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The American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

**THE COMPATIBILITY OF YUSUF AI QARADAWI'S
WASATEYYA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT
WITH THE SECOND GENERATION OF THE MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD**

A Thesis Submitted to

The Political Science Department

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

by

Reem Ahmed El Mahdy

September/2014

The American University in Cairo

THE COMPATIBILITY OF YUSUF AI QARADAWI'S WASATEYYA

SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

WITH THE SECOND GENERATION OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

A Thesis Submitted by

Reem Ahmed El Mahdy

To Department of (Political Science)

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

The degree of Master of Arts

Has been approved by

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to study the influence of the Wasateyya (centrist) school of thought on the Muslim Brotherhood's second generation of leaders. The study shows that the Wasateyya school and its advocates within the Muslim Brotherhood were unsuccessful in bringing about a meaningful change in the direction of moderateness within the movement. The research assesses the influence of the Wasateyya school of thought by evaluating the compatibility of Qaradawi's ideology with that of four members of the middle generation of the Brotherhood; Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh, Essam el Eryan, Khairat al Shater, and Mohamed Morsi. The thesis is composed of seven large sections; sections one to three introduce the research question, methodology, and limitations. Section four is a literature review, section five addresses the relationship between Qaradawi and the second generation of the MB and defines ideological and political Wasateyya, section six is about the case study of the four leaders, and finally section seven concludes the main findings of the study.

INTRODUCTION

SECTION I: AIMS, OBJECTIVES, AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

A) Aims:

The aim of this project is: To determine how far Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders of the second generation have been influenced by Yusuf Qaradawi's Wasateyya school of thought.

B) Objectives:

A) Define political and ideological Wasateyya.

B) To assess the compatibility of Yusuf Qaradawi's ideology with four main leading figures of the Brotherhood independently:

1. Two moderate/liberal leaders: Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh and Essam El Eryan
2. Two hardliners: Khairat al Shater and Mohamed Morsi.

C) To examine the relationship between Yusuf al Qaradawi and members of the MB second generation.

C) Research Hypothesis

Research Hypothesis: The advocates of moderateness within the MB were largely unsuccessful in advancing political and ideological moderateness within the movement.

Section II: Methodology and Research Design

1-Nature of the Study:

This study is a Qualitative research that focuses primarily on the 'What'; To *what* extent the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood are compatible with Qaradawi's views?

My research design and methodology will be based on Michael Quinn Patton's model of qualitative research which he presents in the third edition of his book "Qualitative research and evaluation methods".

2-Research Tools:

A) *Content Analysis*: Is a method of analyzing and interpreting the literature/records and accounts.

B) *In-depth Interviews*: "One-on-one, probing interview between a trained researcher and a respondent". Interviews will be conducted with individuals associated with the Brotherhood or Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi.

C) *Second-hand Interviews*: previously recorded interviews from TV programs, periodicals, and books conducted with the leaders of the Brotherhood studied in this research.

D) *Biographies*: documented accounts written by individuals/figures about their life and personal experiences.

3-Case Study:

The method I will be using for this research is a case study about the compatibility of Yusuf Qaradawi's *Wasateyya* ideology with the four leaders of the MB: Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh, Essam El Eryan, Khairat Al Shater, and Mohamed Morsi.

The question of the compatibility of the ideologies of Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi and each of the four figures of the MB will be answered based on the **criteria of both political and ideological Wasateyya:**

Criteria of Political Wasateyya:

- 1) The ability to reach out and communicate with non-Islamist groups/individuals
- 2) The position on minority rights and the issue of partisanship

Criteria of Ideological Wasateyya:

The components of ideological Wasateyya are justice, righteousness, and tolerance.

Therefore, the positions of each member towards the decisions of the Guidance Bureau during the 2011 revolution are used to cover this component.

Section III) Research Limitations:

Methodological Limitations:

1-Lack of available or reliable data: The first problem that may limit the reliability of results in this research is the complexity of the current situation. It would have been ideal to interview members of the second generation of the Brotherhood, however, this is

unlikely because of the imprisonment of all of the leaders of the group, and the banning of the movement all together. The current circumstances therefore impose a great deal of limitation for this study.

2-Sample Size: The number of the units of analysis used in the study (the four members of the second generation of the brotherhood) or the size of the sample is too small to indicate reliability and generalization of results.

3-Measure used to collect data: This study relies heavily on second-hand interviews and analysis of the literature. The number of personal interviews conducted for the purpose of this study are very few due to the current crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. Hence this limits the availability of primary data, which is inferred from one-to-one interviews with members of the movement. Again this limitation is a result of the current political circumstances in the country.

Limitations of the Researcher:

One limitation of this study on my part is access. As mentioned above It is difficult to guarantee access to individuals/figures associated with the MB due to security reasons, as well as reasons related to myself. I do not currently live in Egypt and so my access to resources for this research are limited.

The second limiting factor of this study is time, in which as a researcher I have a deadline for continuing my study, also having other commitments towards my family as being a mother and wife will also limit my ability to gather more accurate and reliable results as opposed to someone who has a full and long commitment to the study.

The last and possible limitation of this study is personal bias, which can sometimes occur unintentionally. In the end every researcher has his own personal views on the topic he/she is studying, and no matter how much we try to put personal views aside, they still manage to manifest themselves in a way or another through our final product.

SECTION IV:LITERATURE REVIEW

A. History and Background

The society of the MB was first founded by Hassan al Banna in 1928 in the city of Ismai'liya. Al Banna who was an Arabic teacher, possessed the charisma of a leader and was therefore, able to attract a considerable number of followers over a relatively short period of time. (P.Mitchell, 1969). In general Hassan al Banna was known for his moderate views and flexible approach towards Western politics; he believed his main goal was Islamizing society with a bottom-up strategy and hence anything that would serve his goal was welcomed. Alison Pargeter's "From Opposition to power" talks about Banna's

pragmatic personality and how he was willing to do anything that would help the expansion and success of his movement including participating in parliamentary elections and joining political parties.

The organization expanded significantly after the second World War, it held general conferences every year, of which the first was in 1933 and was concerned with the means of combating the problem of Christian missionary activity. During the first four years of its existence, the MB was mainly concerned about expanding and attracting as many number of followers, and therefore, created a press for itself, the first MB magazine under the name of "*Majalat al Ikhwan al Muslimeen*". Later other magazines were founded such as "*Majalat al Nazir*" and "*Al Manar*". The editor in chief of the *Al Manar* magazine was Rashid Reda, a Syrian journalist, and one of the influential characters in Banna's ideology. (P.Mitchell, 1969).

The MB though started off as a social organization, quickly came to assume an important political role in the post colonized Egypt. The presence of the British occupation which led to the gradual erosion of traditional Islamic culture, the break down of the Ottoman Empire, and finally the creation of a Zionist state on Palestinian soil, were all catalysts to the MB's political expansion. Soon after the occupation of the Palestinian territories, the MB created guerrilla warfare in order to assist the Palestinians in resisting the Israeli occupation. The MB officially announced their involvement in politics during their fifth conference, in which the *Jama'a* identified itself as a political organization. The brotherhood's involvement in politics marked a long history of collision with the government which eventually ended with the dissolution of the organization in 1948 and the assassination of Banna in 1949. (P.Mitchell, 1969).

The advent of the free officers coup in 1952 presented a new opportunity for the MB that was soon to turn into a misfortune marking the beginning of an era of persecution and suppression. Hassan al Hudaybi, the successor of Banna, possessed a less charismatic personality which failed to stand up to the challenging and charismatic character of Abd El Nasser. Barbara Zollner's account on Hudaybi's legacy shows how Nasser and members of the secret unit (*Nizam Khass*) conspired against Hudaybi who was infavor of dissolving the secret apparatus and of turning down the Revolution Command Council's (RCC) offer of assuming certain posts in the new government. Due to those and other reasons, when Hudaybi travelled for tour around the Middle East, Nasser took advantage of his absence and issued a decree to dissolve the MB. (H.E.Zollner, 2011). In response to the dissolution decree, members of the secret apparatus made an attempt on Nasser's life during the famous *Manshiyya* incident in 1954. This incident marked the beginning of the enmity phase in the relationship between the MB and the RCC, which triggered a series of trials and persecutions of MB leaders.

The by-product of this era of persecution was the emergence of a line of radical thought pronounced by Sayyed Qutb, also known as *Takfiri* ideology. Despite the fact that this trend gained a significant number of followers within the Islamic movement at large, it has also acted as a driving force for the revival of moderateness and a return back to the gradual bottom up approach of Banna. The first attempt for countering Qutbian thoughts was indeed initiated by Hudaybi. Hudaybi is well known for his famous writing "Du'at la Qudat" which was a refutation of Sayyid Qutb's 'Takfiri' approach manifest in his book 'Milestones'. Hudaybi did not reject democracy and deemed it similar to the essence of Islamic Shari'a. Barbara Zollner refers to Hudaybi's objective of spreading the awareness

among Muslims about the political nature of Islam and hence the importance of political participation. According to Zollner, Hedaybi's significance is manifest in his legacy which paved the way for contemporary moderate views adopted by today's Muslim Brotherhood.

The moderate line of thought became more profound in the early 1970's and throughout the 1980's. The emergence of figures such as Umar Tilmisany-third supreme guide- helped the movement take a turn away from violent action and radical views in favor of a more pragmatic and tolerant approach. Furthermore, the phenomenon of the New Islamic Scholars and independent intellectuals who provided ideological nourishment for the Brotherhood including prominent names such as Yusuf Qaradawi, Mohamed Al Ghazaly, Tariq al Bishri, and Mohamed Salim Al A'wa, has contributed to deeply ingraining moderateness within factions of the Brotherhood. Consequently, many of the movement's stand points on several political and social issues have been revised.

For example Qaradawi being an influential figure to the MB, had been able to reshape their mission of creating an Islamic Caliphate, as well as their vision of an Islamic state in general. Even though Banna shared an open minded attitude when it came to participating in the political system, he never openly approved of democracy as a desirable state system. In fact he opposed the creation of political parties, and was very clear about his advocacy for Islamic rule and the re-establishment of the Caliphate. The concept of civil state with an Islamic identity was introduced by Qaradawi to ensure that democracy is a primary characteristic of the Islamic state. The endorsement of democracy, partisanship, women's rights, and the expression of tolerance towards contending ideas and groups comprise some of the main pillars of centrist ideology as well as contemporary MB thought. The increase in a rhetoric for democracy among the Brotherhood leaders,

coupled with a religious appeal worked towards advancing the political interests of the movement largely over the past years; however, at the same time it has given rise to the suspicions of Political analysts over the group's changing tendencies.

The MB's understanding of democracy and the kind of state they wish to pursue remained a source of debate among Political Science researchers. The underlying questions presented in these debates included whether or not the MB were becoming more democratic? and if their advocacy for democracy is indeed genuine. The fact that the organization had experienced a major change or shift in their ideology has been established in most of the research addressing this topic. Some of those who addressed this topic included; Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Chris Harnisch and Quinn Mecham, Sana Abed Qotob, Mariz Tadros, Alison Pargeter, Amr Al Chobaki, Nathan Brown, and Lorenzo Vidino.

All have in a way or another pointed to this dramatic shift or change towards democracy experienced inside the MB. Some scholarly evidence explains this shift in terms of a means for the Brotherhood to distance itself from extremist Islamists who employ violence in pursuit of their goals. The start of this alleged 'shift' coincides with the events of violence exercised by radical military groups who are offshoots of the Brotherhood such as the assassination of Anwar Sadat and the creation of *Al-Qaeda* with its violent attributes. As noted by Harnisch and Mecham:

Dramatic Islamist violence against the Egyptian regime, such as the assassination of President Sadaat, and increasingly organized violence by groups such as Islamic *Jihad*, *al Gama'a al-Islamiyya* and *Al Takfir Wal Hijra*, among others, provided a strong incentive for the larger MB to distance it self from political violence publicly through ideological statements. (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009, P.191).

Accordingly, the Brotherhood had no alternative but to make sure their hands were 'clean' from all the violence that had been going on in the name of political Islam. Not to say that their call for democracy was a fallacy, but instead they saw it necessary at that particular time to clarify concepts that had long been established in MB ideology, such as the willingness to operate within the legal framework of the system.

Scholarly research has been divided on interpreting and explaining the reasons behind the Brotherhood's ideological evolution. While a group of researchers argue that the MB is merely using democracy as a means to achieve its goal of establishing an Islamic state but do not genuinely believe in democratic principles; another group finds the situation to be less complicated and chose to believe that the Brotherhood's inclination towards democracy is out of a true positive change taking place within the ranks of the organization and supported by the younger youth generation. Lorenzo Vidino talks about this divide in scholarly research explaining that the opinions of experts is divided into two groups, the pessimists, who argue against the sincerity of the Brotherhood's democratic evolution and the optimists who argue in favor of it. Some names of the pessimist experts' include Mariz Tadros, Amr Al Chobaki, Harnisch and Mecham, Abdel-Moniem Said Aly, and Manfred W. Wenner. The optimists on the other hand include Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke, Sana Abed Kotob, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, and Nathan J. Brown.

Most of the scholars listed above, have addressed this ideological evolution from a rather shallow perspective. They overlook the generational and ideological divides which take credit for either advancing or curbing democratic tendencies within the movement. Moreover, it is of vital importance to pay specific attention to the origins of the democratic transformation in the Brotherhood, how it started, who instigated it, who

promoted it within the group, and what was their motive? This study identifies the elements of the ideological shift and attributes it to the phenomenon of the New Islamist Scholars among whom Qaradawi seems to stand out most. The efforts of Qaradawi as this paper argues, are directed towards reviving the moderate spirit of Islamic movements as first outlined by Hassan al Banna. The study demonstrates how the *Wasateyya* school of thought matches and complements that of al Banna's. Furthermore, centrist ideology is even inspired from al Banna's thought. According to Raymond William Baker, "The New Islamist trend owed a great deal to the organizational and intellectual work of the Brotherhood, and in particular, to the inspiration of Hassan al Banna." (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

The work of Baker presents the New Islamist Discourse as an extension of the *Wasateyya* school of thought, and explains how it has for a long period of time represented mainstream MB ideology. Baker identifies the members who comprise the New Islamists placing Qaradawi on top of the list which includes Fahmy Howeidy, Sheikh Mohamed El Ghazaly, and Kamal Abul Majd. However, Baker, Joshua Statcher, Sagi Polka, Samuel Helfont, Gilles Kepel, Betina Graff, David Warren, and Christine Gilmore, all agree that Dr. Yusuf Al Qaradawi along with Sheikh Al Ghazaly are the main founders of the *Wasateyya* school of thought. After the death of Sheikh Al Ghazaly, Qaradawi became the sole target for researchers of political Islam, especially those who wish to study the intellectual dynamics of contemporary MB ideology.

B. Identifying the Different Generations of the Muslim Brotherhood:

The discussion of the generational and ideological divides within the Brotherhood is necessary here for understanding the choice of the middle generation as the focus of this paper, as well as the choice of the four members within this generation. Categories or groups within the MB are classified in the literature sometimes according to age and sometimes to ideology. In this study, reference to ideological differences is achieved by acknowledging the existence of a moderate line of thought within the Brotherhood, which is however, represented by individuals rather than a group or faction. This moderate trend is usually weighed against the traditional line of thought within the Brotherhood represented by its hardliners. The use of this distinction is intended to demonstrate the fact that conflict within the Brotherhood mainly boils down to differences over priorities.

Of the scholarly work which attempts to classify divides in terms of age is a study conducted by RAND (National Defense Research Institute). The study refers to Khalil Al Anani's work on the organization's generational divide, in which he states that there are four generational groups within the Brotherhood, out of which only one group mostly known from the literature by the "reformists" or "second generation" gained specific scholarly attention.

The first generation are those of the 1960's who are mainly characterized according to Anani by their traditional and conservative Islamist beliefs and who were shaped by their experience of the crisis or '*mihna*' under Nasser in the 1950's and 1960's during which the organization suffered its darkest period. These generations of leaders are also known for their cherishing of secrecy and hierarchy as the defining characteristics of the organization. Mohamed Badie' current General Guide, Sayyed Qutb, Mahmoud Ezzat are all representatives of this generation.

The second group are those of the 1970's and who have gained the greatest attention in the literature on the MB. This generation is primarily the focus of this research study, this group's significance lies in the fact that “they did not enter Islamic activism through the door of the Brotherhood but rather as part of *al-Gamā'āt al Islamīya*, or the Islamic Student Associations, that flourished in Egypt's universities in the 1970s. Only later were the activists from this movement formally integrated into the MB.” (Martini, Kaye, York, 2012, P.31). This group of leaders are mostly identified by their advocacy of the movement's political involvement and their belief that change only comes through political participation, besides their emphasis on minority rights and gender equality. The main figures who comprise this generational group according to Anani are Abul Fotouh, El Eryan, Abul Ala' Madi, and Al Shater.

The third generation identified by Anani are those of the 1980's and 1990's who are now in their forties and early fifties. This group according to Anani “is highly influenced by the conservative old guard, and through the latter's support, controls much of the lower level administrative positions within the organization. Calling them 'neo-traditionalists' al Anani argues that this generation is essentially an extension of the old guard.” (Martini, Kaye, York, 2012, P.32). The work of Tammam, Wickham, Abdouh, and Pargeter reveals that members of this group are more 'obedient' and yielding than others due to their rural backgrounds. Tammam argues that during the period of the 1980's and 1990's the Brotherhood has undergone a process of ruralization, in which members such as Morsi were chosen to join the Guidance Bureau based on their rural qualities.

The fourth and last generation comprises of the younger youth of the 2000's and is referred to by Anani as the 'bloggers'. This generation's significance lies in their ability to

deploy technology and modern means of communications for revolutionary purposes. “This is the same generation that was most forward-leaning in joining the protests that toppled President Mubarak.” (Martini, Kaye, York, 2012, P.32).

While Anani's review of the generational divides resembles an articulate account, it fails to point out the ideological connection between the identified generations, and bases its classification merely on age. A clear example of this is the placement of Al Shater in the same group with Abul Fotouh, El Eryan and Madi, and presenting him as a member of the reformist camp who advocates the agenda of tolerance and democracy. This is an inaccurate classification of Al Shater on Anani's behalf (as will be demonstrated later in this paper), who has affiliated him with this group based on his compliance with its member's age group. Anani's classification based on age also seems to suggest that members such as Abul Fotouh and Madi are ideologically different from the generation of youth bloggers. Again this is proved an inaccurate statement as this research study reveals. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, Anani's method of identifying divides within the Brotherhood merely serves as an initial criteria for selection among MB leaders. Accordingly, members from the middle generation or the 1970's generation, who have been the primary leaders of the MB for the past thirty years, are therefore, chosen to be the focus of this study.

Another scholar who has dealt more accurately with the issue of generational divides is Carrey Rosefsky Wickham. Wickham places less emphasis on age divisions in favor of ideological orientations and priorities. For example while she acknowledges that both Abul Fotouh and El Eryan belong to the same generational group, she portrays Abul Fotouh to be more ideologically matching with the generation of youth activists. In her

book Wickham mentions that there are three main factions within the MB today; The conservative old guard, the pragmatic conservatives of the 1970's, and the youth reformists

The old guard who are today in their seventies, eighties and nineties, having devoted long years of service to the *Jama'a* and survived the persecution of the Nasser era, they were a close knit group whose authority derived from the traditional respect accorded to the group's elders, as well as the personal sacrifices they had made on the movement's behalf...Although they endorsed the Brotherhood's participation in electoral politics, they remained wary of the liberal values associated with democratic systems in the West...They were less careful in their rhetoric and more apt to express views out of sync with the brotherhood's alleged commitment to democratic norms. (Wickham, 2013, P. 133).

This generation though ideologically significant, has come to play a relatively limited role within the Brotherhood today. Due to their aging and lack of articulation their role became gradually less apparent in expressing the movement's policies and strategies to the public.

The second group are the pragmatic conservatives:

Their views were more flexible, they were generally less advanced in age, and they had wider political experience. Many of them had served as Brotherhood deputies in parliament. Leaders in this group included Khairat Al Shater, Mohamed Habib, Mohamed Morsi, and Sa'ad El Katatny, with some like Morsi viewed as more conservative and others like Habib as somewhat closer to the reformists. (Wickham, 2013, P. 133).

Within Brotherhood circles pragmatic conservatives served as a bridge between their more conservative and their more progressive counterparts...they can be said to represent the new mainstream of the *Jama'a* ideologically more conservative than the reformists but more flexible than the old guard, and more experienced in, adept at, and committed to representing the brotherhood in wider spheres of public life. (Wickham, 2013, P. 137).

Wickham clearly distinguishes among generational and ideological groupings, when she says,

Not all members of the 70's generation evinced a reformist orientation...many of this age cohort remain forcefully loyal to the movements old guard. some of the Brotherhood's veteran leaders, such as Umar Al Tilmisany, were early proponents

of reformist ideas. By the end of the Mubarak era a new cader of Brotherhood activists in their twenties and thirties had embraced the reformist agenda of the middle generation as their own.(Wickham, 2013, P.138).

While the study's choice of the middle generation as a focus of this paper is based on the generational element (age), the narrower choice of the four members of the MB is based on ideological factors. Hence two members, Abul Fotouh and El Eryan represent the moderate or more liberal line of thought, while the other two, Al Shater and Morsi represent the mainstream/ hardcore MB thought.

The reformist trend was the third main faction within the Brotherhood:

What distinguished the reformists from their counterparts was their embrace of the more progressive interpretations of Islam, their support for greater engagement with other forces in Egyptian society, and their push for fundamental changes in the policy orientations and internal practices of the Brotherhood itself. (Wickham, 2013, P.137).

The distinguishing characteristics of this group are largely derived from the centrist school of thought of Qaradawi which inspired the more progressive trend within the Brotherhood. Hence in this study the 'reformists' are presented in terms of their ability to implement political and ideological moderateness within the movement.

SECTION V: QARADAWI AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

CHAPTER 1: EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF QARADAWI AND THE

MB

A. Significance of Yusuf Qaradawi to the MB From the Literature

This section will deal with the type of relationship exhibited between Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and the Islamic movements at large with a focus on the MB. Qaradawi's relationship to the MB has been shaped over two stages; the first was during the period of the 1940's until the 1960's in which Qaradawi resided in Egypt and endured the '*mihna*' (crisis) of the 1950's, as mentioned in the previous chapter, he shared some of the hardships experienced by the *Jama'a* in the prisons of Abd El Nasser. The second phase of this relationship was marked by the beginning of the 1970's until our current time, during this phase Qaradawi's relationship with the MB was carried from abroad and through his various writings and books, he managed to articulate the vision and mend the path of the organization. The fact that the MB saw in him the potential of becoming their '*Murshid*' (supreme guide) twice reveals a degree of loyalty and respect towards him on behalf of the group. Tammam describes Qaradawi's relationship with the Brotherhood as very unique and asserts that Qaradawi is the main inspirer of the movement's ideology. He explains,

In the MB, Qaradawi wasn't a mere scholar to which the movement resorts in special jurisprudence issues. His role wasn't restricted to meeting the movement's needs of facilitating jurisprudence, he was rather also a prominent preacher whose sermons were effective in mosques, in forums held for Islamic movement's members and supporters, and those for public supporters of the Islamic awakening, which is another important aspect of Qaradawi's influence in his relation with the Islamic movement. (Tammam, 2008).

Tammam also claims that Qaradawi is 'the most influential preacher in the history of the Islamic movement' due to his numerous preaches, lectures, and sermons in addition to his writings and TV programs.

The significance of Qaradawi to the MB, Tammam argues, lies in a few key issues. First is that he was the first Islamic scholar among his generation to dedicate diligent work on the issue of facilitating jurisprudence. The school of facilitation was first initiated by Sheikh Sayed Sabeq through his book "Jurisprudence of the Sunnah" (*Fiqh al Sunnah*); "It managed to get jurisprudence out from the specialists to the public". He was then succeeded by Qaradawi who Tammam says "was the most famous, creative and persistent among scholars of this school. His beginning was with his famous book "The permissible and the prohibited in Islam" (*Al-Halal Wal-Haram in Islam*) issued in 1959, his first and most famous book that made him well-known in the Islamic world."

(Tammam, 2008). Through out his life Qaradawi has adopted leniency in his *fatwas*, but this book '*Al Halal Wal Haram*' did not just issue *fatwas* but also worked on facilitating and simplifying jurisprudence itself so as to be understood by the regular and most humble reader. Second Qaradawi was the first to address controversial and sensitive topics in a deliberate and blunt manner such as the issue of singing and music in Islam as well as all kinds of Arts and Islam's position from them, and most importantly his positions on the issues of partisanship and democracy which were discussed in the previous chapter. He also tackled the issues of women's social and political rights and was always a defender of the emancipation of women.

In these issues, Qaradawi adopted the method of facilitation and permissibility (*Ibaha*) and he did not expand, like others, in prevention and prohibition. Always at his consciousness was the need for an Islamic project for facilitation for the nation, not an individual project whose owner may expand prohibition

under the rule of "Avoiding causes leading to corruption". (Tammam, 2008).

In relevance to his relationship with the second generation of the MB, which will be discussed later in greater detail, Tammam states that

In the second emergence of the Islamic movements in the 1970s, he was the most influential preacher among Islamic groups that emerged in Egyptian universities in this period. He shared with Sheikh Mohamed Al-Ghazali, who was older than him, and he didn't leave the country during the Nasserist ordeal, and took the task of influencing a huge section of these groups, gradually leading to making them lean to the MB movement and to join its organization after that. (Tammam, 2008).

In 1976 Qaradawi was the first preacher to deliver a sermon after the feast prayer, which was to become a traditional habit carried out by the Islamist groups later on. Despite his residence abroad, Tammam argues that Qaradawi still managed to shape the ideology of the Brotherhood through his writings especially in such a critical timing in which the wave of '*Takfir*' spanned the Islamist movements. He thus issued his book "The Phenomenon of Extremism in *Takfir*" which had a huge effect on protecting ranks of the MB from this wave that hit the Islamic case for two decades." (Tammam, 2008). Tammam describes the importance of Qaradawi to the movement at that time, and to the members of the Islamic student activists of the 1970's saying

The MB Movement doesn't see Qaradawi as only a scholar or preacher who provides the movement with juristic and missionary information. He is also an educator and an educational theorist, an important role carried out by him. Qaradawi has participated- in the early time of the movement- in laying down the educational and cultural structure inside the organization. He did so through a series of long articles- dedicated to this purpose- entitled "Culture of the Preacher", published by *Al-Da'wah* magazine that the MB issued in the 1970's. (Tammam, 2008).

Qaradawi's influence on the group is also expressed by Joshua Stacher who discusses the emergence of the *Wasat* party and how it was mainly inspired by Yusuf Al-Qaradawi and the rest of the *Wasateyya* thinkers.

The *Wasateyya* intellectuals are not politically organized and do not belong to any Islamist group, but they proved to be the main source of influence and ideas for the *Wasat* party when it emerged in 1996...The members of this informal *Wasateyya* group are difficult to classify or frame. The group includes such thinkers as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, Tariq Al Bishri, Mohamed 'Imara, and Mohamed Saleem Al 'Awa. (Stacher, 2002, Pp.417-418).

Stacher quotes one of the *Wasat* party founders saying that the ideas of those *Wasateyya* thinkers have laid the foundation of the *Wasat* initiative. Similarly, David Henry Warren highlights the significance of Qaradawi in shaping the course of political Islam in the Arab world, Warren describes Qaradawi as “a leading figure of the global pan-Islamic Reform movement among both the ‘*ulamā*’ and the wider Arab public.” He presents the work of Polka, Norton, Wickham, Scott, and Baker which deals with the creation of the *Wasat* party and the shifting ideology of the MB. These scholars all point to the fact that this “fundamental shift in ideology is brought about by reflexivity within the Islamic reform movement, and most notably the *Wasateyya* school of Al-Qaradawi” (Warren, 2013). Like Stacher, Warren argues that members of the *Wasat* party were highly influenced by the scholars of the New Islamic Discourse and quotes founder of the party Abu El Ela Mady saying that this party was created to put life into the thoughts of these thinkers. In fact Warren takes a bolder stance on the relationship between the *Wasat* Party and Qaradawi when he says,

Close involvement by members of the *Wasatiyya* movement in the development of the Hizb al-Wasat is further indicated by the fact that it was Qaradawi who led calls for the formation of a centrist Islamic political force to counteract both secularism and radical Islamism, and was often invited to speak

at conferences organised by the group. (Warren, 2013).

Warren also mentions that Polka and Norton provide evidence for this by stating that Qaradawi was concerned that a centrist and all encompassing Islam was absent from the political agendas of all Islamic movements in the 1980's and 1990's. He was also displeased with the leadership of the MB for adopting a rigid stance from modernity and reform, and for neglecting the younger generation's voices and excluding them from the decision making process of the organization.

Sagi Polka also provides a thorough discussion of Qaradawi's centrist school of thought (*Wasateyya*) in which he makes reference to the link between the MB and Centrism. Polka asserts that Centrism is based on the idea of gradualization, in which an Islamic state cannot be achieved without a gradual process of *da'wa*; preaching within the *Umma*, and weaving the Islamic principles within the social fabric of the Islamic community. Such a strategy Polka suggests, was initially adopted by al Banna and the MB. (Polka, 2003). This statement verifies that *Wasateyya* was in fact a feature of the ideology of the MB since the times al Banna and that Qaradawi and his *Wasateyya* school of thought are an attempt to revive those concepts of moderation and reform. Polka also mentions the adaptive measures lately carried out by the MB and states that thinkers of the *Wasateyya* or school of centrism have largely encouraged and inspired those changes, which include legitimate political activity and denunciation of violence and radicalism. (Polka, 2003).

The significance of Qaradawi to the MB and the Islamic movements at large mainly lies in his incorporation of moderation as a distinguishing feature of contemporary Islamists. Bettina Graf argues that Qaradawi takes credit for “turning 'Wasateyya' into a

trademark of a positively viewed Muslim identity”. Goetz Nordbruch also states that “The concept of *Wasateyya* which is meant to reflect “centrist” or “moderate” position in Islamic debates, is an additional feature that contributes to Qaradawi's popularity.” (Nordbruch, 2009, P.4). The main argument is that through his *Wasateyya* school, Qaradawi managed to distance himself (as well as the Islamic movements, and especially the MB) from the secular currents on the one hand, and the radical or extremist currents on the other hand.

Another important contribution of Qaradawi, is his method of facilitation of fiqh that was also mentioned by Tammam and discussed earlier in this section. Nordbruch offers a review of Mo'taz al Khateeb's account on this topic, who argues that Muslims have chosen Qaradawi as a 'global Mufti' for his leniency in '*fatwas*' and his general permissive approach. Nordbruch says, “Related to this is Qaradawi's awareness for social issues and his declared intention to offer facilitation and relief-rather than hardship and constraint-through an interpretation of Islamic traditions. His goal, Khateeb argues, is thus part of efforts by contemporary scholars to overcome obstacles that appeared to prevent contemporary Islam from responding to the necessities of modern civilization.” (Nordbruch, 2009, P.4). The 'obstacles' Khateeb refers to may be manifest in the lack of reform in Islamic jurisprudence, which mainstream Islamic scholars failed to generate, thus exposing Islam to secular attacks such as being incompatible with modernity. This interpretation of Qaradawi's role within the Islamic movement, therefore, confirms the hypothesis that the shift in ideology expressed by the MB and their adoption of a centrist vision, mainly stems from their desire to distance themselves from radical Islamist groups as a response to the wave of secular attacks that was triggered in the early 1990's. Even

though Nordbruch, Khateeb, Graf, and other scholars address Qaradawi's influence on Islamic movements in general, they all still offer an account on Qaradawi's special relationship with the MB and mention his close ties to the organization. In this context, Qaradawi's influence on the MB is a natural by product of his larger influence on political Islam in general.

Standing on the other side of this argument, is Barbara Freyer Stowasser who provides a case study on Qaradawi's positions on women. Even though Qaradawi is perceived by many of the Muslim world scholars as being too liberal in his advocacy of women's rights and his efforts in supporting the emancipation of women, Stowasser finds his positions on women quiet contradictory to his overall centrist approach and describes them as limiting to his quest for moderation. Nordbruch says in his review of Stowasser's case study

While Qaradawi calls for a historical reading of some traditions-for instance those that could be read as denying women any role in public life-he fails to accept equality of the sexes and equal rights. The moderation of Qaradawi's positions on women's rights thus does not reflect a search for justice, but a pragmatist reading of the traditions in the interest of the *umma*. It is as Stowasser argues, the collective interest that drives measures of social reform for the individual, not the other way around. (Nordbruch, 2009, P.5).

This pragmatist approach Nordbruch and Stowasser refer to, is an identifying feature of Qaradawi's strategy. While it is unclear whether Nordbruch and Stowasser find Qaradawi's quest for the 'interest of the *umma*' as a drawback or an advantage, the underlying message is that Qaradawi is mainly concerned by the welfare of the *umma* and adherence to God's Shari'a.

Qaradawi's thought being the main source of inspiration for the MB and the Islamic movement in general, has led scholars of political Islam to analyse his positions and ideology as a prerequisite for understanding MB strategies. David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore say in their research

The most important and influential of the thinkers engaged in developing the concept of Islamic Citizenship is arguably Yusuf al-Qaradawi, not only because he is the figurehead of the *Wasatiyya* movement, which he founded along with Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1996), but because he is recognized as the most influential representative of *Sunni* jurisprudence alive today, described as the MB's "Spiritual Guide" or even, on his return to Cairo and with the delivery of his famous Tahrir Square Sermon on 18th February 2011, as the "Egyptian Khomeini". Where al-Qaradawi leads, it appears, others soon follow especially since, as Tammam has observed, "there is a remarkable parallel development in the thought of Yusuf al-Qaradawi and that of the larger Islamist movement", and we would argue that his views are worthy of consideration on this basis. (Warren & Gilmore, 2012, P.3).

Samuel Helfont also agrees that policy makers should pay attention to what Qaradawi deems 'Islamic' in order to get an accurate understanding of the MB's idea of Islam. Helfont argues that

Qaradawi's success stems from his skill in reinterpreting religious scriptures to fit the contemporary world. He determines what is "Islamic" not only through considering classical Islamic sources, but also through considering the situation and needs of modern Muslims. This is an important point for policymakers. Qaradawi's Islamism, and by extension the MB's, is not a static and unchangeable theology driven by dogma. A few examples of how Qaradawi determines what is "Islamic" should highlight how the Brotherhood's Islam is not dogmatic or timeless. (Helfont, 2010).

Helfont then clearly states that "For groups such as the MB, Qaradawi's thought undergirds their ideology. Therefore, understanding Qaradawi and how his thought

intersects with modernity is essential for policymakers trying to understand Islamism today.” (Helfont, 2010).

The influence of Al-Qaradawi which has made its way to the Brotherhood through his writings, preaching sermons, and Television programs was a primary source of ideological nurturing to the MB, At this point it is useful to take a closer look at the significance and role of this generation in light of the alleged ideological transformation experienced by the MB during the past couple of decades.

B. Significance of the 70's Generation

The generation of the 1970's are the most likely to play the role of a catalyst for ideological evolution for a number of reasons. First the circumstances and the political tone in which they joined the MB, second the nature of their educational background, third their active roles in the professional syndicates, and finally their belonging to a younger age group. Combined together these factors helped make this generation more vulnerable to the influence of the *Wasateyya* thinkers. First the political mood at the time in which this group of young activists came to play a role in the organization was characterized by a greater need to return to religion. After the defeat of Egypt and its allies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, many Egyptians attributed this defeat to the people's deviation from the path of God, and from Nasser's enmity with the Islamists. Hence as mentioned by Dr.Saad El Din Ibrahim “After the 1967 defeat of the Nasser regime at the hands of Israel, the Brothers (along with other Islamic groups) began to win back the support of an increasing segment of Egypt's middle classes.” (Ibrahim, 1982, P. 76). In addition, the Brotherhood's comeback after the crisis years was characterized by a great determination to revive the

organization. This gave rise to the shifting priorities of the Brotherhood leaders who returned from exile or released from prison in the early 1970's; their main concern was how to convince the youth leaders of Islamist groups to join the MB. On the other hand the advent of the Sadaat era also came in favor of the Islamists, as Saad El Din Ibrahim says, "This latest comeback had President Sadaat's tolerance, if not outright blessings. Earlier in the 1970's Sadaat had felt that Islamic groups, including the Brothers would counterweigh the combined opposition to his regime (mounted by Nasserite and leftist elements)." (Ibrahim, 1982, P. 76). Adding to the reinforcement of Islamic trends in society was Sadaat's open-door policy "*infitah*" which allowed for exposure to the cultures and norms of the Gulf and the import of '*Wahabbism*' into Egyptian society. In fact the policy of "*infitah*" did not just result in exposure to *Wahabbism* but also to Western norms which made their way through the media and Television shows. However, the appeal of religion remained stronger and many women during this phase of Egypt's history began to appear in public wearing the head veil or '*hijab*'. This political tone of the 1970's, characterized by an emphasis on Islamic revival coupled with the shifting priorities of the MB at that time, gave rise to a generation of young activists who believed pursuing the implementation of *Shari'a* had to be clear cut.

Contributing to this straightforwardness and practicality in handling their goals, was the educational backgrounds these youth came from. Most of those young men who joined the Brotherhood as members of the Islamic *Jihad* group came from a science background. For example Madi and Al Shater are Engineers, while Abul Fotouh and El Eryan are doctors. The study of science-based knowledge, unlike that of humanities and

social sciences, develops a less tolerant and less open-minded mentality. As Abul Fotouh notes in his memoirs,

we, (the Islamist student activists) had a very straightforward way of thinking; there was only one right way of doing things, we perceived the state as single-minded, even the proper dress code for women we perceived as uniform, all had to have the same color and style, anything but that would be frowned upon. (Tammam, 2010, P.68).

Abul Fotouh also recalls that

One of their main problems as student activists was being intolerant towards those who opposed them, even we were against tolerance as a concept, he says, especially if it was over religion. Our lack of tolerance and narrow horizons made us practice a form of ideological terrorism against those who opposed us. . . (Tammam, 2010, P.70).

Such mental qualities of the 1970's generation have coincided with the pragmatic ideology of members of the secret unit and veterans of the Brotherhood. Abul Fotouh notes how “The brothers of the secret unit like Mustafa Mashhour, Kamal al Sananeery, and Ahmed al Malt” were ideologically closer to them. When they came out of prisons, Abul Fotouh says, “these people carried the same ideas we had, therefore, they were alot closer to us at that time then were other members of the Brotherhood who had been influenced by Hassan al Banna's moderate thought.” (Tammam, 2010, P.95). This fact, according to Abul Fotouh, was one of the main reasons his group of Islamist student activists agreed to join the Brotherhood. “Had we met with Umar Tilmisany or those who carried Al Banna's visions before meeting the leaders of the secret unit, we would have never found it possible to join the Brotherhood.” says Abul Fotouh. (Tammam, 2010, P.95). Hence the educational background of this generation played the role of a catalyst in bringing about the merger between the *Jama'a Islamiyya* and the MB. However, this group of activists

came to change their rigid views completely after being exposed to the influence of Umar Tilmisany and Scholars of the New Islamic Discourse.

The third factor that gives this generation their significance is the expansion of their roles in the professional syndicates in the period of the 1980's. This period was characterized by higher levels of political and social activity, mainly fueled by the former university student activists who newly joined the Brotherhood with the support of that time's General Guide Umar Al Tilmisany. (Wickham, 2013). According to Wickham, this increased participation resulted in an overall change in those individual's perceptions of others and in their world views,

The middle generation of reformist activists have begun to change their beliefs and ideas as they started to interact with groups of people outside the scope of the Brotherhood and Islamist movements...Close interaction between Islamic Trend leaders and individuals outside the movement, including intensive deliberation and debate on sensitive matters, had a transformative effect on the world views of Islamic actors, a point stressed by virtually every middle generation leader I have interviewed during my research. (Wickham, 2013, P.64).

Furthermore, this generation of reformists were able to get along easily with their secular counterparts due to the fact that they all came from the same educational background. All these exposures and experiences undergone by the 1970's generation helped broaden their scope and refined their understanding of their mission towards Islam. The exposure to western and secular cultures in addition to the rise of Qaradawi and his centrist school have together contributed to the ideological evolution attributed to this generation of leaders.

The last feature of this generation that impacts the degree of their significance during the period of the 1970's and 1980's was their young spirits and youthful ambitious minds. Belonging to a younger age group, this generation of activists had a strong motivation and unlimited devotion to their cause. Unlike the old veterans of the Brotherhood they were in touch with reality, always interacting and communicating with people from all over the political and social spectrum, and were much more willing to enter new challenges and take up more risks. (Wickham, 2013). Hence the generation of reformists at the time articulated a different vision and strategy for the organization to achieve its goals, namely through acknowledging the system and participating in it. However the old guard being less accepting to change resisted this idea and gave rise to the tensions between the two factions of the Brotherhood.

C. Qaradawi & The 70's Generation

The previous sections touched upon the significance of Qaradawi to the MB and to the Islamic movements at large. Here some light will be shed on his relationship with the 1970's generation and its significance. Qaradawi's ability to attract many followers from this generation mainly stems from his possession of a unique combination of historical merits and open-minded and modern worldview. He has managed to create the perfect mix of both the old and the new generations; he survived the times of al Banna and was influenced by him, he also survived the challenges of the 1950's and 1960's providing him with the experience and wisdom of his age. On the other hand he shares the optimism and activeness of the younger generations and their eagerness for continuous reform and refinement of their goals. This ability of a religious scholar to intertwine tradition and modernity is the reason behind Qaradawi's appeal to this generation of activists. William

Raymond Baker studies Qaradawi and the scholars of the Centrist school, he observes how they were focused on investing their efforts with the younger generations of the MB.

According to Baker,

This emphasis on the cultivation of the young has elicited a surprisingly positive response for a school that controls neither a party apparatus, nor for that matter any institutional structures at all. Young Egyptians have responded to the major New Islamist figures, especially Mohamed Al Ghazaly and Yusuf Al Qaradawi, as they did to few others in public life. While it is possible to identify other important intellectuals who have identified with opposition political trends and played leadership roles in civil society, none have attracted as wide a following among the youth over so long a period. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

Abul Fotouh discusses Qaradawi and the Wasateyya school's influence on him and his peers in the Islamic *Jihad* during the 1970's. "I will never forget the roles of those Sheikhs whose influence began to reappear after the death of Abd El Nasser in the early 1970's, and on top of those was Sheikh Al Ghazaly and his Wasaty school of thought." (Tamnam, 2010, P.35). It appeared to be that Al Ghazaly's role during this phase was stronger than Al Qaradawi due to two main factors; first his senior position in the field of *Da'wa*, (Qaradawi himself mentions that he was a student of Al Ghazaly), and second his presence in Egypt among those young cadre of activists at that time, as opposed to Qaradawi who had already resided in Qatar by that time. Yet it is undeniable that both Al Ghazaly and Qaradawi tread on the same lines of thought, and that the role of Qaradawi after the former's death was an extension of his school of thought and role towards the Islamic movement. Abul Fotouh devotes a large section of his memoirs explaining the great influence the Sheikhs of the *Wasateyya* school of thought had on him and his generation of leaders. Al Ghazaly comes on the top of the list which includes Yusuf Al

Qaradawi, Al Bahy Al Kholy, Umar Tilmisany, and Sayyed Sabeq. All of which were teachers of Qaradawi with the exception of Tilmisany. Abul Fotouh praises the *Wasateyya* school for being the main resurrector of the MB ideology and for introducing new concepts in the minds of students of his generation such as the comprehensiveness of Islam, the rejection of violence, and the importance of political participation. He also mentions that Qaradawi attended the summer camps and led the Eid prayers in Abdeen square organized by students of the Islamic *Jihad* in which he delivered lectures and sermons that spread his influence among members of that generation. Another important means through which Abul Fotouh and his peers were influenced by Qaradawi was through his writings in *Al Da'wa* magazine.

It is impossible to learn about the history of student Islamic movements in the 1970's without considering *Al Da'wa* magazine and its influence on our ideas and directions...Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi issued several writings through this magazine discussing the importance of educating a preacher, all of which had a great impact on our ideological composition. (Tammam, 2010, P.100).

Lorenzo Vidino refers to Qaradawi's school of centrism as being a parallel organization to the MB, he argues that Qaradawi had established this school since the emergence of Tilmisany's strategy of participation in the 1970's. This in fact is a verification for Qaradawi's influence on the 1970's generation and of the harmony of their ideas and goals. Vidino coins the term 'New Brothers' to refer to the followers of Qaradawi's *Wasateyya* school of thought as well as those Muslims who live in the West, whom he refers to as the 'New Western Brothers'. Vidino says, "Though Al Qaradawi might not be the pope of Sunni Islam, he unquestionably is the pope of the New Brothers and their Western branches." (Vidino, 2011). Vidino also quotes Abul Fotouh saying,

“Sheikh Al Qaradawi is an influential scholar and one of the MB's spiritual leaders in the Arab world...Any Muslim Brother would be honored to have him as a supreme guide...”

(Vidino, 2011).

Evidence of his influence is also manifest in the public statements of this generation's leaders in T.V. interviews and press releases. For example, El Eryan in an interview on 'Al Hayat' TV in 'Al Hayat Al Youm' program mentions that Qaradawi has been affiliated with the Brotherhood for a very long time, and that he has a long history with the organization. He also commented on Qaradawi's Friday sermon in Tahrir saying that it was an excellent speech and that he supports every word said in it. In another statement he declares that he is one of Qaradawi's students and a very close friend to him as well. In the same interview, El Eryan articulated the definition of a state as understood by the Brotherhood. He explained that "it is a civil state in which the *'umma'* is the source of *'sulta'*..."In a different interview with I'mad Adeeb, El Eryan announced that it is the right of the Brotherhood to create a political party, and that the party will be civil rather than religious, and that the Islamic state is a civil state, not one based on the authority of priests as is the case with the Christian state. It is therefore clear that El Eryan treads on the same line of thought produced by Qaradawi and that he is highly influenced by his ideology.

Al Shater's rhetoric also seems to be derived from Qaradawi's *Wasateyya* school of thought. In an interview with Al Shater in the popular T.V show "*al 'ashera masa'an*" with Mona al Shazly , Al Shater makes clear reference to the concept of *'shura'* and how it serves as the bases for all decisions taken in the organization. He clearly states that "the group is not just based on the concept of listening and obeying...but mainly after enacting

the concept of *Shura* first, the decision making process goes through different phases, and eventually the *murshid* is nothing more than a symbol of leadership and respect." Most importantly he asserts that *Shura* for the MB is binding '*mulzima*' and not just informative '*Mu'lima*', he makes reference to two different schools of thought on this issue and clarifies that they abide by the school which holds *Shura* as binding, which is also the same school of thought Qaradawi belongs to.

CHAPTER 2: IDENTIFYING POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL WASATEYYA

A. Identifying Ideological Wasateyya

The '*Wasateyya*' school of thought is the foundation of Dr. Qaradawi's ideology and the essence of all his *fatwas* in the field of theology. The term '*Wasateyya*' in Arabic means middle or moderate, '*wasateyya*' is the adjective, while '*Wasat*' in the noun meaning middle. Sheikh Qaradawi states that Islam is a '*Wasaty*' religion which always adopts middle grounds in all situations, and that his adoption of the '*Wasateyya*' school of thought stems from his certainty that '*Wasateyya*' is the essence of Islam and the main representative of true Islam or what he refers to as the 'first Islam'. The first Islam is a term Qaradawi uses to refer to Islam when it was first originated and revealed to God's Prophet, Mohamed (PBUH). Therefore, Qaradawi says

I have been blessed and guided by God the all mighty to adopt the path of *Wasateyya* ever since I entered the domain of *Da'wa* and *Fatwa*, which is the path of moderation and renovation and the method (*Manhaj*) of the '*wasat*' *Ummah* as it has been named in the *Qur'an*...and it is also the method of all the prophets, companions, and the righteous people as God mentioned in his holy book. (Qaradawi, 2010).

Qaradawi therefore, argues that the path of '*Wasateyya*' is God's path, and that choosing to follow the middle path is ordered to Muslims by God. He supports his argument by reciting the Qur'anic verse "*Ihdina al serat al mostaqeem, serat al latheen 'an'amt 'alayhem ghayr al maghdoub 'alayhem wa la al daleen*". The verse is a form of '*Do'aa*' (prayer) meaning may the lord guide us to the straight path, the path which God has bestowed upon those who are guided and un despised by him the all mighty. In this verse Qaradawi attempts to define the straight path, as the path of moderation. His argument

goes as follows: If we assume that we have two separate points that we want to connect, it is apparent that between those two points we can draw so many lines, yet among all those lines only one is straight, and the rest must be deviant and stray. This one straight line will only be found in the middle, and therefore the straight path which God refers to in his holy book, must be the middle path, hence the path of moderation or '*Wasateyya*'. He further supports his claim by referring to the Prophet's '*hadeeth*' (saying) which states that “the path of God is the one in the middle and is surrounded by other paths all led by satin”.

In another verse in the *Qur'an*, Qaradawi stated, God makes reference to '*Wasateyya*' by mentioning the scale of balance (*al Mizan*), in which God says, “God has brought his book with justice and a scale”. This scale referred to in the verse, Qaradawi argues is an innate element of human creation which guides people to righteousness and justice by helping them to weigh between good and evil; and is also a reference to '*Wasateyya*' since balancing and weighing are synonymous to middle or to seeking a middle ground. When God the all mighty orders people in the Qur'anic verse to “avoid cheating in the scale” this as Qaradawi argues is a call for striking a balance and treading on the path of moderation or '*Wasateyya*'. Hence '*Wasateyya*' is explained by Qaradawi in terms of balance and moderation. So that a balance is always needed to be stroked between two things which implies that there always has to be compensation between two things or two parties. This also means that each party or issue must get its own space in expressing itself equally, without any party dominating over the other, therefore *Wasateyya* is what strikes this balance, and ensures every party takes his or its full rights.

Qaradawi identifies six main definitions for '*Wasateyya*'; first that it means justice. Making a compromise or striking a balance entails taking a middle position between two

parties, and hence justice is achieved. Second it means righteous and straight, as explained above, the straight line between two given points is the one found in the middle. Third it is a sign of goodness, because according to a traditional Arab saying attributed to the ancient philosopher Ibn Al Atheer “usually the best of things is found in the middle”, also the best beads of the chain are those that lie in the middle, and the best of actions are usually a middle ground between the two ends of the scale. For example, generosity is a medium between miserliness and squandering, and courage is a medium between cowardliness and recklessness. A Muslim must therefore avoid any extreme behavior by staying further away from it or in other words by staying in the middle since the furthest point from both ends of the scale is the point in the middle. Fourth, *Wasateyya* resembles safety, because the safest spot is always found in the middle, the middle is always safe and secure and is not exposed to the dangers which the ends are exposed to. Fifth, it resembles strength, since the middle of a thing is the strongest point of it. Youth for example resembles strength and it is a medium between two weaknesses, childhood and elder hood. Finally sixth it resembles the center of unity because the middle is where any two or separate parties connect and meet, and the middle is the medium in which all components of one thing unite and combine.

The *imam* also refutes arguments which accuse '*Wasateyya*' school of thought as being lenient in the teachings of Islam. He says many people consider his method of choosing to take the easier and less complicated of solutions in his *fatwas* as a form of complacency or leniency in religion. On that issue Qaradawi states that his method is derived from the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* and that it is on the contrary along the lines of adherence to the teachings of Islam. On the other hand there are other people, Qaradawi

says who perceive some of his *fatwas* as extreme and in contradiction to his *Wasaty* ideology. In response to those people, Qaradawi argues that adopting moderation does not always mean compromising on everything. He explains that there are situations in which a true Muslim is not allowed to make compromises, such as those pertaining one's religion or land, and this is not astray from moderation but is in fact at the core of it. Hence Qaradawi states that it is in the core of '*Wasateyya*' to be assertive and strict in situations that require you to be so and to be lenient in those situations that require leniency. Of the situations which Qaradawi recalls being assertive are the issues of acknowledging the right of the Jews in creating a land in Palestine, and that of gaining profits from non Islamic banks.

Sheikh Al Qaradawi lists thirty features of his *Wasateyya* school of thought which act as the foundation of his ideology or method (*Manhaj*), the most significant of these features include: 1) A balanced and proper understanding of Islam in its inclusive nature. 2) The belief in the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* as the basis of '*Wasateyya*'. 3) Establishing belief based on faith and unity. 4) Reinforcing one's relationship with God through worshipping. 5) Being well mannered. 6) Preaching to God's path through advocating good and forbidding evil. 7) Establishing human and social values. 8) Respecting both spiritual and intellectual powers. 9) Renovating religion from within. 10) Calling for renovation in religion and in all aspects of life 11) Avoiding declaring others as apostates. 12) Looking after the rights of Islamic and religious minorities. 13) Choosing the easier and less complicated solutions in *fatwas* and adopting optimism in preaching. 14) Balancing between the givens in Islam and between the changes that come with time. 15) The importance of renovation and change. 16) Making use of all that is old and traditional.

Sheikh Qaradawi makes reference to al Banna as being one of the most prominent advocates of '*Wasateyya*'. Moderation was strongly manifest in his well balanced personality in which he resembled both '*salafism*' and '*sufism*', tradition and modernity, conservatism and renovation, he was a preacher and a revolutionist, and a worshipper and a '*jihaddist*'. Therefore, the ideology of Al Banna combined both politics and religion, as well as science and education. Qaradawi also praises al Banna's MB for being an explicit model of '*Wasateyya*'. He says the Brotherhood are moderate in everything, they balance between objectivity and emotions, the material and the spiritual, observation and activity, individual and society, *Shura* (consultation) and obedience, rights and duties, and old and novel. (Qaradawi, 2010, P.159).

B. Identifying Political Wasateyya:

1. Comprehensiveness of Islam

The perception of Islam as a religion that encompasses all aspects of life is the cornerstone of the MB political Ideology. This notion has been passed from al Banna to all his students and all members of the *Jama'a*, including Sheikh Qaradawi who has made many arguments in his books about the comprehensive nature of Islam. Qaradawi writes about the features of the MB movement, stating that it has three main features in which the first is their notion or vision of Islam as an encompassing religion. He explained that the MB movement had been unique for its advocacy of the comprehensiveness of Islam

It did not understand Islam as many others did, in being a set of rituals and worshipping deeds unrelated to society, state, politics, and ideology...The Muslim Brothers have rejected this deficient view of Islam, and saw that Islam is distinct with its spacial, time, and human comprehensiveness that was

expressed by Hassan Al Banna. (Qaradawi, 2007, P.155).

Qaradawi elaborates on how Islam has become confined only to preaching inside mosques, and how the secular and liberal currents of the West have deprived Islam from its all encompassing nature. First he says, they (secularists) have omitted from Islam the concept of advocating the good and forbidding the evil (*al 'amr bel ma'arof wal nahy 'an al monkar*) as been ordered from God in the Qur'an. This according to Qaradawi is an obligation on all Muslims and could take the form of giving advice to people, and especially to those who are in positions that affect the *'Ummah'*. Second the secularists have omitted the duty of *'Jihad'* in the way of God, which becomes obligatory on Muslims whose lands have been conquered by non believers. They have also omitted the obligation of ruling according to the orders of God; his Qur'an, and his Prophet's *Sunnah*, which again Qaradawi stresses is a certain obligation on those who govern or lead the *Ummah*. Another feature of Islam which they omitted is the unity of the Islamic *Ummah* which is governed by three main laws; the presence of a common high reference for all Muslims manifest in the Qur'an and Prophet's *Sunnah*, existence of a common land or territory for Muslims (*Dar al Islam*), and unity of a central leadership, manifest in the greatest *imam* or Caliph. He also speaks of all ideologies and revolutionary trends that they all had an encompassing style so for example socialism as interpreted by socialist thinkers was not merely an economic system but rather a way of thinking that is applied to all aspects of life. Hence, Qaradawi poses the question of why it is the right of these ideologies to possess an encompassing approach, while on the other hand it is always denied from Islam?

Understanding the comprehensiveness of Islam therefore, stands as a pre-requisite for understanding the arguments of Qaradawi and the Wasateyya school about the role of Islam in politics. According to Qaradawi, those who advocate for the separation of politics and religion, are in fact promoting the corruption of politics. Separating religion from politics is like 'Machiavellinism' in which politics is separated from morals and values, in which case leaders justify any means to an end and are likely to become tyrants.

2. Definition of the State in Islam

Sheikh Qaradawi clarifies that the Islamic state or the state as known in Islamic history is a civil state rather than a 'religious' one. This understanding of the state is adopted by contemporary MB thought as will be shown later in this study. The Islamic state according to Qaradawi is one in which the authority lies in the hands of the people (*Al Ummah masdar al sultat*), meaning that the people choose their leader and hold him accountable for his decisions and actions. The people also have the freedom to correct their leader in case he deviates from the right path. "The civil state is the state of law, accordingly it is not the state of the president or the prime minister, but it is based on the independence of the three authorities, (Judicial, Legislative, and Executive) independence in its true essence, which makes up the civil state." Qaradawi then sets six main components of the civil state: 1) The leader must not be sanctified but is like the rest of the people subject to questioning. 2) The people are the source of all authorities, 3) Freedom of opinion, 4) Independence of authorities, 5) Representation of the people in parliament, and 6) The right of citizenship. The civil state, Qaradawi says, with all its six components are manifest in the Islamic state called upon by Islamist movements.

In his book “*Al Din Wal Siyyassa*” (religion and politics) Qaradawi defines the state in Islam as follows: "an Islamic state is a civil state like any state, but what differentiates it from another state, is that it is based on Islamic Shari'a..." (Qaradawi, 2007, P.158). The meaning of a civil state Qaradawi elaborates, is

One that is based on the choice of the most qualified, provided the choice is taken by the '*ahl al hal wal 'akd*' and is also based on a general oath of allegiance from the people to their leader, and in which '*Shura*' or consultation must be enacted. It is also based on the accountability of the leader in front of his people, where it is the right of the people to criticize him and give him advice. In fact Islam has made this a duty for all Muslims, as mentioned above to denounce and forbid evil and advocate what is good "*al 'amr bel ma'roof wal nahy a'n al monkar*". (Qaradawi, 2007, P.159).

Qaradawi also asserts that it is the right of Muslims and Islam to establish their own state. He says the secularists have denied Islam this right which Muslims consider an obligation and a necessity. “Based on our arguments that Islam is an inclusive religion and that Islam and politics cannot be separated, then the first and most important aspect of politics is the establishment of a state.” (Qaradawi, 2007, P.160). The *imam* then provides three sets of evidence that the establishment of a state is a necessity and an obligation in Islam. He derives his first evidence from verses of the *Qur'an* in *Surat “Al Nisaa”* which address the leaders, those who are in charge of leading the *Ummah*, to seek integrity in governance and to rule justly. The verses also address the people or those who are governed to obey their leaders (given that the leaders must be Muslim and just) and to resort to the *Qur'an* and *Sunna* in cases of conflict. These verses according to Qaradawi

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Those qualified to elect or depose a caliph on behalf of the Muslim community. In medieval political theory, the term refers to legal scholars whose task it was to offer the caliphate to the most qualified person. Because, in practice, most rulers designated their successors, the task was generally a mere formality. Some modern thinkers such as Yusuf Al Qaradawi, have tried to accommodate this task to that of a parliament.

imply the existence of a state in which exists the governors and the governed. There are several other verses in the *Qur'an*, Qaradawi says, that deal with issues of politics and society, and are referred to as 'verses of laws' (*A'ayat al Ahkam*), whom scholars like Al Razi and Malki have based many of their books on. The second evidence for an Islamic state Qaradawi provides is from Islamic history. The Prophet (PBUH) struggled for a long period of time to establish an Islamic state and an Islamic nation from which his *Da'wa* would originate. He (PBUH) therefore presented himself and his *Da'wa* to several tribes until eventually the tribes of “*Al Aws Wal Khazraj*” believed in his *Da'wa* and chose to immigrate with him to Madina in order to establish a Muslim community and a state. In that sense Madina was the home of Islam (*Dar al Islam*) and the basis of the new Islamic state to which all those who believed in Islam had to immigrate. It was also forbidden for Muslims to live in another state (*Dar al Harb*) with the unbelievers. The third evidence Qaradawi provides stems from the nature of Islam it self as mentioned earlier in being an encompassing religion, that impacts all aspects of a Muslim's life. Also it is in the nature of Islam to advocate organization and structure as well as the need for a leader and a united front. All of which Qaradawi argues are characteristics of a state.

3. Partisanship

Sheikh Qaradawi presents the position of al Banna on the issue of partisanship stating that, Al Banna totally opposed the idea of political parties because for him it only resembled division among the Muslim *Ummah* and created weaknesses in society, besides the fact that parties never strived to implement the law of God, but are synonymous to the systems of partisanship of the West. Therefore, *imam* Al Banna concluded that the establishment

of parties was against the common welfare of the *Ummah*. However, Qaradawi argues that Al Banna's decision was based on the circumstances of his time, when Egypt's political parties acted against the unity of Egyptian society against the foreign invasion of the British, hence his call for abolishing parties stemmed from the need to unify the Egyptian society in face of the British occupation.

My position on the issue of political parties however contravenes that of Hassan al Banna's in which I have presented the legitimacy of the establishment of parties in an Islamic state, stating that the existence of various political parties is similar to the existence of different schools of thought in Jurisprudence (*Mazaheb al fiqh*) in which each school of thought has its own visions which may oppose those of the other schools of thought. . . I believe that in adopting such contradicting views to those of al imam al Banna, I have not deviated from his method (*Manhaj*), because he always preferred research and renovation over tradition...and I believe that if *imam* Al Banna was among us today and encountered the tyranny and authoritarianism of a single party over its people he would have definitely changed his position about partisanship. (Qaradawi, 2013, P.130).

Qaradawi argues that it is the right of Islamists to have a political party of their own. He refutes three main arguments made by secularists against Islamists and their political parties. First that politics is a dirty game that religion should not be involved in. Qaradawi states that this belief is completely false, because politics is supposed to bring benefit for the people, and is meant to work towards the general wellbeing of the *Ummah*, and hence any work that is done for benefiting the people cannot be considered a 'dirty game' or profane. Evil however, lies in the hearts of those who take advantage of politics to generate non virtuous gains. On the other hand we have seen several examples of just leaders who have successfully led their people. The second argument is that an Islamic political party could not be contested since it is translated as the rule of God on earth and hence any opposition towards it would be forbidden. Qaradawi also indicated that this

would be an incorrect statement because an Islamic party would not be licensed to exist unless it presents its program and objectives with its vision and goals as well as its strategy of implementing reforms on the social, economic, educational, and political fronts before the committee. So if the party program appears to be exploiting religion then it could be denied its right to exist. The third argument Qaradawi refutes is that the creation of an Islamic political party would also bring forward the need for Copts to create their own party as well which will eventually contribute to a sectarian turmoil. On that issue Qaradawi says he does not find a problem in the creation of a Coptic party since it will provide them a legal channel to express their political views instead of being accused of working in politics through the church.

On several occasions, Qaradawi has asserted that it was not acceptable to deny any group of citizens their right in political participation based on their religious orientations or due to the fact that they adopt reform measures derived from Islamic faith. Hence it would not be fair to deny Islamists from creating a political party that represents them, given that this right was granted to the socialists, the liberals, and the secularists. Then why, Qaradawi asks, should the Islamists be the only group excluded from creating their own party? This according to the imam is a violation of the Egyptian constitution and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A second point Qaradawi raises is the fact that the Islamists do not seek to establish a religious party but rather an Islamic party. The Islamic party according to Qaradawi is a lot different from a religious one, in the sense that the former is much more inclusive and encompasses economics, education, society, and politics, whereas the term religious only refers to faith and worship. According to this understanding of an Islamic party, the Islamists do not mind any one to join their party

including non Muslims. A third issue the imam raises is the fact that Islamists represent a massive popular force, and must therefore be represented in state parliament. Since the function of political parties is to represent the various factions of society, it would seem more logical for the Islamists who are the greatest opposition force in the country to create a party that represents its followers.

The arguments of Qaradawi have been a great support for the MB's initiative of creating a political party. His fatwas relating to this matter and all other political issues have influenced the Brotherhood's perception about politics, as noted by Tammam "the influence of the independent Islamist thinkers has penetrated deeply within the ranks of the Brotherhood casting cultural and ideological changes." (Tammam, 2010, P.18).

4. Democracy

Since the understanding of the Islamic state has been established as being a civil state based on '*Shura*' in which the people have the right of choosing their leader and holding him accountable and in which Islam is understood as a comprehensive religion, Qaradawi asserts that this makes the Islamic state the closest to the democratic state. By democratic state, Qaradawi elaborates, he means political democracy, and not economic democracy which means Capitalism, nor Liberal democracy which entails absolute freedoms. He states that

What concerns us from democracy is the political aspect from it, and its essence is that people have the right of choosing their leader and of opposing a leader who is forced upon them, and this is what Islam has decided through the enforcement of '*Shura*', denouncement of tyranny, requiring the most qualified to lead, and following the opinion of the masses. (Qaradawi, 2007, P.172).

The imam also clarifies that '*Shura*' in this case is binding ('*mulzima*') and not informative ('*mu'lima*'); meaning that the leader is not just required to listen to the opinions of "*ahl al hal wal 'aqd*" (as is the case in informative shura) but he is obliged to follow them. He argues that there are other opinions which deem shura as ('*mu'lima*') informative only rather than binding, but he refutes these arguments. Qaradawi makes it clear that it is the right of every citizen to provide advice to the ruler and to support him in following the good and forbidding the evil, as long as he does so in a polite and respectful manner.

Qaradawi states that:

What we are keen on borrowing from democracy is its guarantees and mechanisms which prevent forgery and forcing upon people what they do not like...The method of election and counting on majority votes is a valid and correct mechanism that should be protected from those who seek to forge it. (Qaradawi, 2007, P.173).

More interestingly Qaradawi counters arguments made by some extremist Islamists who deem democracy as un-Islamic and a form of apostasy. He explains that,

Those who consider democracy as non-Islamic in being the rule of the people, I tell them, that democracy is the rule of the people in the face of the tyrant and the dictator, and not in opposition to the rule of God. It is already established that democracy will or should be applied in a Muslim society in which the rule of God already prevails. (Qaradawi, 2007, P.173).

The *imam* also refutes several arguments about democracy; first he opposes those who accuse democracy of being flawed because it is a man-made system that is designed to replace a divine system. He says:

Not all man-made systems are rejected by Islam, God the almighty has ordered people to use their minds and to contemplate and innovate, but we must always evaluate our works, do they comply with God's *Shari'a* and rules or not? And we have seen democracy comply with Islam's concepts of '*Shura*', and of advocating the good and forbidding the evil, and of seeking the welfare of the *Ummah*.

He also answers to claims of democracy being an import of the West, elaborating that

Importing ideas from the West is not forbidden as long as we learn to adopt what benefits us and complies with our faith, and reject what clashes with it. In that case we have chosen to borrow from democracy its mechanisms and guarantees, disregarding its exaggeration in permitting freedoms and praising the individual's rights at the expense of the society. (Qaradawi, 2007, P.174).

In an attempt to summarize his position on democracy, Qaradawi states that “What we want is to establish democracy in the Muslim society, and the Muslim '*Ummah*' in which democracy would respect and help preserve, the religious values, principles, and culture of this society which are considered constants that are not subject to reform or change.” (Qaradawi, 2007, P.174).

The *imam* then strives to illustrate evidence that proves democracy is compatible with Islam. He provides three sets of evidence based on the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*. The first evidence he discusses is that Islam opposes authority of the dictator or tyrant. According to his argument, democracy is supported by Islam because the *Qur'an* has denounced the rule of tyrants and opposed those who wish to rule the people against their will. Qaradawi supports his argument with several verses from the *Qur'an*, which deem all tyrants as unjust and describe them as misguided, the verses also address and denounces those people who have allowed themselves to be led by tyrants and describes them as immoral and obscene. According to the *Qur'anic* verses Qaradawi concludes that the principles and objectives of Islam are to liberate the people from the rule of dictators and to honor all mankind from humiliation by granting them the right to choose their own leader and the right to hold him accountable in case he deviates from the right path, as Abu Bakr the first rightly guided caliph said “assist me as long as you see me on the right path, and if I

deviate correct me, and obey me as long as I obey God, once I disobey him the al mighty, then I cannot ask for your obedience”.

The second piece of evidence Qaradawi refers to is the obligation in Islam to follow the masses and the advocacy of collective action. The *imam* says that there is evidence from the *Shari'a* and Prophet's *Sunnah*, that order all Muslims to join and become part of the '*Jama'a*' or a large group of people and to follow the masses and pay attention to the opinions of the majority of believers. The vision of the majority of believers is important to God as is apparent in the *Qur'anic* verses, in which God has placed emphasis on the believer's visions and perceptions of each other's deeds and actions. Hence Ibn Mas'oud one of the Prophet's companions said “whatever the believers deem as good is deemed good by God, and whatever they deem as evil, is deemed evil by God.”

The third evidence Qaradawi provides in favor of the compatibility of democracy with Islam is the fact that Islam rejects the prayers of the *imam* who leads collective prayer against the people's will. He says, according to the Prophet's saying (*Hadith*), in collective prayers the *imam* must be someone loved and admired by the people, and if the *imam* proceeds in leading the prayers against the people's will then his prayers are not going to be accepted by God. “So if this is the case for leading a prayer”, Qaradawi says, “then how would it be to lead the entire *Ummah*?” Hence the relationship between the ruler and the ruled must be based on dual love and respect.

Qaradawi's views which deems the will of the people to be the most important deciding factor in the choice of their leader, is a fatwa widely embraced by the MB. Tammam notes how Abul Fotouh has come to cite the views of Qaradawi when asked

about the Brotherhood's position from democracy and their eagerness to respect the will of the people. Tammam stated that,

Abul Fotouh makes a controversial point about the full acceptance of the people's right in choosing their leader even if this leader was a non-Muslim. There was a previous fatwa for Yusuf Al Qaradawi along the same lines, however, what is worth noting is Abul Fotouh's (who is one of the most important leaders in the Brotherhood) embrace and acceptance of it. (Tammam, 2010, P.46).

5. Women and Minority Rights

The issue of religious minorities and Islam's approach towards them has represented a primary source of attack to the Islamist movement. Qaradawi discusses this issue extensively, with the aim of proving that Islam has catered for the issue of dealing with non-Muslims who are inhabitants of the same land. He refutes four main claims regarding this issue; first is the claim that Islam considers religious minorities as ²'ahl al dhimma' which is a term many people perceive as degrading and implies inferiority to Muslims. Qaradawi says that '*dhimma*' is an Arabic word meaning guarantee and pledge; that the non-Muslims are guaranteed to be taken care of by God and his Prophet, and that all Muslims make a pledge upon themselves to treat them in the way they would like to be treated, hence the saying goes ³“*lahom ma lana w a'aleyhom ma a'alayna*”. However, Qaradawi says, “If Christians find the term '*ahl al dhimma*' offensive then there is no

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Ahl al dhimma is a historical term referring to non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state. Dhimma allows rights of residence in return for jizyah (tax) collected from non-Muslims. According to scholars, dhimmis had their rights fully protected in their communities, but as citizens in the Islamic state, had certain restrictions. They were excused or excluded from specific duties assigned to Muslims, did not enjoy certain political rights reserved for Muslims, and were subject to payment of a special tax (jizyah), but were otherwise equal under the laws of property, contract and obligation.

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Means that they are entitled to what we are entitled to, and are charged with what we are charged with, hence implying fairness and equality in treatment.

problem in exchanging it for citizens since we are partners of the same nation, as had been agreed among all scholars of Islamic *Shar'ia*". (Qaradawi, 2007, P.176).

The second claim is that Christians are obliged to pay the tax collected from non-Muslims (*Jizya*) according to the rule of *Shari'a*. Qaradawi explains that the *Jizya* was collected from non-Muslims in the past as a substitute for the obligation of *Jihad* and as a gesture of acknowledging the submission to the Islamic state in return of receiving services and protection. Islamic scholars have all agreed that if non-Muslims participate in defending their lands against the enemies then they become exempted from paying the '*Jizya*'. Since today military service has become mandatory on all citizens, then certainly there is no need to implement the '*Jizya*' on anyone.

The third argument Qaradawi refutes revolves around imposing the teachings and rules of the Islamic *Shari'a* on non-Muslims who do not believe in it. The *imam* says, the teachings of Islam are never to be forced upon any non-Muslim such as the rituals of prayers, fasting, and charity (*Zakat*). Even charity Qaradawi says, is not forced upon them because it is considered a form of worship, so our religion does not impose it on non-Muslims. As for the personal status laws, which include marriage, divorce, and inheritance, those too are derived from the Islamic *Shari'a* and hence are not imposed on non-Muslims. Therefore, they are left free to set their own laws that comply with their doctrines and faith, and Islamic history recalls that Christians had their own courts and judges who dealt with their issues according to their faith. As for the criminal and civil laws, these are applied equally to all citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims. However, there are some criminal laws that apply only to Muslims such as the punishment of drinking alcohol, because it is not forbidden in non-Muslim's faith.

The fourth claim Qaradawi discusses is that of excluding religious minorities from assuming certain positions or posts in the state system. He explains, there are certain positions which require specialization in the Islamic *Shari'a* such as judicial positions for example, in which in the old days a judge had to be a Muslim. However, today the situation has changed in which judicial courts have become collective, dealing with both Muslim and non Muslim cases, and it is therefore acceptable to recruit non Muslim judges as long as they qualify. As for posts of the presidency, Qaradawi believes that this is a crucial post that cannot be held by a non Muslim, because it resembles the leadership of the Islamic '*ummah*' and succession of the Prophet.

The state in Islam is a state of doctrine, it is an idea and a message, it is affiliated with religion inseparable from it, with the primary mission of reviving God's religion on earth. Leadership of a state in Islam has roles related to religion such as leading the people in prayers, and being solely responsible for carrying out the mission of Islam. (Qaradawi, 2007, P.178).

Qaradawi, however finds it acceptable for non Muslims to assume the posts of Vice President, Prime Minister, and Minister, and asserts that he has come across many non Muslim Arab figures who assumed these positions and proved their competence and success.

Qaradawi's views on the issue of the inclusion of women and their rights, resemble the moderate (*wasaty*) approach he applies when dealing with all issues. He acknowledges that he adopts a contravening position to that of al Banna's when he permits the work of men and women in the same workplace unlike Al Banna who advocated the absolute separation of men and women in the workplace. "I oppose Al Banna in his position on women and in his call for the absolute separation of women and men, and from preventing her from assuming any leadership position including nominating her to the state

parliament.” (Qaradawi, 2002, P.350). The *imam* also asserts that Islam was the first religion to honor women and free them and give them their rights and restore their dignity. In support of his claim, Qaradawi recites a few verses of the *Qur'an*, and some sayings (*Hadeeth*) of the Prophet from his *Sunnah*. He concludes that the *Qur'an* equates women with men in the religious, social, and political duties, and permits the work of women in the judicial field as well as to nominate herself as a candidate for state parliament. Further, the *imam* states that a woman who reaches the age of maturity (*sen al rushd*) does not require the presence of her patron for a marriage contract to be valid. He also stresses on the fact that during the time of the Prophet, women participated in sessions of knowledge and education, and were allowed to meet with the Prophet independently. They also had the opportunity to participate in 'holy' wars (*ghazawat*) against the non believers, sometimes even carrying the sword, and in military service and in medicating the wounded. Qaradawi also says that there has been a *fatwa* issued several years ago permitting women to vote in elections.

Another very rich source about the features of political Wasateyya is William Raymond Baker's book which provides a clear definition of the objectives and strategies of the New Islamist Thinkers and their Centrist school of thought. Baker features how the New Islamists were inspired by the presence of extremists who spoke in the name of Islam, distorting its image and raising the world's concerns over the reach of Islamists to power. He explains that the scholars of the New Islamic Discourse wanted to publicize the true image of governance in Islam as opposed to the one advanced by the extremist trend. Baker presents “the seven critical characteristics that New Islamist theorists agree a political system must have to meet the exacting Islamic standards of justice achieved

through democracy.” The first is that authority rests in the hands of the people, in which they have the right of choosing their leader and removing him from power. Second is that the society's responsibilities and duties must be independent from the state's authority. The third, fourth, and fifth characteristics provide respectively, freedom as a right for all, equality of all citizens, explicit recognition of the rightful place of the other, i.e non Muslims, sixth is that any injustice is religiously forbidden (*haram*), and finally seventh is that *shari'a* is the source of legislation. (Baker, 2003). Baker asserts that these measures outlined by the New Islamists were mainly created in the face of some factions of the Islamic movement who mistakenly claim that seizure of power must be immediate and sudden, and believe reaching power is an aim in itself. In Baker's words “In important ways the specter of political Islam drives the corrective work of the New Islamist School.” (Baker, 2003, Kindle edition). Clarifying their political vision in this way, the New Islamists have made their first departure from extremist and traditional elements of the Islamist movement and have also set a foot back on track with the visions of al Banna. Another way the founders of the *Wasateyya* school have countered mainstream political Islam was through their denunciation of its advocates perception of the concept of '*hakimmiyya*' in Islam, (all rule must only be to God). Baker mentions how this phrase is used by traditionalists and some elements of the MB to justify their bid for power.

Often these diverse advocates of political Islam give a falsely legitimizing, historical aura to such claims with loose references to the Caliphate system or '*wilaya*'. They capture headlines with noisy denunciations of Western democracies and its competitive political parties, focusing public attention on the alternative Islamic forms of rule they advocate. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

By declaring their acceptance of partisanship and democracy as a just system of governance, (manifest in Qaradawi's 1993 *fatwas* on pluralism and democracy), and by downplaying the necessity of establishing a Caliphate, the New Islamist scholars and their followers signaled a departure from mainstream political Islam.

Founders of the *Wasateyya* school reach a conclusion that there is no one form of governance dictated by Islam as argued by mainstream political Islamists, through establishing that “only texts, not particular interpretations or historical models, are authoritative. Moreover they point out that those texts of *Qur'an* and *Sunnah* that relate to political rule are few in number and general in character, referring for the most part to values and purposes rather than means and structures.” (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition). Based on this interpretation of the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, the New Islamists deem the extremist's perception as mainly flawed and hence their claim of democracy as being a form of apostasy is refuted. As put by Baker,

The New Islamists categorically reject these claims...These include, in addition to political Islam's distorted understanding of '*hakimeyya*' [God's rule], its dangerous presumption of legitimate authoritarian rule by religious figures in a religious state, and its mistaken inclination to regard the caliphate or *wilaya* as models for such a system that are appropriate in modern times. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

In this way the centrists have been successful to answer to secular attacks which accuse them of wanting to rule in the name of God and of being only after power and authority. Their embrace of democratic values and reform of their goals stands as a primary distinct feature of their ideology. Primarily the way through which this faction of scholars called New Islamists approach the *shari'a* is what fuels their moderation. According to Baker, “Finally, they maintain that this age, like all others must not be bound in political affairs

either by earlier interpretations of texts or by the example of political arrangements adopted by previous generations. In their view each age must have its own political *fiqh*.” (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

Another element of ideological evolution introduced by Qaradawi and the New Islamists, is the distinction between the divine basis for legislation and the fully human claim to legitimate rule. This distinction is important because it is what this group of scholars base their definition of a civil state with Islamic identity on. They argue that mainstream political Islamists go wrong by confusing two issues in the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*; the source of legislation and the basis for obedience owed to the ruler.

In Islam, they explain, legislation originates in revelation. *Shari'a* has a divine character in those provisions that come directly from *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, and both ruler and ruled are subject to these elements of *Shari'a*. In contrast the legitimacy of the ruler and of the political system itself in an Islamic society depends on the consent of the people, meaning that Islamic government is a civil and not a religious government. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

According to Baker, the New Islamists acknowledge that this confusion has its roots in Islamic history dating back to the fourth caliph as well as in the writings of contemporary theorists like Sayyed Qutb and Abul Ala El Mawdudi, whom have aggressively reasserted that “Rule is but for God and he is the creator and the ruler, two verses that have consistently been cited to blur the distinction between the divine basis for legislation on the one hand and the fully human claim to legitimate rule on the other.” (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

A significant departure from extreme Islamists thought advanced by the New Islamists and embraced by the second generation of the MB, is that of rulership and the issue of electing women and non-Muslims for parliament. As mentioned above the New

Islamists believe each age has its own *fiqh*, and the prevention of women and non-Muslims from assuming seats in parliament or the presidency is tied to the concept or idea of '*wilaya*' in Islam. "The New Islamists reject all of these contemporary applications of the idea of *wilaya*." (Baker, 2003). There are two main '*hadeeths*' (sayings of the Prophet Mohamed PBUH) from the *Sunnah* that have given rise to concerns over the nomination of women and non Muslims to important posts; the first the saying "no command by non-Muslims over Muslims" and the second says, "Those who give authority to women fail". The efforts of Qaradawi, Al Ghazaly and Mohamed Saleem Al Awa go in this direction; they argue that

Both texts are used in the wrong context to prove something that has nothing to do with them...these restrictions on the political rights of women and non-Muslims are derived from the obsolete concepts of *wilaya* and should be disregarded. The term refers to an absolute power to command and the concept originally referred to the head of the Islamic state who had military and purely religious duties, notably leading prayers, that were considered inappropriate for women or non-Muslims to perform. None of these conditions can or should be met in contemporary political life. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

Hence Qaradawi and the *Wasateyya* group of scholars have concluded that the concept of *wilaya* no longer applies to our current age, and the criterion of nominating candidates should rather be based on "their qualifications to perform the consultative role, such as honesty, absence of corruption, and courage in facing evils". (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition). The New Islamists therefore believe, the idea of a Caliphate in itself is not what matters but rather the essence of this form of governance is what we need to retrieve.

According to Al A'wa,

If there is something to learn from this early age, it is that the caliphate was based on two pillars: first the caliph was selected through *shura* among Muslims with no particular group entitled to choose for the nation as a whole; and second the nominee chosen never assumed power without clear cut support

of the people. Translating these lessons into contemporary language, Al A'wa concluded that democracy is the best way to choose among rulers since human beings have so far found nothing better than direct elections, and he stated further that the mandate of elections should not be that long. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

An important outcome of the impact of the *Wasateyya* scholars on the second generation of young activists was the policy of pragmatic self-restraint practiced by the group in the 1980's and 1990's. This policy defined the group's relationship with the state during this time, in which the MB refrained from both extreme criticism or close identification with the state system. "The New Islamists worked to provide *tarshid* (guidance) for the efforts of the Islamic body in the civic and political spheres that were expanding in those promising years. They did so moreover in a balanced way that set them apart." (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition). Baker argues that the authoritarian political conditions at that time worked to bring the realization of the New Islamists to the need for gradual and slow reform of the society. In such context the role of the *Wasateyya* intellectuals was "to rationalize the Islamic wave and make it an essential element of moderate social forces, drawn together from across the political spectrum and bridging the gap between Muslims and Copts." (Baker, 2003). The impact of this role was manifest in the MB's reformist's increased political participation mentioned earlier and endorsed by Tilmisany, the General Guide of that time. The argument made by Baker is that the leaders of *Wasateyya* school did not actually control the activities of those Islamist activists but rather provided them with the required support and guidance to pursue their vision. Their role was carried out in terms of "giving lectures and participating in public debates and discussions that gave Islamists the collaborative opportunity to assess their experience critically and reflect on its importance for the long term." (Baker, 2003). During this

period, the MB gained considerable successes in the parliamentary elections and made coalitions with liberal and secular forces, but most importantly they were successful in adhering to the rules of the democratic game. This came as a result of the role played by the *Wasateyya* founders, who emphasized the importance of self-criticism and integrity for the pursuit of common welfare. “This capacity to accept the discipline of democracy and to respond with positive self-criticism proved to be a distinctive character of the activist Islamic wave, in no small part due to such guidance by the New Islamists.” (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

All the above forms of transformations witnessed by the Brotherhood and advanced mainly by its second generation of leaders, namely, acceptance of the system and increased participation, embracing the rights of minorities and their eligibility to hold power, the revision of the goal of establishing a Caliphate, and clarifying the role and status of the highest authority in an Islamic state; all have become distinct features of contemporary MB ideology. Tammam touches on these transformations experienced by the Brotherhood, in which he says,

Who ever follows the project of the MB over the past years will find out that it has witnessed an important transformation that has moved it from the scope of the Caliphate and the establishment of an Islamic state to the full embracement of the modern nation state which seems to have eventually embraced the Brotherhood after a long period of conflict...There have become no mention of the Caliphate and the Islamic state, but it has rather been replaced by more novel terms such as the 'civil state with an Islamic identity' advanced by the middle generation of the Brotherhood through its most prominent representative Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh. (Tammam, 2010, P.10).

He continues to elaborate on the changes which included some of the middle generation's announcements of their full acceptance of nationalism even if it results in bringing non-

Muslims to power. “Even some of the Brotherhood leaders such as Essam El Eryan, did not find any shame in declaring their acceptance of the establishment of a Coptic party.” (Tammam, 2010, P.10). He sums up by stating that the Brotherhood have become closer to a political party, yet even a rightist party with liberal tendencies. Tammam provides an analysis explaining the causes of these transformations, in his view, two factors at play have led to this ideological evolution. The first is what Wickham referred to in her writings as a process of social learning, which takes place through a long term process of participation and communication with various political forces, resulting in certain value changes. The second, Tammam observes, is the influence of the independent Islamist thinkers comprising the New Islamic Discourse.

The critical moments of sever attacks by the Brotherhood's opponents has led the Brotherhood to revise their methods and approach to jurisprudence...this gave rise to the emergence of the rhetoric advanced by the Independent Islamist thinkers, who had been marginalized in the past. This has given them the opportunity to express their unlimited influence within the movement and come to the forefront of its cadres. (Tammam, 2010, P.8).

C.Conclusion

Finally the definition of political Wasateyya according to the above discussion is summed up in four main key points: the acceptance of the system and increased participation, embracing the rights of minorities and their eligibility to hold power, the revision of the goal of establishing a Caliphate, and clarifying the role and status of the highest authority in an Islamic state. Such features of political Wasateyya have been embraced by several political systems including Turkey, Algeria, and Malaysia. In these countries, Wasateyya has played a major role in stabilizing the political system, and bringing about development based on a true understanding and application of democracy. In Egypt, however, the

successive authoritarian regimes have worked on curbing any moderate attempts advanced by Islamist movements. A clear example of this would be the continuous rejection of the Wasat party initiative proposed by the splinter group of the MB in 1996; in fact the Egyptian regime did not only reject the party initiative but has also worked on supporting the more extreme faction of the MB in face of the emerging moderate or *Wasaty* trend. This and several other reasons, which will be discussed in the following section, have presented challenges for the prevalence of political Wasateyya within the MB.

SECTION VI: CASE STUDY OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF FOUR LEADERS OF THE MB WITH QARADAWI'S WASATEYYA SCHOOL OF THOUGHT

CHAPTER 3: ABD EL MONIEM ABUL FOTOUH

A. Background

The choice of Abul Fotouh as a case to be studied here is primarily based on his significance as the most outspoken and exposed of members within the movement.

Furthermore, he stands out as the main advocator of political Wasateyya and hence the main representative of the reformist trend within the Brotherhood.

During the 1970's he was a leading figure of Islamist student activists in Cairo University, in which he co-founded the first Islamic cell "*Al Jama'at al Islamiyya*". He became leader of Cairo University's Student Union in 1975 and was one of the first among his peers to join the MB in 1974. (Ali, 2004, P.159). Abul Fotouh has undergone ideological changes starting as a fundamentalist in the Islamic Jihad Group who believes in violence as a means for direct change. However after joining the MB and being influenced by Umar al Tilmisany he developed a more gradual and moderate approach void of any violent tendencies, and characterized by a greater belief in '*Da'wa*' for implementing a gradual change within society as a prerequisite for Islamic rule.

Tilmisany was well known for his more liberal and flexible approach which came at odds with the hardliners of the MB particularly Mustafa Mashhour and Ma'oum al Hodaybi. Abul Fotouh mentions that

We first believed in deploying violence as a means to achieve goals but Umar Tilmisany was the main reason we diverted away from this stance. He managed to convince us that change comes with peaceful measures and within legal frameworks and as a gradual process. (Ali, 2004, P. 162).

The period of imprisonment after the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 was the time during which Abul Fotouh and his fellow student activists were exposed to the influence of MB leaders among whom the most prominent and influential was Umar Tilmisany. Abul Fotouh acknowledges that this was a turning point in his ideological genesis, which paved the way for the more moderate ideology he embraced afterwards and which became his main source of peculiarity among members of his generation. As mentioned by Abul Fotouh

While we were in prison, we stayed for more than a year, and we were highly influenced during that time with figures such as Umar Tilmisany, Jaber Rizk, Yusuf Kamal, and Lasheen Abu Shanab. . . There were those among the MB, mainly members of the secret unit, who also shared our same view that violence was a necessary means, and whom Umar Tilmisany usually suffered from. (Ali, 2004, P. 163).

Abul Fotouh's general orientation today is a product of a mixture of factors; his vigorous political experiences, his relationships and strong ties with Scholars from the Moderate school of thought, and his interaction and cooperation with secular and liberal political forces. As put by Rosefsky Wickham “During the 1970's Islamist student leaders interacted openly with their secular counterparts, and that communication between them was facilitated due to the fact that they both came from the same educational and social backgrounds. Among these Islamist student leaders, was Essam El Erian, and Abd El Moniem Abu El Fotouh.” (Wickham, 2013, P.38). As a result Abul Fotouh possesses a moderate, liberal, Islamist agenda characterized by a high tolerance for democracy and inclusion of women and minority groups.

B.Reaching out to non-Islamist Groups

Most of the information gathered about the relationship of Abul Fotouh with Sheikh Qaradawi reveal a great connection between both individual's ideas and goals. The first evidence derived from the literature is the fact that Sheikh Qaradawi initially established his *Wasateyya* school of thought during the 1970's coinciding with Umar Tilmisany's endorsement of the strategy of political participation. Abul Fotouh was among the first of student activists to join the MB then, and soon became the biggest advocate of the strategy of participation within the group. (Vidino, 2011). Abul Fotouh's capacity of tolerating and embracing opposing ideologies is very much in line with Qaradawi's approach, which Raymond Baker accounts on saying,

In their manifesto, the New Islamists make a clear gesture of cooperation in the national interest to secularists and others outside the Islamic wave. They explain that revival depends on the interaction among all the categories and elements of the nation because no one category can bare the burden on its own. They acknowledge difference but signal a willingness to act in concert with others. Those others may share only part of their vision. (Baker, 2003, Kindle Edition).

According to the revised literature, Abul Fotouh has constantly expressed a great willingness in communicating with figures and parties outside of the Islamic current. His efforts in this domain are observed by Wickham, Tammam, Pargeter, Tadros, and Abdouh. The fruits of his diligent work in connecting the movement to the other political forces are bared during the 1980's in which the Brotherhood experienced the golden age in its history of participation. Abul Fotouh's approachable character is praised by those who are even the most hostile critics of the Brotherhood and its reformist camp, such as Abdouh, who makes reference to Abul Fotouh's efforts in advancing the popularity of the Brotherhood through “his enlightened intellect” and his “popular appeal”. Abdouh notes

that by the expulsion of Abul Fotouh, the Brotherhood had experienced a great loss. (Abdouh, 2013, P.147).

Tammam, further discusses Abul Fotouh's central role in the Brotherhood in the domain of politics. Apart from continuously referring to him as the iconic figure of the middle generation, Tammam asserts that Abul Fotouh is the reformist member who is mostly immersed in pragmatism and political participation. Hence revealing a lot about his readiness to interact and communicate with non-Islamist groups. Regarding Abul Fotouh's high commitment to democracy, Tammam observes, "Abul fotouh's popularity within the Brotherhood has experienced a set back due to his advanced vision of democracy." (Tammam, 2010, P.51). He presents Abul Fotouh's understanding of democracy, which is very much inline with Qaradawi's; Tammam says,

Abul Fotouh asserts that there is no difference or collision between '*shura*' and democracy, he finds no reason for them to be confused together or compared to each other because *shura* is an Islamic behavior that does not necessarily relate to politics, while democracy is a mechanism for regulating political participation...Abul Fotouh also smoothly overcomes the controversy over the issue of whether *shura* is informative (as per Banna's teachings) or binding by concluding that *shura* must be binding, and that al Banna's followers have misinterpreted his opinion.

Tammam then clearly explains that Abul Fotouh's definition of democracy is simply the rule of the people, without any reference to God's *Shari'a*. "It is even the absolute rule of the people regardless of their religious identity or inclinations or even if it meant the choice of non-Muslims and an order that is contradicting and opposing to Islam."

(Tammam, 2010, P.44). This, according to Abul Fotouh, means that *shari'a* cannot be imposed on the people, hence if the majority of the people refuse to submit to *shari'a* then their choice must be respected. Tammam further states that Abul Fotouh has completely

rid the political process of any Islamic cover, by announcing that establishment of a Caliphate has no religious implications, but is rather a form of coalition and a symbol of unity between Arab nations which is not very different from the coalition of the European Union (EU). This brings us to the comments of Sheikh Essam Tulayma, (a dear student of Qaradawi who shares most- if not all-of his political and religious views) who says, “the Caliphate is no more than a structure to unify the Islamic and Arab world under one umbrella, the same way the European countries have chosen to create the European Union (EU) to unite under its banner...” (Tulayma, 2014). Tammam also makes reference to a *fatwa* issued by Qaradawi, and which he says that Abul Fotouh has strongly embraced, the *fatwa* includes that

There is no problem that the Islamists hand over authority to others as long as they are freely elected and chosen by the people, even if it was a non-Muslim figure. He therefore acknowledges that Islam cannot be enforced upon people against their will and based on that people have the right to reject Islam. (Tammam, 2010, P.46).

Finally Tammam explains the significance of Abul Fotouh within the Brotherhood saying that “he is not merely a member of the Guidance Bureau, but one of the most important leaders of the middle generation, he is not just the most capable of meeting the requirements of modernity and reform, but of also implementing these reforms within the movement.” (Tammam, 2010, P.46).

Wickham, who also examines Abul Fotouh's practice of politics, notes how he has been actively interacting and communicating with members of secular and liberal orientations on a daily basis. She further observes that such communication has influenced the ideological composition of Abul Fotouh and his peers. (Wickham, 2013).

C.Position on Women and Copts

Abul Fotouh's position on minorities is again very compatible with that of Sheikh Al Qaradawi, in which Abul Fotouh commits to the notion of citizenship (*mowatna*) which provides Copts the full rights of anyone holding the Egyptian nationality. He acknowledges their rights in assuming any position in the state including the post of President, unless the constitution-approved by the people- commands otherwise. Hence if the constitution demands that the President must be a Muslim, then this reflects the wish of the people and not the opinions of religious authorities; the same applies to the rights of women, Abul Fotouh accepts that a women could run for the presidency as long as there is no legal decree that can prevent her from doing so. (Tammam, 2010).

Abd El Rahim Ali also cites the opinions of Abul Fotouh regarding the rights of Copts and women, in which he is quoted saying

The concept of nationalism ties us with the Copts, and we have issued several studies and articles stating that "*Lahom ma lana w 'aaleyhem ma 'alayna*" there is no difference between us. The same applies to the role of women, they are totally entitled to occupy high ranking positions in government. (Ali, 2004, P. 167).

Wickham mentions how Abul Fotouh was one of the first opponents of the 2007 party platform because of its disqualification of Copts and women from running for the presidency,

He along with other reformist figures insinuated that the platform had been drafted by a few senior leaders without the proper consultation of group members and that its call for the establishment of a religious council and the disqualification of Copts and women from the presidency did not reflect a wider consensus...In addition they challenged the Islamic validity of these provisions. For example Abul Fotouh cited the opinion of prominent Islamist scholar Yusuf al Qaradawi in arguing that only the supreme constitutional court was authorized to determine whether existing legislation violated the *shari'a*. (Wickham, 2013, P.125).

Given Qaradawi's *fatwas* and positions on the inclusion of women and Copts, it may be concluded that Abul Fotouh, with his reference to the full rights of Copts according to citizenship, his advocacy for the participation of women, and especially his recalling of Qaradawi's opinions in that regard, proves the compatibility of his ideas with the Sheikh.

D.Position on Partisanship

Two issues are at play when discussing the position on partisanship. First is the issue of the right of any group to create a political party, and second is the controversy over the issue of the Brotherhood's separation of its religious and political roles. I begin discussing Abul Fotouh's position on the second issue, namely the separation of the Brotherhood's political and religious roles. In fact this issue was listed by Abul Fotouh as one of the main reasons for his departure from the movement. According to Wickham Abul Fotouh sees that the separation of the political and missionary work of the movement is essential to prevent tyranny, his stance was clear when the Brotherhood decided to create the FJP and appointed members of the Guidance Bureau to lead the party. Martini, Kaye, and York also observe that “Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh and Abu El Ela Madi are two figures from the middle generation who have been particularly vocal critics of the MB's blending of missionary work with political activism.” They argue “that a lack of separation between these two roles undermines the concept of a civil state, benefits religious leaders in elections, and leads to the election of politicians who do not possess the appropriate skill set for policy making.” (Martini, Kaye, York, 2012, P.40). Further according to Tammam,

Abul Fotouh who leads the reformist trend within the MB, strongly advocates the transformation of the movement into a political party. For Abul Fotouh this step will enable the movement to work within the legitimate framework of the system, hence advancing the legality of the Brotherhood and ending its long history of being a banned and illegal organization. "In his bid to provide legality to the movement" Tammam says,

Abul Fotouh announces his rejection for the Brotherhood's boycott of political activity and its confrontation with the regime through the full transformation to a political party with all its requirements which include: the termination of the current structure of the movement and its complete transfer to a party subject to financial and legal state censorship, the abandonment of any secret activity and the exposure of all the movement's structures to public censorship, and finally the abolition of the international organization (*tandheem*) and the end of any relationship between groups and movements outside the geographical borders of Egypt." (Tammam, 2010, P.46).

The position of Abul Fotouh on this issue is an extension of his vision of the movement and the nature of its role within the Egyptian polity, in which he desires for it to overcome its status as a banned organization. His position on legality has also been expressed in an interview with Mahmoud Sadeq; Abul Fotouh makes it clear that the MB has no intention to clash with the state and is never going to employ force in confrontation with the state.

I do not agree that there is any clash between the MB and the governments, The MB since its creation under Banna never approved of clashing with the state, and its slogan was no clash with anyone....and we are still following his '*Manhaj*'...There is no confrontation what so ever with sons of our country or *umma*....we however only confront those who are enemies of Islam such as the Jews and Israelis. (Sadeq, 2002, P.142).

The second issue related to his position on partisanship, is the right of any movement or group to create a party that represents them. Tammam also elaborates on Abul Fotouh's position regarding this issue, saying,

Of the controversial issues which Abul Fotouh manages to overcome is his acknowledgement of the right and freedom of all oppositional forces to create a

party. He believes parties should be created spontaneously without the need to wait for administrative approval, and should be created according to its creators inclinations and beliefs without any restriction, this includes secular, liberal, or communist forces. He also emphasizes the right for the creation of non-Islamic parties as long as they will be supervised by the judicial authority which enjoys complete autonomy and is independent from the executive authority.

This reminds us of Qaradawi's declaration in which he said he does not find a problem in the creation of a Coptic party since it will provide them a legal channel to express their political views instead of being accused of working in politics through the church. Hence Abul Fotouh argues that the executive and administrative authorities should have no say in permitting the rights of creating parties, but this should rather be the responsibility of the judicial authority alone. On that basis Abul Fotouh rejects the current form of the Egyptian law which regulates the creation of parties.

It is now relevant to recall Qaradawi's and political Wasateyya's position on partisanship; he asserts that it is not acceptable to deny any group of citizens their right in political participation based on their religious orientations or because they adopt reform measures derived from Islamic faith. Hence it would not be fair to deny Islamists from creating a political party that represents them, given that this right was granted to the socialists, the liberals, and the secularists. This according to the *imam* is a violation of the Egyptian constitution and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

E. Consistency with Ideological Wasateyya

It is first important to categorize Abul Fotouh as a leader of political activity and reform and not a man of organization (*tandheem*).⁴ This is an important distinction to make

because it reveals the priorities of each member in the group. Sheikh Essam Tulayma asserts that it is vitally important to categorize these four individuals on that basis. He explains that those who assume an organizational role are mainly committed to the survival of the '*tandhim*' (organization), they pay little attention to the larger ideological cause of the movement. According to Tulayma, Abul Fotouh is concerned with ideology and hence his relationship to Sheikh Qaradawi is stronger than those who assume an organizational role in the Brotherhood. It is also important to note that, according to his memoirs, Abul Fotouh's incentive to join the Brotherhood was based on his need for an entity, a strong organization to embrace his mission of establishing an Islamic state, which implies a lot regarding his understanding of the role of the organization. Even though, later Abul Fotouh comes to change his idea of how Islam should be served and how *Shar'ia* should be applied, his role within the Brotherhood never revealed any organizational orientation on his behalf. Rather his role had been focused on instigating the political activity of the movement since the 1980's, which had been brought about through activity in the syndicates and universities.

The first incident that took place within the Brotherhood was the emergence of Al Wasat party and the split caused by this group. Abul Fotouh, although not part of the Wasat affair, shared the ideology of its leaders. The fact that he did not participate may have been due to the reason that he saw no benefit for breaking away from the

Since the days of Hassan al Banna, emphasis was given to the organizational structure as being the only instrument for achieving the mission of empowering God's religion on earth. This mission is believed by the Brotherhood to be achieved by the process of gradualization; building the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, Muslim society, Islamic Government, the global Islamic state, and reaching the status of *ustathiya* with that state. These secondary goals and the primary mission cannot, according to the method of Al Banna, be achieved without the strong *Jama'a* or organization. The reformists and centrist vision has disagreed with the traditional MB method on the significance of the organizational structure in achieving the broader mission of empowering God's religion. This gave rise to differences in priorities among the two camps of the Brotherhood.

Brotherhood at that time, and that this move might have jeopardized his influence within the Islamic movement by limiting and confining his scope of activity if he was to leave the Brotherhood. Joshua Statcher accounts on this citing Essam Sultan (a Wasat founder), he says, “Perhaps to justify why some of his contemporaries chose to stay with the Brotherhood, Sultan stressed while many of the 1970's generation were ideologically with us, they were reluctant to join the Wasat because there were practical and administrative considerations that made them stay within the Brotherhood.” (Statcher, 2002, P.420). From the beginning Statcher explains how members like Abul Fotouh, El Eryan, and Habib were directly responsible for the emergence of the Wasat and have contributed largely to its formation.

Another major event that took place was the 2005 parliamentary elections, in which the Brotherhood was able to secure up to 20% of seats in parliament, hence emerging as the largest oppositional force in the country. Abul Fotouh's role during this phase is demonstrated by the increased democratic tone that characterized the Brotherhood's rhetoric at that time. According to Tammam, after the 2005 elections great victory, a controversy emerged within the Brotherhood on the issue of the missionary status of the movement and the need to transform into a political party. This was mainly advanced by the guru of the Reformist camp, Abul Fotouh. As a result the issue of legality became more pressing, and as mentioned earlier, Abul Fotouh began to raise concerns over the necessity of the international structure (*Tandheem*) and of the need to reconcile with the regime and submit to state censorship.

As pressures to clarify its positions on many political and social issues mounted, the Brotherhood began drafting their first party platform in 2007 believing that this would

be a step forward towards reconciling with the state and proving to be inline with its democratic rhetoric. Yet beginning from 2005, the regime had begun its next wave of attack against the Brotherhood in response to the parliamentary victory. The regime dreaded a second victory for the Brotherhood and hence sought to crush the movement in an attempt to contain its growing influence on Egyptian politics. The imprisonment of reformist leaders was the first measure taken against the Brotherhood, thus allowing more space for the conservatives to have the upper hand in the movement which led to the power shift referred to previously. The 2007 party platform, therefore, took a conservative twist and was later strongly criticized and opposed by Abul Fotouh and El Eryan. Abul Fotouh mainly criticized the platform's disqualification of Copts and women from running for the Presidency and the call for the establishment of a council of religious scholars to vet executive and legislative bills for conformity with *shari'a* principles.

Of the most noteworthy positions of Abul Fotouh was his proposal of boycotting the 2010 parliamentary elections. By his advocacy to boycott the elections, Abul Fotouh illustrated a turning point in the strategy of the reformists and revealed their ultimate cause. At this point in time the oppressive measures of the Mubarak regime against the opposition had reached a peak, and submission to the rules of the electoral game as was set by the state then, would have signaled a departure from the democratic cause. Hence being fully aware of the situation, Abul Fotouh was not willing to align himself and his movement with a bluntly authoritarian regime.

The real test for Abul Fotouh's commitment to the reformist cause came during the revolution. All his positions up until his ultimate expulsion from the movement reveal a high commitment on his behalf to the cause of the revolution and to the democratic

process. From the very beginning, there was no mention of Abul Fotouh opposing joining the protests on the 25th of January, in fact a documentary on Al Jazeera channel has recorded Abul Fotouh delivering a revolutionary speech to a large crowd of youth on the 25th of January in front of the Supreme Courthouse in Al Kasr Al Ani Street. When the MB decided to join on the 28th of January, Abul Fotouh's role was profound in rallying reformist youth and managing their presence and role in Tahrir. Abul Fotouh also expressed his support for joining the revolution by responding to criticisms waged against the MB from secular and liberal forces, who were claiming that the MB was attempting to ride the revolutionary wave. (Wickham, 2013).

Again his position was clear when during the revolution the MB leadership agreed to enter a deal with Umar Soliman; Abul Fotouh recorded a video and uploaded it on youtube on the 7th of February 2011 to express his discontent with this 'disgrace' as he described it, and called on the Brotherhood to realize that this is not the time to harness personal gains. Abul Fotouh said,

It is unfortunate that some of the Brotherhood leaders have still not realized that the times of repression are over and that there remains no need for them to accommodate to the regime..we are now in the phase of the revolution and our youth have paid an expensive price to bring down this regime, it is a disgrace to enter any negotiations with a regime which has killed its youth in the streets. . . (Abul Fotouh, 2011).

Furthermore, Essam Sultan, a Wasat founder, was reported saying in an interview with Tony Khalifa on *Al Qahera Wel Nas TV*, that,

The Brotherhood was about to strike a deal with SCAF, but Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh ruined it for them, he broke in during the meeting of the shura council in suez and yelled at them saying, this is treason, I will scandalize you and tell everyone about this shameful deal. . . (Sultan, July, 2012).

Later when the MB decided to create the FJP, Abul Fotouh also opposed this decision, and according to Wickham, declared that the creation of a party would allow the Brotherhood to mix its missionary and political roles, which in Abul Fotouh's opinion presents a huge dilemma for the movement and would result in a dictatorship. In his interview with Mona Al Shazly in *Al A'shera Masa'an* show, Abul Fotouh declared that the Brotherhood “made a mistake when the movement's Shura council assigned the president and vice president of the party, they did this because they had still not fully understood that the party should be independent of the *Jama'a*.” (Abul Fotouh, May, 2011). In general Abul Fotouh makes a point that he does not object to the creation of a political party as long as it will be guaranteed that it remains independent of the organization. “This is why, Abul Fotouh says, I decided to run for the presidency independent of the movement and as an individual.” (Abul Fotouh, 2011).

Therefore, naturally when the MB decided to field Al Shater as their presidential candidate, Abul Fotouh condemned this decision and announced that “this is a big mistake on behalf of the Brotherhood which undermines its credibility and also reveals their insistence on mixing missionary and political roles.” Abul Fotouh said in an interview on *Al Hayat TV*, “I am not pleased with the performance of the MB, here I mean, not the base of the Brotherhood but rather its leadership which most often taints the history of this great movement and its noble goals.” (Abul Fotouh, April, 2012). He also- like shiekh Qaradawi-stated that “the fielding of Khairat Al Shater will further divide the Islamic vote, and is a decision that reveals instability and damage within the decision making apparatus of the movement.” (Abul Fotouh, April, 2012).

The moment which underscored Abul Fotouh's ideological commitment (hence verifying his agreement with Qaradawi) was his reaction upon learning about his expulsion from the Brotherhood. Abul Fotouh had previously declared during his interview with Mona al Shazly, that

His loyalty was not to a certain organization (*Tandheem*) but rather to an ideology and a goal, hence I am not concerned about sustaining my membership within the Brotherhood as much as I am concerned about advancing its original message and objectives which have been established by its founder Hassan al Banna. (Abul Fotouh, May, 2011).

In the first comments he gave the media after the decision of his expulsion, Abul Fotouh said,

I am very busy with my presidential campaign which is a national project a lot more important than these issues, and I always wish for everyone, and especially the MB to be at peace and harmony to serve Egypt, and I do not concern myself with any of these trivial issues. (Abul Fotouh, June, 2011).

The profile of Abul Fotouh therefore, shows that he is compatible both with ideological and political Wasateyya. However, even though he had been struggling to push the MB forward in the direction of political moderateness, he has in fact done very little in terms of actually bringing about any meaningful change towards this end.

CHAPTER 4: ESSAM EL ERYAN

A. Background:

El Eryan is an interesting figure to study because of the ideological transformation he experiences beginning from 2007. His rise as a member of the guidance bureau marks a turning point in his positions towards ideological Wasateyya which seems to pair more with the hardline wing of the movement. In addition, like Abul Fotouh, he has been one of the most exposed and outspoken leaders of the reformist trend.

During his time at University, El Eryan was the secretary of the cultural committee of the federation of students of medicine at the College of Medicine at Qasr Aini from 1972 till 1977, and then became the president of the general union for students of Egyptian universities.

In 1981, he was arrested alongside several other members of Egypt's Islamist groups, tried in a military court, and released a year later. In 1986, he was elected to the board of directors of the Egyptian doctors' syndicate. In 1987, he was elected to the People's Assembly, becoming the youngest parliamentarian in modern Egyptian history. In 1995, he was imprisoned along with many others for his membership in the MB. He was also jailed in 2005 after he hinted that he might run for president, in 2006 for his participation in protests, in 2007 for his leadership role in the Brotherhood, and in January 2011 at the height of the anti-Mubarak revolt. (Trager, Kiraly, Klose, Calhoun, 2012).

Before the recent crack down on the MB in 2013, El Eryan occupied the positions of Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, People's Assembly, vice chair of the Freedom and Justice Party, and advisor to President Morsi.

B. Reaching out to Non-Islamist Groups

Like Abul Fotouh, El Eryan was an active member of the Islamic groups of the 1970's in Cairo University, and was also highly influenced by the pragmatic and reformist agenda of Umar al Tilmisany. According to Wickham and Pargeter, his activity during the university years and after graduation in the Egyptian syndicates has fueled his communication skills and widened his horizons, hence moderating his view of the other. The participation in student union elections and the arrangement of several events on university campuses which include music and art were a significant part of El Eryan's exposure during this phase. El Eryan's political experience therefore, expanded since the early 1980's, he became aware of the need for equal and fair representation in electoral politics, El Eryan says,

The Islamists are often accused of dominating any elections, and I personally see that this is not in our benefit, either on the students level, the syndicates, or the parliamentary, because there needs to be a balance. The competition had always been with a governmental entity or a party supported by the regime, and of course the Islamists would win because no one likes to support the regime. I believe one of the main reasons for the popularity of the Islamists is their oppression by the regime. (Eid, 2013, P.88).

According to the revised literature, El Eryan shares many of Abul Fotouh's progressive stances and has typically been framed by scholars as a 'leader of the reformist camp'. Abd El Rahim Ali has referred to El Eryan as a main advocate of political participation and of the separation of the Brotherhood's missionary and political roles. In his interview with Ali, El Eryan stresses on the importance of tolerance and of opening communication channels with the 'other', he explains,

On the educational side there needs to be more tolerance towards the views of others, there should be more acceptance to the other, a willingness to listen and understand, and eventually become capable of cooperating with that other. This need stems from the domination of an era of persecution and torture which the *Ikhwan* witnessed in the 1960's and which led them to loose faith in all those

around them, a loop of mistrust which envisioned the other as being a danger for their existence and is out there always to get them. . . (Ali, 2004, P.178).

Wickham had also mentioned that El Eryan was highly influenced by Tilmisany and that he was of the main leaders of the Islamist student movement during the 1970's. Ali had also accounted on some of El Eryan's political views and his commitment to democracy, which reveal the profound impact of the scholars of the *Wasateyya* on the composition of El Eryan. Therefore, El Eryan is a strong advocate of their understanding of an Islamic state, as a civil state with an Islamic identity as Ali quotes him saying.

C.Position on Minorities and Partisanship

El Eryan's position on the inclusion of women and Copts has been deemed by the current literature as progressive. Tammam observes that El Eryan has taken the lead in making announcements in favor of Copts and women, Tammam says, "Some of the Brotherhood leaders such as Essam El Eryan have found no problem in announcing their approval of the creation of a Coptic party..." (Tammam, 2010, P.10). Tammam, Ali, Wickham, Pargeter, Eid, Abdouh, and most of the scholars cited here have reached a consensus over El Eryan's progressive stance on issues relating to Copts and women. Ali and Wickham both account on El Eryan's full support of the inclusion of Copts and women in political participation and their eligibility to run for the presidency. This was evident in the situation of the 2007 party platform which was strongly opposed by El Eryan due to its exemption of Copts and women from running for the presidency.

In an interview with Amr Adeeb after the events of the revolution, El Eryan announced that

The Brotherhood is calling for the freedom of establishing political parties, the ruling NDP has been restricting the creation of parties, granting legitimacy to parties on selective basis, now after the revolution we are calling for this situation to change and for all parties to be granted the freedom to operate. . .once this is achieved the Brotherhood will be the first to announce the creation of a party. (El Eryan, February, 2011).

El Eryan also stressed that the party will not be a religious one, and that it will most definitely include Copts and women as members.

His position regarding the separation of the movement's missionary and political roles was different after the revolution and after the creation of the FJP. Even though his announcements on that issue always came in favor of the separation, his participation in the creation of the party and turning a blind eye to the control of the movement on the party proved otherwise.

D. Consistency with Ideological Wasateyya

Like Abul Fotouh, El Eryan has always played a political and ideological role within the Brotherhood. According to Sheikh Tulayma, Qaradawi especially regards Abul Fotouh and El Eryan as the two dearest and closest members of this generation to him. He also added that the two figures mentioned share the same ideology and views of Qaradawi due to their ideological roles, which make them closer to the Sheikh. (Tulayma, 2014).

During the Wasat affair, as mentioned earlier in the section of Abul Fotouh, El Eryan had been described by Joshua Statcher as one of the main instigators of the Wasat party, despite his refusal to join Madi and Sultan in their movement against the MB

leadership. This was explained according to Statcher's work by the fear of being unable to play an active role outside the scope of the Brotherhood, and hence the decision not to join the Wasat party was based on a conviction that reforming the Brotherhood from within was a safer bet during that time.

El Eryan's role after the victory of the 2005 parliamentary elections was similar to that of Abul Fotouh in terms of advancing the democratic rhetoric of the Brotherhood and working towards defining the political agenda of the movement and clarifying its positions on controversial issues such as minority rights, the separation of its political and missionary activities, and its transformation into a political party. He also participated with Abul Fotouh in criticizing the 2007 party platform which was mainly drafted by the conservatives.

The 2010 parliamentary elections marked the beginning of El Eryan's alliance with the conservative leadership of the Brotherhood. Now being a member of the Guidance Bureau, El Eryan supported the leadership's decision to avoid the boycott and claimed that participation would force the regime to face them. Yet this position was opposed to Abul Fotouh's who-as mentioned above-endorsed the boycott led by Al Bardei's NAC. El Eryan's commitment to the reformist/centrist agenda and to democracy was further challenged with the advent of the revolution.

As previously noted, the decision to abstain from participating on the 25th of January was the decision of the conservative-led Guidance Bureau, which El Eryan repeatedly voiced through media outlets. In a statement to clarify the Brotherhood's position from participating on the 25th of January 2011, El Eryan stated that,

The MB have announced their demands which have been agreed upon by all the political forces, these include sparing the country any chaos and instability. And

we have decided regarding the 25th of January, to join the National Assembly for Change (NAC) in a sit in in front of the high supreme court, which the *Ikhwan's* political, national, and social leaders will participate in with the aim of expressing the unity of the entire nation in advancing certain demands. We have also decided not to prevent any of the MB youth from taking part in the strike as long as they adhere to the regulations of the Brotherhood which include abstaining from attacking any public figures, destroying public or private property, and avoiding acts of disturbance and chaos. . . (El Eryan, January, 2011).

Tadros and Wickham account on El Eryan's role in siding with the Guidance Bureau's decision of refusing to participate. Tadros says, “When asked regarding the Brotherhood's participation, El Eryan announced that the Brothers would not be taking part in the scheduled protests because it is a day that we should all be celebrating together. This was clearly a political stance meant to appease the government...” (Tadros, 2012, P.30).

According to the literature, El Eryan's position from the negotiations handled with SCAF during the revolution was an initial rejection to these talks. Pargeter quoted El Eryan saying that “Even after Mubarak goes we refuse to deal with Omar Sulaiman”. However, his position changed later and he was part of the talks that took place with Umar Soliman in early February. Abd El Galil Mustafa, a member of the NAC was interviewed on *Al Tahrir TV* and was reported saying that,

When Umar Soliman contacted us and the rest of the revolutionary forces including the MB, we all decided not to meet with him. . .but I was surprised later on to hear that the MB have agreed to negotiate with Soliman. I called Essam el Eryan to find out about the reality of these talks, he said that we wanted to know what the regime was up to and whether they are willing to accept the demands of the revolution. . . (Mustafa, 2011).

El Eryan's involvement in the negotiations that took place with the regime reveal the difference in approach between him and Abul Fotouh as well as his degree of commitment to the cause of the revolution.

Of course the most significant role played by El Eryan is during the Brotherhood's decision to create the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). El Eryan was a strong proponent of this decision and was therefore the first choice of the Guidance Bureau to assume the position of the party's vice president, and soon became its president after Morsi won the presidential race. He appeared on several TV interviews supporting the cause of the party and presenting it as an important part of the democratic transition in the country. He repeatedly stressed on the independence of the party from the movement and of the party's ability of fully representing the Egyptian people by electing Copts and women.

It is also significant to note that El Eryan supported the Guidance Bureau's decision of expelling Abul Fotouh after his decision to run for the presidency. In an interview with Tony Khalifa on *Al Qahera wel Nas TV*, Essam el Eryan was asked about the reason for expelling Abul Fotouh and his answer was that,

Abdel Moniem has taken a rushed decision in violating the shura council's decision of not nominating a candidate to the presidential elections, we have taken this decision because we realized this is a sensitive phase not just to reassure the people and the military that we are not seeking power, but also because we are looking for a consensual presidential candidate who all the national forces would agree on, and I think such a candidate does not yet exist. (El Eryan, August, 2011).

The tone of El Eryan's statements reveal a high degree of commitment to the Guidance Bureau's decisions, he speaks for the decision makers in the movement when he says 'we' implying that he was a participant in the decision making process.

Furthermore, in the same interview, El Eryan was asked about Mohamed Saleem al A'wa and his decision to run for the presidency and if he was considered the consensual Islamic candidate, El Eryan said,

This is not true, the Islamists did not agree on a candidate...and we as a MB announced that we do not want a candidate with an Islamic background, because we see that this will harm the current transitional phase in the country, and therefore I repeat we want a candidate who all the national forces would agree on. The problem is that the previous statements of Al A'wa implied that he was not intending to run for the presidency but now he contradicted himself by deciding to enter the presidential race. Another problem of Al A'wa is his problems with the Copts, because of his statements on one of the satellite channels. . .(El Eryan, August, 2011).

In general El Eryan seems to be voicing the inclinations of the hardliners of the Brotherhood and their concerns over political Wasateyya and its advocates within the group. For example when Tony Khalifa asked him about the reason for the Brotherhood's expulsion of some youth members, El Eryan responded saying

We did not expel our youth we only had a problem with those who wanted to break away and create a party which I think was an un feasible project, and hence I am sure they will return back to the mother movement...This happened to Sheikh Al Ghazaly when he got expelled from the movement and later returned back and apologized to the *Murshid*. . . (El Eryan, August, 2011).

Tony Khalifa then asked him about the fate of anyone who wanted to break away from the movement, El Eryan said, "They will ultimately bounce back, because our *da'wa* is built on a genuine sense of compassion." (El Eryan, 2011).

El Eryan in all his declarations for the media, has therefore been taking up a defensive position for the Brotherhood's senior leadership's decisions and most often attacking members of the reformist camp. His strong advocacy for the Brotherhood's decision of not fielding a presidential candidate is later reversed after the Brotherhood

decide to nominate Khairat Al Shater. In validation of El Eryan's loyalty to the conservative wing is Islam Lutfi's (a prominent member of the coalition of youth who instigated the revolution) statement on *Al A'asema* show with Yusuf Al Husseiny on ON TV, in which Lutfi contravened El Eryan's statements regarding the events of the 25th of January. In his statement El Eryan wanted to provide evidence of the MB's participation, but Lutfi denied this and proved that he and his fellow activists were trying to pressure the MB senior leadership to take part in the protests. (Al A'asema, January, 2013).

Hence in general El Eryan seems to have experienced a major transformation regarding his stance from Wasateyya. In the beginning he was in compliance with both ideological and political Wasateyya in terms of his progressive agenda and his tolerance towards secular and liberal forces, as well as in his endorsement of political participation and the vision of Islam as an encompassing religion. However, beginning from 2008, after his rise as a member of the Guidance Bureau, El Eryan became only compatible with political Wasateyya irrespective of ideological Wasateyya. This in turn feeds the argument about the weakened presence of real moderateness within the MB.

CHAPTER 5: KHAIRAT AL SHATER

A. Background

The significance of Al Shater mainly lies in his role within the Brotherhood as the strategic mind and the man of organization, he also stands as one of the most important members of the MB's Guidance Bureau and its primary financial sponsor. According to the Washington Post Institute,

Al Shater joined the MB in 1974. Previously, he was one of the founding members of the General Islamic Action in Alexandria in 1967 and was later imprisoned for participating in student demonstrations. After joining the MB, he became one of its most influential leaders. Due to his many business interests, he is widely viewed as the group's key financier and strategist. (Trager, Kiraly, Klose, Calhoun, 2012).

Amira Howeidy talks about Al Shater in her article on Ahram online saying that “El-Shater has emerged as the Brotherhood's most powerful figure since the Nasser regime's 1954 crack down on the group.”(Howeidy, 2012). At the age of 16 Al Shater joined the youth wing of Nasser's Arab Socialist Union, “According to novelist Mohamed El-Makhzangi who went to school with him, El-Shater was at a young age the head of one of the Socialist Union's neighborhoods, as their structural units were called.” (Howeidy, 2012).

Al Shater received a Bachelor's degree from Alexandria University in Civil Engineering and Anthropology. He Later earned his master's degree in Construction Management from Al Mansoura University, in which he also worked as a Lecturer. According to Howeidy, Al Shater joined Alexandria University at the height of anti-Nasserist sentiments after the 1967 defeat. “No longer a Nasserist, he participated in the

1968 student anti-regime demonstrations, was arrested and then served in the army for two years. He resumed his education and after obtaining a master's degree took a teaching job at El-Mansoura University.” (Howeidy, 2012). After the assassination of President Anwar Sadaat in 1981, Al Shater travelled to London due to the popular crack down on the Islamists, as was not to return back until the mid 1980's.

In the early 1990's, Al Shater along with his friend and MB member Hassan Malek established the computer information system company '*Salsabeel*', which was confiscated by the Mubarak regime in what came to be known as the *Salsabeel* case. Al Shater received a two year prison sentence and was released in 1993. According to Howeidy, Al Shater consolidated his power within the MB both on the managerial and financial fronts.

In 1995 El-Shater became head of the Brotherhood's Greater Cairo sector, an administrative but important position that saw him overseeing organization and communication across a large area...He quickly devised a “parallel” organizational structure to that laid out by ⁵Mashhour, creating opportunities for talented members who don't meet the ancient regime criteria of religiosity, historical legitimacy or knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence...El-Shater's interest in upgrading the performance of the group drove him to form a unit for administrative development, which provided training in time and strategic management. As his businesses flourished across diverse sectors - furniture, fabrics, tractors, car manufacturing, chemicals and management consultancy - El-Shater's leverage in the group also grew. (Howeidy, 2012).

In this manner, Al Shater managed to create an 'organization within the organization', earning the loyalty of most of its members as well as running the show from behind the scenes. (Howeidy, 2012).

In 1995 Al Shater was held accused for reviving the MB, an illegal organization at that time, and received another prison sentence until the year 2000. By the time Mahdi Akef had assumed the role of Murshid, Khairat Al Shater became his second deputy and according to Howeidy, “Akef showed less interest in administrative and organizational matters and allowed El-Shater to assume greater responsibility, including control of the Brotherhood’s finances.” (Howeidy, 2012). The Washington Post Institute talks about Al Shater's role in the 2005 elections in which the Brotherhood won a total of 88 seats and shortly afterwards in 2007 Al Shater was arrested.

Starting in 2004, he served as second deputy to former general guide Mahdi Akef and was instrumental in negotiating with the regime regarding the Brotherhood’s participation in the 2005 parliamentary elections, in which the group won 88 of 454 seats. In 2007, he was arrested with other MB members for allegedly providing combat training and weapons to student protestors. Sentenced to seven years for terrorism and money laundering, he was released in March 2011 following Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. (Trager, Kiraly, Klose, Calhoun, 2012).

Howeidy also mentions that Al Shater was arrested in 2007 because he broke his agreement with the government in which he promised to limit the number of candidates in the elections, but apparently did not keep his promise due to pressures from the organization's ranks and files.

B.Reaching out to non-Islamist Groups

The efforts of Al Shater in reaching out to parties outside the scope of the Brotherhood are considerable in terms of selling the image of the movement to the West. Al Shater has been consistent in expressing the moderate nature of the MB as a movement to the West;

KirkPatrick describes Al Shater as the main advocator for moderation and change within the Brotherhood when he says that:

Mr. Shater was known for years as the group's most important internal advocate for moderation and modernization...In prison, he talked radical Islamist inmates into renouncing violence. He helped chart the Brotherhood's first steps into electoral politics, initially in Egypt's professional associations of doctors, lawyers, engineers and the like. Then he was at the forefront of its more transformative drive to win seats in the Mubarak-dominated Parliament; the experience did more than anything to moderate the group as it forged coalitions and courted the mainstream. And over the past decade he also oversaw its stepped-up outreach to the West through Web sites in Arabic and English. (D.KirkPatrick, 2012).

He also wrote an article titled "No Need to be Afraid of Us" in which he expressed his advocacy for democratic principles and the importance of tolerating religious minorities. Also according to the Washington Post Institute, Al Shater played a key role in the 2005 elections by negotiating with the regime to allow for the Brotherhood's participation in the elections. Like Abul Fotouh and El Eryan, Al Shater played an important role in laying the foundations for the Brotherhood's entry into the political domain through his activity in the professional syndicates.

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Consequently, Al Shater seems to be on the same track with El Eryan and Abul Fotouh regarding the need to communicate with the 'other' and the need to express their commitment to democratic principles. His perception however, to the contenders of the Brotherhood is one based on a conviction that they (the MB) are taking up a superior cause and therefore need to enter politics in order to fight the non-Islamists forces. This

comes in compliance with Mahmoud Abdouh's analysis which holds that the MB senior leadership reduce Islam and the well being of the *Ummah* to the survival of their movement.

C.Position on Minorities and Partisanship

Similar to El Eryan and Abul Fotouh Al Shater defends the cause of the Brotherhood by reassuring the world that the Brotherhood and accordingly Islam is concerned with the wellbeing of non-Muslim minorities and women. Yet his stance from the participation of women in the public sphere and their eligibility to run for senior positions such as the presidency is contradictory to strong advocates of the Wasat vision. As KirkPatrick noted, Al Shater is very strict regarding segregation of the sexes, “so strict that it advises women not to talk on the telephone with men outside their immediate families.” (D.KirkPatrick, 2012). This limitation of women's roles and responsibilities contradicts Qaradawi's moderate views which permit women to share the same workplace with men and nominate to senior positions.

Al Shater's idea of the goal of the MB and his stance on the issue of separating the political and preaching roles of the organization comes at odds with that of Abul Fotouh and El Eryan. The main mission of the *Ikhwan* according to Al Shater is to empower God's religion on Earth and which comes with many prerequisites that will be mentioned below. For Al Shater, the political party is only one vessel of the organization, or a tool used to achieve change on the political ground. His opinions are clearly presented in a lecture he gave in Alexandria in 2011 under the title “Features of *Nahda*: Gains of the Revolution and the Horizons for Developing”. This lecture was translated by the Hudson

Institute in an article named “Khairat al-Shater on the Rise of the MB”. Al Shater is quoted saying

Everywhere the *Ikhwan* are working to restore Islam in its all encompassing conception to the lives of people, and they believe that this will only come about through the strong society. Thus the mission is clear restoring Islam in its all encompassing conception; subjugating people to God; instituting the religion of God; the Islamization of life, empowering of God's religion; and establishing the *Nahda* of the *Ummah* on the basis of Islam. (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, Mneimneh, 2012, P.129).

Then Al Shater continues by saying that the *imam* Al Banna has set the prerequisites of accomplishing this broad mission according to his understanding of the Prophet's method (PBUH). These, Al Shater refers to as secondary goals which help reach the larger objective of restoring Islam; namely the bottom-up approach of *Da'wa* that al Banna has always referred to. Starting with building the Muslim individual, then the Muslim family, the Muslim society, and the Muslim government, and eventually the global Islamic empire or Caliphate. The Islamic tone in Al Shater's speech is very apparent and takes a much stronger appearance than that available in Abul Fotouh's and El Eryan's rhetoric. In the same speech, Al Shater highlights the importance of establishing a society of Muslims (*Jama'a*), and explains how maintaining the *Jama'a* is one of the constant or given missions that cannot be disputed or reassessed.

We also learned in the method of the MB that this overall mission and these secondary goals can only be achieved by means of the strong *Jama'a*. The *Jama'a* is therefore the one primary instrument to achieve this overall mission and these secondary goals. We say Islam disappeared from life, thus preachers of the *Ikhwan* undertook the work of restoring Islam in its all encompassing conception to the lives of people, and they believed that this would only come by way of the strong *Jama'a*. This is the same idea of that was expressed by his Eminence Umar Bin Al Khatab (may Allah be pleased with him), which some scholars attribute to the Prophet himself, stating that 'there is no religion without a *Jama'a*, no *Jama'a* without an *imam*, and no *imam* without obedience'. (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, Mneimneh, 2012, P.130).

Al Shater goes on to explain that the *Jama'a* is the main instrument or means to achieve the broader objective of restoring Islam and that is why it is one of the constants that is not subject to negotiation. On the other hand the party, according to Al Shater, is a product of Western civilization that is used or manipulated by the MB to achieve gains on the political space, he asserts that it is the means through which the *Jama'a* enters conflict with those who oppose their overall mission on political grounds.

The *Jama'a* on the other hand is not an instrument of conflict or competition. The *Jama'a* is an instrument of integration and rallying of the entire *Ummah* in order to build its *Nahda* on the basis of Islam...Therefore in our process of developing and changing, it would not be possible if someone says, “the *Jama'a* should become a party” or “forget about the *Jama'a* and let's establish a party or two or three”, because the party is a vessel born of the Western idea which has a particular nature within particular limitations. (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, Mneimneh, 2012, P.131).

Hence it is apparent how Al Shater comes to view partisanship as opposed to Abul Fotouh and El Eryan who advocate the transformation of the MB into a political party or who push it to abandon its political role altogether.

The need for separating the political and missionary roles is on the other hand endorsed by Qaradawi and his student Sheikh Tulayma, who argued for the validation of Abul Fotouh's stance on that issue saying, “There is a difference between separating religion from politics and between separating the political and missionary roles of the movement, the first is the call of the secularists and this is not what Abul Fotouh intends to say.” (Tulayma, 2014). Hence Al Shater's objection to this conviction resembles a departure from political *Wasateyya*. In addition his emphasis on the importance of the survival of the organization (*tandhim*) distinguishes him clearly from the

reformist/moderate cause and brings him inline with the hardliners of the Brotherhood. (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, Mneimneh, 2012).

D. Consistency with Ideological Wasateyya

According to Sheikh Tulayma and the revised literature, Al Shater had assumed an organizational role within the Brotherhood, he is therefore, concerned about strategic aspects within the movement as opposed to advocates of the moderate line of thought.

According to Amira Howaidy, Al Shater who became the second deputy of the supreme guide Mahdi Akef was greatly in charge of the administrative and structural matters of the organization due to Akef's lack of interest in them. Also as mentioned above, Al Shater's compatibility with political Wasateyya is considered relatively high, yet as will be argued here, his compliance to ideological Wasateyya is almost non-existent.

His relationship with members of the Wasat Party for example was not very strong and his affiliation to their cause was non-existent. According to ex-MB member Tharwat al Kharabawy, The group within the MB led by Khairat Al Shater, Mahmoud Ghozlan, Mahmoud Ezzat and Badie' "views the enhancement of the organization as a mandatory obligation, similar to a religious practice. i.e. it is not right for anyone to live his life unless he belongs to the Brotherhood." This group comes in opposition to the other group led by Tilmisany, Abul Fotouh, Habib, and Al Za'farany which "views the organization not as a goal in itself but a rather means to an end; the Brotherhood does not have to have a rigid organizational structure thus turning into a movement that affects society." (Abu Bakr, 2012). Kharabawy says, that Al Shater's group wanted to get rid of all the other group who opposed their views, "The first person they got rid of was [current Al-Wasat

party Head] Abul Ela Mady and the others in 1996 who now belong to Al-Wasat party.”
(Abu Bakr, 2012).

Another very important aspect that distinguishes Al Shater from advocates of the *Wasat* is his praise of obedience as a prerequisite for the success of the movement's goals. According to the teachings of Al Banna, the *Jama'a* must be based on people who express religious characteristics and possess pious behavior. They must in their words and deeds be representatives of the *Quraan* and the *Sunna* of the Prophet. They must also adhere to the decisions taken by the *Jama'a* and its *imam*, given that the decision making process is based on a system of '*Shura*' (Consultation). If any member fails to adhere to these conditions they can no longer be considered part of the *Jama'a*. In this fashion the organization is based on behavior and structure, in which the structure is based on the relationships between the members and the *imam*. The first guiding elements of these relationships according to Al Shater are brotherhood, trust, and obedience. In this way obedience for Al Shater is a necessary element for the continuity of the organization, the same way parties advocate for partisan commitment and encourage adherence to the party's policy and instructions.

All of the above fundamentals of the MB, Al Shater argues are not subject to development or change. As he simply puts it

Thus this part of our method represents constants, and there is no room for discussion about change or developing. No one can come and say lets change the overall mission. No one can come and say lets remove one of these objectives. No one can say instead of the *Jama'a* lets make a party or two...No one can say forget about obedience, discipline, and structures of the *Jama'a*, claiming that we can call any gathering a *Jama'a*. No, all of these are constants that represent the fundamental framework for our method: the method of the MB, it is not open to developing or change. (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, Mneimneh, 2012, P.133).

Khairat Al Shater also expresses a great deal of intolerance towards members of the organization who refuse to adhere to the political vision of the MB. In KirkPatrick's article he is quoted saying

You have one of two choices...Either you stay in the MB and the MB's party, or if you insist on another party, then you'll be the ones leaving us...This is normal," he said, "because the party is an expression of a political vision. If you have the same vision, you will join this party. You can't adopt a different vision from the party that represents us, that represents the vision of the group. (D.KirkPatrick, 2012).

Based on this approach Al Shater was one of the main opponents of Abul Fotouh and according to Amira Howaidy and David KirkPatrick, he was the main reason behind the expulsion of Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh from the Brotherhood along with other Brotherhood members who disagreed with the political decisions of the Guidance Bureau.

Al Shater's position from the Brotherhood's limited participation on the 25th of January was documented in his interview with Mahmoud Sa'ad on *Al Tahrir* TV, he said, "I believe the Brotherhood participated from the very first day, my own daughters and wife participated in the protests." When Mahmoud Sa'ad told him that his family participated as Egyptians and not under the umbrella of the Brotherhood and that the Brotherhood announced it will not participate on that day, Al Shater told him, "No the Brotherhood announced that it will participate but according to the current political situation as Essam El Eryan said, and I do not want to get into such details, let us hold on to the present moment..." (Al Shater, June, 2011). Therefore it is clear that Al Shater was trying to escape from answering in order to overcome accusations such as riding the wave of the revolution and the like. It also comes clear that he supported whatever decision the Brotherhood made regarding their participation on the 25th of January.

Again regarding the negotiations with the regime that took place during the revolution, Al Shater asserted that the Brotherhood did not leave the square in order to strike a deal with Umar Soliman, but they were rather knocking on all the available doors to realize the goals of the revolution. “Those who went and talked with Umar Soliman made it clear that the first demand of the people is the ouster of Mubarak, and that there is no compromise on this demand” said Al Shater. Mahmoud Sa'ad also asked him about the reason behind the Brotherhood's refusal to compete for the presidency. Al Shater while reasserting that the Brotherhood does not seek to assume power, explained that the Brotherhood's decision was based primarily on the objective of reassuring the people that the Brotherhood was not the only alternative for Mubarak's regime as the regime was always trying to imply. Hence Al Shater was in agreement with the Guidance Bureau's decision of not wanting to field a presidential candidate.

Overall Al Shater stands as the most significant member of the Guidance Bureau for a number of reasons. First he is the mediator between the veteran old guard leaders and the younger group of reformists; as mentioned earlier being a pragmatic conservative he is able to hold the stick from the middle. On the one hand he maintains the traditional identity of the organization with his emphasis on the necessity of reviving Islam in all aspects of life, and on the other hand he acknowledges the change in governing systems which have moved towards a greater acceptance of liberal democracy, and has therefore been a primary force behind his organization's embrace of democratic principles. Second Al Shater's significance also stems from his status as a businessman and a financial supporter for the organization. His businesses which have employed many members from the MB, have helped him create a network of alliances as well as empowered his status

within the organization. Third Al Shater being a continuous target of the regime has made him a martyr of his cause. According to the Hudson Institute article “His prestige also derives from the enormous personal suffering that he has endured for the MB's cause: he has spent more than half of the past two decades in prison, and his property has been confiscated twice in the same period.” (Fradkin, Haqqani, Brown, Mneimneh, 2012, P.127).

Finally the compatibility of Al Shater with Qaradawi and the Wasateyya ideology is deemed only political. With the exception of Al Shater's views on partisanship and the role of women, the rest of his views on the comprehensiveness of Islam, the concept of a civil state, and endorsement of political participation are all in sync with those of Political Wasateyya. However, his thought and views are incompatible with ideological Wasateyya. This is clear from his positions during the 2011 revolution, by embracing all the decisions of the Guidance Bureau. As well as from his rigid and traditional personality which manifests itself for example through his stance on the role of women, the importance of hierarchy, obedience, and the organizational structure.

CHAPTER 6: MOHAMED MORSI

A. Background:

Morsi's significance in this study lies in his role as the strategic implementer of the MB, his role within the Brotherhood is an extension of Al Shater's. Morsi traveled to the United States to pursue his Doctorate degree from the University of Southern California and received his degree in 1982. During that time two of his four children were born and are therefore US citizens by birth. Later Mohamed Morsi was appointed in the California State University as an assistant Professor until 1985. In the same year he returned to Egypt and was appointed head of the Engineering Department at Zagazig University, in which he was a colleague of fellow Brotherhood members Mahmoud Ezzat and Mahmoud Ghozlan. (Washington Institute, 2012).

In 1977 during his stay in California, Morsi joined the MB, however his position within the organization was not significant until he became the leader of the MB's Parliamentary bloc from 2000-2005. Shortly afterwards, he was elected by the Shura council of the Brotherhood as a member of the Guidance Bureau, and after the 25th of January revolution, he was elected Chairman of the newly established Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). According to Shah Abdul Hannan article on Ikhwan Web,

Dr. Morsi played a major role in the political section of the MB. He was supervisor of that section which has seen significant action during the recent period, starting from the reform initiative launched by the group in 2004, then the publishing of a political program in 2007, and led the political operations during the parliamentary elections in 2010. (Abdul Hannan, 2012).

Morsi also suffered several arrests under the Mubarak regime. He was arrested in 2005 after the results of the elections were marred by the state, in which he had won a majority.

After the 2005 elections were rigged, Dr. Mohamed Morsi led demonstrations in support for judges demanding independence, refusing referral of some judges to the Competence Commission to punish them for their outspoken views against blatant elections fraud. Consequently, Dr. Morsi was arrested on the morning of May 18, 2006 with 500 members of the Brotherhood during their protest in front of the North Cairo Court and Al-Jalaa Court Complex in Central Cairo. He spent seven months behind bars. (Abdul Hannan, 2012).

Morsi was arrested again during the January 2011 uprising for participating in the demonstrations on the Friday of anger along with many other MB members.

When several prisons were destroyed during the revolution, and many prisoners escaped, Dr. Morsi refused to leave his prison cell. Instead, he contacted satellite TV channels and news agencies demanding the judicial authorities visit the prison and check the legal position of jailed MB leaders, to clarify if there were indeed any legal reasons for their arrest, before leaving prison, since no judicial personnel were available there. (Abdul Hannan, 2012).

After the January 2011 uprising, and with the advent of the presidential elections of 2012, the MB decided to enter the presidential race appointing Khairat Al Shater as their primary candidate and in April Mohamed Morsi was chosen as a backup in case Al Shater was prevented from running.

When Shater was indeed excluded due to a previous conviction, Morsi became the MB's presidential nominee. In the first round of Egypt's presidential election, Morsi won 24.78 percent of the vote, securing his position in a runoff against Ahmed Shafiq in mid-June. On June 24, Morsi was declared president, having won 51.73 percent of the vote. (Washington Institute, 2012).

The 2012 presidential elections marked a critical point in Egypt's history, and the outcomes of the elections signaled a dramatic change in the balance of powers between

the former military based regime and the Islamist opposition. According to the Biography Channel

On June 24, 2012, Mohamed Morsi made history when he was elected the new president-elect of Egypt. Morsi is the first democratically elected president in Egypt's history, and the first Islamist to lead an Arab country...Morsi is Egypt's fifth president, and the first leader from outside of the military. The election marks a pivotal point in Egypt's history, and follows a tumultuous transition to restore political powers and establish a new government after Mubarak's 30-year reign. (The Biography Channel, 2014).

B.Reaching out to non-Islamist Groups

Mohamed Morsi's role in reaching out for non-Islamists is summed up in his experience as a parliamentarian. He was not a man of ideas as much as he was an implementer, he took charge of the political operations of the group for a long period in which he supervised over the 2004 reform initiative and the 2007 party platform which stirred wide debates among all the political forces and the liberal elements of the Brotherhood. Morsi like Al Shater is mainly compatible with political *Wasateyya*; he talks about the importance of inclusion of women and Copts and the guaranteeing of their full rights based on the Brotherhood's program. He also acknowledges the significance of communicating with all the political factions in the country and the need to work together for the wellbeing of the nation.

Morsi unlike the three aforementioned MB members was not one of the Islamist student activists of the 1970's, but rather he joined the MB intellectually from abroad. It was not until 1985, when he returned to Egypt, that Morsi began an active role in the MB. In an article on the Middle East Issues website, Morsi was profiled as “a seasoned member of Brotherhood’s mainstream leadership, with a typical combination of modest rural background, conservative social views and a successful professional career.” (Manfreda,

2013). Morsi's rural background seems to have contributed to his largely conservative ideology characterized by a greater tendency to listen and obey to those advancing him in age and experience. As Wickham quotes Tammam saying

Over the past decade or so most of the new comers to the Guidance Bureau were from the countryside: Mahmoud Hussein from Assyut, Sabri A'rafat Komi from Dakahliyya, and Mohamed Morsi from Sharqiyya...This trend was encouraged by the Brotherhood's old guard because rural people are less prone to challenging their leaders. (Wickham, 2013, P.142-143).

Hence in general Morsi was depicted as more traditional than members of his generation such as El Eryan, Abul Fotouh, and Habib. He is classified by Wickham as a pragmatic conservative who is more inclined towards 'conservatism'.

Being a representative of contemporary mainstream Brotherhood ideology, Morsi like Abul Fotouh, El Eryan, and Al Shater, also adopts the notion of a civil state with an Islamic reference. In his interview with a reader from the 'Arabist' website Dalia Malek, he stated that

I was saying that in general, there is no such religious state based on a theocratic concept. There is no state in the world now that applies the meaning of "theocratic state." What we have now is the civic state. Whether it does or does not have the flavor of religion is something else. We cannot in reality call Muslim countries "Islamic states." As you said, we see violations of the constitutions of those countries. But an Islamic state is by definition a modern state. It's a civic state. You have three completely independent authorities: the parliament, the judges, and the government. Islam confirms these authorities to be independent. Also, the people are the source of power. This is also by definition Islamic. (El Amrani, 2011).

C.Position on Minorities and Partisanship

According to Wickham the impact of parliamentarian activity on MB members like Morsi and Sa'ad al Katatny has increased their familiarity with, and expertise on the

norms and values of democracy. However she notes that this has done little in affecting their ideological orientation

But when we turn to the impact of participation on the ideological orientations of Brotherhood deputies, the results are more mixed. In many cases their rhetoric shifted toward a greater emphasis on democratic constitutional and political reforms. But this shift did not necessarily entail a readiness to grant the country's elected leaders unrestricted authority to fashion laws of their own choosing or an endorsement of the full range of civil and political rights associated with democratic systems in the West. For example Mohamed Morsi, a longtime Brotherhood MP took the lead in formulating the draft party agenda released in 2007, which envisioned the establishment of a council of religious scholars to vet legislation for conformity with the Shari'a and which limited eligibility for the presidency to a Muslim male. (Wickham, 2013, P.134).

Morsi's contradictory actions send mixed messages about his ideological composition. This has been expressed by Joshua Hammer who lists a couple of Morsi's actions which elicit different implications about him. His courageous dismissal of the military junta who claimed the right to rule the post-Mubarak Egypt on one hand, and his disqualification of women and Copts from running for the presidency and advocating an international law to ban religious insults on the other hand. The first would imply Morsi's commitment to democratic principles, while the other would suggest just the opposite. Hence Hammer concludes that "So far, the only certainty about Morsi is that his ultimate intentions remain unknown." (Hammer, 2012).

D. Consistency with Ideological Wasateyya

Morsi's role within the MB has taken the form of 'behind the scenes' man who was never known to the public before the presidential elections of 2012. His role was largely confined to implementing ideas rather than generating them, and hence was always associated with the hardliners of the Brotherhood. Hammer notes how Morsi was always

“committed to whatever the Brotherhood dictated”. He explains how Ayman Nour, founder of the secular Al Ghad party, noticed that “Parliamentary petitions to President Mubarak routinely disappeared after reaching Morsi. When Nour asked him about it, Morsi admitted pocketing the documents instead of passing them on, explaining that he couldn’t sign until he’d gotten the opinions of all the Brotherhood’s representatives.” Hammer also observes how Morsi, with fellow leaders of the Brotherhood, “were committed to political Islam, but they were also committed to the economic stability that had allowed several of them to earn significant wealth. And so, Hammer notes, Morsi became a strong advocate for Egypt’s free-market economy. His closest political mentor was Khairat Al Shater.” (Hammer, 2012). However, according to Hammer, “Morsi’s pragmatic acceptance of a liberal economy wasn’t undergirded by liberal ideals. What tempered his approach to politics wasn’t the belief that all viewpoints were equally deserving of respect, but rather that there were constant impediments to implementing the one truly authoritative viewpoint.” Therefore, Hammer notes, Morsi did not hesitate to be part of the negotiations that took place with the regime during the revolution. “He was also far more willing to cooperate with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) if doing so might allow the Brotherhood to gain power.” (Hammer, 2012).

The Time of Israel on line newspaper, described Morsi’s profile in the Brotherhood saying

Morsi, who served in the parliament, is said to have never been the ideas man in the Brotherhood. Instead, he served as an implementer of policy. Critics say Morsi is solidly part of the hard-line wing of the Brotherhood that has shown little of the flexibility or willingness to compromise. Throughout his rise in the group, Morsi has been closest to the two figures who are now the Brotherhood’s powerful deputy leaders, Mahmoud Ezzat and Khairat el-Shater. (Michael, 2012).

The article quotes a former senior Brotherhood figure Abd El Sattar al Meligi saying that “Morsi has no talents but he is faithful and obedient to the group’s leaders, who see themselves as above the other Muslims...Morsi would play any role the leaders assign him to, but with no creativity and no uniqueness.” (Michael, 2012). The article then talks about how Morsi is perceived merely as a subordinate of Al Shater stating that

As a result of this reputation, Egyptians widely assume Morsi’s presidency will be unofficially subordinate to the Brotherhood’s strongman and chief strategist, el-Shater, who was the group’s first choice for president. But he was disqualified by election authorities because of his prison conviction during the Mubarak regime. Morsi served only as a backup candidate, earning him the unflattering nickname, “Spare Tire.” (Michael, 2012).

Morsi was one of the main figures of the Brotherhood who took part in the negotiations that were held with Umar Suliman in early February during the 2011 revolution. His positions from all the decisions taken by the Brotherhood during and after the revolution come in agreement with its senior leadership. Most importantly his role and ideology was underscored after he became Egypt's newly elected President, and his allegiance to the survival of the Brotherhood and the agenda of the hard-liners was evident especially when he expressed very little tolerance to deal with secular and liberal forces.

In general Morsi's role as a mediator for the Brotherhood, his support for all the Guidance Bureau's decisions during the 2011 revolution, most importantly his involvement in the talks with Umar Soliman, and his performance as Egypt's president all reveal his inconsistency with ideological Wasateyya. The above discussion of his role and

inclinations show his compliance with political Wasateyya irrespective of its ideological content.

When Sheikh Tulayma was asked about whether or not he sees Morsi as ideologically rigid, he responded by saying, “If you are comparing him with sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, then I would say he is a lot more rigid, he is not like Abul Fotouh and Essam El Eryan...” Dr. Sanaa Al Banna also agrees that Morsi and Al Shater belong to the same ideological group which is a lot different from that of Abul Fotouh and El Eryan. On his behalf, Dr. Qaradawi said that he mostly supports Abul Fotouh because he considers him to be the best candidate who represents his views and ideology. But during the last round of the elections when Morsi was competing against Shafiq, Qaradawi said, “I of course had to give my voice to Morsi, even though I never met the man, but my choice was based on the fact that he represented the only Islamic candidate...” (Qaradawi, 2014).

Overall, Morsi's ideological composition is a product of his religious conservative rural upbringing, as well as his eight-year life experience in the United States. Even though his stay in America did little in changing his country side traditional and reserved nature, it added to his awareness and exposure about the requirements of the modern day life and provided him a glimpse about the nature of democratic societies.

SECTION VII: CONCLUSION

This paper examined the compatibility of four leaders of the MB with Yusuf Qaradawi and his Wasateyya school of thought. The Wasateyya school of thought is divided into two main components, the ideological and the political. Each of the four leaders were assessed based on both these components.

The major research question of the study is:

1. How far MB leaders of the second generation had been influenced by Qaradawi's Wasateyya school?

The findings of the research are as follows:

Case Study Results:-

1. Abd El Moniem Abul Fotouh proves to be compatible with both political and ideological Wasateyya. His commitment to ideological *Wasateyya* is assessed mainly through his historical role within the movement, his positions from the decisions taken by the Guidance Bureau during the revolution distinguish him from the rest of the three members of the group.

2. Essam el Eryan proves to be consistent with political and ideological Wasateyya up until his rise as a member of the Guidance Bureau in the 2008 shura council elections.

From that point his allegiance shifted towards the hardliners and hence he becomes consistent only with political Wasateyya.

3. Khairat Al Shater and Mohamed Morsi are both partially compatible with political Wasateyya and in compatible with its ideological component.

Based on the findings of the case study, Qaradawi and his Wasateyya school of thought did not have a significant influence on the MB especially over the last ten to fifteen years. The reasons for this can be summed up in the following points: first the role played by the Egyptian regime in exploiting the ideological divisions within the MB, as was the case during the Wasat party affair in 1996 and after the 2005 parliamentary elections, worked on inhibiting the growth of the reformist/moderate stream of thought within the MB. Second is the increasing dominance of Salafist thought which began to take over the political climate during the past twenty years, and which has negatively influenced figures of the Wasateyya themselves. This phenomenon has caused a shift in the scale of political ideology towards the left. Third, the limited role of reformist/progressive leaders within the movement such as Abul Fotouh, as a result of the attempts of the traditional hardliners to contain their influence within the ranks of the movement, has confined their chances for bringing about any meaningful change in the direction of moderation.

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