the actual time of election that was supposed to be in July 2010. Thus, there was no need to rush for election. This contradicts with insisting on respecting laws and regulations when there was a need to promote Al A’rian for the Guidance Office’s membership. A’ssam al A’rian asserted that any call to rush for election is considered as a violation to bylaws even if the Shura Council approved it, 2) According to article 9 there is no legal obligation to hold the Shura Council’s election directly before electing the Supreme Guidance. The Shura members are supposed to constitute the committee that is going to supervise election, so how in this case could they be potential candidates for the Office and supervisors for election simultaneously. Based on that, Rageb recommended establishing a separate committee with detailed structure and tasks, which would supervise elections and introduce opinions regarding submitted appeals. Those who are running for the Shura’s election should not take part in this committee, 3) there was no need for electing the whole Guidance Office. Ex-members were still in their positions and did not resign before the end of their period in July 2010, 4) Conducting a survey to know members’ opinions about legal issues is legally invalid; it opens the way for violating bylaws.

Furthermore, Rageb concluded that the MB’s leadership is responsible for this preceding legal controversy. They did not publish bylaws to enlighten MB’s members until the end of the crisis. This resulted in a lot of confusion and did not allow members to develop a solid opinion about the issue. It was clear that there were efforts to exclude some members. The performance of Ikhwan Online clearly indicates how certain opinions within the movement are ignored. For
instance, Ikhwan Online did not publish Al A’rían’s popular article about the impact of security repression on the MB. The same happened with Abou al Fotouh’s published autobiography. Moreover, there are undocumented incidents about how the movement’s leadership excluded certain figures and limited their popularity among MB’s members. Examples for these incidents were unwritten orders to cancel Abou al Fotouh meetings with Brothers in Al Giza district. Inflammatory information about certain figures penetrated MB’s lower administrative levels. One of example of that information was about Al A’rian’s opinion regarding Camp David Accord, and how his opinion contradicts with the MB’s discourse. In addition, there was a notice that Muhammed Habib apologized for his opinion regarding the procedures of the last election, and this in fact did not happen.

Rageb also criticized the MB’s approach of justifying all actions rather than admitting mistakes; which resulted in contradictory statements, and increased youth dissent. The MB’s perception towards media is unjust to the media landscape in Egypt. There is a shared negative stereotype among Brothers that perceives all media channels and figures as enemies of the movement. This pushed some members to isolation; they are detached from what is written about the movement and how the other perceives them. Some members do not even read what is published for their leaders in certain newspapers. They derive most of their information from Ikhwan On line that lacks professionalism and reflects a very biased image about the MB. Thus, it is not surprising that many members adopt a very naïve and narrow-minded perception to current reality of the MB. The MB’s educational section is in charge of the emergence of a parochial culture, and the lack of awareness among members. The section did not play its expected role in enriching the political consciousness of MB’s members; even religious knowledge was mainly derived from one or few shallow, easy-read educational books. The
Quran and prophet’s traditions have been superficially employed to justify actions of leadership against members who share different point of view. Many members who lack the interest in understanding the movement’s internal dynamics, and complexity of surrounding political and socioeconomic context supported the dominance of this sort of oversimplified discourse.

The lack of openness and awareness about diverse opinions from outside the MB enhances the presence of blind trust and absolute obedience to leadership. Obedience to leaders is justified by the analogy of the father and son relationship. However, this kind of paternalism is not germane to social movements where members share equally all rights and obligations. Adding to that, trust and obedience should not be instrumentally used to neglect accountability and transparency. Trust and obedience are the tenth and ninth pillars of allegiance in the MB; however, the leadership should fulfill the other eight requirements to be obeyed by members. Public critique should not be perceived as a threat; rather it is the base of corrective measures, and one of the ways of assuring sustainability. Rageb concluded that MB should overlook the discourse of tribulation, and always being the victim for the regime and its media channels. The educational section should design new curriculums that cherish diversity, and appreciate a new reading of the Egyptian social and political reality.

Magdy S’aad’s blog, It Does Not Matter, addressed three main issues: 1) the human side of MB that managed to break stereotypes about Brothers as superman, or aliens, 2) MB’s internal dynamics, activities, and membership, 3) self-critique including the cultural of obedience, the inappropriateness of “Islam is the solution” slogan, and the women minor role in the decision


making process”. S’aad also criticized leaders for not supporting students against security repressions and harassment in Ain Shams and the Azhar University. Though S’aad is one of the known critical bloggers, he described some MB’s activists and bloggers as being arrogant and unable to communicate with other rank and file members who do not have the same level of political consciousness.

The leadership’s stance on the blogging phenomenon differed over time. At the beginning, the leadership underestimated the impact of these virtual activities on the movement’s solidarity and public image. By mid 2007, bloggers activities gained a momentum and media attention, and the leadership recognized their significance on the MB’s internal coherence. Muhammed Morsy, the Head of the Political Department in MB at the time, managed meetings with bloggers to discuss their critique. It was apparent that, the MB’s leadership became more cautious about its decisions and their influence on the movement’s young members. Reformist MB’s leaders at that time believed that the movement should benefit from young members’ activism. Al Z’farany wrote on his blog that this trend should be encouraged. Abou al Fotouh also asserted that young Brothers should play an influential role in the decision-making process, and be presented in the movement’s bureaus. In addition, Mahdi Akef and A’sam al A’rian supported opening channels of dialogue with young bloggers. Al A’rian said that “they have the right to speak out even if they are going to challenge leaders. However, he continued saying “At the end, if they will stay with the group then they will have to accept what the majority wants!”

179 An interview with Magdy S’aad by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 18, 2012.
180 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Mayton, “Young Egyptian Bloggers Seek a More Democratic Muslim Brotherhood”.
January 25 Revolution and Brothers’ Political Performance

The January 25 revolution broke the psychological barrier of fear, and secrecy. The MB witnessed a number of resignations and dismissals among its young members and bloggers whose dissatisfaction with the movement’s political performance continues to soar. Most politicized young Brothers participated in the first day of the revolution. The leadership did not refuse the participation of its members but its stance was not to be officially present. When the government accused the movement of political instability, the Guidance Office declared the participation of the movement on Friday January 28. The Brothers’ participation was a key element in giving momentum to the revolution and pressuring Mubarak to step down.

According to Muhammed al Kassas, “MB’s youth were present on the first day of the revolution. We continued coordination with other political forces and developed what has been known as “The Youth Revolution Coalition”. We informed the Guidance Office about these updates. The Office did not mind because the leadership did not have enough information about what was going on. They asked us to take all required measures in this regard. The leadership was not yet convinced it was going to be a revolution and true change would happen. Members of the Coalition informed the Office of all events during the first 18 days of the revolution, and MB like other political forces participated. The coalition’s relationship with MB continued this way until February 11. Later on, there was a debate over preserving the status and presence of MB youth in the Coalition. After ongoing dialogues and debates with the Guidance Office, we agreed to be present in the Coalition even if the movement would not officially support its decisions. On April 1, the movement did not participate in one of the demonstrations, though they did not notify us or declare this stance. We agreed that even if the MB would not participate; they should not declare that. The dispute emerged over Friday May 27 protest. We
called for “Anti Corruption” demonstrations on May 27. There was a parallel call under the slogan of “The Constitution First”. The Coalition held a conference and we declared that we were not for the second call, and we thought this was an irrational demand. Despite our stance from the second call, we were attacked by the movement’s leadership that described the protest as an attempt to drive a wedge between the military and people. Then we were shocked, when the Secretary General of MB declared, on Saturday May 28, “we do not have any representatives in the Youth Revolution Coalition”\textsuperscript{184}.

Disappointment with the movement’s political performance became acute after the establishment of the FJP. The Shura Council, rather than party’s founders, chose board members and leaders of the FJP. Ahmed Abou Zekry, one of the participants in Brothers’ youth conference, said, “This is not the way civilized parties are established”. Muhammed Akel added, “I was shocked to know this announcement; this implies that MB’s leaders do not see the founding members as qualified enough”\textsuperscript{185}. This was an indicator of maintaining an organic relationship between the movement and the FJP. Al A’rian justified this action by the fact that the party did not have enough time to make election; they were rushed to prepare for parliamentary electoral campaigns. He added that founder members of Al Wasat and the Democratic Front appointed themselves as the new leaders without elections; this election is temporal and FJP members can ask for another election later on.\textsuperscript{186} In fact, this election did not take place till now.

After the establishment of the FJP, another debate emerged over the slogan to use in parliamentary election. The Supreme Electoral Committee considered the slogan, “Islam is the

\textsuperscript{184} An interview with Muhammed al Kasa by the author, Cairo, Egypt, february 1, 2012.
\textsuperscript{185} Hanan Solayman, “Muslim Brotherhood’s Young Members Dismayed at new Leadership Appointments”, \textit{Daily News Egypt}, May 4, 2011.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.
Solution” (Islam Hwa al Hal), as an unconstitutional one. The FJP refrained from using the slogan in its electoral campaigns, and replaced it with “We Have the Good for Egypt”. Young Brothers criticized the “Islam Hwa al Hal” slogan during the 2005 parliamentary election. Magdy S’aad was an advocate for developing another slogan. He suggested using the slogan of “Egypt for Egyptians”. For, Muahmmed al Kassas, “the slogan was appropriate during 1980s where Brothers needed to emphasize their ideological background. I was against perceiving this slogan as a sacred one; the movement easily changed it after the revolution. Hence, there was no need to appear so attached to it. In 2005, the student section in the movement innovated the slogan of “We Have the Good for Egypt”, and it has been used by some parliamentary candidates under the campaign of “Reformers”\textsuperscript{187}. The rationale behind that was to build a wider coalition among other forces, and not be imprisoned in the cage of using religious slogans.

On January 14, 2012, the Shura Council delegated the Guidance Office to coordinate with the FJP over managing the transitional period in Egypt\textsuperscript{188}. Young members perceived such an action with cynicism, because FJP founders and leaders were already influential members in MB’s Shura Council. The movement’s Guidance Office members and party leaders kept announcing that there is a financial and administrative separation between the MB and the FJP, but direct observation to elections’ banners and campaigns proved how the FJP is using the movement’s resources, banners to publicize for itself. This reflects the inability of the movement to set clear lines between the movement’s socioreligious activities, financial resources, and its political party.

\textsuperscript{187} An interview with Muhammed al Kassas by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012.
\textsuperscript{188} ……, “Shoura al Ikhwan Youfawed al Irshad ll Tashawer m’aa al Houria wa al A’dala ba Shan al Fatra al Intkalia”[Muslim Brotherhood’s Shura Council Delegates the Guidance Office to Negotiate with the Freedom and Justice Party over Managing the Interim Period], Al Dostor, January 14, 2012.
Another debatable issue is the MB’s lenient stance on the SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Forces) human rights violations and slow approach of running the interim period. Muhammed Morsy declared the FJP’s respect of the time line issued by the SCAF for power transfer. The FJP and MB did not support political demands that asked the SCAF to leave power on April 2012, and write the constitution after the military withdrawal from the political scene. In one of its statements, MB affirmed that the withdrawal of the SCAF would result in a vacuum of power and accused other political groups of pushing for chaos. The Supreme Guidance Office did not take strong actions against violent attacks on civilian Copts in Maspero on November 9, 2011. There were also no critical voices from Brothers against virginity tests, and military trials for civilians. The strong criticism of the SCAF was when the Prime Minister Deputy, Ali al Selmy, introduced a Supra Constitutional document. They organized a protest against the document on Friday, November 11, 2011. The Guidance Office also refused to participate in demonstrations after Muhammed Mahmoud violent confrontations with the army and police forces. The leadership perceived these violent escalations as a conspiracy to hinder parliamentary election. The Brothers refused to suspend their electoral campaigns in reaction to the killing of a number of civilians during these confrontations.

Young Brothers dissented from many of MB’s leaders and FJP members’ statements about the Supreme Armed Forces Council (SCAF), and the role of the military in the revolution. Mahmoud Ghozlan, a member in the Guidance Office and the MB’s spokesman, accepted giving

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189 “......., " Al Houria wa al A’dala Yo’alen Tamsko ba Khartit al Tarik Alty A’inha Al Magles Al A’skary"[The Freedom and Justice Party Declares Its Commitment to the Time Line Announced by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces], Al Shorouk, February 5, 2012. It should be noted that the MB and the FJP supported the Constitutional Declaration on March 2011. According to the declaration, the constitution writing should precede the presidential election.

190 For two MB’s male members, “the stance of MB not to participate in the protest after Muhammed Mahmoud’s confrontations is not right from an ethical and humanistic perspective. At the political level, this is a pragmatic decision. The MB should have a control over the parliament; this would limit the political power of the army”, An interview with two MB’s members at Tahrir Square by the author, Cairo, Egypt, November 20, 2011.

immunity to SCAF members. Ghozlan said that immunity would be through the consent of martyrs’ families after rewarding them. Sobhy Saleh, the FJP parliamentary member, stated that the role of the military should be honored in the first anniversary of the revolution. He described that as an obligation in return for the military efforts and respect to the transitional constitutional declaration. The FJP and MB supported Al Ganzoury’s government. Muhammed Badi’e, the Supreme Deputy, described Ganzoury’s government as a good choice. He also added that the issue is not about Ganzoury or the name of the Prime Minister but rather the delegated authorities he enjoys. Muhammed Morsy, the head of the FJP, said that the party had no problem with Al Ganzoury’s government and they were ready to cooperate with it. The MB’s and the FJP’s support to Ganzoury’s government waned after the tragic massacre in Port Said that resulted in the death of over 70 football fans on February 2, 2012. Khairt al Shater, the Supreme Guidance Deputy, declared the readiness of the FJP to form a coalition government with other political parties.

The Guidance Office refused to participate in the November 25, 2011 protest after Muhammed Mahmoud confrontations. Ikhwan Online, the official website of the movement,

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192 A phone call for Ghozlan on Al Hakika’s TV program, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wQ-ibJ1gHpY&feature=related (accessed January 31, 2012). Ghozlan’s statement raised controversy among MB ranks; he later on retracted these statements about military immunity, and said that there should be an end for the military rule in Egypt, and power should be transferred to a civilian elected president. He justified his previous statements about immunity by saying that this would encourage top military rulers to step down without the fear from punishment. Leila Fadel, “Brotherhood Floats Immunity for Generals in Post-Mubarak Egypt”, The Washington Post, January 12, 2012.


194 Al Ganzoury was appointed after Muhammed Mahmoud’s confrontations by the SCAF on November 25, 2011. He was a Prime Minister during Mubarak’s regime from 1996-1999.

195 Ghada Muhammed al Shrief, “ Badi’e rafdna Nzool al Tahrir Man’an ll Fitna wa Damirna Mortah”[Bad’ie: We Refused Going to Tahrir to Prevent Disorder, and We are Morally Comfortable with this Decision], Al Masry al Youm, November 26, 2011.


called for another protest to support the Palestinian cause. Yussf al Karadawy who was supposed to participate in the Protest of Palestine refused to participate in it and renounced the MB’s stance on November demonstrations. The same scenario was repeated with the violent confrontations between protestors and the army outside the Cabinet, and again the MB refused to participate in any demonstrations against the SCAF. There has also been criticism over the FJP political lists in elections. The FJP’s list for the Shura Council in Al Gharbia governorates had one of the ex National Democratic Party members.\textsuperscript{198}

There has been a strong criticism of MB website’s content and media coverage especially after the release of the FJP newspaper. Young Brothers expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of the Ikhwan On line website. Some described the website as unprofessional, and biased. Magdy S’aad, and Arwa al Tawel criticized an article published on the website which described those who are calling for demonstrations as enemies seeking to prevent Islamists from being in power. The article accused the “Change Academy” and April 6\textsuperscript{th} movement as tools for imperialism.\textsuperscript{199}In reaction to the performance of Ikhwan On line, a group of young Brothers launched an initiative called “Ikhwan Off Line” as a media alternative to the MB’s website. The initiative criticized the website media coverage for demonstrations that did not witness Brothers’ participation.\textsuperscript{200}Some young members criticized this initiative; they perceived it as a threat to internal solidarity and the public image of the movement. They advised founders of the initiative to send their critique to higher administrative levels to be considered. Founders actually expressed their dissatisfaction with Islam On line’s performance, and demanded changing its

\textsuperscript{198} In reaction to the dissatisfaction with the FJP and MB’s leaders statements, and political stances, the Facebook group “Do not Debate and Do not Argue, You are Ikhwan” launched a campaign that is called (Hello, Guidance Office/ Allo ya Maktab al Irshad) that published the phone numbers of the Guidance Office’s members and asked members of the group to text their critique and dissatisfaction via messages. Tharwat al Kharbawy praised this campaign, and he considered it an expression of the democratic nature of Islam that encourages critical thinking. He also added that, this flow of critical ideas would play a role in reforming the movement in the long run.

\textsuperscript{199} The founder of the Change Academy, Dr Hesham al Morsy, was one of the Brothers, and many young Brothers benefited from the trainings of this academy.

\textsuperscript{200} Ikhwan Off Line website is still underconstruction.
editorial team, but all their demands were in vain. Abd el Galil al Sharnoby, the Ex-chief Editor of the website, resigned on May 2011 as result of critique on the website’s coverage of Friday’s demonstrations. Al Sharbanoy described the website’s coverage by being the MB’s perspective rather than reality.

Youth dissent with the movement’s stances was not only because of such macro issues, but the movement did not support some of its young members when they were accused of attacking the Israeli embassy in Egypt on October 2011. Ahmed Mahmoud Abd al Karim’s family, one of the movement’s members, asked the MB’s administrative office in Assiut to interfere and support his son. The movement refused to interfere because this would put it in confrontation with the SCAF. The MB also did not support any of its previously affiliated members at the time of parliamentary elections. For instance, MB supported a Salafist candidate against Mustafa al Naggar in Nasr City district.

Young Brothers’ Conferences

The gap between the inspirations of youth and leaders’ ideology was apparent in the first conference for young Brothers. The idea of the conference was firstly initiated by Muhammed Maher A’kl, Muhammed Nour el dein, and Muhammed Shams. For Shams, “the movement is suffering from organizational and ideological problems. The revolution marked the start of a new phase in the movement’s history. Thus, there was a need to consider all these problems and develop new proposals for reform. We found that many young members were dissatisfied with the movement’s discourse and performance; they had many ideas in mind and were ready to

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202 Ghada Muhammed al Shrief”Al Ikhwan Ythamoun al Gam’a bel Takhly a’n 3 A’ada O’atklo fe Ahdas al Sefara al Israelia”[The Muslim Brotherhood Gives Up its Members Who Were Detained During the Embassy Incident], Al Masry al Youm, September 16, 2011.  
203 Muhammed Gharib, “Al Naggar: Tarkt al Ikhwan Ba’ad Morg’at Fekrya, wa al Gam’a Tad’am Morshh al Salfyen Dedy”[Al Naggar: I left the Muslim Brotherhood because of an Intellectual Position and the Movement Supports the Salafist Candidate Against Me], Al Masry al Youm, November 17, 2011.
pressure for that. For instance, a group of young Brothers wanted to demonstrate in front of the Guidance Office. We thought a conference or a public platform would be a good channel to absorb and introduce some of those ideas. We had meetings with Mohy Hamid, Mahmoud Abou Zaid, and Al Katatny; also, Abd el Rahman al Bar and Muhammed Morsy attended these meetings from time to time. We suggested establishing a special committee for MB’s youth within the existing structure, which would have separate activities. This proposal was refused; nevertheless, we introduced examples for this proposal from the MB’s experience in other countries including Morocco, Malaysia, and United Kingdom. At the end of our meetings, they accepted the idea of a public conference. Our objective from the conference was not to complain against the movement, but rather to provide proposals for reform, and create a space or a platform for sharing ideas. It was supposed to be similar to hearing or feedback sessions. We also planned to have other events following the conference to discuss the movement’s ideology, broad goals, and MB’s intellectual heritage. Unfortunately, this did not happen. We started the conference’s preparations, and we held two workshops before it. One hundred and sixty members of the MB’s members attended them. The Guidance Office asked us to cooperate with MB’s members in the Coalition of Youth Revolution: Islam Lotfy, Muhammed al Kassas, and Ahmed Abdelgawad. The conference was designed around a political and administrative pillar. The political part discussed the movement’s political role and its relationship with post revolutionary party politics in Egypt. The second part focused on the internal structure and organization of the movement. We decided to hold the conference before establishing the FJP in order to discuss the pros and cons of establishing a political party. After preparing papers, the

204 It should be noted that there has been a proposal in 2009 to hold an online conference for MB’s youth to discuss controversy over the last Guidance Office’s election. Mos’aab al Gammal, one of MB’s bloggers and current members in Al Tayar al Masry Party, published a notification about the call for the conference, but it was then cancelled. Mos’aab al Gammal, “Bayan Hawl Tageal al Moatamer al Electrony la Ba’ad Shabab al Ikhwan”, Mos’aab’s Blog (Al Haya Kalma/ Life is a Word), November 25, 2009, http://www.kelmh.blogspot.com/2009/11/blog-post_25.html (accessed February 29, 2012).
Guidance Office refused to sponsor the conference; they were shocked by the content of some papers. Some papers had ideas about disintegrating the movement, and not establishing a political party. The Guidance Office asked us to cancel the conference, but we thought it was too late to take such a decision. Our initial plan for the conference was to make it public and invite some intellectuals, and other MB’s figures who were not on good terms with the current leadership. We wanted the conference to be an attempt for conciliation between the movement members, as what Al Talmasany did with dismissed members, mainly Al Ghazaly and Sayid Sabik, when he became the Supreme Guide. This did not happen as most intellectuals apologized for not attending and thought it would be better to stay away from ongoing disputes between MB’s members, so we had to apologize for not having Muahmmed Habib and Abou al Fotouh. This was in order not to let anyone think that the conference represents any front within the movement; it was just an exclusive platform for MB’s youth. The absence of the MB leadership’s support to the conference negatively affected its popularity, and undermined the possibility of running similar activities by MB’s youth. However, Helmy al Gazar, the MB leader in 6th of October district, called for another Youth Conference\textsuperscript{205}.

The first Youth Conference issued twelve recommendations, among them: 1) reconsidering the movement’s decision about dismissing its members who joined other parties, and giving members the freedom to choose among different parties, 2) establishing a legal status for the movement, 3) founders of the MB’s party should not be members in the Guidance Office, and one of them should be less than 35 years old, 3) assuring a separation between any established political party and the MB’s socioreligious activities, 4) opening direct dialogues among members of the movements at different levels in all governorates through seminars and public meetings, 5) establishing a special section for youth which would play a role in raising

\textsuperscript{205} An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012.
youth awareness, and sponsoring conferences and debates, 6) establishing a committee for evaluation in each governorate to follow up measures of MB’s reform. The Conference also asked the movement to delay the procedures of establishing a political party, and open channels of dialogue over this issue.

The conference sent a message that the legacy of secrecy is over and all issues should be open to discussion. Participants criticized the culture of secrecy, and called for transparency in the movement’s financial records and administrative dynamics. They also called for youth and Sisters’ participation in all administrative levels including the Guidance Bureau. There has been a call to revisit all educational curriculums within the movement; as there is a gap between the movement’s moral claims, educational curriculums, and its political actions. Members are told that refraining from the discourse of establishing an Islamic state and seeking the Muslim Caliphate is just a political maneuver, and not the true beliefs of the movement!

Internal dynamics and structure of the movement were at the heart of the conference’s debates. Muhammed Nour introduced a preliminary idea about changing the structure of the movement in resemblance to holding companies. In this way, MB would turn into a network of pressure groups. The MB’s organizational structure would consist of different sections or branches with separate agendas. An administrative board would be in charge of coordination among these activities. For example, there would be a separate body for syndicates, another one for youth; each of them would act as a pressure group in their field of interest. This new hierarchy would assure a bottom-up approach in the decision-making process, and avoid the centralized current administrative system within the movement. 206 There were other recommendations to adopt a matrix and networking styles of management.

206 Ibid.
Furthermore, there was a criticism on the criteria of promotion within the movement, separation of power, and composition of the Shura Council. Participants asked for the presentation of the heads of administrative sections in the council, and guaranteeing transparency for all decisions.207

The MB’s youth conference gained public attention, and the refusal of the Guidance Office to sponsor it put them in an embarrassing situation. It was interpreted by many as an internal schism, and the inability of the MB’s leadership to absorb young members’ critique and inspirations. In reaction to that, the MB’s administrative Office in 6th of October district called for another conference for MB’s youth in April 2011. The Guidance Office sponsored this conference and it was an attempt to overcome embarrassment that was associated with the first one. There was an intension to accuse the first conference’s organizers by violating their arrangements with the Guidance Office and that is why it refused to sponsor their initiative. This actually did not happen because most of those who organized the conference were from the first party organizers’ group. The conference emphasized the same recommendation as the first conference. Muhammed Morsy, the President of FJP and Ex- member in the Guidance Office, collected the names of participants to prepare a list of young rebellious members. The conference addressed the decision making process, the MB hierarchy, the culture of secrecy and the lack of transparency.208 Some participants also called for a differentiation for the types of decisions within the movement. Meaning that, there are critical decisions that all MB’s members should participate in through referendums or surveys; other technical decisions can be directed by lower


208 A telephone call with Moss’ab al Gammal by the author, Cairo, Egypt, March 17, 2012.
administrative levels to give them more autonomy and freedom of action. The conference asked for female representation in all administrative levels.209

**Culture of Obedience and Self-Critique**

According to Magdy S’aad, “the MB benefited from the political openness after the revolution, nevertheless the leadership perceived it as a threat to its internal coherence and solidarity. The revolution resulted in a high level of self-critique, and threatened the culture of obedience, soldiery, and trust. For example, the leadership considered electing anyone who is not from its members as treason. MB’s members in the Youth Revolution Coalition were dismissed on May 2011. It is ironic that, some members were dismissed for clicking “like” on one of the Facebook groups initiating a protest which the movement did not participate in. This kind of authoritarianism is one of the obstacles that are facing the movement. The MB’s indoctrination process relies heavily on oral rote learning; there are not enough spaces for creativity. The movement acts the only truthful source of knowledge; and its opinions and stances are standards for evaluating others. 210

The culture of obedience is one of the critical issues that became so evident after the revolution. According to one of the members, “I was blamed by my mentor and by other members for criticizing some of the movement’s decisions. There was a follow up to my opinions on Facebook. I was afraid to tell my mentor and other MB’s members that I did not vote for the MB’s parliamentary candidate, in order not to accuse me of treason. There is a blind trust in the Guidance Office decisions, and many mentors keep justifying all decisions even if they are not totally convinced by that. Before the revolution, there was a possibility for any MB’s


210 An interview with Magdy S’aad by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 18, 2012.
member to join other political platforms, movements, or campaigns. I was a member in the National Association for Change, and I participated in some meetings and demonstrations organized by Kefya. After the revolution, there were strict orders not to join other parties or political initiatives that are not supported by the MB. If you kept criticizing the movement’s decisions, and did not abide by them, usually you would end up on the black list of your mentor. I think this is my status right now, as they do not delegate more tasks to me.”

The written resignation of Muhammed Saiid, who joined the movement in 1986 and became one of the middle calibers, pointed out how he was asked to give up some of his opinions on Facebook. The MB conducted an investigation with him over a year and he was proved innocent, though the result of the investigation was not declared and they asked him to give up some of his critical ideas in return for that.

Muhammed al Kassas and Magdy S’aad asserted that the movement employs the tribulation or the battle discourse to justify secrecy and obedience. The fear from an external enemy or a conspiracy that would disintegrate the movement has been always present in the justification of certain decisions. Before the revolution, the state and its media channels were blamed for everything. After the revolution, the movement is creating other illusive enemies for its solidarity. Those enemies are liberal and left trends, certain intellectuals and media figures. There were orders for rank and file members not to follow articles by some writers like Belal Fadl, and A’la al Aswany, and other intellectuals like Diaa Rashwan, and A’mar Ali Hassan. The FJP newspaper launched a campaign against “The Revolutionary Socialist Group” and accused

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211 An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.
212 Mohamed Saiid, “Astkalty al Mosabab men al Ikhwa al Muslimin” [Reasons of My Resignation from the Muslim Brotherhood], Facebook.com, March 9, 2012, http://www.facebook.com/notes/mohamed-saaid/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86/390744044286888 (accessed March 21, 2012).
them of calling for chaos on the first anniversary of the revolution. Abd al Rhaman Ayyash concluded that dogmatic movements seek to create enemies to maintain their solidarity; current enemies for MB are dismissed, resigned members, and media channels. The fear from the impact of liberal and left ideas on MB’s youth is also confirmed by one of the female members who is in charge of the education section; she asserted that youth are inclined to adopt radical and revolutionary ideas that are spread under the influence of media, and this is negatively affecting the relationship of trust between them and the leadership.

The culture of obedience and trust in leaders’ political decisions is promoted by the lack of political awareness among many file and rank members. The movement recognized this problem after the 2005 parliamentary election; hence, the Political Awareness Committee was established in the same year; however, the work of the committee was not to enlighten members about MB’s internal dynamics, and history. The main task of the committee is to inform them about political issues, and the required tools to understand media implicit political messages. In 2006, Fathy Shehab and A’ssam al A’rian published a book about political education entitled “Papers in Political Education”. The book included basic political concepts like political participation, political consciousness, civil society, and types of political regimes. Generally, the book provides a shallow overview of these concepts, and it ambiguously highlights the political project of MB. It is mainly divided into four parts. The first part is about Islamic rule; it employs Qutb’s concepts about “Al Hakimyya”, and Shari’a application, without any practical detailed description for tools of implementation. The second part emphasizes the necessity of unity among Arab and Muslim countries. The third part addresses women’s rights. It concludes that

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213 An interview with Muhammed al Kassas by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012. An interview with Magdy S’aad by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 18, 2012. MB’s Facebook groups of “Nabd Ikhwan”, and “Anta A’yal Ikhwangy” published critique for those writers’ ideas.

214 An interview with MB’s female member via email by the author, Cairo, Egypt, sent in February 28, 2012.
women enjoy equal political and socioeconomic rights, except that they cannot assume presidency. The last part of the book provides a holistic reading about universal human rights, and equality among citizens to law. It also asserts that Christians cannot assume presidency, run armies, judge among Muslims regarding personal issues, and occupy any positions that are related to mobilizing public opinion. The book does not only provide a vague and brief vision to the political reform project of the MB; but Salafist conceptions and ideas are infused in its content. The book does not adopt many open intellectual ideas about pluralism, and minority rights; its emphasis on shari’a lacks practical programs.215

According to one of the female members in the MB and FJP as well, “there is trust in the Guidance Office decisions because decisions are taken in a democratic way. They are not just orders from a certain leader, but rather decisions are the outcome of a democratic process. There are ways to channel opinions to the leadership of the movement. You can write a memo not only to your direct mentor but also for the Supreme Guide. Along my experience in MB, I did not face any problems in expressing my opinion and influencing some decisions. However, this was at the lower and middle administrative levels; I do believe it is hard for file and rank members to challenge or influence MB’s public crucial decisions, such as establishing a political party, or supporting a certain political stance. There are no clear channels for internal lobbying. This is one of the obstacles that should be addressed in the coming stage. There should be certain events or channels for members to express their critique and see how certain new ideas are shared by other members.”216

215 A’nani, 2007, 82-86.
216 An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.
For one of the influential members within the MB who is currently working on the Renaissance project\textsuperscript{217}, “MB is one of the most democratic movements. I attended one of the Guidance Office meetings and there were equal chances for all members to express their own opinions. I witnessed heated debates among members; and there is rarely a consensus. At the end, the decision is the result of a majority vote. This is a true pragmatic democracy where there is no influential school of thought. It all depends on who has the vote. Members of MB should play a role in decision making through internal lobbying, but change is not easy; it would take time. Therefore, I was against holding the MB youth conference without the consent of the Guidance Office. Critique to the movement’s structure and performance should be through available channels and internal lobbying”\textsuperscript{218}.

He also asserted that it is true the promotion process is associated with age. The generational gap within the MB is obvious because most upper positions are occupied by elder members. After the revolution, there have been sure steps to present youth in high administrative levels through direct appointments. The Renaissance Project is mainly run by members who are less than 40.\textsuperscript{219}Magdy S’aad emphasized that age and seniority are a main criteria for promotion; but promotion also depends on how rebellious you are. Many members are excluded because of adopting different visions to social or political reality.\textsuperscript{220}This shared attitude is implicitly stated in the answers of one of female middle age member who is responsible for activities of the educational section. Her focus was mainly on the solidarity and organizational coherence of the movement, even if this would not satisfy some members. She elaborated that giving internal

\textsuperscript{217}The Renaissance project is a holistic project of Egypt’s reform. Khairt al Shater, the Supreme’s Guide Deputy, is supervising and planning for this project with other international and Egyptian experts. The project seeks to benefit from the experience of Singapore, Turkey, South Africa and Malaysia. It is divided into sub units including: Media, Health, Education, Public Administration, Defense, and International Relations. Nagy Abd al Aziz, “Al Ikhwan wa al Huria wa Al A’dala Youkalfan Khairt al Shater ba A’dad Mashrou’a al Nahda”[Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom and Justice Party Delegates Khairt al Shater for Preparing the Renaissance Project], \textit{Al Masry al Youm}, December 12, 2011.
\textsuperscript{218}An interview with MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.
\textsuperscript{219}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{220}An interview with Magdy S’aad by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 1, 2012.
solidarity a priority encourages members to overcome many internal problems and dissatisfaction with the promotion process within the movement’s hierarchy. Members would be ready to give up some of their convictions and accept the majority vote with the movement.\textsuperscript{221} For her, “the MB does not adopt democracy but rather shura; meaning that not all members have the right to vote and be involved in the decision making process but rather few selective qualified members who form together the Shura Council are in charge of that. Any member of MB is not supposed to ask for changing this principle or express his dissatisfaction with it, as long as he voluntarily accepted to be part of the movement. I do believe democracy would produce good and beneficial decisions; however, it has negative impact on the coherence and solidarity of the movement. It may pave the way for disintegrating the movement. However, it should be noted that, applying shura principle did not prevent MB’s leadership from conducting frequent surveys to absorb opinions of file and rank members regarding crucial issues like electoral programs. The electoral program of the Shura Council (second parliamentary body) was modified based on the results of one of those surveys\textsuperscript{222}.

The democratic nature of the movement is contested by other members. The movement has a pyramid centralized hierarchy. Elections were carried only over high and middle administrative levels. After Parliamentary elections in 2005, all administrative levels were elected due to media pressures. Decisions of the Shura Council and the Guidance Office are obligatory for all lower levels.\textsuperscript{223} The democratic nature of MB is not related to organizational design, or internal elections only but rather to the ability of members to introduce different

\textsuperscript{221} For instance, her opinion regarding nominating women for presidency contradicts with MB’s position on this issue, even though, she stated that I am ready to give up my opinion to avoid intellectual schism in the movement. she also added, MB’s intellectual position is the result of a majority vote and it reflects the opinion of one of the religious schools in Islam. Thus, it is not just the personal opinion of one of the leaders.

\textsuperscript{222} An interview with MB’s female member via email by the author, Cairo, Egypt, sent in February 28, 2012.

\textsuperscript{223} Khalil al A’nani, “ Al Ikhwan al Muslmin fe Masr: Shaykoka Tosare’a al Zaman [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against Time](Cairo: Maktabt al Shorouk al Dawlya, 2007), 96-108.
opinions and rebel against the leadership’s decisions. It is also related to the nature of promotion criteria and standards.²²⁴

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Figure 2. The Muslim Brotherhood Hierarchy.

For Muhammed Shams, “This hierarchical system is so centralized; most crucial decisions are taken by high administrative levels which are not elected by the majority of members. This kills creativity, and blocks channels of benefiting from members’ suggestions and ideas. If you have a creative proposal, it will die on its way to upper levels. The Shura Council did not have a joint meeting since 1995, and the Guidance Office practiced all authorities without being accountable to other bodies till 2008. The result of election and promotion to certain

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²²⁴ A’nani, 141.
administrative levels are manipulated through supporting some members, making them more popular, and present in public conferences, whilst excluding others, or spreading wrong information about their performance and stances. Manipulating elections’ result was clear in the last two elections of the Guidance Office. In 2006, Al A’rian lost and got only 40% of votes, in the coming election he got 96% because there was a consensus to overcome the controversy that rose about nominating him. Muhammed Habib did not get the membership of the Shura Council in the last election, though he spent 24 years in the Guidance Office!"\(^\text{225}\)

According to a written a resignation of one of the MB’s members, published on his Facebook account, “I do not play a role in the decision making process. They justify that by indirect democracy, meaning I choose the member who would choose those who take decisions. Actually, I did not choose my mentor, and my mentor did not choose his head”\(^\text{226}\).

For Abd al Rahman Ayyash, “the exclusive nature of the decision making process and the lack of bottom-up participatory tools pushed some young members to leave the MB, and join other political organizations after the revolution. In many cases, those young members did not have different ideas than their leaders; they just moved to other spaces that would absorb their personal qualities and skills”\(^\text{227}\). Others left the movement because they either have conservative religious ideas, or open liberal religious beliefs. Some also withdrew due to disagreement over certain political positions. Resignations and dismissals do not always reflect a different intellectual school of thought or a unique reform project, but rather different political and religious preferences.\(^\text{228}\)

\(^{225}\) An interview with Muhammed Shames by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012.
\(^{227}\) An interview with Abd al Rahman Ayyash by the author, Cairo, Egypt, November 11, 2011.
\(^{228}\) An interview with Ismail al Alexandrani by the author, Cairo, Egypt, November 20, 2011.
Muslim Brotherhood and Post Revolutionary Party Politics

There has been a debate among Brothers over the legal framework of the movement and its connotation with party politics in Egypt. The young Brothers’ conference discussed different legal settings that the movement may adopt regarding party politics. Muhammed Shams presented four scenarios about this issue.

The first scenario is to focus on missionary activities and support different political parties according to the moral claims and vision of the movement. The MB in this case would allow its members to join other parties according to their ideological preferences, and it would act like a pressure group. This would be in resemblance to the relationship between the Fethullah Gulen Movement and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. This scenario would assure full autonomy for the party in designing its political agenda, and would allow the movement to direct all its resources and capacity to missionary activities and societal reform.

The second scenario is to have a political party as the political wing of the movement without financial and administrative dividing lines. This scenario would fail in achieving a division of labor between the party and the movement. This is actually the scenario that is currently adopted by MB.

The third scenario is to support a political party that enjoys financial and administrative autonomy. This is similar to the relationship between the MB in Morocco and the Justice and Development Party. In this case, the movement would be responsible for the party’s actions, but not for its resources and other activities. The party is simply the political institutional manifestation of the movement’s beliefs. In this case, there is a high possibility to witness a schism between the party and the MB due to disagreements over certain political issues.
The fourth scenario is to turn the whole movement into a political party. This scenario was firstly proposed by Mamoun Al Hudaiby in the 1990s. In this case, the movement’s socioreligious activities would be part of its political agenda and propaganda.

The last scenario is to disintegrate the movement and not to establish a political party; as what happened in Qatar. According to this scenario, the vision of the movement would penetrate different NGOs, syndicates and other institutions individually through affiliated members who believe in the reform project of the MB.229

For Shams who introduced these scenarios, “I personally was against the second scenario. Establishing a political party for the movement would create a duality between MB’s moral claims and political actions. The Arab Israel conflict is a clear example of that; according to the MB’s ideology, Israel is not a legitimate state and we should support resistance by all means. This is different from the political stances of a political party that would accept a peace treaty with Israel. The movement’s discourse also expresses a strong belief in the role of the Islamic economy, though there is not an applicable project for that. The movement would develop this project along time. Therefore, there is no need to support a certain economic program for a political party; the movement can work with scholars on this vision, rather than being attached to special economic vision that contradicts with its original beliefs. I am wondering, how the movement would support and justify something that contradicts with its ideology and educational curriculums?

There are also practical problems associated with establishing a political party. Among those problems is the problem of funding. Most members financially support the movement because of its reform project rather than the political agenda of its party. So, how would the

movement be able to draw a line between financial resources for the party and the movement?
The financial separation between the movement and the party’s resources is not clear till now, given the lack of transparency, and the absence of a legal framework for MB’s activities and financial records. Furthermore, establishing a political party for the movement does not provide any objective ways to evaluate the popularity of the party. There were unwritten orders for members to join the party, even if they will not be active members. This reminds me of the fake popularity of the NDP; millions had membership, but it was a decorative one. The party in this way would not be able to rely on its internal resources and capacity. It will always rely on the power of the MB. This was clear when most calibers were from the MB. The FJP’s Board members were chosen from the Shura Council. Even the FJP’s hierarchy is similar to the MB’s
internal structure. It has a pyramid hierarchy.

![Diagram of the Freedom and Justice Party Hierarchy]

Besides this hierarchy, the party has a Council of Elders whose members do not have any administrative tasks, and are elected by the High Board for four years. It also has a technical sub hierarchy in resemblance to MB. The technical hierarchy includes special sections for women, youth, and education.\(^{230}\)

The MB is currently providing social services to serve the party political goals. Most efforts and resources are directed to political debates and problems rather than ethical and religious preaching. In the long term, the movement’s organizational structure would not bear all these activities. It is acting as a political party, pressure group, social, and spiritual organization, all together, and compensating the deteriorating role of the state. This active social and political role is problematic, given the fact that Brothers lack the culture of cooperating with other partners. A deep involvement in political activities would result in a moral vacuum or a moral bankruptcy. Based on this reading, I do believe the MB is heading towards the last scenario of turning into a political party. The leadership of the movement is actually recognizing this issue; however, they are not seeking for change. The organizational trend is dominating the movement’s leadership, and they do not have any problem with that. They focus only on internal solidarity and organizational expansion. The other possible scenario is to witness a schism between the FJP and the movement. There is a possibility that some FJP figures would lead a coup against the hegemony of MB’s leadership over the party’s agenda.

Another proposal regarding MB’s political party was introduced by Muhammed Osman who was one of the previously affiliated members and current coordinator for Abou al Fotouh’s presidential campaign. Osman did not reject the idea of establishing a political party. He suggested that 30% of the party’s founders should not be from the MB. There should a special

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231 According to one young female members, “There were orders for us to join the FJP even if we are not going to be active members. There was an emphasis on increasing the number of FJP’s members to be two millions. Since March 2011, most activities and discussions within the family focused upon political issues. This was at the expense of moral, religious, and educational activities. An interview with an MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012. Another male MB’s member confirmed that we got orders from our mentors to participate in the FJP’S electoral campaign even if we are not members”. An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, November 22, 2011.

232 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2012.
quota for women’s representation in the founding committee.\textsuperscript{233} Copts’ representation should not be less than 10%, and youth to be presented by over 30%.

According to another MB’s member, “the movement should give its members the freedom to join other political parties. Restrictions on members’ free choices negatively affected the popularity of other political parties like Al Wasat or Al Nahda. Supporting political pluralism would enrich the political scene after the revolution, and we would have the chance to truly evaluate the performance of each party and its popularity. The leadership’s justification was how could we work at the social and socioreligious level with members who share different competing political vision? I was not convinced with this justification because there is nothing wrong with diversity within the same movement.”\textsuperscript{234}

The leadership has different perceptions regarding the establishment of a political party. “We carefully examined the post revolutionary political context. The utopian model was not to establish a political party and support other ones, but Egypt is facing a turning point in its history. There was a need for a strong political force to run the state. We did not find any other strong partners whom we can rely on during such a tough period. We did not make this generalization based on political programs or statements but rather based on our knowledge about certain political figures who are running existing or emerging political parties. This entails directing all our resources, and efforts to one strong political force. We kept in mind the parochial political culture in Egypt; voters do not vote for programs but for people they know. Thus, if there is one strong political party to gain all theses votes; this will give Islamists a word

\textsuperscript{233} According to a female member in the FJP and the movement, there are 900 women out of 7000 founders in the FJP. An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.
\textsuperscript{234} An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.
in the concurrent political game. Establishing a political party for the movement was no more than a tactic and we can change it later on”\(^\text{235}\), said by one MB’s member.

The Guidance Office declared that the MB would not allow any of its members to join or establish other political parties. Young Brothers who formed the Al Tayar al Masry Party were dismissed from the movement, on July 14, 2011, because of this violation. Mos’ab al Gammal, Islam Lotfy and other dismissed members asked for a fair investigation before their dismissal, but this did not happen.\(^\text{236}\) The dismissal decision was taken by the Supreme Guide. This was an exception, since all dismissal decisions should be taken by the Shura Council. Most dismissed young Brothers were active members in the student section, and closer to administrative and regional bodies. There was fear about their potential impact on other MB’s members.\(^\text{237}\) Muhammed Shams asserted that MB’s leadership perceived them as a potential threat that should be eliminated before attracting other young members.\(^\text{238}\)

Muhammed al Kassas, Muhammed Shams, Islam Lotfy, Mos’ab Rageb, Mos’ab al Gammal, and other MB’s members established Al Tayar al Masry Party on May 2011. The party was a development for a political project that firstly expressed itself in a civil society initiative called “Free People” (Ahrar). The party still did not get an official approval from the PPC. Its planned program expresses very open discourse; Muahmmed al Kassas refuses to describe the party as an Islamic one; it is rather a centrist conservative party. Al Kassas said that adopting a religious base for the party would allow us to gain more supporters, but we refused to do so. We wanted to establish a different political project that overcomes ideological polarization, and

\(^{235}\) Ibid.


\(^{237}\) An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 20, 2011.

\(^{238}\) An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 1, 2011.
respects the Arab and Islamic cultural of the Egyptian society. Shams concluded that the religious background of most Islamic parties in Egypt is very ambiguous. Advocating Islam’s higher principles and goals (Makasid al Shari’a) is shared by all parties including liberal ones. The major challenge is turning those broad goals into detailed policies and programs; there is still no unique Islamic contribution in this regard. The party’s discourse is an organizational manifestation for Al Bishry’s notion of National Mainstream that expresses the minimal level of consciousness among different national ideological groups. The membership of the party reaffirms this philosophy via the inclusion of members who belong to different ideological backgrounds, and the harmony between its political position and other revolutionary forces such as April 6th Movement, and grass roots newly established movements including A’askar Kazboon, Makamlem, Salfio Costa, Shayfanko, and Ultras Football Groups. Al Tayer al Masry founders were motivated by overcoming the ideological polarization that emerged after the revolution between secular, loose grass roots political movements, and Islamist groups, especially after the establishment of the FJP, and the rigid political positions of Muslim Brotherhood from demonstrations since May 2011. The ideological background of party’s founders reflects a high level of ideological openness and complexity due to their prior experience in MB’s student section, human rights organizations, Youth revolution Coalition, the Union of Revolutionary Forces, and Baladna institution for civil society leadership. The Al Tayar al Masry program is designed around two main principles: associational democracy, and the establishment of a welfare state. The program is still unfinished project with no detailed practical


240 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 7, 2012.
policies. The party supported most demonstrations, and clearly resented the SCAF rule for the interim period. The lack of detailed program and participation in state decision-making bodies make it difficult to evaluate consistency in the party’s discourse and how unique its political and socioeconomic program, compared with other Islamists or secular groups. Till now, the party is a loose political platform for MB’s ex-members and other political activists.

It was surprising that Al Wasat, Al Nahda, and Al Tayar al Masry did not form one coalition during parliamentary election. Al Tayar al Masry called for a dialogue between some left calibers, The Justice Party, the Youth Revolution Coalition, Al Wasat Party, Al Nahda Party, and other intellectuals to prepare for one strong electoral coalition. The dialogue was failed, and most parties did not join it. Al Tayar al Masry later on invited the Justice Party, Al Wasat, and Al Nahda to join the Revolution Continues Coalition. Al Wasat refused because the coalition includes one liberal Party (Masr al Houria/ Egypt Freedom), and another Leftist Party (The Socialist Coalition). The Justice Party justified its refusal by its strategy to nominate only young revolutionary politicians not other parties’ calibers. The absence of coordination among those newly established parties resulted in humble electoral gains.

Muslim Brotherhood’s Gender Ideology

Magdy S’aad briefly highlights the limited role of women in the decision making process. He associated this minor role with a conservative religious perception shared by the movement’s leaders and the large majority of file and rank members. According to S’aad, “MB’s parliamentary male candidates, during 2000, and 2005 elections, were concerned about where should the female candidate set down in the parliamentary hall. They were asking should she sit

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241 Unpublished version of the program was taken from one of the party’s members in the Committee of Program’s Writing.
242 An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 7, 2012.
beside us or not, and how can she attend late meetings. This incident is very reflective on how a conservative religious discourse conditions MB’s members’ mentality.”

The role of women within the movement is highly contested after the revolution. Security repression was the main justification for women’s limited role, and lack of representation in the movement’s administrative bodies. The intellectual heritage of the movement indicates a conservative vision towards women’s political involvement. Hassan al Banna’s ideas about women’s role was elaborated in his article “Diary for the Muslim Woman” (Resalet al Mar’a al Muslima), published in 1940. Al Banna designed his perception around a biological and a sexual differentiation of roles. He advocated and prioritized the role of women in the private sphere. He was against women political participation as either a voter or a candidate. Political participation was seen as a deviation from women’s salient original role in the family. Women’s true role is to be good mothers and wives. He was against calls to encourage women joining the Bar Association, Engineering School, and being employees in the state’s apparatus. He also concluded women’s work as teachers or doctors should be according to strict measures, and sex segregation. Early Brothers also believed political discussions and debates at home would create stress and tensions in the family; it is better for women to stay away from politics. There should be special curriculums for girls and women to meet their needs of being good wives and mothers.

Despite this conservative approach to women’s role, Al Banna established a special branch for Muslim Sisters. Sisters played a major role in spreading da’awa, and enhancing MB’s popularity. He invited Zeinab al Ghazaly, who was the founder of the Islamic Female Group (IFG), to integrate the IFG in MB’s structure and to be the head of the Sisters’ branch. The first

243 An interview with Magdy S’aad by the author, Cairo, Egypt, January 1, 2012.
245 Christina Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (California: The Hoover Institution, 1964), 167-171.
assignment to Ghazaly was actually a political one; Al Banna asked her to communicate with Al Nahas pasha, and overcome the misunderstanding that emerged between them. Al Ghazaly was politically active with the MB; she criticized Nasser’s policy in the Muslim Women Magazine, and played a key role with Sayyid Qutb’s sisters in establishing the 1965 group. As a result of this role, Al Ghazlay was persecuted and spent six years in jail. In spite of her active political role, Al Ghazaly asserted that the primary role of women is to be wives and mothers. They raise men of ummah, however, they have the right to be judges, state employees, or even prime ministers. According to Jihan al Halfawy, the first MB’s parliamentary candidate, what happened to Al Ghazaly was the reason that forced MB’s leaders not to let women be so involved in politics. The conservative perception that adherents of MB hold about the political role of women in the early decades of its establishment did not face strong societal pressures or critique; women were not active players in the political and public sphere with few exceptions at that time.

This gender discourse witnessed a change due to societal pressures, and media focus on the MB’s internal dynamics, and human rights discourse. The first time the MB had a female parliamentary candidate, along its history, was in 2000. In 2005, the movement nominated Makarm al Deiry for Nasr City district. It should be noted that female candidates were the wives of known figures and calibers. Jihan al Halfawy is married to Ibrahim al Z’afarany, and Al Deiry was the widow of the MB’s secretary general Ibrahim Sharf. None of the file and rank members were nominated for that. Nominating a female member is determined according to a number of

247 Quoted in Dina Rashed, Ibid, 66.
criteria: 1) personality and qualifications of the candidate, 2) the presence of MB in this district compared with other competitors, 3) services she can provide to her district.248

Actually, the debate over supporting parliamentary female candidates was resolved in 1987; nevertheless, the movement maintained its conservative stance regarding presidency or “al walya al kobra/Imama”. This limited political role for women is accepted by MB’s females. Makarim al Deiry, a 2005 parliamentary candidate, concluded that not assuming the presidency office is in women’s interest. Heads of states are involved in decisions about wars, and details of bloody events. It would be better for women not to be exposed to such dangerous situations.249 Thus, this gendered discourse should not be perceived as male dominated doctrine; it is rather embedded in the mentality of many members regardless of their gender.

There is only one exceptional incident when Helmy al Gazar, the head of MB’s office in 6th of October district in 2010, nominated one of the MB’s Sisters to the membership of the administrative Office in 6th of October. This action was not highly welcomed by the MB’s leadership, especially Khairt al Shater, the Supreme Guide’s Deputy, who has more of a Salafist attitude.250

According to one of the female members, “Sisters are so active in the movement. They are involved in many activities ranging from charity to participation in political campaigns and elections. Sisters organized and participated in university campuses’ demonstrations. I was not convinced by security repression allegations that have been used to prevent women’s presence in lower and middle administrative levels. I thought there would not be strong threats; we still live

248 Ibid, 61.
249 Mariz Tadros, Ibid, 94. According to one of the female members, “Al Banna’ was open minded regarding women rights. Sisters within the movement enjoyed more rights compared with their current status. Sisters used to travel to other governorates to give sessions; they participated in the 1948 war, and all issues related to Sisters within the movement were managed by them not by male leaders. Al Banna asked Zeinb al Ghazaly who was not from MB’s ranks to manage the Sisterhood section within the movement. This reflected a high level of inclusion, and objective understanding to the value of expertise”. An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.
250 Unpublished lecture by Ibrahim al Houdaiby, American University in Egypt, October 24, 2011.
in a conservative society that respects women, and the security would not dare to harm them. I think women should play a more influential role in the decision making process. They should be presented in all administrative levels including the Shura Council and the Guidance Office. All Sisters’ activities should be run and administrated by women themselves not by men. I was provoked when all speakers in the Sisters’ conference, that was entitled “Women from Revolution to Renaissance” in July 201, were men. Sisters planned and prepared the agenda of the conference, and then they were not present on stage! We should speak for ourselves”251. Mustafa al Naggar also concluded that the MB’s justification of the fear from security repression is flawed. MB’s leaders allowed Sisters to actively participate in electoral campaigns; they distributed flyers, talked with people, went to homes to convince voters, and they supervised the voting process. They were exposed many times to security harassment during election times. Hence, Brothers made use of Sisters without giving them an adequate representation, and they were neither voters nor candidates for any position within the MB. A year has passed after the revolution without any crucial changes in the Sisters’ participation. Only 5 female candidates joined the parliament, because the FJP put female candidates at lower ranks in their electoral lists. Most of the chosen candidates were old females who are known for their organizational loyalty and discipline. Young critical and qualified Sisters were dismissed.252

MB’s Sisters are active members in the public sphere; they participate in many charity and welfare associations. They were also active in the virtual space with a critical tone. MB’s males did not only dominate MB’s blogging activities; Arwa al Taweel, Aya A’laa, Somaya al Sayed, Assma Yassir, Assma and Somaya Al A’rian, Tansim Radwan and Aya al Fiky, and Shams al Dein are active female bloggers. They share their personal experiences, and comment

251 An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.
252 A telephone call with Mustafa al Naggar by the author, Cairo, Egypt, March 18, 2012.
on the political dynamics in Egypt. This virtual experience was not limited to a number of MB’s females who are well educated, open to other discourses, and belong to families of certain MB’s leaders. The majority of MB’s females are religiously conservative, and they participate only in political activities organized or supported by the MB. The majority of the MB’s females did not participate in the “Egypt’s Women” protest in December 2012 that was against army attacks and human rights violations against female protestors. Manal Abou al Hassan the Head of the Women’s Committee in the FJP criticized this demonstration and accused those who organized it of being tools for western agendas.

From a different perspective, one of the female members addressed the lack of political awareness among rank and file sisters. For her, “Female mentors and members are so traditional in their approach to socioreligious activities adopted by the movement. They are not open to new ideas. I tried many times within my family to introduce new ideas but most of my proposals were resisted. I think this was due to two reasons: 1) some mentors lack required qualifications to apply new ideas, 2) they lack courage to try something new, and are afraid of failure. This is not limited to Sisters only; it is part of our current culture in Egypt. Sisters in campuses are still unable to benefit from the political openness of the revolution, and to develop different activities. In addition, blind trust and absolute obedience to leaders is so apparent among Sisters. This is justified by the lack of interest in understanding politics, and the exclusion from the decision making process within the movement. There are easy criteria and requirements for Sisters’ entry

254 Later on, Abou al Hassan denied those statements, and promised to release the record of the interview but it is not released till this moment. Regardless of these statements, the FJP and MB’s stance on demonstration was a negative one. Mona Madkour, “Aminat al Mara fe Hizb al Ikhwan: Rafdana al Mosharka fe Masirat Hrar Masr Lan al Musharkat feh Momowlat wa Ladyhom Agenda Khasa”[The Head of the Women Committee in FJP: We Refused to Participate in Egypt’s Women Demonstration because Participants were Financially Sponsored and Have Special Agenda], Al Shark al Awsat, January 14, 2012.
to MB, compared with males.\textsuperscript{255} This resulted in the admission of many unqualified Sisters who do not truly bear the culture and beliefs of MB. There are currently some indicators to enhance Sisters’ presence in MB’s organizational structure; though most taken steps are very slow”\textsuperscript{256}.

3.4 CONCLUSION

The stratified nature of the MB’s young generation is apparent compared with the al wasat generation whose members were mostly involved in syndicates and diverse civil activities. The Salafist discourse conditioned the consciousness of many young members; and some of them lacked political awareness and experience of interaction with different ideological voices. According to one MB’s member, “the influence of the young generation is still limited. The phenomenon is so urban and only among the well educated politicized members. Many of young file and rank members are not affected by what is happening and their loyalty to the movement’s leadership is not diminishing. The coherence of the movement is assured, at least in the short run, but the movement is losing its Crème de la crème”\textsuperscript{257}. For another young member, the influence of young members would be apparent after the end of the political interim period in Egypt. Many young members are in the gray area; they are justifying many of the leadership’s actions because of the current unstable political circumstances. Many of them are unsatisfied with the FJP’s performance in the parliament, the movement’s relationship with the SCAF, and their stance on presidential candidates”\textsuperscript{258}. The psychological impact of the revolution on MB’s young members is salient in this regard; if the youth were able to make Mubarak step down, why cannot they force their leaders to take required measures for reforming the movement?

\textsuperscript{255} According to one of the female members, “The strict recruitment measures of Brothers compared with Sisters have been justified by state security repression. Brothers are involved in the decision making process compared with Sisters. It would be easy for state’s intelligence bodies to penetrate the movement without such strict measures. Sisters were also excluded from leadership positions in order not to be exposed to security harassment. We believe women’s and men’s roles are complementary; men can do some activities that cannot be performed by women and vice versa”; An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 14, 2012.

\textsuperscript{256} An interview with MB’s female member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.

\textsuperscript{257} An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 7, 2011.

\textsuperscript{258} An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, February 7, 2012.
The gap between young members and MB’s leadership has been widened due to MB’s political performance after the revolution. Whilst young members took the lead in organizing demonstrations and pressuring Mubarak to step down, leaders were not truly convinced a true political change was on its way. They accepted a meeting with Omar Sulieman, Mubarak’s ex-deputy, and were not persuaded that more pressures would kick Ahmed Shafik out from the cabinet. The MB refused to participate in a number of demonstrations while its members were present in the streets and in daily face-to-face interactions with other political partners. The conciliatory tone with the SCAF made many members skeptical about leaders’ political intentions and the political future of Egypt. The leadership’s justification was always that MB is a reformist movement that adopts gradual measures, and revolution is against its ideology. According to one MB’s member, sudden changes break, and MB is not a revolutionary movement. Revolutionary changes do not fit the *milieu* of Egyptians, and we prefer maneuvering and gradual pressures with the regime.\textsuperscript{259} Actually, Hassan al Banna’s writings were not clear in this regard. He described a revolution as a *Fitna*, and in other diaries he emphasized *Greatest Jihad* against the ruler if he did not apply required reforms. Al Banna’s conviction about revolution is ambiguous; it is unclear how the regime would apply radical reforms that the MB called for without a revolution or strong pressures, and would the MB support revolution if it will turn its claims into reality or not?\textsuperscript{260} The linear gradual approach, that starts from individuals to the Muslim Caliphate, is used by many affiliated members and leaders to justify MB’s skeptical stance towards revolutionary changes. In other words, the stage of reforming the society is not yet done, so the movement should not rush for the state’s reform phase. It is surprising how some MB’s members have such strong belief in this linear approach of reform

\textsuperscript{259} An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.
that proved unjust to social reality, given the convoluted nature of development. The question here is how MB would be able to achieve the goals of revolution without pressuring the still existing old regime.

The concurrent generational gap introduces a number of questions not only about the MB’s structure or methods but about reasons of existence as well. Should MB continue as a revivalist movement or a political party? Is it possible to dissolve the movement, and search for new channels of societal reform or not? It is evident that some young members are creative enough to provide answers for these questions and adopt certain ideas for reform.

The answers of some informants in this chapter uncover many dimensions in regards to different interpretations for institutional democracy, gender, and political revolutionary tendencies within the MB. Whilst some members advocate introducing bottom-up approach for participation, and decentralization for MB’s structure; others believe in shura that is established upon an elitist approach of participation, and suppression for diversity. This narrow rigid perception towards participation is motivated by the goal of preserving solidarity and avoiding internal schisms, to the extent that one of the female members accepted giving up her opinion regarding women’s right of assuming presidency, and fearing undesired consequences of democracy.

The gender conservative approach concerning women political roles and their limits is not an exclusive expression for male domination, but rather an embedded conservative and cultural discourse regarding women political rights and active social roles.

The political revolutionary tendencies within MB are contested among young members; when some members are calling for radical stances against military rule, preserving the revivalist nature of MB; others are rationally justifying the leadership’s pragmatic relations with the SCAF,
and describing MB’s critical decisions such as establishing a political party, or supporting the demand of writing the constitution after the presidential elections as purely political tactics which the MB would change later on, regardless of their impact on the movement’s moral claims, and consistency in positions. Answers also indicate an intra generational gap that is inspired with preceding generations; the old generation sponsors and supports young groups who keep their ideas alive. They promote some young calibers, whilst exclude other circles. The leadership is incapable of responding to youth reform demands; rather than opening channels of dialogue, some young members were exposed to harsh disciplinary measures, and direct dismissals.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Muslim Brotherhood is one of the most complicated movements, where many variables, areas of analysis, and perspectives conflate, and overlap. This sort of complexity includes organizational design, intellectual schools, cognitive maps of leaders and members, regime nature, and international dynamics. This thesis pays exclusive attention to internal dynamics within the movement and the impact of schools of thought on its ideology and trajectory. In this concluding part, I shall summarize how generational gaps manifested themselves (the Qutbist-Reformist Gap), over what these gaps emerged, and continuities and discontinuities between the two consequent generational waves (1970s and current generation).

The Qutbist- Reformist Gap

The generational interactions within Muslim Brotherhood flirted itself in the intellectual gap between the reformist and organizational (Qutbian) streams. It is evident that young and reformist members are still powerless to de-authorize the dominance of the current leadership and its discourse. Diversity within the MB is suppressed through organizational disciplinary measures against rebellious members. The Promotion to positions based on loyalty to leaders paved the way for opportunistic and hypocritical. The FJP lists, for instance, included members who expressed a high level of obedience to MB’s decisions, while members who expressed different opinions like Muhammed al Beltagy, or Gamal Heshmat are marginalized in the parliament compared with other candidates.  

Actually the organizational stream consolidated its presence in MB over time since mid 1970s due to four major elements: a) the penetration of the rural culture, b) the rising tidal of Salafism, c) the lack of democratic mechanisms and a pyramid centralized structure, and d) State coercion.

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261 A telephone call with Mustafa al Naggar by the author, Cairo, Egypt, March 18, 2012.
Since the 1970s, the movement witnessed the exclusion of Al Banna’s close circles, and the penetration of Qutb’s ideas throughout the active presence of the 1965 group. The current leadership of the movement represents a mix of the religious conservative school of Salafism and the Qutbist trend. This intellectual mix undermines the revolutionary dimensions of Qutb’s ideas, and overrates other dimensions like emotional detachment, organizational coherence, tribulation, exclusive discourse, and conservative interpretations of Islam. The middle administrative cadres who joined the movement during 1980s are having more bureaucratic and organizational skills, rather than clear well-defined political orientations and preferences. Hence, the MB’s middle and upper administrative ranks have been dominated by members who share a conservative socio-political ideology, and pay most of their attention to organizational discipline.

The Salafist discourse penetrated the movement's educational curriculums, and this has been associated with increasing rural influence. Historically, Hassan al Banna’s call addressed the young educated youth, Al Azharite students, and city employees who belong to the middle class or petty bourgeoisie. They bridged the gap between their rural roots and the secular westernized structure of the state. The goal of Al Banna was to establish a bridge between modernity and traditionalism. During 1974-1984 the MB attracted university students who later became key syndicate calibers and acquired skills throughout direct interaction with Marxists. At that time, the urban middle class nature of MB was preserved and flourished. The deteriorating economic conditions and Structural Adjustment policies since the early 1990s pushed many rural residents to cities, who found the MB a resort to preserve their traditional values. The MB penetrated rural areas and gained the appeal of rural immigrants who kept their rural values and modes of thought rather than adopting secular ideas of urban spaces. The movement enjoyed a high level of recruitment in rural governorates compared with urban districts, and in the Azhar
University compared with other civil governmental ones. The promotion process and middle administrative ranks are dominated by rural calibers who share Salafist discourse and conservative political orientations. In parallel, the movement lost its appeal among urban youth who stemmed their religious knowledge from diverse resources including lay preachers, TV religious channels, and other Salafist religious groups. Since 2008, the Guidance Office added a new article to increase the representation of rural governorates in the Shura Council. For instance, Al Dakhlia, Al Sharkiya and Al Gharbia have about 23 members which means they dominate one third of the Council’s membership. In contrast, Cairo and Alexandria have only 11 members. Another article gave the Guidance Office the authority to appoint 20% of the Shura’s members, and be in charge of the Council in case it failed in conducting meetings. The Shura Council did not have meetings from 1995 till 2009, and most decisions were exclusively taken by the Guidance Office.\textsuperscript{262} These measures allowed hard-line members, since Mustafa Mashhour’s leadership, to dominate the movement and recruit rural conservative calibers. They even maneuvered with rules through changing the residency of some rural cadres to urban areas. This happened with Muhammed Morsy, from Zagazig Governorate, who was nominated to the Guidance Office as an urban member after moving to Cairo.\textsuperscript{263} Thus, it is apparent that a conservative wing is dominating based on different intellectual sources: religion (Salafism), politics (Qutb’s ideas), and culture (rural traditions).

\textsuperscript{262} Security repression has been used as a justification for not holding the Shura meetings. The MB’s leadership thought frequent meetings would provide state’s security bodies with opportunities to spy over the movement. Regular meetings would also disseminate the image of an organized potential opposition group. According to Abd al Satar al Malegy, these justifications are flawed. The leadership can handle meetings throughout different ways like small sub groups’ meetings for the Shura members, or sending written comments about certain decisions. Also, the political regime was already aware of how organized is MB; it was not in a need for more evidences. This high level of secrecy rather raised regime’s skepticism about MB’s activities and goals, and increased the level of mutual hostility. Al Sayed Abd al Satar al Malegy, Tagroby m’aa al Ikhwan [My Experience with the Muslim Brotherhood] (Cairo: Al Zahra for Arabic Media, 2009), 314-316.

\textsuperscript{263} Hossam Tamam, “Tarif al Ikhwan”[The Ruralization of the Muslim Brotherhood], Futuristic Studies Unit (Bibliotheca Alexandrina), 2011, 1-12.
This conservative intellectual structure infused MB through the exclusion of enlightened religious figures like Muhammed al Ghazaly, and Yusuf al Karadawy. The educational curriculums included Salafist elements, and superficial religious knowledge. Mentors who are responsible for the educational section lack required religious knowledge and openness to guide young members and answer their critical questions. Family (Al Osrah) meetings turned into circles for socializing, chatting, and exchanging some simple religious teachings. Many young members know nothing about Al Banna’s diaries, religious sources of knowledge that formed his ideas, and his political decisions in the early decades of MB’s establishment. This shallow knowledge has been associated with religious and intellectual arrogance. According to Al Nafisy, little attention was paid to curriculums of socialization, and critical thinking within political Islamic movements and the Muslim Brotherhood. The culture of socialization has been associated with a lack of creativity, impressionism, romanticism, laziness, and waiting for leaders’ decisions rather than taking the lead. Organizational discipline and survival turns out to be the ultimate goal, rather than the initial reform program. In this way, leadership determines the agenda of concern, and members pay attention and interact only with issues that have direct impact on the movement’s interest. They became emotionally and mentally attached to the movement’s agenda, rather than public concerns.

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264 In 2008, Al Karadawy criticized MB’s educational curriculums for including Wahabist teachings. He asserted that his writings and scholarly work of other Muslim intellectuals like Muhammed al Ghazaly, and Muhammed Fathy Osman are excluded because they provide critical enlightened reading of Islam. Al Malegy, 264.

265 Mohamed Saiid, “Astkalty al Mosabab men al Ikhwna al Muslmin” [Reasons of My Resignation from the Muslim Brotherhood]. Facebook.com, March 9, 2012, http://www.facebook.com/notes/mohamed-saiid/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86/390744044286888 (accessed March 21, 2012).

266 Al Nafisy, Al Harka al Islamya Sagharta fe al Tarik [The Islamic Political Movement: Gaps Along the Way] (Kuwait, Dar al Raib’an, 1986), 81-82.
The penetration of rural culture and superficial understanding of Islam, due to the infusion of Wahabist ideas, emphasized the values of obedience, loyalty to leaders, and trust in elders compared with other values like critical thinking. Obedience, religiosity and seniority became the main standards of promotion.\textsuperscript{267}

The hierarchical design of MB is another element to refer to the democratic nature of the movement, and how one trend managed to control upper ranks. The pyramid structure of the movement was not a democratic one, even in the early years of its establishment. Hassan al Banna’s charming personality made him the center of all decisions; he was responsible for all details, and his personality as \textit{votary} helped him in excluding all his rivals and attracting more followers. Al Banna presented himself in any disagreement with his rivals as the victim who is always ready to forgive culprits. Al Banna, instead of promoting diversity in his movement, established another principle which is “The Opinion of One is for All”\textsuperscript{268}. Christina Harris described the influential and dominant role of Al Banna as “[He] was the Muslim Brotherhood in its early years”\textsuperscript{269}. Al Nafisy also criticized Al Banna’s leadership style- that continued till the moment- for adopting the style of “\textit{The Great Man}” who is gifted and above criticism. Salah Shady\textsuperscript{270} said, “after the death of Al Banna we missed direction and felt lost”; meaning that the destiny of the whole movement has been attached to only one man. As per Al Nafisy’s analysis, Al Banna did not recognize the impact of the one-man leadership style on the movement. This

\textsuperscript{267} Khalil A’nani, \textit{Al Ikhwan al Muslmin fe Masr Shaykoka Tosar’a al Zaman} [The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt Against Time] (Cairo, Al Shorouk International, 2007), 304.
\textsuperscript{269} Harris, 151.
\textsuperscript{270} Salah Shady is one of the MB secret apparatus’s known calibers who joined the movement in the early 1940s.
reflexively expressed itself in conflicts that emerged over the leadership of the MB after his death.  

Al Banna managed a number of public conferences which provided spaces for sharing ideas and discussions. Public conferences were rarely established later on. Before the current bylaws of MB that were introduced in the 1990s, most decisions were taken based on a consensus to underscore high levels of solidarity and unity. Most decisions were taken from above by the Supreme Guidance and the Founding Committee. The centralized vertical hierarchy of the MB concentrated all powers in the hands of the Guidance Office’s members, with limited authorities for the Shura Council and administrative sections.

The exclusive nature of decision-making and the lack of internal popular democratic mechanisms were always justified by security repression. The Shura Council was unable to conduct any meetings since 1995 till 2008. The majority of members do not participate in critical decisions. The MB is currently in a critical situation for supporting a presidential candidate after the nomination of Abou al Fotouh, nevertheless, the movement did not think about conducting a survey to get members’ preferences and opinions about the issue. Elections at lower and

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271 Al Nafisy, 1986, 65-66. The democratic nature and leadership style of Al Banna is contested. Some MB members’ autobiographies praise the openness and flexibility of the man; other critical works provide an opposing reading. The truth is always something in between. It is apparent that Al Banna’s strong personality, charming charisma and fluency let many people love him, and were convinced with all his arguments. No one of his followers had been able to present this type of charisma till now. The movement was still in the early decades of its establishment at the death of its founder, and Al Banna did not draft clear tools for resolving conflicts, and channeling diversity among opinions. According to Al Karadawy, Al Banna’s discourse encouraged creativity, and flexible understanding to contexts, and laws. He encouraged his followers to study Jurisprudential schools, and asserted in his twenty principles (fundamentals) that no one has absolute truth, and all opinions are open to criticism. Al Banna did not ask his followers to worship his opinions. He rather said that the Imam’s (leader) opinions change based on changing circumstances. Al Karadawy concluded that if Al Banna had the chance to live in our age he would have changed many of his opinions and interpretations, and he would not be annoyed by new intellectual contributions for his movement’s structure, discourse, and educational curriculums. Yusuf al Karadawy, *Al Ikhwan al Muslmun 70 A’man fe al D’awa wa al Tarib wa al Jihad* [Muslim Brotherhood 70 Years in D’awa, Education and Jihad](Cairo: Wahba Book Store, 1999), 245-250. Al Banna’s followers added little to the MB’s structure, and intellectual heritage except regarding women’s political participation, and party politics.


administrative levels did not take place till 2005, and were mainly in reaction to evoked criticism by media. The current bylaws do not include any sections about members’ right, channels of appeal against unfair or illegal decisions, and measures of resolving conflicts and investigations. All articles focus exclusively on members’ obligation and duties.\textsuperscript{274} As noted in chapter three, some members praised the democratic nature of MB; apparently, most of those members are inclined to support an elitist-stable style of leadership. In other words, a group of qualified leaders (the Shura Council and Guidance Office members) knows better than other members (Rank and File) whose participation in critical would endanger MB’s solidarity. This implicitly refers to the semantic meaning of \textit{shura} in the minds of some of the research’s informants.

Regime despotism consumed much of MB’s energy, and turned its focus from strategic issues.\textsuperscript{275} The Movement spent years in struggle with the state’s oppressive system, and involved in fierce debates with other political forces rather than developing concrete economic, and social programs, and political Islamic theory of governance. Hassan Hathout concluded that Islamic movements suffer from psychological problems of the despotic cage; they might not be able to get out of it even if they got their freedom. Rather than establishing free democratic polity, they might introduce their version of dictatorship.\textsuperscript{276}

The state security approach constrained the presence of any moderate Islamic discourse. It denied Al Wasat Party’s right in existence for years, and did not differentiate between moderate and extremist Islamists. This approach resulted in the elimination of any potential Islamic competitor for MB. In addition, military trials targeted moderate figures within MB, and

\textsuperscript{274} Al Nafisy, 1989, 32. 
\textsuperscript{275} Al Nafisy, 1989, 18. 
gave hard-line members the opportunity to consolidate their presence, and market their religious and political discourse to MB’s rank and file members.

Torture, and unfair trials by the state played a role in enhancing this leadership style. Old members were perceived as heroes who made great sacrifices. This legacy of sacrifice and heroism promoted a culture of emotional mobilization to leaders’ decisions rather than an objective assessment to leaders’ performance. After spending years in jail and being detached from concurrent events, elder leaders assumed leadership, rather than handing administrative positions over to young involved members.\textsuperscript{277}

Furthermore, one of the major consequences of state coercion is promoting the culture of secrecy and lack of transparency, which negatively influenced the movement. The culture of Secrecy has many manifestations: Firstly, rank and file members were excluded from the decision making process, and channels of dialogues were eliminated. Secondly, many active roles by MB at the moral and socioeconomic level were restrained. Thirdly, criteria of recruitment lacked objective criteria of selection.\textsuperscript{278} Secrecy also resulted in a case of emotional detachment and a shared attitude of intellectual arrogance; members feel they are superior and know more than others, in addition to putting the movement on fire lines with the government. The feeling of superiority was explicitly expressed by one of the MB’s informants when asked about the decision of establishing a political party; he concluded we did not find any other strong partners who would be able to run the transition period. This answer reflects a sort of a political overconfidence, and a lack of a collaborator discourse towards other political groups.

\textsuperscript{277} Al Nafisy, 1986, 64-67.  
\textsuperscript{278} Al Nafisy, 1986, 129-133.
Generational Gaps: Over What?

The political ideological frame of the MB was vague from the beginning. Al Banna provided a holistic description to the goals and nature of his movement as “a Salafi call, a Sunni approach, a Sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic organization, and a social idea”. The ambiguity of goals allowed the movement to attract many followers who joined it for different purposes (75% for religious purposes). Harris concluded that Al Banna meant this ambiguity and smartly used it in his struggle with the political regime. He emphasized the religious nature of his movement in the presence of a strong prime minister and overrated the political dimension of his activity under the rule of weak government.²⁷⁹ The ambiguity of goals for any institution, according to Tarik al Bishry, justifies and enhances the lack of accountability measures which is one of the reasons of debates between the reformist and the organizational stream.²⁸⁰

Actually, the vague nature of the MB is one of its current dilemmas. The political dimension of the movement explains the controversy that took place between MB’s members regarding establishing a political party and whether it serves the original nature of the MB as a religious revivalist movement or not. Hassan al Banna himself might not be aware of the expected consequences of being heavily involved in politics. His movement flourished quickly, and it seems that his goal was to use political tools to introduce some reforms at the moral level such as forbidding prostitution and alcohol consumption. He regretted establishing the secret

²⁷⁹ Harris, 151. Al Banna’s vision about the multiple roles of his reform movement is part of the Muslim understanding to Islam as intellectual framework or life system that combines both spirituality and materialism. Al Banna’s writings about the role of the movement and questions of existence did not witness intellectual revision. He left life young and did not get the time to evaluate his experience and take corrective measures regarding the political role of the movement and activities of the secret apparatus. Rashid al Ghanoushy has an interesting argument in this regard. He concluded that the holistic and totalistic nature of Islam does not necessarily entails holistic Islamic organization and structure. Labor division and specialization among different Islamic groups fits more the contemporary nature of the nation state. Abou al A’la Mady, Rouyat Al Wasat [Al Wasat Party’s Vision](Cairo: Al Shorouk International, 2005), 17.

²⁸⁰ Al Bishry, 129.
section, and admitted that had he had the opportunity, he would have turned MB into a purely revivalist religious movement. Al Banna’s focus was mainly on ethics and morality; he did not provide a practical and a detailed program for MB about shari’a application and replacement of western rules. His economic reforms were limited to abolishing usury and collecting Zikhat. The vagueness of programs and lack of practical details has dominated MB discourse till this moment.

As noted in chapter three, deep involvement in politics after the revolution undermined the missionary dimensions of the movement, and a total shift to political party may be a possible scenario in the long run. Khalis al Galby critically addressed the relationship between Islamic revivalist movements and party politics. He described the political parties’ mentality as one of the disasters that negatively influences Islamic movements; party’s mentality adopts a number of opinions and resists others through delegitimizing them rather than opening constructive channels of dialogue. It is a one-dimensional way of thinking that justifies actions rather than admitting mistakes. This mentality suppresses creativity and critical thinking; it turns its calibers into executives rather than pioneers. Thus, creative members are most likely to split the movement, and migrate to other reform projects. Critical members share together the feeling of cognitive dissonance with the movement’s discourse; alternatively, they start to have their salons, and meetings to share ideas. Thus, it was not surprising that large numbers of Egyptian Current Party’s founders were from MB’s young active members; also, the 1970s active group joined Al Wasat party. Small circles and friendship ties turned later into political organizations.

281 Al Kharabawy, Ibid, 90.
282 Al Bishary, 125-126. However, Al Banna was not expected to think alone about detailed concrete programs of reform: He was not a state- man, and his expertise in this regard is limited. Al Banna’s book “Our Problems: In the Light of an Islamic System” provided some recommendations and suggestions for moral, administrative, economic, and political reform; however, Al Banna’s Contributions fit the needs of his age and cannot transcend the boundaries of his time. Transcending time, context, and critically meeting contemporary challenges was supposed to be the mission of his followers, which apparently they did not fulfill at the best. See details of Al Banna’s book in Al Karadawy, 306-313.
The revolutionary dimension of the movement is another contested issue that widened the gap between the two streams. Al Banna had contradictory statements about revolution that require intellectual revision. The leadership’s stance on the SCAF is not actually surprising; Al Banna himself had some lenient stances on the palace, and royal governments that can be justified throughout the framework of pragmatism. Despite these positions, the solidarity of the MB was assured due to State persecution. The current revolutionary scene does not provide the movement with the defensive position it used to enjoy for decades against state repression. The movement now has many challenges at the intellectual, political, and economic level to face, and there is a critical public open eye on its activities and positions. Thus, assuring consistency among multiple roles, and providing creative solutions to the post revolutionary landscape in Egypt are decisive factors to judge the future trajectory of the movement and its ability to maintain internal solidarity, and gain public support.285

Along with this line, the spiritual, organizational, and social networks inside dogmatic movements consolidate its solidarity bonds and make it difficult to end up its life course. MB’s educational and spiritual programs interfere in the daily details of its members. Brothers get married to MB’s Sisters, most of their friends belong to the movement, and some of their economic activities rely on the movement’s support. The movement’s multiple activities provide members with a different state to live in. Belonging to the movement is an opportunity to get close to God, get married, and assure a social network. Some members are unwilling to lose all these spiritual and material privileges, even if they disagree with MB’s decisions and

285 Unpublished lecture by Ibrahim al Houdaiby about Muslim Brotherhood, American University in Egypt, October 24, 2011.
discourse.\textsuperscript{286} Songs, historical stories, festivals, and general meetings are among tools to establish emotional bonds.\textsuperscript{287}

Strong attachment to the movement’s discourse was emphasized in the third MB’s conference (1935). Al Banna introduced two crucial principles: The first principle states that every Muslim should believe that any weakness in the MB’s teachings is a reflection to the weakness of the correct Islamic idea itself. The second principle asserts that Brothers should support any institution that serves and shares the goals of the MB, and at the same time should give up any loyalty to other groups that have contradicting goals with the MB’s call, especially if MB’s leaders asked for that. In this sense, MB is not just a religious group that has its own interpretations to Islam but rather its only voice, and an institutional manifestation of the ideal model of Islam. These two principles contributed to a shared perception of superiority among MB’s adherents compared to other Islamic groups, and a conviction that MB’s project is the best, if not the only, path of reform.

State repression and a legacy of tribulation enhanced the movement’s narrative about the necessity of unity, and suppression of diversity. The movement keeps till the moment making use of the legacy of solidarity and conspiracy theory against its reform program. For instance, one of the articles in Ikhwan On Line described other opinions that contradict with MB’s decisions as deadly poison, and asked MB’s members to listen only to their leaders.\textsuperscript{288} Despite the ambiguity of goals and strong loyalty to MB’s leadership, the wide popular base was not usually in its interest. The movement failed in making political risks, and its influence was less

\textsuperscript{286} An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, November 20, 2011. An interview with an MB’s member by the author, Cairo, Egypt, December 27, 2011. An interview with MB’s female member, Cairo, Egypt, February 13, 2012.

\textsuperscript{287} Al Nafisy, 1986, 21.

compared with other loose small active groups like Masr al Fata (1940s), or Kifya Movement (2000s).

The framing process within MB is another aspect of disagreement between generational units. The movement failed to draw lines between religion as a sacred source of knowledge and human interpretations to organizational issues and politics. Organizational decisions were perceived as religious orders that must be obeyed. Members who violate these orders share the feeling of being sinful. This discourse was justified through the presence of religious figures, or members with a religious educational background in high administrative ranks. Religion has been instrumentally used to justify certain actions, for instance, the use of prophet traditions about allegiance to justify obedience, and deplore any rebellious actions against leadership’s decisions.

A parochial emotional discourse divides the world, in the mind of followers, into two mutually exclusive dichotomies: black and white, betrayers and patriotic, respectively. This process is scholarly coined as “Boundary Framing”. This put the movement in confrontations with other political partners and absorbed much of the energy of its members. The MB’s discourse gives priority to loyalty to the movement; when the MB and the state’s interest conflicts members’ preference should be to the movement and not to the state. It is expected; if the movement is the guardian of Islam and its survival is the only way of reform in members’

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289 Al Bishry, 143.
292 Framing, generally, is defined as a dynamic, on going, contested process which involves the participation of movement actors, external players, and a dialectic with the existing context. In Benford and Snow’s words: “Framing refers to this signifying work, that is to the processes associated with assigning meaning to or interpreting relevant events and conditions in ways intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists”, David A. Snow, Robert D. Benford, “Clarifying the Relationship Between Framing and Ideology in the Study of Social Movements: A Comment on Oliver and Johnston”, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/ArticleCopies/SNOW_BED.PDF (accessed October 8, 2011). “Injustice Frames”, or “Boundary Frames” refer to how the movement identifies problems, violations, victims and oppressors. They answer questions of “what went wrong’, and “ who or what to blame” David A. Snow, Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participation Mobilization”, in in International Social Movement Research from Structure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Culture, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kräsi, Sidney Tarrow, Vol 1 (London: JAI Press INC., 1988), 614.
293 Ibid, 66.
consciousness. This discourse entails how the MB identifies the We and Adversaries, and it also creates another dilemma regarding how MB would design a separate discourse for political indoctrination within the FJP, and how is it going to handle political diversity within its party?

Socioeconomic and political revolutionary tendencies within MB are among salient issues that increased the gap between reformist and conservative members on the eve of the revolution. Historically, Al Banna had lenient stances on some pro western governments, and he expressed an acceptance for cooperation in order to introduce partial reforms at the moral level. In this sense, the movement’s discourse did not strongly reject cooperation with the political regime for the sake of partial gains. This can be the historical explanatory framework to understand MB’s arrangements with Mubarak’s regime over the 2005 parliamentary election, meeting with Omar Sulieman during the revolution, and soft stances on SCAF violations. Such positions are justified to rank and files by the negative consequences of revolutions, and the appropriateness of gradual empowerment and change. The MB’s political performance and stance on the military institution in Egypt is in harmony with the political discourse of other branches of the movement in Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Algeria. The MB in Iraq did not continue resistance against US forces and accepted being part of the political game that was designed by occupation. In other words, MB’s strategy started to focus on coexisting with existing political regime, competing over power distribution, rather than leading a change. This political position does not meet MB young revolutionary members’ inspirations and ambitions.

294 Al Bishry, 121-123. Al Banna’s stance from national independence is contested, and should be interpreted within the context of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Al Banna’s call was against secular nationalist voices that welcomed separation from the Ottoman Empire. He rejected national boundaries imposed by colonial powers, and perceived them as tools of imperialism. This was hostile towards other national discourses in the late 1920s and 1930s. Stating that Al Banna did not present a strong position against colonialism, as per Al Bishry’s analysis, is unjust to his intellectual heritage, the influential role of MB in 1948 war, and violent resistance against British troops in Egypt. Al Banna identified three stages for fighting colonialism: 1) Negotiations, 2) Resistance, 3) Declaring the status of war. See, Al Karadawy, 306. These stages confirm the gradual approach of Al Banna’s call, and its peaceful nature. This let his call appears more pragmatic and less revolutionary compared with other national voices at that time.
Furthermore, the MB’s current socioeconomic discourse does not provide any clear standpoints regarding economic independence and capitalism. Ironically, the movement that used to criticize capitalism, and global injustices is run by wealthy businessmen who have interest in privatization and scorn any active role by labor unions. This contradicts with the economic interest of poor MB’s conservative followers. Khairt al Shater, one of the keys Egyptian businessmen, is currently designing the MB’s socioeconomic and political program. Hasan Malik another MB’s influential business cadre described Mubarak’s economic policies as good ones except for high levels of corruption associated with them. Like any conservative European parties, the FJP economic program points out eradicating corruption, and balanced, sustainable and comprehensive economic development. The first principle in Al Shater’s program for presidency supports privatization and attracting foreign direct investments. Nothing is mentioned about anti-monopoly measures, national safety networks, and nationalization procedures. MB’s businessmen and especially Kharit al Shater reflect an ideological mix of capitalism, religious conservatism, and political pragmatism. Al Shater had a Marxist background and his cognitive map was shaped by the secrecy and the teachings of the 1965 group. His strong personality, charisma, economic activities, and the diversified sources that shaped his consciousness allowed him to spread his dominance and establish a strong bond with MB’s hard-line figures. Al Shater, before his nomination to presidency, was responsible for most critical files in the MB. He was in charge of preparing the MB’s reform plan, and the government’s program, managing MB’s financial resources, and following up MB’s

international organization’s activities and financial resources.\textsuperscript{296} The mixed ideology of MB’s businessmen is not expected to lead revolutionary changes at the socioeconomic and political level. It has an interest in maintaining good terms with major international markets and assuring moderate political position for Egypt in the Arab region. In an interview with CNN, two FJP spokesmen who are close to the circle of Khairt al Shater concluded that the MB is fully committed to respect all treaties, and not preoccupied to be in confrontations with the outside world.\textsuperscript{297} The interview was after meetings with White House Officials, and US policy experts in which FJP representatives depicted the MB as a moderate Islamic group.

The gender ideology of MB is another reflection for the gap between conservative hard-line members and reformists that involves an overlap between religious and cultural elements. Despite strong demands for women participation and involvement in the administrative make up of the movement, few steps were taken since the eruption of the revolution. The security allegations are no more present, and sisters are deeply involved in MB’s street politics without adequate presentation, and suitable socialization curriculums.

**Generational Continuity and Discontinuity**

The 1970s generation and young Brothers, the current generation's relationship with some of the 1970s members reflects a type of \textit{age accumulation}. They share together the same critique of the culture of obedience, secrecy, the necessity of legal status for the movement, and criteria of promotion. The young generation expresses new ideas like dissolving the movement, turning its hierarchy into networks of pressure groups, and critically revisiting the MB’s

\textsuperscript{296} Haitham Abou Khalil, “Khairt al Shater al Moftara a’lihe wa al Moftiry A’lina”[Khairt al Shater the Opressed, Who is Oppressing Us], \textit{Facebook.com}, March 21, 2012, http://www.facebook.com/notes/%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AB%D9%85-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84/%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7/-331834273532477 (accessed March 21, 2012).

intellectual heritage. Unlike the 1970s members, some young members split quickly from the movement and expressed their impatient with MB’s discourse. It took decades from some 1970s figures to resign from the movement. These two different positions can be intellectually and historically interpreted, as follows:

The 1970s members joined the movement with conservative religious discourse; they did not feel any kind of emotional detachment with conservative Qutbist elder members. They were totally absorbed in the task of restructuring the movement and writing its bylaws for at least 10 to 15 years, which let them enjoy the feeling of ownership, compared with other young members whose early consciousness was shaped by other political and cultural spaces, and excluded to an extent from major decision-making positions. Omar al Talmasany’s personality was a major element in bridging the gap between old conservative members and the 1970s calibers; he listened to their demands and opened channels for them within MB’s structure; he shaped the emotional tie between them and the movement. This element is absent in the case of young MB’s members; old major calibers failed in understanding the rationale beyond youth arguments and suggestions; even open minded 1970s members became isolated and channels of dialogues between them and MB youth were deliberately narrowed via unwritten orders from hard-line calibers. The religious, intellectual, and spiritual needs of the young rebellious generation are satisfied by other channels; no more MB is the only resort for the majority of them; the political and social scenes in Egypt since late 1990s witnessed the emergence of many initiatives and grass roots movements that absorbed some young members’ anxiety, and dissatisfaction with the slow reformist approach and rigid MB’s administrative style. In this sense, the young generation shared the attitudes of multiple organizational and intellectual affiliations, motivations, and commitments, hybrid political ideology, culture of street collaborator politics, and ideological
toleration. This was clear the Al Tayar al Masry’s call for dialogue between some left calibers, the Justice Party, the Youth Revolution Coalition, Al Wasat Party, Al Nahda Party, and other intellectuals to prepare for one strong electoral coalition, harmony of political positions with other revolutionary groups, the diverse ideological backgrounds of calibers in the Revolution Continues Coalition. Young Brothers created their own political platforms and refused to join Al Nahda or Al Wasat Party due to different reasons including the ambiguous Islamic ideological background, and the bureaucratic style of management. The Al Tayar al Masry’s political project provides a different discourse than those two preceding parties. It does not adopt Islam as an ideological reference of its activities. Their project is still not yet drafted and its influence on large segments of Egyptians cannot be evaluated at this stage, though it is salient to keep an eye on its development. The internal administrative structure of the party is still unfinished, and its decentralized- democratic nature cannot be compared with other organizational experiences like Al Wasat or FJP. The relationship between the Egyptian Current party and other growing newly established grass roots movements like A’skar Kazboon, Hazmoon, Makamleen, Ultras Football Groups may influence the political discourse of the party, providing it with flexible organizational culture, creative tools of mobilization, more revolutionary ideas about political presence in the public sphere, and socio political injustices.

Furthermore, the revolution has a key impact on the exclusion of young politicized members. Apparently, MB’s conservative leaders recognized that those members represent a threat to the movement’s coherence, and their rebellious tendencies cannot be contained within the existing administrative structure. They preferred excluding them quickly before attracting other members and forming strong oppositional front; this expressed out in the way of dismissing
some members (Al Tayer al Masry’s group) without conducting investigation, or sending
warnings.

In both generational subsequent waves the MB’s leadership failed in responding to new
demands and creative proposals; active rebellious members were either contained or dismissed.
Tools of resolving generational disputes ranged from dismissal (with or without fair
investigations), suspension, and defamation campaigns against certain calibers; rather than
opening channels of dialogue, and developing clear mechanisms for resolving disputes.
Table 2. A Comparison Between MB, Al Wasat Party, and Egyptian Current Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Internal Level</th>
<th>The Organizational Level</th>
<th>Muslim Brotherhood</th>
<th>Al Wasat</th>
<th>The Egyptian Current Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Design             |                          | 1. Pyramided centralized structure.  
2. Exclusive decision making process (major decisions only by the Shura and Guidance Council.) | 1. Classical Centralized Party’s structure.  
2. Internal democratic voting mechanisms. | 1. Tendencies towards decentralized structure.  
2. Unfinished Administrative design. |
| Disciplinary, and promotion Measures and Exit-Entry Criteria. |                          | 1. Strict gradual disciplinary measures from warning, suspension, to dismissal.  
2. Joining other political parties is not allowed.  
3. Strict exit and entry criteria (religiosity, reputation, commitment, loyalty).  
4. Promotion is based on loyalty to leadership, seniority, religiosity, and obedience. Election is conducted for the heads of all administrative levels since 2005, due to external pressures. | 1. Dismissal for non disciplined members based on a) written report about violations, b) Conducting an investigation, c) Final decision by the Membership Committee which includes (the President Deputy, Secretary General, and five members from the Higher Executive Committee).  
2. Dismissal for members who would join other parties.  
3. Election for | 1. Unfinished internal bylaws.  
2. Flexible exit-entry criteria.  
2. Non refusal for multiple political affiliations. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Style</th>
<th>The Great Man Style (seniority, normative spiritual qualifications, loyalty, has close relation to the leaders and mentors)</th>
<th>Seniority, and functional qualifications, with the presence of clique politics.</th>
<th>Functional, rotational Leadership Style.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion/Politics</td>
<td>1. Religion is used for external socio-political mobilization. 2. Religious traditions are</td>
<td>1. Emphasis on the religious intellectual background of the party. 2. Religious discourse is</td>
<td>1. Refusal for using religion in mobilization, or being the exclusive source of reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactional level with the external environment</td>
<td>Socialization Values</td>
<td>The nature of political stances</td>
<td>The Relationship with Non-state Actors</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
<td>used to justify organizational decisions, and political stances.</td>
<td>Risk- Aversion.</td>
<td>Skeptical-antagonistic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialization Values</td>
<td>A selectivity nature based on political Rational Calculations with moderate risk – taking stances, in a middle ground between revolutionary and conservative trends.</td>
<td>Refusal for political coalition with liberal and leftist groups; however, supporting certain demands by other political groups that are in harmony with the party’s positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In conclusion, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be in urgent need for intellectual renewal. The movement did not benefit from the jurisprudential contributions of Azharite Sheikhs and other Muslim intellectuals. The last intellectual contribution of the movement was Al Houdaiby’s book “Preachers not Judges” and was mainly a reaction to Qutb’s writings.\footnote{Khalil al A’nani, “Theoretical Deficits”, \textit{Al Ahram Weekly}, July 4, 2007.} The complexity of the book and its legal language does not encourage many members to review it. The rising Salafist tidal moved MB’s focus on faith, personal behavior, and piety, with parochial conservative understanding on social and political problems. Rank and file members follow up the movement’s statements and news more than following intellectual, and jurisprudential new ideas. Until now, the MB’s structure does not include religious and political committee that would act as consultancy bodies for leadership. The political Educational Committee relies on disqualified superficial books written by MB’s members about MB’s history, reform project, and other political conceptions.\footnote{Al Malegy, 254.} The Muslim Brotherhood needs to provide a clear political theory of governance, solid interpretations to notions of Shura, citizenship, and human rights, and a detailed socioeconomic program. A renewal intellectual movement requires internal channels of dialogue and sharing ideas. The MB’s culture should appreciate and encourage self-critique. This does not seem possible in the short run. The movement applies strict disciplinary measures to suppress diversity, and market a number of statements to maintain unity and solidarity, such as “1) An MB’s member should accept orders and advices of his mentors like a dead man in the hands of the priest. 2) Give up your opinion, even if your mentor committed a mistake it is better than your right argument. 3) The MB alienates its bad members. 4) The MB will go on its way with the support of its followers or not, and No one did a favor to its mission. 5) Preserving the MB’s organization is preservation to Islam itself. 6) An MB’s member is merely a cog in the
MB’s machine, and the movement chooses for him”. With such shared narratives, changes are not expected to happen. Innovative individual contributions are not appreciated or at least contested throughout dialogues. The current administrative structure, also, does not provide mechanisms for sharing ideas and monitoring leaders’ decisions; the Shura Council has limited authorities, and there are rarely conferences for discussions and performance evaluation. There should be bottom-up mechanisms to allow for active rank and files members’ participation in the decision making process.

The future discourse and trajectory of Muslim Brotherhood might rely heavily on its ability to provide creative solutions to its political role, political indoctrination tools, and the organizational relationship with the FJP. The movement’s stance on the military presence in the political formula would be a decisive factor in maintaining its solidarity, public appeal, and survival among other Islamist discourses. Arrangements between the Supreme Armed Forces and Islamists, specifically MB and Salafists, would draw the map for a new Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is truly at a crossroad, future decisions will not only affect the movement’s solidarity and internal coherence but also the framework of Islamist political discourse. The coherence and solidarity of the MB would not be assured, in the long run by maneuvering and surrendering unappealing contradicting statements. The MB should reconsider its promotion criteria and adopt flexible discourse that absorbs self-critique, and a participatory approach with other political forces.

To end up, I should admit the limitations of this study that would provide a direction for further research. The study elides in-depth analysis to MB’s intellectual heritage. It does not critically address intellectual contributions of Al Banna, Qutb, Rashid al Ghanoushy, and S’aid Hawy. In this sense, the study draws a dizzy picture for MB’s political theory, and how it
developed along its history. Muslim Brothers need a modern reading for Al Banna’s literature and ideas. Al Banna’s ideas have been distorted, or reinterpreted differently. The oath of allegiance, for instance, was only for the secret apparatus leaders, but it was used for the d’awa section as well. Recently, a new diary for Al Banna entitled “Al Manhaj” explains the philosophy behind the secret apparatus was added, though there is still little attention to that.\textsuperscript{300} Hence, the movement needs an intellectual renewal movement that would combine different elements from critical writings about political Islam, MB’s members’ autobiographies and written resignations. It seems that the current leadership and educational section’s mentors are disqualified for this task. Most of them do not have a social science background, and are less open to accept strong critical ideas. The change would be possible if it is either from outside, or through a strong internal schism or a revolution for change. A comparative reading to the discourse of MB in other countries, and how the movement managed its relation with the political regime and secular political forces is salient to enrich the experience of Brothers in Egypt, and introduce new paths for reform.

The study also overlooks international dynamics and their influence on political Islam in Egypt. The international dimension is dismissed regarding the Egyptian Brothers’ organizational relation with the International Organization of Muslim Brotherhood, and the future trajectory of this relationship if the MB would turn into a political party, or refrain from political activities. Thus, I consider this study as a preliminary step to navigate history, internal dynamics, and current challenges of the Muslim Brotherhood.

\textsuperscript{300} An interview with Muhammed Shams by the author, Cairo, Egypt, February 7, 2012.


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