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American University in Cairo
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

**Competing Models of the Modern Islamic State:
Wahhabi vs. Muslim Brotherhood Ideologies**

A Thesis Submitted to
Political Science Department
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of Master of Arts

By

Mohammad Abdul-Monaem Abdul-Hamid Affan

Under the supervision of Dr. **Heba Raouf Ezzat**

December/2014

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NEVER FORGET ... NEVER FORGIVE

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Transliteration:

أ	اَ	ض	d
ا	ā	ط	ṭ
ب	b	ظ	ẓ
ت	t	ع	ʿ
ث	ṭ	غ	gh
ج	j	ف	f
ح	ḥ	ق	q
خ	kh	ك	k
د	d	ل	l
ذ	ḏ	م	m
ر	r	ن	n
ز	z	هـ	h
س	s	و	w
ش	sh	ي	i
ص	ṣ		

CHAPTER ONE: A BACKGROUND

I. INTRODUCTION:

The birth of the modern state in the Muslim world was associated with a relatively new phenomenon in the Islamic experience, which is the emergence of multiple contradicting doctrines and ideologies for the Islamic state. In contrary to the case in other polities preceding the modern state in the political history of Islam (i.e., empire state, sultanates, kingdoms, city-states, or the more primary forms as tribes), contemporary *Sunni* Muslims – and even Islamists – do not agree upon one model or theory for the Islamic state. Despite the fact that all are claiming Islamic reference, there are diverse theories, which include: the authoritarian traditional theory of Wahhabism, the democratic theory claimed by Islamic democrats as *Rashid al-Ghannoushi*, the theocratic democracy of *Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi*, the idealistic theory of *al-ḥākimiah* (the governance) of *Sayyid Quṭb*, and the semi-theocratic theory, the rule of religious scholars ‘*ulamā*’, as in case of Afghani *Taliban* and Somali legal courts systems, which represent a *Sunni* counterpart of the Shiite *Velayat-e-Faqih* theory¹.

The emergence of the modern state carried many challenges to the traditional model of the Islamic governance. The modern state is characterized by specific patterns of legitimacy, constitutionality, citizenship, and sovereignty, which are different from those of the traditional Islamic state. Therefore, many scholars point to inherent incompatibility between both states. Bertrand Badie, for instance, states that the political modernity contradicts the cultural patterns and the societal organizations of the Muslim World.² In accordance to him, Heba Raouf argues

¹ Abdelilah Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought: a historical survey of the major Muslim political thinkers of the modern era* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009).

² Bertrand Badie (trans. by nakhlah friefer), *al-dawlatan: al-dawlah wa al-mojtama‘ fi al-gharb wa fi dar al-islam* (Beirut ; al-dār al-baiḍā’: al-markaz al-ṭaqāphi al-‘arabi, 1996), 289.

that the modern state disintegrates and expropriates the Islamic notions of *al-jamā'ah* “the Group” and *al-ummah*, resulting in distortion and limitation of the Islamists’ political imagination about the modern Islamic governance.³

Recently, *Wael Hallaq* claims that the Islamic modern state is an “Impossible State”. He argues that: “The Islamic state, judged by any standard definition of what the modern state represents, is both impossible and a contradiction in terms.”⁴ He mentions many major incompatibilities between both state models, including: positivist rational paradigm of the modern state vs. the metaphysical normative paradigm of the Islamic state, the autonomous sovereignty as one of the form-property in the modern state vs. the affirmation of the God sovereignty in the Islamic state, and the centrality of the morality in the subject production in the Islamic state vs. the technology of the subject production by the modern state, which aims at creation of an efficient productive citizen.⁵

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, with the success of the Political Islam movements to seize power in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, the problematic of the Islamic state was raised again and ignited serious conflict between Islamists and seculars. They combated around many issues, as: the identity of the state, codification of the *shari'ah*, and the constitution, what resulted in severe political polarization in the Arab Spring countries. Nevertheless, another hidden conflict seems to begin simultaneously in the camp of the Islamists itself between the Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood, the two major *Sunni* Islamic movements. The

³ Heba Raouf Ezzat “nazarāt fi al-khiāl al-syāsi lel-islāmyyin: eshkāliāt manhajiah wa syāsiyah” in *islāmyoun wa democracyoun: eshkāliāt benā' tayyār Islāmi democrāti*, ed. Amr Shoubky (Cairo: markaz al-drāsāt al-syāsiyah wa al-estrātijiah, 2006), 44.

⁴ Wael B. Hallaq, *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), ix – xiv.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 5 – 12 & 155-160.

increasingly prominent role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Spring challenges *Al Sa'ud's* position within the *Sunni* Islamic world.⁶ In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to challenge the Saudi model of the Islamic governance and refutes the historical Saudi claim that their '*ulamā*'-backed political system is the authentic Islamic model of governance. The political gains of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates across the region were thought to reveal the obsolescence of the Saudi Islamic state model.⁷

II. RESEARCH QUESTION, HYPOTHESIS AND OBJECTIVES:

The Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood movements are considered the major modern Islamic movements in the *Sunni* Muslim World. Each of them calls for a different model of the Islamic state. The Wahhabi ideology adopts a traditional state model,⁸ based on traditional legitimacy, centralized hierarchical power, and patriarchal form of state-society relationship. In contrast, The Muslim Brotherhood took a more adaptive approach, blending modern Western political thought with the Islamic tradition.⁹ However, there are two main political trends within the Muslim Brotherhood: a democratic one which could be traced in the writings of the founder of the movement: *Ḥassan Al-Bannā*,¹⁰ and reaches its maturity by follower intellectuals as

⁶ Simon Mabon, "Kingdom in Crisis? The Arab Spring and Instability in Saudi Arabia", *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, 3 (2012): 548.

⁷ Stratfor Report, "Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries." <http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/saudi-arabia-and-the-muslim-brotherhood-unexpected-adversaries/pdf> (accessed 9-4-2014).

⁸ Simon Bromley, "The States-system in the Middle East: Origins, Development, and Prospects" in *A Companion to the History of the Middle East*, ed. Youssef M. Choueiri, 518 (Oxford: Blackwell Companions to World History, 2005).

⁹ Stratfor Report, "Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries."

¹⁰ Tariq Ramadan, "Democratic Turkey Is the Template for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood", *New Perspectives Quarterly* 28, 2 (2011): 42.

Rashid al-Ghannoushi, and an idealistic radical trend, exemplified in the concept of *al-hākimiah* of *Sayyid Qutb*.¹¹

The ideological and political divide between the Saudi political system and the Muslim Brotherhood is rooted in their histories. Despite their alliance and cooperation during 1950s and 1960s against their common enemy: the Nasserism, many evidences point to the negative stance of the Saudi regime from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. At the beginning, the King ‘*Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud*, the founder of the Saudi state, refused to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a legal branch in the kingdom.¹² Later on, the clash between the Saudi regime and *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* (the Islamic Awakening) group, which represents a Brotherhood-like version of Islamism, in the wake of the Gulf War in 1990s negatively affected the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Saudi regime.¹³ Recently, the Saudi state declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group.¹⁴

Therefore, the research question is: what are the differences between the Islamic state model in the Wahhabi ideology and the models adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood? And why these differences are perceived by the Wahhabi regime as dangerous and perverted doctrines, which should be banned and criminalized in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

My hypothesis is that the Muslim Brotherhood’s theories of the Islamic state are in stark contrast with the Wahhabi model, regarding: the constitutional order, the mode of legitimacy, the

¹¹ Ana Belén Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?” *The Muslim World*, 99 (2009): 294.

¹² Stratfor Report, “Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries.”

¹³ Stephane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam: Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 3.

¹⁴ BBC News: Middle East, 7 March 2014. “*Saudi Arabia declares Muslim Brotherhood terrorist group*”, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26487092> (accessed 12-4- 2014)

power structure and distribution, and the pattern of citizenship. Both Muslim Brotherhood versions: the democratic and the radical, represent a direct threat on the authoritarian conservative model of the Wahhabi ideology. Therefore, the fears of emergence of a new *Sunni* Islamic state model that may de-legitimize the Saudi regime are responsible for this negative Saudi stance from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

The objectives of this study include:

- a. Reviewing the political legitimacy theories and their different approaches in defining this concept.
- b. Defining the concept of the Islamic state and explaining how the emergence of the modern state carried many challenges to the traditional model of the Islamic governance.
- c. Discussing the emergence of the Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood movements, highlighting the political and historical contexts, and the main religious scholars and intellectuals affecting their political ideologies.
- d. Comparing the Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood models of the Islamic state regarding: the constitutional order, the mode of political legitimacy, power structure and distribution, and the pattern of citizenship.
- e. Exploring how the Saudi regime built its political legitimacy and the religious principles upon which it relies.
- f. Explaining how the Muslim Brotherhood political doctrines represent a threat to the religious base of the traditional legitimacy of the Saudi regime, and how the spread of the former was associated with legitimacy crises and political unrest in the Saudi Kingdom; the fact that could account for the negative Saudi attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

Political legitimacy has been one of the key concepts in the political thought for centuries. It could be traced in the works of Plato and Aristotle about the justice and the classification of the governments. In the modern age, the philosophers of the social contract contested the concept of divine legitimacy of the kings and called for a new rationale for political legitimacy based on popular support. However, Max Weber's theory of political legitimacy, formulated a century ago, is considered to be the seminal work in this field.¹⁵

a. Political legitimacy: a search for definition:

Political legitimacy is a common pivotal subject in different disciplines, such as: sociology, politics, political anthropology, philosophy and law. The main problematic of this concept is the justification of the right to rule and of political obedience.¹⁶ Max Weber defines the legitimate authority as an authority which is obeyed "because it is in some appreciable way regarded by the [subordinate] actor as an obligatory or exemplary for him".¹⁷ Other definitions of political legitimacy refer to the justified obligation as the main indicator of legitimacy. For instance, A. J. Simmons' definition of the state legitimacy is "the complex moral right it possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties on its subjects, to have its subjects comply with these duties, and to use coercion to enforce these duties."¹⁸ Jürgen Habermas also states that: "Legitimacy means a political order's worthiness to be recognized" and according to

¹⁵ Mattei Dogan, "Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories", *International Social Science Journal* 196, 60 (2009): 195.

¹⁶ Jean-Marc Coicaud (trans. by David Ames Curtis), *Legitimacy and politics: a contribution to the study of political right and political responsibility* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10.

¹⁷ Christopher Pierson, *The modern state* (London and New York: Roulledge, 2004), 17-18.

¹⁸ Mathew Coakley, "On the value of political legitimacy", *Politics Philosophy Economics* 10, 4 (2010): 374.

Paul Lewis, "legitimacy may be defined as that political condition in which power holders are able to justify their holding of power in terms other than those of the mere power holding."¹⁹

Nevertheless, many scholars point to additional aspects in the definition of political legitimacy. Allen Buchanan argues that it is not enough to define legitimacy relying on the notion of the right to be obeyed. The difference between the political power and the mere state coercion is not only wielding power in a justified way, but also exercising power in a morally justified way. Therefore, he states that: "A wielder of political power (the supremacist making, application, and enforcement of laws in a territory) is legitimate (i.e., is morally justified in wielding political power) if and only if it (1) does a credible job of protecting at least the most basic human rights of all those over whom it wields power and (2) provides this protection through processes, policies, and actions that themselves respect the most basic human rights"²⁰

Also Bruce Gilley, in his attempt to put an operational definition for political legitimacy, states that the state is legitimate when it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising power. The notion "rightfulness", according to him, includes three different aspects. Firstly, the views of legality; that "refers to the idea that the state has acquired and exercises political power in a way that accords with citizen views about laws, rules and customs," Secondly, the views of justification; that means the moral reasoning of legitimacy is in conformity with shared principles and values. Thirdly, the acts of consent; that refers to positive

¹⁹ Nikos Kokosalakis, "Legitimation Power and Religion in Modern Society", *Sociological Analysis* 46, 4 (1985): 371.

²⁰ Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 153-154.

actions that express citizens' recognition of the state's right to hold political authority and a general acceptance to obey the decisions that result, as voting in election, tax payment,... etc.²¹

b. Different approaches to the political legitimacy:

From the previous section, two approaches in defining political legitimacy could be recognized: subjective and objective. From the subjectivists' standpoint, legitimacy is based on conviction of the citizens – or most of them – that the authority to which they are subjected is right and proper. On the other hand, the objectivists believe that legitimacy cannot rely only on “mere floating conviction of the majority”. Instead, it is based on socio-cultural base, manifested in the compatibility of the government output and the society's value pattern.²²

According to J. G. Merquior, both subjectivists and objectivists belong to what he calls “Belief theory of legitimacy”, because both of them argue that political legitimacy is based on a same logic; believing in the rulers' claims to power and the accordance of these claims with the common value system in the society. He differentiates between this approach and the “Power theory of legitimacy”, in which efficacy is a necessary condition of governance. Therefore, the political power is considered legitimate when its holder can effectively call on other centers of power for support. In this approach, the legitimacy is based on credibility not credence; it is *de facto* not *de jure* issue. Yet, legitimacy based on mere power reserve, he adds, is scarcely deserves its name.²³

²¹ Bruce Gilley, “The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries” *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2006): 501-505.

²² J. G. Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber: Two studies in the theory of legitimacy* (London, Boston, and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 4.

²³ *Ibid*, 6-8.

Chris Thornhill argues that political legitimacy question is usually examined from two perspectives: political theory and sociology. According to political theory, legitimacy is a result of rationalized procedures or norms, while, according to sociology, it is a result of an aggregate of societally constituted attitude, shared practices and facts. According to the former approach, the political system can be abstracted from its societal setting and its legitimacy can be externally measured by normative postulates, while according to the latter, legitimacy cannot be assessed in static, or externally theoretical norms; instead, it must be observed and described in a broad societal context, as it comprises, not only norms, but also variable nexus of attitudes, practices and functions.²⁴

The major dilemma in the political legitimacy study is whether legitimacy is a matter of norms and values or a matter of political reality. The realists affirm that meaning of politics resides in power game itself; therefore, it is characterized by the autonomy of the rulers in relation to morality. For them, politics is not defined by a finalism that would orient the decisions and actions of the rulers; instead, it constitutes a framework within which individuals endeavor to win out over the others. It could be reduced into confrontational relationships based on competition between groups within a state or between states within the plane of foreign relations. In such approach, politics has its own interests and terms of evaluation that are different from morality, and hence, legitimacy has nothing to do with the justification of the right to rule or the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, because this is alien to real political life. On the other hand, Jean-Marc Coicaud believes that there cannot be sharp separation between both aspects of legitimacy. He states that legitimacy as “a right to govern is indissociable from a

²⁴ Chris Thornhill, “Political Legitimacy: A Theoretical Approach between Facts and Norms”, *Constellations* 18, 2 (2011), 135-136.

normative dimension”. The practices of statesmen should be justified in correspondence to the fundamental principles to which the members of the society adhere.²⁵

To sum, the political legitimacy has diverse dimensions: belief and efficacy, subjective and objective, normative and realistic, traditional and legalistic...etc. Consequently, it cannot be defined or studied depending on one approach and neglecting the others. It should not be defined using the normative references in terms of social values and convictions, overlooking the efficacy of the rulers and the power relations in real politics. Also, it cannot be examined and evaluated in terms of correspondence to moral parameters, disregarding how it is manifested in social actions and behaviors.

c. Max Weber’s theory of political legitimacy and its critics:

Max Weber is the best example of theorists who argue that political legitimacy is a matter of belief. His theory of legitimacy is ruler-centered, based on different patterns of legitimacy claims and subsequent motives for compliance. He defines the legitimate domination as voluntary submission to power systems in whose validity the subject believes.²⁶

Weber differentiates between three terms: power, political power, and domination. Power, according to him, means “probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. As a specific form of power, political power is related to the “striving to share power or striving to influence power distribution either among states or among groups within the

²⁵ Coicaud, *Legitimacy and politics*, 77-79.

²⁶ Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, 6&97.

state”. Weber maintains that “domination” is a special case of power.²⁷ It indicates the probability that a command within a given specific content will be obeyed by a group of persons. The prestige of being considered binding is what he calls “legitimacy”.²⁸

The Weber’s legitimacy theory specifies three different forms of domination: (i) the traditional domination by the patriarch or patrimonial prince, in which the authority rests with an individual who has been chosen on traditional bases, (ii) the charismatic domination by warlord, demagogue, or party leader, in which the authority rests on loyalty to exceptional heroism or the exemplary character of an individual, and (iii) the legal domination by the bureaucrat or state servants, in which the authority rests “on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” Weber prefers the legal form of legitimacy, arguing that legal legitimacy implies harmony, efficiency, and order in the bureaucratic organizations of the state.²⁹

These different forms of legitimation, for Weber, represent three different stages of political development: traditional form of authority, sanctioned usually by religious precepts, dominates in early stages of a nation’s development, the charismatic or populist leadership dominates during the transitional phase, and the legal or bureaucratic authority is a feature of the more developed states.³⁰ He believes that process of formalization and rationalization is inevitable transformation, wherein ethical references and considerations to sustentative justice

²⁷ Murray Knuttila and Wendee Kubik, *State theories: Classical, Global, and Feminist Perspectives* (London: ZED books, 2000), 50.

²⁸ Pierson, *The modern state*, 17

²⁹ Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of comparative politics: search for a paradigm* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 95 – 98.

³⁰ H. J. Wiarda, *Introduction to comparative politics: concepts and processes* (California: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), 35.

will be more and more eliminated.³¹ Moreover, Weber relates each form of legitimacy with specific political culture. According to him, the dominated culture in the traditional authority is submission to the religion or mysticism, the culture propagated by the charismatic authority is that of the prophet leading a people to a new future, while the legal form of legitimacy is associated with secularism and separation between religious and governmental practices.³² The institutional features related to different types of legitimacy claim, according to Max Weber, are summarized in the following table:³³

Institutional variables	Types of legitimacy claim		
	Traditional	Charismatic	Legal
Rulers	Masters	Leaders	Functional superiors
Ruled	Subjects	Followers	Legal equals
Obedience	Personal	Personal	impersonal (to laws)
Relationship	Rule- bound (Traditions)	Non rule- bound	Rule- bound (Laws)
Staff	Retainers or vassals	Disciples	Bureaucrats
Predominant social action orientation	Tradition-oriented	Affectual	Rational-instrumental

Table (1): Institutional features of the different Weberian forms of domination

Mattei Dogan criticizes the Weberian theory of legitimacy and accuses it to be anachronistic. Dogan's criticism is based on two arguments: first, if Weber's typology is applied to the contemporary world, two of the three types of legitimacy can scarcely be found: traditional and charismatic. "Truly traditional legitimacy only survives in few countries such as Morocco,

³¹ Coicaud, *Legitimacy and politics*, 19.

³² Chilcote, *Theories of comparative politics*, 101.

³³ Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, 99,101.

Jordan and Saudi Arabia”. On the other side, there are no examples of charismatic legitimacy in post-industrial societies, even if the charismatic phenomenon has resurfaced in some countries of Africa and Asia.

Second, the legal form of legitimacy represents an amalgamation of many varieties. “In this amalgamation at least three kinds of rational legitimacy can be identified. The first is the advanced pluralist democracies in which most of the citizens consider the regime to be legitimate. The second variety represents what could be called authoritarian regimes, in which civil rights are partially respected and which are governed by civilians. These regimes appear to be legitimate only to part of the population....The third variety includes certain dictatorial, tyrannical or totalitarian regimes that are rejected or passively tolerated by most of the population, even if the people have no way of expressing their discontent.”³⁴

Another critique to the Weber’s theory of legitimacy is related to its emphasis on association between secularization and the legal legitimacy in the modern state. Weber believes that the formal legality is based on a rational law, which should not rest on values and should be devoid of all sacredness of content.³⁵ The Weberian theory overlooked the role of religion in political legitimation in contemporary modern states. The claim of disconnection between religion and power in modern society is misleading, because it supposes that power struggles and power relations in these societies operate outside any religious and ethical context. Yet, according to Clifford Geertz, power must always be legitimized within “a symbolic cultural and value laden frame of reference”. He concludes that: “Thrones may be out of fashion and pageantry too, but political authority still requires a cultural frame in which it defines itself and

³⁴ Dogan, “Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories”, 196-203.

³⁵ Coicaud, *Legitimacy and politics*, 20.

advances its claims, and so does opposition to it. A world wholly demystified is a world wholly dipoliticized”³⁶

Despite these criticisms, legitimacy theory of Max Weber is still of use in our research, as its categorization of different forms of domination and the related patterns of political legitimacy, political culture, and ruler-citizens relationship is an informative analytical tool in our cases. In the light of Weberian typology of domination, Wahabbi and Muslim Brotherhood models of the modern Islamic state will be examined, highlighting the main religious doctrines constituting the traditional domination of the Saudi regime and the related political culture concerning the rulers, the ruled, and the nature of relationship between them. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood doctrines about constitutional order, mode of legitimacy, power structure and distribution, and pattern of citizenship will be discussed, explaining how these doctrines represent a threat to the legitimacy of the Saudi regime, and how this could account for the negative stance of the Saudi regime from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

IV. METHODOLOGY:

In this research, the problematic of competing models of the modern Islamic state will be addressed in the case of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood. The cases are chosen on occasion of the current unexpected conflict between the both Islamist ideologies. Remarkably, the Saudi state responded aggressively to the political ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the wake of Arab Spring. Saudi regime, for instance, supported – financially and diplomatically – the military coup against the *Ikhwani* president and the harsh crackdown of the movement in Egypt. Later on, they declared Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group.

³⁶ Kokosalakis, “Legitimation Power and Religion in Modern Society”, 367-368.

As the studied topic in this thesis is the theoretical models of the modern Islamic state in Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies; therefore, qualitative methods for data collection will be applied. The main methodology will be the textual analysis of the main intellectuals' writings; such as: *Rashid al-Ghannoushi*, *Sayyid Quṭb*, *ibn Taymiyyah* and *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*. The textual analysis means “making an educated guess at some of the most likely interpretations that might be made of that text.”³⁷ Although textual analysis as a methodology was criticized because it is not a standardized procedure, it is an essential tool for discourse analysis.³⁸

The discourse analytical approach is an important methodology for studying different ideologies. As the foundation of beliefs and attitudes, ideologies control the ‘biased’ personal mental models that underlie the production of their discourse.³⁹ In this thesis, the discourse of the founding ideologues and the main intellectuals of both Islamist movements will be analyzed, exploring how ideological inclinations affect the reading and interpretation of the religious texts.

³⁷ Alan McKee, *Textual analysis: a beginner's guide*, (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 1.

³⁸ *Ibid*, 118.

³⁹ Teun A. Van Dijk, “Ideology and discourse analysis”, *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, 2 (2006), 138.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The main concept in this study is “the modern Islamic state”, which is a compound term constituted of two elements: the Islamic state and the modern state. Therefore, before proceeding in our study, it is necessary to discuss this complicated term, exploring: what is the meaning of Islamic state, and what are the problematics associated with its definition? And then, light will be shed on the concept of modern state and how modernity carried many challenges to the traditional concept of the Islamic state.

I. The Islamic state: its rationale and definition:

Although there is no clear text in the Holy *Qur'an* or in *Sunnah* “the Prophet’s traditions” that defines or even necessitates building a state, it has prevailed among Muslim scholars “*ulamā*” that Islam does propose a political order, and it is both religion and state, and these two aspects of Islam cannot be meaningfully separated from each other.⁴⁰ The rationale of the Islamic state is that Islamic teachings have many ordinances with social implications, which will be unachievable or unbinding without worldly power applying and enforcing them. Such coordinating and coercing agent that has the power of commanding right and prohibiting wrong “*al-‘amr bil ma‘ruf wa al-nahi ‘an al-monker*” is the state.⁴¹

This rationale is explicitly elaborated in the following *ibn Taymiyyah*’s words: human beings cannot secure their interests unless they get together. On gathering, they become in dire need to have a head. Allah Almighty obliges commanding right and prohibiting wrong, which need power and authority. Also, other God’s obligations as: *jihad*, justice, holding pilgrimage,

⁴⁰ Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic state”, *Islamic Studies* 32, 1 (1993):17.

⁴¹ Mohammad Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam* (Berkeley and Los Anglos: University of California, 1961), 4.

Friday's praying, and religious festivals, defending the oppressed, and executing *al-ḥudud* "corporal legal punishments", all of them need power and authority.⁴²

The old Islamic scholars used to define the Islamic state, using the term "*dār al-Islām*", as "all the lands those fall in the Islamic domain, in which Islamic rulings are carried out and its rituals are practiced, and therefore, Muslims have to defend it when it is attacked".⁴³ It is obvious, from this definition, that it is not enough to define the Islamic state as the state that is inhabited predominantly or even entirely by Muslims. It is needed also to be committed and to apply the socio-political tenets of Islam or the Islamic *shari'ah*.⁴⁴ Therefore, if the main elements in the definition of any state are: the people, the territory, and the political power, the pillars of the Islamic state are: *al-ummah* or the Muslim 'people', *al-shari'ah* or the Islamic law, and *al-khilāfah* "Caliphate" or the Islamic political system.

A. The Ummah:

Ummah is a compound term that has religious, political and cultural dimensions. It, therefore, must be taken in its original Arabic form and cannot be translated easily to "people" or "nation".⁴⁵ According to Emile Durkheim's definition, religion is "a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and

⁴² Ahmed ibn Taymiyyah, *al-siāsah al-shar'iyyah fī iṣlāḥ al-rā'i wa al-ra'iyyah* (Beirut: dār al-afāq al-jadidah, 1983), 138-139.

⁴³ Ismā'il al-Shatti, *al-islāmyoun wa ḥokm al-dawlah al-ḥadiṭah* (Kuwait: Afaq Bookstore, 2013), 18.

⁴⁴ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 1.

⁴⁵ Ejaz Akram, "Muslim Ummah and its Link with Transnational Muslim Politics", *Islamic Studies* 46, 3 (2007): 387.

practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them”.⁴⁶ In Islam, such moral community is termed “*ummah*”.

However, it will be also a reductionism to confine the meaning of *ummah* to be a religious community, because Islam is a political religion par excellence.⁴⁷ After *Hijrah* and emergence of the Islamic state in *Madinah*, *ummah* signified both religious and political unity under the leadership of the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH, and after his demise, *khilāfah* became the political vehicle of this unity.⁴⁸

Yet, after death of the Prophet PBUH, two important developments occurred: the first was the expansion of Islam to rule wide territories from Eastern Europe to South East Asia. Secondly, various Islamic religious and political groups emerged as: *Shiite* and *Khawarge*. Both factors resulted in splits of Muslim *ummah* into different sects and ethno-religious entities. Even the caliphate state, which was the symbol of *ummah* unity, splitted, so that, many caliphs co-existed at the same time in different Islamic capitals as: Baghdad, Cordoba, Cairo, and Istanbul. These complex religio-political changes that happened during the medieval age weakened the collective identity of the *ummah* and gave it a general and minimal notion of the community of believers. Hence, according to Peter Mandeville, the concept of *ummah* was declined till the colonial era, in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which had witnessed the revival of *ummah* sentiments in the face of the danger of colonialism.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations”, *International Studies Review* 3, 3 (2001): 60.

⁴⁷ Mujtaba Razvi, “Muslim Ummah: Problems and Prospects”, *Pakistan Horizon* 40, 3: 46.

⁴⁸ Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic state”, 19.

⁴⁹ Peter Mandeville, *Transnational Muslim Politics: Reimagining the Umma* (London, NY, Routledge publisher, 2001), 73-74.

As a sociological phenomenon, *ummah* can be viewed as a collective identity that is grounded in the socialization process in Muslim societies. Individuals are socialized to identify the values and purposes of their societies and internalize them. Moreover, rituals and ritualized behaviors of the society further reinforce this identity and give the members a sense of similarity, especially against the ‘Others’ whose collective identities are different.⁵⁰ Consequently, the term “*ummah*” represents a state of mind for Muslims, a form of social consciousness or an imagined community, which united the faithful in order to lead a virtuous life according to the teachings of Islam and to safeguard the boundaries of their land. It also represents a framework for maintaining religious unity and accommodating the cultural diversities. A Muslim could go to Morocco or Indonesia and would know how to behave, because the pattern of life would be the same, all shaped according to the principles of Islam and general characteristics of *ummah*.⁵¹

To summarize the sociological function of the concept *ummah*, Van Nieuwenhuijze states that this concept acts as both a symbol of cohesion and a cohesive force at the same time. At first, it acts as an abstract entity symbolizing the cohesion of all Muslims as Muslims. Once it had come into existence as an abstract entity, it, then, acts as a force maintaining and stimulating this cohesion.⁵²

Mohammad Asad defends the identity of *ummah vis-à-vis* the modern concept of nationality stating that: “Most people of our time have grown accustomed to accepting racial affinities and historical traditions as the only legitimate premises of nationhood: whereas we

⁵⁰ Riaz Hassan, “Globalization’s Challenge to the Islamic Ummah”, *Asian Journal of Social Science* 34, 2 (2006): 314.

⁵¹ Razvi, “Muslim Ummah: Problems and Prospects”, 46.

Riaz, “Globalization’s Challenge to the Islamic Ummah”, 312.

⁵² C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, “The Ummah: An Analytic Approach”, *Studia Islamica* 10 (1959): 13.

Muslims, on the other hand, regard an ideological community – a community of people having a definite outlook on life and definite scale of moral values in common – as the highest form of nationhood to which man can aspire.”⁵³

B. The Islamic *shari‘ah*:

Implementation of Islamic *shari‘ah* is not only the main function or the most characterizing feature of the Islamic state, rather, it is *raison d’etre* for it. Noah Feldman states that the Islamic state is pre-eminently a *shari‘ah* state, defined by its commitment to the legal order imposed by it. He emphasized that “the *shari‘ah* is precisely what makes the state Islamic”.⁵⁴

The word *shari‘ah* means the Way of the God and the pathway of goodness, which aims at both physical and spiritual welfare and well-being of people.⁵⁵ It is the Divine law, which has been provided in the ordinances of the *Qur’an* and supplemented by the Prophet *Muhammad* in the body of teachings described as his *Sunnah*.⁵⁶ It is “a set of principles on morality, dogma, as well as practical legal rules, which are contained in the *Qur’an* and the *Sunnah*”.⁵⁷ It represents a moral law or a moral system, in which the law -in the modern sense- is a tool or a technique.⁵⁸ It

⁵³ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 96.

⁵⁴ Noah Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2008), 6,20.

⁵⁵ Khaled Abou El Fadl, “The Shari‘ah”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, ed. by John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 9 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

⁵⁶ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 3.

⁵⁷ Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic state”, 23.

⁵⁸ Hallaq, *The Impossible State*, 10.

is the classical or the traditional Islamic constitution – a constitution that, like the English constitution, was unwritten and ever-evolving.⁵⁹

From previous definitions, it is obvious that *shari'ah* is not a mere legal system in the Islamic state; it represents “a complex sets of social, economic, moral, and cultural relations that permeated the epistemic structures of the social and political orders” in the Muslim communities. It involved a theological substrate that directed much of the worldview of the populations, the regulations of agricultural and mercantile economies that constituted the vehicle of material life, political values and strategies that protect against any power abuse, a cultural rendering of law, and judicial processes of writing, documenting, teaching, and studying. “The *shari'ah* then was not only a judicial system and a legal doctrine whose function was to regulate social relations and resolve and mediate disputes, but also a discursive practice that structurally and organically tied itself to the world around it in ways that were vertical and horizontal, structural and linear, economic and social, moral and ethical, intellectual and spiritual, epistemic and cultural, and textual and poetic, among much else”.⁶⁰

During the lifetime of the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH, identification of what is *shari'ah* and how to apply its ordinances in different political and social situations was exclusively the function of the prophet, guided by divine revelation. But after his death, revelation stopped and it became mandatory for Muslims to do this task by themselves. During first few centuries, the *shari'ah* academic and legal systems were established. Beside the *Qur'an*, the main source of the Divine revelation, Muslims depended on three other sources:

⁵⁹ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 6.

⁶⁰ Wael B. Hallaq, *Sharī'a: theory, practice, transformations* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 543-544.

- a. Reference to actions and sayings of the Prophet, known collectively as his *Sunnah*, which were captured by reporters and passed from one person to another.
- b. In other situations, when Muslims were faced by new questions, which were not present in the Prophet era, they used analogical reasoning or deduction by analogy “*al-qiya’s*”.
- c. Also, the communal or scholars’ consensus “*al-ijma’*” about how to do under particular circumstances was another source of Islamic *shari’ah*.⁶¹

Interestingly, the foundation of the *shari’ah* academic and legal systems was not the work of the Islamic ruler or the Islamic state. It was the Islamic community who produced its own experts. The jurists and scholars emerged as civilian leaders who represent “the heir of the Prophet” and the guardians of Islam. They fulfilled many functions in the society, but the most important ones were muftiship and judiciary functions.⁶²

Mufti was a private legal expert who was responsible for issuing *fatwa* (*Shar’i* legal answers) to different questions he was asked to address. Although his opinion “*fatwa*” was not binding, it was routinely used in courts to settle disputes. Furthermore, question-and-answer activity was the first step in building the Islamic legal system. With time, *fatwas* were collected, systematized and issued as “law books”.⁶³

The judge “*al-qadi*” was – like the *Mufti* – belonging to the guild of *al-’ulamā’*, and was from the ordinary social ranks of the community. Yet, judges used to perform wider functions in the Islamic state. Beside settlement of disputes, they were in charge to: (i) take care of orphans, poor, and women who have no relatives to look after, (ii) supervise different transactions between individuals as: sale, partnership contracts, and inheritance of deceased persons, (iii)

⁶¹ Ibid., 26.

⁶² Hallaq, *The Impossible State*, 53.

⁶³ Ibid.

inspect endowments, (iv) play the role of social mediators...etc. As both Muftis and judges were well-trained on *shari'ah* law and at the same time involved in the everyday social activities in their societies, they could develop the Islamic legal system, using *ijtihād* “creative religious reasoning” to face the new circumstances that were ever-evolving.⁶⁴

Thanks to the flexibility of the religious texts and the diversity of the communities ruled by Islam, multiple legal schools were founded with different methodologies of *ijtihād*, the fact that accounts for the richness and adaptability of the Islamic *shari'ah*. By the end of tenth century, no fewer than one hundred schools of *fiqh* had emerged, however; according to classical legal reasoning, none of them could have an exclusive claim over the divine truth.⁶⁵

Therefore, it is important to differentiate between jurisprudence “*Fiqh*” and “*Shari'ah*”. There is only one Islamic *shari'ah*, which represents an abstract ideal, but there are a number of competing schools of thought of *fiqh*, known as *madāhib*.⁶⁶ Hence, *shari'ah* is far more concise and very much smaller in volume than the legal structure evolved through the *fiqh* of various schools of Islamic thought.⁶⁷ It “comprises those clear cut commands and prohibitions which are contained in the *Qur'an* and the *Sunnah*, and no more.”⁶⁸ While these deductions and interpretations made by jurists “*Fuqahā*”, which are usually many in number, more complicated, and contradict each other, are not sacred nor binding, despite the fact that they acquired in the popular mind a sacrosanct validity and considered as an integral part of *shari'ah*.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ Ibid., 57-58.

⁶⁵ Abou El Fadl, “The Shari'ah”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, 12-14.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 12.

⁶⁸ Nasim Hasan Shah, “Islamic Concept of State”, *Islamic Studies* 26, 1 (1987): 98.

⁶⁹ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 11,100.

C. The Caliphate “*al-khilāfah*”:

The third pillar of the Islamic state definition is the Islamic political system, known as the Caliphate “*al-khilāfah*”, although, it is argued by many authors that Islamic *shari‘ah* does not specify any form of government. It is argued that *al-khilāfah* or *al-imāmah*, which is generally seen to manifest the Islamic perception of political organization, is mainly a result of the interplay of juristic doctrine and historical precedent which do not constitute an obligation under the *shari‘ah*.⁷⁰ *Mohammed Asad* states that:

“Coming to the question of the concept of an Islamic State, one may safely say that there is not merely one form of an Islamic State, but there are many; and it is for the Muslims of every period to discover the form most suitable to their needs, on the condition, of course, that the form and the institutions they choose are in full agreement with the explicit, unequivocal *shari‘ah* laws relating to communal life.”⁷¹

The Caliphate was defined by old jurists as *al-Māwerdi* to be “the succession of the Prophet in guarding the religion and ruling the world affairs”.⁷² *al-Taftasāni* also defined it as “a general leadership of both religious and worldly matters, as a succession to the Prophet PBUH”.⁷³ Therefore, the caliphate is usually considered both a religious and a political post.

According to *Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri*, the Caliphate system, in order to be normative “*khilāfah ṣaḥiḥah*”, must be characterized by three qualities and the defect in any of them renders it deficient “*khilāfah nāqiṣah*”. These qualities are:

⁷⁰ Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic state”, 25.

⁷¹ Ibid, 23.

⁷² Barrāq Zakariā, *al-dawlah wa al-Shari‘ah fi al-fikr al-Islāmi al-mo‘asr* (Beirut: Markaz al-ḥaḍārah li-tanmiat al-fikr al-Islāmi, 2013), 85.

⁷³ Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri (trans. by Nādiyah al-Sanhouri), *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ ‘oṣbet al-‘umam* (Cairo: al-hai‘ah al-maṣriyyah al-‘āmmah li-alketāb, 2013), 75.

First: the Caliphate system should be built on a contractual base, i.e., the caliph should be chosen by free *bay'ah* (pledge of allegiance), while using force and violence is completely illegal in a true caliphate system.⁷⁴

Second: the candidate who runs for the office of the caliphate should meet the eligibility requirements to ensure the proper functioning of the government. These requirements include: to be Muslim, adult, male, with intact mental and physical abilities, virtuous (committed to the Islamic morals), expert in Islamic *shari'ah*, and characterized by *Quraishi* descent (the tribe of the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH).⁷⁵

Third: Concerning the function of the Caliphate political system, it should have three criteria:

- a. The caliph's government has both religious and political prerogatives. The religious prerogatives include: defending Islamic creed, declaration of *jihad* (religious war), and organizing some social rituals as alms "*al-zakāt*" and pilgrimage "*al-Hajj*". Although the political prerogatives of the caliph are flexible and changing according to political and societal developments, they are usually categorized as executive prerogatives. They include maintaining internal order and security, guarding borders, inspecting fiscal affairs, observing and guiding his assistants as ministers, governors, and the like.⁷⁶
- b. In the exercise of all these prerogatives, the caliph should be committed to the Islamic *shari'ah*.
- c. The mandate of Caliphate state should include the whole Muslim lands "*dār al-islām*" to ensure the unity of the Muslim world.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Ibid., 237.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 108-115,237

⁷⁶ Ibid., 175-183,238

⁷⁷ Ibid., 238

II. Problematics associated with the Islamic state definition:

The definition of the Islamic state is associated with many problematics, which could be summarized in four items:

A. Applying western terminologies and concepts:

Mohammad Asad emphasizes that “the ideology of Islam has a social orientation peculiar to itself, different in many respects from that of the modern West, and can be successfully interpreted only within its own context and in its own terminology”.⁷⁸ This problematic becomes obvious on asking certain kinds of questions as: “Is the Islamic state democratic?”, or “Is the Islamic state a welfare state?”, or “should it be a federal state?”...etc. According to *Asad*, using concepts like democracy, welfare state, or federalism, which are originated and shaped in different cultural context, and trying to apply it in the case of the Islamic state will be inappropriate.

Even using the concept “The State” to translate the Arabic term *al-dawlah* is argued to be inappropriate too. The term “state” in English has a static notion, while *al-dawlah* has an opposite notion in Arabic. *al-Dawlah* means transformation from a state to another. Therefore, Arabs used to differentiate between *al-dawlah* and *al-mulk* “Dominion or Sovereignty”. The latter is a permanent authority, while *al-dawlah* points to one form of that authority: the dynastic rule, and a prominent criterion of it: devolution of power.⁷⁹ The idea of rotation and of successive changes of dynasties is integral to the Arabic concept “*dawlah*”.⁸⁰ Even in the *Qur’an*, *dawlah* is used only in the sense of “circulation”, when it is stated that wealth should not be circulated among the wealthy alone (59:9). All these meanings are clearly different from the

⁷⁸ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 21.

⁷⁹ Barrāq, *al-dawlah wa al-Shari‘ah fi al-fikr al-Islāmi al-mo‘asr*, 82-83.

⁸⁰ Hallaq, *The Impossible State*, 53.

concept of “the state” or “the nation state”, the Western concept representing a European phenomenon developed between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁸¹

B. The dilemma of the classical political Islamic thought:

Some authors differentiate between the Caliphate system under the rule of the Righteously Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali), who rule during the years 11-40 AH, and the Caliphate system that follows during the Umayyad, Abbasid, and the Ottoman states. In the last few years of the era of the Righteously Guided Caliphs, the conflicts and warfare between the Prophet’s companions permanently affected the Islamic jurisprudence and resulted in emergence of an adaptive political Islamic thought. Many deviations in the main political Islamic values as the consultation “*al-shura*”, the right to oppose and account the rulers, and inviolability of the public treasury not only became *de facto* practices, but also were religiously justified by many jurists and Islamic scholars.⁸²

The best example of the deviation in the political Islamic thought as a result of the tough experience the *ummah* passed by after the era of the Righteously Guided Caliphs is the deviation in the concept of political legitimacy. After death of the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH, Muslims were divided regarding the way of his succession into two main groups: the first group, Shiites, believes that *al-imāmah* is more serious to be left for the choice of the people without designation from the Prophet. While the second larger group, known as *'ahl al-sunnah*, believes

⁸¹ Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic state”, 21.

⁸² Hākīm al-Muṭīri, *al-huriyyah 'aw al- ṭoufān* (Beirut: al-mu’assasah al-‘arabiyyah li-al-derāsāt wa al-nashr, 2008), 107.

that succession of the Prophet should be decided by consultation “*al-shura*” according to the will of the people and their interests.⁸³

In the *Sunni* tradition, as mentioned before, *al-Sanhouri* states that the normative Caliphate system is built on a contractual base, and the only legitimate way to be a caliph is to be chosen by free *bay‘ah* (pledge of allegiance), while using force to hold that post is completely refused.⁸⁴ *Asad* also refers to the *Qur’anic* verse “O you faithful! Obey God and obey the messenger and those in authority from among you” (4:59) to affirm that government in Islam should be formed only on the basis of people’s free choice. The expression “from among you” refers to the community as a whole, not to specific class or family. Therefore, any assumption of governmental power through non-elective means –for instance, on the basis of “birthright” – becomes illegal.⁸⁵

In accordance to *al-Sanhouri* and *Asad*, *Tawfiq al-Shāwi* argues that *al-shura* “the consultation” is the pivotal constitutional principle in the Islamic state. He affirms that the Islamic government is a *shura* government, which relies on a contractual base “Contract of Allegiance” or “*‘aqd al-bay‘ah*”. Being a contract, the *bay‘ah* is only valid if it reflects the free will of the people, without any coercion. Furthermore, it gives the *ummah*, the right not only to choose the ruler, but also to account him and to impose any conditions and limitations on his authority to guarantee the common good of the *ummah*, because any contract gives the contractors the right to impose the conditions that guarantee their interests.⁸⁶

⁸³ Ali Faiyyaḍ, *naẓariāt al-sultah fī al-fikr al-siyasi al-shi‘i al-mo‘ser* (Beirut: Markaz al-ḥaḍārah li-tanmiat al-fikr al-Islāmi, 2010), 105.

⁸⁴ *al-Sanhouri*, *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ ‘oṣbet al-’umam*, 237.

⁸⁵ *Asad*, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 34-36.

⁸⁶ *Tawfiq al-Shāwi*, *fiqh al-shura wa al-estishārah* (Mansoura: dār al-wafā’, 1992), 434-435.

Hākim al-Muṭiri, however, mentions three deviated forms of political legitimacy, which were justified by the Islamic jurists as *de facto*:

First: Driving political legitimacy from other sources than people consent, as arguing to be the guardians of the murdered caliph's blood “*'awliā' al-damm*” as Umayyads did, or being the heirs of the Prophet PBUH, as Abbasids did.

Second: Considering the designation of the Caliph to his successor a form of political legitimacy, and claiming that the contract of Caliphate in this case is valid, even if the nominated successor is a relative to the caliph (his father or his son), and regardless the people opinion, as *al-Māwardi* states in his famous book *al-aḥkām al-sultāniah* “the sultanic rulings”. The importance of this juristic opinion is that it religiously legitimates the hereditary succession and the dynastic rule.

Third: Validating holding power using violence and coercion for fear of political chaos “*fitnah*”. The famous Islamic jurist *al-Nawawi* states that: “The third way –to hold the post of Caliphate – is the coercion and takeover. Hence, if the imam died, and an omnipotent man seized power, without designation or nomination from the previous imam and without people consent or *bay'ah* (pledge of allegiance), and he was fulfilling the eligibility criteria for the Caliph post, he then becomes a legitimate imam, to maintain order and stability. But if he does not fulfill these eligibility criteria, such as being religiously ignorant or immoral, there are two opinions in this case, and the correct one is validation of his ruling too, for the same reasons.”⁸⁷ This juristic opinion follows what Merquior categorized as power approach of legitimacy, which depends

⁸⁷ *Hākim al-Muṭiri, taḥrīr al-insān wa tajrīd al- ṭoḡian* (Beirut: al-mu'assasah al-'arabiyyah li-al-derāsāt wa al-nashr, 2009), 561-577.

only on efficiency of the ruler in calling upon resources and power centers in the state. However, as he stated, legitimacy based on power reserve only is scarcely deserves its name.⁸⁸

Eventually, Muslim jurists put minimal criteria for political legitimacy: as long as the ruler could defend Muslim territories “*dār al-Islām*” and did not prevent his Muslim subjects from practicing their religion, he is legitimate ruler, and rebellion against him is forbidden for fear of disintegration of *umma* and spread of anarchy “*fitnah*”.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the great political efficacy of the defective Caliphate system and the glorious Islamic civilization flourished under its rule masked the political deviations of the Caliphs and sultans, who seized power through illegitimate ways other than *shura* and free *bay‘ah*.⁹⁰

The logic behind this adaptive attitude of the jurists was not only to please the rulers; rather, in most of cases, it was an *ijtihad* to achieve as much public interests as they can. Scholars seem to have no adequate power *vis-à-vis* the ambitious rulers, therefore, they adopted a pragmatic strategy: to offer them a religious justification for their *de facto* power, in exchange with implementation of *shari‘ah*.⁹¹ They invented a new formula for political legitimacy, based on the commitment to *shari‘ah* and the ability to maintain order within the Muslim community and to defend it.⁹² *al- Māwardi* is considered the best representative for this category of the classical Islamic jurists. He was looking for a way to maintain the principle that the *shari‘ah* is binding on the rulers, who hold their posts depending only on their own power. However, as Hamilton Gibb remarks, “in his zeal to find some arguments by which at least the show of

⁸⁸ Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, 6-8.

⁸⁹ Mohammed Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam: religion and politics in the Muslim world* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 11.

⁹⁰ al-Shāwī, *fiqh al-shura wa al-estishārah*, 26.

⁹¹ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 27-38.

⁹² Olivier Roy (trans. by Carol Volk), *The failure of political Islam* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), 29.

legality could be maintained, *al-Māwardi* did not realize that he had undermined the foundations of the law”.⁹³

C. The underdevelopment of the political classical Islamic thought:

Under the pressure of adaptation, the political classical Islamic thought was deprived from a healthy growth. In contrary to the other branches of the Islamic *shari‘ah*, such as: jurisprudence of rituals and personal status or theology, the political aspect was deficient. The hegemony of the political over the religious and the predominance of the *de facto* logic in the political arena did not encourage the Islamic jurists and thinkers to exert much effort in an unfruitful field. Therefore, they did not provide suitable innovations or *ijtihad* for tools or institutions to achieve the values and goals of the Islamic *shari‘ah* as: consultation “*al-Shura*”, accountability, and just management and distribution of public treasury.

This problematic will be tackled in the topic of ruler-citizens relationship. It is argued that in Islam, the government is limited and the citizen’s duty of allegiance is conditional. According to *al-Sanhouri*, the government is limited by two main boundaries: it should not transgress the ordinances of the Islamic *shari‘ah* and it should exercise its power for the benefit of the whole *ummah*.⁹⁴ *Asad* expands the limitations of the government authorities further. For him, the government necessitates their citizens’ obedience only when: it is elected according to the people’s free will, it is adherent to the Islamic value of consultation, it is committed to the Islamic *shari‘ah* and does not give any order in contrary to its rulings, and finally its orders should be physically and morally affordable. In return, the government, on fulfilling these preconditions, has the right to call upon all the resources of its citizens. For instance, it has the right to impose additional taxes and levies, rather than the alms “*zakāt*”, if it is necessary for the

⁹³ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 27-38.

⁹⁴ al-Sanhouri, *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ ‘oṣbet al-’umam*, 191.

welfare of the community, it may impose a restriction on private ownership of certain kinds of properties or natural resources for public utilities, and it may subject all physically able citizens to compulsory military services.⁹⁵ Moreover, *Asad* states that, in order to obtain the fullest allegiance of its citizen, the government must assume active responsibility for their material welfare and provide all economic facilities and social services necessary for maintenance of human happiness and dignity.⁹⁶

Unfortunately, although all these principles could be found in the classical workings of the Islamic jurists, they did not elaborately discuss how to achieve them. Questions like: who designates the *Amir*? how should the consultation “*al-shura*” and the accountability be organized?, who are *'ahl al-ḥal wa al-'aqd* “people of loosening and binding”?, are they elected or appointed by the *Amir*?, are their opinions obligatory or just an informal advice?, could they cancel an order from the ruler or go to another institution for arbitration?, all these questions have no clear answer in the classical Islamic thought.⁹⁷

Moreover, the problem of the ill-developed political Islamic thought further aggravated after the eighth Islamic “*Hijri*” century. As one of the general symptoms of the Islamic civilization retreat, *ijtihad* was stopped at the time when the Muslim *ummah* was exposed to massive political, social and cultural changes. Hence, when the modern Muslim societies emerged, the Islamic jurisprudence was not ready to cope with these unprecedented developments.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ *Asad, The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 70-79.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁹⁷ *Roy, The failure of political Islam*, 42-45.

al-Sanhouri, *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwurahā li-touṣbeḥ 'oṣbet al-'umam*, 198.

⁹⁸ *Sayyid Quṭb, naḥwa mojtama' islāmi* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2013), 49.

D. The inevitable overlap between the sacred Divine *shari'ah* and the human thought:

The last problematic associated with the definition of the Islamic state is how to differentiate between the sacred unchangeable part of the Islamic *shari'ah* and the human context-related part, included in the jurisprudence "*fiqh*" and manifested in the Islamic historical experience. As mentioned, *Mohammad Asad* states that the binding *shari'ah* is the clear cut ordinances in the *Qur'an* and *Sunnah*, while the deductions and interpretations made by the jurists are neither sacred nor binding.⁹⁹ However, the *shari'ah* consists only of broad principles and doctrines¹⁰⁰, which need interpretations and elaborations to be understood and implemented. Therefore, the *shari'ah* is always presented to the Muslim community conflated with *fiqh*,¹⁰¹ making the human part (represented in the work of jurists) inseparable from the whole entity of *shari'ah*.

The problem becomes more complicated, if we realize that these jurists' deductions and interpretations are –to great extent– shaped by the social, political and historical contexts. How the Prophet's great companions (as the four Righteously Guided Caliphs) or the classical Islamic jurists understood the *shari'ah* rulings and implemented them is considered by many a binding and complementary part of the *shari'ah*. No doubt that those great men were able to understand and implement *shari'ah* more accurately, nevertheless, their implementation is suitable only for their historical context, and it is the duty of each generation to invent their social systems, without being obliged to follow the historical precedents.¹⁰²

A clear example of how the historical precedents are sometimes transformed into an integral part of the binding Islamic *shari'ah* is the power structure and distribution in the Islamic

⁹⁹ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 11 &100.

¹⁰⁰ Kamali, "Characteristics of the Islamic state", 37.

¹⁰¹ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 100.

¹⁰² Qutb, *nahwa mojtama' islāmi*, 44-45.

state as described by jurists. Unlike the modern state, traditional or pre-modern states were characterized by centralized, undivided, personal-vested political power.¹⁰³ This could be applied to the case of the mediaeval Islamic state. Therefore, in the classical workings of the Islamic jurists, authority is vested in the office of *Imām*, who is the supreme executive and administrative ruler of the land and has a wide range of executive powers including an indefinite term of office, unlimited power in fiscal matters and appointment of officials.¹⁰⁴ The Islamic jurists did not discuss the issue of Islamic state nor describe its structure and function as an institution; instead, they listed meticulously the qualities – mostly subjective – of the main posts of the state as caliphs or judges. The priority accorded to the personal qualities prevented development of any thought regarding the subject of institutions.¹⁰⁵

Despite the emergence of modern states with institutionalized and divided political power in Islamic countries, on reviewing the writings of modern Islamic theorists as *Mohammad Asad* and *Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri*, both emphasize the central power of the head of the Islamic state. *al-Sanhouri* argues that in normative caliphate system, the power should be centralized, and the caliphs should have both religious and political prerogatives (executive and judiciary).¹⁰⁶ *Asad* also claims that many authentic traditions of the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH support the concentration of all executive powers in the hands of one person, whom he described as *Amir* or *Imām*. Furthermore, he argues that there cannot be a radical separation of the legislative and the executive branches of the government. He defended this integration through the instrumentality

¹⁰³ Bruce Charlton and Peter Andras, *The Modernization Imperative* (Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2003), 3-4.

¹⁰⁴ Kamali, “Characteristics of the Islamic state”, 31.

¹⁰⁵ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 43&62.

¹⁰⁶ al-Sanhouri, *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ ‘oṣbet al-’umam*, 159, 175-189.

of the *Imām* by arguing that it overcomes duality of power which often places the executive and the legislature in opposition to one another.¹⁰⁷

In addition, the authoritarian tendency in the traditional Islamic thought is another consequence of the conflict and the warfare between the Prophet's companions during the Great Strife "*al-fitnah al-kubra*", at the end of the era of Righteously Guided Caliphs. The fear of political chaos and societal disintegration resulted in acceptance of the authoritarian domination "*al-Mulk al-'aḍuḍ*" with Hobbesian qualities, because it seemed to be the only resort from this chaos and the protector shield of religion.¹⁰⁸

III. The modern state: its historical origin, evolution, and characteristics:

The second element of the main concept in this study is the "Modern State"; a concept that refers to a socio-political construct began to emerge in Europe in the seventeenth century according to the principles of the treaty of Westphalia, and spread to the whole world later. Consequently, this concept is inextricably bound up with both European history and philosophy.¹⁰⁹

Historically, there were many diverse forms of traditional (pre-modern) states in European experience: city-states, feudal systems, patrimonial empires, nomad or conquest empires, and centralized bureaucratic empires.¹¹⁰ David Held categorizes five clusters of state systems developed in Europe:

¹⁰⁷ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 52-58.

¹⁰⁸ Ezzat "nazarāt fi al-khiāl al-syāsi lel-islāmyyin: eshkāliāt manhajiah wa syāsiah" in *islāmyoun wa democracyoun: eshkāliāt benā' tayyār Islāmi democrāti*, 46.

¹⁰⁹ Kenneth Newton and Jan W Van Deth, *Foundations of comparative politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 23-24.

¹¹⁰ Pierson, *The modern state*, 30.

1. Traditional tribute-taking empires;
2. Systems of divided authority, characterized by feudal relations, city-states and urban alliances, with the Church (Papacy) playing a leading role;
3. The polity of estate, which emerged in the post-feudalism era, characterized by a power dualism, i.e., power was split between rulers and estates, constituting bodies of various kinds (local assemblies of aristocrats, cities, ecclesiastical bodies, corporate associations...);
4. Absolutist state, in which the absolutist monarch was at the apex of a new system of rule, which was progressively centralized and anchored on a claim to supreme and indivisible power;
5. The modern nation-states.

Emergence of the modern state in Europe was a product of many societal, economic, and political changes, such as: demographic transformation, urbanization, industrialization, growing social division of labour, commercialization and commodification, the rise of capitalism, the rise of scientific modes of thought, transformation in the conceptions of rationality (including secularization), and democratization.¹¹¹

All these changes –collectively known as modernity– necessitate metamorphosis in the political organization of the society. However, there was more than one pattern of conversion. Some states arose through a gradual transformation of existing independent political units – mostly medieval monarchies – as the case of Britain and France. Other states arose by the unification of independent but dispersed political units. The major examples are Germany and Italy. Finally, there were states that arose from the break-up of independent political units –

¹¹¹ Pierson, *The modern state*, 28.

mostly the empire states. The break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire after the First World War are examples.¹¹²

The Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan describes four consecutive stages of the modern states' evolution. Yet, he admits that only few European states went through these four stages in a classical way and “the history of each state is too complex and diverse to be covered by a simple, uniform scheme”. These stages are described as follow:

- i. In the first stage, elites took the initiative for the unification of a given territory. The process of territorial consolidation was achieved mainly by economic and military means, and many institutions were built to perform essential functions of the state. These functions include: “to provide internal order and deal with disputes (police and courts), to provide external security (armed forces and diplomatic services), to extract resources (taxes), and to improve communications (roads and bridges)”.
- ii. The second phase, nation building, aims to create feelings of a common identity and a sense of allegiance to the political system among the disparate populations of the new state. Many tools were utilized to achieve this aim; standardized language was spread by compulsory education, military conscription strengthened feelings of identity with the nation, and nation symbols – such as a national hymn, national flag and national heroes – were emphasized.
- iii. In the third phase, towards the end of the nineteenth century, democratic states were created. The belief in the principle of electoral-based political legitimacy increased the political role of masses, and hence, modern political parties were founded, the ideas of political opposition and devolution of power were accepted and institutionalized, and the universal adult suffrage was introduced.

¹¹² Newton and van Deth, *Foundations of comparative politics*, 23.

iv. In the last phase, after the Second World War, the modern state reached its full maturity. The democratic states, especially in the Western Europe, accepted the responsibility for the well-being of their citizens. Welfare states, committed to provide welfare services and equality of opportunity, were created and wealth redistribution policies, as progressive taxation, were adopted to strengthen economic solidarity between different parts of the population.¹¹³

This historical synthesis, according to *Wael Hallaq*, is one of the “form-properties” of the modern state. He emphasizes that modern state is a product of a cultural-specific location: Europe. It is shaped by “the terms of Enlightenment, the industrial and technological revolutions, modern science, nationalism, capitalism, and the American-French constitutional tradition.”¹¹⁴

Another essential feature of the modern state, mentioned by Gianfranco Poggi, is the nationhood. Although, there is nothing intrinsically modern about existence of racial and linguistic commonalities between people inhabiting the same territory, but in the modern states, nationality encompasses more than these primitive bonds, such as: religious and cultural bonds, historical experiences, and institutional legacies.¹¹⁵ Therefore, the modern state is commonly termed a nation state, which is defined as “a state based on the acceptance of a common culture, a common history and a common fate, irrespective of whatever political, social and economic differences may exist between the members of the nation-state.”¹¹⁶

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

¹¹⁴ Hallaq, *The Impossible State*, 3,23.

¹¹⁵ Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: its nature, development, and prospects* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990), 26.

¹¹⁶ Newton and van Deth, *Foundations of comparative politics*, 23.

Christopher Pierson specifies further seven characteristics of the modern state – mostly derived from the writings of Max Weber – which distinguish it from other pre-modern or traditional states:

1. Monopoly of the means of violence: according to Weber, the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”.
2. Territoriality: the modern states became defined as geopolitical and geographical units, occupying fixed and precisely defined territories; the feature did not exist in previous patterns of states, such as empires.
3. Sovereignty: this means that the modern state represents the highest and final authority within the territory governed by it, and it does not recognize any superior authority.
4. Constitutionality and rule of law: the modern state is characterized by presence of constitutional principles and laws that regulate the process of governance, unlike the pattern of “personal rule” that had prevailed in the traditional patterns of political societies.
5. Legitimacy: which means that, in normal circumstances, the state decisions and laws gain public acceptance, based on legal legitimacy, in contrary to other forms of legitimacy, mentioned by Max Weber, as the traditional or charismatic that prevailed in the pre-modern patterns of the state.
6. Citizenship: although this concept is old, back to the Greek city-states, but it retreated in the political communities that followed. With the French Revolution, it returned and acquired a new meaning associated with the right to political participation, the equalities in rights and duties, and the representation of sovereignty in the citizens rather than the king.

7.A well-developed bureaucracy: despite the existence of administrative structures in the traditional states, Weber remarked an evolution in the bureaucracy of the modern state. He described many ideal attributes of it; such as: it has hierarchical structures, it is characterized by specialization (i.e., each branch of which is committed to specific field of activity), it works according to general regulations and policies dictated by the political authority, it implements the rules impartially, and the recruitment and career advancements depend on technical qualifications.¹¹⁷

Despite these detailed characterizing features, it is still hard to put a comprehensive agreed-upon definition of the modern state. Roger Owen differentiates between two distinct meanings of the concept of modern state: the state as a sovereign political entity (i.e., with its own boundaries, its own flag, international recognition, and a seat in UN), and the state as “a set of institutions and practices, which combines administrative, judiciary, law-making, and coercive power.” He states that the first is absolutely clear and easy to be used even in non-European context, while the other is more problematic, because there is no consensus about it.¹¹⁸ Hallaq points to different dimensions of the phenomenon of the modern state: “the Weberian bureaucratic, the Kelsenian legal, the Schmittian political, the Marxian economic, the Gramscian hegemonic, and the Foucauldian cultural”. Nevertheless, all of them are not necessarily accurate or accepted.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Pierson, *The modern state*, 6-23.

¹¹⁸ Roger Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East* (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 1.

¹¹⁹ Hallaq, *The Impossible State*, 20.

IV. Emergence of the modern state in the Islamic experience:

Indeed, the date of modern states' emergence in the Islamic world could not be determined precisely. It is an extended process, started in the era of Ottoman reforms, known as "*Tanzimāt*" between 1839 and 1867. These reforms were a result of a series of military defeats that reflected a clear European superiority. They included military, financial, and administrative radical changes. Most importantly, *Tanzimāt* adopted legal and political innovations (drafting a constitution, establishing a parliament, modernizing judiciary system... etc.); the developments that probably put the foundation of the modern state.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, some authors point to an earlier date for the foundation of the modern states in the Islamic world; the date of the French campaign to Egypt and Syria, and the era of *Mohammad Ali*, in the first half of the nineteenth century.¹²¹ Yet, definitely, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which had dominated most of the Islamic world for four centuries, in the wake of the First World War and its replacement by European colonial powers was a true moment of birth for the modern state systems in the Islamic experience.¹²²

This unnatural birth of the modern states in the Islamic world negatively affected its stability and efficiency. It was "a brutal importation of European model into a segmented and unstructured society".¹²³ As the political modernity was an attempt to solve specific Western problems (i.e., feudalism, the religious-political power struggle, disintegration of sectarian

¹²⁰ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 60.

¹²¹ Barrāq, *al-dawlah wa al-Shari'ah fī al-fīkr al-islāmi al-mo'asr*, 138.

Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 9.

¹²² Kjetil Selvik and Stig Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 21.

¹²³ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 16.

ties...etc.), when it was transplanted into other areas in the world, it subordinated them to its logic, and its efficiency was linked to dealing with same problems with same priorities.¹²⁴

Burhān Ghalioun elaborately states: the modern state has entered the Arabic political life as a ripe fruit, unconnected to the long historical experience that produced it and deficient in the values, thoughts and ethics that enable the society to correctly handle it. This explains why the modern state became in Arabic experience a thought with fragile roots and pillars, and with shallow impact on the individual and collective feelings and consciences. It became lacking autonomous driving spirit and motivating goals, and incapable of achievement.¹²⁵

Nevertheless, it seems that the Western claim of the necessity and effectiveness of the modern state have gained acceptance in Muslim societies, even among the Islamists, who devote their efforts to answer the question: how to Islamize the modern-state.¹²⁶ Yet, on the other hand, many scholars argued that the modern state has carried serious challenges to the traditional concept of the Islamic state or Islamic governance. *Hallaq* discusses in his book “The Impossible State” many contradictions and tensions between both entities. He refused the Islamists’ assumption that the modern state is a neutral tool that could be utilized to perform certain functions according to the choices of its leaders and the views of their ideologies. Instead, he believes that the modern state has its own values and metaphysics, which produce certain political, economic, social, cultural and psychological effects.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Badie (trans. by nakhlah friefer), *al-dawlatan: al-dawlah wa al-mojtama‘ fi al-gharb wa fi dar al-islam*, 289-290.

¹²⁵ *Burhān Ghalioun, naqd al-syārah: al-din wa al-dawlah* (al-dār al-baiḍā’: al-markaz al-ṭaqāfi al-‘arabi, 2007), 560-561.

¹²⁶ Sherman A. Jackson, “Islamic reform between Islamic law and the nation-state”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, ed. by John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 43 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

¹²⁷ *Hallaq, The Impossible State*, 155-156.

The basic characterizing feature of the Islamic state, as mentioned before, is its commitment to implementation of *shari'ah*. The Islamic *shari'ah* is described by *Hallaq* to be a moral system aiming to establish an ideal life, and a central domain or paradigm, to which all subsidiary social domains (politics, economy, education ...etc.) are judged and controlled.¹²⁸ Therefore, the Islamic state has a purely pedagogical role: to make man virtuous.¹²⁹ Contrarily, the moral imperative is relegated in the modern state to a secondary status, because it is shaped by the Enlightenment paradigm - the paradigm that aims at economic and technical progress, and emphasizes the rationality and scientific methodology. Therefore, if the Islamic state is guided by moral transcendental paradigm, the modern state is guided by secular positivist paradigm, and if the mission of the Islamic state is upbringing a moral Muslim subject, the mission of the modern state is to produce a disciplined and productive national citizen.¹³⁰

Another aspect of incompatibility between the modern state and the Islamic governance, according to *Hallaq*, is their contradicting concept of sovereignty. The Islamic governance cannot permit any sovereignty other than *Allah*, to His will it submits, and by His orders and prohibitions it is bounded. In contrast, the modern state is a sovereign entity, not bounded by any higher or transcendental sovereignty. Its sovereignty represents “an inner dialectic of self-constitution; i.e., sovereignty constitutes the state and is constituted by it”.¹³¹

Sherman A. Jackson highlights another aspect of existential incompatibility between the modern state and the Islamic governance: the legal system. One of the main characteristics of the modern state is what Jackson calls “legal centralism” or “legal monism” that means that all laws should be state-sponsored, uniform, equally applied to all citizens, and superior to all other

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*,

¹²⁹ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 63.

¹³⁰ *Hallaq, The Impossible State: 5-12, 155-160.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 157-158.

reglementary regimes. Therefore, citizens of the modern state have to forfeit many aspects of their valued regimes and commitments as an inevitable price of citizenship. The Islamic governance, in stark contrast to this rigid monism, is characterized by legal pluralism, in which *shari'ah* rulings are applied variably on Muslims and non-Muslims in the same community. The Muslim jurists did not only admit the right of non-Muslims to be committed to their religious rulings, but also exempted them from many rulings of Islamic *shari'ah*, as implementing some corporal religious punishments "*hudud*" for some crimes as drinking wines or adultery. Some exemptions, however, may be considered as discrimination in modern sense, as exemption of non-Muslims from military service. This legal pluralism was not considered repugnant to neither religious authority nor state sovereignty in the pre-modern Islamic state. The contradiction between monistic legal system of the modern state and the pluralistic system of Islamic state is the reason why codifying *shari'ah* principles as positive laws is believed to be unachievable.¹³²

The contradiction between the concepts of nationality –as a civic identity in the modern state– and *ummah* – as a religio-political collective identity – is another important aspect of incompatibility between the Islamic governance and the modern state. The European notion of nationality is alien to Islam and is claimed to be repugnant to its universalism. Furthermore, the nationalism is viewed by many of Islamists as pure *jāhiliyyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance).¹³³ The doctrinal and practical challenge of the modern state nationality to the concept of Islamic governance could be summarized in two main points: first; in Islamic governance, according to many jurists and scholars, the mandate of the Caliphate should include the whole *dār al- Islām*

¹³² Jackson, "Islamic reform between Islamic law and the nation-state", in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, 43-45.

¹³³ Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 342.

(Muslim lands)¹³⁴, the condition that practically becomes infeasible in nation-state system of governance. Secondly; there is incongruity between the rights of citizenship in the modern state and the primacy of the rights of religious brotherhood within the *ummah*, as the modern state is considered “the exclusive repository of its citizens’ allegiance”.¹³⁵

Globalization, as a vehicle for liberal democratic and capitalist ideology, further complicates the project of Islamization of the modern state, according to *Ismā‘il al-Shatti*. It binds the nation states with certain economic, monetary, knowledge, communication, and information systems, which remarkably limit the sovereignty of nation states, whatever the ideology it adopts. Consequently, he wondered how any state could apply the Islamic economic principles under the hegemony of the international economic institutions, or how it could promote traditional Islamic values within societies that have undergone massive changes, including: urbanization, individualism, predominance of Western education, consumerist culture...etc.¹³⁶

All aforementioned tensions and contradictions may explain why there are different and contradicting versions of Islamic political ideologies and there is no one agreed-upon theory or model for the modern Islamic state, and why all the modern models of the Islamic state are always accused of being distorted in both theory and practice.

¹³⁴ al-Sanhouri, *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ ‘oṣbet al-’umam*, 238.

¹³⁵ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 32.

¹³⁶ al-Shatti, *al-islāmyoun wa ḥokm al-dawlah al-ḥadiṭah* , 61-96.

CHAPTER THREE: BIRTH OF ISLAMISM

In this chapter, modern Islamist ideologies (specifically, the Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood ideology) will be discussed, highlighting the historical and political contexts that shaped these ideologies and resulted in their variations. However, it is important first to start with the concept of Islamism itself: what does it mean?, what accounts for its emergence?, and what are the different premises and factions that gather under its broad banner?

I. Islamism: what, why, and who?

Ideologization of religion is one of the prominent political phenomenon in the modern era and one of the most puzzling and unexpected cultural phenomenon as well.¹³⁷ As cultural systems, religion and ideology show a great deal of conflation, because they share many features and play similar social roles (e.g., legitimization, mobilization, and a guide for social action). Furthermore, the conceptual conflation is increased due to mutual transformation between both ideational systems, as in some cases religions have been turned into political ideologies, while in others, ideologies was turned into pseudo-religions (especially, the totalitarian ideologies as: Marxism and Fascism).¹³⁸

Religion as political ideology is usually developed by coalitions of religiously based political activists, who used religio-moral arguments to support their claims in politics and applied their moralized premises about justice, opportunity, and equality to particular (and usually contested) political and policy decisions.¹³⁹ *Hassan Rachik* defined religious political

¹³⁷ Manfred B. Steger, "Religion and Ideology in the Global Age: Analyzing al Qaeda's Islamist Globalism", *New Political Science* 31, 4 (2009): 529.

¹³⁸ Hassan Rachik, "How religion turns into ideology", *The Journal of North African Studies* 14 (2009): 347–348.

¹³⁹ Rhys H. Williams, "Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 35, 4 (1996): 375-376.

ideology as “a set of ideas that refer to religious tools and accompany political actions and processes in a sustained and systematic way.” Therefore, religious ideology tends to deal less with metaphysical and theological issues and focuses more on social and political topics.¹⁴⁰

Accordingly, Islamism could be defined as “Islam as a political ideology, rather than religion or theology”,¹⁴¹ or “presenting Islam as the guiding principle, even the blueprint, of government”.¹⁴² It is “the tendency to view Islam not merely as a religion in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behavior.”¹⁴³

As a social movement, Islamism is defined also as Islamically-inspired political activism. It is a “political activity and popular mobilization in the name of Islam”¹⁴⁴, “it is a modern intellectual and political movement that seek to bring society and politics into agreement with Islam”,¹⁴⁵ or according to the Turkish political scientist *Mümtazer Türköne*, “it is an effort to render Islam sovereign to all domains of life from faith and thought to politics, administration and law, and the quest for arriving a solution to the problem of underdevelopment of the Muslim countries against the West by establishing among Muslims unity and solidarity.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Rachik, “How religion turns into ideology”, 347,357.

¹⁴¹ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 2.

¹⁴² Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, “Islam and Politics” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, eds. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 2.

¹⁴³ William E. Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, 3 (1987): 308.

¹⁴⁴ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 6.

¹⁴⁵ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 128.

¹⁴⁶ Yasin Aktay, “The Ends of Islamism: Rethinking the Meaning of Islam and the Political”, *Insight Turkey* 15, 1 (2013): 114.

From the previous definitions, three main defining criteria for Islamism could be observed: it is a modern phenomenon, it is an intellectual and political movement, and its main premise is the belief in the comprehensive nature of Islam. According to many scholars, the doctrine that Islam represents a total system is what leads vast majority of Islamists to call for establishment of an Islamic state.¹⁴⁷

Many cultural, political, and sociological hypotheses attempt to explain the rise of Islamism phenomenon. Out of them, three main hypotheses will be discussed in this chapter: the political nature of Islam, the reaction to colonialism, and the impact of modernity.

Concerning the first hypothesis, it refers to a cultural factor, that is, the political nature of Islam. Islam is argued to be “a political religion *par excellence*.”¹⁴⁸ It was born as a political and religious community, a sect and society.¹⁴⁹ The Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH and the succeeding Righteously Guided Caliphs were the highest authority in both religious and political arenas.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, the non-separation between religious, legal, and political spheres were supported by the rulings of Islamic *shari‘ah*.¹⁵¹ Therefore, Islamists built upon these historical and intellectual facts in their endeavor to reunite the religious and political spheres in modern time,¹⁵² disregarding any societal and political changes happened from the era of the Prophet.

Nevertheless, many scholars refuse the historical claim of non-separation of religious and political in Islam, as well as, the claim that the political nature of Islam is unique. *Mohammed Ayoob* argues that the *de facto* separation of political from religious arena and subsequent

¹⁴⁷ Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology”, 308.

Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 128.

¹⁴⁸ Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: the University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 54.

¹⁴⁹ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 12.

¹⁵⁰ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 130.

¹⁵¹ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 13.

¹⁵² Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 130.

supremacy of political started in the Islamic experience at the end of the Righteously Guided Caliphate and continued throughout the three great *Sunni* dynasties: the Umayyad, the Abbasid, and the Ottoman.¹⁵³ According to *Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed*, the separation between religious and political or *al-din* and *al-dawlah* began later, after the emergence of local or regional sultanates in Abbasid era from the tenth century onwards, despite the fact that their separation was not complete, as the temporal rulers and religious scholars “‘*ulamā*” were in mutually dependent relationship.¹⁵⁴

On the other hand, the intermingling of religion and politics is not unique in case of Islam. Manfred Brocker and Mirjam Kunkler have studied the phenomenon of the religious parties that began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They define religious parties as the parties that hold an ideology based on religion and mobilize support on the basis of the citizens’ religious identity (using pre-existing religious institutions or networks). This political phenomenon was associated with different religions; such as the Christian Democratic parties, which emerged in continental Europe as the Church’s reaction to the secularizing policies of the nation-states. Later on, other religious parties emerged as Hindu-Nationalist parties in South Asia, Jewish parties in Israel, and Islamic parties in the Muslim world.¹⁵⁵

Consequently, *Ayoob* concludes that Islam is no more politicized than other religions. The historical political role of papacy, religious roots of Zionism, the religious rhetoric of the Hindu nationalist parties, and the role of Buddhist *Sangha* (the Buddhist community of monks)

¹⁵³ *Ayoob*, *The many faces of political Islam*, 10-11.

¹⁵⁴ Akbarzadeh and Saeed, “Islam and Politics” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 3-4, 20.

¹⁵⁵ Manfred Brocker and Mirjam Kunkler, “Religious parties: Revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis- introduction”, *Party Politics* 19, 2: 172 & 175.

in defining national identity in Sri Lanka, all these manifestations disprove the myth of the unique political nature of Islam.¹⁵⁶

The second explanatory hypothesis assumes that Islamism was emerged as a reaction to the colonialism. *Bassam Tibi* argues that modern Islam, as a political ideology, must be seen in the colonial context. Islamism, despite its shrill accusations against European hegemony, is unthinkable without European colonialism.¹⁵⁷

Clifford Geertz thoroughly discusses the political and cultural context of the process of ideologization of Islam. According to him, “people who live in traditional societies are guided both emotionally and intellectually in their judgments and activities by unexamined prejudices, which do not leave them hesitating in the moment of decision, skeptical, puzzled and unresolved”. As a consequence of the military defeat and backwardness shock resulted by colonialism, the traditional premises that had oriented Muslim peoples in the past lost their usefulness, leaving them in a state of increasing doubt and loss of orientation. The lack of adjustment between religious traditions and the new unfamiliar colonial context, the breakdown of traditional consensus, and the fate of religious traditions were the predisposing factors that lead to the ideologization of religion.¹⁵⁸ In short, according to Karl Mannheim, The ideologization of religion takes place within a context characterized by the rapid and profound social and intellectual disintegration of stable traditional societies.¹⁵⁹

Tibi, in accordance with Geertz and Mannheim, affirms that the colonial penetration, which disrupted the social structures of Muslim societies, is responsible for spreading of political

¹⁵⁶ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 14.

¹⁵⁷ Bassam Tibi (trans. by Judith von Sivers), *The crisis of modern Islam: a preindustrial culture in the scientific-technological age* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988), 39.

¹⁵⁸ Rachik, “How religion turns into ideology”, 349.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 248.

ideologies in these societies, including both Islamic and secular ones.¹⁶⁰ Paul Salem further explains *Tibi's* argument. He states that the colonial powers radically redefined the political environment in terms of institutions and of political cultures and popular attitudes. As regard secular ideologies, the colonial challenge ignited the emergence of some Western ideologies as: national independence ideology and revolutionary populist ideology. On the other hand, the social, political, economic and cultural transformations associated with colonialism created an identity crisis for the individuals, due to “lack of congruence between inherited orientations and the realities of the contemporary environment.” Consequently, Islamic fundamentalism, as an ideology, “bestows a new identity upon a multitude of alienated individuals, who has lost their socio-spiritual bearings.” In this regard, Salem quoted Geertz’s words: “ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role ... It provides a ‘symbolic outlet’ for emotional disturbances generated by social disequilibrium”¹⁶¹

The third hypothesis that attempts to explain the emergence of Islamism is contextually related to the second, which is the impact of modernity. According to many historians, modernity was brought about to the Muslim world as a result of colonialism, started with Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798.¹⁶² Nevertheless, the relationship between Islamism and modernity is complicated. Islamism was argued to be a conservative reaction to and a rebellion against the modernity. Although traditional Muslims accepted the material and technical aspect of

¹⁶⁰ Bassam Tibi, “Islam and Modern European Ideologies”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18 (1986):20.

¹⁶¹ Paul Salem, *Bitter legacy: ideology and politics in the Arab world* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 10-16, 136.

¹⁶² Tibi, “Islam and Modern European Ideologies”, 21.

modernity, they refused its way of thinking, as they believe that relativism of modernity negatively affects the morality and the traditional values of Muslim communities.¹⁶³

On the other hand, Islamism is argued to be a modern phenomenon too. Islamists are “as much products of modernity as they are reactions to it”.¹⁶⁴ Their dream of all-encompassing religious government bespeaks a modern bias, as their imagined Islamic state takes the modern model of the leviathan power, which pushes citizens toward the pure Islam.¹⁶⁵

Islamists, while attempting to resist Western modernity and to build an authentic Islamic theory for a new way of life, have borrowed many modern Western ideas. They not only borrowed Western material technology, but also they borrowed many modern methods of political and social organization as well as Western political ideas and symbols.¹⁶⁶

Furthermore, Islamism is not only a modern phenomenon, but also it could be considered as a modernizing agent. It did not only get the benefit of the modern transformation of the traditional Muslim societies, but it helped also in the entrenchment of such transformations. For instance, Clifford Geertz points to the necessity of the spread of the politics in its modern sense for the process of religion ideologization. Thanks to the emergence of the modern form of political activism (the modern political organizations, the modern leaders and intellectuals, the modern public space and the mass media), the ability to detach members of traditional societies from their traditional ties and recruit them to adhere to a new system of ideas has significantly increased, and hence, the religious ideologies were able to grow ever larger.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 131.

¹⁶⁴ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 34.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶⁶ Shepard, “Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology”, 315.

¹⁶⁷ Rachik, “How religion turns into ideology”, 351-352.

Another feature of modernity that had a great impact on the emergence of Islamism is the print revolution and mass literacy, which rendered the fundamental Islamic texts available for increasing masses in Muslim societies. In traditional Muslim societies, scholars “*ulamā*” were the sole interpreter of Islam. Yet, after colonial domination, the traditional Islamic establishments were accused by both seculars and Islamic revivalists to preach a ‘fossilized’ form of Islam. Both factors (print revolution and mass literacy, and recession of the religious role of traditional scholars) allowed religiously inclined individuals, usually educated in non-religious institutions and engaged in secular professions, to practice their right to interpret the religious scriptures in their own way. Those Islamic “thinkers” or “intellectuals” challenged the religious authority of the traditional scholars, and succeeded to gain popularity for their Islamists’ ideology.¹⁶⁸

In sum, the Islamism benefited from modernization of the Muslim societies (emergence of modern politics, increase literacy, modern education, individualism, recession of traditional social forces...etc.) to overcome the religious hegemony of the traditional institutions, and to spread its ideology and its own definition of religion through establishment of social movements and political parties, and attracting members and supporters to these establishments. Nevertheless, on doing so, Islamist movements helped to entrench the values of the modernity and its mode of thinking, which they consider perverted and harmful to the morality of Muslim communities.

However, it is important to observe that many of aforementioned dynamics and criteria could not be generalized on the whole Islamist groups, as under the broad banner of “Islamism”, diverse ideologies and movements are gathered. Despite similarities in their rhetoric and

¹⁶⁸ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 27-29.

objectives, monolithic nature of Islamism, according to *Mohammad Ayoob*, is a myth. He argues that the political, cultural, and socioeconomic manifestations of Islam - like the practice of Islam itself -are to great extent- context specific and resulting from interpenetration of religious precepts and local culture.¹⁶⁹

Many classifications and categorizations are designed to differentiate between various groups and ideologies constituting the Islamism phenomenon. The most common classification of Islamist movements is the moderate – extremist “or militant” subgrouping. This classification is based on some vague criteria, for instance: the moderate Islamists accept to work within the existing political systems, while the extremists do not recognize the legitimacy of these systems and reject to work within these regimes. Also, the moderate group believes in gradual change and adopts a peaceful strategy, through participation in formal political process to induce as much political, economic, and social reforms as they can. Extremists, on contrary, seek to overthrow the existing regimes and to induce immediate and radical changes in the society, mostly by using violence.¹⁷⁰

Another important categorization of Islamism is based on the historical evolution of this phenomenon and the distinctive criteria of Islamist movements in different historical phases. This typology, however, raises a problematic question: when did the phenomenon of Islamism emerge?. The academic scholars gave three different answers to this question. According to Geertz and *Tibi*, Salafism was the first modern Islamic ideology that presented an alternative to the traditional visions of religion at the end of the 18th century.¹⁷¹ On the other hand, Mümtazer

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

¹⁷⁰ Jillian Schwedler, “Religion and Politics”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, ed. Michele Penner Angrist, 111-112 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

¹⁷¹ Rachik, “How religion turns into ideology”, 349.

Tibi, *The crisis of modern Islam*, 90.

Türköne states that “there seems to be a broad agreement that *Jamāl al-Din al-Afghāni* (1838 – 1897) was the founder of the Islamist ideology”.¹⁷² Thirdly, according to Olivier Roy, the Islamism phenomenon began more or less in 1940s. It could be traced in the society of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, established in 1928, and the *Jamaat-i Islami* of Pakistan, established in 1941.¹⁷³

Bassam Tibi, according to this categorization, divided modern Islam ideology into two types: the archaic variant, which calls for return to the authentic Islam of the Prophet PBUH, and modernistic variant that calls for pan-Islamism and attempts to reactivate Islam as a mobilizing ideology. For him, the Wahhabi movement belongs to the first category, while *al-Afghāni* belongs to the second.¹⁷⁴

Olivier Roy’s categorization of Islamist movements is more or less based on the same principle of traditional and modern subgroupings. The first category “Fundamentalism” is the oldest Islamic group that appeared as early as the eighteenth century and it includes further two subgroups: traditionalists, constituted of clergies and ‘*ulamā*’, who strictly follow the founding religious texts, prefer the imitation “*taqlid*”, refuse the innovations and new *ijtihad*, and their vision of *shari‘ah* is essentially legalistic and casuistic. The second subgroup is the reformist fundamentalists, who criticize the traditions and the popular religion (Maraboutism and superstitions), and aim to return to the founding texts with their own *ijtihad*. Roy categorizes the Wahhabi movement as well as *al-Afghāni* and his disciple *Muhammad ‘Abduh* (1849 – 1905) in the latest subgroup.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Mümtazer Türköne, “The Birth and Death of Islamism”, *Insight Turkey* 14, 4 (2012): 94.

¹⁷³ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 3&35.

¹⁷⁴ Tibi, *The crisis of modern Islam*, 90.

¹⁷⁵ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 30-31.

The second Islamic revivalist group, according to Roy's classification, is the "Islamism". It has emerged in 1940s and manifested, as mentioned, by two large Islamic movements: Muslim Brotherhood and *Jamaat-i Islami*, which were founded independently, yet, the overlapping between their themes were striking and the intellectual contact between both groups were soon established.¹⁷⁶

The Islamists share some criteria with the reformist fundamentalists, such as: their call for return to the pure Islam, implementation of *shari'ah*, and *ijtihad*, and their rejection of the 'fossil' version of Islam preached by traditional scholars "*ulamā*". On the other hand, Islamists differ from the fundamentalists in their main principle: Islam is a global and synthesizing a system of thought. Also, Islamists believe in necessity of "*Islamization*" of society first – through social and political activism – before implementation of *shari'ah*. Therefore, Roy argues that Islamists insist less on prompt applying of *shari'ah* than fundamentalists.¹⁷⁷

Nevertheless, William Shepard, in his typology, put *Sayyid Quṭb* and *al-Mawdudi*, who belongs to Muslim Brotherhood and *Jamaat-i Islami* respectively, in the category of radical Islamists rather than political Islamists. According to him, they share with Islamists their concept of global Islam; however, they insist more on the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Islamic ideology and refuse any form of apology or exchange between Islamic and Western ideologies. They also emphasize the urgency of putting the *shari'ah* into practice and extending its scope to include not only the political, but also other economic, social, and cultural fields.¹⁷⁸

From all previous literatures, the historical evolution of the different variants of the modern Islamic ideology or Islamism could be summarized in the following figure:

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 35.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 36-38.

¹⁷⁸ Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology", 314-315.



Fig.1: Categorization of Islamism according to the historical evolution

With some generalization, the ideological differences between these variants of Islamism are summarized in the following table:

	Traditionalism	Salafi Reformism	Modern Reformism	Political Islamism	Radical Political Islamism
The ideology variant:	Conservative	Salafism	Progressive Pan-Islamism	Politicized Islam	Radical Idealistic
When did this variant emerge?	It was the predominant ideology in pre-modern Muslim communities	The end of eighteenth century and the beginning of nineteenth century	The second half of the nineteenth century	1920s - 1930s	1940s - 1960s
The main challenges to which it responded:	Modern versions of Islamism	Perverted Islamic practices (religious innovations) and sects (Sufism and Shi'ism)	Colonialism and the weakness of the Ottoman Caliphate	Colonialism, Westernization, and the fall of the Islamic Caliphate	Westernization and the post-independence secular Muslim regimes
The prominent example:	Traditional religious establishments and official bureaucratized clergies (al-Azhar, al-Zaytuna, al-Qarawiyyin...)	The Wahhabi movement (in Arab peninsula) & the Senussi movement (in Libya)	<i>Jamāl al-Din al-Afghāni</i> and his disciple <i>Muhammad 'Abduh</i>	Muslim Brotherhood (<i>al-Bannā</i>)	<i>Sayyid Quṭb</i> (Muslim Brotherhood) & <i>al-Mawdudi</i> , (<i>Jamaat-i Islami</i>)

Their concept of Islamic <i>shari'ah</i> :	- legalistic and casuistic - call for strict and prompt implementation of <i>shari'ah</i>	- legalistic and casuistic - call for strict and prompt implementation of <i>shari'ah</i>	A modern and more inclusive understanding of <i>shari'ah</i>	-understanding <i>shari'ah</i> in a comprehensive way. - call for gradual implementation of <i>shari'ah</i>	-understanding <i>shari'ah</i> in a comprehensive way. - call for urgent implementation of <i>shari'ah</i> after a radical Islamization of the society
Their stance from <i>ijtihad</i> :	-	+	+	+	+
The degree of modernity: (modern ideas and modern activism)	-	-	+	+	+
Anti-western stance	-	-	+	+	++

Table (2): Ideological differences between main versions of Islamism

II. Tale of two ideologies: Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood:

In contrary to the myth of monolithic Islamic ideology that is composed of eternal, purely divine, and context-free doctrines, it was shown in the previous section of this chapter that there are different ideologies within the Islamism trend. Each of these ideologies basically is a net result of a reaction between three different elements: the sacred religious texts, the historical and societal contexts, and the ideological inclination and the personal experiences of the founding ideologues. Based on this argument, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies will be

explored, as a necessary intro to study the Islamic state models they are adopting. This ideological analysis entails comparing the contexts and the main challenges associated with the foundation of these ideologies and the academic background and the ideological inclinations of the founding ideologues. Then, in the light of these variables, the main religio-political doctrines of these competing ideologies will be contrasted.

A. The historical and societal context:

Ideologies are not a closed system of ideas, which are static, abstracted and insulated from the continually changing political and sociological environment. Nevertheless, the core doctrines of each ideology are to great extent determined by the challenges that stimulated its foundation, and the historical context in which it was born.

For Wahhabism, it was the eighteenth-century Najd the birth place which determined the core doctrines of Wahhabi ideology. The province of Najd is a broad desert located in the central Arabian Peninsula. It is often described as a desert wasteland; therefore, it was almost an isolated region.¹⁷⁹

Sociologically, Najd was divided between nomads and settled folk “*ḥaḍar*”, both were organized in small-scale autonomous polities, as tribal groups or chieftaincies. The tribal groups were linked by ties of kinship, and each tribe had its own leading clan, from which, a *sheikh* was selected.¹⁸⁰ However, Najd in the early decades of eighteenth century was in a *Hobbesian* state;

¹⁷⁹ Natana J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004),7.

¹⁸⁰ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 9-10.

the tribes were warring, feuding, and lacking any unifying ideological or national *esprit de corps* or *‘aṣabiyya*.¹⁸¹

Politically, Najd occupied a marginal position in the Muslim world. After the weakening of the Abbasid caliphate in the tenth century, none of the great Muslim empires had ruled it, because it lacked valuable economic resources, it posed no strategic threat, and its conquest offered no prestige.¹⁸²

As regard the scholastic tradition, Najd scholars *‘ulamā’* were educated in the main Islamic learning centers in Hijaz, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. They mostly belonged to the *Hanbali* jurisprudence school and there were certain family lineages specialized in maintaining and transmitting this scholastic tradition, among them *Al Musharraḥ* family, to which *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* belongs.¹⁸³ However, the Wahhabi historians drew a grim picture for the religious circumstances in the 18th century Najd. *Hussein ibn Ghannām*, for instance, mentions in his book *Tārikh Najd* “History of Najd”, which is considered one of the official historical books of Wahhbi movement, that before *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*’s call, the majority of Muslims, especially in the Arab peninsula, had returned back to polytheism “*al-shirk*” and *al-jāhiliyyah* (pre-Islamic ignorance). Due to the predominance of religious ignorance, moral disintegration, and Muslims’ division into different sects, *ibn Ghannām* believes that Islam before Wahhabi call had become a ‘stranger’ once again, as one of the Prophet’s sayings mentioned.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Larbi Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, eds. Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003), 31.

¹⁸² Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 10.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Hussein ibn Ghannām, revised by: Nāṣer al-Din al-’Asad, *Tārikh Najd* (Cairo, Beirut: al-shorouq, 1994), 13&31.

It could be generally concluded that the Wahhabi ideology at its inception was shaped by three main determinants: (i) the tribal milieu, in which pre-modern forms of political organization predominated, (ii) the classical scholastic tradition, mainly the *Hanbali* one, and (iii) the spread of perverted Islamic doctrines and practices, which represented the main challenges to which the Wahhabi movement responded.

Consequently, the Wahhabism was a traditional reformist movement, founded by a classical *Hanbali* scholar. It followed a traditional scholastic way of preaching and depended on tribal alliances and conquests in its expansion. As the main challenges stimulated its foundation was basically religious, the Wahhabi movement adopted a purely religious reform agenda.

In contrast to pre-modern Najd in early eighteenth century, Muslim Brotherhood was established in the newly developed modern state in Egypt in the second quarter of the twentieth century, exactly in 1928.¹⁸⁵ Between 1922 and 1952, -the decades usually described as the liberal era in the modern Egyptian history- Egypt was legally an independent state, with mixed monarchical and democratic features. In 1923, the king issued a new constitution that allowed for establishment of a parliamentary government, yet, the power was actually divided between three competing parties: the colonial British power, the king, and the parliament, mostly dominated by *al-wafd* party (the independence party).¹⁸⁶

It was cancelling of the Islamic Caliphate, European colonialism, and collaboration of Egyptian elites with their colonial masters what drove *Ḥassan al-Bannā* to establish the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁸⁷ *Khalil al-Anani* states that the most significant impact on *al-Bannā* came when

¹⁸⁵ Kristen Stilt, "Islam is the Solution: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood", *Texas International Law Journal* 46 (2010):76.

¹⁸⁶ Nathan Brown and Emad El-Din Shahin, "Egypt", in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, ed. Michele Penner Angrist, 204 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

¹⁸⁷ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 66.

he moved to Cairo in 1923 to pursue his higher education. He was stunned by the gap between the life in his rural town and the new life in Cairo where he was exposed to the cultural and political ferment taking place in the wake of 1919 revolution.¹⁸⁸

In his diaries, *al-Bannā* described the period he spent in Cairo after the World War I. In this period, he wrote, the current of disintegration increased, affecting the souls, the views, and the ideas in the name of ‘mental liberation’ and affecting the behaviors, morals, and deeds in the name of ‘individual liberation’. He maintained that this wave of atheism and immorality was very strong and devastating.¹⁸⁹

al-Bannā accused the *Kamali* coup against the Islamic Caliphate and the Egyptian secular elites of acting to weaken the religion and propagate the Western materialism. He bitterly noticed that, at that time, the ‘camp’ of immorality and disintegration was in a state of strength and vitality, while the ‘camp’ of Islamic virtue was shrinking and declining. Then, he decided to act positively: to push the Islamic leaders to work together seriously against this current of atheism and immorality or he will take the initiative.¹⁹⁰

During the second establishment of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s, after the assassination of its founder, the Brotherhood’s main ideologue in this period, *Sayyid Qutb*, was faced by another challenge: the military secular regimes of the post-independence Arab states. The liberal era in modern Egyptian history came to an end by the military coup executed by the Free Officer movement in 1952. The proclaimed ideology of the post-independence Egypt was secular: socialism and pan-Arabism. The new rulers established a single-party regime with

¹⁸⁸ Khalil al-Anani, “The Power of the Jama‘a: The Role of Hasan Al-Banna in Constructing the Muslim Brotherhood’s Collective Identity”, in *Sociology of Islam*, eds. Gary Wood and Tugrul Keskin, 5 (Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL, 2013)

¹⁸⁹ Ḥassan al-Bannā, *muzakirāt al-d‘wah wa al-dā‘iah* (Cairo: dār al-tawzi‘ wa al-nashr, 1986), 57.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

highly centralized political power and hugely enlarged state apparatus. The new regime was controlling all societal activities (economy, education, media, religion...etc.) and was supported by large brutal security devices. In its endeavor to submit the religious to the political, the military regime in Nasserist Egypt crushed the Islamic movements, specifically the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁹¹ It was that harsh crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood what encouraged radicalization of its thoughts, as shown in the writings of *Quṭb*, which he wrote from his prison cell.¹⁹²

In short, the first determinant that accounts for the variation in religio-political doctrines of the Wahhabism and the Brotherhood's ideologies is the historical context and the founding challenges. According to *Hassan Rachik*, the first forms of ideological reformism (Salafism, Wahhabism) faced pre-ideological systems, such as: popular religion, local traditions, scholarly interpretations,...etc.¹⁹³ Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, was faced by other threats: colonialism, Westernization, modern secular ideologies (nationalism, pan-Arabism, socialism), and authoritarian military regimes. These challenges were obviously modern and political, therefore, Muslim Brotherhood formulated a more politicized and a more mature form of Islamic ideology, so that, it is considered the true founder of Islamism.¹⁹⁴

Also, the difference in contexts had its impact on the structure of both movements. Wahhabism was a traditional pre-modern call, which depends on classical preaching, writing epistles, educating pupils, tribal alliances, and conquests.¹⁹⁵ On the other hand, *Ḥassan al-Bannā* created a modern organization to enact his agenda. He endeavored to propagate his ideas through

¹⁹¹ Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East*, 24-30.

¹⁹² Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2013), 28.

¹⁹³ Rachik, "How religion turns into ideology", 354.

¹⁹⁴ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 35.

¹⁹⁵ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 24.

different tools: preaching in unusual sites as coffeehouses, issuing journals, and establishing local social services (schools, charitable organization, clinics...etc.).¹⁹⁶ As a result, ‘cells’ were created in universities, in factories, and in administrations¹⁹⁷ and within twenty years the organization’s membership was estimated to be two million and the movement had established approximately 2,000 branches across the country.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, as a founder of a social movement, *al-Bannā* worked on identification of the movement’s mission, objectives, means, and system of values and norms. Then, he followed different socialization tools to align the Brotherhood’s members with the movement’s aims and values, in order to ensure a well-disciplined and coherent organization.¹⁹⁹

B. The founding ideologues:

The variable personal experiences and the diverse ideological inclinations of the founding ideologues are the second determinant that shaped the two competing Islamic ideologies and accounted for their differences.

Wahhabi movement was founded by a young *Najdi* scholar *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* (1115-1206/1703-92).²⁰⁰ Two key important aspects of his biography have to be highlighted to recognize his ideological inclination: his educational background and his personal trait. *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* belonged to a prominent scholarly lineage named *Al Musharraf*, which

¹⁹⁶ Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 21-23.

¹⁹⁷ Roy, *The failure of political Islam*, 57.

¹⁹⁸ Michelle Paison, “The History of the Muslim Brotherhood: The Political, Social and Economic Transformation of the Arab Republic of Egypt.” Institute for Global Leadership at Tufts University in United States.

<http://tigrarchives.org/files/resources/nimep/v4/The%20History%20of%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood.pdf> (accessed 17-10-2014)

¹⁹⁹ al-Anani, “The Power of the Jama‘a: The Role of Hasan Al-Banna in Constructing the Muslim Brotherhood’s Collective Identity”, in *Sociology of Islam*,11.

²⁰⁰ Michael Cook, “On the Origins of Wahhābism”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 2, 2 (1992): 191.

provided religious leaders (teachers, judges...etc.) to several oasis settlements in Najd. His father, *Abd al-Wahhāb ibn Sulayman Al Musharraḥ* (d. 1740), was the chief jurist in *al-‘uyayna*.²⁰¹

In his childhood, *Mohammad* acquired the standard introduction to the usual range of Islamic sciences.²⁰² Later on, he started his itinerary to pursue learning, a common scholastic tradition for the Muslim *‘ulamā’*. Wahhabi sources confine his travels to Arabian centers: *al-Aḥsā’*, the Holy Cities (especially Medina), and the southern Iraqi city of Basra. Other sources report that he visited other Islamic centers, such as: Baghdad, Mosul, Damascus and even some Iranian cities.²⁰³ Thus, *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* was a traditional scholar, whose educational experience was purely Islamic. Some of his contemporary Islamic scholars, including his brother *Sulayman*, accused him of lack of sufficient academic preparation and this is what led *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* to break with the common Islamic thought in his days.²⁰⁴

Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb is said to have a radical and confrontational personality. On return from his scholastic itinerary, he brought a collection of books with him and described them as “the weapons I have prepared for *Majma‘a* (his hometown in Najd)”.²⁰⁵ The established image of *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* in Western world and in many parts of Islamic world gave the impression of a religious fanatic, who denounced the Islamic traditions, adopted a literalist interpretation of religious texts, intolerant of those who differed from him, discriminatory in his attitude towards women and religious minorities, and committed to use of violence in the

²⁰¹ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 10-11.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 11.

²⁰³ Cook, “On the Origins of Wahhābism”, 192

Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 11.

²⁰⁴ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 2&22.

²⁰⁵ Cook, “On the Origins of Wahhābism”, 192

spreading of his religious ideas.²⁰⁶ Many evidences supported this negative image portrayed for him, such as: his opinion that the Ottoman Empire and Muslims living in his days are guilty of *Shirk* “polytheism” and apostasy, declaring *jihad* “sacred war” against them,²⁰⁷ stoning of women for adultery, and destruction of the tomb of one of the Prophet’s companions in *al-‘uyayna* “*Zayd ibn al-khattāb*”.²⁰⁸

Natana J. Delong-Bas, on the other hand, took an opposite stance, stressing the flexibility of *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*. She suggested that *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*’s definition of *jihad* is defensive and he did not call his non-Wahhabi contemporaries as infidels.²⁰⁹ The *takfiri* ideology (excommunication) for which the Wahhabis become noted historically was not present in the writings of the founder.²¹⁰ He also, according to her, believed that education, not *jihad*, is the main way to lead Muslims to correct understanding of Islam, and in the latter part of his life, from 1773, he abandoned the formal position of the *imam* of the Saudi emirate to devote himself to religious education.²¹¹

In contrast to his well-known literalist attitude, Delong-Bas argues that *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* believed in the importance of reinterpretation of scripture in one’s own time and place, rejecting the *taqlid* and the literal interpretations of scripture.²¹² His support for *ijtihād* is

²⁰⁶ Tim Niblock, *Saudi Arabia: power, legitimacy and survival* (London & New York: Routledge, 2006), 24.

²⁰⁷ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 44.

²⁰⁸ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 27.

²⁰⁹ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 43.

²¹⁰ Natana J. Delong-Bas, “Islam and power in Saudi Arabi”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics* eds. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 412 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

²¹¹ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 25-26.

²¹² Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam*, 182.

apparent in his citation of multiple legal schools of thought.²¹³ Even in women issues, *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* had relatively more ‘progressive’ stances than predominating views in his time, for instance: insisting on women’s consent before getting married, her right to control the dowry, and her rights to divorce if subjected to physical maltreatment.²¹⁴ “Portrayal of Wahhabism as a monolithic, retrograde, ultraconservative, and, ultimately, jihadist school of thought seeking to eliminate any alternative religious thought or practice” is argued to be based on historical developments that occurred after *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*’s death.²¹⁵

The main ideologues of Muslim Brotherhood, *Ḥassan al-Bannā* and *Sayyid Qutb*, represent another generation of the Islamic revivalists. Both were born in the early beginning of twentieth century (1906), brought up in a small conservative rural area, had a secular education and secular professions, lived in a large modern capital: Cairo, and practiced a modern form of religious and political activism.

Ḥassan al-Bannā was born in a small town of *Mahmudiyyah* in the province of *Buhayra*, ninety miles North West of Cairo. His father, *Sheikh Ahmed Abd al-Rahmān al-Bannā*, was an Islamic scholar and the local *imam* (prayer leader) of the town mosque. *al-Bannā* was affected by his father’s traditional religious learning and piety, and he received his basic education and religious knowledge from him. After graduation from *dār al-Mua’lmin* (Teacher Training School) in *Damanhour* (the capital city of *Buhayra*), he moved to Cairo at the age of sixteen to join *dār al-‘ulum* (a modern institute for higher education). In 1927, he received his first teaching

²¹³ Delong-Bas, “Islam and power in Saudi Arabi”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, 414.

²¹⁴ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 26.

²¹⁵ Delong-Bas, “Islam and power in Saudi Arabi”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, 413.

position at a government primary school in *Ismailiyya* in the Suez Canal zone, where he established Muslim Brotherhood organization in the following year.²¹⁶

From the early years of his life, *al-Bannā* was involved in different religious and political activities. When he was a boy, he became a member in a *sufi* group called *al-haṣāfyiah*, and at the age of thirteen, he was appointed a secretary of another group affiliated to *al-haṣāfyiah* that aimed to preservation of Islamic morality.²¹⁷ Moreover, when the 1919 revolution erupted, he joined the demonstrations against the British occupation, an incident that fostered *al-Bannā*'s nationalist sentiment against foreign powers.²¹⁸

The biography of *Sayyid Quṭb*, the second Brotherhood ideologue especially in 1950s and 1960s, shows many similarities with that of *al-Bannā*. He was born in the same year, but in a village of *Musha* in Asyut Province in Upper Egypt. He was the eldest child of a relatively well-known family that had fallen on hard times. His father was a member of *Mustafa Kamel*'s *al-Hezb al-Watani* (National Party), and the family home was a meeting place for the political elites of the region.²¹⁹ He received a secular education in the public schools, and when he was fifteen, he was sent to Cairo to complete his higher education.²²⁰ In 1933, he was graduated from *dār al-*

²¹⁶ Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 21.

al-Anani, "The Power of the Jama'a: The Role of Hasan Al-Banna in Constructing the Muslim Brotherhood's Collective Identity", in *Sociology of Islam*, 5.

²¹⁷ Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 21.

²¹⁸ al-Anani, "The Power of the Jama'a: The Role of Hasan Al-Banna in Constructing the Muslim Brotherhood's Collective Identity", in *Sociology of Islam*, 5.

²¹⁹ Ana Belén Soage, "Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Quṭb", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 10, 2 (2009): 189.

²²⁰ Ibid.

'ulum, the same collage from which *al-Bannā* was graduated earlier, to work in the Ministry of Education as school teacher too.²²¹

Nevertheless, in his youth, *Quṭb*, in contrast to *al-Bannā*, did not join any Islamic organization nor involve in any Islamic activities. Instead, he was attracted to literature²²², and during 1920s, till 1940s he was known as a secular intellectual, who worked as a novelist, poet and a modern literary critic.²²³ Moreover, during his studying years, his uncle introduced him to *al-wafd* Party, and he became a member in it and a disciple of his prominent writer and philosopher *'Abbās al-'Aqqād*.²²⁴ Later on, in 1945, he abandoned his membership in the party and the whole party system due to what he saw an opportunistic behavior of its politician.²²⁵

The eventual conversion of *Quṭb* from secular modernism to Islamism started around 1947, when he wrote his first Islamic book “Social Justice in Islam” “*al-'adālah al-ijtimā'iyah fi al-Islām*”. His Islamic views radicalized as a result of his stay in the United States (1948 – 1951), where he came in close contact with the Western modern culture. It seems that he saw only materialism, vulgarity, and sexual licentiousness in this culture, notwithstanding its great scientific and technological achievements. Only in 1953 (at the age of 47 years old and after four years of *al-Bannā's* assassination), *Sayyid Quṭb* joined Muslim Brotherhood officially and became its intellectual leader and the main ideologue.²²⁶

²²¹ Shahrough Akhavi, “Sayyid Qutb”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics* eds. John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin, 159 (Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Danny Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 48, 6 (2012): 962-963.

²²⁴ Soage, “Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 189.

²²⁵ Shahrough Akhavi, “Sayyid Qutb”, in *The Oxford handbook of Islam and Politics*, 160.

²²⁶ Orbach, “Tyrannicide in Radical Islam: The Case of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj”, 963.

By exploring the academic background and the life experiences of the three founding ideologues (just before the start of their call), we can reach some conclusions. Firstly, while *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* received a traditional Islamic education in the common religious centers in the Arab peninsula and considered a professional scholar, both *Ḥassan al-Bannā* and *Sayyid Quṭb* were “laypersons”, who were trained on secular education. They were “Islamic Intellectuals” not professional Islamic ‘*ulamā*’. Secondly, *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, for his traditional academic background and life experience, was preaching a simple theological version of Islamism. On the other hand, *al-Bannā* and *Quṭb*, thanks to their modern education and their contact with Western ideologies and culture, developed a more inclusive and more sophisticated version of Islamic ideology. Thirdly, Both *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* and *Sayyid Quṭb* were characterized by a radical personal trait. This may be explained, in case of *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, by the tough nature and the plain vulgar culture of the nomadic life, and in case of *Quṭb*, by his poetic romantic personality, which was further radicalized by his brutal prison experience. On contrary, *Ḥassan al-Bannā*, as a professional activist and gifted organizer, exhibited more flexible and pragmatic features.

C. The main religio-political doctrines:

As an expected consequence of different historical and societal contexts, different challenges, and diverse life experiences and ideological inclination of the founding ideologues, the main religio-political doctrines of both Wahhabism and Muslim brotherhood ideology vary greatly.

Wahhabism, as founded by a traditional Islamic scholar in response to hegemony of what he thought to be perverted Islamic creed “*‘aqedah*” and practices, had a purely religious reform agenda. The main precepts of the Wahhabi call were: the *ummah* had returned to *shirk* “polytheism” and *jāhiliyyah* “pre-Islamic ignorance”, the *ummah* need to return back to the true

tawhid (God oneness) and get rid of *al-beda'* (religious innovations), and the principle of Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong “*al-'amr bi-l-ma'ruf wa al-nahi 'an al-monker*” is the way to fight *al-shirk* and *al-beda'* and revive the true *tawhid* and *sunnah*.²²⁷

A Prophetic tradition states, “Islam first appeared as a stranger and it will one day return as a stranger again”. By this tradition the Prophet PBUH meant that as the idea of God oneness and that the people must devote all worship only to Him was utterly foreign to the Arabs in seventh-century Mecca, it will return once again a strange idea. *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* believed that he lived in such a time,²²⁸ because many of the widespread practices at that time as veneration of Saint’s tombs and reliance on them to intercede with God and the special rites of Sufi orders are considered by him as polytheistic practices.²²⁹

Instead, *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* adopted a special concept of *al-tawhid*, constituted of three main sub-concepts: “*tawhid al-rububiyah*” that means the belief that God is one, “*tawhid al-'uluhayyah*” that means the belief that God should be the only object of worship, and “*tawhid al-'asmā' wa al-ṣefāt*” that means the belief that God is unique in his name and attributes. Furthermore, he claimed that it is not enough to proclaim the oneness of God in words to be Muslim; this proclamation should be expressed also in worship, which should be dedicated to Allah alone without any intermediary.²³⁰

Concerning reviving *al-sunnah* and fighting *al-beda'*, *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*’s definition of *shari'ah* and his stance from Islamic *fiqh* were not as clear as his opinions in creed. Despite his

²²⁷ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 11-12.

²²⁸ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 2.

²²⁹ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 23.

²³⁰ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 11.

theoretical call for *ijtihad*, he continued to adhere to the *Hanbali* juridical doctrine, which had prevailed in Najd before him, and he never expressed any unprecedented juridical opinion.²³¹

Consequently, the political doctrines of *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* were just repetition of the traditional *Hanbali* political doctrines and those of *ibn Taymiyya* in particular. According to *Madawi al-Rasheed*, “ignoring Islamic political thought has been a feature of *Wahhabiyya* since its inception”. Some of Wahhabi historians state that *Sheikh Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* did not concern himself with writing treatises discussing the nature of the Islamic *imāmah*, because it has already discussed in passing.²³²

The three main political precepts in *ibn Taymiyya*'s political thought, which have a clear impact on the Wahhabi political ideology, are:

First: Establishment of the religion and implementation of the *shari‘ah* is the main function of the Islamic state: “The purpose of political authority is to subject the whole human life to God and to make His word supreme”.²³³ Therefore, according to him, the basic functions of the ruler is to reform the creed, make the people stick to religious rituals as praying, alms, and pilgrimage, prevent the transgressions against Allah and against his subjects, protect Muslims, and propagate Islam.²³⁴

Second: *ibn Taymiyya* has a traditional authoritarian political view and he follows *Hobbesian* logic in defending his view: “Man is social by nature. When they join hands they secure what is good for all and avoid what is evil for all. For the same purpose they submit together to an

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Madawi al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 47.

²³³ Muhammad Abdul-Haq Ansari, *Ibn Taymiyyah expounds on Islam: Selected Writings of Sheikh Al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah on Islamic Faith, Life, and Society* (Riyadh: Imam University, 2000), 500.

²³⁴ ‘Abdul Allah al-‘Uthaimin, *al-shikh Mohammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb: hiatouh wa ‘afkarouh* (Riyadh: dār al-‘ulum, 1993): 151.

authority, without which they cannot live”... “To obey the authorities and to wish them well is a duty incumbent upon all Muslims unless they are asked to do something sinful. They are not allowed to rise up against them so long as they establish *ṣalāḥ* (Goodness) among them.”²³⁵

Third: As *ibn Taymiyya* believed that the presence of the *imam* is mandatory for both the unity of *ummah* and the establishment of *al-shar‘*, he justified the kingship and other ‘deviant forms’ of political legitimacy as a matter of necessity. Consequently, he stated that the *imam* could be appointed by agreement of the people of loosening and binding “‘*ahl al- ḥal wa al- ‘aqd*”, or by the former *imam* “succession”, or by *de facto* force, and in all these cases, he must be obeyed from his subjects, because the obedience of the *imām* – even if he was unjust or immoral – is a religious obligation, unless he orders a sin.²³⁶

As regard Muslim Brotherhood, it could be argued that it includes multiple ideologies rather than one. In contrast to the Wahhabism that remained mostly a local movement, Muslim Brotherhood’s spread in many countries with diverse contexts allowed for emergence of different versions of Brotherhood political ideologies: the socialist version of *Mustafa al-Seba‘i*, the first Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s leader, the radical idealist version of *Sayyid Quṭb*, and, later on, the liberal democratic version of the Tunisian ideologue, *Rashid al-Ghannoushi*. Yet, in this chapter, two variants of Muslim Brotherhood ideology will be discussed: the original ideology of its founder *Ḥassan al-Bannā*, and that of the second most influential intellectual in the Muslim Brotherhood history: *Sayyid Quṭb*.²³⁷

²³⁵ Ansari, *Ibn Taymiyyah expounds on Islam*, 501-502.

²³⁶ al-‘Uthaimin, *al-shikh Mohammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb*, 150-151.

²³⁷ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Quṭb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 249.

Ḥassan al-Bannā was neither a traditional *‘ālim* “religious scholar”, like *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, nor a professional theoretician and political ideologue, as *Sayyid Qutb*.²³⁸ He was mainly “a charismatic disciplinarian and shrewd organizer”.²³⁹ However, his main contribution in the modern political Islamic thought is his characteristic definition of Islam comprehensiveness – The definition he elaborately described in *Resālat al-ta‘ālim* “epistle of teachings”, in one of his famous quotes:

“Islam is a comprehensive system, concerned with all aspects of life. It is country and homeland, government and *umma*. It is ethics and power, mercy and justice. It is culture and law, knowledge and judiciary. It is matter and wealth, gain and prosperity. It is *jihad* and *da‘wa* (call to Islam), militia and idea. It is true creed and correct worship, indistinctively.”²⁴⁰

This idea of comprehensive Islam was the pivotal doctrine in *al-Bannā*’s religio-political ideology, so that, he shaped his organization based on it. In *Resālat al-ikhwān al-muslimoun taḥat rāiat al-qur’ān* “Muslim Brotherhood under the banner of the Qur’an”, he wrote: “We are not a political party, although the politics on the foundation of Islam is in the heart of our idea...We are not a welfare association, although the charitable work is one of the our greatest purposes...We are not sport teams, although the physical and spiritual sports are an important part in our means...We are not any of these organizations”²⁴¹ Instead, *al-Bannā* defined Muslim

²³⁸ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 70.

²³⁹ Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37 (2005): 373.

²⁴⁰ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 296.

²⁴¹ *Ḥassan al-Bannā*, “Resālat al-ikhwān al-muslimoun taḥat rāiat al-qur’ān ” in *Majmu‘at rasa’il al-shahid Ḥassan al-Bannā* (Alexandria, dār al-da‘wah lil-ṭebā‘ah wa al-tawzi‘ wa al-nashr, 1990), 121.

Brotherhood to be “a Salafi call, a Sunnite order, a Sufi reality; a political institution, a sport team, a cultural association, an economic company, and a social concept”²⁴²

For this inclusive multifaceted organization, *al-Bannā* assigned specific goals:

- “Building the Muslim individual...with a strong body, high manners, cultured thought, ability to learn, strong faith, correct worship, conscious of time, of benefit to others, organized, and self-struggling character;
- Building the Muslim family: choosing a good wife or husband, educating children Islamically;
- Building the Muslim society;
- Building the *Khilafa* (a form of union between all the Islamic states);
- Mastering the world with Islam.”²⁴³

Obviously, *al-Bannā*'s objective was to found an “Islamic state”; nevertheless, he followed a gradual “bottom-up” strategy, depending mainly on popular education and broad-based social programs.²⁴⁴ He states that: “government is one of their (i.e. the *Ikhwān*'s) means, and they will strive to take it away from any government that does not comply with the commands of God. Yet the *Ikhwan* are more wise and strict than to proceed to the task of government while the souls of the nation are in the condition they are in. A period is required wherein the principles of *Ikhwan* will spread and dominate”.²⁴⁵ *al-Bannā* strategically prioritized preaching to indoctrinate the masses with the Brotherhood's ideology,²⁴⁶ and to achieve this

²⁴² Nazih Ayub, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London: Routledge, 1991), 100.

²⁴³ Ayyan Ali, “Will the Muslim Brotherhood Succeed Where Osama Failed?”, *New Perspectives Quarterly* 28, 3 (2011):19 – 22.

²⁴⁴ Ramadan, “Democratic Turkey Is the Template for Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood”, *New Perspectives*, 42.

²⁴⁵ Ayub, *Political Islam*, 100.

²⁴⁶ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 303.

goal, he “recruited members door-to-door and built a welfare society–cum–athletic league–cum–anticolonial movement held together by meticulous organization and strict master–disciple relations.”²⁴⁷

On the other hand, some authors accused *al-Bannā* of having vague and contradicting ideology and strategy. For instance, shortly after its foundation, Muslim Brotherhood exercised two patterns of activities that aroused controversy: First, the Brotherhood involved in the political activity as a party and named candidates to run in the general parliamentary elections in 1941 and 1945. Second, the Brotherhood formed an armed wing called the Secret Apparatus “*al-jehāz al-khāṣ*” that practiced violence, not only against the colonial power and Zionists in Palestine, but also against its Egyptian political rivals.²⁴⁸ Also, *al-Bannā* once “warned that other measures would be needed, ‘some soft, others hard,’ because the Society (i.e., Muslim Brotherhood) would have to confront the opposition and the hostility of those who did not understand the truth of Islam.”²⁴⁹

Other example of the ambivalence in *al-Bannā*’s political ideology is his stance from the parliamentary system and political parties. Although, he defended the principles of constitutionality and parliamentary representation, he aggressively attacked the multiparty political system.²⁵⁰ Also, despite his criticism of the Egyptian political system in his days due to its corruption and elitism, he decided in 1941 that it is an appropriate time to participate in the official political process and field candidates to the parliament.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers”, 374.

²⁴⁸ Stilt, “Islam is the Solution: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, 77.

²⁴⁹ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 303.

²⁵⁰ Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 128.

²⁵¹ Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 25.

The ambiguity of *Ḥassan al-Bannā*'s ideology raises a debate about its relation to the reformist tradition. Some authors argue that *al-Bannā* was a continuation of that tradition. It is well-known that *al-Bannā* was influenced directly by the ideas of *Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib* and *Rashid Redā*, the disciples of the prominent reformist figure *Muhammad 'Abduh*.²⁵² However, other observers have indicated that *al-Bannā* and *Quṭb* had a more radical approach to reform than *al-Afghāni* and *'Abduh*. They believed that the formers were fundamentalists rather than modernists. *Nazih Ayubi*, for instance, states that: “whereas the earlier Islamic reformers such as *al-Afghāni* and *'Abduh* were striving to modernize Islam, the following generation of Islamists such as *al-Bannā* and the Muslim Brothers were striving to Islamize modernity”.²⁵³ *Mohammed Ayoob* adds that the influence of other sources than reformist tradition (for example, the Sufi Brotherhoods and the modern totalitarian ideologies) could be observed also on both the ideological and organizational framework espoused by *al-Bannā*.²⁵⁴

The same debate was raised about the relationship between *al-Bannā*'s and *Quṭb*'s ideologies; whether it is continuity or rupture. Many Islamist authors, as *Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi*, *Ṭāriq Ramaḍān*, and *Farid Abd al-Khāliq*, emphasize the discrepancies between their ideologies.²⁵⁵ These discrepancies were described by *Ṭāriq al-Bishri* in eloquent phrases: “The thought of *Ḥassan al-Bannā* is a thought which cultivates land, and spreads seeds, and waters a tree that spreads with the sun and the wind. As for the thought of *Sayyid Quṭb*, it digs a trench and builds a fortification of high fences and lofty towers, an impregnable fortress. The difference between them is the difference between peace and war.”²⁵⁶

²⁵² Ibid.,23.

²⁵³ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 299.

²⁵⁴ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 70.

²⁵⁵ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 249-250.

²⁵⁶ Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 198.

al-jāhiliyyah “pre-Islamic ignorance” and *al-hākemiyyah* “God’s sovereignty” are the main concepts in the *Sayyid Qutb’s* religio-political ideology.²⁵⁷ *Qutb*, in his ideology, was greatly influenced not only by the doctrine of comprehensive Islam adopted by *al-Bannā*, but also by the Islamic thought of the founder and the leading ideologue of *Jamaat-i Islami*; *Sayyid Abu al-A’la al-Mawdudi*, from whom *Qutb* borrowed these concepts.²⁵⁸

As for the first concept; *al-jāhiliyyah*, it is conventionally translated as “the Age of Ignorance”, and refers to the Arabian society prior to the Prophet *Muhammad’s* mission.²⁵⁹ However, *Qutb* gave this concept a new definition. For him: “*Jāhiliyya*—as God describes it and His *Qur’ān* defines it—is the rule of humans by humans because it involves making some humans servants of others, rebelling against service to God, rejecting God’s divinity (*’uluhiyyah*) and, in view of this rejection, ascribing divinity to some humans and serving them apart from God. *Jāhiliyya*— in the light of this text—is not a period of time but a condition, a condition which existed yesterday, exists today, and will exist tomorrow.”²⁶⁰

Consequently, *Qutb* concluded that Muslims of his days returned back to the state of *Jāhiliyya*. He boldly stated that “The existence of the Islamic life and the Islamic *ummah*, and even the existence of *Islam* itself stopped long ago – a fact that may induce shock, panic and disappointment to many who still like to be *Muslims*”.²⁶¹ This is because these communities, which claim to be still Muslim, are included within the *jāhili* communities, as they gave the most peculiar characteristic of the God’s divinity “*’uluhiyyah*”, which is *al-hākemiyyah*, to other than

²⁵⁷ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 73.

²⁵⁸ Fathi Osman, “*Mawdudi’s* Contribution to the Development of Modern Islamic Thinking in the Arabic-Speaking World”, *The Muslim World* 93 (2003), 480.

²⁵⁹ William E. Shepard, “*Sayyid Qutb’s* doctrine of *Jahiliyya*”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35 (2003): 522.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 524.

²⁶¹ *Sayyid Qutb, al- ‘adālah al-ijtimā’iyah fi al-Islām* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2013), 221-222.

the God. Hence, they received from other than God their system, canons, values, parameters, customs, traditions, and almost all aspects of their life.²⁶²

Against *Jāhiliyya*, and in stark contrast with it, there is the concept of *al-hākemiyyah*. The Arabic term *hākimiyyah* is a verbal noun derived from the Arabic root “*h.k.m*”, which means, according to the Arabic-English Dictionary, governorship; rule; command; dominion, and authority. This indicates that the word *hakim* signifies the highest governmental and legal authority.²⁶³ Three main features characterize *Quṭb*’s definition of the concept of *al-hākemiyyah*: First: *al-hākemiyyah* is a matter of faith and creed, rather than politics and government,²⁶⁴ as to admit that Allah is the only *hakim* or sovereign is one of the necessities of the confession of faith “There is no god but Allah”.²⁶⁵ According to *Quṭb*, “Allah exercises *al-hākimiyyah* in the human life on one hand by controlling human affairs by His will (*mashi’ah*) and determination (*qadar*) and on the other hand by organizing their life conditions, rights, duties, relationships and mutual obligations by His *shari’ah* and His programme. And in Islamic system, no one takes share with Allah either in His will and determination or His *shari’ah* and programme, otherwise it will be infidelity and polytheism.”²⁶⁶

Second, *al-hākimiyyah* is not related only to the legislation and legal provisions or even to the foundations and principles of government, but it extends to everything that God has prescribed

²⁶² Sayyid Quṭb, *ma’ālem fi al-tariq* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 1973), 91-92.

²⁶³ Sayed Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, 3 (2002):145.

²⁶⁴ Zakariā, *al-dawlah wa al-shari’ah fi al-fikr al-islāmi al-mo’asr*, 287.

²⁶⁵ Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 155.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

Quṭb, *al-’adālah al-ijtimā’iyah fi al-Islām*, 99.

for the organization of human life. “This means that all-human conduct; political, economic, art, literature or other activities must fulfill the ordinances of the *hākimiyyah* as acts of worship.”²⁶⁷

Third, *Quṭb* gave the concept of *al-hākimiyyah* an idealist connotation, as he linked it with a higher and all-encompassing system of the universe. According to *Quṭb*, “Every part is in harmony with all parts, and everything is in an integrated unity. Every existing part has a reason for being that is related to this complete and absolute harmony... The universe is regulated by one single law that binds all its parts in a harmonious and orderly sequence. This systematic arrangement is the creation of the will of the one *hākimiyyah*”.²⁶⁸ Consequently, as Man is obliged to live in the frame of this universe, he is not allowed to follow any different programme. The harmony between the programme that guides the human life and that of the whole universe is the only way that guarantees the cooperation between the man and the enormous cosmic forces, rather than collision with them, because, if he clashes with them, he will be torn and crushed. This is why humanity today suffers a life of misery, confusion and turmoil.²⁶⁹

This idealistic radical view is not only characterizing the religio-political doctrines of *Sayyid Quṭb*, but also, his strategy of change. He believed that preaching is not enough alone, “because the usurpers of God’s divinity would not voluntarily give up their power”.²⁷⁰ Therefore, he called for forming a vanguard ready to launch *jihad* against the modern *jāhili* system.²⁷¹ In contrast to *al-Bannā*, *Quṭb* saw *jihad* the main tool to eliminate obstacles in the way of the establishment of the Islamic state and to free men from all authority except that of God.²⁷² *Quṭb*’s radical thoughts drove *Ḥassan al-Houḍaibi*, the second general guide of Muslim

²⁶⁷ Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 151.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.,152.

²⁶⁹ Sayyid Quṭb, *hādā al-din* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2001), 24-26.

²⁷⁰ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 303.

²⁷¹ Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 28.

²⁷² Soage, “Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 197.

Brotherhood, in 1969, to write a book titled *du'āh lā quḍāh* “Preachers, Not Judges” and to circulate it among the Brothers in prison to refute these radical ideas.²⁷³ Furthermore, *al-Houḍaibi's* successor, *Umar al-Telmesāni*, wrote in 1980s that the ideas of *Sayyid Quṭb* represented himself alone and not the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁷⁴

In conclusion, there are many similarities and differences between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood ideology (with its both versions). The major similarity between the aforementioned ideologues is their belief that the Islam in their days was in a case of recession and their contemporary Muslims need to return back to the pristine Islam. They also shared the same negative stance from the traditional Islamic scholars, blaming them for their responsibility of the crisis of Islam.²⁷⁵

On the other hand, *Ḥassan al-Bannā* had a different stance concerning the Muslim societies. He did not embrace the concept of *al-jāhiliyah* adopted by both *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* and *Sayyid Quṭb*.²⁷⁶ He believed that only “the open proclamation of apostasy, denying well-known beliefs and religious obligations and deliberately twisting the meaning of the *Qur'ān* rendered the believer an infidel.” Also, while he shared the same concept of purifying Islam and fighting religious innovations with *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, he did not see many Sufi practices to be innovations. “More generally, *Banna's* keen desire for Muslim unity to ward off western imperialism led him to espouse an inclusive definition of the community of believers.”²⁷⁷

Politically, *al-Bannā's* concept of Islam as a total way of life and his support of constitutional rule and parliamentary government are completely alien to *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*,

²⁷³ Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: evolution of an Islamist movement*, 28.

²⁷⁴ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 80.

²⁷⁵ Akbarzadeh and Saeed, “Islam and Politics” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 26.

²⁷⁶ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 39.

²⁷⁷ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 141.

who lived in a tribal milieu, in pre-modern political communities. Nevertheless, both agreed upon the idea of religious functions of the ruler and his responsibility to fight immoral and religiously forbidden practices.²⁷⁸

Regarding *Sayyid Qutb*, he clearly radicalized and further politicized many religio-political doctrines of *Hassan al-Bannā*.²⁷⁹ The latter's concept of total Islam was transformed, thanks to *Qutb*, into a totalitarian idealistic ideology. Also, the violent means of change as revolution and *jihad*, which were mentioned by *al-Bannā* in indirect expressions and accompanied by excuses, became the only valid strategy to establish the Islamic state in *Qutb's* political thought.

Interestingly, both *Qutb* and *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* declared that Muslim societies in their days became *jāhili* societies; despite the fact that they lived in totally different historical circumstances. Moreover, both gave different explanation and used different logic to support their claims. For *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, the main cause was the perverted religious practices and doctrines, which he saw repugnant to *al-tawhid* "God oneness". *Sayyid Qutb*, in the post-colonial era, had another justification; the Muslim communities retained Western legal, cultural, economic and political forms instead of restoring Islam. For him, the imperative of faith in God's oneness is to establish a social and political order in conformity with God's will as expressed in His *shari'ah*. Therefore, ironically, *Qutb* saw Saudi Arabia one of the *jahili* countries because it did not establish such pure Islamic order.²⁸⁰

In table (3), the main differences between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood ideology are contrasted:

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 198.

²⁸⁰ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 148-149.

	Wahhabism	Muslim Brotherhood ideology	
		<i>Ḥassan al-Bannā</i>	<i>Sayyid Quṭb</i>
Historical and political contexts:	Pre-modern tribal milieu	- Modern state - Colonialism	- Modern state - Post-independence secular military regimes
Sources:	- Traditional Islamic education - Hanbali jurisprudence (especially, of <i>ibn Tayyemiah</i>)	- Secular education - Reformists' legacy - Sufi Brotherhood - Western utopian political ideology	- Secular education - <i>al-Bannā's</i> and <i>al-Mawdudi's</i> traditions - Western utopian political ideology
Main concepts:	- <i>al-Jāhiliyyah</i> - <i>al-Tawhid</i> - Revival of <i>Sunnah</i>	- Comprehensiveness of Islam - Islam is <i>din wa dawlah</i>	- <i>al-Jāhiliyyah</i> - <i>al-hākemiyyah</i>
Strategy of change:	- Radical - Top-down - Forming a traditional religious call - Tribal alliances and warfare (<i>Jihad</i>)	- Gradual reform - Bottom-up - Building a modern social movement - Violent means are exceptional and regretted.	- Radical - Top-down - Forming a revolutionary vanguard - <i>Jihad</i>

Table (3): the main differences between Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood's ideology

CHAPTER FOUR: MAKING A MODERN STATE ISLAMIC

Since the fall of the last Islamic Caliphate “the Ottoman Empire” in 1924 and the emergence of the modern states in the Muslim World instead, restoring the Caliphate or establishing an Islamic state has become one of the major themes of the modern Islamic movements. However, while Islamists were preoccupied answering the question “how”, they did not pay enough attention to the question “Is it possible?”.

As mentioned, Max Weber associates the legal form of legitimacy characterizing the modern state to secularism and separation between religious and political practices.²⁸¹ *Wael Hallaq* also asserts that modern state is the social construct of the secular positivist paradigm of Enlightenment.²⁸² Therefore, he refused the Islamists’ assumption that the modern state could be a neutral tool, utilized to Islamize the society.²⁸³ Establishing the Islamic state in a secular state framework is a myth, distorting the political imagination of the modern Islamists, according to Heba Raouf. Islamists subconsciously embrace the Western model of the secular state, then, they attempt to Islamize its structures without questioning the possibility of establishing the Islamic state ideal in a context and using a tool that is different – if not inimical to – the philosophy of the Islamic sociology.²⁸⁴

On the other hand, the claim of the absolute secularization of the modern state was criticized by many scholars. Nikos Kokosalakis, for instance, states that “The almost universal separation of church and state in western societies does not necessarily imply a corresponding separation between religious, culture and politics.” He refuses the argument that, in modern

²⁸¹ Chilcote, *Theories of comparative politics*, 101.

²⁸² Hallaq, *The Impossible State*, 5-12.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 155-156.

²⁸⁴ Ezzat “nazarāt fi al-khiāl al-syāsi lel-islāmyyin: eshkāliāt manhajiah wa syāsiyah” in *islāmyoun wa democracyoun: eshkāliāt benā’ tayyār Islāmi democrāti*, 44-46.

societies, power relations and struggles operate outside any religious and ethical context. Moreover, in the Third World - in the Islamic countries in particular - , whose social and political institutions operate also in a modern social context, the connection of political power and religion is more explicit. In Islam, according to him, the religious and political spheres are hardly separable, despite of absence of institutionalized church in Islam.²⁸⁵

Concerning the problematic of making the modern state Islamic, Islamists propose many theories, varied basically according to their answers on the question: who is entrusted and in charge to define and implement Islamic *Shari'ah*: the ruler, the *ummah*, or the '*ulamā*'?. While the traditional answer refers to the *Imām* (the highest political and religious post in the Islamic state), the Islamic democrats emphasize that it is the Muslim *ummah* and the Shiite *Velayat-e-Faqih* theory states that it is the Islamic scholars '*ulamā*'. The following figure (2) summarizes the main theories of the modern Islamic state.

In this chapter, the Wahhabi model of modern Islamic state will be discussed in comparison to two theories of the Muslim Brotherhood: the democratic theory claimed by Islamic democrats as *Rashid al-Ghannoushi*, and the idealistic theory of *al-ḥākimiah* of *Sayyid Qutb*. The comparison will include the constitutional order, mode of legitimacy, power structure and distribution, and pattern of citizenship.

²⁸⁵ Kokosalakis, "Legitimation Power and Religion in Modern Society", 367-370.




Fig.2: Different theories of the modern Islamic state

I. Foundation of the Saudi state:

It is well-known that the founding moment of the Saudi state was the pact that was made by *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* and *Mohammad ibn Sa‘ud* in 1744.²⁸⁶ In that year, *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* fled to *al-Dir‘iyya*, an oasis settlement that was under the rule of a clan known as *Al Muqrin*, which will become later famous as *Al Sa‘ud*.²⁸⁷ In the first meeting, *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* declared that the people of Najd were living in a state of *jāhiliyyah* and that he aimed to purge the Najd tribes from the un-Islamic practices. Then, he asked *ibn Sa‘ud* to give him an oath to

²⁸⁶ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 8.

²⁸⁷ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 18.

declare *jihad* for this cause, and in return, he will be the *imām* of the Muslim community.²⁸⁸ *Mohammad ibn Sa'ud* accepted the mission on two conditions: first, that *Sheikh ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* continued to support him if their campaign triumphed. Second, that *Sheikh Mohammad* approved his taxation on *al-Dir'iyya's* harvests. *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* agreed to the first, but as for the second condition, he replied that God might compensate the *amir* with booty that will be greater than those taxes.²⁸⁹

This pact is thought to determine the power relations in Saudi state till now. From that moment, there were three Saudi states: the first state persisted from 1744 to 1818, when it was crushed by Ottomans and Egyptians. The second state was from 1824 and 1891. This state came to an end as it was beaten by *Al Rashid*, a family ruling a local tribe. After the fall of the second state, *Abd al-Raḥmān Al Sa'ud* fled to Kuwait as a refugee.²⁹⁰ *Abd al-Raḥmān's* son *Abd al-Aziz* started to establish the third state in 1902 using an Islamic extremists' army known as *Ikhwān* "the Brethren", as well as, the military support from the *Kuwaiti Amir*. In the next thirty years, *Abd al-Aziz* conquered village after village, succeeded in unifying tribes in *Najd, Hijaz, Ha'el and 'asir* under his rule and finally declared the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.²⁹¹ Later, he bequeathed power to his sons: *Sa'ud* (1953-1964), *Faisal* (1964-1975), *Khaled* (1975-1982), *Fahd* (1982-2005), and *Abdullah* (2005 - till now).²⁹²

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 19.

Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 44.

²⁸⁹ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 19.

²⁹⁰ Gwenn Okruhilk, "Saudi Arabia", in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, ed. Michele Penner Angrist, 388 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

²⁹¹ Jillian Schwedler, "Religion and politics" in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, ed. Michele Penner Angrist, 119 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

²⁹² Okruhilk, "Saudi Arabia", in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 388-389.

The modern state has emerged in Saudi Arabia as early as it gained an international recognition in 1932. Depending on British support, *Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud* started to establish the state apparatus. The British adventurer Harry St. John Philby played a key role in foundation of Saudi bureaucracy and was responsible for negotiation with American and British oil companies seeking to exploit Saudi oil.²⁹³ The second phase of modernization began in late 1950s and early 1960s (especially under the rule of King Faisal). Two main factors catalyzed the process of modernization in this period: the oil revenues and the challenge of Nasserism. The result of this process was bureaucratic expansion, adopting welfare programs, creation of modern army and security apparatus, institutionalization of the religious and judiciary authorities, development of the modern education system, foundation of chambers and tribunals of commerce, and declaration of many regulations: as the labor code and civil servants code.²⁹⁴

The bureaucratic modernization, however, was not accompanied by political modernization. The Saudi political institutions have stayed severely underdeveloped or even completely absent.²⁹⁵ In 1990s and early millennium, increase domestic and international pressures for reform, after the crises of Gulf War and Sep. 11, forced the Saudi regime to modernize its political institutions. In 1992, King *Fahd* issued the Basic Law of Governance which represents the first Saudi 'constitution' and announced the setting up of the Consultative Council,²⁹⁶ while the municipal councils were created in 2005.²⁹⁷

From this brief history of the Saudi state foundation, two remarks could be observed:

²⁹³ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 44.

²⁹⁴ Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East*, 39.
Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 25-26.

²⁹⁵ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 158.

²⁹⁶ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 45.

²⁹⁷ Okruhilk, "Saudi Arabia", in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 391.

i. The Saudi state “owes its birth to an alliance between religion and politics”.²⁹⁸ From 1744 pact, *Al Sa‘ud* monopolizes the political power, while the religious power is controlled by *Al Sheikh* (the descendants of *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*).²⁹⁹ A mutual dependence relationship has been established between both parties; “the ‘*ulama* helped to shape the type of the state which emerged, and they in return were used by the King in the achievement of his political objectives”.³⁰⁰ The *Wahhabi* ‘*ulamā*’ used to give religious legitimation to Saudi regime’s decisions and policies by issuing *fatwas* (religious edicts), especially in critical times or in controversial issues, such as: the crush of *Ikhwān* “the Brethren” revolt in 1927, stationing of American troops during Gulf War, and participation in Israeli-Palestinian peace process.³⁰¹ In return, Saudi regime allows for the *Wahhabi* ‘*ulamā*’ to control over the social arena through controlling the formal religious institutions (such as: the Council of Senior Religious Scholars “*hay’at kubār al-‘ulamā*’” and the Organization of Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong “*hay’at al-‘amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa al-nahi ‘an al-monker*”), religious education, legal system, and the Islamic affairs ministry.³⁰²

This division of labour between the Kings and the *Wahhabi* scholars represents, according to *Madawi al-Rasheed*, a kind of secularism. Wahhabi scholars exclusively control religious praxis and the social sphere to ensure compliance, while the Royal Family and

²⁹⁸ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 31.

²⁹⁹ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 45.

³⁰⁰ Niblock, Tim. *Saudi Arabia*, 33.

³⁰¹ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 45.

³⁰² Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 33.

Andrew Hammond, *The Islamic utopia: the illusion of reform in Saudi Arabia* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 46.

technocrats with modern educations were in full control of politics, economy, foreign relations and defense matters.³⁰³ Therefore, he concludes that:

“The relationship between religion and politics in Saudi Arabia clearly illustrates that the state is not a ‘theocratic unitarian state’, as described by an earlier generation of scholars and often repeated in the Western media. The Saudi regime is a hybrid formation that subjects religion to political will. It is neither fully secular nor religious. It is a pragmatic entity that has survived as a result of the strength of the power of oil and mystification, both internal and external. It is best described as a post-modern pastiche. The gap between the social sphere controlled by religious scholars and the political sphere controlled by royalty is responsible for serious contradictions experienced at the level of the individual and society.”³⁰⁴

ii. “The construction of the Saudi state was entirely guided from above”.³⁰⁵ According to the categorization of modern state foundation mentioned in Chapter Two, the Saudi state arose as a result of unification of independent and dispersed political units. However, the unification of the state was not a result of negotiations and agreements between different groups representing the whole nation; instead, it followed the pattern of mediaeval conquests.

Larbi Sadiki argues that “the Saudi state is superimposed on a stateless society”. The *Najdi* tribes were lacking any unifying ideological or national *esprit de corps*. There was no historical tradition of the state in this region. Therefore, the Saudi state cannot be considered a continuation of a previous state. It lacks institutional legacies and has no tradition of acting legally, representing a nation, governance in the name of a public authority, or representing a general

³⁰³ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 25.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 58.

³⁰⁵ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 23.

will. It is a clan state that resembles a private dynasty rather than a modern state and this accounts for the patrimonial character of the Saudi state.³⁰⁶

What Max Weber wrongly generalized in his analysis of the sociology of Islam could be applied in the case of the Saudi state. Weber described Islam as a warrior religion,³⁰⁷ in which the warrior stratum was its social carrier. As a result, the Muslim homelands had been dominated for centuries by a system of patrimonial bureaucracies as well as patrimonial political and economic structures; the system which he termed the “*Sultanism*”.³⁰⁸ *Al Sa‘ud* behaved as the warrior stratum of the *Wahhabi* call. They treated other tribes as conquered lands; therefore, they established a Sultanic state with a patrimonial regime, not a modern state with legal domination and citizenship rights.

II. The Saudi state of exception:

As a result of the two aforementioned factors, the state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represents a special case. If it is judged by the classical characterizing features of the modern state, it will show many major exceptions. It is a hybrid polity mixing some criteria of the modern state with others of the pre-modern dynastic state. Features like monopoly of the means of violence, territoriality, and existence of a well-developed bureaucracy gave the Saudi state a modern state appearance. On the other hand, the Saudi state retained many pre-modern characteristics, especially: the constitutional order, the mode of legitimacy, the power structure and distribution, and the pattern of citizenship.

³⁰⁶ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 31-32.

³⁰⁷ Bryan S. Turner, “Revisiting Weber and Islam”, *The British Journal of Sociology* (2010): 162.

³⁰⁸ Bryan S. Turner, “Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses”, *The British Journal of Sociology* 25, 2 (1974): 237-238.

i. As for the constitutional order, Christopher Pierson states that constitutionality is an extremely important component of the idea of the modern state. According to him, the constitutional political order means the rule of law not the rule of men. Max Weber defines it as “a consistent system of abstract laws impartially administered by a rule-governed and non-partisan civil service”. Contrarily, in pre-modern states, patriarchal political, social, and economic powers were largely undifferentiated and their activities are regulated explicitly in arbitrary, absolutist, theocratic and dynastic ways.³⁰⁹

The Saudi state maintains the same classical Islamic constitutional order, in which Islamic *shari‘ah*, interpreted by Islamic scholars, was the unwritten constitution. This explains why there was no constitution in Saudi state from its inception till 1992, when the Basic law of Governance was issued. The Wahhabi scholars were who consistently opposed any written constitution, because they believed it could reduce their importance.³¹⁰

However, Andrew Hammond believes that the Basic Law of 1992 is not really a constitution. Even it is named in Arabic *al-nizām al-‘asāsi lil-ḥokm* not *al-dustour* (constitution), because the latter is “associated with the secular nation-state whose constitutions are regarded by the ‘*ulamā*’ as documents compromising the supremacy of the *Qur’an*.”³¹¹ Yet, the term constitution is used in the first article of the Basic Law: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God’s Book, The Holy *Qur’an*, and the *Sunna* (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH).”³¹²

³⁰⁹ Pierson, *The modern state*, 14-15, 18.

³¹⁰ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 95.

³¹¹ Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 48.

³¹² The Basic Law of Governance http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-information/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx (accessed 31-10-2014)

According to Hammond, the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* in Saudi Arabia are interpreted mainly through the *Hanbali* tradition. Hence, the Saudi constitution is embodied in a series of *Hanbali* scholars' texts and opinions stretching over 1,100 years. Hammond specifies three main works serving as the main references for the Saudi constitutional order: *kitāb al-tawhid* (The Book on the God Oneness) and *al-'uṣul al-ṭalāṭah* (The Three Principles) of *Sheikh Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, and the collected *fatwas* of *ibn Taimiyya* (*Fatawa Ibn Taimiyya*), the key scholarly reference for Wahhabism.³¹³

In short, the Saudi state attempts to maintain the old formula of the constitutional Islamic order, in which the *shari'ah* represents, as the English constitution, an unwritten and ever-evolving constitution³¹⁴ or “a judge-made legal system”,³¹⁵ the religious scholars, like what was happening in the whole Islamic history, were exclusively responsible for defining and interpreting it, and the rulers had the paramount responsibility to implement it.³¹⁶ But, in the Saudi state, the scholar's capacity to guarantee the rule of law is much weaker than it was in the classical Islamic history.³¹⁷ Although, theoretically the *shari'ah* reigns supreme, the king has the ability to control the scholars' caste fiscally and by giving him the prerogative to appoint them in the main religious posts.³¹⁸

ii. Secondly, concerning the mode of legitimacy, all states have to legitimize its system of governance. According to Max Weber, this legitimation may depend on tradition, which means to appeal to a 'natural order' claiming to govern from immemorial time or to the God's Will.

³¹³ Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 48-49.

³¹⁴ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 6.

³¹⁵ Turner, “Islam, Capitalism and the Weber Theses”, 238.

³¹⁶ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 28.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 101.

³¹⁸ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 33.

Also, it may be based on charismatic qualities of a leader, or sometimes on both: tradition and charisma. Yet, the modern state is characterized by a specific form of domination; the legal rational domination. This pattern, for Weber, is based on the belief in the legality of enacted rules, whose actions are bounded by laws.³¹⁹

Although Weber's typology of political legitimacy was argued to be anachronistic in the contemporary world, because the traditional and charismatic modes of legitimacy are scarcely found, the Saudi state represents a unique case, being one of the remaining states depending on a pre-modern form of political legitimacy.³²⁰

In the Basic Law of Governance, in article 5, "Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King *Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud*, and their descendants. The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and His Messenger's *Sunna*"³²¹ In addition, article 7 states: "Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God and the *Sunna* of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the State."³²²

These two articles explicitly affirm the traditional nature of the political legitimacy in the Saudi state. It is a dynastic monarchy that supports its claim for governance using a religious frame. Furthermore, the Royal Family utilizes the historical role of the King *Abdulaziz Al Sa'ud* in the foundation of the state to attain a sort of Weberian charismatic legitimacy.³²³ The

³¹⁹ Pierson, *The modern state*, 18.

³²⁰ Dogan, "Political legitimacy: new criteria and anachronistic theories", 195-196.

³²¹ The Basic Law of Governance.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 54.

dominant official narrative in Saudi Arabia in the history books, the national museum, and in the state-run media recounts “the glorious history of the state formation under the wise leadership of the King *Abdulaziz Al Sa‘ud*”. He succeeded to unite diverse tribes and regions, and married into all defeated tribes in order to instill a sense of nationhood, therefore, a “city after city opened its gates to his military forces”.³²⁴ Accordingly, Gwenn Okruhilk concludes that *Al Sa‘ud* bases their claim to legitimacy on their alliance with the Wahhabi scholars and on their success in conquest the state in 1920s and 1930s.³²⁵

Furthermore, Kjetil Selvik and Stig Stenslie mention four pillars for the Saudi state legitimacy: the *Al Sa‘ud* Family, the Wahhabi Islam, the Oil, and the international support.³²⁶

A. “Saudi Arabia is often referred as a family business.” As mentioned, the king *Abd al-Aziz Al Sa‘ud* used to get married from all defeated tribes to consolidate his power. These wives gave him thirty six sons in addition to twenty seven daughters. And today the Royal House of *Al Sa‘ud* has grown to be more than 4500 members.³²⁷ This huge membership enables the Family to dominate all senior military and civil posts in the council of ministers, governorates, defence and internal security apparatuses, and the foreign affairs institutions.³²⁸ On the other hand, to organize the Family’s political participation and the throne succession, many institutions were established; such as: a higher committee of senior princes (which was established by King *Faisal* to advise him in major decisions),³²⁹ the Family Council (which was an internal decision-making body, announced in 2000, and formed of eight senior

³²⁴ Gwenn Okruhilk, “Making Conversation Permissible: Islamism and Reform in Saudi Arabia” in *Islamic activism: a social movement theory approach*, ed. by Quintan Wiktorowicz, 259 (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004)

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 252.

³²⁶ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 247.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East*, 49.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 50.

princes), the Allegiance Commission (which was established in 2006 by King *Abdullah* to lend a formal procedure to the selection of future kings and crown princes), and the Transitional Ruling Council (which was established to govern in emergencies as health crises and assassinations).³³⁰

B. The Wahhabi Islam is the second pillar of the Saudi state. It has served major functions in the process of Saudi state foundation and legitimation. In his endeavour to build a nation state in *nationless* societies, King *Abd al-Aziz* uses the Wahhabi Islam as “an identity maker”.³³¹ In atomized tribal milieu with absence of a minimal degree of nationhood sentiment, “Islam in – its Wahhabi brand – provided the only unifying force”.³³² Therefore, the Saudi state affirms in its Basic Law of Governance its commitment to implement the Islamic *shari‘ah*, protect the Islamic creed, “encourage good and discourage evil”, undertake its duty regarding the propagation of Islam (*da‘wa*), and support the Islamic causes.³³³ It also asserts its religious duty towards the Holy Places:

“Article 24:

The State shall develop and maintain the Two Holy Mosques. It shall provide care and security to pilgrims to help them perform their *Hajj* and *Umra* and visit to the Prophet's Mosque in ease and comfort.”³³⁴

To highlight their religious legitimacy, kings of Saudi Arabia used to be called *imām al-muslimin* “the leader of Muslims” and in 1986, King *Fahd* took the title *khadem al-ḥaramain al-sharifain* “the custodian of the two holy sites”.³³⁵

³³⁰ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 389.

³³¹ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 248.

³³² Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 31.

³³³ The Basic Law of Governance

³³⁴ Ibid.

C. The revenue of oil provides the state another source of legitimacy. In 1938, an American oil company discovered oil in Saudi Arabia and in 2004, it is estimated that Saudi Arabia is controlling 13.1% of the world's production and 22.1% of the world's reserve of oil.³³⁶ The oil revenues grew from \$655 million in 1959 to \$4.34 billion in 1973. Furthermore, due to oil crisis in the next year, it grew to \$22.5 billion and reached its peak in 1981 at \$108 billion.³³⁷ Therefore, while in the 1920s and 1930s, King *Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud* used to distribute gifts and subsidies to tribesmen and the Brethren "*al-Ikhwān*" to support his legitimacy, the huge oil revenues from 1960s enable the following kings to turn this selective patronage into a general programme of social welfare. The state began to provide free medical and educational services, guarantee positions in the government for university graduates, subsidize basic commodities as food, electricity and fuel, pay housing allowances, financially support individual businesses, and provide social security for the aged, the disabled, orphans and women who have no means of support.³³⁸

Mamoun Fandy describes a set of four concentric circles to explain how the Royal Family in Saudi state distributes patronage and welfare services to gain political loyalty. In the first circle, there is *Al Sa'ud* themselves. The Royal princes are given a yearly stipend that depends on the prince's position in the state and family hierarchy. The second circle includes the aristocratic families, who are linked to the Royal Family by blood ties and marriage relationships, such as: *Al Sheikh* and *Al Sudayri*. In the third circle, the Saudi trading and entrepreneurial families (as the *Juffali*, *Rajhi bin Mahfuz*, and *bin Ladin*), who has limited

³³⁵ Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 56.

³³⁶ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 249.

³³⁷ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 158.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, 157-158.

tribal connections to *Al Sa'ud*, exist. The last wide circle includes all Saudi citizens, who enjoy generous welfare services without paying taxes.³³⁹

D. The last source of the Saudi legitimacy, according to Selvik and Stenslie, is its alliance with the world's superpowers. At first, Great Britain supported the foundation of the third Saudi state and helped it to gain the international recognition. It also played an indirect role – through British advisors – in the development of the modern Saudi state apparatus.³⁴⁰ After the Second World War, a meeting between King *Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud* and the American president Franklin Roosevelt put the foundation of a special relationship between both countries.³⁴¹ In this mutually beneficial relationship, the Saudi regime guarantees the oil supply for the United State, and in return, the United State provides the regime with American arms and supports it against any regional threat. Thanks to this partnership, the Saudi state succeeded to overcome the threat of military coups in 1960s, the threat of Islamic Republic of Iran in 1980s, and the threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1990s. On their side, in addition to securing oil supply, Americans gained Saudi support for their foreign policies in the region. They, for instance, supported United States' struggle against communism and war on terrorism.³⁴²

In conclusion, on contrary to Weberian claim, the legal legitimacy based on constitutionality is totally absent in the case of the modern Saudi state. Instead, *Al Sa'ud* “has perpetuated their rule through a skillful combination of distribution, penetration, and coercion, with a legitimating dose of ideology”.³⁴³ They depend on pre-modern forms of legitimacy:

³³⁹ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 249-250.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 41 & 44.

³⁴¹ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 408.

³⁴² Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 250-251.

³⁴³ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 389.

traditional (dynastic and religious) and charismatic. Furthermore, they attempt to substitute the legal political legitimacy by “performance legitimacy”³⁴⁴ through patronage and rentierism, and to support their rule through the international alliances.

iii. Regarding the power structure and distribution, it is argued that in the modern states, the political power is institutionalized, divided (multi-centric), and impersonal, so that, the political apparatuses are distinct from both the rulers and the ruled.³⁴⁵ According to David Held, the modern state “has to be understood as a set of organizations and collectivities concerned with the institutionalization of political power.”³⁴⁶ Consequently, for Max Weber, the administration of modern states would be bureaucratic, because it is “the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings.”³⁴⁷ Weberian bureaucracy is governed by fixed rules, run by professional civil servants and managed by functional superiors with rational-instrumental attitude.³⁴⁸

On contrary, the pre-modern state is like a pyramid of top-down authority, consists of a hierarchical unified system with a single center of power. Furthermore, it has a simpler and a more static structure, whose rate of growth and increased complexity are much slower than the modern state.³⁴⁹ According to Weber, in the traditional domination, the administration staffs are

³⁴⁴ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 44.

³⁴⁵ Held. “The development of the modern state”, in *Formations of Modernity*, eds. Hall S and Gieben B, 87-88.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 116.

³⁴⁷ Pierson, *The modern state*, 16.

³⁴⁸ Merquior, *Rousseau and Webery*, 99,101.

³⁴⁹ Charlton and Andras, *The Modernization Imperative*, 3-4.

mainly vassals, who are bounded by personal obedience to the ruler and dictates of the tradition.³⁵⁰

The criteria of power structure and distribution as well as the bureaucratic apparatus clearly reflect the hybrid nature of the Saudi state. The power is highly centralized, and largely vested in the person of the king. Although the Basic Law states that the authority of the state is divided into three branches: the judicial, the executive, and the organizational, it renders the king the final arbiter in all these authorities:³⁵¹

“Article 44:

The Authorities of the State consist of:

- The Judicial Authority
- The Executive Authority
- The Regulatory Authority

These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this Law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.”³⁵²

The powers given to the Saudi king are too extensive³⁵³, including the following prerogatives:

- To “supervise the implementation of the Sharia, the general policy of the State, and the defense and protection of the country.”
- To dissolve and reconstitute the Council of Ministers and to appoint and relieve deputies of the Prime Minister and member minister of the Council by Royal Decree (as the king himself is the Prime Minister too).³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰ Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, 99,101.

³⁵¹ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 105.

³⁵² The Basic Law of Governance

³⁵³ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*,180.

- To choose and relieve the heir by a Royal Decree.
- To appoint and relieve the judges,³⁵⁵ and act as the highest court of appeal in the country.³⁵⁶
- To appoint and dismiss military officers from service (as he is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces)
- To announce state of emergency or general mobilization and to declare war.
- To approve and amend laws, international agreements, treaties and concessions.
- To appoint members of the *Shura* Council, and to dissolve and reconstitute it.³⁵⁷
- To appoint governors and members of the municipal councils in each provinces (from 2005, 50% of municipal councils' seats become filled by election).³⁵⁸

Therefore, the Saudi political system is very centralized and authoritarian with poorly developed political institutions. It is neither representative nor accountable. It represents “unusual form of palace politics, characterized by a great concentration of highly personalized power”.³⁵⁹ The basic political rights (establishing political parties, joining political organizations, public criticism, organizing strikes and protests...etc.) are absent.³⁶⁰ According to Stephane Lacroix, the political field is built entirely around *Al Sa'ud* as the exclusive repository of political competence. Moreover, as pre-modern states, the power field in the Saudi state appears as a pyramid that is divided into parallel sectors. “In this configuration, only the Royal Family, set

³⁵⁴ The Basic Law of Governance

³⁵⁵ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 106.

³⁵⁶ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 390.

³⁵⁷ The Basic Law of Governance

³⁵⁸ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 408.

Niblock, *Saudi Arabia: power, legitimacy and survival*, 107.

³⁵⁹ Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East*, 39.

³⁶⁰ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 389.

above the entire system, maintains vertical relations with all sectors making up the field of power”.³⁶¹

As regard the bureaucratic apparatus in the Saudi state, although it is well-organized, occupied by professional civil servants, and ruled by fixed regulations, the important posts in the administration apparatuses (as ministers, governors, and high military ranks) are occupied mainly by members of the Royal Family and to lesser extent by loyal ‘vassals’.³⁶² The king and senior princes used to pay attention to matters of foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and sensitive religious affairs, relegating other issues as economic development and education to “American-educated princes of the third generation” or to loyal technocrats.³⁶³

iv. The fourth manifestation of the Saudi state’s exceptions is its pre-modern pattern of citizenship. The idea of citizenship is another key element in the modern state. In its contemporary notion, citizenship means more than a membership in a political community; it is a positive legal status with a set of rights and duties. It is “an amalgam of ruling and being ruled in turn”.³⁶⁴ David Held states that “citizenship is a status which, in principle, bestows upon individuals equal rights and duties, liberties and constraints, powers and responsibilities within the political community”³⁶⁵ On the other hand, for Max Weber, members of the traditional societies are not considered truly citizens; rather, they are subjects to a patriarchal master. They owe him personal obedience, based on traditional bases not a legal justification,³⁶⁶ and the dominated culture within these societies is submission to the religion or mysticism.³⁶⁷

³⁶¹ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 9, 23.

³⁶² Owen, *State, power and politics in the making of the modern Middle East*, 39.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*,49.

³⁶⁴ Pierson, *The modern state*, 111,116.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*,21.

³⁶⁶ Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, 99,101.

³⁶⁷ Chilcote, *Theories of comparative politics*, 101.

In the modern Saudi state, the pattern of Ruler-Citizens relationship is obviously patriarchal, for three reasons:

First; citizens, according to the Basic Law, owe the king a personal loyalty and obedience. In Article 6: “In support of the Book of God and the *Sunna* of His Messenger (PBUH), citizens shall give the pledge of allegiance (*bay‘a*) to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship and ease.”³⁶⁸

Second; as a rentier state, the relationship between the king and the people in Saudi Arabia is based on an unwritten pact. According to this pact, the king guarantees for the people cradle-to-grave socio-economic welfare services, in return, the people give up their political rights and offer their political loyalty.³⁶⁹

Third; the nationality in Saudi Arabia is not a universal right, guaranteed to the whole population. There is a special group termed *bidoon* or stateless citizens, who have not formal IDs or recognized as Saudi citizens.³⁷⁰ Also, the King has the prerogative to give naturalized Saudi citizenship to the foreigners (on extremely hard conditions)³⁷¹ and to withdraw the nationality of any Saudi citizen according to the law.³⁷²

To sum, the socio-political nature and the historical context associated with the foundation of the Saudi state (i.e., unification of the state through tribal conquests and the central role of the conservative Wahhabi call in legitimation of the state and in national identity making) are responsible for traditional/modern hybridity of the Saudi state. The Saudi political system attempts to maintain the traditional Islamic constitutional order within the modern state format;

³⁶⁸ The Basic Law of Governance

³⁶⁹ Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 158.

³⁷⁰ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 387.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 392.

³⁷² Saudi Arabian Citizenship System <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3fb9eb6d2.pdf> (accessed 4-11-2014)

therefore, according to Noah Feldman, it appears as “an image in a distorting looking glass. All the familiar elements are there, but their size, their placement, and their interrelations are altered.”³⁷³

III. Competing models of the modern Islamic state:

The authoritarian Islamic state model of the Saudi state is religiously justified by the Wahhabi political ideology. As mentioned, Wahhabism, as a conservative religious revivalist movement, did not offer any political vision or theory different from those already existed in the *Sunni* tradition, especially of the *Hanbali* scholar *ibn Taymiyya*.³⁷⁴

As regard the constitutional order, it adopts a traditional view, in which the power is vested in the office of the *imām*, who is the main responsible of the implementation of *Shari‘ah*. The Wahhabi Grand Mufti Sheikh *Abd al-Aziz ibn Bāz* states, in his interpretation of the verse “O ye who believe, obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you” that “obeying those in authority follows on from fulfilling the obligation to obey God and the messenger”.³⁷⁵ In this constitutional order, the ruler practices unlimited powers in politics, while the *ummah* has no right for political participation³⁷⁶ and only the ‘*ulamā*’ who are allowed to play a political role through offering advice to the ruler, but privately (not in public).³⁷⁷ Therefore, Andrew Hammond argues that the Basic Law and the *Shura* council were actually an attempt to codify the relationship between the king and the clerics and not the people.³⁷⁸

³⁷³ Feldman, *The fall and rise of the Islamic state*, 102.

³⁷⁴ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 45.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

³⁷⁷ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 184.

³⁷⁸ Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 49.

Also, Wahhabism accepts the two controversial mechanisms for gaining the political power: *istila'* (seizing power by force), and *ta'yyin* (the appointment of a successor by the current ruler, i.e., the hereditary rule).³⁷⁹ It justifies what J. G. Merquior termed the power approach of legitimacy, which depends only on efficiency of the ruler in calling on resources and power centers in the state.³⁸⁰ The Wahhabi scholars legitimize seizing power by force using the same traditional logic of the classical Muslim scholars: "a tyrannical sultan is better than perpetual strife."³⁸¹ According to *Madawi al-Rasheed*, "*ibn Abd al-Wahhāb's* understanding of the Islamic state was limited to applying *shari'a* and fighting religious innovation, without paying attention to the most important pillar in state formation – the principle by which a ruler is chosen, made accountable and changed if transgression from the true path is apparent."³⁸²

Concerning the ruler-citizens relationship, Wahhabism emphasizes the obligation of total obedience even to the unjust ruler. *Sheikh ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, following the tradition of *ibn Taymiyya*, states that: the doctrine of '*ahl al-sunnah*' is that the unjust rulers should be supported and followed in what accords God's ordinances; praying behind them, sharing in *jihad* with them, and utilizing their power in Commanding Right and Prohibiting Wrong ... The rebellion against the unjust rulers almost always results in greater evil and lesser goodness, so that, the rebels do not succeed usually to reform neither religion nor worldly affairs. This proves that the command of the Prophet (PBUH) to us to be patient with the unjust ruler is more correct ... He

³⁷⁹ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 46.

³⁸⁰ Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber*, 7.

³⁸¹ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 41

³⁸² *Ibid.*, 48.

ordered the rulers to be just and to do what in favors to their subjects, and ordered us to be patient with their grievances and not to rebel against them.³⁸³

However, the act of rebellion in official Wahhabi discourse extends to include any form of political activism, as: writing an article critical of the regime, advising the ruler in public, and signing a petition calling for reform.³⁸⁴ “It eventually deprives the Muslim community of its right to have a say in political matters.” According to Wahhabism, the only legitimate criticism of political authority is allowed in secrecy between scholars and rulers, and the latter are not under any obligation to act according to the advice of the former.³⁸⁵ Therefore, *al-Rhasheed* concludes that the official Wahhabi discourse produces consenting subjects rather than citizens.³⁸⁶

This authoritarian Saudi-Wahhabi model of Islamic state is fiercely challenged by the Muslim Brotherhood political ideology in its two main traditions: the *Bannaist* and the *Qutbist*. The Islamic state model in the former tradition is thought to be more democratic and in the latter is more radical.

As for *Ḥassan al-Bannā*'s political ideology, he admits that there is no blueprint for an Islamic political system; however, he believes that the Islamic state is a central necessity in any Islamic order, because in Islam there is no separation between *din* and *dawlah*. *al-Bannā* specifies four rough criteria for the Islamic state:

First: *Qur'an* has to be considered the fundamental constitution, from which all legislations would flow. The other sources of legislation include the Prophet's *sunnah* and the practices of the four Righteously Guided Caliphs.

³⁸³ Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhāb (revised by: Abd al-Aziz bin Zaid Romi, Mohammad Beltagi, and Sayyid Hejab), *mo'alafat al-shaikh Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhāb XIII* (Riyadh, jame'at al-imām Mohammed ibn Sa'ud, 1978), 50-51.

³⁸⁴ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 50-51.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.,46.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.,54.

Second: the government should not be autocratic, as it should operate on the principle of *shura* as mentioned in *Qur'an*: “And their affairs are a matter of consultation among them” (42:38)

Third: The rulers are not free; because their authorities are bound by both the Law of God and the will of people articulated by their leaders and learned men (*'ahl al- ḥal wa al- 'aqd*)

Four: There is no rigid form for the Islamic state, as it could have different forms as long as the essence is preserved.³⁸⁷

Hassan al-Bannā's model of Islamic state shows a democratic tendency. He mentions in an epistle titled “The System of Governance” that the responsibility of the ruler is one of the pillars of the Islamic governance and the *ummah* has the right to monitor him meticulously. The ruler has to consult the *ummah* and to respect its will. Moreover, he states that the parliamentary system is a suitable tool to implement the Islamic principle of *Shura*.³⁸⁸ However, some authors argue that *al-Bannā* was not truly pro-democracy. Despite his support for constitutionality and parliamentary system, he has negative stance from the multiparty political system³⁸⁹ and considers it “inimical to the spirit of unity dictated by the *Qur'an*.”³⁹⁰ Also, his notion of representation is different from the Western democratic notion. He refers to the classical term of *'ahl al-ḥall wa al- 'aqd* (the people who bind and loose), who, according to him, include three categories: *'ulamā'*, technocrats, and whoever has some kind of leadership role as heads of families and tribal sheikhs.³⁹¹

Nevertheless, this democratic tradition in Muslim Brotherhood has matured further in the writings of other movement's intellectuals as *Yusuf al-Qaraḍāwi* and *Rashid al-Ghannoushi*,

³⁸⁷ Salem, *Bitter legacy*, 121.

³⁸⁸ al-Bannā, “resālat neẓām al-ḥokm” in *Majmu'at rasa'il al-shahid Ḥassan al-Bannā*. (Alexandria, dār al-da'wah lil-ṭebā'ah wa al-tawzi' wa al-nashr, 1990), 233-239.

³⁸⁹ Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 128.

³⁹⁰ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 301.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 301-302.

who aggressively criticize the authoritarian theory of Islamic state. *al-Ghannoushi*, for instance, comments on the religious doctrines that justify the hereditary rule and make the *Shura* (consultation) is not binding to the ruler: I am feeling disgusting from the presence of such rotten ideas in our religious tradition and political thought, as it was the mines that undermined the Islamic civilization and delivered us to the decadence.³⁹²

The main principles of the democratic theory of the Islamic state include:

- i. The Islamic *ummah* is the true vicegerent of God, who has the supreme authority and who is assigned the task of defining and implementing the *Shari‘ah*,³⁹³ because the *ijtihād* (creative religious reasoning) of the whole *ummah* (led by the guidance of Allah and enlightened by His illumination) is the only protection from the collective perversity,³⁹⁴ and the formula of Islamic governance is “Allah – The *Ummah* – The Ruler” and not “Allah – The Ruler – The *Ummah*”.³⁹⁵
- ii. The *Shura* in Islam is binding to the ruler, and it is not just an advice. As *Yusuf al-Qaradāwi* states: The principle of *Shura* will be meaningless and of no use if the ruler is allowed to consult and then do whatever he wants and what is tempted by his entourage, regardless the opinion of *‘ahl al-shura* (the people of consultation). He wondered ironically “how were these people called the people of loosening and binding (*‘ahl al- ḥal wa al-‘aqd*), if they actually cannot loosen or bind?” He asserts that what happened –and are still happening – to

³⁹² Rashid al-Ghannoushi, *al-hurriyyat al-‘ammah fī al-dawlah al-islamiyyah I* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2012), 246-247.

³⁹³ Azzam Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannoushi: A Democrat within Islamism* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001),100.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*,183.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*,256.

the *ummah* because of authoritarianism strongly supports the view of obligation of *shura*, although he admits it is a debatable issue.³⁹⁶

iii. In accordance with *Hassan al-Bannā*, Islamic democrats believe that democracy is a suitable tool to apply the Islamic principles of governance. For instance, *al-Ghannoushi* believes in the compatibility between democracy and Islam. He advocates “an Islamic model of democracy, which is a marriage between the Islamic value system and code of ethics on the one hand and democratic procedures on the other.”³⁹⁷ This model, from *al-Ghannoushi*'s point of view, does not solve the problem of authoritarianism in the Muslim World only, but also solves the main problem in the liberal democracy; its materialistic philosophy. The absence of transcendental values eventually transformed democracy into rule of the people by the rich and powerful for the interest of the rich and the powerful.³⁹⁸

The democratic Islamists differentiate between democracy as philosophy and as a set of tools (elections, general referenda, multiplicity of the political parties...etc.) that practically enable the people to choose their rulers, to account them if they committed a mistake, and to depose them and change them if they sidetracked.³⁹⁹ They strongly refuse the religious opinions and *fatwas* that condemn democracy as *bed'ah* “a religious innovation” and imitation of the West. *al-Ghannoush* replies that the Prophet PBUH says “the wisdom is the lost property of the believer, so wherever he finds it then he has a right to it” and also the religious scholars say: “wherever the just and the goodness, the God's *shari'ah* is found.”⁴⁰⁰ He believes that as “the democratic system has worked within the framework of Christian values giving rise to Christian

³⁹⁶ Yusuf al-Qaradāwi, *min fiqh al-dawlah fi al-islām* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2001),146.

³⁹⁷ Azzam Tamimi, “Islam and Democracy from Tahtawi to Ghannouchi”, *Theory, Culture & Society* 24, 2 (2007): 54.

³⁹⁸ Ibid.

³⁹⁹ al-Qaradāwi, *min fiqh al-dawlah fi al-islām*, 132.

⁴⁰⁰ al-Ghannoushi, *al-hurriyyat al-'ammah fi al-dawlah al-islamiyyah I*, 133.

democracies and within the framework of socialist philosophy giving rise to socialist democracies”, it could work within the Islamic values framework giving Islamic democracies.⁴⁰¹

Consequently, the democratic Islamic state theory represents an Islamic version of the legal domination described by Max Weber. It accepts only the legal form of political legitimacy, based on free choice or free *bay‘ah* of the people, and refuses other two ‘deviant’ forms: the hereditary succession and seizing power by force. According to this theory, the relationship between the ruler and the *ummah* is contractual. In this contract, ruler is a deputy in behalf of the *ummah*, and he is committed to implement the *shari‘ah* and to consult the *ummah*, and in return, the *ummah* is committed to obey him.⁴⁰² Furthermore, the *ummah* has the right to account the ruler and dismiss him if he breached the terms of the contract.⁴⁰³ In other words, the obedience of the people to the ruler is based on “a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands”, as Max Weber mentions in his description of the legal domination.⁴⁰⁴

The Islamic democrats, consequently, adopt the modern concept of citizenship. They believe that the *ummah* in the Islamic state are the source of authorities and the possessor of supreme sovereignty in matters of governance. *al-Ghannoush* adds that there is a set of political liberties that should be guaranteed by the state for its citizens, such as: the right to participate in governance, the right to assembly, the right to information,...etc.⁴⁰⁵ Even for non-Muslims, *al-Ghannoush* refers to the *Qur’anic* verse “No compulsion in religion” (2:256) and to the Prophet’s saying “Humans are equal as the teeth of the comb” as golden rules from which the

⁴⁰¹ Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannoushi: A Democrat within Islamism*, 104.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, 217.

⁴⁰³ al-Qaraḍāwī, *min fiqh al-dawlah fi al-islām*, 136.

⁴⁰⁴ Pierson, *The modern state*, 18.

⁴⁰⁵ Tamimi, *Rachid Ghannoushi: A Democrat within Islamism*, 79-80.

rights of non-Muslims in Islamic state drive its legitimacy.⁴⁰⁶ However, he describes the citizenship of non-Muslims in the Islamic state as “a special citizenship”, in which, non-Muslims are not allowed to hold sensitive posts (as general leadership). But he argues that these exceptions are very few and do not breach the general rule of equality in the Islamic state.⁴⁰⁷

Regarding the power structure and distribution, the democratic theory of the Islamic state adopts the principle of the division of power, as a consequence of the increased complexity in the modern societies and as one of the basic remedies against authoritarianism.⁴⁰⁸ Although many scholars as *Mohammad Asad* and *Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhouri* affirm the central nature of power in the Islamic state as it was in the era of the Prophet PBUH and his Righteously Guided Caliphs,⁴⁰⁹ and although many Prophetic sayings about the *imāmah* (the leadership of the Muslim community) portray an image of a personal highly-centralized power,⁴¹⁰ the supporters of the separation of power in modern Islamic state argue that these historical precedents are not binding, and the interest of *ummah* necessitates this separation to prevent centralization of power that leads to despotism.⁴¹¹

Moreover, other scholars claim that the traditional Islamic state was the first state applying the principle of separation of power by giving the religious scholars exclusively the legislation authority without any intervention from the *Imām*.⁴¹² In Islam, there is an organic separation, according to *Tawfiq al-Shāwi*, between the political representation of the *ummah*

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴⁰⁷ Rashid al-Ghannoushi, *al-hurriyyat al-'ammah fī al-dawlah al-islamiyyah II* (Cairo: dār al-shorouq, 2012), 145

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁴⁰⁹ Asad, *The principles of the state and government in Islam*, 52-58.

al-Sanhouri, *fiqh al-khilāfah wa taṭwourahā li-touṣbeḥ 'oṣbet al-'umam*, 159, 175-189.

⁴¹⁰ al-Ghannoushi, *al-hurriyyat al-'ammah fī al-dawlah al-islamiyyah II*, 59.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 56-57.

⁴¹² al-Qaraḍāwi, *min fiqh al-dawlah fī al-islām*, 39.

through the people of loosening and binding (*'ahl al- ḥal wa al- 'aqd*), who is entitled to choose the rulers and to monitor them, and the religious representation of the *ummah* through the scholars and jurists, who are responsible for legislation. This organic separation is the best fence against the authoritarianism and abusing the legislative power by executives.⁴¹³

On the other hand, the *Qutbist* version of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology has a totally different perspective about the Islamic state. *Abdelillah Belkeziz* states that:

“With the *Qutbian* trend,...We will not read on the slate of this state any themes or declarations of the sort such as: calls for the constitution; the *ummah* as being the source of political power; or adapting the rulings of *shari'ah* according to the requirements of the age; *shari'ah* and democracy; representation or elected parliaments and so on. Rather, what will confront us are the terms *al-Jāhiliyyah*, unbelief – *kufr*, faith – *imān*, *al-hākemiyyah*, revolution against society, and the immigration – *hijrah* out from the society of the unbelievers or the hypocrites and so on.”⁴¹⁴

Actually, *Sayyid Qutb's* view about the Islamic state is ambiguous and contradicting. He admits that he is not preoccupied by the details of the Islamic system, because he argues that the problem of Muslim *ummah* is to believe in the concept of *al-hākemiyyah* itself and to submit their will to God's will. Moreover, he claims that asking about the details of the Islamic system now is a trick played by *al-Jāhiliyyah* to embarrass the sincere preachers and to push them hurrying up their steps; therefore, he calls them not to pay attention to these tricks and to focus on preaching the principle itself.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹³ al-Shāwī, *fiqh al-shura wa al-estishārah*, 432-433.

⁴¹⁴ Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 199-200.

⁴¹⁵ Qutb, *ma 'ālem fi al-ṭariq*, 44-45.

In General, *Sayyid Qutb's* concept of the Islamic state shows some contradictions. For instance, he supports the contractual theory of governance, as he states that “the Islamic government is based on justice on the part of the ruler, obedience on the part of the ruled, and consultation (*shura*) between the former and the latter”. He also emphasizes that the ruler has no privilege over other Muslims and that he should be elected by the *umma* and should be obeyed only as long as he implements the *shari‘ah*.⁴¹⁶ Nevertheless, he attacks aggressively the democratic system and refuses the claim that *shura* is synonymous with parliamentary government or any other forms of democracy; because, he argues, the system of *shura* in Islam is divinely inspired and based on the principle of *al-hākemiyyah*, which means that the absolute sovereignty belongs only to God. As for the secular democracy, it is based on the principle that the absolute sovereignty is for the people. Therefore, it represents usurpation of God’s right of *al-hākemiyyah*.⁴¹⁷

Sayyid Qutb does not call for a purely religious state that derives its legitimacy from God alone, as *Abdelillah Belkeziz* claims;⁴¹⁸ as he states that the chief executive of the Islamic state does not derive his legitimacy from a religious authority directly from heaven, and he cannot assume his position except by the free choice of the Muslims.⁴¹⁹ Rather, he seems to adopt a mixed concept of sovereignty. He believes in the constitutional and contractual bases of the government, but under the God’s sovereignty, or what *al-Mawdudi* has paradoxically called “the theocratic democracy”.⁴²⁰ According to *Sayed Khatab*, *Qutb* differentiates between two concepts: the source of authority and administration of authority.

⁴¹⁶ Soage, “Hasan al-Banna And Sayyid Qutb: Continuity or Rupture?”, 302.

⁴¹⁷ Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 159-160.

⁴¹⁸ Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, 210.

⁴¹⁹ Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 161.

⁴²⁰ Zakariā, Barrāq. *al-dawlah wa al-shari‘ah fi al-fīkr al-islāmi al-mo‘aṣr*, 263.

For him, the source of the governmental authority in the Islamic state is not the Muslim community or the result of an election, but the enforcement of the *shari'ah*, while the administration of the authority should be based on *shura*.⁴²¹ In short, the government in Islam, according to *Sayyid Qutb*, is neither theocratic nor autocratic; it lies midway between theocracy and democracy.

The relationship between the divine and the human in the Islamic state is another example of the contradiction in *Sayyid Qutb's* theory. As a radical ideologue, *Qutb* asserts the uniqueness, the sacredness, and the unchangeable characteristics of the Islamic system. He argues that “the Islamic *shari'ah* did not come to exist through the evolution of Islamic society; it has existed in its complete and constant form since it was divinely revealed.” Therefore, it is not founded by the Islamic society; rather, it is actually the founder of it, as “in the shade of the *shari'ah*, Muslim community has developed in all spheres: political, economic, social, moral, and in all other characteristics which signifies the shape and identity of their society”. And that is why the Islamic system of governance cannot coexist with any other systems of human origin.⁴²²

Yet, in other site, *Qutb* admits that Islamic *shari'ah* represents holistic principles and general rules, and it is a wide frame that allows for coping with the continuous developments in the humans' life. So that, it is the role of Muslims in each era to define, understand and implement *shari'ah* according to their particular needs.⁴²³ Consequently, Islamic *shari'ah* is not that constant, detailed, purely divine, and ready-to-use system, and the human role in the

⁴²¹ Khatab, “Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyyah in the Thought of Sayyid Qutb”, 161, 165.

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 160.

⁴²³ *Qutb, nahwa mojtama' islāmi*, 39-41.

Islamic state is much greater than automatically applying the divine rulings, as mentioned in his former radical view.

To conclude, there are many differences between the Wahhabi model and the Muslim Brotherhood's doctrines of the Islamic state regarding the constitutional order, mode of legitimacy, power structure and distribution, and pattern of citizenship. These differences are summarized in table no. 4. The Islamic state doctrines adopted by Muslim Brotherhood seem to fiercely challenge the religious base of the political legitimacy of the Saudi state, and this could account for its negative stance from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, as it will be discussed in the next chapter.

	Wahhabi Model of Islamic state	Muslim Brotherhood's doctrines of Islamic state	
		The Democratic Trend	The Radical Trend
Categorization of the model:	Traditional, Authoritarian	Modern, Democratic	Theocratic Democracy!
Constitutional order:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The ruler who is entitled to implement the Islamic <i>shari'ah</i>. - The religious scholars have the duty to monitor him and advise him. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The <i>ummah</i> is the true vicegerent of God, who has the supreme authority and who is assigned the task of defining and implementing the <i>Shari'ah</i>. - The relationship between the ruler and the <i>ummah</i> is contractual. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - God is the sovereign. - The source of authority is derived from implementation of the <i>Shari'ah</i>. - The administration of the authority should be based on <i>shura</i>
Mode of legitimacy	- Pre-modern forms of legitimacy (traditional: dynastic and religious - and charismatic)	Islamic version of Weberian pattern of legal domination	Mixed: Religious (derived from submission to God's sovereignty) and legal (derived from election by the <i>ummah</i>)

	- Performance legitimacy (patronage, rentierism, and international alliances support).		
Power structure and distribution:	Patriarchal, highly centralized, personal vested power.	Institutionalized, divided, law-bounded power.	N/A
Pattern of citizenship:	The ruled are subjects rather than citizens	The ruled are citizens with more or less equal rights.	N/A

Table (4): The main differences between Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood’s models of the Islamic state.

CHAPTER FIVE: ISLAMIST OPPOSITION IN AN ISLAMIC STATE

It is always stated that Islam in Saudi Arabia is “a double-edged sword”⁴²⁴, that is to say, “if the state can use religion for legitimizing purposes, there is nothing stopping society from using it to contest the ruler’s legitimacy or at least attempt to de-legitimize their policy orientation and preferences.”⁴²⁵ In such state, where religion plays a key role in the political legitimacy, what the regime fears most is that kind of opposition that can justify its political claims in religious terms.⁴²⁶ According to Stephane Lacroix, Islam is “the primary language in which social rivalries are expressed.”⁴²⁷ The contest within the modern Saudi state is not about either there is a role of Islam in politics or not, but actually it is about what that role is and how it should be.⁴²⁸

The emergence of Islamist opposition in the Saudi state was catalyzed by two main factors: weakened influence of the official Wahhabi establishment and the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology in the Kingdom. The dependence of the Wahhabi clerics on the state and the utilization of them by *Al Sa‘ud* to support their policies negatively affect their popular credibility, and as the political discontent against *Al Sa‘ud* intensified from 1990s, the official Wahhabi institution “found itself in the awkward position of defending an unpopular dynasty.”⁴²⁹ In late 1990s and early millennium, the Wahhabi establishment was further weakened by death of its two leading figures: *Sheikh Abd al-Aziz ibn Bāz*, the grand mufti, and *Mohammad al-*

⁴²⁴ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 400.

⁴²⁵ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 33.

⁴²⁶ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 50.

⁴²⁷ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 2.

⁴²⁸ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 42-43.

⁴²⁹ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 158.

Uthaymin, in 1999 and 2001 respectively. The newly appointed mufti and the other members of the Council of Senior Religious Scholars were obviously lacking the prestige enjoyed by the deceased scholars.⁴³⁰

As regard the spread of Muslim Brotherhood's ideology in Saudi state, it was mentioned that the King *Abdul-Aziz Al Sa'ud* refused a request from *Hassan al-Bannā* in 1946 to establish a legal branch for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Saudi Arabia Kingdom.⁴³¹ He replied: "what good would that do? Here, we are all brothers and we are all Muslims."⁴³² It seems that the King suspected the Muslim Brotherhood's variant of Islamism.⁴³³ However, *al-Bannā* was keen to maintain a good relationship with the Kingdom, and he used to go there for pilgrimage almost every year.⁴³⁴

Yet, after the rise of the nationalist military regimes in the Middle East in 1950s, which threatened the stability of the Arab monarchies, and brutally crashed the Islamist movements in their countries, "a symbiotic relationship" was formed between the Saudi regime and the Muslim Brotherhood against their common enemy.⁴³⁵ The Kingdom gave refuge to the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi members of the Muslim Brotherhood; in return, the latter played a key role in the propaganda against Nasserism and Baathism.⁴³⁶ Accordingly, Muslim Brotherhood's members occupied influential positions in the media and the educational institutions that enable them to circulate their literatures and spread their ideas.⁴³⁷ They were employed as imams in

⁴³⁰ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 81.

⁴³¹ Stratfor Report, "Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries."

⁴³² Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 39.

⁴³³ Stratfor Report, "Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood: Unexpected Adversaries."

⁴³⁴ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 39.

⁴³⁵ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 152.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*, 172.

mosques, instructors and professors in schools and universities, and senior officials in the ministry of education, who were entitled to design school textbooks and syllabuses.⁴³⁸

The arrival of Muslim Brotherhood was associated with politicization of the Wahhabi Islam, which was, till then, confining itself to correct the religious practices only.⁴³⁹ A new form of Wahhabism was made blending the puritanism of the Wahhabi call with the political ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood in its two versions: the *Bannaist* and the *Qutbist*. This new Saudi Islamist movement that emerged in 1960s became known as *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* “the Islamic Awakening”. During 1970s, *al-ṣaḥwa* expands its influence to acquire “a quasi-monopoly on Islamic activism in the Kingdom”, thanks to the influential position its initiators occupied in the Saudi media and educational systems.⁴⁴⁰ The diagram in Fig.3 summarizes the Islamist traditions shaping *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah*'s ideology as described by Stephane Lacroix.⁴⁴¹

Structurally, *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* did not form a single well-defined organization; instead, they constitute various Islamist movements.⁴⁴² Among them, two main groups “*jama‘at*” are the most prominent: The first group claimed affiliation with the organization of Muslim Brotherhood, and is formed of four loosely connected subgroups. The second group is known as *Sururi*, derived from the name of Syrian *sheikh Mohammad Surur Zayn al-‘Abdin*, who was a scholar, separated from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and set up his own *Salafi-Ikhwani* tradition. It is usually claimed that the latter was the largest *Sahawi* group in the Saudi

⁴³⁸ Eric Rouleau, “Trouble in the Kingdom”, *Foreign affairs* 81, 4 (2002):79.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁰ Stephane Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia and the limits of post-Islamism” in *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam* ed. Asef Bayat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 277.

⁴⁴¹ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 52.

⁴⁴² al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 69.

Kingdom. All the five organizations are formed of hierarchical structures, headed by an advisory council.⁴⁴³




Fig.3: Islamist traditions shaping *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah*'s ideology

The serious consequences of the emergence of this new Islamist ideology in the Saudi state were not foreseen, according to David Commins:

“No one could have foreseen that the Muslim Brothers would successfully spread their ideas in the kingdom and erode Wahhabism’s hegemony. As long as Muslim revivalists supported *Al Sa‘ud*, their doctrinal differences with Wahhabism could be muted and the extent of revivalist inroads into Saudi religious culture undetected. Wahhabism’s soft spot was its political doctrine, which dictates obedience to a ruler unless he commands a believer to violate Islamic law. This puts Wahhabi religious scholars in the position of either defending rulers or offering quiet,

⁴⁴³ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 63.
al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 69-70.

behind the scenes criticism. Muslim revivalists have no compunction about openly denouncing rulers or even striving to depose them ... Revivalist thought offered a platform for political dissent missing in Wahhabism.”⁴⁴⁴

The rise of the Islamist opposition in the Saudi Arabia is back to late 1970s. In addition to the Shiites revolts in the Eastern Province in 1979, in the wake of Iranian revolution, a Sunni rebel was conducted in the same year by *Juhaimān al-‘Utaibi*, who forcibly occupied the Great Mosque in Mecca.⁴⁴⁵ *al-‘Utaibi*’s criticism of the Saudi government as corrupt and illegitimate borrowed many ideas from the *Qutbist* version of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. This could be explained by the fact that *Juhaimān* and some of his group had studied in the University of Madinah, where many members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood were teaching.⁴⁴⁶ Among these members was *Mohammad Qutb*, the brother of *Sayyid Qutb* and who played a key role in construction of *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* ideology, so that he was called by many *sheikh al-ṣaḥwa*.⁴⁴⁷

However, the point of break between the Saudi regime and the *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* was in early 1990s. In this period, two factors challenged the “performance legitimacy” of the Saudi state; First: weakened economy under the rule of King *Fahd*, as a result of the fall of the oil prices in 1980s and a high growth rate of the Saudi population that doubles every twenty years. Therefore, the government capacity to sustain the welfare programmes was cramped. The popular frustration and discontent were further intensified because of the sharp contrast between the economic hardship and the luxury life led the Royal family.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁴ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 5.

⁴⁴⁵ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 401.

⁴⁴⁶ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 78-79.

⁴⁴⁷ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 53.

⁴⁴⁸ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 163.

The second factor, which represented the most serious challenge to the Saudi regime legitimacy, is the Gulf War crisis. A week after *Saddam Hussein's* invasion of Kuwait, King *Fahd* decided to invite the American troops to protect the kingdom from a possible Iraqi threat. This rapid decision, despite the billions of dollars spent by the state on military hardware in 1980s, exposed the regime to charges of incompetency.⁴⁴⁹ Actually, it was not the performance legitimacy that was harmed by this decision only; it was also the religious legitimacy. Although, the official Wahhabi establishment issued a fatwa to support this decision, it was hard to justify in *Shari'ah* terms the invitation of infidels to defend the Islamic Holy Lands and the alliance with them against a Muslim power.⁴⁵⁰

The crisis set off an unprecedented intense public debate inside the Saudi state.⁴⁵¹ Moreover, when it unfolded, *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* was at height of its influence.⁴⁵² They suddenly transformed to be aggressive critics to the Saudi regime and the official Wahhabi religious establishment.⁴⁵³ After the war in 1991, the demands of *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* broadened out into a general call for political reform and not only the withdrawal of the American troops.⁴⁵⁴ It utilized various tools to make pressure on the regime, for example, many petitions signed by hundreds of religious scholars, university professors, and judges were presented to the King *Fahd* during 1990s demanding structural changes in the Saudi state. The

Selvik and Stenslie, *Stability and change in the modern Middle East*, 254-255.

⁴⁴⁹ Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 76.

⁴⁵⁰ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 176.

⁴⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁴⁵² Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 158.

⁴⁵³ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 5.

⁴⁵⁴ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 95.

most important of these petitions were Letter of Demands in spring 1991 and Memorandum of Advice in September 1992.⁴⁵⁵

Both documents did not stop at questioning particular state policies, but they questioned the Saudi state legitimacy in its entirety. And although the opponents did not use the term democracy and use the term *iṣlāh* “reform” instead, they were obviously influenced by the political doctrines of the Islamic democrats.⁴⁵⁶ They “bore the stamp not of Wahhabism but of Muslim Brother-style revivalism.”⁴⁵⁷

The Letter of Demands, for instance, included the call for creation of an advisory council completely independent of the regime, establishment of justice and equality between all members of the society by setting clearly defined rights and duties, acceptance of the principle of accountability for all state officials ‘without exception’, protection the rights of the individual and of the society, removal all restrictions against the will and the rights of the people, and guarantee the human dignity in accord with the norms of *shari‘ah*.⁴⁵⁸ The Memorandum of Advice almost repeated the same points included in the Letter of Demands but in details with harsher criticism and more political language.⁴⁵⁹

On its side, the Saudi regime had to counterattack the criticism of the opponents. The council of the Senior Religious Scholars condemned these petitions that “sows the seeds of dissension and hatred” and “denigrates the state by completely ignoring its qualities, which

⁴⁵⁵ Okruhilk, “Saudi Arabia”, in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 402.

⁴⁵⁶ Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 35.

⁴⁵⁷ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 183.

⁴⁵⁸ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 179-181.

Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 95.

⁴⁵⁹ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 185.

Sadiki, “Saudi Arabia: Re-reading politics and religion in the wake of September 11” in *Islam and political legitimacy*, 35.

indicates the bad intentions of its authors or their ignorance of reality⁴⁶⁰ and finally it states that “The Board confirms that such acts violate the Islamic *Shari‘ah*.”⁴⁶¹ In the same time, the regime offered some concessions in 1992 by issuing the Basic Law of Governance, setting up the Consultative Assembly, and codifying the power structure of the local government,⁴⁶² nevertheless, these amendments actually were ostensible and only justified the status quo political situations. In 1994, the Saudi regime found it is mandatory to use the repression. The leaders of the Islamist groupings and hundreds of its members were arrested and imprisoned for several years.⁴⁶³

The 1994 repression prompted ideological and strategic division between the reformist and radical traditions in *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* trend.⁴⁶⁴ The reformists are who accept the legitimacy of the Saudi government, and therefore, they strive to influence it peacefully and to make it correspond more to their vision of the rightful Islamic state. While the radicals are those who believe that the Saudi regime is illegitimate and strive to overthrow it by either peaceful or violent means.⁴⁶⁵

The radical faction of *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* from mid-1990s became affiliated to al-*Qā‘dah* in the Arabian Peninsula organization, which, according to *Mohammed Ayoob*, was a “product of this marriage between *Qutbist* political ideas and innate puritanism and conservatism of the Wahhabi doctrine.”⁴⁶⁶ *Sheikh Osama bin Laden* himself was one of the *Sahawis*, who became familiar with *Qutbist* ideas while attending King *Abd al-Aziz* University in Jeddah, in the

⁴⁶⁰ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 187.

⁴⁶¹ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 96.

⁴⁶² Hammond, *The Islamic utopia*, 78.

⁴⁶³ Niblock, *Saudi Arabia*, 97.

⁴⁶⁴ Lacroix, “Saudi Arabia and the limits of post-Islamism” in *Post-Islamism: the changing faces of political Islam*, 278.

⁴⁶⁵ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 71.

⁴⁶⁶ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 58.

late 1970s. In this university, he got in contact with *Mohammad Quṭb* and most importantly with *Abd Allah Azzam*, the member of Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and one of the leaders of Afghani Jihad in 1980s.⁴⁶⁷

On the other hand, after their release from jails in early 2000s, the reformist faction of *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah* was transformed into a loyal opposition.⁴⁶⁸ They followed a strategy of co-existence with the regime and worked with it in certain issues as denouncing the terrorism and violence within the Kingdom. Yet, they are still working on spreading their reformist religious and political ideas.⁴⁶⁹

Since Gulf War crisis, the official political and religious Saudi discourse became openly and aggressively criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. For instance, the minister of interior, Prince *Nayif ibn Abd al-Aziz* accused the Muslim Brotherhood of standing behind the violence in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁷⁰ He stated that: "When the situation became difficult for the Muslim Brotherhood . . . they found refuge in the kingdom, which welcomed and protected them, and, after God, guarded their lives . . . We found ways for them to support themselves: some of them became teachers, others university professors—we opened the doors of schools and universities to them. But unfortunately, they had not forgotten their earlier affiliations, and they began to recruit people, to create movements, and they rose up against the kingdom"⁴⁷¹

Also, Sheik *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Latif Al Sheikh*, one of the official Wahhabi clerics argues that "The official *Wahhabiyya* is a call that resulted in the birth of the Islamic state.

⁴⁶⁷ Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, 186.

⁴⁶⁸ Okruhilk, "Saudi Arabia", in *Politics & society in the contemporary Middle East*, 402.

⁴⁶⁹ Ayoob, *The many faces of political Islam*, 59.

⁴⁷⁰ al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 77.

⁴⁷¹ Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, 37.

Traditional Wahhabis protect the state whereas *Sahwis* destroy it. The first manipulates religious texts to support the state while the latter manipulates religious texts to destroy it.”⁴⁷²

Conclusion:

In this thesis, the problematic of competing models of the modern Islamic state is addressed in the case of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood. Based on the Weberian theory of domination and his characterization of the modern state, the differences between the Islamic state models in both Islamist ideologies are contrasted. The aim of the study is to find out what are the differences between both models of the Islamic state and why the Saudi state takes a negative stance from the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

In the beginning, the concept of the Islamic state was discussed. I suggest three main pillars for the definition of the Islamic state: *al-ummah*, which is a compound religious, political, cultural, and sociological term representing the ‘Muslim People’, *al-shari‘ah*, which represents the Divine Islamic law, whose implementation is the *raison d’etre* of the Islamic state, and the *al-khilāfah* or the traditional Islamic political system, in which the Caliph represents the highest political and religious authority.

However, the definition of the Islamic state raises many problematics; for instance: to what extent the Islamic state represents a unique polity that could not be described or discussed using foreign concepts or terms and whether the historical Islamic state was truly Islamic, given that the traditional political Islamic thought was adapted to the *de facto* political deviations. Also, how could the sacred unchangeable part of the Islamic *shari‘ah* be differentiated from the human context-related part included in the jurisprudence "*fiqh*" and manifested in the Islamic historical experience?

⁴⁷² al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State*, 77.

The problematic of the Islamic state is further complicated by the emergence of the modern state, as the latter is characterized by specific patterns of legitimacy, constitutionality, citizenship, and sovereignty, which are totally different from those of the traditional Islamic state. The incompatibility between both state models, according to many authors, is responsible for diversity and distortion of the modern models of the Islamic states.

Then, the study discussed the emergence of Islamism or the phenomenon of political Islamic ideology as a necessary introduction to examine the variable models of the modern Islamic state. It was argued that three main determinants are responsible for ideologization of Islam: First: the political nature of Islam; as Islam is usually described as a political religion, because the Prophet *Muhammad* PBUH built religious-cum-political community, in which, he was the highest authority in both religious and political arenas. Second: the reaction to colonialism; as for many authors, the social, political, and cultural transformations associated with colonialism catalyzed the emergence of the modern political ideologies (secular and Islamist) in the Muslim World. Third: a response to the challenge of modernity; as Islamism was argued to be not only a conservative reaction to modernity, but also, a product of modernity as well as a modernizing agent.

This thesis refutes the myth of monolithic Islamism that is composed of purely divine and context-free doctrines. It was argued that there are different Islamist ideologies, each of them is a net result of a reaction between three different elements: the sacred religious texts, the historical and societal contexts, and the ideological inclination and the personal experiences of the founding ideologues. Among the Islamism, Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood are considered the two major *Sunni* ideologies.

Accordingly, many factors resulted in the differences between the Wahhabi and the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. As regard the historical and societal contexts, the Wahhabi ideology was shaped by the pre-modern tribal milieu of 18th-century Najd and was greatly influenced by the predominating classical *Hanbali* tradition. In addition, the perverted Islamic creeds and religious innovations represented the main challenges to which Wahhabism responded. On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood ideology, in its *Bannaist* and *Qutbist* versions, was shaped by a completely different context. It was the newly-established modern state in Egypt in 1920s and 1930s the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, in case of *Ḥassan al-Bannā*, while the *Qutbist* version of the Brotherhood's ideology was affected by the 1950s and 1960s post-independence Egypt. Obviously, Muslim Brotherhood was faced primarily by modern and political threats (i.e., Westernization, colonialism, secular ideologies and authoritarian military regimes); therefore, it formulated a more politicized and a more mature form of Islamist ideology.

As for the founding ideologue, *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb*, *Ḥassan al-Bannā*, and *Sayyid Quṭb* represent different generations of the Islamic revivalists. *ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* was a classical religious scholar with traditional intellectual resources, while the latter were 'intellectuals', who blended classical Islamic traditions with Western ideologies and doctrines.

As an expected consequence, differences in the historical and societal contexts and in the academic background and ideological inclinations of the founding ideologue resulted in doctrinal variations between Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. Wahhabism had a purely religious reform agenda, concentrating on purification of the religious creeds and rituals from polytheism and innovations. On the other hand, *Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhāb* adopted the classical *Hanbali* political thoughts without any new *ijtihad*. He repeated the same arguments of

ibn Taymiyya that ascribed an authoritarian nature to the Islamic state and justified religiously the dynastic rule.

On contrast, Muslim Brotherhood's ideology was basically political. The main contribution of *Hassan al-Bannā* in the political Islamic thought is his characteristic definition of Islam comprehensiveness and his affirmation that Islam is *din* and *dawlah*. Furthermore, to propagate his ideology, *al-Bannā* established a modern organization and applied different socialization techniques to align its members with the organizations' values and goals. Later on, during the second foundation of Muslim Brotherhood, *Sayyid Quṭb* further politicized and radicalized its ideology. *al-Bannā*'s concept of comprehensive Islam was transformed into a totalitarian idealistic ideology in the *Quṭb*'s concept of *al-hākemiyyah*, and in contrast to *al-Bannā*'s moderate attitude, *Quṭb* adopted a more radical strategy of change.

On applying the Weberian theory of political domination and his characterization of the modern state on the Islamic state models of Wahhabism and Muslim Brotherhood, many essential differences were discovered. The Saudi-Wahhabi model of the modern Islamic state represents an example of traditional domination, with traditional (dynastic and religious) legitimacy, highly centralized and personally vested political power, and patriarchal ruler-citizens relationship.

On the other hand, Muslim Brotherhood's doctrines of the modern Islamic state represent an Islamic version of the Weberian legal domination. In its democratic tradition, it adopts the legal form of legitimacy, divided, institutionalized, and law-bounded power, and a modern concept of citizenship. The radical *Quṭbist* theory of the Islamic state, embodied in his concept of *al-hākemiyyah*, represents an ambiguous contradicting form of domination, blending religious and legal patterns of legitimacy.

In conclusion, the political doctrines of Muslim Brotherhood seem to fiercely challenge the religious base of the Saudi political legitimacy. The Brotherhood's ideology in its both versions (the *Bannaist* and the *Qutbist*) fuels both factions of the Saudi Islamist opposition: the reformists and the radicals; therefore, the spread of the Brotherhood-like form of Islamism, *al-ṣaḥwa al-islāmiyyah*, was associated with severe political unrest and legitimacy crises in the Saudi state. To defend its legitimacy, the Saudi state decided to counterattack the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology since mid-1990s, accusing it of being a deviant and seditious religio-political ideology.

Finally, there are two other topics the thesis suggests for further research and study: First; it is of prime importance to examine Muslim Brotherhood's doctrines about the Islamic state not as theoretical models in the writings of its ideologues and intellectuals, but in reality, in their ruling experiences in different contexts, to verify the genuineness of their political claims and sincerity of their proclaimed ideology. Second; what are the consequences of the Saudi strategy to confront the Muslim Brotherhood's 'threat' and to protect its political legitimacy?. Till now, the confrontational strategy has enabled the Saudi regime to overcome many serious crises, especially during Gulf War and in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. On the other hand, to confront the largest modern Islamic movement and to be involved, directly and indirectly, in its repression will inevitably harm the religious base of the legitimacy of the Saudi state; the state that always claims to be the main defender of Islam and the sincere supporter of its cause.

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