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## INTRODUCTION

Immediately after the “Arab Spring”, many were intrigued by the question of why scholars failed to predict the rising popular movements that toppled some of the long-standing dictators in the Arab region. Much literature has been focusing on the transformation that took place in Arab republics, especially Egypt and Tunisia, where Islamists rose to power; yet survival of monarchies seems to be taking much less attention than that of the republics. Some believe the answer to why monarchies survived is straightforward, and that is due to the oil revenues that Gulf States use to buy off people’s political voices and personal freedoms. But what about the other two Arab monarchies that do not have the same oil assets and revenues as the Gulf States?

Although it is interesting to examine why revolutions took place in the republics and in a manner that surprised even the most specialized Middle Eastern scholars, it is as important to study why there was a lack of regime change in Monarchies, especially those that lack the financial means to compensate their people.

Being personally interested in monarchies and coming from a non-oil-producing country myself, I want to explore the mechanisms of control by which King Abdullah II appeased his people and to also situate Jordan’s experience in a comparative perspective. It is also important to distinguish whether the revolutionary wave was limited from spreading in Jordan and Morocco by the regime itself, or whether the majority of the people really believe in the legitimacy or right of the regime to rule. The decision to study Morocco alongside Jordan is to compare those control mechanisms in what appears to be states that fall under the same category, but in a different sub-region and influenced by a different colonial experience. Do the

Jordanian and Moroccan people not have the same demands for freedom and social equality as the rest of the Arabs living in the republics? Are their voices silenced due to respectful obedience for the ruler or due to fear of regime repression? Or will research show that the answer is a combination of both, respectful obedience for the rulers by a segment of society with regime repression on other groups within those two societies?

The objective of this research is to clarify some of these questions and attempt to answer why the public reacted differently in those two countries than in other Arab republics and monarchies. Furthermore, this research is to examine whether it was the regime action or public reaction that curbed the growth of revolutionary movements in both Jordan and Morocco.

The organizational structure of the chapters is consistent with building up a cohesive argument leading to the final and most important chapter containing the synthesis of the thesis. Chapter II begins with the examination of the historical backgrounds of the monarchies, their state formation period and leadership over the years, where features of regime domination prior to the “Arab Spring” are highlighted. Chapter III studies the manner in which Islamist parties function under authoritarian rule, their organizational structures and their interaction with formal and informal politics. Chapter IV applies Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading model on the two monarchies, with specific reference to the political, economic and societal situations in both and the approach that the monarchs handled significant backdrops post “Arab Spring”, specifically their complicated economic dilemmas. Chapter V, the most significant chapter of all holds the results of the research, and future recommendations on survival strategies for non-oil producing monarchies.

### **Research Puzzle:**

The wave of popular uprisings that began in 2011 across the Arab world, also known as the “Arab Spring”, managed to topple four of the long standing dictators in the region, namely in Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia. This of course rooted fear in Arab authoritarian Monarchs, pushing some to resort to financial resources to silence their people, others sought military help from neighboring countries to suppress popular uprisings, while still others introduced some political reforms. This leaves us with a very important question; is it really good to be king in the “Arab Spring” era, how and why?

Jordan and Morocco are the only two Arab non-oil-producing Kingdoms that lack the financial resources to pay off their people’s silence; how then are they still surviving till this moment? In Morocco, King Mohammad VI holds the title Commander of the Faithful and in Jordan, King Abdullah II capitalizes on the claim of a direct descendant of Prophet Mohammad. Religious legitimacy is only one of the foundation pillars for the rule of both monarchs; however, it had gained them respect and obedience from their people.

This research analyzes the foundational state elements within the non-oil-producing monarchies and draws on reasons behind their survival from the revolutionary wave that swept the Arab region. This research will look in depth at the alternative options offered and means used by the monarchs of Jordan and Morocco in exchange for the people’s political allegiance. The focus of this thesis is to understand how mass uprisings are prevented from taking place and how they are managed once they are taken to the streets.

Emphasis on the common argument of regime repression for survival does not stand on its own because suppression levels were not as severe in Morocco and

Jordan, as their neighboring republics for example, and besides regime attitude pre and post “Arab Spring” did not transform acutely proving the invalidity of this argument<sup>1</sup>. The thesis will examine the strategies adopted by similar monarchs as a reaction to their Islamist opposition, especially with the inclusion of Islamists in Morocco’s political system and the exclusion of the same group from Jordanian political life.

It is important to note that this thesis is not trying to prove a macro-level continuity in the survival of monarchies; on the contrary, it is arguing that there are shifting strategies and mechanisms on the micro level that are helping monarchies defy these currents of change.

### **Hypothesis:**

**Survival of non-oil-producing monarchies is a function of their own traditional legitimacy and the softening of their authoritarian regimes.**

The Moroccan King plays on the card of religious legitimacy; however, after the “Arab Spring” he was also capable of drawing on political legitimacy through introducing constitutional reforms that limited to some extent his powers. The Jordanian King similarly has been claiming religious and tribal legitimacy, whether before or after the “Arab Spring”. Although at the face level it seemed like King Abdullah II was introducing actual reforms for free and fair elections, he still depended on religious and tribal support for his position.

Traditional legitimacy, whether religious or tribal, and action-based legitimacy, or the legitimacy gained by the regime on basis of its ability to offer reform and provide services to the people, have both helped in the survival of the

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<sup>11</sup> Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, “‘Waiting for Godot’: Regime Changes Without Democratization in the Middle East,” *International Political Science Review* 371-392 25(2004): 385.

monarchies in Jordan and Morocco. This paper claims that legitimacy in all its above mentioned forms, coupled with full regime control over state institutions and state security pressure on the Moroccan and Jordanian public have all played a major role in the resilience of those monarchies.

Exploring the reactions of the different monarchies towards Arab uprisings is important to understand how these demands were perceived by the states and what the mechanisms of dealing with the people were, whether through political reform, wealth or coercion. However, this thesis will only focus on the reaction of the Jordanian and Moroccan states and the political strategies they used for survival.

## CHAPTER I

### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

#### **Conceptual Framework:**

##### Definitions:

Non-oil-producing monarchies have survived the Arab revolutions so far. As both Morocco and Jordan are not the typical “*Bakhshish* states”<sup>2</sup>, this only leaves space for legitimacy to be one of the anchors holding both monarchs in place. The conceptual framework of this thesis focuses on the idea of legitimacy in its various forms. Legitimacy could be legally based and either achieved through religious claims, tribal support, or state achievements, or as a varied combination.

The last part of this section clarifies the definitions that will be utilized in this thesis. The operational definition of legitimacy is based on the thoughts of Max Weber, who has focused in depth on classifying the types of authority and the conditions under which each applies. Max Weber’s *Theory of Social and Economic Organization* points out to three different types of authority and discusses their relation to legitimacy. Weber’s breakdown of types of authority includes those resting on rational grounds, others on traditional grounds and still others on charismatic grounds<sup>3</sup>.

The conceptual lens of this thesis focuses on the second type of legitimate authority, the one based on traditional grounds. Weber emphasizes that this type rests “on an established belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority)”<sup>4</sup>. Legitimate authority based on traditional grounds set the guidelines by which ruler

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<sup>2</sup> Bahgat Korany, “Arab Democratization: A Poor Cousin?” *Political Science and Politics* 511-514 27(3): 1994, 511.

<sup>3</sup> Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* tr. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons; ed. Talcott Parsons. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 328.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 328.

and ruled interact, making sure there is a certain mode of loyalty present that is directly relates to the person in power himself. The significance of Weber's interpretation of the traditional authority lies in the attitude associated with subjects' loyalty, where "the obligation of obedience...is a matter of *personal* loyalty within the area of accustomed obligations"<sup>5</sup>. Emphasis is placed on the notion of personal allegiance, and this type of legitimacy is difficult to question because it symbolizes a relation based on choice and faith in the person of the ruler.

We can deduce from the above a more simplified definition of Weber's legitimacy, which emphasizes notions of power, obedience and domination; that is, "to exclusively base a political regime on interests or violence tends to create instability, while the regime becomes stable if it is seen as valid or binding"<sup>6</sup>. The traditional grounds of legitimate authority is also complimented by Philip Khoury's and Joseph Kostiner's outlook on the concept; "legitimacy implies myths and symbols which provide a kind of ideological rationalization and justification for this monopoly of coercive authority"<sup>7</sup>.

Furthermore, this thesis rests upon the idea of dual causation, which infers that a couple of elements have caused the resilience of these monarchies. In addition to traditional legitimacy (religious and/or tribal), the second conceptual element is the idea of "upgraded authoritarianism". Upgrading authoritarianism, or the softening of authoritarianism, focuses on the process of shifting from traditional authoritarianism in the Arab world, to becoming a more flexible system, with potential for limited liberalization under state control.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 328.

<sup>6</sup> Richard Swedberg, *The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 148.

<sup>7</sup> Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 3.



The other concept to define is the system of upgrading authoritarianism, or the process as a whole, which “involves reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions”<sup>8</sup>. It evolves into a type of hybrid regime that is neither fully authoritarian in nature, nor absolutely democratic. The merging of the two concepts, legitimacy and authoritarian upgrading, have produced a system that has been helping monarchies cope with the political, social and economic challenges that have increased since the “Arab Spring”.

Although the focus of this thesis is not the type of regime generated from authoritarian upgrading, it is still significant to place Morocco and Jordan in such a classification. The non-oil producing monarchies fall into the category of hybrid regimes that are represented through the *limited democracy* model,

“There is universal suffrage, a formally correct electoral procedure, elective posts occupied on the basis of elections and a multi-party system...there is no effective political opposition and, above all, the media compromised by a situation of monopoly to the point that part of the population is effectively prevented from exercising their rights”.<sup>9</sup>

This model’s representation of Morocco and Jordan heavily depends on the idea that in both countries, the limitations placed on the citizens’ exercise of basic rights is still absent, although there are signs of liberalization through “democratic” institutions and newly announced policies.

### **Methodology:**

There is no absolute grading system that could measure the degree of authoritarianism; however, there are certain indicators that show to what extent there was a shift from traditional authoritarianism to a new form of hybrid regime.

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<sup>8</sup> Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World”, *The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution* 1-39. 2007:1.

<sup>9</sup> Leonardo Morlino, “Are there Hybrid Regimes? Or are they Just an Optical Illusion?” *European Political Science Review* 273-296 1(2009): 287.

Heydemann proposes in his paper on authoritarian upgrading that there are five features of this phenomenon, and he confirms that they are present in both Jordan and Morocco. The five points listed by Heydemann are: “1. appropriating and containing civil societies, 2. managing political contestation, 3. capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms, 4. controlling new communication technologies, 5. diversifying international linkages”<sup>10</sup>.

By examining each feature and its implementation in either Jordan or Morocco, this thesis will try to draw a comparison between each of the two countries, to see where they are heading on the authoritarian upgrading ladder. Although no specific grading scale will be produced at the end of the research, studying the above mentioned features will make it easier to relatively measure the degree of authoritarianism and its evolution between Jordan and Morocco.

The type and impact of civil society groups, the space given for opposition to maneuver, the influence of reform whether political or economic, the surveillance of new technologies and the type of relations that the monarchies share with key groups within their kingdoms and with international players will each be examined independently. Afterwards, the type of authoritarian regime in Morocco could be measured against that found in Jordan, to see whether there is a genuine shift toward a softer version of authoritarianism.

To be able to determine how this selection process takes place, Heydemann’s five features of authoritarian upgrading will be examined in the two monarchies before and after the “Arab Spring”. If there is a change in regime mechanism in all the features, then the model applies to the two case selections. If there is no regime reaction or change, it either means the variable did not impact the survival of the

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<sup>10</sup> Heydemann, 5.b

monarchies or the regime mechanism of handling it before the “Arab Spring” was more than enough to keep it out of the threat zone. If some of the features apply and others do not, this falsifies the model on the case studies but does not rule out the possibility of having partial authoritarian upgrading.

Moreover, to deal with legitimacy basis, this research has a historical element to be studied. The sources of legitimacy of both Jordan and Morocco have to be traced back in time, concurrently with a research on the current process of change or limited liberalization in the two states.

Historical analysis thus constitutes a major element in the methodology, as it reveals the context behind main concepts in this thesis, namely on the state formation of Jordan and Morocco, the origins of tribal-state relations and the institution building processes in both states. Furthermore, historical analysis helps the merging of the past with the present, by allowing present-day theories on survival of monarchies to be explained by events or processes that date back to the beginning of state formation.

Primary and secondary sources are to be examined and analyzed for qualitative research mainly; this includes specialized journals, books and newspaper articles. Furthermore, this research will include a section on analysis of several reports, Freedom House, and Bertelsmann Stiftung only to name a few. Recent reports, which focus on the period post- “Arab Spring”, will be examined to see how the two non-oil producing states are doing on the authoritarian upgrading scale.

### **Literature Review:**

Despite the absence of much literature on the lack of transformation in Arab monarchies, there seems to be a consensus among writers, on reasons for the survival of such regimes from the wave of revolutions in “Arab Spring”. In his article “The

Resilience of Monarchy”, Ludger Kuhnhardt emphasized that “the strongest source of authority of contemporary monarchies in the Arab world (and elsewhere) is the traditional legitimacy attributed to their rule”<sup>11</sup>. In Morocco and Jordan specifically, the kings are still loved and respected as the rightful rulers of the state because the legitimacy of their rule is backed by religious claims.

Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause confirm that “the Alaouite Crown of Morocco and the Hashemite House of Jordan claim descent from [Prophet] Muhammad himself”<sup>12</sup>. This automatically grants them the right to be the heirs of the thrones; hence, not facing the same challenges of having to defend their rule, like leaders in Arab republics. Nur Koprulu further stresses on the issue of legitimacy to rule specifically for the Jordanian monarchy, arguing that King Abdullah I was able to consolidate his rule through focusing on the “political power of non-Transjordanian dwellers, stressing the tribal elements of the nascent Jordanian identity”<sup>13</sup>. Both religious and tribal legitimacy added to the element of loyalty to the royal family before that to the nation state. Further literature focuses on the state formation of non-oil producing monarchies, the division of politics, the handling of opposition and “Arab Spring” protests.

James L. Gelvin, touches upon why he believes the Moroccan King has retained his position, stating: “the King of Morocco bases his right to rule on his descent from a dynasty reaching back as far as the seventeenth century”<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, with the King’s full command over the military and the police force since the

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<sup>11</sup> Ludger Kuhnhardt, “The Resilience of Arab Monarchy,” *Policy Review* 57-67. 173(2012): 63.

<sup>12</sup> Sean L. Yom and F. Gregory Gause, “Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On,” *Journal of Democracy* 74-88. 23(2012): 77.

<sup>13</sup> Nur Koprulu, “Consolidated Monarchies in the Post, ‘Arab Spring’ Era: the Case of Jordan,” *Israel Affairs* 1-10 (2014): 7.

<sup>14</sup> James L. Gelvin, *The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 121.

country's independence, he has been able to lock down his grip on the institutional foundations of the state, further preventing power sharing.

This emphasis on institutional control by Arab monarchies was also supported by Yom and Gause, "Kings organizationally stand above everyday politics, they can skillfully intervene in the system to spearhead controlled reforms, that diffuse public discontent."<sup>15</sup> By controlling state apparatuses, through institutions and important governmental positions, monarchs are able to allow or limit opposition to their rule, civil liberties and public political participation. Furthermore, and specifically in Morocco and Jordan, Kings "often outmaneuver opposition by offering limited democratic openings"<sup>16</sup>. These democratic openings usually do not reflect a genuine move towards democratization; on the contrary, they are announced in an effort to cover for government shortcomings. Whether these democratic openings are indeed effective or not will be later discussed in depth, as the research crystallizes.

Another point of analysis is the mechanism of control for Arab monarchs; Kuhnhardt argues that "most personal and patrimonial rulers in postcolonial societies resorted to similar mechanisms to maintain their position: patronage, clientalism, theft, corruption, crime and violence"<sup>17</sup>. Arab monarchs in Morocco and Jordan used some of those tactics to rule; however, their traditional legitimacy and the tribal affiliations sugarcoated those actions and gave them the necessary space to politically limit their people.

Adding to the above-mentioned, Yom and Gause comment on the secret to successful rulings of Arab monarchs stating: "Arab kings, emirs, and sultans command natural authority thanks to Islamic values, tribal mores, and hereditary

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<sup>15</sup> Yom and Gause, 75.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 75.

<sup>17</sup> Kuhnhardt, 63.

principles that resonate in their societies”<sup>18</sup>. The literature available seems to be focused on the concept of inherent legitimacy to rule, whether through religious claims, historical backing, slight political openness or institutional control.

To be able to understand what exactly holds monarchies together, one needs to have an in-depth analysis of Jordan’s and Morocco’s state-formation and its institutions, as well as historical background and progress. In addition, the element of adapting to regional social, economic and political shifts has to be analyzed, in order to note the impact of the “Arab Spring” on non-oil-producing monarchies. This is where the concept of upgraded authoritarianism comes in handy.

Change in the nature of the authoritarian rule for Arab monarchies, especially in Jordan and Morocco, has been gradual. Steven Heydemann in his analysis on upgraded authoritarianism confirms that although Arab regimes generally maintain their authoritarian nature, they have also been able to slightly cope with calls for democratization even before the Arab popular uprisings. Heydemann states that Arab regimes have “expanded political spaces- electoral arenas in particular- where controlled forms of political contestation can occur. They have also tempered their opposition to Islamist political participation”<sup>19</sup>. With regard to Jordan and Morocco specifically, Heydemann confirms that both states have been able to slightly open up to opposition, and in a manner that secured considerable participation in parliaments.

According to Martin Beck and Simone Huser, there’s a clear difference between non-oil-producing monarchies and other republics or oil-producing monarchies in the Middle East. Beck and Huser categorize Jordan and Morocco as “stable authoritarian systems”, whereby popular protests in those two countries did take place at the time the revolutionary wave swept the Arab world. However, “if the

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<sup>18</sup> Yom and Gause, 77.

<sup>19</sup> Heydemann, 1.

political situation in the two monarchies before the “Arab Spring” is compared with the situation in 2011, it becomes clear that there has been an unmistakable qualitative leap in the political mobilization of society”<sup>20</sup>. Due to the gradual liberalization implemented by the monarchs in Jordan and Morocco, a stabilizing mechanism was able to formulate, which helped in their survival from the “Arab Spring”.

It is important to take note of yet another point made by Beck and Huser, which confirms that even within this ‘non-oil-producing monarchies’ category, regime reaction towards the popular protests was not homogenous. Beck and Huser “questioned whether Morocco is undergoing a genuine process of democratization or simply liberalization. In Jordan, however, there are strong indicators that political change has so far been limited to purely cosmetic reforms”<sup>21</sup>. This of course, is not enough information to decide whether transformation really did take place in Morocco as opposed to Jordan, it is merely stating what literature has to offer on this topic.

This conclusion by the two authors is based on the degree of liberalization and the type of reform held by each monarch. Beck and Huser add that in Morocco, there was a referendum on a new constitution in 2011 and there were sharper demands for an independent judiciary, which were addressed by the King through “absolving the minister of justice from his supervisory role over the Superior Council of Magistrates”<sup>22</sup>. Although to a large extent the Moroccan King retained his powers, and in some cases, has gained even more leverage to appoint almost half of the members of the Superior Council, the changes that he implemented confirmed to Beck and Huser that actual, gradual liberalization in Morocco is underway.

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<sup>20</sup> Martin Beck and Simone Huser, “Political Change in the Middle East: An Attempt to Analyze the ‘Arab Spring’”, *German Institute of Global and Area Studies: Institute of Middle East Studies* 1-35 2012: 20

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 23.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

Other literature by Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Juli Minoves also confirms that the Moroccan king had on several occasions, post the 2011 protests, been able to outmaneuver the protestors by offering political and social solutions to the kingdom's problems. Stepan, Linz and Minoves confirm that it was a shortcoming from the February 20<sup>th</sup> Movement that they called "for constitutional changes without also demanding free and fair elections for a constituent assembly"<sup>23</sup>. This allowed the king to take advantage of the volatile position he is in and put himself on top of politics once again, as the initiator of possible liberalization in the country.

In Jordan on the other hand, reforms to the electoral law were implemented, new parliamentary elections were in place and an anticorruption campaign was launched, all after the "Arab Spring". However Beck and Huser state: "it must be noted that a new electoral law and the promotion of political parties alone would not change the fact that the parliament is a weak institution in Jordan's political system"<sup>24</sup>. Having applied reforms on institutions that do not possess the necessary power for decision-making has left open criticism against the Jordanian monarch, in wake of the somewhat more evident reforms in its Moroccan counterpart.

Katerina Dalacoura's article also adds to Beck and Huser's research. Dalacoura confirms that relative to the rest of the Arab countries that witnessed protests in 2011, Jordan and Morocco have seen only minor demonstrations in both countries, but responses by the monarchs reflected an image of a liberalized vision, which calmed down the public to some extent. When discussing Morocco, Dalacoura confirms that amendments to the Moroccan constitution "opened up the political system to a degree and included some important reforms, for instance strengthening

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<sup>23</sup> Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Juli Minoves, "Democratic Parliamentary Monarchies," *Journal of Democracy* 35-51 25(2014): 15.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*, 22.



parliament and making Amazigh (Berber) an official language”<sup>25</sup>. This move also touches upon the societal implications of adding Berber as an official language, because it is playing on the fabric of the Moroccan society, in a sense being inclusive of its significant Berber community.

Dalacoura also had some comments on the reforms in Jordan, stating: “amendments would strengthen the judiciary and the protection of civil and political rights”<sup>26</sup>. These small, yet gradual, attempts at liberalization seem to be protecting the monarchies that lack the financial resources to compensate their people. However, as Dalacoura and many others note about the situations in Morocco and Jordan, “the kings’ executive powers remain undiminished and they retain the right to appoint the prime minister”<sup>27</sup>.

Some of the literature examining monarchies in the Arab world even provided predictions on their fate, confirming that their survival cannot solely depend on their right to rule anymore. Jane Kinninmont foresees that the survival of Arab monarchies in general is a short term process, as it ignores the fact that “most of the republics- including Egypt, Iraq and Libya, all of which saw their hereditary rulers overthrown by coups in the 1950s and 1960s- were monarchies once too”<sup>28</sup>. A second, more important point made by Kinninmont is the assessment of the degree of legitimacy that the monarchs have; “perceptions of royal legitimacy are difficult to evaluate in political contexts which lack reliable opinion polls or a free press, and which typically have laws against ‘insulting the ruler’”. Measuring legitimacy and confirming its authenticity is clearly hard in Arab monarchies, especially if there is a degree of repression involved.

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<sup>25</sup> Katerina Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications”, *International Affairs* 63-79. 88 (2012): 72.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, 73.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, 73.

<sup>28</sup> Jane Kinninmont, “Arab Monarchies Cannot Survive by Divine Right Alone”, *World Today* 2012:1.

Stepan, Linz and Minoves however had a different outlook with regard to the future of monarchies, focusing more on reasons that prevent them from falling. The authors specifically focused on idea that Morocco is a country that has great ties with its international allies (U.S., France and Spain), a reason they believe is strong enough to prevent any attempt to overthrow the monarchy; “should internal conditions ever become ripe for a move toward democratic parliamentary monarchy, these three powers would support it”<sup>29</sup>. As for their commentary on Jordan, the authors confirmed that the country’s situation is stable in the hands of its monarchy for the moment. This is mainly because the king has proposed change that has not yet crystallized into proper action reflecting real democratization, while the public response has lost a lot of its momentum. The authors propose that that for transformation to take place, “the people should keep trying, [and] create more political pressure”<sup>30</sup>, an element that is not so visible on the Jordanian political scene today.

This literature review has focused on the elements that helped non-oil-producing monarchies survive, until this day, the “Arab Spring”. The dual causes of legitimacy in all its forms and authoritarian upgrading have been clearly marked, and some of the challenges facing the monarchies listed.

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<sup>29</sup> Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Juli Minoves, 45.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 49.

## CHAPTER II

### FEATURES OF REGIME DOMINATION

#### **Post-Independence Modern day State-Formation:**

Jordan and Morocco were breaking off from the colonial powers in their strive for independence; and although they were sharing similar experiences and having the same rentier character, amongst other traits, the state-formation of non-oil producing monarchies differed between the two states.

On the one hand, Morocco has been under the rule of the Alawi dynasty since the seventeenth century and continued to be so throughout Morocco's colonial experience as a protectorate of Spain and France, until its independence in 1956. This long-standing family rule represents centuries of ownership to the throne; even throughout the early 1950s, when Sultan Mohamed V was forced into exile, he still believed that the sovereignty of Morocco was tied to the rule of his family and their duty to serve the people<sup>31</sup>. This entitlement to rule was further bolstered by the presence of a strong nationalist movement that was fighting off the Spanish and French occupation forces and rooting for the return of the monarchy as the sole independent unit holding the state together. In addition, Sultan Mohamed defied the colonial powers and declared his support for independence,

“this act, along with his increasing confrontation with the Residency, and the increasingly outspoken nationalist movement's choice to elevate Sultan Mohamed as a symbol of Moroccan sovereignty, enhanced his prestige as a sign of continuity of the Moroccan state”<sup>32</sup>.

Not only did the nationalist movement support the return of the monarch from exile, but they also iconized his return as one of the achievements of the movement against colonial powers. The monarch became embedded in the foundational pillars of the

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<sup>31</sup> James Sater, *Morocco: Challenges to Tradition and Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 23.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

Moroccan modern state and his presence was existential to the continuity of the “authentic combination of traditional, religious and modern sovereignty”<sup>33</sup>.

Mohamed V was able to consolidate his power grip over the independent Moroccan state by ensuring the support of a group of loyalists; “at independence, more than 70 per cent of the population was living in rural areas controlled by rural notables...[they] would become the King’s loyal political force”<sup>34</sup>. However, this rural-urban break also resembled Mohamed’s ability to manage the different social, political and ethnic factions in the country in a way that better served the survival of his monarchy. This manner of manipulating social gaps, favoring some over others while concurrently maintaining relations with all has been a strategy used by Mohamed V and passed on to Hassan II. For Hassan II especially, this mechanism proved helpful on the political scene, where “he sought constitutionalism and elections as a means not to be associated to Sultanic despotism-even if real power was increasingly located in informal royal networks and shadow ministries consisting of appointed advisers”<sup>35</sup>.

The significance of supporting the monarchy in the newly independent state was a crucial matter to the colonial powers, especially France. Certain interests had to be maintained under a different type of relation than colonizer and colonized, one that is based on “a form of interdependence that would guarantee its [France’s] economic and geo-strategic interests”<sup>36</sup>. By ensuring that power is saturated exclusively in the hands of the monarchy, rather than any other body in Morocco, France was able to strike two birds with one stone. On the one hand, its state interests were met through their alliance with the King, and on the other, they satisfied the Moroccans’ goal of

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 29.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 26.

gaining independence. This support was embodied in different forms, the most significant of which was the military and police forces that safeguarded the throne of the monarchy from opposition.

On the other hand, the Hashemites were associated with the Hijaz until colonial powers, namely Britain and France, ushered the way into a partitioned Middle East. The supposedly strategic alliance that the late King Abdullah I bin al-Hussein shared with the British ended up crushing his expansionist vision of a more unified Greater Syria region under his leadership, and in 1923 left him as Emir of Transjordan under British guidance<sup>37</sup>. As a means to assert power over his emirate, Abdullah I under British supervision introduced land reforms that restructured the power division between tribesmen and other individuals in the area. Land was redistributed in a manner that empowered those individuals to become the “new class, a land-owning elite whose interests lay with the newly land-wealthy King”<sup>38</sup>; while concurrently maintaining loyalty of and control over tribal sheikhs. These land reforms also served economic purposes for the state, as they eased the process of tax collection and enhanced the agricultural production process<sup>39</sup>.

Pillars of the modern state started to consolidate in various elements, especially through providing security and services to the people; “establishing law and order and protecting the agricultural communities was the first priority of the government”<sup>40</sup>. Health services, loans for agricultural development, enhanced infrastructure and the emphasis on the presence and protection of the country’s borders were all signs of transformation from emirate to established modern state.

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<sup>37</sup> Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 21.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>39</sup> Yoav Alon, *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2007), 125.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, 73.

Although this was a difficult process, many alterations yielded positive results for the emirate; “the country was stabilized, raids ceased in the settled zone, agricultural communities enjoyed a degree of security and the Treasury collected taxes”<sup>41</sup>.

In March 1946, around two decades after the establishment of the emirate, Transjordan finally gained its independence from the British and was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. By then, Abdullah I was able to create certain pillars that would hold his newly born state; he “developed key institutions, including the country’s 1928 Organic Law, which planted the seeds for a fully fledged constitution”<sup>42</sup>. Abdullah also needed to secure the throne from opposition and make sure that he had enough military capabilities to do so; therefore, he turned to the British “for establishing [a] central authority backed by substantial military force”<sup>43</sup>. Not only was this Abdullah’s plan to block possible opposition, but it was also means to balancing the tribal power that previously dominated the political scene.

Between Abdullah’s assassination in 1951 and the short-lived reign of his son Talal bin Abdullah between 1951-2, the newly established kingdom was inherited to the late King Hussein bin Talal. Jordan’s state formation years were marked with challenges to fight off colonialism, to create modern day state institutions and to leave the country in the hands of a ruler capable of absorbing the social, economic and political challenges of the state and turn them into viable conditions to work with. For many, Hussein was able to do just that; he was considered “the father of the modern state...Hussein’s genuine biculturalism, which allowed him to feel at ease in the West as much as in the East, helped forge a climate of openness and tolerance”<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>42</sup> Joseph A. Kechichian, *Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 350.

<sup>43</sup> Alon, 43.

<sup>44</sup> Kechichian, 354.

This section discussed in detail the state formation processes of Morocco and Jordan post-independence, with certain reflections on previous rulers and the manner in which they held the power grip in both countries. The role of Mohamed VI and Abdullah II is not mentioned in this part of the thesis, because further chapters carefully examine the dealings of these two monarchs with opposition, civil society, economic and political dilemmas, as well as foreign ties with international and regional players.

Despite being both non-oil producing monarchies of similar features, Morocco and Jordan proved to have different colonial experiences and state formation types. Morocco has a long history of Alawi rule since the seventeenth century and its colonial experience was one that pushed the monarchy to be call for a stronger nationalist movement. Jordan however, is a constructed state, carved out of agreements that partitioned the Middle East. It is a state that rests on tribal alliances with the monarchy and the continued interference of political and economic foreign presence. Yet, it is still important to note that the similarity lies in the manipulation of certain social groupings that would later become the monarch's loyalists. This of course is one of many similarities that will be outlined in the next section on religious and tribal legitimacy.

In this section, there was little emphasis on the role of the tribes, their integration into the modern state and the form of reinforcement they provide for the state, despite their significance in the state formation. The reason tribes are going to be discussed in the next section is to integrate the essence of tribal structures with the concept of legitimacy to rule, as discussed in the conceptual framework of this thesis.

### **Legitimacy: Religious and Tribal**

As mentioned in the conceptual framework, this thesis rests on the argument that legitimacy of different types has been a determining factor in the survival of non-oil producing monarchies in the Arab region. This section studies in-depth the religious and tribal elements that the monarchs of Morocco and Jordan used as means to fuse legitimacy with their rule.

Both in Morocco and Jordan the monarchs claim lineage to the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). In Morocco, the King holds the title “Commander of the Faithful”; he is the one to whom the people have pledged allegiance and promised to protect through a special relationship that puts him above all matters that tend to separate them<sup>45</sup>. The title Commander of the Faithful does not just add the element of legitimacy to rule over the throne, but it also attaches a sacred-like feature to the King; “attacking him would be both a crime and a sacrilege-inseparable notions in this logic-at once a violation of divine law and desacralization of a figure of Islamic piety”<sup>46</sup>.

This example is not exclusive to Morocco only. In Jordan as well, the King is regarded as a red line and offending him would be considered a crime, as descendants of the Prophet (PBUH) also include the Hashemites family, who root back to the Prophet’s daughter Fatimah<sup>47</sup>. Moreover, the idea that the monarchy is directly linked to the Prophet (PBUH) gives the Jordanian and Moroccan people the reassurance that what is sent from above will prevail over earthly matters<sup>48</sup>. This way of thought stresses the importance of the monarchy as an institution -with a strong religious backing-, as a crucial element for the survival of the state, not only from external

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<sup>45</sup>Abdellah Hammoudi. *Master and Disciple: the Cultural Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 13.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>47</sup> Kechichian ,349.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 14.



threats but also from internal political and societal matters that could be points of dispute between people.

Before diving in to the tribe-state relations and the integration of tribes into the modern state system, focus should be placed on the notion of *baya'a* (oath of allegiance) that groups in both countries have pledged to the monarchs. The concept of *baya'a* epitomizes the type of legitimacy that the people give to the King; *baya'a* “makes him effectively stand above constitutional constraints...it confers divine powers on the King ‘the holder of the legitimate authority is God’s shadow on earth and his secular arm in the world’”<sup>49</sup>. The *baya'a* ultimately means submission of the people to the king and the hierarchy that he tops as the main decision maker.

Due to the importance of gaining people’s loyalty in both countries, many state-group relations had to be modified, especially tribal ones. Tribe-state relations had to be carefully monitored and maintained during the state formation years of Jordan and Morocco. Tribal structures had to be examined and reshaped with the formation of the modern state, to ensure the loyalty of the tribesmen to the monarchy and to also appeal to such groups so they can later be appointed in key positions under the supervision of the King.

Sealing tribal alliances paved the way for the monarchs to use the social order within these groups to control the process of integrating them into the state system. During state-formation years, the concepts of kinship, descent and the dominance of a certain hierarchy in tribal organization were manipulated by the state to promote territorial and other authority-related matters<sup>50</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> Sater, 6.

<sup>50</sup> Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East* (California: University of California Press, 1990), 50.

Morocco's tribal structure differs from Jordan's; although both share similar characteristics of tribal groups, the purpose, transformation and role of tribes varied between the two countries.

Tribes in Morocco are not a single unit and are consistent of different populations, Arabs and Amazigh; therefore, their analysis should incorporate each of the groups and their assimilation into the new modern state. There were two power hubs in Morocco; *bled el-makhzen* and *bled es-siba*; "the former was under the effective control of the sharifien government and paid taxes to the *makhzen*, while *bled es-siba* recognized the spiritual legitimacy of the monarch, but was dissident in its refusal to pay taxes to the *makhzen* coffers"<sup>51</sup>. Before further expansion on the *Makhzen* and its meaning, it should be noted that although *bled es-siba* refused to pay taxes, they still maintained their legitimacy to the throne and its right to rule. *Makhzen* literally means 'treasurer'; it symbolizes the institutional power of the monarchy, and is also considered a regulator of conflict issues, under the guardianship of the King. Learning the meaning and significance of the *Makhzen* is very critical in understanding the role of tribal leaders in Morocco, as they are considered to be groups under the banner of the *Makhzen*, the main institution regulating the state.

In the process of state formation, some tribal leaders or *caids* governed local administrations, and "allied themselves with *Makhzen* in order to protect their territorial and economic interests"<sup>52</sup>. Yet others, specifically *bled es-siba* (mainly affiliated with the Amazigh population) found their interests served with the French colonial rulers. The French wanted a strategic plan that would weaken the Moroccan state; but simultaneously needed to find a possible ally within the population. This match obviously had consequences on the state composition, as the French

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<sup>51</sup> Mohamed Daadaoui, *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 45.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 46.

protectorate “curtailed most of the administrative powers of the sultan and replaced its traditional administration with modern bureaucratic and technocratic structures”<sup>53</sup>. At this point, *bled es-siba* also came under the control of the monarchy and was integrated to balance against the other tribal groups in the country.

It is important to note that the position of some tribes was controversial at the time of state formation, especially with their relation to the monarch. Many *caids* reinforced and pushed forward the petition that called for Mohamed V’s exile; so, it was quiet difficult for him to reinstate them in trustworthy positions once he was back<sup>54</sup>. The monarch kept all groups under his administrative control; however, only the rural notables were the ones to form the loyalist group for King Mohamed V at the time of independence<sup>55</sup>.

The idea that the Moroccan monarch ultimately handles matters of the *Makhzen* allows him to reside over everyday politics, country spending and the overall decision-making process. As for the tribal leaders, those who managed to avoid signing the exile petition were allowed to run businesses and protect their interests vis-à-vis the monarchy. Others who allied with the French still fell under the territorial expansion scheme and administrative leadership of the king. The *caids* or the local tribal leaders were not treated all as a single unit, as the case in Jordan; the Moroccan King managed them in groups according to their earlier political stances.

In Jordan, the case is somewhat different; the structure of the modern state was a mirror reflection of that of the tribes. Therefore, by operating in the same organizational system, it was easier for the government to provide services “ranging from tax distribution, collection or exemption to the control of the spread of diseases

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, 46.

<sup>54</sup> Sater, 24.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, 24.

or organizing the elections to the Legislative Council<sup>56</sup>. Abdullah I was also smart to incorporate the tribal element in the state, without altering the structure of the tribes themselves; “employing chiefs as mediators between the government and the tribesmen and minimal interference in the social structure of the tribes proved effective strategies”<sup>57</sup>. Abdullah was also able to keep check of the tribal leaders, who in turn ensured the maintenance of stability within their groups. The King further provided the tribal Sheikhs with services and material rewards, important recognition in public, the chance to join him on tours around the kingdom, the ability to evade tax-paying, and the privilege of overriding government decisions<sup>58</sup>.

Jordan’s transformation into a modern state rested on this inclusion of the tribal element. The tribes were too strong and dominant to be excluded from politics, yet weak enough to be coopted by the King. Yet, the presence of groups that follow certain hierarchies internally later reflected as a problem of security to the state. In the case of Jordanian tribes, the government found it extremely difficult to exert power in tribal strongholds and “it demanded that the Shaykhs guarantee security in their area of influence themselves, to prevent crimes of all kinds”<sup>59</sup>. Although the security-related fate of some areas remained under tribal supervision, the Sheikhs guaranteed loyalty for the king, because he on the other hand is the sole person who feeds their chieftaincy system and keeps it vital. In a system of mutual beneficiary, the king and the tribes found ways to mutually co-exist and share power.

Legitimacy, whether religious or tribal, seemed to benefit the monarchs of both Jordan and Morocco. In the case of Morocco, religious legitimacy seemed to be the more dominant type, especially that even the dissident tribes were earlier outside

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<sup>56</sup> Alon, 65.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid,70.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 42.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 66.

the administrative control of the state, but still responded to the religious authority and dominance of the monarch. This not only legitimizes his rule, but also allows him to make the necessary changes, whether political or social, with unlimited space. This space to maneuver was apparent the most when Mohamed V expanded his control over *bled es-siba*, without altering the status of the *Makhzen*: “the modernization of the administrative apparatus, [and] the construction of a bureaucratic structure...may have signaled a rupture with the old *Makhzen*. However, the heart of the authority of the *Makhzen* remained unchanged<sup>60</sup>.

In the case of Jordan, religious legitimacy holds a great weight in the legitimacy of the King, yet tribal legitimacy and the insurance that tribes would support the monarch also played a vital role in the survival of the monarchical institution. It seems like the tribal element in Jordanian politics had a saying in the security and stability of the state, especially in areas where tribal arrangements dominate the state. Furthermore, it is obvious that the pillars of the Jordanian state rest upon the ties of the monarchy and the tribal order above all; “the regime promotes loyalties based on the desire to defend both the honor of the tribes and the institution of the monarchy rather than to defend the notion of the nation state”<sup>61</sup>.

This point does not undermine the religious backings of the Jordanian monarch against the Moroccan one. It merely notes that the religious dominance of the latter was linear, continuous and most notable amongst other types of legitimacy, and it remained consistent despite colonial rule and internal gap threats. While the religious element of the former had to be coupled with other supportive types of legitimacy, to construct formal institutions of the state and help maintain it.

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<sup>60</sup> Daadaoui, 54.

<sup>61</sup> Mohammed Ali Al Oudat and Ayman Alshboul, “‘Jordan First’: Tribalism, Nationalism and Legitimacy of Power in Jordan”, *Intellectual Discourse* 65-96. 18 (2010): 66.

## **State Institutions and National Campaigns Pre-“Arab Spring”**

Fear of losing the power grip in the state is less evident in monarchies than republics, due to a certain reassurance from the people that the monarchies have the right to rule. However, this does not exclude the idea that monarchies also have certain state institutions and mechanisms to carefully ensure their optimal control over the state. Control can be manifested in two manners; either physically on the ground, through military and police apparatus or controlled elections for example, or emotionally through creating national campaigns and slogans that bolster the national sentiments of the populations at hand. This section examines and analyzes the state institutions and national campaigns used by Morocco and Jordan, to see what mechanisms they use for state survival.

Morocco and Jordan are both constitutional monarchies that have the façade of a democratic system in place, but in truth the king has the final call on all decisions taking place in the country. Note that this section emphasizes on the pre-“Arab Spring” mechanisms and national campaigns, so that it can later be compared to the post-“Arab Spring” reforms and state changes. This comparison will highlight the elements of transformation and how the two monarchies coped with the challenges they faced since 2011.

Morocco and Jordan have a bicameral system of parliament, consisting of two chambers; in Morocco, there exists the House of Representatives and House of Councilors, while in Jordan, there is the House of Representatives and the House of Senate. In both cases, the bicameral system is double -faced mirror, reflecting democratic practices on the outside, while truly protecting the monarchy and its interests on the inside. Bicameralism in such cases does not truly reflect the representation of the people; on the contrary, it works for and is operated by the

monarch in place; “in theory, bicameralism is supported to bolster the image of a legislative institution that is representative of the preferences of various interests...in practice, bicameralism was designed to reinforce the pre-existing social and political divisions”<sup>62</sup>. Not only that, but parliament is utilized in a way that maximizes the presence of loyalists, while still maintaining stability in “representation of tribal, ethnic and religious forces”<sup>63</sup>. So long as parliament members are kept under close watch, to ensure that they would maintain the status quo rather than create disturbances, their presence will only remain as a façade of democracy that is in no way representative of the people’s actual demands and needs.

Another stronghold for both monarchs is the ability to control government and remain on top of everyday politics. The king selects ministers in the cabinet as civil servant figures, who achieve their purpose of fulfilling his orders<sup>64</sup>. The dilemma here is the deadlock that keeps emerging after lack of change frustrates the people; blame is placed on the government, especially the residing prime minister, who in the first place is just following orders and in reality “has no legal or constitutional authority over his cabinet”<sup>65</sup>. This gives the monarchs the advantage of reshuffling the cabinet as a temporary fix to popular pressures.

National identity and emphasis on national unity through state sponsored campaigns is one of the most coordinated ways to informally influence the people and create a single project they can all relate to. In both Jordan and Morocco, the issue of national identity is quite controversial, due to the presence of a diverse population (especially with Berbers in Morocco and Palestinians in Jordan). The existence of such distinct groups pushes the state to construct a national identity specifically to

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<sup>62</sup> Anouar Boukhars, *Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and Enlightened Authoritarianism* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 44.

<sup>63</sup> Al Oudat and Alshboul, 88.

<sup>64</sup> Boukhars, 45.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid, 45.

defy issues that cause divisions in society. This issue also has collateral effects, especially for the monarchy, demonstrating it as the protector of its diverse population. How the national campaigns differ between Morocco and Jordan is defined below.

This issue can be highlighted in the Moroccan scene through the national campaign that aims at including the Berber community for example, which increasingly, has been adding pressure to be recognized by the monarchy. By assimilating the Berber community and integrating it into the fabric of the Moroccan society,

“the king recognizes the multicultural nature of Morocco and defines Moroccan national identity as more than exclusively Arab, but a blend of many cultures and languages...the monarchy’s recognition of Berber is seen as a political tool to garner support from all Moroccans and international organizations, and to quiet most Berber activists”<sup>66</sup>.

This campaign however presents a problem to the monarchy; on the one hand it is trying to paint this image of a tolerant and diverse society to widen its support base. On the other hand, there is popular rejection by Arabs to the idea of recognizing Berbers, the “largest and from time to time the most restive ethnic minority in Morocco,”<sup>67</sup> as part of the Moroccan community, which can also act as a challenge. This dilemma even presents itself culturally, where some people refuse that their children even learn the Berber language, defining it as inferior<sup>68</sup>.

Earlier national building campaigns in Jordan were complicated due to the presence of strong tribes that hold power in the country. Instead of focusing on the concepts of nationalism and patriotism, emphasis was placed on the interactions of the king with the tribes; “the loyalty of a tribesman grows from a desire to defend the

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<sup>66</sup> Abderrahman Zouhir, “Language Policy and State in Morocco: The Status of Berber”, *Digest of Middle East Studies* 37-53 23(2014): 51.

<sup>67</sup> Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Juli Minoves, 43.

<sup>68</sup> Zouhir, 50.



honor of family, tribe, and king, and not to some abstract notion of Jordanian patriotism”<sup>69</sup>. Yet, with the influx of more Palestinians into the kingdom, a societal rift widened between the Jordanians and Palestinian Jordanians, leaving the monarchy in quite a challenging position to find a balance to accommodate the needs of both people.

In an effort to diffuse the existing societal gap, a new national campaign was launched under the title *al-Urdun awwalan*, literally translating to Jordan First. The purpose of the campaign was to emphasize the rights and liberties of all Jordanians (regardless their country of origin), in an effort to overcome obstacles to modernization; to the monarchy, “it was a matter of assuring some degree of cohesion and establishing the ‘political legitimacy’ necessary for the gradual change to a modern nation-state”<sup>70</sup>. However, this process of building a national identity also backfired, bringing out more oppositional voices against the regime and concurrently highlighting the economic mishap in the country. In the process of trying to diffuse the gap, more Jordanians lost their ability to connect through the tribal elements and its concepts of honor and loyalty, while Palestinian Jordanians found it as an opportunity to voice their discontent at the state<sup>71</sup>.

The difference between Morocco and Jordan is that the process of integrating the Berbers into the Moroccan society was a matter of gradually absorbing a group that has always been part of the Moroccan identity, despite ongoing difficulty and negative popular attitudes. However in Jordan, integrating two people with separate national identities, while simultaneously attempting to recreate a unified identity seemed like a much harder task for the monarchy. By claiming the Moroccan identity above all, the monarchy was able to maintain the legitimacy of its own national

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<sup>69</sup> Al Oudat and Alshboul, 70.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 81.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 87.

identity, with it being more inclusive of other groups. However, in Jordan, by reconstructing a new identity that overrode values of tribal elements and disregarding the origins of many Palestinian Jordanians, the monarchy lost some of its political legitimacy as promoter of Jordanian nationalism.

In this chapter, similarities and differences were highlighted between the two countries; yet, one of the most defining characters that distinguish them apart is the nature of handling political opposition. Although indirect mechanisms of control are discussed under the title of state institutions in this chapter, the details of understanding political opposition is examined thoroughly in the following chapter. Juggling political opposition in constitutional monarchies is very difficult, especially when the purpose of the system defies its representative aspect. Studying the nature of political opposition and the manner in which their handling differed between non-oil producing states can inform us more on its organization and strength, as means to understand the possible alternatives to the monarchical institution.

## CHAPTER III

### OPPOSITION HANDLING PRE-2011 REVOLUTIONARY WAVE

Chapter three studies in-depth the monarchies' mechanisms of control over political opposition, specifically in the period pre-"Arab Spring"; as Morocco and Jordan handled opposition differently, yet both succeeded in crippling opposition groups in the kingdoms. Examining the conditions of opposition groups pre-2011 revolutionary wave allows for a comparison to be made about the monarchies' ability to absorb the wave without giving enough space for opposition to crystallize into an apparent threat to the monarchical institution.

#### **Divide, Rotate and Rule: Morocco vs. Jordan**

The manner in which political opposition is handled in Morocco and Jordan determines the type of constitutional monarchy the states adopt. The multi-party system in Morocco allows the monarch to control opposition through a divide and rule strategy, giving parties the opportunity to participate in politics and ensuring that they weaken each other through competition. While in Jordan, the opposition is dealt with as a single bloc, with challengers fighting against and criticizing the actions of the regime, regardless of their ideological differences<sup>72</sup>. A distinguishing feature between Morocco and Jordan is that political parties were allowed to operate formally in Morocco since its independence, with the decision consolidated through its 1962 constitution, while their counterparts in Jordan became formally legal to operate only from 1992 onwards.

The Moroccan political scene is complicated; its multi-party system was born out of the monarch's desire to increase competition between the political parties, so

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<sup>72</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition," *Comparative Politics* 159-179 36(2004): 161.

his position as ruler and final arbitrator is not threatened<sup>73</sup>. The democratic façade of existence of political parties only bolstered the position of the king internally and abroad. Internationally, it reflected a more tolerant political space and for Moroccans, it increased legitimacy of the monarch, despite that its purpose in fact is to weaken the most dominant opposition in the country<sup>74</sup>. It is important to also note that with the implementation of the first constitution, it was hard to exclude certain political parties from the political scene completely, seeing as they played an essential role in the process of state formation. The Istiqlal party was a major element in the nationalist movement against the French occupying forces and their role could have only been limited, but not completely eradicated when the decision about the fate of political parties was made in Morocco.

Tensions kept escalating between the monarchy and the opposition throughout the early 1970s, with the King slightly losing grip over rule, and surviving an attempted coup d'état and several assassination plots<sup>75</sup>. Repression and arrests of opposition members continued throughout this period, to reassert Hassan II's control over the political scene and firmly show the opposition that he would not receive threat easily. This rocky period reflected major consequences on political parties in Morocco after the 1970s, where several parties were banned from legally operating, especially those that proved to be in contestation with the king's position.

Since King Hassan's situation was to allow certain political parties to formulate and function under his rule, his strategy was to divide opposition and regulate them; "King Hassan II allowed the growth of the Islamist opposition in the

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<sup>73</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 47.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, 55.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 57.

early 1980s as a counterweight to his secularist opposition”<sup>76</sup>. By allowing the formation of more parties, the Moroccan King ensured that all groups had their share in politics, so as to remain far from the monarchy and its rule.

In 1998, King Hassan was also able to create a new system for dealing with political opposition in a more inclusive manner, through introducing the government of *Alternance*. By alternating in government between political blocs, “opposition would be brought in to head a coalition of the main political parties and independent royalists”<sup>77</sup>; this manner guaranteed a win-win situation for the king. The success of such approach will reflect political legitimacy on the monarch’s behalf and its failure will expose the weakness of opposition. This approach to political parties differed quite distinctly from King Hussein’s approach to political parties operating in Jordan, where no political parties were allowed to operate until the Political Parties Law of 1992 was enacted.

The Jordanian context differed for a couple of reasons. First, the monarchy prohibited the legalization of political parties in Jordan, after a failed military coup in 1957<sup>78</sup>. This of course eliminated the chance for any political participation in the system and as the Moroccan monarch did, Hussein also asserted his full control over the political arena with his loyalists. The difference between the two monarchs was that Hussein excluded political opposition completely, seeing as they acted more of a unified single threat, mobilizing against his position rather than competing groups trying to eliminate one another.

Second, this strategy of exclusion of opposition forces was not a constant plan that King Hussein followed throughout his rule, unlike the one used by his Moroccan

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 59.

<sup>77</sup> Marvinne Howe, *Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and other Challenges* (North Carolina: Oxford University Press, 2005), 230.

<sup>78</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World*, 54.

counterpart to control opposition. From the late-1950s till the period of intended liberalization in the late-1980s, Hussein kept his close watch over opposition, making sure that they ran in parliamentary elections as independent candidates, since political parties were banned. However, the activities of the opposition groups were not entirely hindered by this formal ban of political parties; on the contrary, opposition still tried to perform its role by “rally[ing] social forces, using the professional associations, informal organizations, and underground parties and publications as catalysts for unrest”<sup>79</sup>. It was important for opposition to keep a foot in the political sphere, even if their roles were informal; they were groups that fostered constant pressure to the monarchy and ensured instability to the status quo.

After the economic crisis that shook the kingdom in 1989, King Hussein implemented liberalization policies that reopened the way for parliamentary elections again, legally allowing and regulating political parties, giving more press freedoms, and relatively taking a more democratic turn, although the ultimate decision-making still pertained to the king<sup>80</sup>. This process of liberalization reflected political legitimacy on behalf of the monarchy, portraying a trend of easing up on political opposition internally, while simultaneously proving to the West that a more tolerant political process was underway. In reality, the economic crisis caused the king to remove subsidies and apply a strict plan to abide by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan<sup>81</sup>; therefore appealing to opposition and giving them more space to maneuver was a strategy to alleviate the economic pressure that the people were facing.

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid, 100.

<sup>80</sup> Malik Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan,” *Comparative Political Studies* 100-129 32(1999): 100.

<sup>81</sup> Jillian Schwedler, “Don’t Blink: Jordan’s Democratic Opening and Closing,” *Middle East Research and Information Project* Press Information Note 98, 3 July 2002: 1.

Opposition groups welcomed this change to a multi-party system, as they were at the time calling for political reform rather than the king's abdication to the throne. Political parties across different ideological spectrums were part of this process and any monarchical fears of opposition groups overstepping the king's authority were minimal; King Hussein "was changing the rules of the game without changing the real distribution of power"<sup>82</sup>.

Participation of political parties under authoritarian rules is difficult, and as noted above, it all comes down to the wishes of the monarch and how much political space he is willing to provide opposition with. Despite liberalization attempts in both Morocco and Jordan, it was clear that handling opposition before the 2011 revolutionary wave was a matter of maintaining legitimacy as a cover to other economic downturns rather than an actual step forward towards democratization.

The next section will discuss the actions of the dominant political parties pre-"Arab Spring" and their interactions with the monarchy. Questions like how they perceived regime actions, why did they participate or abstain from participating during elections and what changed for them at the time of the "Arab Spring" will be studied.

### **Islamists' Advantage:**

To be able to understand the role of political opposition before "Arab Spring", the dynamics, history and strategy of the Islamists in both Morocco and Jordan have to be analyzed. The case of the Islamists in Jordan and Morocco will be carefully dissected in the next section to see the development of their political parties and the magnitude of their opposition. Moreover, an in-depth analysis of their roles

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<sup>82</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World*, 106.

culminating up to the “Arab Spring” will be conducted. Since Islamists include different political groups, only the most dominant political parties that participate in formal politics will be examined; the two study cases include the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan.

***Morocco’s Justice and Development Party:***

The Justice and Development Party in Morocco witnessed several developments since its creation in 1997. Its Islamist ideology had to be reshaped to fit into the complex political system of Moroccan politics. This section gives a historical background of the party, its leadership and transformation over time, to see how it politically maneuvered into becoming the most dominant group representing Moroccans and holding position in government in the year of the “Arab Spring”.

The establishment of the PJD in 1997 came with certain rules and regulations; the political party detached itself from the proselytizing faction, the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR) and separated itself from the religious activities the group undertook<sup>83</sup>. This separation for the PJD came in the form of creating a distinct character and form for the party, which was confined within the laws of the Moroccan constitution. It was established for the sole purposes of participating in formal politics, and presented an agenda that dealt with “questions of democratization of governance, institutional and constitutional reforms, and integration of the masses within the national development plans”<sup>84</sup>.

It was clear that the PJD was careful in constructing its political program, to appeal to as many voters as possible. The PJD’s outlook on the elections was skeptic,

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<sup>83</sup> Ashraf El Sherif, “Institutional and Ideological Re-Constructions of the Justice and Development Party (PJD): the Question of Democratic Islamism in Morocco,” *The Middle East Journal* 660-682 66(2012): 661.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, 664.



especially with the idea of joining forces in a national government; the party feared the concept of getting tangled in the hype of politics, so instead it “focused on popular tactics such as the fight against corruption”<sup>85</sup>. This soon turned into a strategy of survival for the Moroccan PJD, addressing issues that do not just pertain to Islamist voters.

Survival strategies for an Islamist party under the rule of an authoritarian regime, especially a multi-party system that fostered the division between political parties required strong leadership. Abd al-Ilah Benkiran, a pragmatist in reality, was “a dove politically, but a cultural hawk”<sup>86</sup>; his interactions with the monarchy amidst other centrist parties elevated his discourse into one that promoted a more moderate stand with the king. Benkiran’s hawkish counterparts in the party have a sharper tone toward the monarch; they believe that a drastic constitutional reform is needed to reassess the powers of the king and set Morocco on a true democratic path<sup>87</sup>.

Benkiran balances himself well between the hawks of the party and the monarchy; he stresses the importance of preserving an Islamist identity but with moderation, he emphasizes constitutional reform but understands that the monarch is above politics and his powers cannot be contested. Benkiran’s most successful strategy was “opposing the workings and performance of the government instead of challenging the legitimacy of the monarchical institution”<sup>88</sup>. Despite the late arrival of the PJD to the Moroccan multi-party system, its leadership under Benkiran allowed it to climb the ladder of power quickly; his moderate positions, his understanding of the limitations of working under an authoritarian regime and his ability to learn from the trial and errors of previous political parties in Morocco took him a long way.

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<sup>85</sup> Eva Wegner, *Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2011), 125.

<sup>86</sup> El Sherif, 664.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, 666.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, 674.

The outlook of the PJD toward parliamentary elections reflected a belief that any change that is to happen has to take place within the system, manipulating the rules of the game, gaining as many votes as possible and entering formal politics. They also tried to improve the image of representative institutions, so that voter perception and regime attitude toward the party would be presented in a more positive light<sup>89</sup>. This attitude pushes the PJD to participate rather than boycott elections in Morocco, and for the party, this outlook meant greater voter turnout and higher popularity.

By defying the obstacles of the political game, and focusing on their political program, the PJD participated in all parliamentary elections after its establishment, but did not take part in the government of *Alternance*.<sup>90</sup> This allowed it to have an advantage over other political groups by the first year of the “Arab Spring”. Here, the Islamist advantage was reflected in the party’s ability to carefully examine strategies of competitive parties, to escape from being scapegoats to the errors of government and portrayed themselves as the powerful alternative by the time the November 2011 parliamentary elections came to light.

#### ***Jordan’s Islamic Action Front:***

As mentioned earlier, political parties in the Jordanian Kingdom were banned from operating until 1992, when King Hussein decided to introduce a new law allowing their political participation. The political parties that formed did not just spring overnight; many of them worked underground for a long period of time; however, “democratic themes had not been prominent in their political agendas or

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<sup>89</sup> Wegner, *Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes*, 142.

<sup>90</sup> El Sherif, 680.

publications prior to the political openings”<sup>91</sup>. One of those existing groups was the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.

Due to the cooperative relations that the royal family shared with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan since its establishment in 1945, it was the only group that was allowed to operate in the realm of social organizations. This of course facilitated the MB’s entrance into the Jordanian political scene. Consequently, as soon as the political openness legalized political parties, the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of Jordan’s MB) was created.

Like its Moroccan counterpart, the IAF reflects a rift between the party leadership, also divided among soft and hard-liners. Of course, the IAF party has one platform, where it “calls for the implementation of Shari’a, denounces corruption, advocates a *Jihad* (struggle) to liberate Palestine, stresses support for the Jordanian Armed Forces and...calls for public freedoms and democratic expansion”<sup>92</sup>. However, the hawks and the doves disagree on positions regarding three main important issues that are critically linked to the decision-making of the party and they are: the Palestinian issue, the role of Islam in governance and the approach toward the political system in the kingdom.<sup>93</sup>

The doves, under the leadership of Hamzeh Mansour, are pragmatic and very supportive of the royal family; they act moderately by emphasizing the importance of following a democratic path while simultaneously reassuring the monarch that they are not after his abdication to the throne<sup>94</sup>. On the other hand, the hawks take on a more rigid stance toward the royal family, as they do not believe the principles of

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<sup>91</sup> Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 52.

<sup>92</sup> Glenn E. Robinson, “Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan,” *The Middle East Journal* 51 (1997): 378.

<sup>93</sup> Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, *Between Religion and Politics* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 55.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid*, 56.

Islam are being applied properly as they should while the Hashemite family is in power.

With regard to participation in electoral politics, at the brink of the first multiparty elections in the Kingdom, a new electoral law favoring tribes over party list was enacted, limiting the participation of the Islamist blocs. Despite this setback by the regime, the IAF still managed to win seventeen seats in the November 1993 elections<sup>95</sup>. Fear of the Islamists winning majority in parliament led the regime in Jordan to place tight control on electoral laws and seat distribution number in areas with Islamist stronghold. Furthermore, the liberalization process that started in the early 1990s gradually retreated before the 1997 elections; modifications to the press and publication law “dramatically increased restrictions on newspapers, raising capital requirements twenty-fold and expanding the list of untouchable ‘security’ issues”<sup>96</sup>. Limitations on civil rights and political participation, as well as increased corruption and favoritism for loyalists supporting the royal family were clearly noted in the decade prior to the “Arab Spring”.

A particular emphasis was placed on the IAF because it is the strongest and most prominent opposition in the Kingdom, one that has been stirring demonstrations and protests in Jordan. For the monarch, it was the most opposition group that needed to be kept under close control, considering its standpoint on the boycott of elections; this abstention from participation was used as a party strategy to delegitimize the position of the state<sup>97</sup>. Furthermore, they were the ones who pushed for certain powers to be stripped from the king, namely prohibiting him from dissolving parliament and choosing the prime minister from the parliament. However, it is important to note the absolute powers of the monarch, as he appoints representatives in the Upper House,

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid, 101.

<sup>96</sup> Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, 55.

<sup>97</sup> Wegner, *Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes*, 127.

controls parliament and elections, oversees every single individual and institution without having any body overseeing his decisions or actions<sup>98</sup>.

The IAF's participation in parliamentary election took a different turn than its Moroccan counterpart. Of the 6 elections held after the party's establishment in 1992, the IAF only participated in three and boycotted the rest, specifically in the 2010 and 2013 elections, prior and post "Arab Spring" respectively. Besides the concept that boycotting elections discredits the regime, a major reason behind IAF's abstention from participation is that the actual people they are representing belong to the group of Jordanians who are originally Palestinians (constituting majority of the population) but are underrepresented in the first place<sup>99</sup>. This results in an unequal distribution of parliamentarians representing the different groups constituting the Jordanian population, especially with the increased number of seats belonging to pro-regime loyalists or tribal heads representing the minority in the country.

The problem that this dilemma also poses is the manner in which political transformation will take place in Jordan from now onward. The pressure that the IAF is facing with regards to its decision to exclude itself from formal politics is pushing it to have a more direct and harsh tone calling for political reform in the country. The next chapter will dive into the developments of the opposition with the monarchy post- 2011 popular upheavals and will analyze whether real political reform resulting in democratic change is possible to occur.

As this section outlines, the position of the most dominant and influential Islamist political parties in both Morocco and Jordan were dissected. To understand the mechanism of control of the PJD and the IAF, one needs to put them into context.

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<sup>98</sup> Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Façade Democracy and Jordan," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies* 20(1993): 196.

<sup>99</sup> Ellen Lust-Okar, Sami Hourani and Mohammad El-Momani, "Jordan Votes: Election or Selection?" *Journal of Democracy* 119-129 22(2011): 127.

The PJD was established in 1997, as a latecomer to the Moroccan political scene, especially with other political parties legally operating in the country decades before that. The PJD also had a moderate outlook toward the political game, whereby they do not allow for the political system to control them, but instead try to enhance the representative institutions to become more credible for the public. Furthermore, its choice to participate in politics, despite many disadvantages working against it and that the monarchical institution will remain the utmost exerciser of power, has benefitted its position in the past years, building up to its victory in the first elections after the “Arab Spring”.

In the Jordanian context, it can be noted that the Muslim Brotherhood had an advantage over other political parties, as it was the only group that was allowed to operate under the banner of a charity organization since the country’s independence. Its members established a political party in 1992 as soon as it became legal, but the party got caught up in the unfair political game, whereby it was trying to change the rules of participation, rather than focusing on a specific program that appealed to the majority of voters (who are very underrepresented). Furthermore, the wide rifts between the party’s doves and hawks on basic principles and goals for the party make it extremely difficult to defy an authoritarian regime and gain confidence of the voters. The IAF’s position on the participation or boycott of elections is also confusing; it boycotts elections in an effort to highlight its uncompetitive and unfair elements, and to delegitimize the position of the monarch. However, it does not call for the king’s step-down from the throne, but rather participate in informal venues and street politics as a drive for change.

This chapter has covered the regime interaction with opposition groups, with specific focus on the most dominant political parties in the country, especially in the

period prior and leading up to the “Arab Spring”. The next chapter will contain the most valuable insight to the core of this thesis, emphasizing the conceptual framework, and its relation to the text as well as outlining the elements within authoritarian regimes that have progressed, regressed or remain constant after the revolutionary wave of 2011. Questions regarding the concept of upgrading authoritarianism will be examined and analysis of whether Morocco and Jordan fall into the category of upgraded authoritarian systems will be made.

## CHAPTER IV

### UPGRADING AUTHORITARIANISM IN MOROCCO AND JORDAN

Chapter four examines and analyzes the most recent developments that occurred in Morocco and Jordan since the beginning of the “Arab Spring”. In this section, the adaptation of the monarchies with the revolutionary wave, the effectiveness of political reforms and the maneuvers of forces on the ground in both countries are to be studied. Moreover, several Freedom House and Bertelsmann Stiftung reports tackling the five-point features discussed by Heydemann earlier on role of civil societies, political opposition, economic reforms, communication technologies and international ties will be assessed in an effort to understand the process of authoritarian upgrading in Morocco and Jordan. The reports analyzed cover the post-“Arab Spring” period and give information on the transformation that took place, if any. The assessment of those reports will then be used to examine whether the two countries are genuinely moving towards a more democratic path, regressing towards a more authoritarian status or changing survival techniques to preserve the status quo.

A brief overview of the popular uprisings and challenges that Morocco and Jordan faced since 2011 will be mentioned; however, details will only focus on the transformations that took place with respect to Heydemann’s five-points on authoritarian upgrading. Despite Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading scale beginning with the role of civil society, this thesis will begin with the examination of handling political opposition post-“Arab Spring”. This will highlight the pre and post “Arab Spring” gap, especially with reference to the previous chapter.



### ***Managing Political Contestation:***

The first feature in the upgrading authoritarianism scale is the ability to manage political contestation. For authoritarianism to be maintained and upgraded, regimes have to handle political competition in a more democratic structure, even if it just through cosmetic reforms. These types of electoral reforms reflect to the outside world a transformative path toward a more liberal and free competition, while concurrently managing a tighter grip on opposition groups<sup>100</sup>.

Managing political contestation post- revolutionary wave in Morocco was tricky; the main group that was leading the protests that broke out on February 20<sup>th</sup> and which derived its name from the date mentioned above was “a band of youth, leftist, and Islamist activists”<sup>101</sup>. The February 20<sup>th</sup> movement demanded political and economic reforms from the monarch and called for an end to corruption in the country; after constant pressure, King Muhammad VI responded to the protest by offering to redraft the constitution.

The July 2011 constitution, fully supported by the PJD and boycotted by the February 20<sup>th</sup> movement, did not curb the monarch’s power, yet promised a more independent judiciary and gave more space for parliament to participate in the decision-making process, “allowing it to pass laws and bills and grant amnesty”<sup>102</sup>. The new constitution also compels the monarch to assign the winning party leader as head of government<sup>103</sup>; however, all the amendments mentioned above do not reflect a true power shift from the monarchy to the state institutions as much as it is the

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<sup>100</sup> Heydemann, 10.

<sup>101</sup> Matt Buehler, “Safety-Valve Elections and the Arab Spring: The Weakening (and Resurgence) of Morocco’s Islamist Opposition Party,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 137-156 25(2012): 149.

<sup>102</sup> El-Sherif, 678.

<sup>103</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014- Morocco Country Report. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, 7.

strengthening of the parliament and judiciary, with the king still having the last call on decision-making.

Despite all those difficulties still in the path of the democratic process, the PJD decided to reap the seeds that the February 20<sup>th</sup> movement sowed and participate formally in the transformation, instead of taking it to the streets. The PJD participated in and won the November 2011 parliamentary elections, under the leadership of Abdelilah Benkirane.

The Moroccan case highlights a very important note; the largest and most organized opposition party (PJD) was pulled into the political process and is now trying to complete the democratic path through formal institutions. It was emphasized in the last chapter that PJD has learned from the mistakes of other parties throughout the years, but the fact that it is now part of the system restricts its fierceness in facing the strength of the monarchical institution. Not only does the party have to politically maneuver now that it is heading the government, but it also has to ensure that its promises and proposed policies come to life for the people.

One challenge for the PJD is the organizational options of this Islamist party, which are under tighter control than its Jordanian counterpart. Whereas in Jordan the MB exists as a separate entity than its IAF political wing, both functioning autonomously through parallel structures, the cornering of the IAF within politics allows the MB to have a tougher stance with the government on the streets. For the Moroccan PJD, the case is different; there is no alternative body that can challenge the monarchy outside of politics.

Another dilemma that the PJD has been facing since its arrival to power is translating their words into action; “the party platform does not specify mechanisms for funding either new initiative jobs for unemployed youth or small- and medium-

sized enterprises”<sup>104</sup>. Funding problems do not reflect in creating new job initiatives only, but also in managing the public fund allocation to solve other issues of poverty and unemployment as well. Unless the PJD finds a way to revise their platform in a more realistic manner that deals with the economic constraints, it will be confronting a harsher reaction by the people and most probably a lower voter base than the 2011 elections.

The monarch dealt with each group in the country differently and according to their interests. For the Amazight population, cultural demands, “especially regarding language, have largely been met in the last decade”<sup>105</sup> and Tamazight is acknowledged as an official language in the 2011 constitution. The leftist and leading Islamist parties were sucked into the political game and co-opted by the regime<sup>106</sup> and the last standing group is the opposition working outside the system, namely the February 20<sup>th</sup> movement. Several Human Rights Watch reports have confirmed the use of violence and torture against the protestors from the February 20<sup>th</sup> movement, and the counterterrorism law is still enacted, “permitting authorities to detain suspects without informing their families for up to 12 days”<sup>107</sup>. Depending on the severity of the demands and the manner in which they were asked for, by various political and cultural groups in Morocco, the monarchical institution found varying ways to maneuver its way through the political contestation and limit its scope.

Though similar protests broke out in Jordan, the defining difference between it and Morocco is that the leading opposition group and the biggest Islamist party in the country (IAF), is the one working outside the system and managing the protests in the kingdom. Following the route of the “Arab Spring” states, opposition groups took it to

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<sup>104</sup> Ibrahim Saif and Muhammad Abu Rumman, “The Economic Agenda of the Islamist Parties,” *Carnegie Middle East Center*, 1-28 (2012): 16.

<sup>105</sup> Stiftung, BTI 2014- Morocco Country Report, 21.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

the streets in January 2011 and demanded economic and political reforms to alleviate the status of the Jordanians. King Abdullah II met those demands through the implementation of

“41 constitutional amendments, the establishment of a constitutional court, the institution of elections under the auspices of the newly installed Independent Election Commission (IEC), the revision of the long-criticized electoral law in June 2012 and the dismissal of four prime ministers”<sup>108</sup>.

Furthermore, the king amended the selection process of the prime minister, instead of single handedly appointing him, the new prime minister would be chosen after deliberation with parliament. What the monarchy saw as positive change towards more inclusive policies to accommodate opposition was seen by the opposition as superficial and minor transformation that did not alter the reality on the ground. Unlike their Moroccan counterparts, the IAF boycotted the only parliamentary elections following the revolutionary wave, seeking instead the pressuring of the regime outside the formal political game.

The IAF’s problem does not just reside in the fact that it does not formally participate in politics; it also has a very vague political program and does not offer clear solutions to any of the economic problems that the country is facing. Despite the IAF’s constant criticism to the government’s approach toward subsidy and privatization policies, they still fail to even formulate a workable vision to offer it in their program as a substitution<sup>109</sup>. How can an opposition party aim at participating in politics, if their agenda is not clear to the simple citizen? And how then do they propose to be effective in government (in case of their election) if there are no guidelines or proposed solutions to begin with? One should not disregard that even in government, there are still limitations to its role; but that does not deny that the

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<sup>108</sup> Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014- Jordan Country Report. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, 2.

<sup>109</sup> Saif and Abu Rumman, 19.

performance of the IAF in Jordan fails to meet that of the other Islamist parties in the region.

The “Arab Spring” that later paved the way for many Islamist governments to come to power in Tunisia and Egypt also raised fears for the Jordanian monarch. Controlling the Islamist opposition in Jordan was important for the survival of the regime; therefore, the state ensured that parties “founded on ‘religious, ethnic or sectarian’ basis”<sup>110</sup> were banned. With the maintenance of strict electoral laws, and other regulations checking the oppositions’ power, as well as the ability to preserve a strong pro-regime cadre through favoritism, clientalism and other regime tactics, the Jordanian monarchy has been able to dismiss opposition temporarily.

Like the Moroccan February 20<sup>th</sup> movement, some protestors in Jordan experienced police brutality and were arrested in the midst of tear gas bombings; however, the severity of the situation in the country did not escalate to the extent that it did in other surrounding “Arab Spring” states. Even in cases where protestors were arrested, King Abdullah II issued pardons releasing them after a while<sup>111</sup>.

Political maneuvering has proved successful so far in both the Moroccan and Jordanian cases. Political contestation has been limited, with interest groups kept satisfied and co-opted by the regimes, while other more critical opposition groups silenced through force. The distinction between Morocco and Jordan is the role of the Islamists in the ongoing dilemma, whereas the PJD in the former chose the formal political path, the IAF in the latter chose informal opposition through street politics. Although in both cases the constitutional reforms did not alter significant changes for the opposition, the Moroccan situation rings more frequent alarm bells, due to the vacuum left behind by the Islamist opposition.

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<sup>110</sup> Stiftung, BTI 2014- Jordan Country Report., 8.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 10.

### *Containing Civil Society:*

The second feature, similar to the strategy utilized in the first, is the containment of civil society groups. By allowing the function of civil society groups, associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), etc. under state supervision and limitation, then their pressure on the regime would lessen, while their beneficial services would extend to the people in a more pro-regime oriented attitude<sup>112</sup>.

The degree of existence of civil society associations differs between Morocco and Jordan, despite both sharing similar restrictions by the two monarchies. In Morocco, civil society groups, including NGOs have to fall in line with the regime's agenda, or else they do not receive funding to operate; this is why it has been conducted that "the impact [of civil society groups] was strongest in the fields of education, social development and assistance to the poor"<sup>113</sup>. Other groups that do not share the same opinions as the state and try to either criticize or pinpoint wrong doings by the regime face three possible outcomes, either do not receive legal permits to run, are overlooked or sued, depending on their degree of fierceness against the regime. Technically, associations within civil society can run freely; for example, they are just required to get a certain license; but practically the government does not pass it out easily. This way, the association operates illegally and can be cracked down by the government as it pleases<sup>114</sup>.

The significant role that the Moroccan state plays in the interaction with civil society can be seen through its various attempts to handle issues that are sensitive to the population at large, yet ones that can still be controlled regularly and given space to function according to the monarchy's will. One of the controversial topics that have been placed under the spotlight especially since the early 2000s is the issue of human

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<sup>112</sup> Heydemann, 6.

<sup>113</sup> Stiftung, BTI-2014: Morocco Country Report, 24.

<sup>114</sup> Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads- Morocco. New York: Freedom House, 2011: 1.

rights in Morocco and the function of international organizations protecting human rights in the country.

Whereas international human rights organizations were banned from hosting and participating in conferences on the matter of human rights in Morocco before, several organizations such as “Amnesty International and the International Federation of Human Rights were invited to Casablanca in January 2001”<sup>115</sup>, in efforts to revisit the role played by the monarchy with regards to this matter. This change in attitude reflected good will to the people that the monarchy is trying to advocate for better protection of human rights. Simultaneously, it tried to prove that human right abuses are individual cases that are not embedded in the system as a whole, and that poor attitudes and behavior of the police toward human rights mirror lack of education<sup>116</sup>.

NGOs are also utilized by the Moroccan regime as a security valve “to marginalize political parties”<sup>117</sup>. By allowing the NGOs to operate on social and economic gaps of the regime through state funding, the monarchy maintains an upper hand on the agenda of the organization, while concurrently taking credit for their work. Furthermore, this increases public opinion in favor of the state, to defy possible alternatives offered in the political programs of oppositional parties. Instead of applying pressure on the government, civil society groups in Morocco are obliged to function under the state umbrella, operating for the will of the people, but according to the conditions specified by the state. Despite the above-mentioned, the presence and growth of civil society organizations in Morocco since the 1970s cannot be

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<sup>115</sup> James Sater, “The Dynamics of State and Civil Society in Morocco,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 101-118 7(2014): 113.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*, 113.

<sup>117</sup> Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroads- Morocco*, 2011, 20.

denied; according to the latest statistic conducted in January 2013, the number of existing NGOs in the country amounts to 30,000<sup>118</sup>.

Civil society organizations in Jordan face similar challenges as their Moroccan counterparts, yet they still differ in composition and numbers. Development of civil society organizations in the kingdom began with the liberalization wave of 1990s, with the number of NGOs reaching 2,000 in early 2013<sup>119</sup>. Many of these groups face dilemmas if they were to function against the regime, because their purpose in non-oil producing Arab monarchies is almost self-defeating. The growth of civil society groups in Jordan was explained by the Bertelsmann Stiftung report as more of a positive addition to the state's legitimacy and a new form of indirect co-optation of these groups<sup>120</sup>.

The royal family controls the biggest projects aiming at development and helping the poor; usually these groups do not require containment and are left to politically wonder more freely than other groups. Due to the tribal nature of the Jordanian society, many civil society groups are established and work under the rubric of "tribal kinship and personal relations"<sup>121</sup>. The presence of groups based on tribal relations is a double-edged sword; it is one way to emphasize issues of solidarity to maintain the social fabric of society, especially at a sensitive time of popular uprising, but it is also a reminder of the societal gap that exists between the Transjordanians and the Palestinians in the country. The containment of such groups is more geographical and class-related than ideological, as their work is "confined to the

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>119</sup> Stiftung, BTI-2014: Jordan Country Report, 27.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, 16.



upper-middle class, and is restricted to Western Amman, the affluent part of the country's capital"<sup>122</sup>.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan offers a lot of charity work, both as part of their religious duties and also as means to enlarge their support base. As a group offering social services, the MB's charity organization is allowed to function, especially in the fields of education, health and the general well being of the citizens. This point remains complex however, because even with the MB's charity organization, the Islamic Center Charity Society, the government still interferes and regulates its function. Since 2006, the administrative control of the Charity fell under direct government control and post- "Arab Spring" pressure, in 2012; there have been talks of redirecting it to the MB<sup>123</sup>. However, no confirmation has been made about this matter officially.

Local Jordanian reports on the role of civil society in the transformational period post- "Arab Spring" confirmed that there are "challenges revolved around structural obstacles, as well as legislative and governmental<sup>124</sup>" ones. Government lock down on civil society organizations in Jordan remains present and in a way that hampers the services they can offer for the reform process. Despite several constitutional amendments that have been announced post 2011, the government dealings with the civil society organizations in the kingdom did not witness a change in their scope of action. On the contrary, reports show that "the mobilization of civil society in both institutional organizations and demand-driven movements was less than necessary in terms of quantity and quality of their presence"<sup>125</sup>.

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>123</sup> Freedom House, *Countries at the Crossroad- Jordan*. New York: Freedom House, 2012: 6.

<sup>124</sup> Musa Shtawi, Center for Strategic Studies University of Jordan and Spanish Agency for International Development (2012), *The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Political Reform in Jordan*, Amman, 3. Available from <http://www.foundationforfuture.org>.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, 40.

Containment of civil society organizations exists to a large extent in Morocco and Jordan; however, both regimes deal with each group differently and according to the purpose and severity of its existence. In many cases, groups that provide charity work, especially those concerned with education, health and development are either coordinated through state funding or are parts of projects initiated by the royal family in the first place. Civil society groups that aim at advancing a political purpose faces much harsher rules and regulations, beginning with legal recognition to operate and ending with very little, if any space to politically maneuver. Morocco and Jordan share quite a large gap with regard to the number of civil society groups they contain and their existence and growth as a whole; however, with the similarities apparent in the regimes' dealings with both, it is safe to say that the survival of civil society groups in both depends mainly on the willingness of the regime to allow them to.

***Capturing the Benefits of Selective Economic Reforms:***

The 2011 popular uprisings in Arab states pressured many governments to revise their economic policies and expenditures. Having no oil revenues to compensate the people like many Gulf monarchies did, Morocco and Jordan were left with economic reforms to calm the streets. The third feature for upgrading authoritarianism is the government's ability to reap the seeds of selective economic reforms; those actually foster the patronage system and allow for pro-regime business groups and military complexes to expand, without capturing the essence of transparent, equal opportunity economic reforms for the majority of the population<sup>126</sup>.

Morocco's economic situation has been under the microscope since the beginning of the popular protests. Attempts at liberalizing market competition have

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<sup>126</sup> Heydemann, 14.

been hindered by the high degree of state interference, nepotism and corruption, due to the domination of the regime, alongside pro-regime families over the majority of holding companies in the country<sup>127</sup>. In 2013, the government implemented reforms “to improve the protection of minority interests, construction permitting and tax filing”<sup>128</sup>; yet regime involvement continues to pose challenges to investors interested in the country.

Further international trade agreements have been signed between Morocco and the EU and tariff reduction policies have been implemented; nevertheless, the authorities still have an upper hand on the trade process, and their “administrative inefficiency and widespread corruption”<sup>129</sup> continue to hamper this trade process. Heavy regime interference in the economic reform process has reflected the same challenges that were faced in the implementation of the country’s political reforms. Although at the face level Morocco is doing its efforts to liberalize and open its markets to foreign trade and investment, the inability of the government to remove itself from the equation has deemed international trade agreements hard to implement.

In early 2012, Morocco also launched its capital market code as part of its effort to reform the banking sector; yet, the body that regulates and oversees this code, constitutes of politicians and advisors who can also tamper with government policies<sup>130</sup>. This makes it all the more difficult to move forward, almost hitting a deadlock until economic interests of the concerned members are met through political meddling.

Another significant issue that is hindering economic reform in the country is the increase of government subsidies post-“ Arab Spring”, as a means to calm angry

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<sup>127</sup> Stiftung, BTI-2014: Morocco Country Report, 14.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, 15.

protestors. Budget deficits have shifted significantly from a surplus in the 2000s, to an \$8 billion deficit in 2011, as food and energy subsidies expanded “from MAD 29.8 million (about \$3.5 million) in 2010 to MAD 52.3 million (about \$6.1 million) in 2012”<sup>131</sup>. Measures to cut down on the deficit have already been taken by the Moroccan government in late 2012, with a \$6.2 billion loan deal with the IMF, on the condition that subsidies are gradually decreased.

Considering that almost 40% of the Moroccan workforce has jobs in the informal sector, they are deprived of the already weak social security and health care programs in the kingdom. Although there was an increase in funding to these programs amounting to 2% in the past couple of years, it is still considered much lower than the public spending on these services worldwide (which averages to about 3.3%)<sup>132</sup>.

Certain measures have been implemented in the past year to secure Morocco’s already weak economic situation; yet with this level of corruption and state interference, no positive outcome has been noted so far. Moreover, with an increase in subsidies and a still tax return, budget deficits are to be treated with IMF loans; however, it is clear that economic reforms in Morocco have been concluded as a temporary fix to the protests that took place in the country. What will the consequence be once the government pressures the people back into the economic reform path, which will come at the expense of their well-being?

Jordan’s economic situation is similar to that of Morocco’s, with pro-regime businessmen having strong domination over leading companies in the market, the informal sector holding up to 44% of the workforce and international trade

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, 17.

agreements signed with the U.S. and EU since the early 2000s<sup>133</sup>. Certain economic liberalization plans regarding the oil sector have been underway since 2010. However, the reforms mandated that fuel subsidies be removed in November 2012 and popular rage about the matter took place right after, demanding the step down of government. Authorities then reassured the people that cash payments to 70% of the population is to be distributed to cover the gap left over by the subsidies.

The banking sector is looking promising compared to Jordan's serious economic situation, where positive net income growth has been on the rise since the beginning of the 2011 revolutionary wave. The Central Bank of Jordan has also been taking measures to avoid inflation, while other modifications on a smaller scale including "public sector wage increases, the distribution of cash assistance payments...and compensation payments for families particularly affected by the removal of fuel subsidies"<sup>134</sup> have been easing the economic strain as well.

Economic pressures and ill provision of services also prevail, like the case in Morocco, especially that almost half the population works in the informal sector. But Jordan also faces other challenges, especially with many Palestinian- Jordanians deprived of the social services in the country.

Economic reforms in the country and attempts to alleviate the rising economic pressure might have slightly increased the economic growth from 2.3% in 2010 to 2.7% in 2012<sup>135</sup>; however, unemployment, poverty, as well as fiscal deficit problems continue to pose a huge threat to the Jordanian economy. The government might have escaped the raging population by offering some cash payment compensations, but the sustainability of such measures are up for question.

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<sup>133</sup> Stiftung, BTI-2014: Jordan Country Report, 19.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, 24.

Economic situations in Morocco and Jordan might have been handled differently, with one gradually removing subsidies, while the other paying cash compensations instead, but the end result looks similarly unpromising. Strains on the economy have had its toll on the people, more than the worsening political situation has been. The governments of both might have evaded the rocky post-“Arab Spring” economic condition, but more permanent measures have to be introduced to be able to ensure survival of the monarchical institution.

### ***Controlling New Communication Technologies:***

The use of modern communication technologies in the Arab popular uprisings has been largely noted and examined. Opposition groups mobilizing for protests utilize online social media tools, through its various venues, be it Facebook, Twitter, YouTube or any other communication platform. The fourth upgrading authoritarianism feature tackles specifically the regime’s control of new communication technologies. It is important for regimes to acknowledge that new technologies are on the rise and can be utilized as tools of mobilization; but it is equally significant for them to create the atmosphere that allows for these technologies to persist while also controlling its content through state regulations<sup>136</sup>. This section is dedicated to understanding how Morocco and Jordan dealt with the challenge of new technologies and the degree to which these technologies were vital in the popular uprisings that took place in the kingdoms.

Like other opposition groups in “Arab Spring” countries; the February 20<sup>th</sup> movement in Morocco utilized Facebook to spread the word and mobilize in their popular uprisings demanding social, economic and political change in the country.

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<sup>136</sup> Heydemann, 21.

The Freedom House report on the “Freedom on the Net 2013” confirms that government reaction to information on online sites and social media platforms has changed before and after the “Arab Spring”. Prior to the “Arab Spring”, information containing criticism of Islam, promotion of minority causes or other sensitive matters to the regime were removed from the internet. Post “Arab Spring” the government [as part of its plan to avoid what happened to its neighboring counterparts] allowed the continued existence of such information, with all social media venues available at the people’s disposal<sup>137</sup>.

This change, however, did not reflect a genuine transformation toward democracy where one enjoys the freedom of expression in Morocco; government regulation and oversight of online material was still conducted according to previously established Press and Anti-Terrorism laws in 2002 and 2003 respectively. The application of the Press and Anti-Terrorism laws on online content translates into direct government control over the information spread online; anyone that discloses information deemed by the government as threatening “national security and public order”<sup>138</sup> will face charges and possible prison sentence. Some of the February 20<sup>th</sup> movement members were detained for their attempts to mobilize people through social media sites; while other singers, bloggers and the like who criticized the monarchy or its symbols also faced similar fates<sup>139</sup>.

Many Moroccans feel the urge to practice self-regulation or censorship, to avoid being monitored or tracked down by the government. Although journalists in Morocco do not contain their criticism for the regime as much as others do, the legal ramifications that befalls them eventually impact their freedom of expression; “in a

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<sup>137</sup>Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013- Morocco. New York: Freedom House, 2013, 6.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, 9.

state that punishes investigative reporting and whistleblowing, people with sensitive information tend to stay quiet to avoid possible retribution”<sup>140</sup>.

The status of internet freedom given by Freedom House to Morocco in 2013 was set as partly free. Though no social media venues or other online platforms are blocked, random arrests of bloggers, journalists and others who make controversial statements online seem to be still taking place under previously published clauses.

The Freedom House report on Freedom of the net 2013 also concludes that the status of freedom in Jordan is not free<sup>141</sup>. Unlike Morocco, Jordan’s government has tightened its control over freedom of the internet since the “Arab Spring” protests broke out. Despite several attempts by the opposition to object to and stop the decision, amendments to the Press and Publication Law of 1998 were enacted in late 2012, which “impose a variety of burdensome requirements to operate online new portals, limiting freedom of expression and placing heavy liabilities on intermediaries”<sup>142</sup>. News outlets are kept under careful scrutiny and their work, especially anything against the government or the regime, is not tolerated and often there is pressure for it to be removed off the net. News outlets that ignored government pressures to delete online material were dealt with indirectly. *Ammon News*, an important local news outlet faced this pressure when it published statements by tribal leaders calling for reforms; the agency’s system was tampered with and therefore had to indirectly shut down for a while<sup>143</sup>.

Online social media platforms [Facebook, Twitter and the such] exist and are open to all users in Jordan; however, local users know the consequences of writing or blogging about sensitive topics that tackle the monarchy, state unity and security, so

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>141</sup> Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013- Jordan. New York: Freedom House, 2013, 1.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, 6.



they tend to self-censor their posts. The general attitude adopted by most Jordanians is one of silence, so striking to the extent that the Freedom on the Net Jordan report claims: “prosecutions and extralegal attacks on web users have decreased in severity over the past year”<sup>144</sup>.

Nonetheless, it is still important to note that harassment of journalists and closure of news websites continue to take place according to the will of the government, even if it is at a lesser extent than previous years. News sites including *Watan*, *Khaberni*, and *Al Ain* had their sites hacked and offices even attacked by anonymous committers<sup>145</sup>.

This section highlights the containment of the Moroccan and Jordanian governments to new information technologies and the means through which they control sensitive information from spreading online. Despite several changes that look democratic in nature, like uplifting censorship over certain topics that were previously taboo, or opening social media platforms to all users despite their strong use in social uprisings, all reports examining the freedom of the internet in the two countries still confirm their strict nature. The round of anonymous attacks against news sites, the silencing of journalists and bloggers and the continuous government censorship over new technologies makes it harder to break the general attitude of political silence online.

### ***Diversifying International Ties:***

The fifth and last feature is the ability to diversify international ties, to be able to survive longer. Arab regimes use diplomatic ties and sign international treaties to

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<sup>144</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, 11.

evade being pointed at as countries refusing political and economic reforms<sup>146</sup>. There is constant pressure on Arab monarchies by the international community, specifically the West and its institutions, to maintain certain ideals of democracy; it is the job of both Morocco and Jordan to preserve and invest in stronger and broader international ties, to escape facing the criticism of those actors. This section is concerned with the development of international linkages between non-oil producing monarchies and other international actors, with regard to the latest attempts toward democratization in the post-“Arab Spring” period.

Morocco has always maintained strong relations with the West, especially the European Union, which has been monitoring the ‘democratic’ transition that the country has been passing through since 2011. This thesis has proved earlier that Morocco’s ‘democratic’ path has been to a large extent cosmetic more than it is a genuine move toward democracy. Despite this fact, the G-8 still commended Morocco’s efforts for responding to the 2011 protests with a newly drafted constitution. Not only did this EU approval and support come in words, but it also did in economic funding through the National Indicative Program, which increased from €654 million between 2007-2010 to about €580 million between 2011-2013 (notice that the former is four years funding and the latter is three years alone)<sup>147</sup>.

Furthermore, the constitutional redrafting and the attempt to solve the internal uprising calmly compared to other “Arab Spring” states kept Morocco as a “preferred partner for Western governments in North Africa”<sup>148</sup>. This locked down safe economic and political partnerships between Morocco and Western countries and gave the ‘democratic’ transition in the country a more legitimate basis.

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<sup>146</sup> Heydemann, 23.

<sup>147</sup> Stiftung, BTI-2014: Morocco Country Report, 25.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, 25.

As for relations with other Arab states, specifically the Gulf monarchies, relations have developed over the last couple of years. Post- “Arab Spring”, Gulf countries increased their development and investment in Morocco, as well as offered it an invitation to join the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2011 alongside Jordan [A section on the GCC and Jordan will also be included below]. The significance of this move is twofold, and applies to the Jordanian case as well. First, the Arab popular uprisings shook the republics and planted fear in the hearts of monarchies, so the Gulf countries saw it as mutually beneficial if other Arab monarchies joined their ranks. Second, the obvious Sunni-Shiite divide in the Gulf and suspicions of a Shiite spread further fed this move toward a more unified front for the majority Sunni monarchies. The invitation was later put on hold, when GCC countries realized that the “Arab Spring” wave was handled well by the other non-oil producing monarchies; there are, however, recent reports claiming that the GCC is seeking another “pan-monarchical military alliance”<sup>149</sup>. No confirmed alliances have been made so far, and the military bloc is still under informal negotiations.

In the case of Jordan, its experiences with the international institutions of the West have proved its commitment to economic reforms, especially through its adoption of IMF and World Bank macroeconomic programs. This of course, comes as a direct result of years of Jordan’s close relations with the United States, which has been backing the monarchy with economic and military aid. Moreover, despite the slow (if any) political change in the kingdom, Jordan like its Moroccan counterpart was able to secure its relations with the EU and was granted “advanced status” for its efforts in the ‘democratic’ process. Not only that, but EU reports published in 2012

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<sup>149</sup> Curtis Ryan, “Jordan, Morocco and an Expanded GCC,” *Middle East Research and Information Project*, April 15, 2014.

also praise the Jordanian monarchy's efforts and commitment to the process of political and economic reform<sup>150</sup>.

Jordan's situation differs from Morocco with regards to regional linkages, mainly because of its geographical proximity to many Arab countries that are facing internal conflicts and are spilling over through the borders. With the situation in Syria still at a deadlock four years into the "Arab Spring" and Abdullah II's call for the Syrian president to step down, relations with Syria have tangled up again. Bilateral relations with Iraq have not been positive either, especially with the minimal contact that is taking place with the Iraqi government nowadays. As for the Palestinian portfolio, close ties with the U.S. and negotiations with Israel on a Jordanian government level still do not reflect the popular attitude of the people towards the issue; however, the Jordanian state has maintained its policies of close coordination with Fatah officials<sup>151</sup>.

As mentioned in the previous section on Morocco's regional relations, Jordan and Morocco share similar positions as Morocco regarding the Gulf. However, Jordanian- Qatari relations seem to be at rocky grounds for several reasons. Jordan's position with regard to Qatar's "proactive role and support of Islamists and Jihadists actors in the violent conflicts in Libya and Syria" is one of condemnation and rejection. The Jordanian monarchy also has growing fear that with Qatar's fueling of Islamist groups in Syria, a continuation of the conflict would mean prolonged threat on the Syrian- Jordanian borders.

The ideological struggle with the GCC entry eventually boils down to a clash between Saudi and American visions of how the non-oil producing monarchies will survive. On the one hand, Saudi plan for Jordan's entry into the GCC will increase

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<sup>150</sup> Stiftung, BTI-2014: Jordan Country Report, 36.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, 37.

economic gains for the kingdom at the expense of further reduction of people's political power; on the other hand, the State's plot encompasses a more direct walk through the democratic path, where popular demands are met and actual liberalization is fostered<sup>152</sup>.

Morocco and Jordan seem to be following similar tracks with their approach to international politics, both keeping tight relations with their closer allies [EU and U.S. respectively]. This link with the West is mainly significant because their oversight over the 'democratic' transition that the Arab monarchies are passing through, allows Morocco and Jordan to continue their cosmetic reforms at the expense of the people with a legitimate badge. As for relations with the Gulf, the most important move to look out for is the possibility that Morocco and Jordan would join other Gulf monarchies as part of their survival strategies against popular uprisings. Not only would the majority Sunni identity be maintained, but also manpower of Jordanian and Moroccan armies would be coupled with Gulf's advanced weaponry to ensure the mutual survival of monarchies in the region.

***Synthesis:***

This chapter has been mainly focusing on the application of Heydemann's five-point features on upgraded authoritarianism to Morocco and Jordan. With regard to the management of political contestation, Morocco has opened way for the strongest opposition to join forces in government, putting its policies and actions under spotlight and allowing for the public to see their shortcomings. In Jordan, quite the opposite took place, with electoral laws implemented in the past still hampering the participation of the IAF and excluding it from formal politics. In such cases, the

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<sup>152</sup> Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, "Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf Cooperation Council," *Orbis* 82-95 56(2012): 85.

mechanism of controlling political competition differed, but the consequences were similar; the regime has locked down its grip on opposition, proving the limitations of its visions and highlighting the lack of alternative plans they could offer for the country.

As for civil society groups, its containments did not differ much between Morocco and Jordan, neither did the method of limitation before and after the “Arab Spring”. The status of this feature remained static, especially that civil society groups are dependent on government support and face dire challenges surviving illegally under strong authoritarian regimes.

Reaping the benefits of certain economic reforms worked temporarily for both Morocco and Jordan. But the fact that nepotism, corruption, state interference and ill distribution of sources still exist and are becoming more apparent than before makes it all the more difficult to contain popular uproar that might erupt as a consequence of harsh economic reforms. The matter to look into is either the sustainability of such measures on the short-run or the availability of alternative economic reforms that are more permanent.

Controlling new technologies does not present means of state control different than the ones used prior to the “Arab Spring”; on the contrary, Morocco and Jordan seem to demonstrate that the government activity with regards to monitoring online users and arresting journalists and bloggers for examples continue to exist. Furthermore, the issues that were taboo to be talked about or criticized remained off limits, especially concerning the monarchies, state security and the like. Freedom of expression and press remain to be tied down, either through self-censorship or through press laws.

The last feature on diversifying international linkages is the most apparent of all other five points, but still no concrete action has been taken to highlight it. Moroccan ties with the EU and Jordanian ties with the US were close before and continued to be strong after the “Arab Spring”; however, the fact that there have been talks of the non-oil producing states joining the GCC makes all the difference, especially that it draws attention to the fears of the monarchs in the Arab world. Seeing as the GCC plan has come to a hold, specifically after Morocco and Jordan temporarily dealt with their popular uprisings, it is still important to wait and see the end result of this proposal.

Heydemann’s authoritarian upgrading includes a before/after gap, certain transformations that take place showing that things are changing on the surface when in reality they are not, certain mechanisms change in order to hinder real democratization from prevailing. Although the nature of authoritarian rule in Morocco and Jordan did not change before and after the “Arab Spring”, certain mechanisms of control had to be adjusted to ease off the popular unrest. The challenges that were addressed post revolutionary wave were management of political competition, benefiting from economic reforms and diversifying international linkages, as illustrated above. While the regime’s dealing with containment of civil society organizations and control of new technologies remained stagnant after the “Arab Spring”.

The following chapter tries to draw conclusions as to where the above-mentioned synthesis places Morocco and Jordan on the authoritarian upgrading scale, and further examines the possible threats that the monarchies overlooked and any other possible challenge to their survival.

## CHAPTER V

### RESILIENCE OF NON-OIL PRODUCING MONARCHIES

Chapter five is the concluding one in this thesis; not only does it draw conclusions as to the transformations of the non-oil producing monarchies and whether they really are upgrading their authoritarian nature, but it also examines the type of regimes produced and the future challenges they might be facing. This chapter also includes a section on future recommendations, to see the possibility of moving forward through gradual political and economic reforms, with a preservation of the monarchical system.

#### *Authoritarian Upgrading Model and Non-Oil Producing Monarchies:*

Chapter IV examined the manner in which regimes in Morocco and Jordan handled the situation post popular unrest. It was obvious that regime management of certain political and economic challenges had to be addressed, with the help of foreign aid of course, be it in collaboration with other monarchical regimes of similar nature or through backing from the West. Seeing as Heydemann's five-point features rest on the satisfaction of all points, then this thesis argues against the original hypothesis that states: *Survival of non-oil-producing monarchies is a function of their own traditional legitimacy and the softening of their authoritarian regimes.* After the assessment of the situation and according to the research conducted above, the results show that survival of monarchies does not fit the upgraded authoritarianism model. Instead, the *survival of non-oil producing monarchies is a function of their own traditional legitimacy and the temporary cosmetic top-down political and economic reforms of the regime.*



It is tricky to assess whether Morocco and Jordan really applied Heydemann's five points to survive the popular uprisings, because there are transformations that took place, as survival of the regimes did not come from inaction; however, they did not include all the points in the guidelines. The management of political contestation, ability to reap the benefits of some economic reforms, and the diversification of international linkages are three main features where there is change, although sometimes cosmetic, and is very apparent before and after the "Arab Spring". As for the containment of civil society and the control of new communication technologies, perhaps the development of mechanism of state control over these issues came at a time before 2011. The last two features show stagnancy after the period of the "Arab Spring", meaning the states' dealings with them were not as visible as the first three features.

In managing political contestation, cosmetic political reform was underway immediately after the breakout of the popular unrest. Fear that the destiny of poor monarchies would be similar to other strong republics that fell caused monarchs to seek alternative means to appease their people. In Morocco, the King immediately called for the drafting of a new constitution, made recommendations to have a more independent judiciary, changed the role of parliament so it becomes more involved in the decision-making process and also attempted to culturally win over the Amazight population by making Tamazight an official language recognized in the new constitution. It is true that all of these changes did not reduce the ultimate powers of the monarch or produce a new system of checks and balances between the legislative, executive and judiciary, but still it was a political maneuver that calmed the majority of the population for the time being and concurrently allowed the PJD to enter formal politics and get coopted by the regime.

These superficial political changes were not only witnessed in Morocco, Jordan's monarch also used similar techniques to stem off the anger that people felt toward the then political status quo. King Abdullah II called for amendments to the constitution, new free and fair elections, a constitutional court to oversee the constitutionality of laws and regulations, the replacement of several prime ministers and the expansion of parliament roles, to also include having discussions with the king on the appointment and elimination of prime ministers to and from power. All these changes highlight state control over the decision-making process; yet, to the outside world, this shows a move toward a more democratic political system. Upgraded authoritarianism in this case applies to the management of political contestation post- "Arab Spring", because laws regulating and at many times preventing opposition from having completely free and fair elections are still present, parliaments remain paralyzed to make any decisions because the final saying is for the monarch and there is no true development **on** the road to political democracy as much as these transformations emphasize them to be.

The second point is the ability to take advantage of several economic reforms, which both Morocco and Jordan addressed, especially that economic demands were one of the main reasons that got people protesting in the first place. Morocco's reintroduction of subsidies and Jordan's facilitation of cash payments and increase in public wages were the alternative offers that alleviated some of the pressure off the regime. Although the split before and after the uprisings was clear in the case of economic reform, this still is not considered a move forward for the economies of non-oil producing states. The nature of the economic changes is so temporary, particularly due to the low budget running it. Seeing how both countries have secured IMF loans demonstrates that another set of the international institution's conditions

will befall the people sooner than later. For the time being, the fact remains that Morocco and Jordan were able to quieten down the streets by offering these temporary fixes, which also confirms the second feature in Heydemann's five-point features.

The third, and I believe the most interesting of all three is the ability of authoritarian upgraded states to diversify their ties, treaties and diplomatic relations with the international community and its institutions, as well as other regional powers. The relations between Morocco and the EU or Jordan and the U.S. has been on the positive generally, but more specifically after the cosmetic reforms of the popular unrest, mainly because the West applauded the 'democratization' efforts of the Arab monarchs. What is more interesting to note is the regional collaboration, efforts and funds that have been sealed post-2011. Both Morocco and Jordan had been invited to join the ranks of the GCC before that deal was placed on hold. Furthermore, there are recent unconfirmed talks about having a joint military collaboration between poor and rich Arab monarchies. This of course is quite significant because it shows the paths that non-oil producing monarchs choose to abide by in future transformations. If they select the Gulf option, then funding from the GCC would take Morocco and Jordan down the path of political silencing of the people, at the expense of economic dependence on the GCC. If they choose the road of economic and political reform, then they would be making concessions but one that would serve their interest, as well as the interests of their people in a much more efficient manner. This shift of focus to emphasize regionalism in post-2011 also fulfills the requirements of Heydemann's point on diversifying international linkages for survival.

As for the containment of civil society and the control of new communication technologies, the situation is particularly different. The fact that no visible change

occurred in these two fields post popular unrest consequently presents two explanations: either it rules out the possibility that they impact the survival of the regimes in the first place or the mechanisms they used before 2011 were strong enough to maintain status quo post 2011.

Laws that allow for the existence of civil society groups have been present in Morocco and Jordan way before the “Arab Spring” and their presence in the first place depends on the will of the monarchy. Furthermore, acquiring license to operate is a delicate process, and sometimes might not even be possible due to regime disapproval of the purpose of the organizations. All these cases reflect a civil society that was and still is dependent on the state itself for survival, which defies the purpose of having an independent body that checks the actions of the regime in defense of the people and their well being.

In non-oil producing monarchies, the trend in dealing with controversial topics has become obvious, with the state reshaping and redefining certain concepts from a different light, while still maintaining the same attitude towards it. This can be seen through the position of the monarchies on human rights, where “the state has even becomes the major player, thereby defusing, to its advantage, critical aspects of the dialogue and stressing more acceptable aspects of education and culture”<sup>153</sup>. By allowing this to take place, the state would escape to a certain extent the blame for human rights abuses and allegations that the system itself fosters this violation in the first place. At the same time, no actual protection of human rights is evident and the issue gets diffused into trivial matters of blame. Since no real or cosmetic transformation took place after the “Arab Spring” regarding the containment of civil

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<sup>153</sup> Sater, “State and Civil Society in Morocco”: 116.

society, then this point fails to be included in Heydemann's system of upgraded authoritarianism.

The final point is the one concerned with controlling new communication technologies. The Arab revolutions were signified by their extensive use of social media tools for citizen reporting, word spreading and mobilization; and this was also true of the two monarchies as well. Nonetheless, regime clampdown on the freedom of expression and freedom of press before the uprisings seemed to continue, if not actually regress after 2011. Journalists and bloggers were arrested in Morocco; news websites were shut down, with the raiding of their offices and monitoring of these online tools by the government continued. Fear of arrests and harassment by government-paid thugs caused many to remain self-censored and watch out for the material posted online. To top all that, topics that were taboo to mention or criticize remained so, specifically with regard to the monarchy, national security and religion. Though some topics that were frowned upon earlier became possible to talk about in Morocco, the general attitude remained the same with the consequences of living up to one's own words on the internet. Freedom of expression continues to be limited through laws previously enacted, be it Press or Anti-Terrorism laws. This point further confirms that control techniques did not change with the development of new communication technologies, because the same repressive manner is still used to block any critical voices in the two countries.

The above in-depth explanation to the application of the authoritarian upgrading model on the softening of the regimes in Morocco and Jordan clearly shows that since two of the five features reflect stagnant results after the "Arab Spring", then this model fails to explain the survival of non-oil producing monarchies. While the first three points confirm the softening of authoritarianism, cosmetically

and temporarily to a great extent, it is still not enough to cover the whole requirements of the model proposed.

The economic and political reforms implemented after 2011 could alternatively, and according to the results of the research, be explained by the continuation of the regimes in Morocco and Jordan to apply cosmetic reforms that address the symptoms of the disease rather than the problems from the roots.

Speeches given by both monarchs, King Muhammad VI and King Abdullah II (refer to appendices), confirm that there is still lack of transparency between the monarchs and the people. In his Throne Day speech given last July, King Muhammad VI discussed the achievements that Morocco has been accomplishing in the past few years, with specific reference to political and economic advancements, as well as the preservation of human rights and different freedoms by the new constitution. However, many of these statements contradict the reality on the ground of what is actually taking place in the kingdom, especially with human rights violations and growing economic disparities in the country. The speech attached in the appendices is significant to examine because it highlights the rhetoric used by the Moroccan monarch, the topics he chooses to address the people with and the manner in which he approaches those themes, in an important event like the Throne Day.

King Abdullah II on the other hand, has not made a statement since his 2011 speech, in which he presented the constitutional changes to the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review. Although the king posted a video online congratulating the Jordanian people on the 68<sup>th</sup> memory of Independence Day this year, he has failed to follow-up with the people on the transformation that took place and the problems that the kingdom is still facing since then. King Abdullah's 2011 speech to the

constitutional committee emphasizes the need to advance forward through a set roadmap, with certain political changes.

Both speeches have almost the same rhetoric of the people and the regime rising together as a single unit for the development of the country as a whole. But note that even if changes mentioned in the speeches did take place, have the changes impacted core principles that control policies onward or have they only been superficial ones that appear to be leading democratization but in reality are just a temporary cover for authoritarianism. Those are only some pointers to see how monarchs attempt to answer their people's inquiries and needs, without actually addressing the main problems holding the countries down.

The next section will talk in more detail about the future challenges and threats that non-oil producing monarchies face, especially if they continue their 'democratic' transformation in such a superficial manner.

### ***Future Challenges and Unforeseen Threats:***

There are several economic and political elements that play a significant part in the survival of the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes. Implementing temporary reforms to calm the people in both countries was not an easy task, but it certainly would not get any easier, especially with the roots of the problems entrenched deep into the soil of the two states. Morocco's Mohammed VI and Jordan's Abdullah II both followed similar transformation paths without really altering the main problems in their states. The political elites that are protected and supported by the monarchies remain in charge of the imbalance that exists on all levels and these include: "acute rural poverty, rampant corruption, inadequate political rights and limitations on social

mobility”<sup>154</sup>. These problems have been present before the Arab uprisings; however their acuteness has been increasing since the events of the “Arab Spring”.

Since the demands of the opposition in Morocco and Jordan do not include an end to the monarchical system and the step down of the head of state, then the kings should focus on fixing the issues their countries face in a more direct and honest manner, to prevent demands from escalating to a boiling point. Instead of further focusing on the surface-level reforms, non-oil producing regimes should invest their effort and energy into addressing these problems. Radical changes will eventually trickle down to the rest of society; for example, tackling issues of corruption means reassessing the allocation of economic sources, which if sorted out, could be directed to more pressing issues like poverty, education and health. Eventually this will create and foster a healthy political environment for people to practice direct politics, where their demands are handled through true representation in parliament. This of course is not an easy process and much easier said than done; however, its durability is much longer than the pacifying reforms the regimes have to come up with at every dilemma they face.

The second point to note is the durability of the ‘traditional legitimacy’ aspect of the regimes’ survival. Both monarchs share similar religious backings for their rule and with Morocco’s long dynastic history<sup>155</sup> and Jordan’s tribal support for the monarchy, the survival of their institutions can endure the popular pressures to a greater extent than republics. But that does not mean that traditional legitimacy on its own can be the sole alternative holding monarchies in place against people’s demands. If the Arab monarchies continue on the same level of performance on both a

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<sup>154</sup> Zoltan Barany, “After the Arab Spring: Revolt and Resilience in the Arab Kingdoms,” *Parameters* 89-101 43(2013): 100.

<sup>155</sup> Zoltan Barany, “Unrest and State Response in Arab Monarchies,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* 5-38 24(2013): 19.



political and economic level, they will be facing harsher and more aggressive responses from their people.

Problems of poverty, unemployment, ill distribution of wealth, etc., are general problems that both Morocco and Jordan face in their fight to reform their countries. Yet, there are several challenges that each country is separately facing and leaving an impact on the economic and political liberalization processes. For Instance, Morocco has a rising problem of Islamist-secularist clashes. Over the past couple of months, there have been constant reports of incidents of clashes between the two, which reached its climax “in the April 24 killing by left-wing extremists of a student leader of Attajdid Tollabi (Student Renewal), a group close to the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party”<sup>156</sup>.

Though this particular issue does not directly impact the existence of the monarchy in itself, the inability of the regime to contain such cleavages hampers the political process altogether and reduces the chances of walking down a sustainable democratic path. Note that the Moroccan regime controls opposition through the divide and rule tactic; yet standing by and watching while such clashes happen or tipping off the balance in favor of one group over the other increases the possibility of things spinning out of control on a larger scale and eventually backfiring against the monarchy.

The monarchy in Jordan has to also be careful because its situation is not just internal pressure from the people, but external pressure as well from neighboring states in conflict (Syria, Iraq and Palestine). Jordan’s geographical position places it at great proximity with these countries; this means any problems occurring abroad would automatically spill over to the kingdom. For instance, if the regime fails to

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<sup>156</sup> Mohammed Masbah, “Islamist-Secularist Divisions in Morocco,” *Sada Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 29, 2014.

contain unrest in Syria and the regime collapses, then the Islamist opposition in Jordan would consequently gain more momentum and have a more aggressive tone with the regime<sup>157</sup>.

There are similar instances from Iraq and the recent developments with regard to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militant group, which is rapidly and effectively taking control over Iraqi territory, in an attempt to restore Islamic rule. Handling such threat, especially when the group claims intents to take over the Levant region, has to be among the priorities for the Jordanian monarchy.

Both monarchies need to keep an eye on their internal and external situations if they need to ensure survival, yet being in control of the internal situation and investing in the people of the country makes all the much easier to fight off external threats. The next section offers future areas of research, which could benefit the monarchies' development forward in a true economic and political reform process, and ensure internal stability of their institutions.

#### ***Future Research Areas:***

As deduced from the previous section, the only way to move forward in a productive and transparent manner is with the transformation of both political and economic elements together. One cannot make progress without the other and the ability of the regimes in Morocco and Jordan to make this combination work will definitely add to its survival rate. Future areas of resarch should focus on problem solving of obstacles, either internal or external, which have been threatening the development of monarchies.

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<sup>157</sup> Marwan Muasher, "Reform in Jordan: After the Vote," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, January 28, 2013.

Political reform has to come in the form of actual laws and policies that add to the element of people's representation rather than that of the king's will alone. This means actual powers are given to parliament to enact decisions based on the demands of the people that elect them<sup>158</sup>. Having a functioning parliament will increase the trust of the people in the regime, as they will regain faith in the political process and concurrently seek changes within the system, rather than informally through street politics. To be able to have a representative parliament, many electoral laws that ensure a biased and unfair voting system have to be revised and eliminated as well. This way, true free and fair elections can enter into play. If future research emphasizes on the significance of a strong parliamentary representative system of governance as means to alleviate political pressure, then statesmen can benefit from the results of the research to advance politically within a legitimate framework.

As mentioned earlier, political reform alone cannot take the monarchies forward, this is why a modified economic plan, which deals with the rising problems of dependency on Western institutions, foreign, and regional aid has to be formed. Instead of having corrupt systems where wealth distribution does not reach the majority of the population, regimes should tackle the origins of corruption and create opportunities to self-sustain themselves through a more steady-income based economy. Economic dependence on foreign, international or regional aid eventually all pour down to a single conclusion, dependence on others is inevitable. Future research in this area can focus on the possible alternatives that the countries should be following to cut down on foreign aid and invest more in local talents, startup companies and home-grown businesses.

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<sup>158</sup> Ibid,1.

Economics and politics are terms that are difficult to separate in terms of impact of one on the other. Tackling problems in the former consequently has results on the latter and vice versa. This is why it is significant to combine the results of future research on both, to be able to make further suggestions and encourage local initiatives that would enhance the situation in the countries without the need to offer temporary fixes for the problems.

Corruption, as stated above, has fostered an environment of favoritism and unequal opportunities in many cases. Solving the problems of corruption, not only its symptoms, will take both monarchies a longer way; new laws regulating this matter “will make it more difficult for corrupt practices to happen in the first place and will provide an institutional check on abuses when they do occur”<sup>159</sup>. When the people see a genuine will by monarchies to invest in their countries and those who actually deserve it, then their whole attitude will be one of respect rather than intimidation, one of will to advance forward alongside the monarchies rather than in defiance to it.

The study of demographic composition of the population and the impact it has on the internal politics of the country is also a very important topic to be researched, especially on the second and third generations raised up in the kingdom. This issue is particularly important for Jordan, with the majority already Palestinian population and the on-going influx of Syrian, Iraqi and other Palestinian refugees into the country. Aside from the political and economic dilemmas that the kingdom and the refugees suffer from, and which are often highlighted in security studies, social aspects also need to be examined to see how intermarriages for example tilt the balance of social clusters, and what that could possibly mean for the status of the country at large. Moreover, issues of keeping intact a national identity that is inclusive of this diverse

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid,1.

group is going to be a hard issue to limit and at some point, questions of who makes up the Jordanian population and what rights they have will be raised fiercely<sup>160</sup>.

Non-oil producing monarchies might have survived the wave of revolutions of the “Arab Spring”, but the challenges those revolutions brought along will be harder to deal with in the long run, if Morocco and Jordan choose the path of cosmetic reform. The anticipation of their people for change, the escalation of the situation with unmet demands and further neglect of the majority’s needs will all boil down and leave the monarchies facing existential problems.

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<sup>160</sup> Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” *Middle East Policy* 96-109 19(2012): 97.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: King Muhammad VI's speech on Throne Day 30 July, 2014

"Praise be to God. May peace and blessings be upon the Prophet, His Kith and Kin  
Dear Citizens,

Today, we are proudly celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of my accession to the glorious Alawite throne. This annual celebration is an opportunity for us to ponder on the state of the nation.

I do not want this to be merely a time when we take stock of achievements. However significant they may be, they will always fall short of the ambitions I nurture for my loyal citizens.

I would rather this celebration were an occasion to pause and reflect, in all sincerity and objectivity, on the positive as well as the negative aspects of our action in order to move forward confidently and resolutely.

I am not only interested in achievements, but also and above all in the actual, qualitative direct impact our accomplishments have had in terms of improving the living conditions of all Moroccans.

Whereas it is, indeed, natural for a person to pause every now and then to determine where he or she is going, such an exercise is even more important for the nation's first servant, who is responsible for more than 35 million people.

Considering the sacred mission with which I am entrusted as the King of all Moroccans, each day and every step of the way, I consult others and give due consideration to matters before making any decision that has a bearing on the nation or the citizens.

Are we making the right choices? What things need to be speeded up? What others should be reconsidered? What major projects and reforms ought to be launched?

If a person thinks that he or she is always right, or that he or she does not make mistakes, then surely this will be a recipe for conceit and erring.

For this reason, I believe we must all ask ourselves: Have the accomplishments and the real progress made had the desired, direct impact on Moroccans' living conditions? Does the Moroccan citizen - irrespective of income, social status or place of residence, whether in urban or rural areas - feel that he or she is indeed better off as a result of the major projects implemented and the reforms introduced.

By asking such questions, our aim is, in fact, to constantly improve efficiency and find the best ways to enable all Moroccans to benefit from achievements on an equal footing.

However, the fact that we ask questions and pause does not mean we are hesitant or unsure, or that we have no clear vision. On the contrary, the way forward is crystal clear, and our choices are well thought-out. We know who we are, what we want and where we are going.

Dear Citizens,

By assessing the state of the nation, we can gauge the progress made, using all standard mechanisms for that purpose. Back in 2005, we made a similar pause and came up with the 50-Year Report to take stock of the work done and pinpoint shortcomings for the post-independence period, and also to assess expectations. The aim of that exercise was to devise more effective public policies.

Today, fifteen years after my accession to the throne, I think it is important to pause, once again, as a nation.<sup>[1]</sup> Moroccan as well as foreign experts agree that

significant progress has been made in various areas in Morocco during this period.

Personally, I do not think anyone can deny that democratic achievements have been made. This is illustrated by the new Constitution adopted in 2011, by the freedoms and human rights system in force in the country and by the launching of the advanced regionalization project. However, the tangible impact of these and other reforms hinges on their actual implementation as much as on the elites that will give them concrete substance.

Nor can anyone deny that major infrastructure projects have been implemented. Could Moroccans - myself included - have imagined that their country would one day be home to the largest port in the Mediterranean? Or have the largest solar power plant in the world? Was it possible in the past for a citizen to take the freeway from Agadir to Tangiers, or from El Jadida to Oujda?

In the economic sphere, growth rates have increased significantly thanks to the adoption of ambitious sectoral plans, such as Morocco's Green Plan and the Emergence Plan for industrial development, among others.

It should be noted that progress in the above areas has not been made at the expense of human development. Across the country, beneficiaries of human development programs have borne witness not only to these projects' direct impact in terms of improving their living conditions, but also to their role in fighting poverty, social exclusion and marginalization in our country.

The question remains: What use have we made of this progress? Has it merely contributed to higher levels of consumption, or have we used it to promote prosperity for all Moroccans? To what extent has this progress translated into better living conditions for the citizens?

Dear Citizens,

I think the Moroccan development model has reached such a level of maturity that it is possible for us to adopt advanced, precise standards to assess the effectiveness of public policies and determine the extent to which they have a tangible effect on the citizens' lives.

This achievement has been confirmed by the World Bank, which indicated that Morocco's total wealth has increased significantly in recent years, thanks in particular to the substantial growth of its intangible capital.

Intangible capital is one of the latest internationally agreed standards for measuring the total wealth of countries and companies.

As I am sure you know, there have been various changes in the standards used by economists and financial specialists to measure wealth.

The total wealth of states used to be measured in light of their natural resources, then on the basis of the gross domestic product, which, in turn, is indicative of the citizens' standard of living.

Later on, human development indicators were adopted to determine levels of prosperity and the extent to which peoples benefit from the national wealth. During the 1990s, intangible capital became an essential constituent of wealth. In 2005, it was formally adopted by the World Bank as a standard benchmark.

Intangible capital refers to constituents of wealth that are not taken into account by conventional financial approaches. <sup>[1]</sup><sub>SEP</sub> The reference here is to the measurement of a country's historical and cultural heritage, social and human capital, the confidence it inspires as well as stability, the quality of institutions, innovation and scientific research, cultural and artistic creativity, the quality of the environment and so on.

Security and stability, for instance, are the cornerstone of production and the creation of wealth. Similarly, trust and credibility are key ingredients to boost

investment. However, these assets are not visible in the total wealth of countries. In 2005 and 2010, the World Bank carried out two studies to measure the total wealth of some 120 countries, including Morocco. Our country ranked among the top African nations, far ahead of some countries in the region.

Having perused the figures and statistics contained in the said studies, and which highlight the development of wealth in Morocco, I wonder, as do all Moroccans: Where is this wealth? Has it benefited all Moroccans or only some segments of society?

No in-depth analysis is really needed to answer these questions. While there has been significant progress in Morocco, the facts on the ground indicate that not all citizens have benefited from this wealth. During my field visits, I have noticed signs of poverty and vulnerability, as well as acute cases of social inequality.

Therefore, and in order to assess the situation properly and accurately, I call on the Economic, Social and Environmental Council to carry out a study of Morocco's total wealth between 1999 and the end of 2013, in cooperation with the Moroccan Central Bank and the national institutions concerned, and in coordination with specialized international institutions.

The objective of the study is not only to highlight the value of our country's intangible capital, but also to make sure intangible capital is used as a key standard in the development of public policies, so that all Moroccans may benefit from their country's wealth.

I hope this study will come up with an objective assessment of the situation as well as practical recommendations in this regard.

To make sure the study's final report does not remain just words on paper, or a document merely for the media, I have decided that its findings should be widely disseminated. In this respect, I urge the government, parliament, all the institutions concerned and key players in society to study those constructive recommendations and seek to implement them.

Since the measurement of intangible wealth helps in decision-making, I want the census, which will be carried out this year to include all types of indicators relating to Morocco's intangible capital.

Dear Citizens, I attach as much importance to improving the citizens' living conditions as I do to safeguarding their spiritual well-being and to consolidating the Moroccan model for the management of the religious domain.

Based on the Commandership of the Faithful as a frame of reference and on the Maliki rite, this distinct model is the result of the thorough reforms we have introduced over the last fifteen years to promote and revamp the religious domain.

This model aims to protect the citizen and society against extremism, reclusiveness and ignorance by protecting mosques from any kind of exploitation, making sure they remain places of worship, where guidance is provided and literacy promoted.

This is exactly what the 2008 Ulema Charter aims for. We have further consolidated that Charter by the "support plan" for local religious guidance, which I launched recently, and which is being implemented by more than 1,300 imams across the Kingdom.

The key element of this model is the provision of enlightened religious training that is grounded in the principles of moderation and that seeks to preserve our immutable Islamic values while promoting *ijtihad* and openness. Through this approach, we are making sure our pristine faith is consistent with our national choices and the requirements of modern times.

For this reason, the Moroccan model for the management of religious affairs has

been commended both at African and international levels.

In this respect, we are keen to put the Moroccan experience at the disposal of sister nations that share Morocco's commitment to the same spiritual values and principles, and that have expressed a desire to benefit from the Moroccan model in such areas of cooperation as the training of imams.

Dear Citizens,

Given the consistency and harmony between our country's domestic and foreign policies, I seek to make the most of our democratic development model to further enhance Morocco's image and standing in the international arena, and defend its best interests as well as its just causes.

Considering the rapid changes affecting the world, I have sought to ensure that the Moroccan diplomatic approach is rooted in self-confidence, proactive thinking, realism and effectiveness. I have also seen to it that our policy is guided by a commitment to legitimacy, openness, moderation and respect for universal values.

This has made our country an effective, credible partner that is heeded and trusted. Working together with the dynamic actors in society, I have been keen to promote and consolidate our country's standing at all levels.

As regards the Maghreb, I should like to say, once again, that I keenly look forward to seeing a strong union built on the firm foundation of solid bilateral relations and integrated economic projects.

I personally believe that disputes are not inevitable and that they are quite normal in all communities. Inside the European Union, for example, there have been disagreements between EU members, but the breaking point is hardly ever reached. What is regrettable in the Maghreb, however, is that a dispute is allowed to continue for the purpose of disrupting the evolution of the Maghreb Union.

Whatever the magnitude of the dispute, it should not, for instance, be used as a pretext for the continued closure of the borders. The situation is such that Maghreb citizens do not understand or accept such a state of affairs. Indeed, a number of people whom I met during my visits to sister nations wondered - rather perplexed - about the reasons for the continued closure of the border and asked that barriers between our peoples be removed.

My answer to them has always been the same: for more than six years now, Morocco has been calling for a solution to this odd situation. However, the response to all of Morocco's constructive initiatives has been a stubborn, systematic refusal which is not only inconsistent with the logic of history and legitimacy, but also out of step with our peoples' natural entitlement to human interaction and economic exchange.

As I pointed out earlier, I am keen to ensure bilateral relations are the mainstay of the Maghreb Union. In this respect, I wish to say how satisfied I was with the positive outcome of the visit I paid recently to Tunisia, and how much I appreciated the hospitality and warm welcome extended to me, both by the noble Tunisian people as well as by their country's representative institutions. I was most touched by that warmth.

I am convinced Tunisia will forge ahead along a peaceful path, consolidate the institution-based state and achieve development and prosperity for the Tunisian people.

As regards the Arab world, the catastrophic situation in which several Arab countries find themselves is, indeed, a matter of profound sadness and concern.

The crisis in both Syria and Iraq illustrates the seriousness of the situation the Arab world is facing today - a predicament which is fueled by the politics of exclusion and

sectarian strife. This situation compounds the humanitarian tragedy that has befallen the peoples of these two sister nations.

It is much more than just a regional crisis. This is a fertile breeding ground for the most violent forces of extremism and terror, which seriously threaten the security of our countries as well as global security and stability.

Today, more than ever, we need a comprehensive Arab order based on economic integration and political unity and cohesion to turn the Arab world into an influential geopolitical force in the international arena – a bloc which is capable of defending crucial Arab causes.

The brotherly bonds and mutual understanding between me and the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States, and Morocco' special partnership with these sister nations are a source of deep satisfaction.

Regarding the Palestinian issue, I reiterate my strong condemnation of the brutal Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip.<sup>[SEP]</sup> As a sign of tangible solidarity with our Palestinian brothers and sisters in their ordeal, we were among the first to provide material aid to the victims of this aggression, putting Moroccan hospitals at the disposal of the wounded to alleviate their suffering in these critical circumstances.

I reiterate my support for all constructive international initiatives aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace on the basis of the two-state solution.

In keeping with our sacred mission to defend Al-Quds al-Sharif, the Al-Quds Committee, which I am honored to chair, adopted a series of sound recommendations during its 20th session, which was held in Marrakech. They back the peace negotiations and call for the protection of the cultural and spiritual character of Al-Quds against the illegal Israeli violations.

During that same meeting, a five-year strategic plan of action for the Bayt Mal al-Quds al-Sharif Agency was adopted with a view to providing support to vital sectors through well thought-out projects in terms of time frame and funding mechanisms.

To bolster the steadfastness of our Maqdissi brothers and sisters on their land, I am particularly keen to ensure the Agency keeps up its action on the ground, provides the inhabitants of Al-Quds with direct, tangible support and seeks to meet their pressing needs.

Dear citizens,

I believe Africa is capable of revival.

Such an objective, however, will be attained only if Africa's sons and daughters rely on their own capabilities. I wish, in this regard, to repeat what I said in Abidjan: Africa should learn to have faith in Africa.

I reiterate, in this respect, Morocco's commitment to implementing a comprehensive, coherent policy towards African sister nations, based on the joint development of resources, more effective human development and greater economic cooperation.

This commitment is illustrated by the visits I have paid to several African sister countries, as well as by both the number and the nature of the agreements signed, which lay the groundwork for a distinct, efficient South-South partnership that I would like to see rooted in solidarity.

I also wish to reiterate my commitment to multipartite and triangular cooperation mechanisms in order to forge balanced, mutually beneficial partnerships with countries of the North.

Considering the growing security threats - particularly in the Sahel and Sahara region - I once again call for collective action to deal with terrorist groups, which find allies in separatist movements, human trafficking gangs and arms and drug dealers



because of their converging interests. These groups represent the most serious threat to regional and international security.

As Morocco naturally turns towards Africa, this does not mean it will do so at the expense of our country's relations with its international partners. On the contrary, this policy will open up broader prospects for partnership between the North and the South.

In this regard, I do not perceive Morocco's Advanced Status with the European Union as an end in itself, but rather as a milestone on the path towards strengthening the Morocco-EU partnership, which I would like to be balanced and equitable.

For this reason, Morocco is particularly keen to ensure the success of the current negotiations for a thorough and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU to serve as a framework for even closer ties between Morocco and Europe, as well as for the integration of the Moroccan economy into European domestic markets.

As well as consolidating its special relations with the European bloc, Morocco seeks to diversify and expand its bilateral relations with EU members.

As regards Morocco's historical relationship with the United States of America, I should like to reaffirm my commitment to consolidating the strategic partnership with the United States, particularly by devising new mechanisms to support and promote the free trade agreement and continue our strategic dialogue with that country.

During the meeting I had with President Obama last November, we managed to give strong impetus to our partnership. The results are starting to show, be it with respect to our bilateral relations, or the similarity of views regarding regional and international issues of common concern, especially those relating to development and security in Africa.

To further promote our open policy and diversify Morocco's partnership relations, I am also keen to strengthen the Kingdom's time-honored ties with both the Russian Federation and the Republic of China - countries that I look forward to visiting in the near future.

I am determined to ensure that the economic aspects of Morocco's special strategic partnership with these two countries are further enhanced and promoted.

Dear Citizens,

Thanks to the Kingdom's sovereign, pragmatic foreign policy, we have managed to rejuvenate and revamp our diplomatic action. <sup>[SEP]</sup> Moreover, I have sought to ensure that all of the nation's key actors are actively involved in defending our country's best interests, particularly our territorial integrity, which remains our foremost priority.

As I have said time and again, the question of the Sahara is the cause of all Moroccans. This is a sacred responsibility for all of us.

In this regard, I call for greater vigilance and across-the-board mobilization. I also recommend that the necessary measures be taken to remain one step ahead of our opponents' schemes. Indeed, there is no room for wait-and-see attitudes, reliance on others or reactive behavior.

I also reaffirm my commitment to the autonomy initiative for our southern provinces. Once again, the Security Council, in its latest resolution, described that initiative as "serious and credible".

In any case, we shall not put the region's future at risk. That is why we shall carry on with development and modernization projects there, particularly through the implementation of the development model for our southern provinces. This model is based on a participatory approach, on good governance and on cohesive, multidimensional programs aimed at achieving integrated development.

Advanced regionalization will be introduced in all of the Kingdom's regions, and

first and foremost in our southern provinces. Indeed, regionalization makes it possible to promote local specificities while enabling the regions' populations to democratically manage their local affairs in a country that harmoniously brings its regions together.

Finally, I should like to pay tribute to our Royal Armed Forces, the Royal Gendarmerie, the National Security Forces, the local authorities, the Auxiliary Forces and the Emergency Services for their constant mobilization under my leadership to defend the nation's territorial integrity and preserve its security and stability.

I also remember, with deep respect, my venerated grandfather and father, Their Majesties King Mohammed V and King Hassan II, as well as all the martyrs of the nation, who made great sacrifices for the glory and sovereignty of our country. May they all rest in peace.

As a tribute to their eternal memory, we shall carry on with development and modernization projects to ensure all our citizens - wherever they may be - enjoy a dignified life in a secure, safe and stable environment, God willing.

"My Lord, make this a City of Peace, and feed its people with fruits". True is the Word of God."<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> King Mohammed VI. (July 30, 2014). *Full Text Of The Throne Day Speech Delivered By HM King Mohammed VI*. Rabat, Morocco. Retrieved from: <http://www.map.ma/en/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/full-text-throne-day-speech-delivered-hm-king-mohammed-vi>

Appendix B: King Abdullah II's speech presenting constitutional amendments 14 August 2011

*In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate* Members of the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review, Ladies and gentlemen,

Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you,

Blessed be the souls of the noble Jordanians and the father of the Constitution, His Majesty the late King Talal, who wrote our great Constitution.

The recommendations concerning provisions of our Constitution that have been presented here today to me is solid proof of Jordan's ability to revitalise itself and its legislation and approach the future with a vision of social and political reform, the foundation of which is wider public participation, the separation between the branches of government and a clear definition of the responsibilities of each of these branches in a manner that truly reflects the Hashemite tradition and good governance in state administration. I extend my thanks and appreciation to the president and members of the committee who carried out the constitutional review and suggested the amendments.

In this context, we should point out the set of ideas and proposals presented by this respected committee, in whose experience and knowledge we trust. These suggested amendments maintain and enhance the balance among the powers through effective constitutional mechanisms. And because we believe in the protection of the Constitution that we have sworn to preserve, one of the major proposals is the establishment of a constitutional court to rule on the constitutionality of legislation and consolidate the judiciary's role as the authority that safeguards the constitutionality of legislation.

At the same time, we also wish to highlight the new form of relationship between governments and Parliament in accordance with the proposals that ensure the balance between the government and the Lower House and by which the dissolution of the Lower House is tied to the immediate resignation of the government. The proposals also suggest that governments can no longer issue temporary laws except in times of war and natural catastrophes and in cases of financial expenditures that cannot be postponed. In addition, it is proposed that an independent national commission oversee parliamentary elections, while vesting in the judiciary the exclusive authority to look into electoral contestations and the trial of ministers.

To reinforce the role of youth in public and parliamentary life, the minimum age of candidacy for the Lower House has been lowered to 25 years, and thus, activism within political parties, professional associations and unions becomes an integral part of our national political culture. By establishing such liberties in the Constitution, we hope to institutionalise citizen activism and effective public participation in the legislative process as well as the formation of governments so that we can move from a phase of sloganeering to opening channels of activism and real life engagement in political parties, unions or youth movements. We need to practice this within the framework of an institutionalised political process that respects the rotation of power through parliamentary governments and a modern election process in which political

parties compete on the basis of national platforms.

It should also be emphasised here that our relentless endeavours to consolidate balance and equity between the authorities are conditional on people's willingness to join political parties that express themselves and their policies at the ballot box. These are the fundamentals of parliamentary democracies.

With the completion of this step, we assert that the roadmap of political reform will be achieved within a timeframe that observes institutional processes and the existing constitutional channels, and no later than the fourth quarter of this year.

Priority in terms of legislation at this stage will be given to the conclusion of constitutional amendments, the recommendations of which have been presented to you today. Amending the Constitution will proceed in accordance with the appropriate constitutional processes and within a timeframe we hope would not exceed one month and that gives the legislative branch the ability to proceed with the review and adoption of political legislation, namely the political parties and election laws, which will have passed through a process of preparation and drafting that reflects the popular will and national consensus.

When these laws are endorsed, along with the municipalities and the teachers' association laws, Jordan will have accomplished most of the legislative infrastructure required for an institutional reform process that ensures an engagement of the grassroots, political parties and unions, Parliament and government that lives up to national ambitions and expectations.

We have ordered this review of the Constitution's provisions and some amendments thereto in the belief that it is my responsibility and duty towards my people in meeting their aspirations and for the good of the present and the future. What is needed now is that all powers and institutions, whether partisan, unionist or popular, engage and invest in this reform process in order to translate into action programmes.

After the Municipalities Law is enacted, municipal elections must be held as soon as possible.

Today, we present Jordanians, both our present and future generations, with these historic constitutional revisions and amendments which reflect the high level of political and legal maturity among Jordanians who are bracing for the centennial of their state; a state that was built on the values of freedom, unity and equality.

Your blessed efforts have paid off, as they are reflected in the legacy of the grandfathers and fathers and the aspirations of the children who are heading confidently towards the future to build the New Jordan in the face of challenges and on the principles of justice and equality. We will realise that in words and in deeds, a genuine achievement that will be a source of pride for all.

Finally, I pray that God Almighty keep Jordan a free, strong and safe country and give us the will and the strength to protect our country as a haven of freedom, justice and human dignity.

Peace, God's mercy and blessings be upon you.”<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> King Abdullah II. (August 14, 2011). *Remarks by His Majesty King Abdullah II On the occasion of presenting the suggested constitutional amendments by the Royal Committee on Constitutional Review*. Amman, Jordan. Retrieved from: [http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en\\_US/speeches/view/id/482/videoDisplay/0.html](http://kingabdullah.jo/index.php/en_US/speeches/view/id/482/videoDisplay/0.html)