Divided, they win? a case study of the new political generation in Egypt since 25th January 2011

Sanaa El-Banna

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Divided, They Win?
A Case Study of the New Political Generation in Egypt since 25th January 2011

A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Political Science

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts

By
Sanaa El-Banna

Under the supervision of
Dr. Heba Raouf Ezzat

July/2012
To my dear parents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SCAF: Supreme Council of Armed Forces

SSA: State Security Agency

CSA: Central Security Agency

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

GBG: the General Board of Guidance

FJP: Freedom and Justice Party

SC: Salafyo Costa Movement

EC: Egyptian Current Party

WAKS: We Are All Khaled Saed FaceBook Page

UA: Ultras Ahlawy Football Community

DIY: Do It Yourself

NDP: National Democratic Party

NSM: New Social Movements

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the political culture of the new political generation in Egypt after 25th January 2011. It aims at examining the reasons behind generational conflicts on the new political landscape. It defines political generation as ‘a group of people who have been subject to common social and political (...) influences and circumstances that shape their political values, attitudes, and signify their sharing of an essential destiny’. Hence, generations are defined in terms of political culture, rather than age groups. The study examines six suggestive cases: The National Movement for Change–Kefaya–, the 6th of April, the We Are All Khaled Saed, the Egyptian Current Party, the Salafyo Costa movement and Ultras Ahlawy football community. Through examining formative experiences, ideological composition and organizational forms, values, symbols, strategies, and inter-relationships, I aim at resolving one research problem: The significant variation within the political culture of the new generation deepens conflicts both within the emergent Generation and with the Muslim Brotherhood– on various ideological issues and political strategies. Also, it stimulates ideological transformation and threatens to upgrade political authoritarianism.

In order to develop a 'grounded', knowledge of the subject, the study, first, examines reasons behind the MB’s failure to co-opt the new generation both before and after the 25th January. Secondly, It examines the formative socio-political experiences of each generational unit. Thirdly, I report the interview findings on ideological and organizational manifestations and, finally, I analyze the results in order to understand the reasons behind generational conflicts and how they might lead into upgrading Mubarak’s authoritarianism.

This research provides future studies with elementary background on the situation, its main actors, their inter-relationships and possible means of resolving their conflicts. I use two integrative methods of qualitative research: ethnographic semi-structured interviews with members of the new political generation and ‘participation as observer’. Data culled from primary and secondary sources is analyzed through conceptual analysis tool to examine the undergoing transformation and possible means to resolve the conflict.

The study concludes that there are four intertwined lines through which generational conflicts evolved: a) problems either withered away or got replaced by new problems, b) a change and/or loss of leadership, mobilizable resources and sympathy, c) the rise of unexpected generational cooperation, and d) one generation topple or liquidate the other.
CHAPTER I
DEFINING THE SITUATION

1.1 Background

In theory, the resignation of ex-president Mubarak on February 11th signified the beginning of an interim period under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). By refusing to open gunfire on civilians, the SCAF was widely perceived as the protector of the January 25th Revolution and the sole representative of national sovereignty. It was generally compared to the Tunisian Army that stood against the ex-president Zein EL-Abedin Ben Ali. On such basis, the SCAF enjoyed massive support as implied in one of the most widespread chants—’the army and the nation are one hand’.

After more than a year since the 25th January Revolution, the trials of Mubarak and his chief officials ended up with rebuttable rulings: (dismissal) of the charges—of ordering the killing of peaceful protestors—in the case of Al-Adly chief executives, and sentencing Mubarak and Al-Adly a life-long imprisonment in ‘proto-Turah’⁴. Despite the SCAF’s promises that violations of human rights would stop after the Revolution, many incidents—starting with Atfih (March 4th), Muqattam (March 8th), Abu Qurqas, (April 19th), Imbaba (May 7th), Israeli embassy (September 12th), Maspero (October 9th), Mohammed Mahmoud (November 19-27), Al-Qasr El-Einy and Ministerial Council (December 15th-23ed), Abbasiya Square (May 4th, 2012), scrutinize the brutality of the SCAF-backed Military Police and Central Security Forces that out-weighted the former Interior Minister’s crimes during the 18-day Revolution. During 2011, a total number of 2286 deaths, 7811 injuries—of these 324 eye injuries (personal communication with Tahrir field-doctors), 27 virginity tests on female protestors, and around 11,879 detention case—of these 7080 were tried before

⁴ A sarcastic name of Egypt’s most luxurious prison where some former NDP members, ex-ministers, business tycoons and Mubarak’s two sons-Gamal and Alaa- have gathered.
military tribunals between the period from January 28- August 29, 2011\(^5\)–indicate the SCAF's indifference of– and/or actual involvement into– the brutal crackdowns on protestors. It failed to undertake meaningful changes to protect civil rights and freedoms. Moreover, it enabled an active operation of Mubarak’s deep state structures–Interior Ministry, security-intelligence agencies, and corrupt Business networks that recently provided two candidates for the presidential elections.

The SCAF has followed progressive steps to deepen the divide between the socio-political forces over a number of ideological, religious and generational lines. These steps included: a) spreading inflammatory information about youth movements over state-run and private TV and radio channels, b) enabling armies of out-of-uniform officers and thugs to deepen socio-political frictions: e.g., Muslim-Christian tensions in Imbaba (7\(^{th}\) May) and Maspero (9\(^{th}\) October), c) enabling select political groups to access power centres and ministerial resources–the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, dependent on their success in ‘placating–(and dividing)–the masses’\(^6\) and d) distorting the public image of the Tahrir protestors, that justified the massacre and detention of revolutionary activists.

By enabling weak and ineffective political rivals to lead the parliament, the SCAF succeeded in ‘criminalizing’ direct practice of civil and political rights–especially protests and strikes, digital opposition and transnational civil activism–while threatening the parliament of eminent dissolve. Thus, it skillfully consolidated a state of ‘safe presence’ by co-opting the MB into its strategic interests. Meanwhile, it divided competitive secular forces around the effectiveness of an MB led parliament under the Ganzoury government that


sucked the country into successive gasoline and electricity crisis. By discrediting the MB before the public opinion and instigating political fragmentation, the SCAF secured a 48.3 percentage of electoral vote to the Mubarak’s former prime minister, Ahmad Shafiq, who ran for presidential elections against Mohamed Morsi, the MB candidate.

The contending actors on the current socio-political landscape are tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Position on the agency-structure continuum</th>
<th>Viewpoint on change</th>
<th>Means of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The MB</td>
<td>Structured</td>
<td>Gradual change</td>
<td>Electoral long-run channels of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 25th January generation</td>
<td>Liquid, Agency-driven activism</td>
<td>Fundamental change</td>
<td>Anomic protests and strikes, direct contestation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deep state structures</td>
<td>Structured</td>
<td>Anti-change</td>
<td>1- Direct coercion, liquidation, imprisonment and detention, 2- indirect coercion: spreading seditious mis-information on state-run and private media outlets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: classification of actors on the political landscape

This study acknowledges the role of the SCAF in leading the counter-revolution, through deepening the divides among the socio-political forces. Nevertheless, it upholds that a significant distinction of the new generation’s political culture deepens political conflicts and enables counter-revolutionary forces to retain political and socio-economic influence.
The growing frustration among the new political generation renders its main channel of political expression – spontaneous and anomic protests–both ‘hazardous and costly’\(^7\). In addition, it further contests the parliament’s legitimacy while the latter’s majority delegitimizes protests and strikes, this time on religious bases– e.g., the *fatwa* prohibiting popular strike on 11\(^{th}\) February 2012.

In fact, the generational conflict reflects a dynamic situation of socio-political transformation. The ideological structures fragment under revolutionary political, social and economic activism. The MB has divided into three political parties besides the official FJP: the Justice, the Development, and the Egyptian Stream parties. Similarly, the Salafi Light party is expected to fragment as the Salafi movement in general demonstrates new variations, e.g., Salafyo Costa. To put it in a broader frame, an entire generation has grown out of Mubarak’s straightjacket structures and challenged the pre-set ‘codes’, checks and balances and hierarchical stratification of political opposition in Egypt. The emergent generation locates itself on common and overlapping areas in-between the structured ideologies and aspires to mobilize public support via loosely structured platforms–networks, groups, and communities.

If the divide between the electoral institutions and the street–represented by the new political generation– continues, the 25\(^{th}\) January Revolution will have only contributed to ‘upgrading (political) authoritarianism’\(^8\). This tendency is indicated through the SCAF’s policies that include: a) ‘managing political contestation’\(^9\)– by expanding political/electoral arenas, b) ‘appropriating civil societies’\(^10\) and (c) ‘capturing the benefits of selective

\(^7\) Ibid, 161


\(^9\) Ibid, 5

\(^10\) Ibid.
economic reforms—by, possibly, re-nationalizing public sector enterprises that were previously under the military control—, securing ‘Safe Survival’ of deep state structures and rallying national resources in support of pro-Mubarak presidential candidates.

To reverse this tendency, generational conflicts should be either mitigated or, possibly, resolved. To this end, this dissertation provides an early attempt to identify the emergent political generation in terms of the varied positions it occupies vis-a-vis the Egyptian society, state, and the agency-structure continuum. In this way, it aims at exploring the reasons behind generational conflicts and providing future studies with preliminary information on the subject. The following section identifies where this research stands regarding previous and, possibly, undergoing studies on the subject area.

1.2. Review of the Literature

At the subject level, a number of studies instruct the use of a) generational and inter-generational conflict theories in the study of various movements, and b) the study of the role of youth in the Egyptian Revolution.

Additional studies are reviewed in more detail as they provide both substantive and methodological assistance to my study. These are: Ward’s work on ideology and generations12 and Quiring’s work13 on intra-generational relationships.

In her study of ideology and generations, Ward concludes that the literature on generations has overlooked the ‘self-constructing qualities of generational perspectives, the variability within the cohort, the impact of different segments of the cohort on one another, and the impact of the new generation on the old’14. The generational theory literature,

11 Ibid.
14 Ward, 516
concludes Ward, could be classified into five categories. These include: (a) Social revolutions—represented by Mannheim, Pinder, Mead and Friedenberg—, (b) progressive continuity: change is limited to 'further expansion of the already existing tendencies'—represented by Feuer and Adelson\textsuperscript{15}, (c) generational relationships as means of solidarity—represented by Campbell, Douvan and Adelson, and Walsh, and finally (d) Ward’s mutual regulations perspective into generational relationships that focuses on social change as the main factor affecting the process rather than the outcome of generational relationships. Ward raps up her argument as follows: If 'feedback loops' are intact, progressive continuity between generations is possible; by contrast, if severed, then social revolution is more probable\textsuperscript{16}. This work provides a background of my explorative study of generational conflict that manifest one or more of these perspectives of the generational theory.

Secondly, the study by Quiring examines the influence of young activists in the New Democratic Party (NDP) of Saskatchewan. The youth, in her study, demonstrated two main attitudes: conservative incorporation into the party’s traditional structure, and the ‘new-left extra parliamentarians’ who followed a confrontational policy to realize fundamental change in both the party structure and their society\textsuperscript{17}. This work provides an example of conservative and revolutionary generational units that compete over various platforms and resources for public activism– a case represented in the new generation in Egypt, whose units both contest the traditional orthodox structures and, nevertheless, need their platforms to realize political representation.

Also, my research represents a continuation to the mounting studies of the Egyptian revolution and the Arab spring\textsuperscript{18}. A broad and necessary description of the role of youth in

\textsuperscript{15} Ward, 517
\textsuperscript{16} Ward, 518
\textsuperscript{17} Quiring.
the 25th Revolution is offered in El-Sharnouby’s work on youth and the 25th of January revolution, in which she explains how the perception of youth has changed from being a source of hope in times of Abdul-Nasser into a burden on the country’s national resources since the 1970s. On this regard, her work aligns with Al-Shakry’s emphasis on the perception of youth as indulging into ‘political apathy, “illicit” sexual activities and a failure to acknowledge the social and economic realities of everyday life’. To El-Sharnouby, the revolution proved the youth’s capability of changing the status quo and merited their ‘national’ responsibility. Nevertheless, it has changed–only temporarily– the exclusionary perceptions of, and practices towards, the youth. The lack of political experience, their dependence on family income and the growing tendency towards stability, all discredited young candidates in their bid for parliamentary seats in 2011.

El-Sharnouby’s thesis provides substantive as well as methodological platform for my work. Her use of Mannheim’s generational theory oscillates interchangeably between its two meanings–age-groups and cohorts; she points out to the determinants of intra-generational


20 Omnia El Shakry. “Youth As Peril and Promise: The Emergence of Adolescent Psychology in Postwar Egypt”.  
conflicts: class, gender, religion and age\textsuperscript{21}–which indicate a use of ‘generation’ as a ‘cohort’– while describing youth initiation of 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolution as one face on parent-children inter-generational conflict.

Nevertheless, EL-Shernouby’s work provides a valuable source of the revolutionary generation’s experiences. Having participated in some of their initiatives/movements, she explains a number of the generation’s characteristics: lack of mobilization and organization skills, anger towards structured ideologies, hybridity, etc.\textsuperscript{22} Taking EL-Shernouby’s work as a starting point, my thesis provides two lines of continuation. First, I treat the 25\textsuperscript{th} January political generation as a ‘cohort’ that intersects with various age groups, ideological currents and socio-organizational forms. Secondly, I explore the main characteristics of the generational units in a way to understand their inter-relationships and reasons behind conflict with the older generation.

1.3. Research Problem, Questions and Objectives

The significant variation within the political culture of the new generation deepens generational conflicts on various ideological issues and political strategies, stimulates ideological transformation and threatens to upgrade political authoritarianism.

Having analyzed the scene, the examination of this problem requires a study of the existing ideological map and political structures—represented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Coalition</th>
<th>Highly Structured</th>
<th>Low-structured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The MB</td>
<td></td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kefaya</td>
<td></td>
<td>Salafiyo Costa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{21} EL-Sharnouby, 67
\textsuperscript{22} ibid. 70-3.
The study follows a line of inquiry towards one main question: What are the ideological, organizational, and cultural characteristics of the new political generation? In doing so, the study investigates the following sub-questions:

1. Why did the MB fail in co-opting the new political generation both before and after the 25th of January?
2. What are the formative socio-political experiences that of various new generational units?

This study takes up as its mission to realize the following objectives:

1. Explore the characteristics of the new political generation— their inter-relations and areas where their viewpoints meet and diverge.
2. Explore the following patterns of linkages that outline the study:
   — Ideological and socio-organizational dys-functioning— failure to co-opt the 25th January generation
   — Formative socio-political experience—the emergence of a new political culture
   — Diffusion and generational conflict- upgrading political authoritarianism
3. provide future studies with elementary background on the situation, its main actors, their inter-relationships and possible means of resolving their conflicts.

1.4. The Theoretical Framework

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23 In this research post ideology refers to a drive towards suspending ideological contestation ‘out there’ and focusing on ‘action plan’ to enhance socio-political conditions and overcoming various aspects of social injustices. However, the lack of ideological consciousness does not defy the fact that political attitudes and electoral choices may reflect subtle ideological orientations.
For the purpose of this research, the generational theory is recognized as the most suitable approach to the nature and motives of the ongoing transformation in Egypt. It provides higher recognition to the role of human agency without indulging into the socio-psychological tradition of studies of collective action. This research will couple conceptual analyses to the ideological and organizational characteristics of the new political generation’s culture.

The idea of generational conflict has received considerable attention in founding Western literature. Plato, for instance, recognized generational strife as one force for social change, while Aristotle realized that, sometimes, political revolutions arise in response to ‘conflict between fathers and sons’. In modern times, literature on the concept dates back to the 1860s with Dilthey’s volumes on culture and historical sciences. His famous contribution to generational studies is the definition of generation as ‘signification for the relation of contemporaneity of individuals (i.e) those who matured concurrently’. In the 1920s and 1930s, studies of generations provided a number of useful definitions that attribute the concept to kinship, cohort, life stage, and historical period. The concept’s various connotations where exhausted in studies of social anthropology, demography and/or sociology.

Nevertheless, it was only with Mannheim’s instructive piece, the Problem of Generations, that a systematic and developed theory of generations started to gain

26 Cited in Jacob Owensby. Dilthey and the Narrative of History. (USA–Cornell University press, 1994), 131
28 Ibid, 126-7
prominence in social sciences. Along the quantitative-qualitative divide in social science methodology, two antagonist schools have treated the issue of generation: positivism and romantic history\textsuperscript{30}. While the quantitative assessment of generations inherits a modern conception of linear historical progression, the romantic historical school, on the contrast, demonstrates how generations contest the deterministic path of history\textsuperscript{31}. Through Dilthey’s conception of the ‘interior time’, Mannheim believes history of intellectual movements could be examined through the unit of generation that emphasizes the influence of shared experiences—intellectual, social and political circumstances—in shaping the intellect of a generation despite the chronological sequence that might appear between its various currents\textsuperscript{32}. The idea of \textit{interior time} has in fact alleviated the threat of indulging into arithmetic mysticism to rather applying qualitative techniques of research and intuitive skills to understand the experiences that shape contemporary individuals of a generation. Hence, instead of mathematical classification of generations, the subjectively \textit{experience-able time and contemporaneity} define various generations\textsuperscript{33}.

Mannheim further develops Dilthey’s conception of \textit{interior time} by referring to Pinder’s notion of ‘contemporaneity of the contemporaneous’\textsuperscript{34}—the coexistence of different generational units in the same real time, while each live a distinctive experience. In such a way, Pinder challenges Zeitgeist’s ‘\textit{the Spirit of an epoch}’—that claims a unified overarching experience lived by different generations within specific intervals\textsuperscript{35}. Towards these contradictory views, Mannheim takes a middle position; he considers the spirit of the epoch a unitary, rather than an organic, entity. He recognizes the biological bases of ‘generation’ as

\textsuperscript{30}ibid, 276
\textsuperscript{31}ibid, 281
\textsuperscript{32}ibid.
\textsuperscript{33}ibid, 282
\textsuperscript{34}ibid, 285
\textsuperscript{35}ibid, 284, 313
he states "the sociological phenomenon of generations is ultimately based on the biological rhythm of birth and death’. However, he recognizes the fact that sociological and historical factors contest the deterministic sequential ordering of generations on, e.g., thirty-year intervals.\(^\text{36}\)

Mannheim, while according the waves of generation, emphasizes that particular historical experiences may define a ‘generational unit’ vis a vis other groups in the same actual/biological generation. Formative historical experiences are reflected on ‘integrative attitudes and formative principles’ that join similarly located individuals as well as ‘spatially separated ones who may never come into personal contact at all'.\(^\text{37}\) Thus, spatial closure and contemporaneity are of only potential significance; ‘when similarly located contemporaries participate in a common destiny (….), ideas, (...) concepts, (...) a generation as an actuality is constituted’.\(^\text{38}\) Mannheim emphasizes that within such a community with shared interests—the actual generation, different and even antagonistic generational units may arise, demonstrating different ‘identiti(ies) of responses, certain affinity(ies) in the way in which all move with, and are formed by their own experiences’.\(^\text{39}\) Such a ‘parallelism in responses’ reinforces binding ties and personal connections between members of the same unit regardless of their age and spatial differences.\(^\text{40}\)

Most historians accept Mannheim’s theory of the social generation that represents a particular identity of location and embraces related ‘age-groups’ that experience similar socio-historical processes.\(^\text{41}\) Sometimes Mannheim’s and Ortega y Gasset’s conception of

\(^{36}\) Ibid, 290  
^{37}\) Ibid, 304-6  
^{38}\) Ibid, 306.  
^{39}\) Ibid.  
^{40}\) Ibid, 307.  

generation are referred to as ‘cohorts’, to differentiate its meaning from the familial connotation of ‘generation’. However, successive literature on generation by Heberle, 1951, Eisenstadt, 1956, Rintala 1968, and Esler, 1984 has generally retained a qualifier that indicates shared socio-historical experiences—by adding ‘social’ or ‘political’ adjectives to ‘generation’.

My dissertation adopts Mannheim’s theory in two ways. Firstly, I emphasize that socio-political experiences are reflected into a common political culture—believes, expressive symbols and values—that results into a distinctive political imagination of authority, state and society. Secondly, I utilize the term ‘political generation’, defined as ‘a group of people who have been subject to common social and political (...) influences and circumstances’ that shape their political values, attitudes, and signify their sharing of an essential destiny. As political generations overlap across time intervals that host major events—wars, revolutions, etc.—their political values, symbols and beliefs contend and converge across various age groups and, thus, provide basis for ideological transformation.

For the purpose of this study, political Generation is defined with particular characteristics that describe contentious political cultures within and between present generation; thus, it transcends time, age, and location barriers while being shaped, partially, by common structures—historical, economic and socio-political experiences.

For the purpose of this research, political culture refers to ‘the political knowledge, beliefs, emotions, and values of a people’, that is ‘interwoven in their daily practices’ and reflect in its various paradigms the contentious relationships between Generation(s). The

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43 Cited in Spitzer,1354
44 Klecka, 8
45 Rintala, 516-7
concept emerged out of structural behaviorist approaches to social sciences with the work of Almond and Verba *The Civic Culture*. Almond and Verba provided a highly generalized concept of political culture that measure attitudes, believes and values through survey and questionnaires. This bared little reverence to the cultural differences between Western, mainly the U.S, and non-Western countries. Later refinement to the concept adopted a dynamic reading of the events and situations as reflective of changing, usually contentious, political values, believes and attitudes among elite and non-elite classes. Various contours of the concept began to gain prominence with the work of Elkins in 1979, where he relates political culture to ‘dispositions’ and ‘mind-sets’. Values, believes, and symbols are parts of the political culture of contentious generations that deploy different dimension of power, and hold different perception of the ‘political’, the banal state, and the socio-organization of collective activism.

This leads us to the various forms of inter-generational conflict that may occur on basis of distinctive membership, experiences, values, structure, challenges and destiny. In his study of youth generations in the 1960s, Braungart develops the Generational Unit Model to determine the influence of socio-historical factors on generational behavior. In his words ‘The generational unit model predicts that chronological age alone will not determine generational behavior, but exposure to select historical, social, and cultural factors in combination with a new psychological consciousness and common destiny will explain

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49 See Rintala, 510

generation units”\textsuperscript{51}. By emphasizing the psychological consciousness, Braungart argues that his model is workable for studies of relationships both between and within political generations, as well as longitudinal studies of generational transformation\textsuperscript{52}.

In another article, Braungart reaffirms that generational units involve both intra-generational and intergenerational conflict, when youth movements compete both between each other and within groups of their actual generations on certain social and political goals\textsuperscript{53}. Intergenerational conflict emerges when a new generation eschews values, norms and practices of a dominant generation, and thus discontinues the lineage of institutional bonds in the society. Conflict takes two forms: ‘de-authorization of the adult generation and authorization of the youth generation’. The first form is indicated through ‘open rejection, attack and destruction of the values, norms and authority of the older generation’ (ibid). Meanwhile, legitimating the goals of the new generation, and acknowledging its ‘indigenous’ values and norms that transcend and replace those of the older generation indicate the other form of conflict\textsuperscript{54}.

The intergenerational conflict provides the new generation with an opportunity to openly compete with units within the new generation that are either spontaneous or opted by groups of the old generation\textsuperscript{55} the intra-generational is motivated by the absence of institutional frames that authorize and legitimate any of the new generation’s values and utopian goals; especially since new generational units tend to take extreme positions regarding both their ideals and means to achieve their goals\textsuperscript{56}.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, 46
\textsuperscript{52} ibid, 50
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 114-5.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} ibid, 115-6
Although intra-generational competition and conflict may occur along left and right alignments, the new generation in general shares a heightened sense of collectiveness and ‘consciousness’. Their competition is on the definition and control of the reality. The challenge of modern societies is not to inhibit or destroy the creative impulse of the new generation, but ‘to move it (…) to a more rational political forum where competition over ideas and resources can be addressed and negotiated peacefully\(^57\)—that is, to empower their participation in public policies, executive and legislative processes.

Generational conflicts may evolve through four intertwined lines: a) problems either withered away or got replaced by new problems, b) a change and/or loss of leadership, mobilizable resources and sympathy, c) the rise of unexpected generational cooperation, and d) one generation topple or liquidate the other.

In conclusion, the theoretical leanings of my research are eclectic. While revolutions, protests, strikes and alike forms of political participation are forms of collective action, the distinctive experiences, ideological leanings, values, believes, symbols—in short political cultures—result into diverse political imagination that guide concerted forms of action and chart the dividing lines between contending generations. Hence, the literature on Generational conflict, political culture and ideological transformation instruct this study.

1.5. Methodology

The ‘craftsmanship’\(^58\) of qualitative research involves the ‘studied use and collection of empirical material—case study; personal experience; introspection; life story; interview; artifact; (…)—that describe routine and problematic moments and meaning’\(^59\). The study has integrally depended on most of these sources in a way to study groups as ‘social units rather

\(^{57}\) ibid, 133.


than individuals”. This approach enabled the study of the meaning, the context, the structure and the processes of concerted forms of action. As one of its variants, case studies are considered the most common form of qualitative research in social sciences, since they provide in-depth understanding of deviant, typical, or critical cases.

In doing so, the study have employed ethnographic tools to explore the characteristics of the new political generation. Ethnography was used in terms of "motivated actions of people (that) reflect (their) background and experiences of the world” such as protesting, forming political parties, blogging and creating media products. Such information were sought through ‘participation as observer’ in various protests and strikes between the period from September 2011-April 2012, and focus group in-depth interviewing that allows participants to 'own' and 'take over' the interviewing space. This also enabled accessing the collectively shared, local and every-day knowledge of socio-political actors.

The choice of six generational units was based on the expected level of differentiation they provide to the emergent political generation, despite the fact that while collecting data, new generational unit where emerging–e.g., Hazemoun Salafi group and Sayha Ikhwaniyya (A MB Scream). The focus group interviews were possible in certain cases—the UA, the Salafiyato Costa, WAKS and the EC. In other case–Kefaya and 6th of April– only one participant provided the information on the group, due to over-occupation with group-related responsibilities. To avoid discrepant information, observation, personal communication and secondary resources were sought for detailed comprehension of the cases. The interviews

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61 Robert, Stake. “Case Studies”. In Handbook of Qualitative Research, ibid.


64 G. Kemberelis and G. Dimitriadis. “Focus Groups: Strategic Articulation of Pedagogy, and Inquiry”. In Handbook of Qualitative Research, ibid, 903.
involved a majority of male participants, and sometimes it infiltrated either group meetings or strike/protest activities—such as with the UA and the EC. Focus groups aimed at interviewing participants from various backgrounds and/or organizational positions. In some cases—in which meetings or phone calls interrupt the interviews—continuation with individual members revealed a slight change in the opinion questions. To mitigate the possibility of subtle distortion, those individuals were contacted individually over phone to ensure their answers are complete and representative.

In-depth interviews ensured a relative validity of data, since participants were interviewed in sufficient detail for the results to be taken as correct, complete, and representative. The sampling of interviewees was based on a purposive sampling strategy with double-sided criteria that combines both the field activists and those who possess ‘soft power’ and low media exposure. Interviewees were researched by methods of observation, desk researching, and recommendation that was sought from primary contacts. Primary contacts were selected on basis of their expected level of experience and engagement in 'street' activism, on one hand, and on their trustworthiness on the other, in order to ensure a minimum level of trust while conducting interviews.

The size of the interview sample depended on the expected level of variation within each unit. An indicator of this criterion was when additional participants started to produce redundant material. Interviews were loosely structured to allow for adaptation of the interview questions to different interviewees. All interviews were preceded by participant’s ‘informed consent’ to use their data for research purposes. The interviews were recorded on a Dictaphone device coupled with hand-written documentation; both will be erased on August 2012. These measures will be taken to ensure that the study area doesn’t entail potential harm for the informants.

The research—by using integrative tools of qualitative and case study research—aims at developing 'grounded' knowledge of the new political generation. This included examination of the socio-political experiences that formed the generational units, the ideological, organizational, and cultural characteristics that reveal the nature of their political culture and imagination.

1.6. The Analytical Framework

The material culled through interviews and secondary resources was organized and analyzed by means of conceptual analysis. A number of contributions have developed the use of conceptual analysis to unpack the dialectic of thought and practice. According to Gregor, concepts are “public signs that refer to groups, categories, or collections of things, events, impressions, or relations between them”\(^{67}\). The study of such concepts, according to Weitz, should observe the need to keep them open and unbound to definitive sets of properties, conditions or criteria\(^{68}\)– especially when they are re-constructed by a revolutionary political generation.

To achieve this level of ‘understanding’, a complementary tool, conceptual integration networks, guides the analysis of interview results. Conceptual integration tools has been developed by Fauconnier and Turner\(^ {69}\) as a method to sort out spaces of meaning and highlight the interconnectedness of mental spaces (inputs), the cross-space mapping, the generic space, and the resulting blended space of meaning, which is carried through the interviewees’ information. For this purpose, the inter-linkages between generational units are

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\(^{66}\) Spradley, 10

\(^{67}\) A. Gregor. *An Introduction to Metapolitics: a Brief Inquiry into the conceptual Language of Political Science.* (Free Press, 1971), 122.


highlighted as means to understand the blended space of meaning they create during the interviews.

In conclusion, the study follows a line of inquiry as follows: I first examine the reasons behind the MB’s failure to co-opt the new generation both before and after the 25th January. Secondly, I examine the formative socio-political experiences and recent evolution of each of the six units. Thirdly, I report the interview findings on the organizational, ideological and cultural characteristic of the new generation and, finally, analyze the reasons behind current generational conflicts and how they lead into upgrading Mubarak authoritarianism.
CHAPTER II
MIRRORING THE ENEMY: THE MB’S STRUCTURED OPPOSITION

The MB has been widely perceived as the real popular opposition of Mubarak regime. However, the revolution was undertaken and led by actors outside the matrix of structured opposition. This chapter examines the ideological and socio-organizational mis-functioning inside the MB that widened the chasm between its various age groups and 25th January generation. Put differently, it seeks to understand the reasons behind the MB’s failure to realize the undergoing socio-political transformation on the street, and why has the new generation been unable to undertake its activities within the existing oppositional structures. This part assumes that the new political generation revolted against two forms of ‘political disciplining’: the disciplining of political opposition by Mubarak’s regime and the disciplining of internal opposition by the MB leadership.

This chapter closely examines the MB for a number of reasons. Firstly, the MB represents one of the oldest opposition forces in the socio-political landscape–established in 1928–and has been widely perceived as the real competitor to Mubarak tyranny. Secondly, although the MB’s discourse draws popular sympathy towards its ideology, symbols and slogans–as shown in voting behavior of Egyptians in 2005 and 2011 elections–a growing number of activists escape the movement, eschew its values and norms of practice, and discontinue the institutional bonds. A number of former MB members founded and/or participated in various forms of ‘open’ de-structured activities: the 6th of April, We Are All Khaled Saed, Kefaya, Ultras Ahlway, the Egyptian Current, and Salafiyo Costa. It is notable that each movement has among its founders and/or leaders one or more of former MB activists–resigned or/and dismissed. Also, each of these movements has contentious relationship with the MB–as indicated through the interview results–, especially since the divide centres around the governmental authority. Hence, the study assumes that much of the
new political generation’s activism has been ‘reactive’ to the ideological and structural crises that the MB experiences. I draw upon a consortium of primary and secondary resources—narratives, autobiographies, life experiences of former leaders and the researcher herself, as well as the movement’s own literature. The following sections proceed as follows: firstly, I expand some aspects of the ideological crisis of the MB, secondly, I deal with subsequent socio-organizational dilemmas, and finally, the recent political strategies of the MB before January 25th.

2.1. The Ideological Crisis of the MB

The Letters, authored by al Banna during the 1930-1940s, represent the constituent literature of the MB. It promoted a reform movement described as a ‘flowing spirit in the Ummah’s heart’\(^{70}\). It aimed at socio-political and economic reform through building grassroot networks of schools, factories, NGOs, parties, mosques, etc. Al Banna identified the MB ‘society’ as ‘a Salafi call, a Sunni sect, a political party, a sports group, a scientific and cultural collectivity, and economic organization and a social idea’\(^{71}\). The rejection to restrict his ‘idea’ in institutional structures reflected al Banna’s emphasize on the ‘Muslim Ummah’ as an ultimate value that transcends particular political, socio-organizational and cultural manifestations\(^{72}\). Hence, the Brothers society has initially been accessible to members of various class, religious, ideological, gender and age affiliations; e.g., it incorporated thirty Christian members into the Sports Section and employed a Christian deputy to its first General Guide—Hassan al Banna\(^{73}\).


\(^{71}\) ibid, 122-3,48-9

\(^{72}\) A broad elaboration on this conception of Ummah is available at Mona Abul-Fadl. *Al-Ummah Al-Quṭb: Nahwa Ta‘seel Menhajy Le Maḥhoum Al Ummah Fi Al-Islam* (Cairo, Al-Shorouk AlDawliyah publication, 2005) 55-7.

With the rise of state suppression under the Nasserite regime (1952-1970), a sharp ideological texture started to define the MB. During the 1960s, the MB literature, led by Qutb’s *Milestones*, revived a Motazalite definition of faith as to include ‘belief and practice’, which served the need for absolute and secret organizational commitment under authoritarian rule. Hence, the literature emphasized the alignment of religious practices, daily language, symbols, chants, and individuals’ political imagination to the directions of the MB leadership, being the sole organized activity in the Muslim Ummah. The transformation in the MB conception of faith has coupled other organizational values, such as absolute trust, obedience, sacrifice and self-denial. During the recent decades, the consequences crystalized in a set of structural and ideological problems that segregated the movement into nationwide socio-economic and political ‘enclaves’. The following paragraphs provide further elaboration on such phenomenal transformation.

Since the 1960s, the MB literature began to focus on secret organization and soldiership that rejected existing political authority and aimed at establishing the ‘Islamic State’. An indicator of such transformation is Mashhur’s argument in *Question along the Way* that establishing the ‘Islamic state’ is a responsibility of individual Muslims, rather than rulers or a’lims. Such responsibility dictates that individuals commit themselves to a concerted form of activism that provides a *hardcore basement* of the ‘Islamic state’. The

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74 Sayyid Qutb. *Milestones*. (Cairo, Dar al-Ilm, 1964)
75 Tariq Al-Bishry. *Al Malameh Al-Amma Le Al-Fikr Al-Siyasi Al-islamy fi Al-Tareekh Al- Mo’aser* (The General Characteristics of the Islamic Political Thought in Modern History) (Cairo, Al-Shorouk Publication, 2005), 33
76 S. Hawwa. *Doros Fi al-Amal Al-Islamy* (Lessons in the Islamic activism) (Cairo, Dar Al Salam for Print, Publication and Dissimination, 1981); ———Al-Madkhal Le Da’wat Al Ikhw’ Al Muslemeen (The Enterance to the Muslim brotherhood Call) (Cairo, Dar Al Salam for Print, Publication and Dissimination, 1984); M. Mashhour, *AL-Da’wah Ela Allah: Al-Da’wah Al-Fardiyya* (The Call to Allah: the One-on-one Call). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’a wa al Nashr al Islamiya, 1981), ———, *Al-Qaed Al-Qudwah A’la Tareeq Al-Da’wah* (The Role-Model Leader on the Road of Da’wah). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’a wa al Nashr al Islamiya, 1990), ————. *Al-Tayyar Al-Islamy Wa Dawruhu Fil Bina’* (The Islamic Stream and its Role on Building). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’wa al Nashr al Islamiya, 1987).
77 Mostafa Mashhour, *Question along the Way* (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamiya 1986).
organizational commitment was preferred to attainment of abstract knowledge, resorting to mystical affiliation–Sufism, or focusing on philanthropic public services. Individual commitment to organized and planned form of collective action was instructed as obligatory as his/her obligation to establish the Islamic state. By arguing that the MB is the only organization that attained sufficient experience in the field of Islamic activism, Mashhor affirms that the MB targets establishing a super-national Islamic state that unifies Islamic nations around the globe. On the same line, Hawwa argues it is not permissible for any Muslim to resign from the MB to join other movements, since the MB is the only organization that can unify Muslims.

Absolute obedience and soldiership were highlighted in the 1990s literature as ultimately important during the execution phase of the ‘Islamic project’. Such phase starts when a member is promoted from ‘sympathizer’ to ‘active’ membership; in other words, when a personal profile is opened in one’s name. Personal information in such document extends to cover a range of fifty to sixty years of a member’s life-cycle, in which durable commitment and obedience became a sin qua non for further promotion along the hierarchy. In order to establish the ‘Islamic State’, the 1960s literature followed a static interpretation of al Banna’s Ta’alim letter that assigned strict rules of trust, obedience, soldiership, and sacrifice of MB’s Secret Apparatus– whose mission was to fight against the English

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78 Ibid, 22-3
79 ibid, 23
80 ibid, 49; also see Al-Tayyar Al-Islamy Wa dawruhu Fil Bina’, 48; AL-Da’wah Ela Allah: Al-Da’wah Al-Fardiyya, 21 and Wihdet Al-A’mal Al-Islamy Fil Qitr Al-Wahid (The Unity of Islamic Activism in One Region). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamy, 1989).
81 Doros Fi al-Amal Al-Islamy, 19.
82 Ali Mahmoud. Rokn Al-ta’ah (The Obedience Pillar). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamy, 1997), 359; also see Gom’ah Abdul-Aziz, Al-Ta’a fi Al-Ma’rouf (Obedience in Ma’rouf). (Alexandria, Dar Al-Da’wah for Publication and Distribution, 2003).
83 al Banna, ibid, 353-71.
occupation of Egypt. Thus, The Ta‘alim Letter’s conception of soldiery spilled over the entire MB structure; concepts of absolute obedience,\(^8^4\), the leadership’s absolute authority\(^8^5\), trust\(^8^6\) and sacrifice\(^8^7\) reflected the Qutbian’s ‘hardcore’ mission. In such a way, the structure of the MB was sacralized at the expense of flexibility, creativity and tolerance towards various opinions\(^8^8\).

As for the education and promotion functions, the education section provides a set of study curriculums and decides upon the promotion of active members. During the recent decades, the education section provided unspecialized calibers with opportunities of setting curricula for various levels of the organization. Moreover, the criteria of inclusion into the section have been absolute loyalty and obedience. Thus, the functioning and effectiveness of this section raises a set of concerns, as reviewed in the ‘Justified Resignation’ of the section’s former educator\(^8^9\). These include:

1. Inculcating the 'listen and abide' culture; the leadership at each section/level silences critique and restricts it through, first, investigation, second, freezing member promotion, third, defaming reputation and, finally, dismissing members individually or in groups.

2. Weakening brotherhood bonds by expanding the leaders’ authority to vocally criticize the misconduct of other MB leaders and/or members—e.g., failure to abide by a checklist of worship duties enlisted by the Education Section\(^9^0\).

\(^8^4\) Gom’ah Abdul-Aziz. Al-Ikhwan Wa Al-Mojtama’ Al-Misry wa Al-Dawly fil Fatrah Men 1928-1938 (The Brothers and the Egyptian and International Society During the Period of 1928-1938). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya, 2003), 133.

\(^8^5\) Ibid, 196

\(^8^6\) Ibid, 162


\(^8^8\) Ibid, 52-6

\(^8^9\) Anonymous, personal communication, 18/03/2012.

\(^9^0\) One narrative explains this point as follow “I was a member of the political committee of the Students Section. I asked my supervisor what the terms constitution and political party refer to. The supervisor answered that the
3. The lack of specialized knowledge of Islamic sciences and professional education skills.

4. The 'educator' lacks sufficient knowledge about members’ socio-economic and political context, while deciding on his/her curriculum, promotion and exclusion.

The correlation between absolute obedience, loyalty and promotion along the hierarchy resulted in that the MB leadership is generally unable to communicate with grass-root bases and with the broader society. One recent example is the Constitutional Committee formed by the MB parliamentarian majority that excluded intellectual, professional and technically experienced figures while including unqualified cadres from the Education Section! Also, discrepancy appears when unspecialized recruiters manipulate the structure of, and methods to, Islamic knowledge: legislation, self-disciplining–Sufism, and theology–Aqidah, to generate religious rulings–Fatawa–and standards of ‘Samt’–organizational religiosity–in the last decade, the education section has been circulating programs such as *How to Read and Understand the Qur’an and Time Management and the Prophetic Traditions*. The tendency to control and structure members’ ‘understanding’ of the Scripture is further intensified with ‘coded’ text books such as *The Practical Program to Build the Modern Quranic Muslim* by El-Deeb\(^1\), the chief training supervisor in the MB.

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\(^1\)See *Al-Barnamej Al-Amaly li Bina’ Al-Muslim Al-Qur’any Al-Mo’aser* (The Practical program to Build the Modern Qur’anic Muslim) (Qatar, Al-Majmou’ah Al A’rabiyyah lil Bohoth wal Derasat wal Tatweer, 2009)
Despite the effort to ‘control’ and ‘structure’ individual religiosity, the education curriculum proved insufficient; follow-up checklists have usually conflicted with members’ scheduled duties in the organization. Yakan argues that the spiritual emptiness of members exposed to public outlets exacerbates with the failure to update study curriculums to balance the shortage of doable duties\textsuperscript{92}. However, the real dilemma of the curricula lies in the rationale of ‘control’; my experience as a member of the MB ‘organization’ between the period of 2004-2008 indicates that activists in political and media sections seek free ‘breath’ in international conferences, where they escape the supervisor’s authority, checklists, and commands—at least on religious concerns. Ironically, supervisors from the Education Section were later directed to attend MB joint conferences to monitor ‘Islamically’ un-lawful behavior.

In fact, both Hawwa and Mashhor ‘defended’ the Islamic traditions, beliefs and values against claims of backwardness and inapplicability. Nevertheless, their reactive propositions regarding Islam replaced al Banna’s traditional Azharite and Sufi background with concepts, structures, and institutions of the liberal ‘leviathan state’–dressed in Islamic vernaculars. This explains why the internal structure of MB mirrors the nature, structure, and rationale of its very enemy: the secular Egyptian ‘state’\textsuperscript{93}. Hence, they internalized a set of mutually exclusive dualities that resulted into a deliberative rhetoric focused on the margins of ‘Islamic’ concepts rather than providing innovative and dialectical Ijtihad\textsuperscript{94}. Secondly, it also developed a totalizing view of an enemy: the West, the secular, liberal, socialist, and

\textsuperscript{92} F. Yakan, \textit{Al-Mutasaqetoun A’la Tareeq Al-Da’wah}. (The Drop-outs on the Road of Da’wah). (Lebanon, Risala Publication, 2001), 52-3

\textsuperscript{93} Heba Raouf, “Nazarat Fi Al-khayal Al Slayasi Le al Islamiyeen: Ishkaliyyat Manhajeyyah wa Siyasiyyah” (Remarks on the political Imagination of Islamists: Methodological and Political Dilemmas) in \textit{Islamiyon wa Dimocratiyon}, (Cairo, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2006), 45.

\textsuperscript{94} ibid, 46
Coptic political forces\textsuperscript{95}. The recent decades witnessed a deepening polarization with the Coptic minority that began to perceive the MB a closed community hostile to its perceived rights to equality and religious freedoms. Meanwhile, the literature adopted a conception of democracy\textsuperscript{96} that deprived women and Copts of the right to presidency\textsuperscript{97}. According to the literature, women are also deprived from the right to travel and transportation except with ‘their husbands’ permission and accompany’\textsuperscript{98}.

The increase of regime suppression forfeited al Banna’s arithmetically gradual sequence of reform; the MB’s institutions were outlawed; members imprisoned and tortured, publications and journals appropriated, schools and mosques closed! By January 25\textsuperscript{th} Revolution, the MB was suspended between two choices:

1- to pursue its activity as a secret outlawed organization, based on tightknit membership, secret administrative charts, and values of absolute obedience and loyalty, and aiming at revolutionary political change at the right moment. If so, then the movement should have prepared political cadres, programs, symbols and slogans to revolutionize the majority of the population and fight with the authoritarian regime.

2-Transforming into an official organization with publicly open membership and published administrative charts, lose recruitment criteria and democratic values of association and collective activism, aiming at gradual reform. In this way, the movement might have taken one of two ways: gradual social reform through NGOs, or political reform through a

\textsuperscript{95} ibid, 48
\textsuperscript{96} Mahmoud Ghozlan. \textit{Al-Ikhwan Wal-Dimogratyyah: Risala Era Al-Shabab} (The Brothers and Democracy: A message to the Youth). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nasr al Islamya, 2011d); Tawfiq Al-Wa’y. \textit{Al RU’yah Al-Shamila Li Tawaguhat Al-Ikhwa Al-Muslemin Al-Islahiyyah} (The Comprehensive Vision of the MB Reform Orientation) (Kuwait, Al-Manar Al-Islamiyyah Publication, 2007), 26
\textsuperscript{97} ibid, 26, 237
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, 237
party. In each case it would have aimed at neutralizing the authority or at least avoid the clash.

Nevertheless, the MB was suspended in various aspects of structural dys-functioning that hampered efforts of self-reform–mainly by the MB units of the new political generation. The movement’s persistence has been described as its greatest achievement for decades.\textsuperscript{99} One of the core concepts in the MB education curriculum is ‘endurance and persistence’. The concept was first crafted by EL-Banna in \textit{Al-Usul Al-‘Ishrun} (‘The Twenty Roots’\textsuperscript{100}, where he instructs ‘soldiers’ of the Secret Apparatus to persist and maintain an enduring commitment towards their goal. \textit{‘Time is part of the therapy’}\textsuperscript{101} of the society, which undertakes a number of stages: a) building the Muslim individual, b) building the Muslim family, c) building the Muslim society, d) building the Muslim government, and e) restoring the Muslim \textit{khilafa}\textsuperscript{102}. In his words, \textit{‘it might take long time, but there is no other way’}\textsuperscript{103}. After decades, the strategy described by al Banna in his literature was re-constructed as to become the prophetic strategy of change.\textsuperscript{104} The method of ‘representing’ the prophetic history, traditions, and personality resulted into ‘sacralizing’ the movement’s sequential and slowly evolving method of ‘change’. Meanwhile, detention, torture, imprisonment and appropriation of private property was justified by the a) al Banna’s sequential strategy of gradual change and b) the Mecca stage of the Prophetic history.

Against the rising critiques of younger generational units, the recent literature emphasized the negative impact of urging revolutionary change. For instance, Nassar

\textsuperscript{99} Abdullah Alnafeesy, \textit{Al Haraka Al Islamiyya: Thagharat Ala Al Tareeq} (The Islamic Movement: Gaos on the Way), (Kuwait, no publisher, 1986), 12-3.
\textsuperscript{100} Al Banna, ibid, 363
\textsuperscript{101} ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} ibid, 223.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, 127.
\textsuperscript{104} personal communication 27/03/2012
describes them as a minority of naïve, inexperienced and un-educated members whose membership hinders the establishment of a ‘hard core’ basement for the Islamic state, and also distracts the educators’ efforts who would suffer intellectually and organizationally to allocate such minority in separate ‘pockets’ inside the organization\textsuperscript{105}.

2.2. The Socio-Organizational Dilemmas of the MB

Recruitment and promotion policies

The contentious oscillation between the state and Ummah resulted into serious misalignment between goals and methods of the MB. While the movement targets social reform and inculcation of Islamic ‘lifestyle’ in daily practices, the recruitment process is one of a militarizing secret organization that ‘selects’ few members and applies strict rules of commitment. The recruitment phase takes as long as five years for a member to be considered as ‘active’. Moreover, the absence of objective criteria of inclusion and exclusion disappoints prospect recruits who, by that time, would have provided considerable sacrifices to maintain un-interrupted commitment.

One criterion of commitment and promotion is that MB members approach their society as an ultimate source of recruits. In such a way, each ‘active’ member in the MB is asked to practice the ‘DF’– Da’wa of individuals–on his neighbors, colleagues, family members, school mates, friends, acquaintances, kin members, etc. The society is thought of as to suffer a) spiritual vacuum and b) intellectual, cultural, and ideational chaos, that the movement fills and organizes\textsuperscript{106}. Hence, a structured program of successive phases identifies what an individual in these circles experience, unknowingly, through his relationship to the MB. As the DF program indicates a purposive and planned ‘selection’ of possible recruits, it undergoes a number of phases: 1-) established relationships of trust, affection and close

\textsuperscript{105} Jamal Nassar. \textit{Al Thabat Fi Tareeq Al-Da’wah} (Persistence on the Way of Da’wah). (Cairo, , Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya,\textunderscore 2005), 90-91.

\textsuperscript{106} Alnafeesy, ibid, 8
knowledge, 2) reviving faith and theological beliefs of the individual—especially the notion of ‘faith and practice’—, 3) encouraging the observance of religious duties, 4) instilling a comprehensive notion of life-long worship, 5) instilling a comprehensive notion of Islam and his obligation to apply Shari’a, 6) emphasizing the individual’s duty to serve Islam, and 7) emphasizing that necessity of organizational commitment and collective activism.

In this way, the MB literature entitles the movement with the ‘right’ to ‘raise’ the society and instruct the values, ideas and beliefs of the ‘organization’. Although the movement considers itself one group of the broader Muslim Ummah—in other words, it does not accuse the society of apostasy—it claims the right to re-construct individual and collective religiosity according to the movement’s conception of faith—that couples both belief and practice. According to Mashhour, until the society fully submits to the organization’s superiority, it is perceived as a collectivity of people who are not sufficiently consciousness of their interest; ‘the society is asleep, it should be awakened and led to the organization’.

In its early decades, the MB targeted resourceful membership that integrated notables of rural Egypt as well as prestigious intellectual and Azharite figures in Cairo. These included the notables of Ismailiya, sh.Hamed Askariyya, Sh. Saed El-Arfy, Sh. Moheb EL-Din Al-Khatib, sh. Farghaly, sh.Amin Al-Huseiny, etc. The MB’s openness enabled resourceful

107 Moutafa Habib. Al-Huda Wal-Nour (Guidance and Light). (Cairo, no publisher, 2000); Ibrahim EL-Deeb. Tarbiyet Al-Mujtama3: ‘Wa Anzer A’asheratak Al-Aqrabeen’ (Educating the Society: ‘And Worn (Oh Muhammed) Your Closest Kindered’). (Cairo, Dar Al-Wafa’ Publication, 2005); Abdul-Halim Al-Kenany. Al-Da’wah Al-Fardiyyah: Moshkelat wa Holool (The One-on-one Da’wah: Problems and Solutions) (Cairo, Iqra’ Institution, 2007); Moustafa Mashhour. Muqawemat Rajul Al-Akidah A’la Tareeq Al-Da’wah (The principals of the Faith Man on the Road of Da’wah) (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya,1995).

108 Ibrahim EL-Deeb. Usus wa Maharat AL-A’mal Al-Jama’y (fundamentals and skills of collective action’. (Dar Al Wafa’ le Atiba’ah wa Al-Nashr wa Al-Tawzee’, 2005).

109 See for instance A’mer Shamakh. Maza Qaddam Al Ikhwan Al-Muslimoun li Misr wal Islam (What Did the MB Provide For the Muslims and Islam) (Cairo, Iqra’ institution, 2011), 166-71; El-Deeb, ibid.

110 Mashhour, Al-Da’wah E1a Allah: Al-Da’wah Al-Fardiyya (The Call to Allah: the One-on-one Call), 11.

111 Hassan al Banna, Mozakerat Al Da’wah wal Da’eyah (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya, 1986), 80, 107
sympathizers and participants to join, while improved the capabilities of un-resourceful participants. With the 1960s, the transformation into a ‘hardcore’ secret organization led into a growing exclusionary tendency against resourceful sympathizers who might develop independent and autonomous modes of thought and action within the organization. Three decades later, in the 1990s, local circles evolved into mediums in which recruitment criteria emphasize a set of increasingly selective practices, symbols, rhetoric and attitudes. The MB began to target recruits with middle and low socio-economic background, who would integrate with the MB through durable ties: marriages, friends, neighborhood, and acquaintances. Such ties are fully dominated and controlled by the MB’s structure. Through providing material, financial and social support, the MB provides opportunities of social mobilization that indebt un-resourceful members and ensure absolute loyalty. Hence, expected degree of loyalty determines the recipient of charity activities in neighborhood and poor urban regions. For instance, Ramadan food-supply bags are usually distributed with the MB labels, and targets Muslim residents who are later asked to vote for the MB candidates\textsuperscript{112}.

Although the movement provides possibilities of social mobilization to un-resourceful members, especially those affiliate to education and training committees, it does not provide professional TOT to ensure the minimum standards of quality. For instance, members in the political committee may be drawn from engineering, medicine, and literary backgrounds rather than political or economic divisions. Similarly are members in the education, charity, and media committees. Effectiveness and creativity are usually sacrificed in favor of obedience and internal homogeneity. Finally, the movement usually fails to estimate members’ potentials, interests and capabilities. The recruitment base has been widening over decades, along with increasing differentiation between sections, while leadership structures remain restricted to their initial volume.

\textsuperscript{112} In 2009, I participated in ‘modifying’ a national charity plan received by the Charity head, of the Women Section, in Assiout.
Monopolizing power by a hardliner leadership

The 1980s generation, now leading the GBG and second-line positions, was deeply affected by the Wahhabi current that spread within the movement for three reasons. First, they were indoctrinated by calibers released from Nasser prisons of the 1960s. Those calibers reflected clear emphases of Sayyed Qutb’s thought, especially regarding individual’s spiritual seclusion from the, assumingly, Jahili society. Second, they also spent the longest part of their employment history in Gulf countries where acculturation with Wahhabism was a state policy for decades. Third, the curriculum taught to this generation was largely dependent on the Wahhabist literature. The 1980s generation hold powerfully the administrative muscles, since they occupy leadership positions starting from local committee—’Shoa’b’—, localities—’Manateq’—, administrative offices—‘Maktab Idary’—, the Shura Council, up until the General Board of Guidance (GBG); thus, it deeply instills the conception of the MB as a secret organization superior to its society (ibid). It also occupies the education section that sets the curriculum and decides upon promotion and recruitment. The 1980s generation used to manipulate administrative charts organizing internal elections to ensure a ‘loyal’ majority at each level of the hierarchy. Monopolizing power was possible through two means:

1- Changing the comparative weights of various governorates along the organizational hierarchy.

The current leadership of the MB worked on raising the number of representatives of governorates where they develop loyal cadres—such as Dakahliayya, Sharqiyya, Alexandria—. This was possible through changing the criteria of representation, to become the number of ‘active’ members inside each governorate, for the Shura Council, and equal representation of Egypt’s seven sections inside the General Board of Guidance (GBG). In such a way, the

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governorates where loyal cliques had strong presence were able to secure the majority in the Shura Council.

2- Through ensuring a majority in the Shura Council, the current leadership was able to control power rotation through appointments.

According to the chart, higher levels appoint 20 percent of members on lower ones. For example, although the Shura Council elects the GBG, the later first appoints 20 percent of the Shura Council members and so on. In such a way, appointees on lower levels usually re-elect those who brought them into power. Moreover, sometimes ‘select’ appointees to the GBG were dislocated from their governorates so that other ‘loyal’ cadres join the GBG through elections—the result of which is pre-determined. Similarly, the GBG circulates an ‘advice sheet’ allover local areas that ‘elect’ the Shura Council, to influence the result of the Shura Council elections. Hence, the Shura Council and alike intermediary levels ‘owe’ its membership composition to the ‘directions’ circulated top-down. It is therefore unlikely that the GBG ‘clique’ would change over decades.

In such a way, the ‘Shura’ concept inside the MB has irreversibly shaken—especially with claims of collective infallibility that sustained until the time of writing this work. In the elections of 2010, a serious conflict within the GBG resulted into the resignation of the movement’s first deputy Muhammed Habib. Al-Zaafarany lodged an appeal against the election results reported thirty flaws in the elections, while was absolutely neglected by the new GBG leadership. After January 25th Revolution, that GBG became further aggressive against internal critiques. It started to investigate every sign of autonomous political activity that does not hold its ‘stamp’— e.g., supporting the presidential campaign of any candidates, organizing demonstrations, strikes, forming independent political platforms, etc. And yet the
GBG defends the processes of ‘internal democracy’ and justifies its secrecy with security-intelligence repression!114.

Leadership and Accountability

In fact, subjective criteria of inclusion to, and promotion along, the hierarchy open various ways for developing cliques, inter-elite conflicts and forming pacts inside the structure. Meanwhile, the literature115 emphasizes a set of values that ‘soldiers’ must hold towards their leadership. These include: trust in the effectiveness of leadership, affection towards, appreciation and respect of, leaders. The indicators of respect involves a set of attitudes: speaking quietly with them, addressing inquiries kindly, avoid repeating questions, avoid deliberating various evidences, modesty and cherishing their ‘position’, preserving leaders’ secrets and disapproving any accusations against them in their absence, meeting their personal and administrative needs without their request, and abiding by their decisions116. The leadership is introduced as ‘a symbol of unity and centre of information and order’117.

Also, the MB leadership practices four types of authority on its members: a) the rights of fathers on sons–obedience, sacrifice, support and affection, b) the rights of teachers on students–learning from leaders and appreciating their experience, c) the right of sheikhs on Murid/soldier–that enables leaders to guide members spiritually and oblige them with worship and practical dues, and d) the right of general guidance regarding strategies and policies of the movement. Mahmoud’s textbook goes further in detailing the obligations on ‘soldiers’ towards the MB leaders as follows:

1. Close knowledge and acquaintance of leaders’ backgrounds and circumstances

114 Mahmoud Ghozlan, ibid, 36.
116 Ibid, 180-200, 218-52
117 Moustafa Mashhour. Al-Qaed Al-Qudwah A’la Tareeq Al-Da’wah (The Role-Model Leader on the Road of Da’wah), 13
2. Trust in the effectiveness and sincerity of leaders

3. Tolerance towards leaders’ misconduct/failure and self-accusation in case orders contradict what the soldier has learned earlier

4. Self-accusation and trust in leaders’ correctness

5. Revising what the soldier has learned regarding controversial issues that depend on Ijtihad, such as:

6. Supporting or weakening recommended leaders

7. Promotion along the hierarchical structure of the movement

8. Appointment of specific cadres in the movement’s multiple organs

9. Allowing the leadership to decide on the soldier’s personal affairs if they contradict the interests of the movement

10. Serving the leadership with time, money, and effort and accepting its discretionary authority to decide on the soldier’s private interests if they contradict those of the movement.\textsuperscript{118}

While detailing the obligations and duties of soldiers towards leadership, the literature while absolutely neglects duties and obligations of the latter. Rather, it sanctifies leadership and silences the right to accountability and transparency by a siege of ‘listen, trust and abide’. For instance, Ghozlan, the spokesmen of the MB, justifies in his article ‘We and Transparency’ the MB traditions of secrecy by ‘political oppression, abashment, exclusion and despotism’.\textsuperscript{119} Also, against the recent disclosure of political and administrative corruption of the leadership—mainly by whistle blowers, Ghozlan restricts the right to accountability to the General Board that hold moral and material authority over leadership.\textsuperscript{120}


\textsuperscript{119} Mahmoud Ghozlan. \textit{Al-Nizam Al-Alamy Al-Jadeed wa Qadayya Ukhra} (The New International System and Other Issues). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya, 2011c), 65. N.g., this article was published after the 25\textsuperscript{th} Revolution 2011.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid, 70.
In this article, Ghozlan does not mention the means by which the General Board could hold the GBG and Shura Council accountable; notably, the organization never set up an internal judiciary board to investigate, examine and judge upon misconduct inside the movement.

The Leadership’s failure to realize tangible achievements despite its growing socio-economic and political presence since the 1970s, has been justified through a number of historical and religious concepts.

First, once critique is addressed, the leadership automatically refers to prophetic experiences in Mecca, in a way that 1- sanctifies its decisions, and 2- justifies the increasing suppression by the regime as of suppression to the Islamic faith. Equaling the MB organizational structure to Islamic faith, its leadership to the prophet (PBUH) and its goals to that of spreading Islam\textsuperscript{121} indicates a self-perception of collective infallibility of the GBG and Shura Council\textsuperscript{122}; it does not mention the conditions and criteria that renders the GBG and Shura Council decisions legitimate and, hence, defendable; moreover, it does not address the growing evidence of past and present mistakes–the 1954 decisions for instance, let alone repeated incidents of financial and administrative corruption.

Second, There are no clear-cut rules that organize suffrage and proposing to candidacy along the hierarchy. The literature emphasizes a prophetic tradition that discourages individuals from claiming authority, running for and competing over power centers in any hierarchical community. Hence, the rotation of power inside the MB has been largely subject to patronage networks that escalate the promotion of specific cadres towards the top administering offices, while marginalizing others for decades.

\textsuperscript{121} Abdullah Alnafeesy, \textit{Al Haraka Al Islamiyya: Ro’ya Mostakbaliiyyah} (The Islamic Movement: A Future Vision), (Kuwait, no publisher, 1989)

\textsuperscript{122} Moustafa Mashhour. \textit{Tasa’olat A’la Al-Tareeq} (Questions on the Road). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya , _1986), 76.
Third, Justifying the failure in elections— and the drainage of financial, human, and solidary resources— by a) the notion of divine support that is only rewarded when members ‘repent’ from, and quit every sin, and b) that God rewards on the effort rather than the result. In consistence with the MB’s duty to ‘instruct’ the society, the education section prepared a training suit in 2009 to justify the organization’s decision to participate in 2010 elections, despite the evidence of the regime’s intention. After failing in elections, the leadership faced growing critique of its decision-making processes, since it silenced different opinions in the pre-elections meetings. The absence of transparency raised the second and third line members’ concerns over power personalization and financial as well as administrative misconduct. With the rise of internal dissent, the leaders’ inconsistency towards freedom was notable—the call for political freedoms and civil rights of its members in the political sphere was contrasted to depriving its members from freedom of expression and the right to transparency, institutionalism and accountability.

Finally, the leadership usually justify failure through emphasizing a set of vague indicators of achievement, such as: the increase of religiosity in the society, the spread of the comprehensive understanding of Islam and its eligibility to ‘reform’ human life, passion towards Jihad and martyrdom, etc. Moreover, it ritualizes narratives of sacrifice and reprints old testimonies of torture and hardship in a way to sacralize hardcore leadership and immunize them of accountability and criticism. Finally, through instructing a notion of time— measured by a whole nation’s, rather individual, life cycle—and *tawakkul*, it exempts itself from responsibility of decisions, and deprives the right to accountability until death! On this issue, Alnafesy notes that the MB never had revisionary literature that evaluates its

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123 personal communication, 21/03/2011
progress for eighty-year time; it also never wrote an autobiography that reflect a self-perception of history\textsuperscript{127}.

*The lack of financial and administrative accountability*

The accountability crisis of the MB leadership centers around non-transparent financial records; personal and collective ownership of financial assets, companies, and bank accounts is widely believed to be inseparable. Within the organization, it is subtly believed that only two GBG members control the financial affairs: Al-Shater and Ezzat\textsuperscript{128}; the GBG is uninformed about either past or ongoing financial transactions. Moreover, monthly salaries of GBG members are, sometimes, subject to compliance to collectively taken decision. It is argued that financial accountability has been sacrificed for maintaining the movement’s image and reputation\textsuperscript{129}. Nevertheless, some cases of financial and administrative corruption gained relatively wide publicity. These include:

1. The complaint reports by Al-Za'farany and Al-Dafrawy, leading figures of the MB, in which they challenge the results of the 2010 internal elections on bases of legal and observational evidences. The ‘new’ leadership, whose legitimacy was contested, refused to recognize the challenges and, thus, forced both leaders on resignation. In fact, they sarcastically asked them to follow that dispute with the Administrative Control Agency. To maintain credibility on grass-root levels, they also spread mis-information that Al-Za’farany had withdrawn his accusation.

\textsuperscript{127} ibid, 16


2. The incidents of financial corruption in the Cairo University Academic Club that were published. The MB investigators reserved the report as confidential although it dealt with a ‘publicly’ scrutinized corruption.

3. Administrative extortion: the GBG used to punish whistle blowers and refused investigating reported corruption incidents—unless published on media outlets. Meanwhile, the ready answer to inquiries is: ‘you should trust the leadership’.

Against these incidents, the commercial policy of the GBG began to disseminate scores of propaganda publications 130, in which it identifies the movement with a number of intellectual, political, and professional figures. These include: Sayid Qutub, El-Shater, El-Iryan, Mohammed Habib, Al-Sawaf, Al-Qaradawi, etc. In doing so, the GBG excluded Abdul-Mone’m Abul-Fotoh, a former GBG member and the movement’s most popular and enlightened figure, included the Turkish PM Erdogan while overlooking the former PM Erbakan who founded and led the MB offshoot in Turkey for decades 131. The illusive representation is explained by two factors. Firstly, the political conflict between Abul-Fotoh and El-Shater’s enclaves within the MB, on one side, and the need to identify with Erdogan’s successful experience, even though Ghozlan, the GBG spokesperson, severs relations with Erdogan, by accusing the latter, publicly, of interference in the Egyptian ‘national’ affairs 132.

Dismissal and resignation incidents

130 e.g., Mohammed Abdul-Rahman. *Ela Al-Mutakhavefien men Al-Shari’a Al-Islamiyyah* (For those Anxious of the Islamic Shari’a. ( Cairo, Markaz Al-E’lam Al-‘Araby, 2011) and *Adwa’ Ala Thawrat Misr* (Lights on th Revolution of Egypt) (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ a wa al Nashr 2012); Abdel-Rahman Al-Barr, “Preface” in *The Muslim Brotherhood Simply* by Mosad Khairy (Cairo, Bedaya institution, 2011).

131 Mosad Khairy, *The Muslim Brotherhood Simply* ( Cairo, Bedaya institution, 2011), 35-52

Over the last decade, the number of publicly announced resignations and/or dismissal incidents from the MB began to rise. The most controversial cases are Abul-Fotoh and the twelve young members who constituted the Egyptian Current party in parallel to the MB’s FJP. The decision to dismiss one caliber at the second-line was based on two questions: ‘Are you a member at the Egyptian Current? Are you member in Abul-Fotoh's campaign for presidency?’\(^\text{133}\). Other punishment measures include marginalization, self-exclusion, and investigation. Since the dismissal cases in the 1990s, The MB literature provided a number of explanatory factors: a) the hesitation to undertake determined decisions regarding financial, administrative or political mis-conduct during the 1990s, especially in professional syndicates, b) internal conflicts due to the mismanagement of the organization, the role of external forces that provoke conflicts between leaders, misalignment in spiritual and professional trainings acquired by members during the ‘formation’ phase of recruitment, competition over strategic positions inside the organization, personalization of power and overlooking internal charts and administrative rules\(^\text{134}\). Thus, unqualified leadership with weak, or absent, intellectual, organizational, and spiritual qualifications assumed power inside the movement. Yakan also draws attention to a number of factors: mis-functioning of the Education Section, unproductivity and misalignment between demand on, and supply of, activities.

### 2.3 Political Strategies of the MB

Despite the end of the Cold War, the rise of decentralized governance, transnational NGOs and Multi-National companies, and the rise of Communication and Information Technology (ICT), the movement, over eighty years history, did not realize but temporal and partial achievements on the political landscape. One of major critiques of the MB is the dependence on political gambling instead of creating favorable environment for its

\(^{133}\) Personal communication, 23 March 2012  
\(^{134}\) F. Yakan, ibid, 52-73
functioning. To put it in a broader frame, the MB’s crisis under Mubarak rule (1981-2011) has had various dimensions. The regime has systematically worked on disciplining its activity through legal and oppressive restrictions that rendered its opposition both exhaustive—of financial resources, effort and time—and ineffective—in realizing socio-political change. This was a by-product of two phenomena. First: the MB was self-confident towards the ideological foundation(s); it drew overarching claims of the Egyptian reality and assumed various institutional/elitist means to realize its goal. Secondly, the regime had systematically blocked channels of ‘formal’ dissent while corrupt and oppressive security apparatus increased popular tendency to ‘quit’ politics, strive to earn livelihood and ignore Ideologue discourses.

The electoral processes under Mubarak regime were employed as means to justify and extend a profoundly illegitimate rule. For more than thirty years, the scenario of running fraudulent elections included systematic box rigging, attacking voters and journalists with plainclothes security officers and/or commissioned thugs, purchasing votes, enforcing public sectors workers on collective vote that favored the regime candidates, attacking campaign activists and hiring officers that vote according to outdates voter lists that include millions of names of dead and migrant citizens, excluding the forms that indicated ‘No’ to the regime candidates, threatening and cracking down over judges who oversee, and/or undertake, the electoral process, throwing electoral boxes in the Nile and importing sealed boxes of fake ‘yes’ votes, launching brainwashing and defamation campaigns over state-run media, etc. Despite the effort to forger the elections, the regime suffered of inability to prove the least evidence of popular support. The patronage network of the NDP controlled the entire

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135 Alnafeesy, ibid
137 Philip Marfleet. “State and Society”. In EL-Mahdi and Marfleet (ed.s). Egypt: The Moment of Change. (Cairo,
national hierarchy and organizations, supported by the interior Ministry. The huge crowds of riot police were directed to prevent voter from reaching polling stations while thugs attacked candidates and observers indifferently.

In addition, political parties represented one of weakest traditions of political opposition in the Arab world. They originate as part of Sadat’s ‘artificial’ opposition platforms. In addition, internal conflicts, financial and administrative corruption, elitism, weak popular support—only three percent of the Egyptian population vote in the elections—vanishing credibility, all has rendered parties’ opposition pointless; according to Rif’at al-Saed, from Al-Tagammou’ party, it represented ‘nothing in Egyptian politics and have no standing whatsoever with the Egyptian people’\textsuperscript{138}.

Similarly, student unions across the nations were coopted through a) the control of young NDP students and b) the suppression of State Security Agency (SSA) that functionally ran the university’s: deciding on appointments of new staff and their promotion, falsifying student elections, authorizing new groups and simulation models, authorizing in-campus public and private lectures, conferences, seminars, trainings workshops, authorizing university events, investigating and controlling student activities, prohibiting any religious and/or political activism and suppressing student demonstrations and strikes, etc\textsuperscript{139}.

Professional syndicates were restricted through legal and oppressive frameworks. Throughout twenty-four professions, syndical activism functions under law no.100/1993 that codified judicial receivership of politically active syndicates. By 2009, the regime has banned the Lawyers Syndicate’s sub-elections, unseated the Chief of Veterinary Syndicate frequently and appointed the high board without elections, appointed illegitimate Chief and board of the Agriculture Syndicate, and restricted the financial resources of the Sport syndicate while

\textsuperscript{138} Cited in Marfleet ibid, 27
\textsuperscript{139} Ahmed Abdallah, \textit{Students and Politics in Egypt} (Cairo, The National Council for Translation, 2007)
preventing the election in the Nursery Syndicate. Hence, the legal and political deformation along with state suppression resulted into stagnant syndical activism, especially in syndicates where elections were prohibited for fifteen years.

Moreover, deep state structures sustained a perception of public activism as both risky and illegitimate. Throughout the three successive regimes: Nasser (1952-1970), Sadat (1971-1980) and Mubarak (1980-2011), political compliance have been established on two bases: a) the presidents’ charisma and/or military background and b) establishing parallel policing, security and intelligence agencies that are independent of– yet equally or even better equipped and empowered than– the military forces\textsuperscript{140}. The three successive presidents have followed a number of way to maintain unquestionable authority: a) employing various strategies to directly control the military corpus–including purging and even liquidating competitive leadership of the military, b) previewing themselves as civilian political leadership and c) employing political organizations\textsuperscript{141}. In such a way, the three presidents increased their dependence on parallel security intelligence agencies and reinforced their interior ministers vis a vis the military. The expenditures on security intelligence reached its peak during Mubarak rule, rising “from 3.5 percent of the budget in 1987 to 4.8 percent in 1997 (in addition to) the expansion of police personnel from 9 to 21 percent of total government employment”\textsuperscript{142}. It was estimated in 2009 that the Interior Ministry’s security forces reached a ratio of 1 personnel per every 37 citizens\textsuperscript{143}. Together with SSI and CSF, barracked riot-deterrent forces and plainclothes auxiliaries function within a


\textsuperscript{141} Henry and Springborg. \textit{Globalization and the politics of development in the Middle East} (UK, Cambridge University Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{142} Cited in ibid, 195

\textsuperscript{143} ibid, Ibid, 196
'legal/judicial/incarceration system, which consists of prosecutors and emergency state security courts and their attendant personnel, as well as a network of prisons'\textsuperscript{144}.

The victims of deep state security apparatus were not only political parties and public figures. Through the Emergency Law – applied at their will– police and intelligence officers subjugated poor urban residents for personal and partisan interests. To mention but few examples: refusing to buy tickets at public transportation and private microbuses and taxies, levying illegal ‘dues’ on street vendors and private taxi/microbus stations, harassing women in poor urban neighborhood, random detention of by-passers, torturing activists without legal permits of detention, etc.

In short, the penetration of the security-intelligence structures has intensified the grievance of the un-politicized poor, who struggle to survive under systematic ‘state thuggery’ that, sometimes, attacked their right to life. Thus, the ‘bourgeois’ discourses of political rights and freedoms and of the Islamic versus secular state took place only in closed party headquarters and syndicates, and have been largely incommensurable to a growing numbers of population. Meanwhile, the structure, values, and ideological currents of that MB were stagnating in the face of systematic and structural state oppression.

The success of the MB as part of a pre-January 25\textsuperscript{th} generation is, at least, debatable. Structured opposition forces suffer political, organizational and generational aging: oligarchical minorities control political parties and NGOs. Their partisan interest resulted into calculated, factional and ineffective opposition that endured Mubarak’s regime and widened the chasm with the newly emerging generation who reflect the rising socio-economic grievance of the masses.

The new political generation has benefited of some attempts to reconnect with the popular grievance. Some groups abandoned official opposition through, e.g., the Tagammu’

\textsuperscript{144} ibid, 196
and Wafd Parties. Rather, they returned to public life through supporting student activism during the 2000 Intifada. Other groups focused on Human Rights through involving with the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, research centres and syndical services, while others, still, established factional parties that persisted beside the Orthodox ones—such as Al-Wasat party off the MB in the 1990s. Also, young calibers of the MB mobilized politically and socially through ad-hoc popular and student initiatives, training workshops on human rights, virtual public spaces where anonymity and informality escaped the ideological political landscape. By reflecting the true impulse of the street, the new generation managed working on consensual areas—e.g., supporting the Palestinian Intifada—and forming the Egyptian Movement for Change Kefaya. In such a way, it gradually moved from restrictive institutional politics, benefitting from the global neo-liberal and technological transformations.

While the ideological and socio-organizational dys-functioning of the MB explains the successive waves of silent and public resignations, the political strategies communicated through media statements, organizational decisions and communicated opinions, both before and after the revolution, explain the chasm between the MB and the emergent generation. If summarized in few words, the MB opposition has been factional, calculated and ineffective.

This partially refers to the traditional ambiguity concerning the movement’s stand against partisan politics. In the 1980s, the literature of the MB reaffirmed an earlier rejection to political parties and electoral competition, arguing that the movement’s chief goal is a grass-root and long-term change that is only attainable by penetrating the socio-economic spaces. In Mashhor’s words ‘we do not want a Muslim to give us his vote only, but rather

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146 ibid, 55
sacrifice himself, his money, everything he owns and resolutely persist against hardship.”

Nevertheless, Mashhor also argued the comprehensive understanding of Islam requires that the MB pressure the government to undertake necessary ‘reforms’ in legislation, public policy and governance.

With Al-Houdaiby’s note on political parties and women participation, the movement realized the need for effective political representation in the government. Hence, recent literature indicates an important transformation, which explains the rise of conflicts over strategic position within the MB—in its internal elections on 2010. To take but one example, Al-Gazzar, while explaining the Yusuf chapter in Qura’n, wrote that ‘the verse no. 55 provides an evidence that eligible cadres must offer themselves—(i.e., run for candidacy) to occupy power centres in case they know that no one else can occupy such position.

Thus, the 2000-2010 decade witnessed fierce electoral polarization between the MB and the regime’s National Democratic Party (NDP). It was generally believed that the MB is the serious threat to Mubarak’s regime. Although the movement benefited from the NDP’s socio-economic failure, its participation was directed towards ‘instructing citizens on the ‘Islamic’ duty of voting (!), forming a public opinion supportive of the Islamic project, releasing political and opinion prisoners and protecting the Islamic identity, culture and fundamentals of the ‘Islamic’ society.

The transformation towards electoral opposition has marked significant changes in the MB ideological and organizational make-up. It demarked a move to the ‘Islamic state’ of EL-

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147 Mostafa Mashhour, Question along the Way, 66
148 Ibid, 101-3
150 Mohammed Al-Gazzar. Youssuf Alayhi Assalam: Men Al-Be’r Ela Al-Mulk. (Joseph (PBUH) from the Well to the Crown). (Cairo, Dar al Tawze’ wa al Nashr al Islamya, 2005), 84.
Banna’s sequential strategy, before acquiring its main conditions: the Islamic society. As noted earlier, the movement has been subject to various restrictions on its civil and political activism—detention, torture, military trials, defamation campaigns and appropriation of its economic assets, etc. Despite these challenges, it pursued secret activism with vertically growing membership base—biological MB generations were systematically incorporated in the Zahrawat ‘Flowery’, and Ashbal ‘Cubs’ children sections. In such a way, the electoral orientation sustained upon, and served, the interests of the distinctive MB society, while new recruits either drain out or suffer recurrent unproductivity. Meanwhile, the rejection to ‘politicize’ the movement by turning its constituencies into mobile electoral blocks was rising among both young and old cadres. Despite those members’ will, and sometimes bitter sacrifice, the FJP was established after the Revolution by circulating ‘orders’ to sign into the party membership, while others dismissed for joining or establishing other parties. In such a way, the 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2011 elections witnessed a gradual transformation of a mainstream grass root movement into a closed political enclave—the FGP—sanctified as means to realize the ‘Islamic project’.

On the other hand, the ideologue discourse reflected deep conviction of ‘collective infallibility’ and ‘ultimate Right’; for instance, following the most turbulent year in pre-January 25th Egypt, 2008-2009, that witnessed more than 200 strikes, the GBG ‘internal’ campaign for 2010 elections emphasized ‘We should teach people their rights and how to claim them’. To put it in a broader frame, the recent literature has centered around the Islamic state, Sharia and the Palestinian cause and situated political difference with contending liberal/secular forces on philosophical, theological, and tactical grounds. This resulted into two phenomenal crises. Firstly, the negligence of growing socio-economic...

152 Al-Nafeesy Al Haraka Al Islamiyya: Thagharat Ala Al Tareeq, 7

153 Personal communication, 23/03/2012

154 See Ghozlan Al-Nizam Al-Alamy Al-Jadeed wa Qadaya Ukhra, 28-37, 44:56
grievance of rural and poor urban population–Illiteracy, poverty, disease, homelessness, indebtedness, and social injustice\textsuperscript{155} and, secondly, over occupation with partisan gains and political fights, e.g., the military trials since 2006. The movement has distrusted, and sometimes quelled, various forms of popular opposition, unless it pressures the regime to loosen restrictions over its activism.

Moreover, the policy of identity disclosure since 2005 has been widely criticized as one reason of turning the MB opposition into factional and ineffective activism. Student recruitment in university campuses has traditionally coupled a policy of ‘secret call-secret organization’ that shed doubts over the real intentions of the MB students. By disclosing the ‘call’ while maintaining organizational secrecy, the number of new recruits since 2005 had severely decreased since most MB students were involved in proxy wars with the regime–represented by in-campus SSA. Hence, the MB lost sympathy and support of peer colleagues who would protest, if ever, against rising tuition fees rather than releasing the detained colleagues. In later years, it appeared that the consciousness of the student section was higher than that of their leadership\textsuperscript{156}. Mutual distrust and lack of credibility shadowed the relation with both the MB leadership and peer organizations and led, recently, into collective dismissal of many student sub-sections, particularly in Cairo University, who later established the Egyptian Current party and led, collaboratively, the Revolutionary Youth Coalition.

Alnafeesy explains the contentious relationship of the MB leadership with its student section by emphasizing the negligence of strategic planning; the movement is totally absorbed in the ‘execution’ phase of the ‘Islamic project’\textsuperscript{157}; it followed a tactical and pragmatic strategy with its most active and creative section–the students. According to Al-

\textsuperscript{155} Al-Nafeesy, \textit{Al Haraka Al Islamiyya: Thagharat Ala Al Tareeq}, 12
\textsuperscript{156} personal communication, 23/03/2012
\textsuperscript{157} Al-Nafeesy, \textit{Al Haraka Al Islamiyya: Thagharat Ala Al Tareeq}, 7
Nafeesgy, the movement employs the student section for mobilizational purposes that usually target tactical and specific political interests. Hence, it fails to provide long-term plans to integrate student activists into the movement’s structure and marginalizes the innovative and experienced cadres while exhausting their energy in proxy wars with delusive enemies: independent and pro-regime students\textsuperscript{158}.

Alnafeesy generally explains the subtle break-down undergoing within the movement. However, he does not explain why the non-MB youth activists failed to incorporate their activities within the organization. Besides the ‘selective’ recruitment strategy, the study interviewees believe that the political strategies of the MB have extended, rather than resisting, political authoritarianism. The following section elaborates on this point as follows.

Besides performing a factional opposition, the MB has generally adopted conservative and calculated resistance. According to an EC founder, a protest in 2010 was organized by the MB students in front of Al-Fath mosque–Cairo against the fraudulent parliamentary election that discriminated against their candidates. Amidst that protest, he started shouting ‘Down Down Mubarak Rule’. Immediately, the MB supervisors punched his head and, eventually, silenced him\textsuperscript{159}. It became clear, he explains, that the regimes’ oppression justified the MB’s ‘listen, abide and trust’ teleology; the movement only persisted upon ‘victimization’ narratives that justified failure and helplessness. A second student cadre explains: when asked why did not the MB, before January 25\textsuperscript{th}, collaborate with political forces against Gamal Mubarak, Ezzat, a GBG leader, said ‘we would not take risk preventing something that would happen sooner or later’. Moreover, according to another cadre–dismissed in July 2011–, Al-Shater told him in 2005 ‘Gamal Mubarak is not a military

\textsuperscript{158} ibid, 22-3
\textsuperscript{159} personal communication 23/03/2012
figure, it is better to support him than to support a military president. ‘The street is a red line’ - so said one of the administrative MB leaders.

This indicates that the ceiling of the MB opposition failed to challenge the regime’s eroding legitimacy. For instance, the MB did not participate in Kefaya’s protests in 2004-5 against Gamal Mubarak. Even when it supported the Judiciary independence cause during the period of 11-18/05/2006, it refused to escalate the pressure on the regime, although this would have changed power balance and brought about the January 25th revolution few years earlier- as many activists testify. The same attitude appeared on 23rd of January 2011, when El-Eryan told a MB activist ‘we grabbed you a decision (from the GBG) not to resist your efforts (in launching the 25th January protests)’. Even after the Revolution, Ghozlan, the spokesmen of the GBG, told another MB revolutionary activist ‘This is not a revolution (Referring to the January 25th revolution), our revolution is yet to come’.

As for the incidents in which the MB chose to protest against the regime, in many instances, the MB leadership undertake arrangements with security-intelligence agencies regarding protests, strikes, and demonstration, while directing young members to organize it unknowing of any prior agreements. In consequence, young MB members have been subject to detention, torture and harassment by security agents for a set of tactical gains targeted by the leadership. One of such incident was in January 2008, during Gazza blockage, when two of the MB rising calibers in Ain-Shams University asked to organize a marsh from the Annual Book Fair to protest against the regime’s policies towards Palestine. Although the central committee of Cairo-East approved the request, on the day of the marsh, its initial organizers were surprised that the committee imposed different leadership on the marsh with clear arrangements about the marsh’s duration, path, chants, and media coverage. Similarly,

160 Personal communication, 23/03/2012
161 Ibid
162 personal communication 23.03.2012
student activities are arranged with the State Security Agency who sought new contacts as soon as new members join college! Moreover, the 2006 detention cycle is believed to have resulted from the MB’s failure to bring about the terms of a security arrangement during the 2005 elections. The MB candidates for the second and third phase should have cancelled their bid for parliamentary seats. Since the election file was then assigned to Abdul-Monem Abul-Fotoh, who refused to withdraw the MB candidates, Al-Shater –who undertook the ‘deal’– was detained until 2011.163

Even during the protests in which the MB did not ‘arrange’ with the security-intelligence agencies, the MB cadres refused to raise the ceiling of opposition. On the January 25th protests, individual MB cadres decided to return home at the afternoon, although only few steps separated them from the Parliament House. On that day, a sarcastic chant aired in Tahrir criticizing the MB’s hesitation: ‘revolution revolution until the afternoon’164. Furthermore, many MB activists refused defending themselves or protestors during the 18-day strike. Self-defense by stoning and firing Molotov bottles was initiated by the UA members, who are believed to have rescued the lives of thousands, while MB activists stuck to absolute ‘peacefulness’165.

2.4. Conclusion

To sum up, the recent decade has shed the light on the contradictory ‘dispositions’ within the MB: it aims at reforming the society from the grass-root, with a tightknit secret organization, under authoritarian rule, through peaceful and gradual methods of change. Moreover, a set of ideological and structural dilemmas has resulted into the concurrent MB-street division. The MB’s conception of faith as to couple both belief and practice has resulted into a political culture of ‘control, obedience and secrecy’ that a) ideologised Islamic

163 Haytham Abu Khalil, ibid
164 Personal Communication 23/03/2012.
165 personal communication, 26.03.2012
traditions as means of maintaining internal homogeneity, justify contradictory political
decision, maintain coherence and ultimate commitment b) applying ‘conscious distortion’\textsuperscript{166} to the ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ of constitutive documents of the movement—the Guidance Board decrees vs. administrative charts, c) demark the borders of ‘us’ and ‘them’ along various definitions of what is ‘Islamic’, and d) develop a number of ‘brands’ of an MB identity depending on the socio-economic, cultural and demographic composition of members in different regions.

A number of consequences resulted from such transformation: a) monopoly and over-use of mobilizing symbols, b) generating a formulaic ‘othering’ discourse c) forming a web of grass-root ‘enclaves, d) generational and factional conflict around complex dimensions: age, gender, intellectual and geographical discrepancies, f) administrative, political, and financial corruption, and g) mutual distrust and stereotyping between the MB leadership and youth on one side, and the MB and non-Islamic political forces on the other.

Following the 2011 elections, the FJP started to support the SCAF’s strategic and tactical interests at the expense of real democratization. Meanwhile, it waived support of various political forces that share the socio-political landscape with the FJP; it began to ‘demonize’ youth opposition as forces that ultimately hinder its 'Islamic project'! The indicators of such tendency are countless. To mention but few: a) the defaming announcement on the MB official journal \textit{the Freedom and Justice} of dismissing twelve young calibers from the MB on February 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, b) accusing Tahrir protestors of anarchism and illicit behavior- drugs, whoredom, serving foreign interests- on the same Journal on 25/01/2011- the famous ‘Banditta’ headline-, c) accusing the Women March on 23/11/2011, in defense of the ‘Blue Bra lady’, of treason, whoredom, serving foreign

\textsuperscript{166} Michael Freeden. \textit{Ideology: A Very short Introduction}. (UK–Oxford University Press, 2003), 14
infiltrators and dishonor\textsuperscript{167}, d) celebrating the ‘success’ of the 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolution in Tahrir while people grieve dead corpses, and praising the SCAF and Ganzoury government–who hold primary responsibility of killing and injuring hundreds in Mohamed Mahmoud clashes, November 2011.

This chapter draws upon writings, events, processes, decisions and life experiences that eventually describe the MB’s ideology and structure in terms of a ‘cultural system’\textsuperscript{168}. It reflects a broader view of the nature and role of the pre-January 25\textsuperscript{th} Generation. This could be summarized in the following remarks:

Firstly, internalizing models of charismatic civil, religious or military leadership into internal structures. The pre-January 25\textsuperscript{th} Generation is, in part, a product of the Nasserite era (1952-1970) known with the spread of nationwide ‘socialist’ organizations: the Socialist Union, the Vanguard Organization and the Youth Organization. While the prohibition of political parties extended such platforms, the Nasserite culture of unionism and nationalism\textsuperscript{169} intensified a tendency to follow charismatic leadership that reflect political and/or military backgrounds.

Secondly, focusing on state-centered opposition that sacralizes the state as main source of political power and legitimation of ideological claims. Although some of its units had practiced dissent politics outside the Nasserite state institutions, it is centralized around the \textit{Rational} of the ‘nation’ state–i.e, embedding the means of political discipline, control, surveillance, and authority. Such Rational is indicated through the discourse, inter-relations, the internal structure of its various institutions, and strategies to realize goals.

\textsuperscript{167} Mona Madkour, “We did not participate in Egypt’s Freewomen because participants where paid and had a partisan agenda,” \textit{AlSharq Al-Awsat Journal}, Internet, available from http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?article=658885
\textsuperscript{168} Cited in Freed, ibid, 41
\textsuperscript{169} Abdul-Hayy, ibid, 48
Thirdly, a strong ideological affiliation that is structured around institutional hierarchies with established authority and responsibilities. Members are recruited on detailed ideational qualifications, and integrated in a pre-set system of command, support, reporting, and accountability. Examples of such organizations include the new Socialist Party, formed after the dissolution of the Communist Party, Wafd, Tagammo’ and Ghad parties, the *Jihad* movement, The Muslim Brotherhood (second constitution), professional and labor syndicates\(^{170}\). These, mostly formal, channels of political participation has reflected clear trends of ideological thought–either liberalism, Islamism or socialism–concerning a set of issues: the identity of the state, the place of religion in the public sphere, the balance of state-society relations on one hand and security and civil rights and freedoms on the other, welfare and social justice policies, economic liberalization vs. nationalization, etc.

Fourthly, challenging the authoritarian regime through official channels of political expression: student unions, political parties and syndicates that encapsulated their activities and disconnected their discourse from that of the wider socio-economic environment\(^{171}\).

In conclusion, during Mubarak era (1971-2011), formal and hierarchically structured opposition forces has mirrored much of the regime’s drawbacks: obsession with control, authority, hierarchies, overarching ideologies, charismatic leadership, administrative and financial corruption, unproductivity, hypocritical use of ‘democracy and freedom’ discourses, etc. Hence, whenever political forces sacralize the state as means to legitimate superiority claims, ideological coherence –through tightknit structures–and organizational leadership are equally sacralized\(^{172}\). In the MB case, the structured ideology Islamizes failure through conspiracy theories and claims of ultimate Right and collective infallibility. The emergent

\(^{170}\) ibid, 49

\(^{171}\) ibid, p.51

\(^{172}\) For instance, the banners of EL-Shater’s campaign for presidency similitude his political ‘struggle’ to Hz. Joseph, Referring to a theological narrative of a prophet who was released from the prison to rule Egypt later.
political generation held a distinctive array of ideas, structures, values, symbols and political strategies. The following chapter explains the formative socio-political experience of various new generational units, before involving closely with their ideological and organizational characteristics.
3.1. Introduction

The break with Mubarak’s taboo, the MB, and the cartoony opposition started since 2004 with the formation of the Egyptian Movement for Change and the National Movement for Change. Kefaya started with 1800 supporter who signed a petitioning statement against passing power to Gamal Mubarak. Soon afterwards, the rebellion thrust disseminated in new forms; a blogging movement started to provide timely and tuned record of state suppression and police brutality. The founding members of the movement were separatist political forces such as Al-Wasat–off the MB, and Al-Karama– off the Arabic Nasserite Party, the Ghad Party– off the Wafd, and the Revolutionary Socialists Organization. The Popular Committee to Support the Intifada (PCSI)–established in 2000– provided an early incident of such cooperation. Against the discredited party platforms, the PCSI combined members from various political forces: the MB, Nasserites, Socialists, and activists from professional syndicates and NGOs. By overcoming protracted ideological tensions, the PCSI managed mobilizing 40,000 against the invasion of Iraq and held the Cairo Conference against Imperialism and Zionism for several years since 2003. Thus, Kefaya’s protests in 2004 managed mobilizing activists from earlier coalitional initiatives; the movement was a ‘consortium’ of activists who later organized into cyber networks and various movements.

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174 ibid, 89

175 ibid, 91

176 ibid, 94
With the aftermath of 2005 election, Kefaya began to fade away while new actors attracted state suppression and media exposure. The land sliding change came from one of the state’s deep structures—the judiciary—that contested the consistency and legality of the 2005 elections after receiving more than a hundred reports of irregularities that took place at the polls. In response, the regime stripped legal immunity of the two prominent judges who vocally condemned the fraudulent elections, claiming they ‘defamed the state’\textsuperscript{177}. The Judges’ Club organized a sit-in while the case gained enormous local, domestic and international exposure. The regime forces harshly suppressed demonstrations by Kefaya activists–joined with MB members– and many believed that the regime might have been experiencing its last days\textsuperscript{178}.

The rise of the Judges’ dissent was coupled with the rise of successive waves of workers’ strikes and sit-ins that escalated the pace of change on the ground. It also gave rise for new political movements to organize on social media outlets—the Facebook and Twitter–accessed by two million Egyptians. In 2006, there has been more than 222 strike, sit-in, hunger strike, stoppage, and demonstration; and during the first half of 2007, there has been a new labor action on daily basis\textsuperscript{179}. These acts worked as ‘test balloons’\textsuperscript{180} of the regime capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, and provided activists with actual and local experiences of running and stopping public dissent.

According to El-Mahdi, “the loosely organized public expression of dissent (..) did not constitute a mass movement in terms of size and constituency, (but) they did produce what Koran calls the spark for prairie fires”\textsuperscript{181}. Put differently, collaborative initiatives in 2003-2005 provided a priori experience with rebellion, inter-ideological and political

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{177} ibid, 99
\item \textsuperscript{178} personal communication 23/03/2012
\item \textsuperscript{179} Cited in ibid, 100
\item \textsuperscript{180} Rabab El-Mahdi, ibid, 100
\item \textsuperscript{181} ibid, 102
\end{itemize}
dialogue, experiencing lives of the ‘other’ through joint platforms and understanding various political languages, ideologies, symbols and values. Moreover, it developed a sense of an ‘essential destiny’\(^{182}\) to step down the regime.

During 2005-2007, the researcher provided political awareness programs for female MB students, who organized a series of international conferences in collaboration with various political forces. Such experiences facilitated discovering the ‘other’ and opening spaces for self-criticism and re-constructing ideological beliefs and political strategies. It also resulted into a rupture from the prevalent ‘imagination’ of political reform represented by the MB. The successive cycles of dissent between 2004 and 2011 gave rise to a new political generation that represents a common culture and distinctive imagination of authority, state and society. The units interviewed for this research represent collectively the following characteristics: a) desacralizing the state as a main source of political legitimation, b) rejection of the nation-state *Rational* of political discipline, control, surveillance, and authority, c) ideological hybridity– reconstructing their ideological concepts in the gray-zones separating prevalent ‘proto-types’, d) horizontal and volatile networking that ensures member’s free entry and exit, with few pyramidal levels and loose functions and accomplishment standards, e) revolutionary political values–rebellion, dissent and rejection of political, religious or ideological authoritarianism, f) flexibility– in terms of functioning as agents of social as well as political change, g) targeting socio-political *re*-form through genuine and independent structures that eschew over-arching political ideology, h) functional and rotational leadership, i) preference of anomic and spontaneous protests, strikes, and confrontation with means of state coercion, and finally, seeking political representation through volatile coalitions–e.g., the Revolutionary Youth Coalition–and independent parties.

\(^{182}\) Rintala, ibid, 516-7
To understand how the network society of these units has developed, the following sections explain the state of affairs before and/or after the 25th January divide. The information on the six generational units—the National Movement for Change, the 6th of April Movement, We Are All Khaled Saed, Salafiyo Costa, the Egyptian Current party and the Ultras Ahlawy football community—was gathered through interviews, Facebook notes and statuses, website content, personal communication, publications—pamphlets and leaflets—and Youtube videos.

3.2. The National Movement For Change- Kefaya

Kefaya had an influential and unique experience in breaking the fear barrier and inspiring the majority of political dissent movements that capitalized on its political momentum. In 2004, Kefaya was formed of a national coalition of political figures, intellectuals, artists—e.g., Bahaa’ Taher—, writers—e.g., Alaa’ EL-Aswani—, employees, doctors, worker and professional syndical activists, youth, NGOs, and newly established parties. Among its prominent figures were Hamdein Sabbahy of the Karama party—separated from the Nasserite Party—Abdul Mone’m Abul-Fotoh—of the MB—Ayman Nour of the Ghad Party—separated from the Wafd party. In such a way the movement was not a coalition of political parties or social entities. Rather, public figures from various professional walks, ideologies, entities and backgrounds joined the movement in their individual name, independent of their groups/parties/movements/etc.

The diffusion of Kefaya founders and their prior experiences resulted into the initiation of a serious of dissent sub-movements—e.g., Worker for Change, and Youth for Change, Artists for Change—and committees—‘No for selling Egypt’ 183, ‘NO for Dependency’ and ‘Support the Palestinian Intifada’ and ‘No for exporting Gas to Israel’. The movement’s founding conference was held in 22/9/2004 in which a statement of five hundred

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183 This committee was formed after the privatization of Omer Afandi companies, which were part of the Egyptian public sector during Nazif government. It was coordinated by Yehya Husein Abdul Hady.
figures addressed fundamental causes that reflected a direction of fundamental political change. It raised popular dissent against corruption, torture, economic backwardness, authoritarianism, dependency on US and Israel, importing Cancered pesticides, breaching human rights, normalization with the Zionist enemy–Israel, social injustice, militarized ugly capitalism, civil freedoms of publication, journalism, party formation, demonstration, strike and sit-in., etc. The first demonstration was held by the High Judicial Court on 12/12/2004,–two days after the international day for human rights–, with taped mouths protesting against the authoritarian and terrorist rule of Mubarak.

Later, the movement stretched out its activity outside Cairo, through establishing sub-committees in governorates head by local coordinators that function independently of their original political parties and groups. Thus, in the memorial of January 17-18 1977\textsuperscript{184}, Kefaya managed to hold demonstrations and stands in various governorates around Cairo.

In fact, the popular orientation of Kefaya was a conscious correction of what it perceived as main drawbacks of ‘closed-door’ opposition. According to a senior cadre in the movement: ‘political parties are opportunist and partisan; they represent a product of the regime ‘gift’ during Sadat Era–i.e., the left, Middle and right opposition platforms; hence, they were subject to the remote ‘playground’ demarked for them by the 1971 Constitution’. On contrary, Kefaya rebelled against ‘contractual’ opposition, it a blind eye to the SSA pressure to restrict the timing, programs and numbers of demonstrators participating in its activities. When asked to ‘arrange’ the demonstrations, it used to reply ‘we are also protesting against security arrangement’.

Kefaya represents the earliest catalyzers for the 25\textsuperscript{th} January revolution. An essentially rebellion movement, it supported the independence of Jurisdiction and workers rights in 2008-9, the independence of Universities through the 9 March movement, the

\textsuperscript{184} This date signifies the popular rise against soaring prices of food supplies following the Sadat infitah and liberalization policies.
Committee for defending the right to health, and above all it fought against the inheritance of power by Gamal. After the fraudulent election on 2010, the MB, Kefaya, 6th Of April, 9 March and political parties: e.g., the Ghad, Karama and the Egyptian Socialist Party–joined the National Front for Change that channeled the popular grievance towards a fundamental change of the regime. It managed in gathering a million signatures of the Seven Demands and later headed by its first honorary president El-Baradei–who then announced his intention to run for presidency. In such a way, Kefaya became part of a growing and broader movement of change that reflected various currents while addressing one target: political change. In the participant’s words ‘it became a belief, a consciousness, a deed, and words that round the streets and addressed the masses. Whether supporting Kefaya or otherwise, Kefaya’s role cannot be ignored in paving the road to the 25th January revolution.’

The experience of Kefaya began to lose much of its credit following the 2007 internal elections that reflected various conflicts over power among its socialists, liberal and Islamist components. When asked on the reason of his separations, one of the 6th of April founder described the situation as follow: “the movement leadership monopolized power with claims of elder age and long experience in political activism. Coordinators should have been able to internalize the values of teamwork and collective decision making, even if they appeared as the movement’s leaders to the outside world”.

Overtime, the movement restricted itself to activities around the Journalists Syndicate and High Board of Jurisdiction where most of its established leaders preferred to protest. It had weak presence in governorates and became fully dependent on the media hustle and TV show programs. Nevertheless, the movement survived until the National Front for Change was formed in 2010. By that time, the sub-movements separated and formed independent movements, especially the Youth for Change (Kefaya’s young members) that later became the 6th of April movement.

3.3. The 6th of April Movement
The 6th of April movement started as an offshoot of the Youth for Change that originally functioned under the Kefaya. With the rise of workers and public sector employees strikes in 2008, new cycles of dissent began to shake the regime. The Mahalla and Kafr Soul strikes were among the most powerful strikes in which the strikers gave a period of six months to have their demands realized, or otherwise call for a general strike by the Egyptian population on the 6th of April 2008.

At first, the 6th of April movement was intended to extend its Youth for Change activities to support the Mahalla workers’ general call. However, the structural problems of working under Kefaya resulted into the establishment of 6th of April by a separate movement of bloggers, human rights and socialists activists. Unlike Kefaya, the 6th of April joined tens of newly politicized young activists who experienced their first encounter with public activism through the strike. Also, the 6th of April benefited of, then, newly emerging social mediums—e.g., Facebook and Twitter. The call for strike on 6th of April 2008 was circulated around FB profiles, messages, blog posts and comments, and Internet fora especially on Kefaya and the MB websites. Thus, the movement’s call for strike was successful par excellence—it asked people to strike by staying at their homes.

Therefore, the movement capitalized on various opportunities that enhanced its performance. The disclosed administrators of the FB page of 6th of April—Ahmed Maher and Israa Abdul-Fattah—directed page participants to print and distribute its statement, drawing graffiti and spray paintings, while well-experienced activists of toured factories asking workers to join the strike. The call realized immense publicity, especially when the Interior Ministry warned people against the strike and advised them to stay home, which was the exact message of the movement ‘6 of the April, stay home!’ In such a way, almost everyone participated in the strike.

The success of the 6th of April strike was followed by a number of projects: the Penetrating Minority Conference in 2008, 2009, and 2010, the 6th of April strike in 2009 and
2010, joining the Freedom March campaign to Gazza in 2009, and the participation in the Baradi’e campaign for presidency during 2010. The movement’s evolution could be organized around three main phases as follows.

During the period from 2008-2009, the movement was founded by twenty activists—nearly half of them belonged to the youth members of the Work Party. Other founders were independent activists who lacked previous experience with the MB, Wafd, Ghad or other, then active, political forces. While the movement founders had many innovative ideas, they lacked sufficient organizational capacities. This encouraged many parties to opt for incorporating them into youth section—the Work and Ghad parties specifically. However, the movement decided to maintain its organizational autonomy.

At this period the Penetrating Minority Conference started as means to scrutinize the corrupt rule of the National Democratic Party—mainly the Policies Committee led by Gamal Mubarak. The movement videoed critical assessment by specialist academicians of the reports presented by the NDP Policies Committee, in which it ‘celebrates’ an illusive depiction of a growing economy and stable politics under the NDP’s ‘democratic’ government. The 6th of April conference aimed at addressing the NDP reports with real numbers and facts that scrutinize the deteriorating socio-economic conditions: human rights, political freedoms, poverty and unemployment, etc. In doing so, the movement also resorted to the Egyptian Centre for Economic ad Social Rights that studied the domestic situation thoroughly.

Despite their success, the movement experienced its first division in 2009, when an ultra pan-Arab solidarity activists—initially members of the Work party, protested the movement’s ‘perceived’ closure to the U.S. The divide has ideological as well as organizational sides. On the ideological side, there has been a growing contention inside the movement on the priorities of its activism: the pan-Arab solidarity group over-emphasized Arab causes especially human rights in Palestine–Gazza, while other activists believed that
their priority is forcing the regime to step down and undertaking comprehensive changes in economy, health and education services. Organizationally, the nationally oriented activists failed to share the decision making process on an invitation from an American NGO—the Freedom House. Thus, the pan-Arab group campaigned—‘you would not pass!’—to prevent others from travelling to the U.S, unknowing that the invitation has already been declined. The collective resignation of pan-Arab activists resulted into the loss of huge numbers of supporters and sympathizers and, therefore, considerable decline in the movement activism. A defaming campaign was launched by the pan-Arab group, Kefaya, and state-run media against the movement’s ‘foreign finance’.

Since 2009, the movement began to re-construct itself and expand its organs in various governorates: Mansoura, Alexandria, Gharbiyya And Asiout. Although the 6th of April strike in 2009 had failed, in November 2009, the second Penetrating Minority Conference was held in Journalists Syndicate and is believed to have realized considerable success. The national journal AL-Masry AL-Youm featured the NDP conference on one side of its front page, beside the 6th of April conference scrutinizing the NDP corruption. Thus, the movement is believed to have paired equally with the regime and regain its public credibility.

Finally, during the period from 2010-2011, the 6th of April began to study successful attempts of change in Serbia, Kirghizstan, Georgia and Chile. The experience of Serbia was significant for the movement since its catalysts were student activists. Founders of the movement arranged training workshops in Serbia and began what the named ‘Youth for Change version II’. The movement began to build an organizational structure and form groups nationwide. By 25th January 2010 it had, mostly student, groups in: Cairo and Giza, Alexandria, Beheira, Kafr El-Seihk, Elghrbiya, Sohag, Assiout, Fayoum, Portsaid, Ismailiyya and Suez. The groups were trained on means of non-violent peaceful change, campaigning and mobilization, organizing protest, marches, demonstrations and strikes. The peaceful, yet
confrontational, attitude of the movement appeared through one member’s experience who used to write ‘Down Down Mubarak Rule’ beside the pharos in Alexandria at 12:00 noon.

Also, the movement began to participate strongly in the presidential campaign of EL-Barad’ei. By then the movement has grown in number and managed to organize his reception in the Egyptian airport, while two of its founders were detained upon his arrival. The movement collected signatures on EL-Baradi’es call ‘Together We Will Change’ through its FB page and group, where it also announced its events and meetings publicly, including the organizational meetings at which members of the security-intelligence agencies were present.

The movement also began to undertake sudden and short-termed demonstration in poor urban regions such as: Ezbet Osman, Dar El-Salam and poor shanty towns in Maadi and Helwan. The demonstration duration was averagely fifteen minutes through which activists pass a street chanting and raising banners, then disappear. The repeated disruption of the daily life of the oppressed poor began to mobilize indirect sympathy with the movement.

The confrontational attitude of the movement was also indicated during their protest in the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 2010. After the CSA had beaten and detained 100 activists of the movement, the NDP parliamentarians asked the government to shoot the protestors with gunfire. In the following day, 6<sup>th</sup> of April activists stroke by the parliament and challenged the government to shoot them.

Overtime, the movement began to improve its tactical arrangements for demonstrations. The plier tactic aimed at sieging the CSA forces between demonstrators by changing the direction of demonstrations in the last minute. Also, distracting the CSA forces by announcing five or six meeting points, three of them fake—e.g., Matariyya, and Cairo University in the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011 protests. Finally, launching demonstrations and marshes at night in various neighborhoods to mobilize support for next-day protests. In the night of the 25<sup>th</sup> of January 2011, the 6<sup>th</sup> of April joined various forces that collectively mobilized protestors in Maadi, Mohandeseen and Shubra. In Mohandeseen, the 6<sup>th</sup> of April mobilized
residents from poor areas: Nahia, Boulak Aubl3ela and Meet Uqba. Through these tactics, popular dissent was expressed in various forms—e.g., sometimes women threw hot water over CSA forces from their balconies, while the shop keepers stoned the police. The 25\textsuperscript{th} January protest is believed to have amounted into a revolution only when 15,000 protestors poured from urban poor regions heading to Tahrir.

After the Revolution, the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April experienced its second divide—due to its failure to coordinate effectively with the Coalition. The Democratic Front of the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April is thought to include a minority of activists who joined the movement in 2010 and survive through media exposure—says the movement interviewee. According to the movement’s political office, conspiracies against its activism were undertaken by various forces to either destruct or co-opt the movement. Nevertheless, the confrontational attitude of the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April resulted into continuous cycles of dissent, this time for human dignity and stopping police torture of civilians under the Emergency Law.

3.4. \textit{WE Are All Khaled Saed Page}

The brutal murdering of Khaled Said—an activist who posted videos that, allegedly, scrutinize illegal actions of a police officer—has trickled widespread anger against the torture of civilians by the police force—under the Emergency Law. According to eyewitnesses, Said was attacked by plainclothes-officers who crushed his head against a ladder string next to the cybercafé—where they attacked him. The Forensic report accused Said of swallowing an overdose of Marijuana. However, his ferociously deformed corpse and the witnesses of his family members catalyzed a widespread wave of dissent that grew until the 25\textsuperscript{th} January revolution. The snowball evolution of dissent began with the We Are All Khaled Said (WAKS)—\textit{Kullena Khaled Said}—Facebook page that emerged few days after the incident on July 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2010. Wael Ghoneim, the founder, aimed at mobilizing mainstream support of the case of Khaled said by emphasizing the ‘normal’ attributes identifying his life before the murder—apolitical, non-Islamists, non-ideological, middle class young man, whose corpse
proves police sadism and the systematic humiliation of human dignity in the Egyptian daily-life. Labeled ‘He could have been your brother,’ the tragedy of Said provided psychological, political and personal motives to mobilize the sedentary critical mass against torture. According to a WAKS administrator, subjects of earlier torture cases were urban poor citizens who were publicly distrusted and un-defendable.

Since it was not the first Facebook page defending Said–‘My Name is Khaled Said’ was established by the 6th of April movement on 24 June 2010– Ghoneim carefully differentiated the page from its competitors– employing an Egyptian colloquial dialect with non-confrontational and decent tone, avoiding collaboration with any political cause or entity–even the Seven Demands of El-Baradie Campaign– avoiding the use of expressions unfamiliar to the Egyptian public such as Nizaam (Regime), speaking the voice of Said, and giving a message that the writer is ‘an ordinary Egyptian devastated by the brutality inflicted on Khaled Said and motivated to seek justice’. Meanwhile, Ghoneim’s purpose was fortified through a touching article by Moustafa EL-Naggar–the founder of the Justice party– that addressed the collective responsibility for the brutal murdering of Saed. Hence, the page scored 300 subscription at the first two minutes and 30,000 on the first day. By March 2011, the page contents achieved 1,300 billion hits while an average of 500,000 participants visit the page at least once every day.

185 Anonymous, “My Name is Khaled Saed”, FaceBook, 24/07/2011. https://www.facebook.com/pages/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%89-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF/129237763772917?ref=ts


In order to extend political mobilization beyond confrontational opposition, the page voiced humanitarian and socio-economic grievance that identified the situation in Egypt in the recent years—"100,000 suicide attempt in 2009 has resulted into the death of 5,000, 48 million poor citizen, 2.5 million in extreme poverty, 12 million without shelter and 1.5 million live in cemeteries, habitual corruption account for 39 billion pounds in one year only, Egypt ranks 115th of 139 nations on the corruption Perceptions index and the 139th rank in hiring transparency, 30 percent of the youth is unemployed, we have the highest rate of new born death in the world: 50 of every 1,000 newborn Egyptians, half of Egyptian children are anemic, eight million citizens infected by hepatitis C, more than 100,000 suffer of cancer every year because of water pollution, the rate of ambulance cars to citizens is 1:35,000, and the Emergency Law has resulted into the torture and death of thousands". In the following months, the 2010 elections, the church bombing in Alexandria on Christmas night, and the torture of Sayyed Belal, again to death, by police officers were turning points that urged the page to initiate a call for the 25th January 2011 protests. Following the success of the Tunisian Revolution, the goal turned from stopping torture in police stations to ‘unseat Mubarak’s rule’.

Later, Ghoneim invited two more administrators to help updating and organizing the 25th January protests. The two interviewed administrators represented examples of well-established and resourceful activists. The first was involved in politics through the MB, Kefaya and the Youth for Change movements, while the other took over the popular campaign of EL-Baradei for five months–besides his research and fieldwork in a notable think tank. Both administrators refused to join institutional opposition forces that represented ‘a failure, a lack of strategy, vision and credibility, controlled by opportunistic, cartoony and highly polarized leadership’.

\[189\] Ghoneim, 165
The page administrators provided a variety of content, including notes, polls, text and multi-media posts, and instructions. Several informative, argumentative, and motivating notes entangle with protest purposes, positive initiatives, individual tragedies, witnesses, narratives, open letters, instructions, participation statistics, legal document, statements, court dates, DIY means and tool-kits that facilitate participation and circulation of the page, and thorough analysis of particular situations, defining the socio-economic and humanitarian conditions that explain police


199, “The We Are All Khaled Saed Page: Billion and 300 Million hit since launching”, ibid.


202 Wael Adel, “Why Do They Beat Us”, FaceBook, 19/02/2012
brutality\textsuperscript{203}, etc. Generally, the notes follow logical persuasive discourse that centres around the rule of law and culturally uncontestable human values—e.g., dignity, freedom and moderation. The topical themes involved issues of torture, bribery, corruption and education\textsuperscript{204}.

The social, political, professional and online networks of the administrators facilitated the flow of resources into the page. The page depended on volunteering professionals for providing and analyzing legal and medical reports. Also, it depended on peer human rights NGOs—e.g., AL-Nadeem Centre for Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and Hesham Mubarak Centre for Legal Advice. In addition, professional blogs provided close field information such as the ‘Egyptian Conscience’\textsuperscript{205} that documented torture during the period from 2005 to 2008. The page has been exceptionally successful in raising public awareness of concurrent issues, e.g., publishing legal, political and historical documents, political statements, analytical articles of notable analysts, videos/images of victims’ corpses, informing about the legal and human dimensions of human tragedies and encouraging members to take part in solidary activities. In such a way, the regime’s crimes were gradually exposed to the public eyes\textsuperscript{206}.

In addition, the page administrators ran opinion polls and online and offline campaign. The polls investigated two issues: a) participants’ preference of time and meeting points of Silent Stands and b) their feedback. The page’s participatory approach was successful in terms of realizing high turnout rates; the 19\textsuperscript{th} January polls returned 5,000


\textsuperscript{206}Ghoneim, 129-130
complete questionnaire. Meanwhile, poll results indicated the real identity of protestors and developed a sense of ownership, sharing and mutual-recognition\textsuperscript{207}. Also, the page ran numerous campaigns, e.g., a) publishing contact details of martyrs’ mothers and encourage participants to support them, b) launching a ‘Vote for Khaled Said’\textsuperscript{208} campaign to nullify electoral votes of participants, c) launching the ‘\textit{Friday of Black Silence}’\textsuperscript{209} to mourn victims of police torture on the anniversary of the Egyptian coup d’état, d) calling upon Muslim participants to guard Christian churches on the 7\textsuperscript{th} of January, 2011–to put down the regime efforts to raise sectarian conflicts, e) encouraging participants to dialogue with infiltrating police officers after publishing a list of their Facebook profiles, and f) drawing parallels the famous movie ‘\textit{V for Vendetta}’ by calling upon participants to wear black outfit on the fifth of November and rounding the streets for six hours to ‘show’ grievance\textsuperscript{210}. Such campaigns empowered participants, enhanced breaking the fear barrier and expose them to the variety of opinions inside the police force concerning Khaled Said.

Among its most successful ‘offline’ campaigns were the Silent Stands. Through 2010, the page has been successful in organizing a number of stands that effectively mobilized public dissent against the regime. Posted on its timeline via an anonymous participants, the idea revolved around non-confrontational expression of grieve, through a number of ‘signs’: dressing black, standing by the Nile/sea, reading, standing silently, give their back to the street, etc. If asked to show their national IDs, participants were advised to show it calmly, abstain from talking to anyone, accompany friends only and stand at distance

\textsuperscript{207} Ghoneim, 118


from each other, avoid dangerous areas—where police officers or police stations preside—, photographing themselves and posting photos on the page timeline.

The success of the first Stand rendered the page popular and credible. Following the first stand, the traffic on the page increased dramatically reaching an average of 7,000 likes per day. On Friday 18th of June 2011, 37,000 like and 120,000 comments were posted. To ‘celebrate’ the high turnout, administrators compiled images in a short documentary along with popular court of Said murderers. The following Silent Stands were on 25th of June and July 9th 2011 and were organized in ten Egyptian cities beyond Cairo and Alexandria—Qalyobiyiya, Kafr El-Sheikh, Aswan, Menia.

The diffusion policy of the page entitled members who would not join the Silent Stand to stand ‘anywhere’ for thirty minutes mourning Said and post their photos. In later stands, media coverage and political figures’ participation were encouraged although the page emphasized that no political advantage should be sought out. Also, all Facebook initiative were mobilized towards supporting the stand. The demands were clearly set as ‘immediate judicial investigation of torture cases, an invitation of every citizens who was subject to humiliation and/or torture to appeal securely to the designated members of the judiciary, and that Khaled Said’s murderers be prosecuted.

The WAKS page reached the success pinnacle on January 2011. The first call for protesting on 25th January was posted on the WAKS page to ‘celebrate the achievements of the police force on the protestors’ own way’—says a co-administrator. The protests were

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212 The Shaheed, “ The Popular Court of Saed murdurers”, *YouTube*, Web, 20/08/2010


214 Ghoneim, 87-88
intended as to honor patriot police officers while scrutinize criminal officers involved in torturing and humiliating the innocents. The aim of scrutinizing the police—‘a chain that the regime tied around our necks’—was also resonant to the immediate cause of the Tunisian revolution—a policewomen slapping Bouazizi—an unlicensed vegetable-cart operator in Sidi Bouzid. The page argued that torture has recently turned into a systematic practice to extract information. Meanwhile, financial corruption prevailed within the police enterprise; due to low wages, officers resort to bribery and illegal activities that they, themselves, should investigate.

Nevertheless, the call for protests on the 25th took a different destination after the success of the Tunisian Revolution. According to Ghoneim, catalyzing events included the suicide incident of Egyptians who set themselves on fire early January 2011. In response, Ghoneim posted shocking statistics on the suicide incident in 2010: 12,000 commit suicide during the period from 2006-2011. 100,000 attempted suicide in 2009 which is five times the rate in 2005, every day 14 Egyptians commit suicide for unemployment and poverty and more than two thirds of the cases are young men under 25 years of age. Accordingly, the WAKS call for 25th protests turned into ‘January 25th: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption, and Unemployment’. Such a call addressed workers, employees, human rights activists and other ‘communities’ that protested in previous dissent cycles. The page also mobilized the Ultras football communities: Ahlawy, Zamalek, Ismaili. The marketing campaign focused on a number of pints: revealing regime weakness and fear, drawing parallel to Tunisia, report on Tunisian victories following Bin Aly’s escape, invite poets, writers, actors, and designers to support the 25th January protests, expose the regime’s
economic, social, political and security failures, and assure that the army will side with people and act honorably\textsuperscript{217}.

The call for January 25th reached half a million Facebook members–in collaboration with other pages such as 6\textsuperscript{th} of April’s ‘\textit{My name is Khaled Said’}. On WAKS page, the invitation was ‘attended’ by 27,000. The page called for spreading the invitation in streets, mosques, churches, and factories and outreaching urban poor regions such as Boulaq, Shubra, Manshiyet Naser, Ein Shams, and Mahalla. Unlike other stands that barely reached 100,000, the 25th January invitation reached half a million. Also, members were encouraged to send cellphone messages to friends and acquaintances, print flyers and asking their friends to invite five more to the event\textsuperscript{218}.

In few days, several political forces began to undertake unilateral dissent acts. For instance, although a protest by 6th of April in Tahrir suffered weak turnout, it resulted into a video post by Asmaa Mahfouz encouraging people of every background to participate on the 25th protests. Also, the Popular Assembly—a group of parliamentary candidates against whom the regime had committed electoral forgery in 2010—protested at the High Courts Complex. Also, professional photographing groups were invited to the event through the page administrator and scores of photographers joined the protests to document the action under a campaign ‘\textit{The Camera is my Weapon}’\textsuperscript{219}.

The page set clear the demands for the ‘big day’: a) raising minimum wages, improving health and education services and issuing unemployment benefits of L.E 500 to university graduates for a limited period, b) annulling the emergency law and that the attorney general take charge of police stations to stop routine torture practices, c) firing the minister of Interior Habib el-Adly, d) placing two term limit to presidency. To prevent

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\textsuperscript{217} ibid, 138-40
\textsuperscript{218} ibid, 143
\textsuperscript{219} ibid, 155
\end{flushleft}
physical confrontation with police officers, the page published several posts ‘celebrating’
good officers: saluting the officer who refused a bribe of $15 million and apologizing for and
the officer who was in charge of protecting the Alexandria Coptic Church on December 31,
2010. Finally, mobilizing the critical mass has also been facilitated through the support of
notable analysts, public figures, singers and actors such as Hamza Namera, actress Basma,
actor Amr Waked, TV presenter Ahmed el-Esseily, director Khaled Yousef, Amr Salama and
Mohamed Diab.\footnote{ibid, 173}

The effort of WAKS page was internationally recognized even before the
David Sharrock, Jack Shenker and Paul Harris, “Egypt: how the people span the wheel of their country's history” The
Sahar Khamis and Katherine “Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and Citizen
Facebook and Twitter let the people keep ahead of the regime.” The Wall Street Journal, 14/02/2011. Web,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703786804576137980252177072.html; Evgeny Morozov, “Smart
Dictators Don't Quash the Internet: Mubarak had no idea how to counter the power of social media. China, Russia and
Iran know better” 19/02/2011. Web,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703786804576150653606688990.html; David Wolman,
“How the January 25 Egyptian Revolution Was Organized” The Atlantic, 04/05/2011. Web,
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/05/how-the-january-25-egyptian-revolution-was-organized/238336/;
John Sutter, “The faces of Egypt's 'Revolution 2.0'”, The CNN World, 21/02/2011, Web,
Mohamed El-Nawawy and Sahar Khamis, “Political Activism 2.0: Comparing the Role of Social Media in Egypt’s

There are 84 mentions of the word "physical" in this text.
3.5. The Egyptian Current Party

The Egyptian Current party was established on June 2011 by a group of revolutionary activists- mostly from the Revolutionary Youth Coalition- representing a wide range of ideological and intellectual backgrounds. The party works on preserving and strengthening the Egyptian mainstream that comprises the majority of non-ideological population. Hence the party focuses on the daily life needs of ordinary Egyptians, following values of freedom, democratic and peaceful rotation of power, good governance, empowering the civil society, and applying standards of social justice in various aspect of life, while preserving the Arab-Muslim identity and African depth regarding priorities of foreign relations.\(^{223}\)

The party sets as its vision that by 2030 the Egyptian per capita income reaches the ten highest international rates, the Egyptian citizens enjoy civil rights and freedoms that ensure full human dignity and that Egypt becomes one of the ten most developed countries politically, economically, scientifically and militarily. The party approaches these ends through serious political functioning and strategic planning to realize a leading regional role of Egypt. The party envisions its role as divided between political and developmental goals. These include: a) providing a civil and democratic party whose performance is directed by religious values and ethics while maintaining openness to the 'other', b) envisioning the Egyptian citizen is the real capital; thus investment in citizens should include better education, training, health care, work opportunities, infrastructure, wages, etc. c) the party envision the 'Sprit of Tahrir' and strengthens its achievements, d) a youthful party that presents new norm and understanding to the political life dependent of youth energies and their capability of realizing achievements, e) incorporating the majority of the population-

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\(^{223}\)“Facebook Revolution” and Iran’s “Twitter Uprising”, CyberOrient, 6, No. 1 (2012), Web

http://www.cyberorient.net/article.do?articleId=7439


individuals and collectivities—in politics, through public workshops—with professionals, handcraft, workers, intellectuals, artists, etc—to realize participatory democracy in setting public policies and incorporating popular needs and priorities in professionally charted plans of implementation\textsuperscript{224}, f) rejection of rigid structures of ideologies and institutions, encourages positive criticism and beneficial difference, and empower marginalized groups—women, Copts, decapitated, and under-poverty line citizens, g) applying the rights of citizenship without discrimination on basis of religion, ethnicity, geographical or social affiliation, h) realizing equal opportunities to all citizens in receiving education, health, and housing services at best quality and widest distribution, providing unemployment assistance and eliminating poverty, realizing justice in distributing national income and services, employing professional and academic capabilities in planning and implementing innovative development on specific issues, giving priority to labor-intense economic projects and small and medium business enterprises\textsuperscript{225}.

The EC’s internal narrative dates back to the 1919 revolution, when Egyptian of various backgrounds, including women and Copts, took their demands into the streets and enforced the English and, then, Farouk kingdom, on compliance to ‘national demands’—liberation and reform. Parallel to the historical Wafid ‘Delegation’ party, the Egyptian Current was established upon a revolutionary ‘situation’ in which a national mainstream has been centered on unified demands: stepping Mubarak down and providing the basics of dignified human life: bread, freedom and social justice. Thus, the EC believes the revolution is continuing; If Egypt does not pursuit its revolutionary change, it will retard hundreds of years because ‘half-way revolutions entomb nations’\textsuperscript{226}.

\textsuperscript{224} Observing the priorities of indigenous population and the ‘end consumer/applicator’
\textsuperscript{225} ibid
The EC adopts Tariq Al-Bishry’s historical analyses of the 1919 Revolution, entitled ‘Towards a National Mainstream of the Ummah’. In his study, Al-Bishry set the conditions that define a nation’s political mainstream as to include: inclusiveness of various political forces that maintain plurality and distinctiveness while manifest the 'common' identifiers of the Ummah with its various socio-political components. The idea of a national mainstream does not negate the possibility of confrontation; rather, it reconstructs itself on bases of contentious interaction between its components. The result of such process is a ‘National Project’: an inclusive definition of the political situation and broad guidelines of action on which a political generation deliberatively agrees. The EC believes that the success of 1919 ‘national project’ resulted from El-Wafd party’s policies: avoidance of ideologue and partisan discourses and unity around the liberation goal. Similarly, the co-founders believe, the success of 25th Revolution resulted from deliberation and focus on immediate socio-economic demands rather than ideologue causes.

The EC provisions its role in post 25th January Revolution politics as to comprise three main characteristics. Firstly, it represents post ideological politics that escapes ideological polarization and classifications: Nasserism, Islamism, Liberalism and Socialism. Rather, the EC is eclectically dependent on ideologies where they serve direct implementation programs. Secondly, the EC is a youth party. It was not founded by notable charismatic, ideological, intellectual or political figures. Rather, political activists and ‘commons’ that first staged political protests in 25th January established the EC. In a co-founder's words 'in Tahrir Square, we found the Egyptian 'common sense' of politics planning and deciding upon floor and ceiling of change demands and negotiate with 'enemies'. Instead of notable ideological 'leadership', the 'ordinary' people staged platforms and expressed their opinions- for good or bad- to the square population. Following the resignation of Mubarak on

227 Tariq Al-Bishry, “Towards a Main Stream of the Ummah” (Qatar, Al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2008), 33.
228 Ibid, 33-4
February 12th, 2011, members of the Tahrir population and the Revolutionary Youth Coalition gained sufficient self-confidence and comprised the EC founders that discredit rotten ideologue intelligentsia of traditional political parties. The youthfulness of the EC calibers addresses a generational divide that characterized the pre-January 25th politics: ideologue parties provide highly theoretical discourses without the least consideration of application, elitism, paternalism and superiority over the 'ignorant' masses, and restricting participation channels of young activists and monopolizing power and representation inside party/movement centres. Also, the party youth has freed itself from the ‘shame chains’ that Mubarak tied around the Egyptian youth neck: in Lotfy’s words “The discourse of Mubarak focused on shaming the youth and Egyptian identity--‘how would I feed all of you, where would I house you, I can not raise voice against Israel, our alliance with the U.S is strategic, etc.’--hence the EC youth has liberated itself from Mubarak’s shame and is determined to utilize available time, effort and capabilities (to reform the country)"

Hence, the EC represents post-ideological forces, in two ways. Firstly, it avoids ideological profiling by maintaining intellectual openness and encouraging eclectic use of various ideological tools—when preparing policy drafts. Also, it avoids involvement in contentious ideologue discourses that proved little difference in application and does not mind the 'ordinary' citizen anyhow. The ideological leanings of the EC comprises three components: a) concerning political rights and freedoms, it adopts liberal values of democracy, power rotation, separation between powers and strengthening the role of civil society, b) economically, the EC rejects both excessive capitalism and socialist processes; rather it seeks a balance between sustainable development and social justice, which places the


party closer to social liberalism, in which private businesses play an influential and responsible role in development while the state undertakes welfare services, finally, c) regarding foreign policy and international relations, the party follows a comprehensive view that comprise Arab, Muslim and African identities along with moderately conservative views concerning the influence of globalization on national identity. Secondly, the party emphasizes the need to participatory democracy, viable and effective communication with the 'street'. Thus, the party perceives itself as means by which ordinary population direct, plan and implement public policies. It argues that the Mubarak regime had exercised authoritarian monopoly of power and suppression of political opposition due to the popular 'abstention' from politics and public concerns in general. Although the party co-founders realize that party platforms has been widely replaced by direct anomic protest and demonstration even in the most developed countries–France and Spain before January 2011– they envision the EC as a popular party that provides a new definition of partisan activity in the Egyptian politics.

Among the EC’s co-founders are former ‘responsible’ of the Cairo University student section of the MB, who were dismissed in June 2011 for participating in the initiation of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition prior to and after the 25th January Revolution. The EC founder provided socio-organizational, material, human and moral resources to the Coalition and contributed to the success of the Revolution. Therefore, the party founders comprised activists of various walks and backgrounds: Islamic, Liberal, Socialist, Nasserite, etc. The idea crystalized with the resignation statement of the former president Hosni Mubarak, when founders realized that ‘post ideological’, revolutionary, inclusive and collective action may lead into considerable achievements unrealized for decades.

The founder’s tendency to undertake nationally inclusive political activism was challenged when the mother organization–the MB–formed th FJP that, according to the EC

\[\text{ibid}^{231}\]
co-founders, ruined the achievements of the Coalition and revived ideological polarization in the political, cultural and socio-economic landscape. Hence, the party founders decided to separate and ‘defend their dream’ through the EC. The party founders aim at mobilizing national consensus on fundamental issues involved in the writing of the new Egyptian constitution, and expect to give rise to various political parties that function within mature institutional framework and enjoy the rule of law. Concerning its relation to the MB, the party founders emphasize the inclusiveness of the MB school of thought that incorporates transcendent values and principles of economic, political and social reform. Thus, the mere dismissal from the organization does not nullify the EC commitment to the ideational principles of the MB, as manifest in the party platform. Nevertheless, some co-founder disagree on magnifying the MB origins of the EC, since the party has emerged out of various coalitions and dialogues between Tahrir activists who comprised, besides the MB calibers, socialist, Nasserite, and liberal activists.\textsuperscript{232}

The founders of the EC are, again, highly qualified and resourceful activists who had various experiences in forming and running political coalitions several years before the Revolution. The two founders participating in the study are active member in a number of initiatives of NGOs: the Union of Revolutionary Forces, the Youth Coalition, the Ahrar institution, Baladna institution for civil society leadership and several human rights networks. Previous experiences also included founding My Right–Ha’iy initiative, organizing the PCIR conferences, and establishing a parallel student union. Hence their background reflects complex, multi-dimensional and overlapping spheres of activity that provided the party with broad socio-political exposure after the Revolution.

During the 2011 elections, the EC formed the ‘Revolution is Continuing’ list to break the polarization between the Democratic Coalition–Islamists–and the Libro-secular list.

\textsuperscript{232} AbdelRahman Fares, ibid.
supported by the Coptic population. The list comprised candidates from the Free Labor Union, the Freedom Party, the Popular Socialist Union, Equality, Development, and the Egyptian union parties. Although the EC succeeded in gathering 36,000 vote for its candidates, the party has failed in achieving parliamentary seats for a number of reasons:

1. Monetary and financial shortage: the electoral processes were dependent on finance; some parties exceeded the ceiling of campaigning finance—spending up to L.E 1 million—, while the EC founders could collect donations of 32,000 L.E only.

2. Distorting the public image of Tahrir protestors by blaming every crisis on ‘the guys shouting in Tahrir’.

3. Suspending the campaign temporarily to support protestors at Mohammed Mahmoud.

4. The constituency where the EC founder ran was geographically dispersed that only nine days before the elections were insufficient to cover the region. In his words ‘I could not convince people that a young man—32 years—could run for their interests’.

5. The shortage of human resources: the limited human resources of the party were distributed over campaign of five candidates.

6. Falsifying the election results in favor of the Islamists in some constituencies and Wafd–liberal—candidates in others

The party expresses itself to the outside world through the main headquarter, in Ramses–Cairo, and various media outlets—Al-Tayyar EL-Masry Facebook page, Youtube channel. During the parliamentary campaign, the party undertook awareness projects, such

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233 The EC founder believes that the election results were falsified in some Gizah constituencies in favor of Islamists and Wafd. According to him, the reasons include that the Revolution is Continuing List was targeted by the SCAF after the Muhammed Mahmoud and the Ministerial House massacres due to the EC support of protestors.


as workshops and documentaries. Currently the EC contributes to the presidential campaign of Abdul-Mone’im Abul-Photoh—a former MB leader. When asked about the reason, a co-founder explained ‘Abul-Photoh is not a consensual politician who would serve the interest of the SCAF and counter-revolutionary forces, enjoys strong determination and will for change, belongingness to the Egyptian society, and representation of various components of the Egyptian identity’. To sum up, the EC’s competitive edge, is youthfulness, religious moderation, and ideological eclecticism.

3.6. The Salafyo Costa Movement

Similar to the EC, Salafyo Costa was inspired by the 25th January Revolution. It aims at eliminating ideological/religious profiling and retaining the Tahrir Spirit of tolerance and unity. On the ‘our vision’ section, the group identifies itself as ‘a development, non governmental and not-for-profit movement, founded by a group with various religious, ideological, and intellectual affiliations to provide real daily-life environment that enables 'knowing the other' through rational deliberation, cooperation and brotherhood, and thus, develop both the society and its individuals’. The group states its mission as to “realize social revival through improving scientific, economic and cultural conditions and growing offspring that effectively lead the country towards a bright future of building and

Thus, among the activities are: awareness campaigns in public health, social and cultural concerns, eliminating illiteracy and educating children through providing small libraries, generating job opportunities by micro-financing small business projects, charity activists, e.g., facilitating financially the marriage of poor women, feeding and sheltering homeless poor, providing blankets on winter seasons, medical caravans, collecting donations for various purposes. Most of these activities take place in Ezbet Al-Haggana.

The SC group has developed through personal relationships built during the 18-day strike. It upholds a set of values that resonate with its vision, e.g., the value of human life, and respect of law, education, improving socio-economic life conditions, donating with time and effort beside financial and administrative assistance, cooperation with domestic and international entities that share common goals – NGOs, human right agencies and government authorities.

The emphasize on purely ‘original’ sources of knowledge is manifest on their mission as stated on the FB page, Salafiyo Costa “our goal is to call upon Salafis and non-Salafis to listen to, and dialogue with, each other, discourse, simply, their causes, be open, avoid defaming, misrepresentation and mutual- accusations, tolerate differences and respect specialization”. Also, the group founders encourage active engagement with national concerns by seeking the truth undergoing in the street–Ezzat Tolba, co-founder- first posed the famous sarcasm on sedentary citizens on 22 February 2011 on his FB page where he

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241 www.salafyocosta.com
242 Mohamed Tolba, “Accepting the Other’s Opinion”, Tahrir Lounge, YouTube, 30/12/2011, Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wD-CsDsIHSI&list=UUO2p1hQnu1zJSx66pdUpVg&index=11&feature=plcp
addressed the ‘glorious Sofa Party’ to take to the streets, while ‘Where is My Ear film’ states ‘the armchair sofa will stay home, but Egypt will get lost’\(^{245}\).

Against the celebrative ‘spectacles’ of national unity among religious institutions, the group approaches coexistence through ‘experiencing’ the lives of each other in its normal settings; it started with a Salafi-Christian football match\(^ {246} \), and quickly incorporated members into charity projects. In a recent medical caravan, it organized doctors with contentious, even mutually hostile, affiliations and encouraged team-working and mutual understanding among them; the group entitles new project managers to involve members of various affiliations– ‘we will not accept a project undertaken by an exclusive group of Salafis, Christians or liberal volunteers’\(^ {247} \). In fact, the strong tendency towards team-working and functional cooperation is admittedly part of the founders’ occupational backgrounds. Waleed Mustafa, a co-founder, explains that most of the founders work at multi-national companies, where coexistence, teamwork, effectiveness and abidance by universal rules define the work environment. In his words: ‘we wanted to replicate this community into our real life’\(^ {248} \).

The popular orientation of the group is further manifest in its definition of the situation in Egypt that comprises ‘a crisis in education, awareness, poverty (…) people believe death is cheaper than getting medicine’\(^ {249} \). The contrast with ‘high’ politics is

\(^{245}\) Ezzatamin, “Where is My Ear”, \textit{YouTube}, 20/05/2011, Web, \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Boj07ZU4L7s&feature=related}


\(^{247}\) SalafyOcosta, “SalafyO Participate”, www.salafyocosta.com, \url{http://www.salafyocosta.com/default_ar.aspx?id=112&Name=%D9%85%D9%86_%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%88_%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83_...} (accessed April 15, 2012).


\(^{249}\) Mohamed Tolba, “Accepting the Other’s Opinion”.

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manifest in Tolba’s rhetoric—*‘Hey you who sit in talk-shows and steer the country left and right, you do not feel how it sounds in the street (the group shouts) People first, not fights on the identity of state, Constitutional amendments, Shari’a application, Bikini and wine, etc’*.

Following the Constitutional Referendum, in March 2011, a Facebook page was established with seven hundred members. After gathering over 90,000 members on FB, the SC group plans for establishing a society-oriented political party, that pressures towards societal policies, compete for executive positions- mainly Youth and Education ministries, and undertake development projects. The group was recognized as a rising political force since the May 27th 2011 protest in Tahrir, in which members took corners and begin to convince liberal and secular crowds of co-existence.

The group markets itself through purposeful media production: short films, TV shows and public seminar. It appeared with Bassem Yousef at his comedian show *ELBarnameg* in which founders narrated on their lifestyles during Ramadan. Also, the group has produced two remarkable short films: ‘Where is my shop’, ‘Where is My Ear’. In both, it condemned prevalent ‘codes’ of cross-religious and ideological debates: claiming ultimate Right, superiority over others, isolation from communal and social bonds. The films humorously emphasized a need for confessional deliberation, self-revision, as well as criticism of ‘irrational’ stereotypes–liberals spend their time in nightclubs, socialize with women, walk naked in public, drink wines, and prepare coffee with Vodka! Salafis accuse the public with infidelity, cut their ears and bomb churches. Criticizing stereotypical perceptions was

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250 Medaneltahreernews, ibid.
251 Mohammed Tolba and Ezzat Amin, interviewed by Bassem Yousef, “Salafi and Liberal”, *ELBarnameg*, 17/08/2011, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TirNGG-Ptd0&feature=relmfu](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TirNGG-Ptd0&feature=relmfu)
employed as means to facilitate rational deliberation, self-criticism, and open discussion\textsuperscript{253}. In Mustafa’s words – ‘what is desperately needed is Knowledge and action’\textsuperscript{254}. The films scored over 120,000 hit on YouTube, in less than three days, and some scripts were broadcasted on the 10 O’clock program\textsuperscript{255}. Ironically, the ‘Where is my Shop’ film was made on less than US$30, using an ordinary camera and shot in an empty shop at EL-Haggana area. The group sarcastically presented the financiers of the film as to include “‘Saudi Arabia, the Israeli Mossad, Freedom House in the United States, and the Embassy of Swan Lake.’”

Finally, public seminars currently involve ‘I Am Not a Sheep’ serious that started in Alexandria, Qena, Tanta and Sharm El-Sheikh. Also, the Salafi founder currently delivers the Salafyo Costa program on the ‘Youth’ channel\textsuperscript{256}. In their program, the group brands a new image of middle class open-minded Salafis with centrist ideology and normally socialize and debate on various issues. The group has acquired broad media coverage throughout national and international outlets\textsuperscript{257}.

The group is distinctive in two respects: 1- it is founded by apolitical and strictly religious youth who grieve the discriminating discourse of Orthodox religious institutions and 2- it represent a success story of a Salafi citizen whose experience of religious and political

\textsuperscript{253} Walid Mosatafa, videoed by Al-Mujaz, “Where is My Ear Film and the Story of Salafyo Costa”, uploaded by Mujazdotme, on 11/07/2011, YouTube, Web http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDCx5MOPQc&feature=player_embedded

\textsuperscript{254} Walid Mostafa on Al-Arabiya TV Channel, “SalafyoCosta: We Are the One’s Who Pay for Your Drinks” ibid.

\textsuperscript{255} Watch on YouTube: \url{http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wTiMnmKMOFQ&feature=related}

\textsuperscript{256} See the program video records on Salafyo Costa YouTUbe Channel: \url{http://www.youtube.com/user/SalafyoCosta}

oppression resulted into severe detachment from communal affiliations; nevertheless, it later turned into productive efforts to realize coexistence and tolerance. According to him, the first encounter with liberal, secular, Christian and female ‘Others’ was a turning point. Although he was at the belief that protesting against rulers is religiously forbidden, after watching the CSA brutality against his ‘liberal’ brother, he decided to quit migration plans and join Tahrir. There, the spirit of unity, tolerance, appreciation and understanding inspired his activism.

In conclusion, SC represents a successful attempt to free individuals from the authority of religious figures and ‘confess’ differences and psychological, political, and social tensions. In such a way, it leans towards neo-liberal and liberal-socialist ideas that emphasize the good of–religious–communities as harmonious with individual freedoms and liberty.

3.7. The Ultras Ahlawy (AU-07) Football Community

The Ultras Ahlawy (UA-07) is a tight-knit group of zealot supporters of the Cairo based Al-Ahly Club. In principal, ultra fan groups are formed of 'particularly passionate, emotional, committed and – above all – very active fans who are fascinated by (...) spurring on their team and have made it their job to (...) support “their” team creatively and to the best of their ability'258. The etymological origin of the term ‘Ultra’ dates back to the French Restoration period (1815-1830). It used to generically indicate hardcore Italian football fans that ‘manifest behaviors that at times exceed that considered the ‘norm’ in linguistics, bodily comportment and ultimately violent practices’259. The idea of football ultra fan groups originated in Latin America and Southern Europe–mainly Italy–during 1960s. Before then, football matches generally characterized parochial, town-based, relaxed, and informal social gatherings. Fan club offices provided tickets as well as common spaces for collective


259 Alberto Testa, “The UltraS: An Emerging Social Movement?”, Review of European Studies, 1, no.9 (2009):54
listening to state radio match commentaries. Episodic violence rarely occurred and was usually explained by individual predispositions.²⁶⁰

Several accounts contest the beginning of the Ultra–hardcore football fans–groupings during the 1970s. On one hand, English sociologists criticize native-born assumptions and claim that episodic violence has occurred since 1959. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that the Ultra fan groups became a socio-political phenomenon with definite sociological contours during the 1970. Similar to Europe’s 1950s, in Egypt, the 1980 and 1990s witnessed primitive and simple football culture.²⁶¹ Professional supporters were either administrators in football clubs or linked to prominent football stars. Football ‘events’ were usually scheduled on weekends for entertainment and recreational purposes. Thus, football teams had less resonance with broad emotional, social or organizational attitudes.²⁶² The emergence of football industry following the globalization and commercialization rise on the 1980s had resulted into various rooting styles and values of Ultra movements. The broader market demand and new media technologies, writes El-Sherif, provided opportunities of ‘high profitability, money laundering, advertising and circulation of financial resources’²⁶³. The material manifestations of globalized football cultures–language, behavior, artifacts and symbols–facilitated the rise of Ultra groups in the country. Following their appearance in Tunisia, Egypt gave birth to some of the most successful ultra groups in the African continent.

The global widespread of the idea inspired Amr Fahmy, then working for the African Football Union, to call for the establishment of ultras Ahlawy. Early forms of coordination with Al-Ahly football fans emerged with Al-Ahly Fan Club (AFC) and Al-Ahly Lovers Club

²⁶⁰ ibid, 55
²⁶² ibid
²⁶³ ibid, para 12.
(ALU) that provided early platforms for the group to launch. In 13 April 2007, the Ultras Ahlawy was founded by twenty-five members who aimed at ‘introducing the Ultras Culture to Egypt and improving the atmosphere in the stadium’—says a co-founder. The movement comprised a majority of ‘male’ members within the 16-25 age-brackets. Its first appearance was at a match of Al-Ahly against the team of Engineering for the Petroleum and Process Industries—ENPPI in 2007. Although the group supports Al-Ahly teams of Basketball, Volleyball, and Handball, it is well-known for supporting Al-Ahly football team, given the widespread popularity of the game. The group usually resides in Curva Nord-Thalta Chimal—and is widely attributed with a masculine ‘cult’ of ‘hardness’, semi-military organization, rebellion against political and, partially, societal rules, ultimate focus on the pitch ‘spectacle’, solidarity, and absolute commitment to entertainment and festivity. Thus, the Ultras ‘way of life’ is generally distinctive from the ‘broader social, psychological, and cultural contexts, in part by virtue of their rebellious nature and their defiance of norms’.264

The group employs various means to provide an amusing and entertaining atmosphere to Al-Ahly matches. The Dakhla—(Introduction) of the matches represents an innovative activity that places the movement among the best Ultras groups in Africa and the Arab world. In many national and international matches, the group has performed remarkable introductions: e.g., the ‘We Are Egypt’, ‘No End’265, ‘One Nation: No for Religious Sectarianism’266 and Freedom267. Such introductions raise players’ moral and encourages them to win, while serving the movement’s commercial and political purposes. Following the

264 Ibid, para 15.
266 -----------------------------,”Ultras ahlawy intro.12/5/2011“,”YouTube, 12/05/2012, Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmvN0apIUcg&list=UUNlupLY7x0XQAXlvy91h8bg&index=1&feature=plcp
267 -----------------------------,”Ultras Ahlawy...Al-Ahly vs mokawlon..28/1/2012 “ YouTube, 29/01/2012, Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1gsO9O4HsXw&feature=related
Porsaid massacre of AU members, a Mourning introduction for martyrs. Similarly, introduction usually provide platform for slangs and obscene chants that humiliate the Interior Ministry and charge officers with mental stupidity and weak educational competence.

Also, the community identifies itself through many self-produces clips, chants, and musical albums. In the Greatest Club in the World album the primary song featured a voice of thousands members chanting ‘the day I stop spurring, is when I am certainly dead’. Some chants belittle the Ultras White knights –‘you, doorkeepers, await eight years to win championship!’ Paper displays of logos and short statements–e.g., Welcome to Hell, Red Devils, Freedom for Ultras–, stadium derbies, and displays of tifos, and choreographies.

Finally, the group is also known for its Pyro shows that instigate football players while adding the sense of amusement and entertainment to the match experience–e.g., The Ring Show. For instance, during Al-Ahly match against ZESCO United F.C in CAF Champion League, the Ultras Ahlawy fired 300 flares at once and surrounded the stadium with a ring of fire while the UA and UD letters displayed by the flares in the group’s curve Talta Chimal. Beyond the stadium curve, it usually performs visual support by wearing certain clothing–polo shirts, caps, scarves that bear Al-Ahly’s logo and design.

Due to their defiance, abnormal enthusiasm and innovative ideas, the Ultras Ahlawy had always been subject to administrative and security-intelligence restrictions. For instance, Al-Ahly club usually refuses to grant the UA members access to the stadium before matches

268 ----------------------------------------, “Ultras Ahlawy,,5 intros 12 days !!. HD”, YouTube, 10/03/2011, Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNFtlMolrEc&list=UUNIupLY7x0XQAXIjv91b8bg&index=107&feature=plcp
269 ------------------------------------, “Ultras Ahlawy...Al-Ahly vs mokawlon..28/1/2012”, YouTube, 23/01/2012, Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1gsO9O4HsXw&feature=related
and prohibits the use of club facilities to draw tifos and arrange displays. Also, the police is used to restrict the use of simple material—sticks, fireworks, flags—arguing it might be used in violent attacks on fans of the opposite club. Moreover, police officers used to appropriate and/or destroy the movement’s instruments—e.g., crushing drums.\textsuperscript{272}

The politicization of Ultra movements begins with the belief in changing or resisting the situation for a common cause.\textsuperscript{273} Hence, around the globe, Ultras groups might have political and/or ideological affiliation dependent on the socio-economic context, the practicability of individual freedom and club orientation. A common cause and common opponents (police, government, media, club administration) serve the Ultras’ survival that usually resort to ‘supporters’ strikes’ and violence to pressure authorities. In doing so, Ultra groups manifest the willingness to violence and taking the cause to open public spaces—where they benefit from the recognizable organization and strong member dedication. As they politicize, Ultra movements develop a distinctive collective identity; a sense of ‘we’ centered on a ‘way of life’. In doing so, traditional rivalries between Ultra movements may be forgotten to resist state persecution against such common ‘way of life’. In such a way, the organizational ‘membership’ develops into absolute fusion within the ‘collectivity’, as Pilz explains, ‘being an Ultra means having a new attitude to life (their Ultra identity), being “extreme”, having fun and being part of a separate new football fan and youth culture. Unlike other fan club activities, a person is an Ultra not only at a weekend game but also during the entire week (life). Everything is subordinated to football and/or the fan movement’.\textsuperscript{275}

The chronological examination of the UA movement since January 25\textsuperscript{th} Revolution exemplifies such development. Initially, the Ultras Ahlawy is organizationally, financially

\textsuperscript{272} "Police steal UA drums", YouTube, 26/09/2011, Web, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=prgVdLxrqzo\&list=UUNIupLY7xOXQAXIjv91h8bg\&index=3\&feature=plcp

\textsuperscript{273} Cited in Testa, 57


\textsuperscript{275} Cited in Pilz and Wölki-Schumacher, 6.
and morally independent of Al-Ahly club. Despite hostile and confrontational attitudes towards police officers that restrict their freedom—e.g., outlawing the use of pyro/flare shows—the Ultras Ahlawy had been an apolitical force until the 25th of January 2011. Although it is allegedly possible to discredit the UA effort during the Revolution—being essentially a non-political group—some UA members have joined the Revolution, while others sided with pro-Mubarak forces—both on individual bases. The pro-revolution members were especially effective in leading a series of ‘attack and run’ street battles defending protestors against police thuggery.

It was obvious that, unlike the MB, Kefaya and 6th of April—UA members’ were the only group that possessed combative experience with CSA and Interior Ministry forces. Having mastered the Attack and defense in stadium battles, the UA members managed reducing human causalities and scoring substantive gains in Qasr al-Nil Bridge, Ramses Street and the "Battle of the Camel.". The exceptional revolutionary thrust of UA members resonated with an obsessive orientation towards absolute freedom—reflected on the famous slogan ‘All Cabs Are Bustard–ACAB’. Meanwhile, EL-Sherif argues that the Revolution was ‘a fast moving, intrepid coup against a rigid, dim rhythm of life. (Such a..) movement needed a bold adventurous spirit defiant of social norms to translate the feelings and expectations of the Egyptian people into huge popular protest. The Ultras' politics of fun provided this, and thus shaped the spirit of the Egyptian revolution.’

The movement started to act collectively in the political sphere after the attack of CSA on its members in Kima-Aswan match on September 2011. The fights started with police encroachment on the group before and during the match and ended up with burning two CSA vans and arresting and torturing members of the group including some of its founders. After releasing their members, the group participated collectively in Mohammed

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276 EL-Sherif, ibid
Mahmoud fights against the Interior Ministry–where the security killed one of its members. The bloodiest scene to follow was in Portsaid where Al-Ahly played against Al-Masry team–traditionally known for deep hostility to the former–. The match turned into a massacre in which 77 members of Ultras Ahlawy were killed. The group responded to the Egyptian Football Union decision–to deprive Al-Ahly from playing for three years – through marshes, protests and strikes that demand just retribution to the victims’ families–23 March statement, 27th March strike by the Parliament, 2ed, 4th, 8th, 13th of April marshes and protests–to mention the least. The group leaders met with senior officials, e.g. the Justice Minister on April 4th, to pressure for just Criminal trials of the responsible authorities–headed by the Interior minister.

The movement expresses itself to the outside world through various media outlets: website, FB page–currently liked by 441,903– Youtube channel, songs, slogans, demonstrations, protests and strikes. In their CD–entitled ‘The Greatest Club in the World’–many songs emphasized the notions of freedom, self-denial, self-finance, belongingness, sacrifice, nationalism, travel with the team, fight for the Right, anti-politics and anti-media, courage, brotherhood, etc. Also, the group has a number of formative slogans: Liberta–liberty–, Alone Against All, and ACAB. The revolutionary manifestation of these values is identified with a set of attributions–dynamism, flexibility, refusal of patriarchy and traditionalism, rebellion, group mentality and positive attitude277. The following paragraph expands on this point as follows.

Dynamism entitles members to support the teams on the pitch, glorify achievements, defend it against opponents and deepen the emotional bond with peer members. Whether the team wins or loses, neither the movement’s faith nor their coherence is affected. Meanwhile, the UA flexibility is manifest through tolerance of multiple commitments and members’

277 ibid
various political affiliations as long as it does not contradict with movement’s purposes. Also, the movement usually takes the initiative to ‘cortege’ the opposing team’s activities—showing strength parades in areas of the opponents’ influence. Such challenging attitudes are also practiced against patriarchal and traditional authorities of the club administration, police forces, parents and families. Thus, areas of contention usually revolve around club contracts with players, coaches and management teams, permissions for early access to the stadium, use of pyro-shows, avoid slangy chants, etc. Also, the movement upholds strongly an anti-media ‘group mentality’, by which members who expose, or accept exposure, to media outlets are immediately dismissed. While appearance on TV shows and reportages is restricted to situations of extreme necessity, the movement preserves member anonymity by communicating public statements over self-owned outlets—website, Youtube, and Facebook page. Such a situation, argues El-Sherif ‘is more comparable to libertarian privacy goals that set limits for itself against sensational media coverage’278. Finally, the rebellion nature of the UA eschews ‘puritanical ethical standards regarding "obscene insults"'(ibid). In their words ‘insults are the salt & pepper of football’. Similarly, the group usually exhorts wearing specific outfits that flout cultural and societal ‘fault lines’279; such behavior usually accords specific ritualization and ‘rules of disorder’280.

To sum up, the formative experiences of each of the generational units have resulted into distinctive position along the structure-agency continuum. The following section reviews the socio-organizational characteristics of each unit and speaks to the socio-organizational dilemmas of the MB, to which many of the interviewed unit used to belong.

3.8. Conclusion

278 ibid
This chapter aimed at introducing the formative socio-political experience and specific narratives of each of the interviewed generational units as perceived by their founders and/or senior participants. The elaborate review on each actor reveals a number of quick remarks, as follows. Firstly, the new generation comprises various age groups as to include Kefaya–over forties– and UA teenage participants and university students. In between these intervals, there are founders of the Egyptian Current (EC), the We Are All Khaled Saed (WAKS), Salafiyo Costa (SC) and the 6th of April movements whose age range between 20-30s. Secondly, there is variation on the Reason D’etre of each unit. The Kefaya, 6th of April and WAKS aim at stepping down the regime, while SC aim at realizing understanding, coexistence and respect between Muslim, Christian and various ideological groups in the country. Meanwhile, the Ultras Ahlawy focuses on achieving an atmosphere of amusement for Al-Ahly population. Thirdly, the appearance timescale between 2004-2011 reveals each unit’s relative contribution and reciprocity with the revolutionary situation of post-January 25th. For instance, fundamental change was sought by Kefaya, WAKS, 6th of April, while others were inspired by Tahrir Utopia–EC and SC–and still others contemporized the Revolution but experienced the first political action after eight months of struggle with counter-revolutionary forces–the UA. Fourthly, except for Kefaya, every unit had interacted with, and mobilized new, supporters on social media outlets such as the Facebook and Twitter. Yet, there are varied of cyberactivism: absolute dependence on social media–the case of WAKS and 6th of April–, functional and temporal dependence–the EC and UA– and paralleling real and virtual activism–the SC case. Fifthly, this has led into two approaches to collective activism. The first approach is circular to two directions. The first is: street politics- social media- street politics– as 6th of April and CS reveal. The second is: social media -street political - social media–the WAKS case. The second approach subjugates social media as means of publicizing the undergoing activity on the ground–in the case of Ultras Ahlawy and the Egyptian Current. Sixthly, many founders of the new generation are
well experienced in political activism and collective action, except for the UA members who first encountered the ‘public’ through the Revolution. Seventhly, the units exercise disruptive as well as confrontational ‘politics of presence’ with various degrees. Depending on the fatality of clash incidents, the following graph shows where the units stand vis a vis the regime. Finally, it should be noted that members and founders of each unit belongs to middle and upper class of urban Egypt, indicated from their employment status, travel experiences and residence places. The only exception is the Ultras Ahlawy that involves, among founders, members from poor urban regions who, according to the interviewees, used to sell their cloths to meet the Ultras group financial needs.

Despite youth domination, the new political generation comprises various age groups. It is ‘common’ culture is identifiable with a set of feelings and strains that demark the fundamental role of human agency. While the MB emerged in response to rising socio-political dilemmas- westernization, colonialism, etc.-, most of the new generational units have resulted from striking personified tragedies: the brutal murdering of Khaled Said, the death of UA members in Mohamed Mahmoud incidents, the strive of Mahalla workers to get monthly salaries, the personal tragedy of Salafi and Copt Egyptians with socio-political injustice, the Tahrir utopia and frustration with the MB sectarian performance, etc. Kefaya was the only case in which the movement, parallel to the MB, resulted from an overarching ideologue definition of the political situation, hence, displaying weak resonance with humane, personal and societal narratives.

Therefore, the new generation’s activism embedded a set of common, sometimes contradictory, feeling that provided sufficient motivation: sympathy, individual unworthiness, strife for self-realization, pursuing adventurous dreams, non-constrain with historical,
ideological or political narratives, boldness, daring, and determination, etc. These feeling might be explained, partially, with structural strains that frustrated young middle class and poor urban population: social injustice, corruption, inflation, emergency law and torture. However, the direct encounter with injustice shadowed various forms of self-expression. For instance, the SC and EC were ‘inspired’ by Tahrir Utopia, while WAKS administrators and participants sought revenge from Said’s murderers. Similarly, the UA pursued joyful and innovative resistance; although they fear regime suppression, the community encourages members to dare chanting obscene slangs on top security officers. The SC had suffered profiling and intimidation for decades and their movement came up, mainly, against stereotypical discrimination.

The Generation in whole manifests values of openness to universal experiences and referentiality, adamant rejection of political, religious, and ideological paternalism and flexibility with offline, online, social and political forms of activism. Daring, autonomy and innovation describes the common culture that contextualizes various strategies, framing and mobilizational processes and enables the rise of ‘integrative attitudes and formative principles’\(^\text{281}\) - e.g., rejection of injustice and humiliation.

For instance, the new Generation followed spontaneous, anonymous and instant forms of resistance that targeted mainstream ordinary citizens without holding pre-assumptions of popular motivation whether religious or political. Such inclusive and informal strategies rendered their discourse intelligible to street citizens. Moreover, avoiding identification with notable intellectual and political figures, weak media presence—at least at their beginning—, the use of daily-life vernaculars and expressions, reference to broad cultural frame—e.g., the image of ‘ibn elbalad’ (the county son), and physical mobility facilitated mobilization

\(^{281}\) Mannheim, ibid, 305
processes and identified the generation with a common cultural traits, despite the spatial separation of its various units.

In conclusion, with the resignation of former president Mubarak, the new Generation in direct conflict with both the deep state and ideological structures–namely the MB. Against these forces, the new Generation shares a ‘common destiny’–a) empowerment under the presidency of a pro-Revolution candidate, either Hamdein Sabbahi or Abdul-Mone’m Abul-Fotooh, or b) imprisonment, torture and direct liquidation under pro-Mubarak president, or c) marginalization under a MB presidency. Also, its formative experiences renders its position contradictory to prevalent values, norms and authority of pyramidal political forces. Its various units openly de-authorize the hierarchical authority, whether religious, political or societal, and severe the institutional lineages of traditional opposition–the MB.

Moreover, given the prominence of human agency, a significant variation in ideological and organizational standpoints has undermined the unity of the new Generation against political competitors. The inability to authorize any political, ideological or organizational frame as legitimate and the competition over defining the situation has further complicated generational conflicts. The following chapter reviews ideological and organizational manifestation of the interviewed members; thus paving the way towards exploring the various possibilities of conflict resolution.
IV– CHAPTER FOUR

THEIDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW
POLITICAL GENERATION

This chapter summarizes interview results with the six generational units. In addition to organizational features, it examines ideological inclinations of participants as suggestive examples of leading trends within each movement/group. For the purpose of this research, I explore the variation within the new political Generation, which may occur due to socio-organizational difference as well as undergoing ideological transformation.

Initially, the interview sections were organized around four groups of questions: a) organization and structure, b) political values, c) ideological inclinations and d) channels of political participation. This chapter categorizes results around two successive themes: the first deals with the new Generation’s ideological standpoints in relation to the Egyptian society and state, and the other deals with organizational and structural aspects of each unit. Given the transformative nature of ideology and structure during times of socio-political influx, reporting the interview results separately provides future longitudinal and comparative studies with necessary information for continuing research.

4.1. The Ideological Inclinations of the New Political Generation

While intergenerational conflict materializes by ‘de-authorizing’ the old generation: ‘open rejection, attack and destruction of (its) values, norms and authority’\(^{282}\), it opens avenues for authorizing the new generation’; that is, legitimating its goals and acknowledging indigenous and distinctive values, norms, membership and structures\(^{283}\) through. Although the new Generation shares a heightened sense of collectiveness and ‘psychological


\(^{283}\) Ibid, 115
consciousness²⁸⁴, internal competition may occur along left and right alignments; hence, variation occur around the definition and control of the reality and on certain social and political goals. Such variation is motivated by the absence of institutional frames that authorize and legitimate any of the new generation’s values, ideas and utopian goals²⁸⁵. In such a way, it provides further platform of conversion and diversion and complexifies the process of conflict resolution.

4.1.1 The New Political Generation and the Egyptian Society

*Individual vs. Society*

When asked whether individual freedoms should be restricted societal expectations, the interviewees took two positions. On one hand, Kefaya, 6th of April and SC emphasize that personal freedom stop where rights of others start. On the other hand, the WAKS, UA, and the EC hold that societal expectation is considered under certain conditions. On both sides, considerable variation of opinion existed.

The 6th of April argued that some cultural values of the Egyptian society have changed with the Revolution-e.g., free deliberation on politics, challenging authority, voicing injustices—while grounding cultural values remain changeable through discursive deliberation. Thus the movement perceives itself a civil rather than a libertarian movement; it comprises Islamist, socialist, liberal and secular activists alike. Although the SC co-founder perceives the Egyptian society as neither conservative nor religious, both SC interviewees drew evidence from the French society that restricts some Islamic practices—such as Niqab—where they infringe on societal values—mainly public visibility.

Regarding the second position, the WAKS administrators adopt a libertarian slogan ‘the street is ours’ with two approaches: one administrator emphasizes the absolute right to


²⁸⁵ --------------------------, “Historical Generation and Generation Units: A Global Pattern of Youth Movements”, 115-6
practice individual rights and freedom, while the other restrict such right on private spaces–where society has no discretion over individuals. However, the latter believe that social constraints should only be observed, in public spaces, if personal freedoms actually encroach on others’ rights. For both administrators, the idea of collective societal values is either absent or rejected. Close to this this view, an EC’s co-founder rejects imposing restrictions on individual freedom while other interviewees, representing the party’s political committee, assure that individual freedom is constrained by social values and common practices that interact with, and re-adjust, individual choices.

Finally, the UA participants exempt the Stadium curva from the society’s broader public sphere. The group emphasized respect of societal expectations in the public sphere—e.g., rejecting membership requests of female supporters, rejecting female supporters’ overnight strike with the group, ignoring some worldwide Ultras traditions that humiliate Egyptian values—such as drinking bear before matches— and absolute dependence on self-finance. On the contrary, the stadium curva is a place of absolute freedom where societal constraints, on behavior, language and attitudes, are usually unobserved.

The Conception of Nationalism

When asked to arrange the spheres where Egypt should have an influential foreign policy- Arabic, African, Islamic and international- the majority of participants replied that Egypt should have an influential foreign policy on each dimension. Kefaya and the EC participants expressed pan-Arabic attitudes for ideational and/or pragmatic reasons. On the contrary, the UA participants believe Egypt should focus on realizing national development to avoid subjugation to wealthier Arab nations; if Egypt manages resolving its crisis, they believe, it will extend hand to needy Arab countries.

Also, the interview participants were asked to choose one or more of the components that better explain their understanding of ‘Egyptian-ness’–national identity, legal citizenship, society, and land. The KS administrators rejected adherence to national identity in terms of
loyalty to a modern nation-state; rather they highlight individual affinity to societal commonalities and geographical spheres. They explain: commitment and loyalty are functions of the ability to change; hence, they identify with the collectivity they understand and feel capable of changing. Similarly the 6th of April, SC and some UA and EC participants highlighted society and land as main components of national identity. In contrast, Kefaya and remaining participants gave priority to the infinite national identity. Obviously, none of the participants bothered relating nationhood to Islam or explain the bond between land and theological beliefs.

Finally, although most of the participants have among their families and acquaintances migrant members, they all reject migration in principle and practice. Two participants—the SC’s Salafi founder and a WAKS administrator—had serious plans for migration before January 25th Revolution; now both struggle to attain their freedom home. The UA participants argued they might seek work opportunities abroad to earn livelihood then return home.

The Conception of Religiosity

The conception of religiosity varied considerably between the following emphases: a) Kefaya: tolerant and moderate adherence to theological faith, based on Al-Azhar model, b) 6th of April: sincere, well-informed and consistent abidance with religious duties; avoiding superiority claims and psychological pressure over others, while providing correct information on religion, c) SC: fear of God and abidance by his rules, d) UA: ultimate closure to God, observance of duties, the outer manifestation of human traits and practices that relate to Islam, and e) EC: observance of Islamic rules and ethical values, extending the good to either family or society- through knowledge, sustainably developing charity, well-raised offspring-, development, awakened conscience, avoiding the forbidden.

As per the WAKS administrators, they were insignificant towards individual and collective religiosity; they believe it should not be subject to surveillance or public
observation. Also, the founder of SC believes the concept is highly charged with superiority claims that profile and classify opponents of a specific sect, ideology or party. Similarly, WAKS administrators recognize the widely divergent understanding of the concept that renders any definition relative and unrepresentative. Hence WAKS and SC agree that the meaning of religiosity depends on the situation, the subject, the discourse source, etc.

When asked whether they consider religiosity a gradual concept, Kefaya, 6th of April, a SC participant accorded there are either moderate/correct or extreme/wrong types of religiosity. EC participants emphasized that some aspects of religiosity is stable, while others—such as personal accountability, consciousness and sincerity—fluctuate.

Finally, when asked whether they consider their groups/movements religious, all the units, except for the WAKS that derecognizes religion in the public sphere, emphasized they are non-religious groups; their activities comprise horizontally dispersed members; thus unidentifiable with specific religious, ideological, or socio-economic affiliations. Nevertheless, WAKS administrators said they respect social and religious values of the Egyptian society. Also, the EC recognizes that most of the party members are religious by default—being former MB members. Similarly, the SC founders confess the majority of their page participants are fundamentally committed to their beliefs: Islam or Christianity. Finally, although the Ultras participants do not call for, or prevent, religious practices—such as collective prayers-Jema’ah— or joint religious festivals— they recognize the role of close friendship on enhancing or deteriorating the level of religious observance of various members.

Inclusion of Women, Copts and Urban poor

Concerning the degree of inclusion of religious, gender and socio economic difference, each of the six interviewed units held distinctive position.

Although Kefaya was first coordinated by a liberal Catholic figure—George Ishaq—and it included female leadership at various committees and governorates, the movement is
generally dependent on middle and upper class participants who mastered public activism through syndicates, parties, student unions or NGOs. Hence, youth were generally excluded from holding senior positions in the movement.

Similarly, the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April comprises founders and leaders of varying religious and gender affiliation. Yet, only at governorate and district levels, there are members of low and middle socio-economic backgrounds. Unlike Kefaya it does not put a ceiling on the promotion of members on bases of age or socio-economic affiliation.

Given the nature of social media activism, the three administrators of WAKS page are middle class Muslim males. However, the page is supported by women participants who post influential web feeds. Similarly, SC comprises female and Christian administrators among its founders, and involves women in street-politics – e.g., May 27\textsuperscript{th} protests. But the page is again restricted to middle and upper class participants who have access to Internet and social media.

Although the UA does not accept membership requests of female supporters- to avoid defamation and ‘show’ respect of social values - the group is inclusive of various religious and socio-economic affiliations. Among its founders are toctoc drivers in Nahia–a poor urban area behind El-Mohandeseen–as well as members who sell their clothes and work double shifts to afford for the group’s financial needs. There are also homeless and orphan members who commit strictly to the group knowing of the dangers they might encounter.

Finally, the experience of the EC is remarkable given the founders’ background as members of the MB. The interviewed participants- president and head of the political office - identify the MB 2007 platform as one important reason for quitting their earlier activities. Excluding women and Copts of presidency to establish an ‘Islamic’ state and Muslim male domination were two influential critiques that resulted into establishing the EC. In the EC, women and Christians are allowed to all hierarchical and cluster positions in the party. The founders refused to establish women and youth committees that would provide Haramlik
‘pockets’ inside the party organization. Rather, they preferred natural classification to
determine the composition of party leadership. However, they recognize that politically
active Christians have joined only two parties: the Free Egyptians Party and the Egyptian
Social Democratic Party. Also, their membership is based on concrete block/pocket in the
parties’ high-boards. Therefore, they believe it is early to decide whether Christians may
molten in non-Christian institutions.

The Ultras provides members with safety shields that replace family and
neighborhood sub-communities. In the group, members share food, shelter, social events-
funerals, birthdays, etc- and future dreams. Some members may withdraw their application to
job opportunities should they know a peer has applied or at dear need for work. Also,
members perceive the group success as extension of personal development; in the UA they
learn communication, leadership and socialization skills; their masculine personalities mature
as they become free and able to realize the group goals.

4.1.2. The New Political Generation and the Egyptian State

I- The identity of the state

Understanding of the Islamic State and Shari’a Application

The WAKS administrators had two opinions regarding the concept of Islamic State. The first is disregarding political concepts that involve religion. The second is emphasizing the relative meanings attributable to the concept, based on the source. Generally, this believe it is a reactionary concept to either a) a perception of Western threat on identity, or b), oppression of secular nation states since mid 20th century. On similar lines, SC founders contest the notion of ‘Islamic State’ for two reasons. Firstly, Egypt has been Muslim for over 1400 years and the majority of its population is Muslims. Secondly, the concept is used in contentious discourses to sacralize human opinions as divinely ordained. Otherwise, a Kefaya participant emphasizes Al-Azhar statement that opted for a civil state of freedom, equality and justice. Perceiving Islamic state as essentially theological, she believes such state never
existed in Egypt. The 6th of April participant believes Islamic state is a civilian state that upholds modern religion, respect treaties, and applies Shari’a in terms of projects and policies. Referring to the MB General Guide, he argues it is not the state of the Guide-Murshid. As per the EC, Islamic State refers to notions of Justice, mercy and efficiency. It is a state that applies the five principles of Shari’a: preserving the Self, Money, Honor, Religion and Mind. Like the WAKS administrators, they argue there is no clear application kit of the Islamic state, as explained in Orthodox writings by AL-Qaradawi or Selim Al-Awwa.

Participants were asked whether they support the application of Shari’a, either in principles of detailed rulings. Except for the SC co-founder, the majority of participants believe Shari’a should be applied in terms of general principles–as mentioned in the Constitutional Announcement. They offered a range of explanations: avoid applying double standards, discrimination against Christian citizens, the contention among, and fragmentation of, Islamist forces, differences between interpretations of the four Schools of Jurisprudence, the spread of fatawa by unspecialized preachers, corrupt institutions-policj, jurisdiction, Al-Azhar- that distort rulings for partisan interests, irreversibility of some rulings if proved illegal such as the five Penal Codes, and, finally, geographic disparity and the variation of socio-economic and cultural circumstances. Finally the UA participants were undecided on the application of Shari’a. They worried about politicizing Islamic rules and the discriminatory impact on fellow Christians. They believe Muslims should only abide by Qur’an and prophetic traditions; hence, the law should not impose Niqab- face veil-or beard or discriminate against Christians with any ijtihad. Also, they believe socio-economic life-standards should be improved before applying Penal Codes; in their words: ‘let them be humans first, then apply Shari’a on Muslims’.

State Responsibility of Religion

When asked whether the state should be responsible for the religion of the majority of its population, participants responded with three sets of opinions.
Firstly, both Kefaya and one WAKS administrator emphasize the need to separate religious institutions from the state. While Kefaya assigns religious responsibilities to an independent AL-Azhar institution, the WAKS administrator goes further to demand absolute retreat of the state from public spheres: culture, religion, human rights, education, etc. in his words ‘the state should stay home and quit looking after the public interest’.

Secondly, the EC, 6th of April, a WAKS administrator and UA agree that the state has obligations towards the religions of every group of citizens. While the 6th of April argues that national resources on this regard should be allocated on proportional bases, the EC argues it should positively discriminate the minority. The UA adds, the state should hold responsibility of religious discourses and curricula to prevent the abuse of religion and spread of extremism; it should balance the demands of religious autonomy with state responsibilities to surveillance and control. The WAKS administrator argues the state should adopt a minimal and corrective role in providing religious services; that is, state should correct actual imbalances between various religious groups: discriminating positively groups that lack sufficient financial resources to establish religious institutions and restrict the enlarging presence of wealthier groups that might discriminate, indirectly, against other beliefs. Unlike the UA, he deprives authorities of the right to restrict extremism if religious groups adhere to it; ‘since every theological faith is extreme to another if we outlaw extremism we will prevent thinking’.

Thirdly, the SC expressed a complex attitude. On one hand they accord state responsibilities to the religions of its various groups, while arguing for an independent Waqf-religious charity-and AL-Azhar institutions that resemble the case on the Christian side. Meanwhile, the group co-founder believes the state should serve societal needs rather than capitalist interests; hence, it should stop building both churches and mosques. Finally, both SC members reject claims of absolute authority by the state on religious institutions; they believe there should be an institutionalized authority, guided by popular needs.
National Identity and Education Curricula

When asked whether the Coptic history should be represented in national curricula, participants expressed one of two opinions as follows.

Firstly, the majority of interviewed units emphasized the state responsibility of national education and the formation of identity. The 6th of April emphasized the need to instruct religious history to the extent it resonates the larger space of the national identity. On the contrary, the EC suggests the state should instruct religious history and cover various theological faiths that exist both nationally and internationally. Finally, the SC founders argue that the Education Ministry should tutor foreign textbooks that cover the Egyptian history objectively and instill the pride of one’s history and identity. They believed national historians would ultimately follow directions of authoritarian governments, e.g., defaming King Farouk and militarizing Islamic history under the 1925 coup regime.

Secondly, administrators of WAKS argue that the national identity represents a mythical argument; the state should not provide national education; since it empowers hegemonic ideologies, narratives and beliefs and deform the consciousness of successive generations. Rather, independent and democratic institutions of various socio-cultural groups should set the criteria and standards of educational curricula, and provide educational services independently, through civil and private sectors. The state should ensure that various groups have equal opportunities to educate their offspring.

Understanding of the Secular State

According to a Kefaya participant, neither secular nor religious states ever existed in Egypt. Also, the SC’s spokesman argues that Muhammed Ali might be the last religious ruler; Egypt has been a secular state for over 200 years. Both Kefaya and SC participants agree that the concept is used ignorantly for discriminatory purposes. Yet, Kefaya retains that politics should not represent religion, though various actors might have religious inclinations.
Finally, the UA also contest the concept arguing that the notion is either distorted or inapplicable to the Egyptian society, while WAKS administrators derecognize the concept.

On the other hand, 6th of April draws a positive conception of the secular state, in which Citizens are equal, individual rights are open and accessible, politics is democratic, religion has no authority on either politics or the public sphere, etc. Against such conception, the EC details two historical models that explain the concept. On one hand the EC condemns the French model that deprives individuals of practicing religion freely and access power centres. On the other, they highlight the American model that allows channels influential religious beliefs through constitutional and legal frameworks. They generally argue that the Turkish experience provides an acceptable model of secularism that might suit culturally religious societies like in Egypt. Also, they refer to the intellectual contribution of Abdul-Wahhab EL-Missiri on secularism that helps reversing negative connotations of the term.

Voting for Women or Christian President

Except for the SC co-founder and 6th of April participant, the majority of interviewees believe they would vote for a Christian or woman candidate for presidency depending one or more of these circumstances: sufficient qualifications, realizable program, well-functioning state institutions, running before a pro-Mubarak figure such as the former head of General Intelligence Agency Omar Soliman, adequate respect and application of laws, respect of religious freedoms and the culture of the society’s majority. However, many participants believe Christian and women candidates will probably lose the elections.

II- The leviathan State- the Powerful Society

Political vs. Socio-Economic Rights

Concerning the divide between socio-economic and political rights, participants expressed three viewpoints, as follows. Firstly, the SC founders believe socio-economic rights should precede political freedoms, because the majority of population is unwilling and/or unable to recognize ideologue/political discourses. They quote a famous saying
‘hungry bellies do not think’. Secondly, the 6th of April, UA and EC party emphasize the need to struggle for both type of rights in parallel, since each conditions the attainment of the other. They emphasize the revolutionary politics does not await sequential achievements and gradual reforms. One exception to this tendency is the EC president who retains that some of the revolutionary goals are attained before others depending on the situation. Kefaya movement also emphasize such parallelism, by connecting socio-economic demands, e.g., cheap gas, to political arguments—stopping the gas exports to Israel. Finally, the WAKS administrators hold two viewpoints. While one administrator considers political rights a *sin quo non* of channeling socio-economic demands, the other believes many people concern with politics that directly affect income, education, housing, etc.

*The Welfare State*

Both Kefaya and EC argue that the state should provide welfare services—housing, education, health care, etc.—to each citizens, able and unable and at best quality. The 6th of April believes the states should provide basic services only, while both the SC and UA groups emphasize the state welfare duties in general. The WAKS administrators believe the state should quit all welfare functions except for health care where the possibility of direct or indirect hegemony is mitigated.

*Increasing taxes*

The interviewed units, including the WAKS, generally support an increasing taxing system. The SC founder reserved that this should not punish the wealthier being more successful, while the WAKS administrators explained that the state should first provide the infrastructure of modern livelihood nationwide, then retreat and ‘stay home’!

*Empowering the Society*

In consistence with earlier results, the majority of interviewed units believe the civil sector—NGOs, charities, cooperatives, etc.—should assist the state in providing welfare services through: interest mobilization, aggregation and articulation, and distribution of
resources. Thus, it is supportive and complementary. Kefaya added the role of civil and private sectors should function according to a comprehensive national plan. Also, the EC emphasized the civil sector rights should never be traded off against welfare services, the civil sector should have the right to provide welfare services and basic needs until the state services function properly. Only one WAKS administrator believes the civil and private sectors should be fully responsible for welfare services- cultural, artistic, educational and religious spheres-, while the other believes wealthier regions should depend on the private and civil sectors while poor region receive exceptional state support.

*Restrictions on the civil sector*

Except for the UA and the spokesman of SC, all the units interviewed affirmed that the financial, political and administrative constraints on the establishment and functioning of the civil sector should be alleviated. The NGOs and charities should enjoy legal personality once they inform the Ministry of Social Affairs of their establishment. The state has the right to investigate and hold these organizations accountable in case fraudulent or illegal activities are actually reported.

The UA and one SC participant believe that the state has the right to control both the establishment and the functioning of the civil sector. The UA participants argued that it should ensure NGOs are productive, effective and un-corrupt. Also, it should prevent the establishment of charities and civil organization that humiliate the cultural and religious values of Egyptians—such as supporting homosexuality. Finally, the EC and the 6th of April were the only units that desperately tried to register their activities with the Ministry of Social Affairs. They complain of lengthy and restrictive conditions that render any organization dysfunctional.

*Employment by the State*

The interviewed units believe the state is responsible for creating and facilitating employment of young graduates through a) policies and programs that provide public and
private employment, b) facilitating the establishment and functioning of small business enterprises, and c) encouraging graduates to enhance their employability by adjusting economic and education policies and encouraging individuals to struggle and realize their goals. Kefaya affirms that a national plan should include marketing the production of Small Business Organizations SBOs both domestically and internationally. Also, the WAKS administrators emphasized the state should help training and connecting new graduate with employers, while the UA highlight the need to make graduate employable be readjusting economic and education plans; if it fails, he state should provide unemployment retribution.

Public vs. Private sector

Except of one WAKS admin, all the units interviewed agree that the public sector should remain, for a set of reasons. Firstly, WAKS administrators gave reasons such as: undertaking infrastructural projects, correcting the imbalances in socio-political power structures, civilianizing the military public sector and correcting economic policies before privatization, to void ruining lives of millions of public employees. Secondly, Kefaya participants believe central planning of agricultural and infrastructural projects necessitates having an economic public sector. Other participants, from the 6th of April, believe it helps providing public goods such as water, electricity and gas, while sharing powerfully the market of natural resources: Cement and Iron. Finally the SC and UA believe it facilitates investment of taxes and employment security, respectively.

Finally, when asked whether private, including foreign, investors should undertake these functions, participants had variant opinions. Kefaya, 6th of April, and the EC argued that foreign investment should not provide basic and/or strategic services. Also, the SC and WAKS argued it should only have utility rights of natural resources. To this, Kefaya added it should function within the parameters of a comprehensive national plan. Finally, arguing that the state should comply to, and trust, societal choice, one WAKS administrator believes that
foreign investment should be permitted unconditionally if the civil society support its functioning.

Political rights and ‘public stability’

The interviewed units agreed that authorities should not constraint the practice of political rights with claims of preserving ‘public peace and stability’. The WAKS argues that disturbing public stability is one target of strikes, sit-ins, stoppages and stands, so people would feel the grievance of the strikers. Similarly, the UA participants highlight that traffic jam reoccur frequently with every ministerial or presidential commutation. Participants generally believe police forces should only interfere when actual destruction of public or private property takes place; thus, preemptive prevention of political rights and detention of activists under Emergency Law are deemed illegal. The UA participants added that state officials are usually responsible for turning peaceful strikes into destructive action; the negligence and trivialization of protestors’ demands, influence and effectiveness—especially on state-run media—result into protestors’ determination to show the seriousness of their demands.

State Encroachment on Personal spheres

The majority of participants argued that the state has the right to gather personal information of nationals to provide statistical base for public policies. The WAKS administrators had detailed remarks on this regard. Firstly, the state should not reveal personal information of citizens on their national ID, and secondly, there should be an independent agency that sets criteria for protecting individuals’ privacy and security. The two remarks were addressed in discussing the negative sides of central governance, impartiality and abuse of information by police officers.

III- Channels of Political expression

Participation in Elections
When asked whether participants used the right to vote either before or after 2011, had earlier experience in running for, or observing elections, and determinants of their electoral vote, the reply varied to a great extent. Firstly, despite the long history in student and syndical activism, the Kefaya participant only used her vote in 2011. As for the EC, the two participants used their votes frequently before 2011. Both EC and Kefaya participants voted on basis of personal background, party and ideological affiliation. Both participants ran for the 2011 election and observed the process in earlier elections. The EC president was affiliated to the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights that oversaw the 2005 elections; he provided training workshops for over 1200 observer and toured many governorates to collect notes and personal remarks. The other participant had observed elections indirectly by posting media feeds featuring corruption and forgery in various constituencies. The WAKS administrators used their votes in 2005 and 2011 only; in 2011 one admin voted correctly while the other nullified his vote by writing ‘Down Down SCAF Rule’. Although the later admin had good experience with school elections and enjoyed wide popularity among colleagues, he lost hope in the national electoral processes since 2005.

On the belief it is religiously forbidden, the SC co-founder never voted for election. On 2011, he abstained from voting, to support martyrs’ families who had not receive proper retribution. The spokesman of the group used to vote for the NDP—following the church policies towards Mubarak regime. In 2011, he voted for the Egyptian Block- a liberal Christian coalition. His vote was determined by ideology and party affiliation.

As per the 6th of April participants, he used to vote for the MB in 2005, and abstained from voting in 2011. His vote was determined by the electoral program and candidate affiliation. Both SC and 6th of April never ran for or observed elections. Finally, the UA participants never voted before 2011, since most of the group members are underage. The personal background and whether candidates may serve their needs usually determine their electoral vote.
Experience of State Oppression

Except for the SC Christian spokesman, the majority of participants had experienced one or more forms of state oppression: detention, kidnapping, imprisonment, torture, etc. One of the WAKS administrators experienced detention and torture—physical and psychological—during childhood, when police forces detained all participants in a MB summer camp for children in Alexandria, the case is known by ‘the Children Organization/Tanzeem EL-Atfal’. He was also investigated during his high school study in AL-Azhar. Kefaya activists were subject to new forms of state thuggery; protest leaders were kidnapped by plainclothes officers in small microbuses and thrown in deserted ring roads. Similarly, the 6th of April activists were subject to recurrent detention, while the SC Salafi co-founder was recurrently investigated for various concerns. Some EC participants were imprisoned and tortured in military trials, and the UA participants estimated a 70% of their group members to have been detained and tortured before matches and several times after the revolution—the Kima Aswan match is the most significant.

Internalizing Government’s Bureaucratic Corruption

The majority of participants internalize administrative corruption in government bureaucracy, for various reasons: informal/customary obligation (WAKS, SC), avoid discrimination and/or injustice (SC’s Salafi co-founder, EC), a social gesture towards officials-Ikramiya (UA). However, the 6th of April and Kefaya participants refuse, principally, paying bribes, while WAKS and some EC participants began to refuse bribery only after the Revolution; they now ask employees to demand their right from the government instead of charging fellow citizens.

Wasta and Self-Employment

The majority of participants preferred working in private and personal business enterprises, while members of the EC and WAKS already own small enterprises. Also, participants would generally apply to jobs where they might qualify. One WAKS
administrator added he would first investigate the work environment, managers backgrounds, and evaluation criteria before submitting his application. Participants of the UA argued they would need a recommendation and/or Wasta since university education does not qualify graduates while the majority of employers demand three years experience as priori condition for employment.

**Taking part in government, parliament or localities**

When asked whether the might run for parliamentary election or undertake executive position in central/local government, Kefaya, 6th of April, SC and EC participants replied they either consider or have already ran, as candidates, for parliamentary elections. Since participants are mostly young activists, they believe parliamentarian functions of control, surveillance, checks, and balances would provide close knowledge on how government functions undergo. Later, some participants might consider undertaking governmental positions. Kefaya participants added she would only run for official positions after the revolution succeeds. Also, participants from the UA and WAKS page argued they would never undertake legislative or executive positions. Finally, the SC participants had two opinions: the founder’s opinion is refusal of any parliamentary position—though offered—while the other considers undertaking parliamentary or local governmental authority.

**Means of political expression**

Participants were asked to organize expressive means that channel their demands to executive authorities: petitioning, lobbying and meeting with parliamentary representative, pursuing legal processes, and, finally, direct protest, striking, stoppage, sit-ins, etc. Opinions about which tool to comes first has varied widely. The UA clearly explained they would protest and strike and follow direct confrontational means; e.g., in Kima Aswan match, they confronted police violence physically, stroke, and protested until detained members were release. Similarly, during Mohammed Mahmoud fights, they stoned the Interior Ministry building and fired Molotov bottles as means to take revenge of a UA member—whom the
CSA had shot on November 2011. When a senior officer asked them to quit politics and focus on football, a co-founder replied ‘do you think we are that trivial’.

Although the WAKS page encourages claiming rights through legal means, administrators believe people should raise their voice through demonstration, protest, strikes, sit-ins, and various means of street mobilization– to enforce the government compliance. Similarly, Kefaya argues that ‘deeds should precede words’; thus, street mobilization and media propagandizing should precede conferences, statements, petitions and legal means, while discouraging international scrutiny. Unlike Kefaya, the 6th of April encourages citizens to scrutinize the government internationally to ensure just assessment of legal cases. Also, the movement is used to enforce consideration of its petitions and policy drafts through strikes and protests. In addition, the movement is successfully involved in parliamentary lobbying, by channeling law drafts through like-minded parliamentarians. For instance, they suggested establishing Consultative Council to the SCAF– although they disagree with the outcome–, and drafted a law for political isolation of Mubarak’s senior officials.

Contrary to the 6th of April, the SC co-founder failed in lobbying for a law draft of the police agency. Hence, the movement believes strikes and protests are the only means of political expression. Finally, although the EC participants have experienced legal and political means, they believe popular rights are claimed through direct confrontation with the regime. Hence, political pressure is usually mobilized for general causes, such as police brutality, while factional or syndical demands are drafted in memoirs and policies, and defended through legal suits and political negotiations.

4.2. The Organizational Characteristics of the New Political Generation

This section concerns with organizational factors that reflect the degree of power structuration and/or diffusion and institutionalization of each generational unit. The following sub-sections underline aspects of, mainly, the resource mobilization literature on social movements, where it intersects with human agency and movement inter-relationships. To
begin with, this section embeds two main concepts: firstly, the notion of ‘network’ which refers to informal, multi-layered and intersecting groups that enhance communication and resource mobility, and, secondly, the notion of participants, referring to volunteers who contribute with time, skill, money, material support, and knowledge, on multiple levels and at intersecting dimensions of the movement activism.

Although the new Generation has generally identified with common enemy–Mubarak regime–the success of protest attempts by the 6th of April, EC and WAKS movements reflects what Oberschall conceives as precondition of successful protest movements: developing a network of pre-existing associational ties and a segmented society\textsuperscript{286}. The 6th of April founders experienced political activism through Kefaya, blogging and political parties–the Work, the Front, the Ghad and the MB–, while the EC co-founders are in large part the product of previous activism in the MB. Similarly, the WAKS administrators were active in El-Baradei’ presidential campaign that mobilized various activists from the National Movement of Change. The three cases capitalized on ‘friendships and personal contacts’\textsuperscript{287} developed through conferences, joint activism in student unions and development initiatives–and encouraged members to extend mobilization efforts to various socio-political networks to widen movement/party constituencies. Hence, the possibility of joint initiative increased as various movements hold compatible, though different definitions, of the situation\textsuperscript{288}. In theory, cooperation is usually possible when activists tolerate variation of different perspectives, being irreducible, and admit ‘plurality of levels and instruments of social transformation’\textsuperscript{289}. In such case, networking qualities improve and job specialization provide


\textsuperscript{288} ibid, 125

\textsuperscript{289} A. Melucci, \textit{Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age}, (UK, Cambridge University Press, 199),127, 210
grounds for smooth interaction, mobilization and circulation of resources—especially information and transferrable skills.  

However, there interviewed cases also manifest two problems with opening to activities with joint affiliations. Firstly, it sometimes results into vertical mobilization, especially when personal contacts facilitate non-rotational power monopoly. For instance, Kefaya comprised founders and coordinators from notable ideological and partisan affiliations. However, this affected its ability replace ‘elite’ leadership with young activists who favored creating independent movements that they can autonomously lead. Secondly, joint affiliations might lead into successive waves of fragmentation. After separation from Kefaya, the pan-Arab clique within the 6th of April distorted the movement’s priorities and severed moral and solidary bonds, leading into the first fragmentation. Thus, following the first breakdown, the movement deprived member with multiple affiliations from holding leadership positions.

Being run by a majority of teenagers, the UA founders and members lack ideological and/or political affiliations. Nevertheless, the movement recognizes the benefits of multiple affiliations. Although the group does not act as a political force, its members are involved, individually, in various presidential campaigns that benefit from their experience and flexible mobility. The movement dismisses members who join adversary Ultra groups such as White knights. Also, the group usually exhausts the utmost energy of members’ ‘biographical availability’—especially leaders of district sections; thus, there is little or no time left for partisan politics if ever.

When asked why the participants did not undertake their activities as part of the existing opposition forces, especially the MB, the Ultras answered they do not recognize political parties and institutions as part of their ‘world’—strictly identified with the stadium.

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290 ibid, 120
Curva Nord. The WAKS administrators answered concretely: ‘political parties represent a failure, lack of strategy, vision, and credibility. Moreover, they polarize around hypothetic arguments and overlook the mounting socio-economic grievance on the ground’. As per Kefaya, ideological affiliation represented a stumbling block to unify forces against the regime. The SC case was little different since its founders were creating and marketing for a new discourse in the midst of fierce intellectual and political fights. The other two units— the EC and 6th of April— represent separatists units of the MB and Kefaya respectively. In general, a growing distrust of institutional forces and determination of to realize a dream of the ‘new Egypt’ encouraged founders to take the ‘risk’ and maneuver with the regime alone.

The Egyptian Movement for Change- Kefaya

The Kefaya movement maintains an organized form of confrontational opposition, but the lack of transparent organizational rules resulted into severe competition over power, that later weakened the movement’s presence. The movement was organized around target-based and flexible structure. The coordination committee was formed of thirty to forty members and was entitled with decision making and taking processes, planning, setting goals, slogans, etc. the steering committee was concerned with daily activities that realize the goals set by the coordination. Topical committees also worked on coordinating between governorates, recruitment, mobilization, administration and financing. Finally, reporting and coordination was entitled to the coordination committee that also decided on forming ad hoc project committees for specific tasks. The network structure of Kefaya failed in restricting the authoritarian tendencies of some leaders. It also enabled paralleling the same work through different committees where un-wanted figures might raise objections on the functioning of the movement. Finally, it also enabled marginalizing new and less-resourceful members of the movement. Hence, the movement fragmented quickly into various groups that undertook their activities independently. The 6th of April was among the most active separatist groups that was later defamed and accused of treason by Kefaya.
The 6th of April Movement

The 6th of April movement is significant in the fact that it comprises contradictory tendencies to democratize the movement on one side and maintain strict control on its members from the other. A general coordinator runs the administrative office of the movement and represents its highest leadership. The administrative office comprises the twenty founders of the movement—who hold the veto right on any decision that represent total deviance from the movement goals—, the political office and governorates’ coordinators. It sets long-term plans ranging from six to twelve months. The political office manages coalitions and coordination with national and international forces and sets short term plans of the movement, while the executive office comprises governorates’ heads and undertakes daily activities. The executive office is divided into sub-committees including: media, finance, training and social development. The administrative office meets every week, and the choice of governorate coordinators is based on consensus from the team members. The movement hold a profile of every member including the date of membership, record of his personal attitudes and any punishments levied by leaders on higher levels. The movement functions according to an internal administrative chart and dismisses members in case they either protest a decision or dishonor the movement on media outlets. The head of the political office believes that the movement does not need internal elections because it has only one target—stepping down Mubarak regime. Thus it should work collaboratively and give leadership to the experienced, like-minded, and qualified members. He believes elections may bring about incompatible leaders whose different personalities and priorities may bring the movement down. Despite his critiques, the movement ran election during the last three months that involved all administrative levels except the general coordinator.

According to the movement’s interviewee, members may freely quit the movement should they find their goals realizable through other means. Yet, the movement still enjoys high levels of commitment to the dream of change and is willing to undertake comprehensive
reforms in the country. According to the interviewee, members usually join the movement to undertake collective action towards shared goals. Internal criticism is allowed although, on the long run, it may result into dismissal from the movement. The reporting and communication system are horizontal, but leaders usually lead and steer the work rather than participating collectively in the execution processes.

‘We Are All Khaled Said’

As per WAKS page, the page has benefited of the anonymity and spontaneous qualities of activism on social media outlets. Liked by over two millions, the page represents an early sign of the regime’s failure and is widely believed to have triggered the 25th January Revolution.

The anonymity of administrators’ identities was admittedly inspired by Vandetta’s character in the movie ‘V for Vandetta’—‘the image of an anonymous sentinel who tries to wake up people around him and spur them to revolt against the government injustice’. Also, it was necessary for mobilization as well as security purposes. Repeatedly, Ghoneim emphasized that disclosing the identity of WAKS administrators would hinder effective mobilization, since it distorts conversations into ideological and political battles that are highly charged with conspiracy assumptions. In addition, administrators were threatened with torture, prosecution and/or direct liquidation. Thus, a number of measurements were followed to prevent identities from slipping out: using proxy servers and specialized computer programs such as Tor, changing IP addresses constantly—masking the location by deriving the address from foreign countries, opening only image or text file attachments and displaying them on Google mail first, etc. Nevertheless, anonymity was sometimes dangerous— the page was suspended by the Facebook administration who realized it was coordinated by fake accounts.

\[291\] Ghoneim, 102
\[292\] ibid, 118
Due to the instant extension of the page membership, two more administrators, interviewed in this research, joined Ghoneim in steering the page. Administrators sealed their identities even against each other. Although Ghoneim had personally known an administrator– through conferences, workshops, and the campaign of EL-Baradei– the third administrator joined the group anonymously and the page was fully administrated through Google Talks. Nevertheless, the latter’s role was by no mean inferior. He prepared a strategy paper for the page and a video that trended the Said’s case on Twitter and Facebook. While steering the page, administrators depended on ‘common understanding’ of goals and policies; the understanding of the page image, goals, language and recipients directed posting decisions of each admin both individually and cohesively.

The page administrators did not stipulate certain ‘road maps’ for the development of their activities; they lacked clear job distribution and systematic of reporting, communicating, and evaluation. Generally, administrators subscribed to broad ‘consumer preferences’ of the page participants. For instance, during the Tunisian revolution, administrators differed around whether or not to cover the events undergoing in Tunisia. After posting a tentative new, the majority of participants criticized paralleling Egypt to Tunisia; thus, the post was deleted293.

Wael Ghoneim’s professional background had clearly stamped marketing strategies of the page. ‘The Sales Tunnel’ strategy aimed, first, at convincing FB members to join the page and read the posts, then interact through likes and comments, and finally integrating them in online campaigns through which they independently generate content. The final stage was indicated when people break the ‘fear barrier’ and decidedly take into the streets294. Although participants were expected to join institutional political forces, administrators believed they would towards independent dissent afterwards. In such a way, they believed the page assists the unmarketable discourse of 6th of April movement by engaging people into

293 ibid, 128
294 ibid, 67-8
immediate daily politics. However, when the silent stands began to attract political figures and confrontational movements, the page administrators moved their focus towards virtual activism; the page has adamantly resistant to the rebellious language of ‘My Name is Khaled Said’ Page. Ghoneim ‘branded’, marketing rules for the WAKS page included publishing opinions and facts objectively, apologize when publishing wrong new, use of the plural pronoun ‘We’, etc.

The WAKS’s peaceful and inclusive approach was admittedly inspired by the Indian peaceful resistance—led by Ghandi. Ghoneim refers to a famous quote of Ghandi—“they may torture my body, break my bones, even kill me, then they will have my dead body not my obedience” (108). Thus, Ghoneim discouraged people from chanting ‘Down Down Mubarak Rule’ for various mobilizational and ideational purposes: avoidance of contestable claims, protect the ‘popular’ thrust of the page activities, avoidance of identification with conspiracy activities, slangy language, and partisan political forces.

The popularity of the WAKS page, now over 2 million participants, could be attributed to the ‘know how’ by which administrators steered their activism. First, they employed strategies of member-based content, spontaneity and participatory democracy. The mounting contributions of participants reflected variety of wide range ‘individual’ innovations. Thanks to anonymity, the page also comprised pro-Mubarak, revolutionary activists as well as supporters of Amr Moussa and members of various backgrounds and affiliations. The variety and novelty of content personified the movement through solidary images and videos—e.g, a pregnant women’s ultrasonographic image of her fetus coupled with these words ‘My name is Khaled, and I’m coming to the world in three months. I will never forget Khaled Said and I will demand justice for his case’.

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295 ibid, 112
296 ibid, 107
Similarly, the idea of the First Silent Stand was posted by an anonymous member (Ghoneim, 2012:70). The silent stand was both proactive and provocative. Scores of emails followed developing the idea, emphasizing the stand should not turn into a ‘bad theatre’—typical political demonstration. Suggestion were that protestors read from Qura’n or bible to prove their anger and, nonetheless, nonviolence. Wearing black was agreed upon, since the stand in singel file by the corniche would have made protestors inconspicuous from regular crowd. Participants were advised to maintain silence and refrainment from side talks.

Also, the English page was launched through a British supporter who suggested helping to voice the page in the outside world. After critiques on scrutinizing domestic concerns internationally, a poll undertaken by the original page revealed that 78% of participants were supportive of the page. The English version later played a crucial role in gauging support from the international arena. Again, the collaboration with the English page was anonymous; the identity of the admin was unrevealed. A positive spirit was prevailing through individual posts that featured national unity: Christians protesting for Sayyid Bilal and Muslims protesting against the Church bombings. Home taped videos were also effective in mobilizing ‘mainstreamers’, such as Asmaa Mahfouz’s video before January 25th, especially when coupled with simple and clear instruction that facilitate the incorporation of apolitical citizens into protesting activities. The general ‘daring’ attitude extended to subverting meaning of old speeches by Mubarak to strengthen the call for protesting.

The page has generally encouraged member participation through various means: publishing scraps of reasonable and resourceful comments, publishing individual images/videos and applauding the ‘small achievements’, highlighting important posts—such as sarcastic resignation letters written in Mubarak voice297 and saluting individual initiatives—such as inviting Said’s mother to Silent Stands and establishing parallel ‘WAKS pages in

297 ibid, 141
Arab countries–Yemen and Tunisia\textsuperscript{298}. Also, the page provided participants with enormous ‘supply’ of safe and less safe activities. These included launching charity events in the name of Said and asking people to photograph themselves and post on the group. Responses returned comments such as: funding a university student and doing Umrah for Khaled Saed. Also, calling upon participants to change their profile pictures to an anonymously designed banner featuring Said on the Egyptian flag and writing ‘The Martyr of Egypt’ and interfering in talk shows asking the hosts to discuss the case of Said.

Besides maintaining ‘tight feedback loops’ with page population, administrators emphasized publicizing instances of personal and individual acts: standing within the sea for half an hour holding Said’s photo, handicapped people bearing a stand and parents mourning Said with their newly born baby, etc. The innovation and novelty of such ideas derived much support especially as emails flowed inquiring on meeting points at various governorates and locations. Against flooding demand, the administrators asked members to wear in black in Fridays and take photos holding Khaled Said’s banner. Over 100,000 joined the page in few days following the press release on the Silent Stand event. The mounting support of Said’s case resulted, finally, into government recognition: the Prime Minister Nazif announced that if the security officers convicted, Justice would be served\textsuperscript{299}.

In conclusions, administrators believe that the WAKS page success proved that ‘change’ is the only demand that units Egyptians–rather than not political forces or charismatic figures. In Ghoneim’s words ‘the merits of any individual could always be scrutinized and questioned. But no one in his right mind could question the need for change’\textsuperscript{300}. According to the interviewed administrators, the disclosure of their identities following the 25th January Revolution has negatively affected the page’s success. After

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid, 85
\textsuperscript{299} Ibid, 85
\textsuperscript{300} Ibid, 73
disclosing the identity, vision, opinions, background and referential ideas of its founders—Wael Ghoneim—, the resolution of the page’s vision and mission began to weaken. They became unsure on how people perceive them, what should they write and using which language. Nevertheless, they believe, this gave way to new cycles of dissent after January 25th Revolution.

*The Egyptian Current*

The EC represent the most structural units of the new political generation. The internal hierarchy is organized with an internal chart that specifies levels, responsibilities, authorities and processes such as decision-making, ordering, regular reporting and evaluation. Although the party’s top positions are subject to elections, the horizontal networks developing around Cairo are yet to consolidate into structured party constituencies. Therefore, the party did not finalize neither the internal structure nor its platform, although it aims at balancing both centralization and decentralization needs. For instance, the political office and decision-making processes are centralized in the Cairo-based headquarter, but is subject to change once local constituencies are established. Hence, the party does not entitle its leaders or spread IDs, though it heads steadily towards full-range institutionalization.

When asked whether they might quit their membership in the party, the interviewees said that they only consider leaving the party if it ceases representing their ideas, such as if a post-construction election inside the party brings a new leadership with contradictory orientations, or if the party decides to merge with other parties. Otherwise, the interviewees explained that founding the party was motivated by the aspiration to realize shared goals collectively, rather than realizing socio-economic or partisan gains. According to them, it was obvious that the MB was coming soon to power. But the party platform— announced since 2007—and the subsequent establishment of the FJP without due revision resulted into their separation from the MB.

*The Salafyo Costa*
The SC founders are all professionals at late twenties and thirties and members of either institutional religious authority—the Egyptian Catholic Church, Al-Azhar, religions academies— or strong ideological affiliation-socialism, liberalism, revolutionary socialism, secularism, etc. The Salafi founder belonged to the MB during the period of 2000-2002. According to his account, he denounced the infringement on members’ right to grow beards being ‘un-presentable’ of the MB’s public image; especially since his ‘responsible’ attributed such quest to the need to ‘promotion’ along the organizational hierarchy. After leaving the MB he orientated himself towards ‘pure’ Islamic knowledge. He studied in Sheikh Al-Muqaddem’s academy and was, together with other Salafi co-founders, a disciple of Sheikh Mohammad Abdul Maqsud from 6th of October City. The majority of co-founders lack previous or concurrent political and/or ideological affiliation.

The SC is run through a steering group of the page administrators who post their statuses for deliberation and refinement before publishing on the group page. ‘If approved by five administrators, the post is published’ says the Salafi founder. Although the group is closed–i.e., subject to administrators’ acceptance of membership requests–it invites members from different ideological, religion, and socio-economic backgrounds to join its discussions. Based on their competence in maintaining tolerant and open environment, the current administrators were chosen by the Salafi founder who recently started to focus on building local constituencies for the party.

The group functions according to a set of universal ‘auto-run’ rules that organize the range of topics, frequency of post and comments, language, recognized Scriptural references, etc. For instance, the group prohibits disgracing members or public figures and accusations of treason, madness, level of awareness. Also, slanging language and reference to contentious figures are unacceptable. The breach of rules twice results into automatic de-subscription by the administrators. Member complaints are directly reported to administrators. In addition, the Arabic is the only language of the group, commercial and campaigning activities are
forbidden, comments should be concise and members should not post more than twice a day. Spams are automatically deleted and reference to Scriptural text should be derived from certain, trusted, websites and inserted carefully or, otherwise, deleted. Communicating with the group undertakes the form of sharing photos and videos of various events on the group page. The group is supported by an average of 5,000 memberships per month, which reached the peak–30,000 memberships–after its founders’ participation in the fights at Mohammed Mahmoud and Ministerial House on November 2011. Currently, the page administrators function independently of the founder, who was once de-subscribed for breaching the rules.

When asked whether they might quit their activity, participants emphasized that they commit to values of understanding, co-existence, mutual-recognition, and eliminating socio-political injustices. Such values are servable through various structures and/or activities: engaging with talk shows, projects, NGOs, parties, etc. Nevertheless, the group undergoes preparations for establishing a society-oriented political party, that facilitates a number of issues: accessing poor urban and rural regions where Facebook and Twitter are inaccessible, provide a legal coverage that ensures public trust and credibility, establishing a system of reporting, communication and evaluation, developing a cluster structure of activism, decentralization to achieve utmost effectiveness, and preserving the idea of the SC through a Constitutive Committee that comprise the co-founders and maintain balance between tendencies to democratize and decentralize and the need to maintain the identifying values and principles of the group.

*The Ultras Ahlawy (UA-07)*

As per the Ultras Ahlawy (UA), it also organizes itself around three-leveled hierarchy. On the top, fifteen founders of the group undertake decision making, negotiations with authorities, set long and short term plans and inculcate the UA values into new members: belongingness, volunteerism, freedom, etc. At this level decision is taken through voting of the majority. The second level is formed of three hundred sections that function in
urban and sub-urban areas of Cairo. The section heads direct, organize, and coordinate between members to realize the group projects. The group usually communicates directly regarding its project coordination, while publicize and announce its activities on the FB page. The movement expects its supporters to reach 60 millions who follow Al-Ahly team in Egypt. Nevertheless, it only accepts internal donation of members. The leadership inside the UA is based on field experience, efficiency and mobilizational qualifications. The interviewees emphasized that leadership is important for external communication, coordination and negotiation processes that involve certain degrees of authority. Yet, members at different levels execute projects collectively and encourage new comers to learn socio-organizational skills through participatory planning, decision making, execution. As one founder describes ‘I teach others how to become leaders so they would replace me at any time’.

In fact, the use of tacit rules inside the UA and the dependence on functional and rotational leadership, real experiences and field knowledge–in advancing a members qualification–signifies the experience of the UA as a ‘culture, a whole life, rather than a functional group’ says a section head. The UA members share daily life activities, social events, festivals and invite their friends into each other houses so that parent recognize their relationship to the group. Therefore, members usually exit the group due to occupational needs or migration, but they never cut their bond to the group. Rather, some members return from abroad to support the group after the Portsaid massacre. Finally, the group does not provide members with IDs or titles, nevertheless, some titles refer to specific functions rotatable to various members, like chanting in the Stadium microphones–Kabu–and assigning copyrights of songs and videos to specific members to protect the group’s intellectual rights.

Finally, concerning their finance, the interviewed units emphasized they fund their activities through member, national businessmen and charity donations, and revenues of selling their products- booklets, T-shirts, etc. The Ultras Ahlawy strictly forbids national or
international donations and insists on self-financing is activities. On the other hand, SC and WAKS are almost dependent on social media outlets that run on a zero-budget system.

### 4.3. Conclusion

The ideological and organizational manifestation of the new political Generation explain in large the various forms of inter-generational conflicts, given its 'distinctive membership, experiences, values and structure' (see Rintala, ibid, p.510). Compared to earlier findings on the MB, considerable diversion appears in the structure, processes, values, and ideas of both generations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The pre-January 25th Generation—the MB</th>
<th>The new political Generation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Exclusive national identity outlined with abstract and religious values</td>
<td>- Inclusive national identity centered around ‘the here and now’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The referentiality of prophetic history and traditions</td>
<td>- Instant time and constantly variable references.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Salafi religiosity: practice defines the degree of observance</td>
<td>- Sufist and popular religiosity: social interactions and subjective belief indicates observance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ultimate adherence to establishing the 'Islamic State', as contradictory to ‘Secular’ governments.</td>
<td>- Questioning the meaning of ‘Islamic state’ while standing neutral, if not supportive, to the conception of secular state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rejection of voting to non-Muslim or woman candidates for presidency</td>
<td>- Conditional openness towards non-Muslim or woman candidates for presidency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Outsourcing some welfare and strategic services: the FJP program entitles the Ministry of Awqaf to finance education and health services.</td>
<td>- Entitling the state with welfare and strategic services and rejection of foreign ownership of natural resources and involvement in strategic industries: water, iron, etc.</td>
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Organization cult: life-long and ultimate commitment, tight knit hierarchy, secret rules (various administrative charts since 1939), inclusion based on selection, collective infallibility, sanctifying the organization as part of ends (the ‘prophetic’ method of change), leadership based on conformity and abidance by rules.

Mutual commitments with free entry and exit, loose hierarchical/horizontal structures, openly-accessible rules (the info section on Facebook), inclusion based on choice, collective trial and error, alterable methods to change, leadership based on networking capabilities (possessing entrepreneurial, organizational, communication and negotiation skills).

Structure-centered activism, secrecy, politics of soldership, traditional protest-centered opposition, claims of superiority over society and possession of the ultimate right, power rotation based on promotion and obedience, financial ambiguity, refusal to abide by official legal/institutional frameworks, voting based on ideological subjectivity.

Agency-centered activism, publicity, politics of fun, disruptive and joyful opposition, no claims of superiority over society, power rotation based on achievement/resourcefulness/innovation, financial transparency (e.g., Where is My Ear film by SC) and strife for ‘legal’ presence through political parties and/or NGOs, voting based on personal background, candidate capabilities and deliberation of suggested programs.

Table 3: Differences between the MB and the new political generation

In sum, this chapter concludes that the new political generation orientates politics towards the concept of presence and spontaneity rather than representation. This has often been practiced through focusing on basic needs of the poor urban daily-life. Although many conditions determine the effectiveness of cyberactivism, the new generation’s political
culture can still often be seen divorced from their real social world: anonymity, mythology and timelessness. Hence, the internal context of the rising generation’s culture is much closer to online than offline spaces. Although they managed beating the Mubarak regime structures, the essential qualities of this culture—risk-taking, spontaneity, relative liquidity, focus on the ‘here and now’ and a general glocal orientation—resulted into a mounting rejection to obedience, authority and hierarchical structures. Since the later traditionally underlie the cultural bases of the Egyptian society, the rising generation failed in realizing political representation in the 2011 elections; in an EC participants’ words ‘people could not trust a young man’s capability of serving their interests’. In conclusion, the study argues that the new generation’s strive to organize and institutionalize its activism will put its politically-oriented units in an unequal competition with traditionally organized forces, e.g., the NDP remnants and the MB; the new generation’s partial success during the 25th January protests was in large part due to the spontaneous and flexible forms of activism. Hence, while the MB mirrored the NDP in its internal structure, strategies, political imagination and authoritative rationale, politically oriented generational units equally approach the example of the MB. Nevertheless, generational conflict of such units is resolvable through negotiation and mutual recognition. On the contrary, apolitical units—organized such as UA or un-organized such as the WAKS—lack shared grounds with older generational units and, thus, represent cases of protracted conflict.

As per the current situation, the electoral strategies of the MB targeted the frustration of electoral campaigns of ex-MB members such as Al-Adl (Justice) party, the EC candidates in the ‘revolution is Continuing’ list and the former GBG leader Abdul-mone’m Abul-Fotooh campaign for presidential elections. The former General Guide Akif accused Al-Fotooh of ‘breaking his pledge to God’, while El-Shater described those who vote to Abul-Fotooh as ‘sinful’. Also, the movement has generally waived support of young protestors who were
unjustly persecuted through military trials, and turned a blind eye on the urgent demands of martyr’s families, to avoid clashing with the SCAF. Moreover, it incorporated a former NDP candidate in its parliamentary electoral list and extended discussions of the Governmental Statement, during the first two parliament rounds, at the expense of issuing a Political Seclusion Law that prohibits political activities of chief figures of the Mubarak regime; currently, the movement’s candidate runs a strong competition against Mubarak’s former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq. Regarding the youth movements, the former Chief Editor of Ikhwan Online— the MB official website— Abdul Gelil Al-Sharnouby announced that the MB website distorted realities about Fridays’ demonstrations and defamed various political forces, particularly 6th of April and Change Academy, being means to imperialism, chaos, and instability.
CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The previous chapters aim at examining the political cultures of the contending generations in Egypt. It briefly explores the reasons behind severing the ‘feedback loops’ with the MB, the socio-political experiences of the new political Generation and their ideological and organizational characteristics.

Based on interview material, online content, and participation as observer–in meetings, strikes and protests–, this chapter attempts to analyze ideological, socio-organizational and cultural manifestations of the new political generation. It argues that the significant variation within the political culture and imagination of the new generation deepens intra-generational conflicts on various ideological issues and political strategies, and enables counter-revolutionary forces, headed by the SCAF, to upgrade political oppression and authoritarianism. The analysis is aided by Fauconnier and Turner’s model of conceptual integration networks, while applying epistemological analysis of the cultural manifestations of the six generational units. It concludes that two forms of dissent divide the new generation–disruptive and confrontational activism– that direct the forthcoming development of each unit. The following sections proceed as follows: a) assembling concepts into ideological standpoints, b) cultural activism and political imagination and c) generational inter-relationships

5.1. Assembling Concepts into Standpoints

Generational conflicts usually involve ideological transformations. Embedded within the term ‘Ideology’ is ‘that in certain situations, a collective unconscious of some groups obscure the real conditions of the society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilize
The MB’s conception of success as mere persistence stabilized a growing dissent for decades. The leadership interest was bound to specific ‘settings’, which prevented recognizing the influence of spontaneous and anonymous dissent on their domination on the political opposition landscape. On the opposite, *Utopians*—“certain oppressed groups (who) are intellectually interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of the society (and) see only those elements in the situation that negate it”\(^{303}\), could not analyze the existing situation; their thought has been directive for action. Thus, the UA, WAKS and 6\(^{th}\) of April represent variants of utopian activism, compared to the MB and Kefaya’s ideologue and calculated opposition; they emphasized radical change and rapid socio-political mobilization. Nevertheless, the discrepancy within the new generation’s political imagination espoused speedy and fatal ideological divergences after February 12\(^{th}\).

Before dealing with the ideological currents of generational units, I should first identify the term ‘Ideology’. Based on Manheim’s proposition\(^{304}\), Freeden identifies ideology as an intellectual structure that ‘exhibit(s) a recurring pattern, held by significant groups, compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy, and do so with the aim of justifying, contesting, or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community. Thus, he argues that ideological transformations indicate the rise and fall of generations ‘along the change of circumstances and criteria of significance’\(^{305}\).

The conceptual integration analyses (…) provide means of understanding the undergoing ideological transformation by specifying input spaces: Islamism, structuralism, nationalism, and ideological affiliations such as liberalism and socialism. Such input spaces are cross mapped through participant’s previous affiliations and experiences—campaigning,

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\(^{303}\) Ibid, 40

\(^{304}\) ibid, 55-70

protesting, running electoral processes, joining NGOs, political parties, syndicates, etc. Blended meaning spaces are manifest through concurrent affiliations and intra-generational relationships. In such a way, conceptual analysis traces the ‘meaning’ through various experiences, information, biographies, decisions, strategies, and materials, rather than exclusively analyzing informative ‘text’—as the case with content analysis.

*The National Movement for Change–Kefaya*

To begin with, the National movement for Change-Kefaya reflects a strong Nasserite and secular impulse; participant repeatedly identified the movements as an extension of the Socialist Party; by answering to many interview questions with *'we in the Socialist party program believe....., call for...., promote....’.* Also the movement defines the situation in the ‘Arab’ world with three main issues: the American occupation of Iraq, the Palestinian cause, and the New middle East project that threatens Arab identity and encourages mobilizing efforts on political, cultural and civilizational *fronts*\(^{306}\); finally, the participant emphasized a conception of religion as restricted to personal and private spheres while expressing respect for conservative values of the *popular* culture. Posing ‘political’ and ‘constitutional’ reform as main targets of its activism, the movement emphasizes an elitist impulse of socialist secularism. Indicated through answers on ‘Islamic state’ and Shari’a application, constitutional reforms are employed as primary means to eliminate *perceived* Islamic authoritarianism.

Throughout the interview sections, the Kefaya participant faithfully reflected core concepts that grounded political discourses in the Nasserite era (1952-1970). First, she emphasized a concept of welfare that spans physical, moral, mental and spiritual needs of Arabs citizens; in addition, the constitutive definition attributes democracy, welfare and

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progress to the ‘Arab nation in Egypt’. The participant also highlighted an ideologue conception of national identity that emphasizes abstract concepts and attach temporal socio-economic needs tactically to the movement's fundamental ends- Arab unity.

Kefaya emphasizes state responsibility of central planning for public, private and civil sectors. Progress, as described in the movement’s mission, is a function of increasing control over the society; it involves democratic commitment as an ultimate form of Arab self-determination; this explains the movement emphasize on the link between lacking democracy and occupation of Iraq. Also, the route to rationality and progress passes through control—e.g., holding adequate statistical records of population, instructing individual pursuit for self development through state responsibility of employing graduates and setting SBO development policies. Also, rationality associates with actions/policies that sustain human relationships; it holds a strong appeal to productive integration with collectivity and the 'unimpeded pursuit of communal welfare goods', indicated through the focus on central planning and integration of civil and private sectors as parts of a broader development plan. Hence, Kefaya’s ‘Socialist Clause’ in Freeden terms, states that public or common ownership of, or control over, the means of production and distribution may integrate non-state actors: co-operatives, syndicates, or mixture of public and private agent.

Finally, Kefaya also emphasizes the need to suppress class governments, by supporting increasing taxation system, central planning, and equality of freedoms and rights among citizens. Finally, the movement promotes advanced conception of participation in which citizens strive for socio-economic mobilization, human emancipation, aided by the state institutions and policies. Thus, the state functions as rational and accountable agent of, supposedly, a democratic community.

The Salafiyo Costa (SC)

307 ibid
308 See Ideologies and Political Theory, 446
The case of SC reflects an orientation towards social liberalism. First, the movement is highly foundational—guaranteeing recognition to, and respect of, contemporary sets of infallible and self-evident beliefs—of which opinions, attitudes, and decision of the ‘other’ are derived. For instance, the Christian spokesman justifies the Salafis’ inability to deliver feast greetings because he ‘recognizes’ that Islam admits only two feasts: Al-Adha and Al-Fitr. Thus, it indifferently employs ground-rules of ‘liberal dialogue’: equal participation, non-exclusion, accountability and representation—especially the inclusiveness of the admin group-freedom of speech and rules of evidence. Similarly, although founders are fundamentally committed to various faiths and/or ideologies, principles of liberal ‘sociability’—coexistence, mutual recognition and understanding—are encouraged through FB dialogue, TV shows, and actual engagement in joint developmental projects. Hence, The movement’s interest in education resonates to Parekh’s note that dialogue necessitates liberal education that ‘promotes intellectual curiosity, self-criticism, and knowledge of other ways of life’.

Also, the movement expresses strong global market orientations. The founders’ background, sales and marketing, beside the group composition results into strong orientation towards media marketing: in his own words ‘the media profits from misrepresenting liberal, Salafi, and Christian components of the Egyptian society; on the contrary, we point at the common ground between the three that is much larger than contention areas’—says the group founder. Also, the ‘contrast’ principle extends to the groups raison d’être: down-top reform, street politics, rejection of electoral and/or political coalition, focus on the ‘common’ rather than the ‘specific’. However, the pure ‘contrast’ principle threatens undermining the very pluralistic approach, in case it over-emphasizes differences rather than similarities—

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310 Cited in Kymlicka, ibid, 132.
312 ibid
following the principle of specialization, the group prohibits that, for instance, a Christian member represents believes of a Muslim liberal and vice versa.

The rationale of liberal economy also extends to the movement’s strategic decisions. Unlike the 6th of April founders, the SC transferred the page administration to new administrators, who work according to a set of auto-run rules organizing the page, without ascribing a veto right for themselves, despite the risk any administrator can quite possibly delete the whole group at one click. When asked about the reason, the founder said ‘we trust the wisdom of the crowd’. In fact, this reflects universal principles of liberal markets: avoiding authoritative interference and trusting the ‘automatic’ self-correction of the system’s ‘anonymous’ hand.

On the political sphere, the movement responses resonate in much part to Freeden’s conception of new liberal politics: support of ‘diffused, responsible and limited use of political power, allowing a non-constrain space of individual expression, avoidance of sectional privileges’ and accountable and educated exercise of political choices. Accordingly, the group employs self-help rhetoric by encouraging volunteerism and individual freedom to develop capabilities through rational attributes—e.g., the refusal to punish citizens with high incomes through increasing taxes and preference of independent enterprises. Meanwhile, they entitle the state with socio-economic and welfare responsibilities especially concerning education, health, and poverty.

Through reference to the French model, the group principally adhere to ‘rational freedom’, that acknowledges societal limits on individual liberty, despite its founder’s belief that ‘Egyptians are neither conservative nor religious’. Yet, the formation of the group represents a successful individual initiative. In other words, it reflects a case of ‘weak

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313 When appointed to the 2011 parliament, the group founder said he refused to overtake the position before families of martyrs’ retrieve their rights.

314 M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 154
commitment to mechanical groups\(^{315}\)-mainly Orthodox religious institutions- that allows founders to form independent groups and communities through which they rationally pursue self-realization. The Salafi founders are less interested in preaching people on religion or obliging them with practices that restrict their life choices. Rather, they adhere to democratic, majoritarian, principles and ‘defend’ their presence— “There is nothing to differentiate our lifestyles, except maybe we are more conservative and orthodox”\(^{316}\).

Nevertheless, such tendency is coupled with a drive towards particularization against Orthodox institutions. When asked whether Salafyo Costa is distinctive of other Salafi groups, participants confirm that, in principle, Salafis in SC are strictly observant of religious duties; they conform to the Salafi ‘fundamentals and methods to knowledge’. Nevertheless, they argue, ‘SC is practically oriented towards philanthropic civil service rather than electoral politics’. The group adopts a slogan ‘we are not running politics, we gather all the trends’\(^{317}\). In Tolba’s words: The difference from other Salafis is that the group does not have a political orientation; it does not support electoral candidates, run for elections or promote legal and/or constitutional changes. (In fact), people will not legitimize a rule that does not recognize pressuring socio-economic needs as of ultimate priority\(^{318}\).

Therefore, despite the plea to mobilize support from referential Salafi figures—such as Al-Aziz Bellah, Abdul-Mone’im Maqsud, and Mahmoud Gaber— hardliner sheikhs usually offend the group on various grounds: providing concessions to infidels, retreating from the ‘Bara’ concept and following an ‘ignorant and daring’ leader\(^{319}\). In fact, the eclectic approach

\(^{315}\) M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, 252

\(^{316}\) Tolba, ibid.

\(^{317}\) Walid Mostafa, on Al-Arabiya TV Channel, “SalafyoCosta: We Are the One’s Who Pay for Your Drinks” ibid.

\(^{318}\) Tolba, “Accepting the Other’s Opinion”, ibid.

of SC promises future revisions of core Salafi principles by reconfiguring the spaces of meaning and contesting the rigid authority of religious figures. However, this might couple a growing tendency towards further differentiation from other Egyptian Muslim. In other words, branding the SC activities would foster Salafi co-founders to defend their existence by strict differentiation from widespread Sufi Tarikats like Shazilis and Naqshabeni, popular ‘mystic’ religiosity, Azharite Salafism, etc. Hence, internal dialogue might be traded off against dialogue with Christian and Liberal ‘others’.

The movement generally reflects a disruptive rift against numerous socio-religious codes. It began with subverting many traditions of communication especially between Salafi and Christian Egyptians. Its internal ‘code’ comprises three notions. Firstly, rejection of oppression and/or profiling on religious and socio-political grounds- reflected on the slogan ‘We’re always the ones paying for your drinks’ and the sarcastic name that debases claims of excluding Salafi citizens from ‘modern-neo-liberal’ spaces such as Costa Café. Secondly, the strife to free individuals from oppressive authority of religious institutions and authoritarian regimes. Finally, the constant use of humorous clauses and funny tricks, especially in media products, subverts the perception of Salafis as essentially un-sociable creatures and re-fills its meaning spaces with positive inferences. The disruptive tendency also extends to the group name and logo. The name was a sarcastic criticism of popular misperception on Salafis while the logo appropriates the Costa Café’s symbol–whose waiters distrusted Salafi customers–by replacing its three beans with a bearded elder Salafi man posing a stare into the distance.

Finally, the group ideas emphasizes ‘the here and now’: the existing reality is referential of the group’s decisions and opinion–e.g., the Coptic spokesman assures Sharia is already applied because Muslims are the majority for centuries. What differs such approach from pragmatism, in the case of SC– is that dealing with such reality is again derivative from theological beliefs and universal human values. In many instances, it emphasizes the ‘real’
situation: ‘liberals, socialists, Christians and Salafis all live in one place and have to bear each other willingly or otherwise’- says the Salafi founder.

‘We Are All Khaled Said’

Firstly, given the absolute dependence on anonymity and cyberactivism, there should be a clear distinction between the ideas promoted by the WAKS page and the ideas held by its administrators, which are varied and, to an extent, self-contradictory. While the page promotes a social democratic orientation to politics, administrators, Ghoneim, represents a tendency towards liberal pacifism, while the other two administrators, interviewed for this research, represents two variants of libertarianism–minarchism and non-pacifist left libertarianism.

The popular apolitical and human-centered approach of the WAKS page reflects a tendency to maximize the utility of the ‘porous boundaries and overlapping spaces’ (Freeden, pp. 63-4) that identify various socio-economic communities in Egypt. While ideological structures–charity organizations, political parties, NGOs and organized movement–emphasize the distinguishing or exclusive variables of ideological prototypes, Ghoneim recognizes ideological ‘dependencies’– that ‘identical political concepts (mainly freedom and human dignity) may serve as building blocks for an entire series of ideologies’320.

To that end, the WAKS page encouraged anonymous discourses on torture between political rivals, benefiting of autonomous and spontaneous dissemination. The administrators believe dissent cycles in the country have been through many ups and downs since 2004, especially during EL-Baradei campaign and the elections on 2010. At that time, serious defaming campaigns as well as a confrontational political discourse marginalized the majority of population regarding the 6th of April. By lowering the confrontation curve, WAKS page targeted three goals: a) horizontal incorporation of the silent critical mass, b)

320 Freeden, Ideology: A Very short Introduction, p. 52
avoid internal discourse—i.e., with other political forces, and c) encourage parents, elders and children to express grievance through safe and peaceful means. Finally, the page discourse has been channeled through cool and trendy propagandizing materials that ‘fashioned’ the cause especially among the university students. In such a way, the liberal and pacifist principles directing the WAKS’s vision, mission and steering processes prohibited the least violation of Emergency Law or offense of police officers—despite their violence against protestors. As Ghoneim explains, the Indian pacifist traditions of non-violence against all living things has been of inspirational influence on his activism as a WAKS founder. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this was based on a broader ‘metaphysical’/theological view, and whether self-defense is conditionally permitted when impersonal and political violence is rejected. Following Ghandhism, the page encouraged self-restrain and compassion towards officers and thugs, by apologetically expanding on their socio-economic life conditions. Rather, WAKS encouraged peaceful and non-violent resistance, solidarity, compassion, public responsibility and socio-economic harmony.

As per the page administrators, both reflect libertarian orientation by subscribing to an authentic Millite conception of ‘liberty’—non-constrain by coercive action of another, namely the governmental authority and social/religious traditions; political agents are ‘self-owners’ who enjoy unconstrained individual liberty and voluntary association. Freeden believes libertarianism is an optimizing ideology; while the liberal ideology upholds that ‘free

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321 In many instances, the page administrators refused to redirect the silent stand protestors into political demonstration led by the 6th of April. This was to ensure that the discourse on torture sincerely addresses the popular grievance rather than profiling protestors as supporting a specific political force.


individuals will be able to develop rational and social attributes.\textsuperscript{324} It places liberty within a conceptual system that includes individuality, progress, rationality, general interest, sociability and constraints on political power. On the contrary, Freedon states, libertarian ideologies overemphasize the concept of individual liberty, relativity of religious, cultural and social foundations, and a concept of power as either a) dispersed in, and accountable to, various communal groupings, or b) replaced by the absence of centralized power. Thus, the nation turns into a set of self-governing communities\textsuperscript{325}.

In this regard, the WAKS administrators represent two selfstyled versions of libertarianism: minarchism and left-libertarianism\textsuperscript{326}. In principle, libertarianism is hostile to many of the powers entitled to modern nation states. WAKS administrators deprive the state of the right to provide welfare services that shape individual consciences—especially concerning education, culture and religion; the state powers on such areas are deemed illegitimate, since it implant mythical and non-consensual obligations of individuals and communities. Rather, both administrators perceive national belongingness as contingent on societal and geographical limitation. Therefore, they entitle non-governmental private and civil sectors to undertake welfare services and reject legal restriction on the establishment and functioning of such entities.

In such a way, both administrators promote ‘participism’ in both economic and political spheres—Independent local markets replace capitalist and centrally planned economies; political engagement is based on values of freedom, self-management, justice,

\textsuperscript{324} Ideologies and Political Theory, 153
\textsuperscript{325} ibid, 184
solidarity and tolerance. The anti-capitalist thrust is manifest in the adamant rejection of neo-liberal foreign investment that transfers ownership of natural resources to un-accountable agents. Rather, both defend the right of indigenous communities to own resources independent of central national authority. To prevent the concentration of power, administrators seek to replace unjustified authority with voluntary institutions/organizations that empower small communities of self-government and management. If the society is organized into voluntary associations–municipalities, cooperatives or organizations–, consensual, thus legitimate, politics could be realized.

In this case, the state becomes a night watchman that provides security, jurisprudence and law-enforcement functions, and practices limited and responsible political powers to correct imbalances and prevent sectional privileges or socio-economic injustices. In doing so, non-governmental checks and balances must be applied on its functioning. Despite the reasonableness of such ideas, administrators’ opinions diverge on this point. A tendency towards non-pacifist left libertarianism occurs as one administrator entitles the state with, only, the right to set universally applicable rules of social, political, and economic processes. Once settled, it must quit the public sphere and oversea the functioning of pre-settled systems. Allegedly, the exercise of power in any institutionalized form–whether political, economic or religious–breaches the non-constraint condition of individual liberty. This view also couples a faith that individuals have the right to enforcing their rights autonomously and independent of state authorities. Meanwhile, such force should not be used against acts that violate no libertarian rights–including the ‘no one’s’ right justified with notions of ‘public interest’. In conclusion, libertarian views of administrators hold that state effects are generally negative, positive effects could be sought through independent and voluntary mechanisms and that if some positive effects are unobtainable thereby, the national authority should be balanced.

*The Ultras Ahlawy (UA-07)*
Similar to its European parallels, the UA started in urban cities—Cairo and Alexandria—then began to spread in peripheral regions subsequently. Therefore, the UA represents a purely urban socio-political phenomenon. Despite the right-wing thrust of the UA’s 'defamation culture'—that involves insulting authorities against reputed weaknesses—such as poor educational background of Interior Ministry officers—it manifests clear left-wing leanings—e.g., using concepts with fascist connotations such as 'Capu', obsession with chaos and disorder, paralleling martyrs with Che Guevara's model of 'freedom fighter', etc. The UA phenomenon could be read through a relative Deprivation lens; when 'cognitive dissonance' develops with a conviction that legitimate expectations—freedom inside the stadium—are unsatisfied. Thus, a socio-psychological approach to the UA 'cult' explains an embedded sense of marginalization and deprivation, by the rise of materialization, commercialism, individuation and, subsequently, estrangement of young individuals. While political corruption, patronage, and opportunism forfeit poor urban youth's attempts to mobilize socio-economically, they build alternative safety shields—e.g., the UA community—based on mutually solidarity and un-conditional support. As one member explains: 'If I die, I know thousands will march in my funeral, defend my right, and remember me in the stadium curve'. Meanwhile, the members' world view: 'I only find myself inside the curve'—explain the general statist orientation within the movement; similar to team player on the pitch ground, the state is entitled to 'play' the main political, economic, and social roles while citizens, UA supporters, 'watch' and greet.

The UA could be described as a youthful sporty and national group independent of ideological and intellectual affiliations. Individuals follow their 'communal sense' and

327 Gunter Pilz and Franciska Wölki-Schumacher, 36

decided to take part in both peaceful and violent scenes of the Revolution. The only enemy it perceives is the oppressive security-intelligence agencies—especially the barracked CSA and riot forces. Although their world is only experienced inside the stadium curva, the conception of nationalism and freedom extend their passion, sacrifice and solidarity to the broader Egyptian society. The support of the weak, poor and oppressed majority of population was reflected on their refusal to undertake an introduction in the name of Gamal Mubarak, before the 25th Revolution and insistence on fighting the Interior Ministry forces during Mohammed Mahmoud incidents—‘do they think we are that trivial’, then, said a section leader. The hostility towards Mubarak’s authoritarianism has extended to subsequent institutions that aim at coopting, controlling and overseeing their activity, namely Al-Ahly Club and formal opposition forces. Thus, they represent an apolitical, post-ideological and post-Islamist unit of the new political generation.

The UA interviewees believe the society, political forces, and media are prisoners of the regime’s authoritarianism and ‘stupidity’. The conviction that their expectations, of freedom inside the curva- would never be satisfied develops feelings of prejudice and discrimination329 which leads into radical forms of resistance. This comprises violence, staging demonstrations and strikes, and political lobbying. Besides being a closed ‘cult’ of Al-Ahly team, the bloody suppression of the UA in Posrtsaid Massacre, January 2011, intensified the radical tendencies of the movement. Moreover, the systematic defiance of societal and cultural norms inside the stadium intensified a self-perception of being unworthy ‘outcast’. Although members tend to comply with societal expectations beyond the curva, in their recent clash with regime intensified the movement’s estrangement from various political forces and solidarity with peer ultras movements- e.g., White knights. Having always considered their cause legitimate, and that the curva is their territories-where they have the

right to boundless self-expression- the UA sustained suppression and social ‘stigmatization’ through superiority claims over political forces. The UA upholds its collective purity, non-pollution, principled rejection of media and politics being tools for commercialization and suppression- in their words ‘we have realized many achievements that the society, and various political forces, is yet to reach- freedom, self-realization, etc’. Such ethical stand is believed to be morally worth of sacrifice-sometimes with member’s life. Also, the strong feeling of belongingness to the UA as more of a surrogate family that secures individuals intensifies a ‘mythology’ of the ‘hero’ -closely identified with a ‘cult’ of death and hardship. Heroism is granted when members ‘die’ in pursuit of freedom, especially if the murderers are police officers. Hence, the Revolution ultimately served heroic ideals of the movement while providing a cause for other youth groups that, allegedly, suffer meaningless, unworthiness, and lack of reliable ‘point of reference’.

Despite the radical resistance of state suppression, the UA interviewees emphasized the ‘state’ obligations and responsibilities towards various areas of public interest: education, religious institutions, healthcare, housing, control of NGO activities, enforcement of law, holding private and civil agents accountable, etc. The purposive intervention of state authority is deemed to protect the society against drainage of resources, deterioration of socio-religious values, political and administrative corruption. For instance, interviewees believed the state should prevent establishment of NGOs that defend homosexuality and should set reasonable criteria of religious curriculum and discourse that protects the society against extremism and politicization of religion. Similarly, interviewees believe the state should facilitate employment of young graduates and initiation of small business enterprises. Also, the public sector should not be privatized in case it functions effectively and welfare services should be universally provided for citizens at the best quality.

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Although the state is entitled with various responsibilities, the UA members do not intend to undertake any official positions; they hardly voted for the 2011 elections, they refuse mobilizing for or collaborating, collectively, with any political forces. While security-intelligence institutions usually manage incorporating opposition forces into sustainable economic and political networks, the UA is politically non-negotiable. The win—win situation is politically impossible since the UA mentality eschews various forms of ‘structured’ authority. The bloody confrontation in January 2012 was inevitable since- as EL-Sherif states- it reflects conflict of two life paradigms ‘the paradigm of oppression, control, normalization of apathy, versus a paradigm of joyful liberation from shackles of social and institutional norms to create gratifying chaos. However, such confrontation, writes EL-Sherif, is useful; “(it is) between two rhythms of life—one so dim it fails to realize its own fragility, stagnation and gradual extinction and the other so young and full of life that it fails to realize the revolutionary consequences of its actions”\textsuperscript{331}. In fact, this view is also supported by the UA expectation of their movement’s future: ‘we believe another revolution is upcoming; we might be its early lights.’

\textit{The Egyptian Current and 6\textsuperscript{th} of April}

The ideological leanings of both the EC party and 6\textsuperscript{th} of April gravitate towards new liberalism (social liberalism). Both actors challenge the neoliberal policies of Mubarak era (1981-2011) that resulted into enormous records of financial, political, and administrative corruption. Thus, it drained natural resources—e.g., arable lands and natural gas, and resulted into economic instability. By 2010, 28 percent of the poor income went to taxes while ministers and ‘crony capitalists’ paid less that 8 percent. The minimum wage, agreed by the government, is believed to suffice buying only one meal per day. Moreover, the government

\textsuperscript{331} EL-Sherif, Ibid.
is indebted with L.E 376 billion as insurance to public employees\textsuperscript{332}; as a result, by December 2010, there has been 32 stands, 20 sit-ins, 22 strikes, 59 protest in the public sector and 41 in the private sector\textsuperscript{333}.

Accordingly, both the EC and 6\textsuperscript{th} of April envisions a responsible and strong role of the state in ‘enabling’ the practice of socio-economic liberties. They set as their priorities the need to provide universal and basic welfare services—education, housing, unemployment assistance, health care—and the need to maintain a strong presence of the state in the market; the state should provide basic and strategic services such as energy, infrastructure and water. Also, both actors defend free and effective non-governmental civil and private sectors.

Nevertheless, the EC and 6\textsuperscript{th} of April’s rapprochement to liberalism differs in the degree and the various input spaces of which these views are derived. The EC is admittedly a post-ideological and post-Islamist entity. Besides arguing for a principled effect of Shari’a on legislation and public policies—by which the government should only observe a set of broad values: mercy, freedom, and justice—the perception of \textit{Islamic} state eschews traditional writings of \textit{Islamic} intellectuals—namely Salim El-Awwa and Yusuf AL-Qaradawi—who, according to the EC co-founders—instilled a \textit{mythology} of ‘Islamic state’, as mutually exclusive of secularism, centered around political power, control, and sanctification human opinions being representative of pure Islamic tradition. For them, the Islamic state existed, historically, for forty years only—during the prophetic history. Meanwhile, the EC’s post-Islamism, as Bayat writes, ‘is not anti-Islamic or secular; (it) dearly upholds religion but also highlights citizens’ rights. It aspires to a pious society within a democratic state’\textsuperscript{334}. While


\textsuperscript{333} The Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights, \textit{The Dissent Movement Publication}, January 2011.

Islamist parties- namely the MB and EL-Nour- envision powerful and effectual state institutions that spread the ‘good’, eradicate the ‘evil’ and discipline, religiously, the defiant population, the EC emphasizes the role of state institutions in providing the necessity of dignified socio-economic life. Instead of focusing on citizens ‘obligations to the righteous state’ (ibid), the EC emphasize the obligations of state towards citizens. Hence, envisioning a state that is representatives of (rather than superior to) the community.

Compared to the ‘faithful’ EC democrats, the 6th of April movement shares many post-Islamism stands; it identifies Egypt as a ‘civilian state with Islamic background’; it argues for a loose application of Sharia principles, respect of international treaties–including the Peace Treaty with Israel 1979– and respect of religious values and traditions as held by the majority of the population. However, they differ on the degree of inclusiveness and emphasize on social injustice. While the EC eclectically incorporates Islamist, liberal, Nasserite and socialist views within its platform, the 6th of April focuses solely on stepping down the regime and undertaking political and social reform. Meanwhile, The movement strongly adopts confrontational orientations –indicated through refusal of half-solutions– especially during negotiations before Mubarak resigns– and of gradual reform. Nevertheless, unlike the UA, both the EC’s and 6th of April’s political orientation rendered them movement negotiable.

In conclusion, the new political Generation shares a new liberal conception of the role of the state. Except the Greenian leanings of the WAKS administrators, the interviewed units reflect Hobhouse’s view on the state’s function as ‘an instrument of collaborative responsibility of the society for the joint welfare of its members’; it enjoys overlordship on property and supervisory power over industry; hence, the liberal and moderate socialist currents comprising the new Generation endorse the idea of the minimum income and state

responsibility of socio-economic spaces where fundamental needs are endangered, in which it could act more efficiently, or with less risk to the public. Also, the majority of interviewed units emphasize the state responsibility of guaranteeing the minimum standard of life that enables individuals and communities to exercise civil rights and freedoms. Finally, the abstract notion of individual property, indicated through pursuit of independent enterprises and choice of taxation system, gravitated towards the conduct of universal individual welfare, while the majority of participants conceptualized individual interests as complementary and mutually supportive of national interests.

This research argues that such common grounds facilitated a temporal erosion of ideological divides during the 18-day strike. The new Generation succeeded in barring “the ambiguities of theory,” “the complexities of life,” and “the exhaustion of utopia,” as titled in Bell’s remarkable work. However, the resignation of ex-president Mubarak in February 11th signified the awake of ‘structured’ ideology—in terms of FJP, EL-Nour, and Liberal, Socialist parties—after only eighteen days only of the ‘Tahrir utopia’. Although this also gave rise to post-ideological activism, the political platform has been largely occupied with battles of the older generation’s leadership. Meanwhile, competition over political gains—representation, control, media exposure, policy recommendation, foreign assistance, etc., resulted into undergoing divisions and troublesome oscillation between various political alliances. The variation within political strategies and imagination of the new Generation is much evident when examining the cultural manifestation of its activities.

5.2. Cultural Activism and Political Imagination

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It is traditionally argued that the use of arts in contentious politics did not transcend mere expression of dissent\textsuperscript{337}. Nevertheless, at specific ‘moments of madness’, the expressive and the instrumental divide collapses\textsuperscript{338} and two images of revolutionary change arise: disruption and confrontation. In fact, the new Generation has employed arts for both reasons: a) tactical disruption of the public–by intervening in the normal flow of their visual life and occupying public spaces with dissent expressions–e.g., graffiti–and b) to win a confrontation with the enemy–the oppressive Interior Ministry and/or SCAF.

To begin with, the various units of the new political generation is used to attack the system in Myriad and genuine forms. These included music, wall drawings, graffiti, expressional material–pamphlets, banners, logos, photos and caricature– slany poetry, ironic chants, hip hop and monlog songs, slogans, video feeds and spoof anthems. Some earlier blogs aimed at mimicking the outlook and speech of government officials, circulating satirizing and slany poetry on Mubarak in a way to informally authorize the expression of ‘obscene’ dissent. The movements interviewed in this research comprised among their members designers, fine artists, musicians, bloggers, media activists: photographers, montagists, amateur actors and singers –e.g., Yosra Hawary’s performance of On the Wall poetry– all functioning beside sarcastic writers, poets and intellectuals such Baha’ Taher, Bilal Fadl and Ahmed Fouad Negm. The new generation’s confrontation with the regime integrated arts, music, ideology, politics, and activism. ‘The Street Is Ours’ shout gave rise to street politics where the dogmatic conception of the state falls down at the face of enthusiastic and celebratory assertion of the power of irony that ridicules oppressive authority.


\textsuperscript{338} Cited in ibid,158
The diversity of tactics purported aimed first at hiding the source identity through various photo-shop and sound-diverting computer programs. The authors unknown, art products used to hit millions of Facebook, You Tube and Twitter profiles, benefitting of the anonymous and spontaneous spread of the message. After the Revolution, producers began to reveal the source gradually—e.g., the ACAB became a signifier of the UA, while the cover-face Graffiti identifies the 6th of April. Also, the graffiti of Khaled Saed is replicated all around walls surrounding the Interior Ministry—although the WAKS administrators deny stamping it.

The new generation has generally emphasized visual subversion of the system. For instance, the 6th of April protestor on 25th January tended to become colorful—dressing in red—and joyful—spreading flowers on the police. The new character of the protestor was evidently contrasted to the Islamist ‘bad theatres’—extensive daylong marshes that threaten CSA officers with divine punishment as challengers of the Shri’a! The new image of the protestor confused the police, attracted media attention and stopped onlookers’ eyes on them. The sooner a dissent tool gets old, new combat icons emerge—e.g., the Vandetta mask was quickly replaced by black and white neck and head ties, yellow stickers and hang rope, photo-stamped T-shirts, etc.

Following the work of Scholl, the next paragraphs show a schematic examination of the disruptive and confrontational artistic presence of above movements, based on the information gathered through interviews and social media sources.

The silent stands mobilized through the WAKS and 6th of April’s targeted sudden—a street-length—marshes/stands in poor Cairo neighborhoods and main streets. It aimed at exceeding the normal flow of everyday life and ‘creating a situation’ of outburst dissent. In order to challenge the routine exercises of ‘popular compliance’ 339 they orientated

339 See Seif EL-Din Abdul-Fattah. Al Zahf Ghayrul Muqaddas: Tamim Al-Dawlah Le Al-Din (The De-sacralized Creep: Nationalizing Religion by the State) (Cairo, Al-Shorouk Al-Dawliyyah, 2005)
themselves onto temporary ‘ruptures’–repeatable, spontaneous, and short-term protest that lasts from ten to fifteen minutes and cover one street per time. Meanwhile, the repeat of such practice provided a wealth of knowledge on the oppressive regime’s mobility and flexibility as well as Cairo-based troops’ number and the processes of their mobilization towards the protest venue. Hence, in the process of breaking fear barriers, the security structures’ strengths and weaknesses were thoroughly tested. For instance, the 6th of April was able to know that CSA mobilize in thirty minutes as well as their routes through the crowded mid-noon Cairo streets. The multiple and expanding nature of such protest caused real cracks in the ‘texture of domination’\textsuperscript{340} and allowed people to explode their anger autonomously.

In fact, the early incidents of Kefaya, WAKS and 6th of April protests encapsulated the creative potential of street activism, resulting into new repertoires of actions: taping mouths, silent stoppages, dressing in black and mourning Egypt–represented in Khaled Saed, dressing red and distributing flowers to police officers and riot forces, thus turning the ‘social protocols and hierarchies upside down’\textsuperscript{341}. The unpredictability of the protestor attitude confused the oppressive strategies and created a real notion of protestors’ anonymity–on the days of silent stands by WAKS, the polis had to stop and check every black-dressing passer-by! Similarly, the call to photograph oneself as soon as s/he stands by the Nile or sea-side reflected a focus on the ‘here and now’, acceptance of temporariness and state repressive capacities, and an orientation to the ‘moment’ which forms individual yet continuously sporadic ‘cracks’ to turn down the regime. In accordance with Bey’s ‘temporal resistance’\textsuperscript{342}, the avoidance of forming endurable and real-world structures–e.g., the WAKS page–reflected a tendency to survive continuous untraceable breaks. Also, the dissent acts of Kefaya, 6th of April, and WAKS reflected a belief that the regime cannot be defeated, but

\textsuperscript{340} Cited in Scholl, 159.
\textsuperscript{341} Cited in Scholl, 159.
\textsuperscript{342} Cited in Scholl, 160.
merely disrupted momentarily. Although the 5-10 minutes protest are certainly coordinated by insurgents via the internet and cellphones, they looked spontaneous to the public; they confused bystanders, authorities and pro-Mubarak thugs who used to act wither on pre-paid bases–when the security agencies hire them against pre-set calls for protesting– or in case the protestors themselves arranged their activity with the regime–such in the MB case.

A similar conception of temporal ‘underground’ resistance is provided by Deleuze and Guattari\textsuperscript{343} where possibilities of social change reside in the idea of temporal breaks, this time on basis of ‘rhizomatic structure’ of resistance. The rhizomatic conception of resistance focuses on its ever-lasting underground and indivisible presence that potentially appear ‘up there’, at sudden moments, with various confrontational lines, and thus becomes un-controllable, even by its initial inspirers. On this regard, the experience of the Youth Coalition is instructive; although the youth movements were successful is trickling down enormous dissent, sooner after the revolution they lost control over the process!

Following the Ismialiya group–that began its first song after rejecting Egypt’s bid for the International Football Cup under VIVA in 2010–the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) hip hop songs became a wider practice of self-dependence, autonomy, and self-appreciation. The Ultras Ahlawy for instance often translated their principles into collective and participatory clips. For example, Freedom is a copyright-protected song by the Ultras-Ahlawy that spilled over the entire landscape of cultural opposition. So is the ‘Street is Ours’ chants at the time of Kefaya, that resisted the normal flow of public compliance. The target of DIY graffiti during post January 25\textsuperscript{th} period was also directed towards breaking the divide between the producer and spectator by personalizing the grievance and engaging the passer-by and on-lookers. Hence, strategic public spaces–the ring road outlets and highway bars–became ‘stages of

\textsuperscript{343} Ibid.
participatory theatre\textsuperscript{344} that encourages horizontal participation, since everyone—at least for a moment—turns into an active agent of change\textsuperscript{345}

The DIY culture of immediacy is assisted by the new generation’s mobile characteristics. Possessing local knowledge of urban spaces—e.g., backstreet ways, under-highways, informal cafés and shanty towns—is usually a characteristic of young adults who spend the majority of their life in street football matches, fights and hangouts. While Kefaya was stuck to the Journalist Syndicate’s front, the UA began their marshes on the 25\textsuperscript{th} January 2011 from Nahya and Meet Ukba backstreets—see the memoirs of UA martyrs on their homes’ balconies in such areas. Hence, the encounter of the pre-January 25\textsuperscript{th} generation with the ‘street’ was functional, whereas the new generation ‘adults’ engraved every street contour with keys, sprays, and talks; in such ways, they managed inflicting little scratches in the daily routine of compliance.

In fact, the 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolution revealed disruptive as well as confrontational perceptions of power. While disruption represented an attempt to take over dominant signifiers and reload them with defiant messages—e.g., Kefaya’s subversion of national anthem—confrontation reflected a collective will to realize a complete rupture with authoritarianism, rather than subverting it. Scholl explains the difference as embedded in two worldviews\textsuperscript{346}. The first is a Hegelian dialectical materialism, in which history becomes a circuitous serious of revolutions and counter-revolutions between adversary social forces. Accordingly, the confrontational imagination of political change addresses abstract dilemma rather than technical issues—e.g., the UA abstract fight for Liberta (freedom) versus the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April four demands for the 25\textsuperscript{th} January protests: changing the Interior Minister, raising the minimum of wages, etc. The other view is a libertarian conception of history, in which

\textsuperscript{344} Scholl, 162
\textsuperscript{345} Cited in Scholl, 165.
\textsuperscript{346} Scholl, 169-71.
competing forces compromise through interest aggregation and deliberation, and, thus, eliminate the bases of politics which is conflict-represented in the MB’s ideology of gradual political change. Hence, the confrontational dissent recalls the friend-enemy duality that Schmitt, strongly emphasized as to be the foundation of politics\textsuperscript{347}.

During the Revolution, signs of both disruptive and confrontational dissent were evident. On one hand the protestors did not deny the friend-enemy representation on state-media, rather, thy subverted the enemy meaning to become Mubarak rather than masses. On the other, many interviewees emphasized it was only through violent self-defense, that marshes from Nasr City could reach its destination–Tahrir. Thus, the Tahrir square was simultaneously transformed into a fight yard as well as a desirable world!

In sum, the artistic expression of the new political Generation sharpens the debate on tactical use of art for revolutionary street politics. Art was used in both tactical and strategic methods. Sometimes the confrontational dissent, in the Ultras Ahlawy and 6\textsuperscript{th} of April cases, espoused foundational view of politics and society, while other cases reflected anti-foundational views–e.g., the WAKS administrators. Hence, while the idea of collapsing the state is a nightmare of the disruptive interventionists, it represents a desired goal to confrontational actors. However, the confrontational conception of the Ultras Ahlawy, 6\textsuperscript{th} of April and WAKS administrators received different response from the regime, dependent on the degree of non-negotiability: While the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April was defamed and one WAKS administrator was detained during the revolution, the UA activists were collectively massacred in Port Said.

5.3 Generational Relationships: Collaboration and Conflict

Most of the interviewed participants expressed contentious relationship with the MB and the Islamist parliamentarian majority. Meanwhile, the intra-generational relationships–as

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid, 171
expressed by the interviews participants- held variety of cooperative and contentious terms. As per the WAKS administrators, both administrators were former members of the MB and consider the MB’s hardcore basement of the Islamic state as the first contender to the page’s message. Also, despite the page administrators believe their contribution would channels new support to confrontational movements such as the 6\textsuperscript{th} of April; they disagree on free-riding their activism–namely silent stands– to realize partisan interests. Since the silent stands began to attract 6\textsuperscript{th} of April, Ghad, Karama, and EL-Baradie’s supporters, they quitted the stands and asked members to show dissent individually and share their photos on the page. As per Kefaya, the collaborative beginning of the movement rendered tis activities comprehensive and inclusive. However, power monopoly by the Nasserite elite and the un-even competition with young activists over resulted into fragmentation and further decline. The EC had also emerged out of Tahrir coalition during the 18-day strike. It communicated smoothly with newly emergent parties such as Justice, Dignity, and the Democratic Left parties. Before dismissal from the MB, they also used to coordinate with leading GBG members on various tactical and strategic issues–through the Youth Coalition. However, since June 2011, the party began to form independent coalitional fronts and electoral lists–e.g., The Revolution is Continuing. The SC is ideally against coalition and/or politicizing the page for any force’s favor. They tactically support individual initiative such as Masrena and Salasel. They find the discourse of Wael Ghoneim and the model of the EC closer to their ideas. On contrary, they believe the MB had traded popular support for parliamentary seats and, therefore, replicating the 1954 scenario. They believe the MB is excessively reformist and uncommitted to the application of Sharia–says the Salafi co-founder.

Before the Revolution, the new Generation managed forming a broad coalition of various youth movements that coordinated and publicized meeting points, protest routes, demonstrating materials, chants, time program, information and instructions, etc. The 6\textsuperscript{th} of April participants were beneficial in planning protest programs, handling security forces and
charting protest routes. For instance, the choice the Arab League Street was based on the breadth and the number of conjectural poor neighborhoods surrounding its area. Nevertheless, the confrontational attitudes of the 6th of April were counterbalanced by the WAKS orientation: the choice of publicly accessible meeting-points outweighed the 6th of April’s suggestion to meet by the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, Rasd—a network of MB news reporters nationwide—provided web coverage of rallies and mobilizing processes, the WAKS page posted numerous instructions concerning the meeting points, timing, and safety and security regulations: accompanying friends, a DIY tool kit: banners, clothing, strategies of action, etc. The cyber networking facilities enabled effective distribution of work between revolutionary forces. For instance, Mohandessen and Boulaq protests were assigned to 6th of April while Rasd cofounder was asked to update WAKS page in emergency cases—e.g., warning against eminent dangers or posting strongly motivating news. However, anonymity of cyberactivism had also affected the outreach to structured movement such as the MB that refused coordinating with anonymous organizers348.

Finally, the 6th of April had contentious relationship with almost each of the interviewed movements. Before the revolution, the 6th of April used to coordinate with the MB and other forces against the regime. During their strike—before the parliament—in 2010, the movement was joined by Mohamemd Al-Beltagy and Hamdy Hasan—two senior leaders of the MB—although they preferred non-confrontational opposition to the regime. Otherwise, the MB co-founder of the movement emphasized ‘we begged the MB to join our protests several times and they refused’. After the Revolution, the MB began to distrust and defame the movement through various statements on foreign finance, treason, and anarchism—says the 6th of April participant. As per Kefaya, the 6th of April quit the movement due to the rising Nasserite domination on its activism; the 6th of April believes the movement has died

348 Ghoneim, ibid, 170.
since 2007 elections. Finally, they believe if youth movements managed to coordinate and organize their efforts, the following elections would result into 10% MB, 4% non-Islamist forces and 2% EL-Nour representatives. The parliamentarian majority will be of young activists.

However, a number of obstacles impede current attempts of collaboration within the new Generation: the strong sense of ownership—the SC Constitutive committee—, the strife for control—the 6th of April’s record of every participant, the loss of anonymity privileges and, thus, self confidence—the WAKS administrators—, the elitist claim of power—Kefaya’s leadership, the strife for structured authority—the EC, and, finally, the mutually-exclusive claims of ownership of the Revolution and popular support. In addition, ritualization of confrontational means in the Tahrir Republic turned revolutionary dissent into a defeatist logic. Finally, the ideological variation, divergence of political imagination, and competition of political gains hinders collaborative activism and opens the platform for new dissent movements to emerge.

5.4. Conclusion: Upgrading Authoritarianism

The SCAF’s refusal to shoot gunfire during the eighteen day—from January 25th to February 11th—was part of a passive ‘wait and see’ policy that, later, turned into active offense against protestors. According to ‘official’ records, the army fired its first shot on Coptic protestors in the ‘Maspero massacre’ (October 9th); it killed 25 and injured 321 civilians349. Such attitude could be explained by the army’s relative position vis a vis other security agencies. The struggle over resources explains the military’s willingness to remove its main competitors: Mubarak and Gamal, Al-Adly—the Interior Minister, the head of the Central Security Force, General Hassan Abd al-Rahman and the crony capitalists who backed them: Ahmed Ezz and Rasheed Ahmed Rasheed for

instance\textsuperscript{350}. Having cleansed the political landscape, the SCAF transformed from a ‘shadow state’ with undercover economy and governance into a deliberately ‘coercive state’\textsuperscript{351} that is superior to political forces, presiding above the law while defending—at least nominally—the nation from its own weaknesses: chaos—. Moreover, to ensure exceptional independence of elected political institution—the parliament and presidency that lack traditional military background—the SCAF worked on creating a divided political environment by infiltrating the sociopolitical forces.

The SCAF’s strife to maintain and expand its political and economic assets restricts its ‘political’ willingness to handover the power to a civilian government that stands neutral, if not supportive, to the Revolution. Its tendency to iconize the Revolution, monopolize its discourse, occupy the Tahrir Square with armies and plainclothes-conscripts, and aggressively crack down on various attempts towards democratization, all recall the Turkish 1980s model of the military that monopolized discourses on nationalism and secularity and its authoritarian ‘deep state’ structures\textsuperscript{352}.

Throughout post 25\textsuperscript{th} January period (11.02.2011- July 2012), there has been four intertwined lines through which generational conflicts evolved: a) problems either withered away or got replaced by new problems, b) a change and/or loss of leadership, mobilizable resources and sympathy, c) the rise of unexpected generational cooperation, and d) one generation topple or liquidate the other. The following sections detail on each of these possibilities.


\textsuperscript{351} L. Cantori, “Americanized Political Science and the State as a Coercive Institution in the Middle East”, Paper at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association. (USA, September 3-5,1999), Web, Retrieved from: http://userpages.umbc.edu/~cantori/Conf.html

Firstly, problems either withered away or got replaced by new problems. The driving forces along this line are deep state structures that distort efforts of political forces away from long-term strategies by which the SCAF maintains a ‘safe presence’: the CCA, the dissolution of the Parliament, the revival of NDP and pro-Mubarak forces in the political landscape. Generational problems, whether ideological or socio-organizational, were replaced by new issues that threaten the very existence and functioning of each side: rigging election, acquittal of Interior Minister’s chief executives, issuing rebuttable ruling on Mubarak and his Interior minister Al-Adly, resolving the Parliament and sentencing the law of Political Dismissal as unconstitutional, issuing and activating the Judicial Arrest decree and the arrest of seven of the 6th of April activists during the second-round presidential elections, etc.

Through the CCA, the SCAF maintains a stronger position against electoral institutions that contest many articles of the Constitutional Announcement that the SCAF has changed, especially the most controversial 28th article–without reference to the electoral constituency. Furthermore, the CCA enables the SCAF’s tight grasp on power, by controlling legislation, the national budget, appointment of Constitutional Committee, seizing immunities against democratic scrutiny, the power to veto war declarations by the president, monopoly of foreign policy and relationships with the U.S.A. The tools employed on this line include devising situations of severe socio-political tension such as dumping gasoline supplies in sanitation pipelines to obstruct traffic, inciting sectarian conflicts, enabling thuggery activities over the ring road and intra-province roads, enabling the spread of illicit commodities–drugs and arms– through black markets, and directing seditious media outlets against revolutionary forces. During the presidential campaign, TV show programs worked intensively on eroding the differences between the MB and non-MB pro-revolution candidates. As a result, generational problems between Abul-Fotoh and the MB–Morsy–presidential campaigns withered away as adversary campaign emphasize ‘civil’ state, security, and economic stability as antonyms to both present and former MB competitors, as well as revolutionary candidates–Khaled Ali and Hamdein Sabbahy.
The second line is a change or loss of leadership, resources and sympathy. Since the Parliamentary elections on November 2011, the MB popularity suffered from continuous deterioration. Instead of issuing laws that influence the democratic progress in Egypt—e.g., laws concerned with reforming the police agency, the Judicial authority, the NGOs, the Labor Unions and the Political Dismissal Law against pro-Mubarak politicians including Amr Mousa and Ahmed Shafiq—, the parliament spent two consecutive rounds discussing the Annual Balance of Al-Ganzouri government. In addition, the Constitutional Committee represented a majority of the MB and affiliate figures and excluded the majority of revolutionary forces. Political greed, partisanship, and opportunism resulted into the MB’s loss of five million votes between Parliamentary and Presidential elections.

On the new Generation’s side, the SCAF followed many tactics to discredit activists’ attempt to mobilize support: defamation campaign, torture, imprisonment, military trials, and mis-representing the public image of protestors. In such a way, it restricted solidary and moral resources of the new generation while the MB has, allegedly, free-rode the Revolution. In parallel, pro-SCAF media outlets overemphasized political ineffectiveness and greed of the MB and contributed to the rise of popular frustration against both the organization and revolutionary forces. An exception to this situation is the UA that enjoyed rising sympathy after the Portsaid massacre and the MB failure to negotiate for just trials of murderers. It also expanded its resource constituencies through involvement into presidential campaigns and initiative.

Meanwhile, the SC leadership has changed while many members quit the movement and challenge its leadership. The 6th of April has also suffered a loss of sympathy and leadership; it began to knit its organizational structure tightly against separatist groups. The EC’s close involvement in the Strong Egypt project of Abdul-Mone’m Abul-Fotouh suggests either merging the party into the project or facing scarcity of mobilizable resources since both employ comparable discourses and draw upon identical socio-organizational resources. Also, Kefaya’s Nasserite thrust
has revived through Hamdeen Sabbahy’s campaign for presidency; he won the third position with a margin of 700,000 votes less than Ahmed Shafiq.

On the overall scene, the majority of sedentary population, the Sofa Party, suffer economic and financial crises and is deeply frustrated of the Tahrir Republic and its political representatives in both the parliament and the street. The five million votes to a pro-Mubarak candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, indicate the strength of such a tendency.

Thirdly, an unexpected cooperation between the contentious generations has occurred before the second-round of the presidential elections. The driving force was the threat that a pro-Mubarak regime would return with its various socio-economic and political structures. The fear of a ‘common destiny’ in the SSA prisons stimulated the launch of National Unity Conference between contentious forces that represent both generations in the political landscape. The flashlights of such line began since the MB’s call for a millionarity protest to push for changing Al-Ganzouri government after its failure in running the country. Cooperation opportunities also included lobbying for collective concerns and campaigning against counter-revolution candidates–Amr Mousa and Ahmed Shafiq.

Finally, cleansing the political landscape is expected on various grounds. The Orthodox Salafi movements might liquidate the rising neo liberal SC movement that invests its socio-political capital while provides alternatives to rigid power structures inside the Salafi trend. Also, the MB is subject to fragmentation along the power center-periphery divide. Indicators such as the divide between EL-Shater and Abul-Fotooh at the grass root, the rise of ‘A MB Scream’ movement, the rising popular opposition against the MB polices and decisions—especially regarding the SCAF, Al-Ganzoury government, the Constitutional Committee, the CCA, the decision to run for presidential elections, and accepting the CCA, the rising contention between the MB organization and the FJP on one hand and the Presidential institution—all pressure for changing the leadership and/or organizational split.

Upgrading political authoritarianism after the January 25th revolution has been devised upon the existent cleavages both between and within the rising political forces. The failure to cleanse the
Interior ministry and the Judicial system, along with upgrading state thuggery into systematic commissioning of prisoner thugs, all indicate a reversion of Mubarak policies in bloodier outfit; n.g. the scenes of pro-regime thugs massacring protestors in sit-ins—during the Abbasiya clash on May 4th, were normalized as part of Egyptian daily-life; Shafiq was confident while declaring that the Abbasiya massacre indicates how the SCAF’s military forces would deal with contenders of his alleged electoral success. The state-run media misleadingly reported Abbasiyya sit-in as protests against the dismissing Hazem Abu-Ismael’s application for presidential candidacy, hence discouraging popular support of legitimate demands.

By the time of writing these words, it is evident that the interim period has been characterized by ‘revenge-taking’ by counter-revolutionary forces, headed by the SCAF. Since 25th January 2011, the counter-revolution tactics included: dragging, confusion, rumors, co-optation, delaying, terrorism, deformation and misleading, fragmentation, and threatening. The deepening of generational conflicts was in many respects a responsibility of the MB’s conservative approach to politics. Firstly, since the Constitutional Referendum—March 2011, the MB bailed out revolutionary forces, overlooked the persecution of civilians before military tribunals and criminalized dissent and strikes. Secondly, the movement spurned protestors during Mohamed Mahmoud, Maspero, Ministerial House incidents while harnessing electoral votes for parliamentary elections—later the parliament was turned into a talk court. Thirdly, it demonstrated seditious media performance through both the Freedom and Justice Journal and the 25th January Satellite channel. Finally, it extended the non-decision situation, which displays the movement as a utilitarian and opportunistic force that follows partisan agenda. Although the MB leadership expected rigging electoral votes in the presidential elections, it neither decided to boycott the election, not coordinated with political forces on to ensure fair elections; also, it was neither independent of political forces nor fully engaged in revolutionary politics; similarly, it neither separated from the Tahrir Republic, nor supported such a strife despite facing one common enemy. According to Al-Bishry, the MB was historically punished for decision it failed to take rather than one it already took; hesitance and non-
decision rendered the movement decisions reactionary and freeze its strategic mind. Hence, decision making and taking processes during post January 25th period were undergoing within courts of the General Intelligence Agency, SSA, Interior, Economy, and Foreign Affairs ministry as well as pro-SCAF media and judicial institution—it is believed that some 25 percent of judges are former military officers. The Constitutional coup was facilitated through the MB decision to run for presidential elections, the lack of objective criteria in the selection of the Constitutional Committee, –which enabled the SCAF to form the Constitutional Committee independently—, presenting Morsy as the 'Only Islamic candidate', challenging political forces in parliamentary elections and defamation of Abul Fotoh campaign and Revolutionary forces.

However, the SCAF's plan to bring a pro-Mubarak candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, to the presidency was forfeited by a number of factors: a) the announcement of evidenced results by Morsy's campaign leaders indicating his success, b) the success of the National Unity Conference on June 22ed, c) the support of the Judges for Egypt initiative to the announced results by Morsy's campaign.

Once power, partially, surrendered to Morsy, the crony capitalist networks around Shafiq are expected to raise chaos and instabilities to obstruct Morsy's progress in the first 100-day program. Intelligence agencies are expected to exhaust Morsy's effort, mislead him, bar his access to confidential state security issues and challenge his leadership of the state. Meanwhile, pro-SCAF media outlets will increase the fear of the unknown and the foreign enemy, discredit Morsy's legitimacy and show his arrival to power as a politically arranged matter rather than a democratic success through electoral votes. In parallel, SSA, CSA and police agencies are expected to withdraw and enable the rise of crime incidents, arrange cutting gasoline supplies and enable traffic blockages in a way to reenforce the view of 'new president' as oath breaker. Also, the Intelligence agencies are expected to incite a rift between Morsy and the MB and revolutionary forces, negotiate with him individually and over emphasize the breakdowns within the political landscape.
To reverse the such tendency, political tactics include: a) maintaining the revolutionary thrust of the Egyptian street within a comprehensive political discourse that emphasizes the common dangers rather than differences, b) reinforcing National Unity through institutional forms, e.g., a presidential institution and coalition government, c) emphasizing the role of Judges for Egypt and other independent judges to forfeit challenges of constitutional coup d'etat upon Morsy's legitimacy, d) tracking the corrupt networks around Shafiq through trials, e) forming independent intelligence agencies that provide correct information to the president, forming independent security agencies that maintain peace and stability and fight against crimes and forming a parallel bureaucratic structure that execute presidential decrees and policies. Towards these steps, generational conflicts have to mutate to enable broader collaboration against counter-revolutionary forces; divided, they will never win.

This dissertation provides future studies with necessary background on the nature and situation of, and approach to, the new political Generation of Egypt. Future studies may employ approaches of post-Islamism and post modernism to both the orthodox and separatist youth groups within the MB. It is remarkable that the different 'layers' and interpretations of 'meaning' within the mother organization has crystallized into the EC youth drive to autonomous political activism, instead of approaching relatively stable and systematic meaning of religious Scriptures–provided through Al-Azhar traditional institutions. Hence, the EC mirrors the MB post-modernist tendencies, especially concerning the subjugation of Scripture’s meaning to tactical and political, rather than epistemological, contestations with orthodox MB authority.

Also, the 6th of April movement could be approached through political opportunity and discourse analysis; the movement manifests a post-Nasserite thrust in terms of ideological set-up, while developing hierarchical structures that parallel the MB and earlier socialist organizations. As per the UA, it is better approached through development studies that open avenues for researching the correlation between poverty and police torture on one hand and authoritarianism as well as reciprocal political violence of the deprived youth, on the other. Finally, the Salafiyo Costa lie at the
heart of the neo-liberal phenomena of Islamism. The movement's focus on media renders its discourse one-dimensional and challenges its bid for participatory development.

The study also opens avenues to the examination of post-revolutionary urban politics. The Arab spring in Egypt enabled poor indigenous communities to appropriate the urban public spaces; the settlement of street vendors in the midst of Tahrir square, the widespread of lower class daily vernaculars, food carts, homeless tents and tea service at traffic lights.

In the following months, this research will develop into a broader examination of new cases such as Hazemoun and the Masrena initiatives and will include new comparisons within and between the Socialist and Liberal trends of the political landscape in Egypt.


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