The Haitian threat: humanitarianism, security, and internally displaced Haitians following the 2010 earthquake

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The Haitian Threat
Humanitarianism, Security, and Internally Displaced Haitians
Following the 2010 Earthquake

A Thesis Submitted to
The Center for Migration and Refugee Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

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BA, University of North Texas 2007

Under the supervision of Dr Agnes Czajka

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I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my mother, Karen Hicks Yeargain.
Abstract

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This thesis explores the relationships between internally displaced Haitians, humanitarian organizations, and the international community. The thesis focuses primarily on humanitarianism as a mechanism of security and the framing of displaced Haitians as security threats. I engaged with the discourses of the media and humanitarian organizations, as well as interviews conducted with aid workers in Haiti following the earthquake. Exploring the dynamic relationships of humanitarian organizations, the international community, the Haitian government and the internally displaced Haitians, this thesis attempts to problematize the many assumptions about international humanitarian aid and the Haitian population. There are three major focuses of the thesis: the increasing use of security in the distribution of humanitarian aid, humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security and the construction of meaning and threat.

By complicating humanitarian assistance as not just an act of goodwill towards mankind and by arguing that the failures of delivering humanitarian aid post-earthquake were not the result of inefficiencies, violent Haitians or a corrupt “failed state.” They are instead the result of humanitarianism functioning as a mechanism of governance, the prioritization of security in the distribution of aid, and how Haitians and the Haitian state are discursively represented as both hopeless and caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and violence, and as potential security threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid workers. This thesis discusses the very foundation of humanitarianism itself and the relationship between humanitarianism as an industry, the international system, security, representational practices and the construction of threats and ask how these multiple issues intersect to create the kind of humanitarianism that we see in post-earthquake Haiti.

This thesis explores how the dominant narratives about humanitarianism and Haitians are a reflection of the unequal power distribution of the international community and how those narratives construct to portray Haitians and internally displaced populations in a particular way to help justify political interventions, which in turn recreate and reconstruct the meanings and identities of the population. Deconstructing dominant narratives about humanitarianism allows for a more nuanced exploration of what exactly humanitarianism is and how it functions as a mechanism of power, governance and security.
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Introduction

“Until Jan. 12, Haiti was a “fragile state” desperate for help to develop a working economy and effective institutions. Now it is something much worse — a charnel house with tens of thousands of corpses in a capital city laid waste” (Traub 2010).

“Twenty years in inner-city ERs, I thought I had seen it all until ... Haiti. Flying in you feel like you are being dropped into a war zone — helicopters, tents, military vehicles, cargo boxes and searchlights” (Plantz 2010).

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) headquarters in Haiti are located near the airport in Port Au Prince. The security is tight; men in blue helmets patrol the area in armored tanks. The complex is surrounded by walls and fences topped with barbed wire, and the gates are manned by tanks and men with rifles. Each day lines of Haitians wait outside in the blistering sun for the opportunity to enter the complex. After the earthquake, MINUSTAH became one of the primary headquarters for most of the United Nations (UN) organizations and most of the interagency cluster meetings were held in this complex. The majority of Haitians waiting outside were camp managers, local NGO workers, or members of camp committees who were asking for meetings with one of the agencies located inside. In order to enter the complex, Haitians needed a letter of approval and their names had to be on a list. They had to produce identification cards and have their bags searched and their bodies patted down after walking through a metal detector. It is a site of security. This is not unusual in Haiti. In fact, the scene repeats itself at most entrances to the humanitarian organization complexes. What is interesting about this story is not just the securitization itself, but the ways in which security manifests itself in Haiti. When I wanted to enter the complex, I was ushered to the front of the line. The security officers asked to see my American passport, and I was escorted around the metal detector and into the complex. Although I had approval, and my name
was on “the list” the security officers never checked for my name. A young, blonde, American passport-holding woman is apparently not a security threat.

This story reveals two of the major themes in this thesis. The first is the increasing use of security mechanisms in the distribution and functions of humanitarian aid. The second is the construction of identities, meanings and, ultimately, threats. I will discuss how this and multiple other factors are influencing how humanitarian organizations operate in Haiti. The thesis reveals how international organizations have increasing control over the everyday lives of internally displaced Haitians, and how security measures dictate access to goods and services. The thesis also reveals a certain duality inherent in the security: Security is experienced differently based on the population and the individual. Enmeshing humanitarianism and traditional security mechanisms makes humanitarianism a mechanism of security.

When I began this research project I wanted to answer a seemingly simple question: Why was the United States military deployed to distribute aid in Haiti? I knew the answer would be much more complicated than the dominant narratives. I knew the answer was grounded in the increasing securitization of societies, the construction of Haitians as security threats, and the role of the international community in how aid is distributed. I also thought that the answer could be easily sketched, that I could draw on socio-historical and economic factors to illuminate the answers. However, after spending time in Haiti, conducting interviews with aid workers from international aid organizations such as World Vision, the American Red Cross, the International Committee of Red Cross Red Crescent societies (ICRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the World Food Program (WFP), Samaritans Purse, MINUSTAH, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the United States military, as well as speaking to Haitian non-profit workers, and internally displaced Haitians\(^1\), I realized I was ultimately asking the wrong question and attempting to answer it in the wrong way. The deployment of US troops to Haiti was just one small part of a much larger puzzle. By utilizing discourse analysis of the media and academic articles about Haiti and the policies and programs of international humanitarian organizations, I recognized the multiple layers and relationships that lie behind how humanitarian agencies responded to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and reveal the complicated relationships between security, risks, humanitarianism, and the international community. Throughout this thesis I will use “international community” to signify the sets of relationships between nation-states and international organizations. The term international community does not imply that all actors within the global political arena “behave” the same, but does refer to the often hegemonic control of the production of knowledge, discourses and practices of particular actors within global politics.

Michel-Rolph Trouillot in *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (1995) writes about which narratives matter, which stories are retold and which remain silent. Haiti, since its beginning as a colony, has had only some of its stories retold, some of its histories recounted. Who tells the stories about Haiti? Who has a voice about the realities of Haitian life, both pre- and post-earthquake? When international humanitarian organizations decide on policies and programs in Haiti, whose stories are heard, and recounted, and determine how humanitarianism is practiced? The narratives about Haiti, especially in the international community at large are discursively created and recreated

\(^1\) All of the interviewees asked to remain anonymous. In some cases they allowed me to note the organization they worked for.
by non-Haitians, by aid workers, missionaries, academics and politicians. The identities and meanings about Haiti are created and constructed and then reproduced by outside forces.

The cluster meetings I attended in the MINUSTAH headquarters were held almost entirely in English or French (instead of Haitian Creole). The majority of the people attending were not Haitian. At the meetings, the representatives spoke of the “parallel structures” that operate in Haiti. Parallel structures were defined as the three pillars of humanitarian assistance: The United Nations, the Haitian government and the NGO community. The word parallel implies exactly what was occurring: parallel lines (even if they are “pillars”) do not intersect. Each operates separately, with different goals and different strategies. Although there were constant debates on the role of the Haitian government in the distribution of aid and the rebuilding of Haiti, a consensus was never reached.

The cluster meetings illuminate, first, that the humanitarian industry is a mechanism of governance operating outside of Haitian law and governance. The imagery of parallel structures reveals a common narrative of humanitarianism: It posits things as being individual, unrelated, and distinct. Discussions about humanitarianism are often framed in either/or terms: You are either a proponent of human rights or a defender of state sovereignty; humanitarian organizations are either neutral and apolitical, or they are the direct result of hegemonic policies by the United States and other Western powers. The discourse on Haiti was similarly structured: Haiti will either have security, through means of surveillance, policing and monitoring, or Haiti will descend into chaos; there are Haitians who are vulnerable and Haitians who are not; there are Haitians who deserve
aid, because of their vulnerability and there are Haitians who do not because of their violence and corruption. Each supposedly exists separately and one must ultimately choose a side.

Discussions about humanitarianism also highlight the seemingly natural conflicts that complicate humanitarian aid distribution. In the case of the cluster meetings the parallel structures analogy suggests the inability of the Haitian state (because of its failure, its lack of good governance, its corruption) to work with the UN and the NGOs. Haitian men are framed as being in conflict with Haitian women, aid workers and themselves. Development cannot be achieved without security. There is the “first world,” which has the knowledge and the ability (and the money and the power) to provide humanitarian assistance in the “third world,” a place that stands in stark contrast to the first world, a place that needs, requires, desires first world assistance. The first world has a humanitarian duty to intervene, not just to end human suffering but also to ensure that nothing spills over into neighboring countries.

In addition to questioning the relationships between humanitarian organizations, states and the Haitian population, this thesis will attempt to problematize many of the assumptions behind humanitarian assistance. I hope to suggest that the issues posed as either/or are not so simple. They intersect and overlap. The human rights regime is not necessarily in conflict state sovereignty. Haitian men are not always rioting, looting and raping. The Haitian state cannot be contrasted so starkly with other nation states, because of its “bad governance” and state failure. In the following chapters, I will attempt to complicate humanitarian assistance as not just an act of goodwill towards man-kind and argue that the failures of delivering humanitarian aid post-earthquake were not the result
of inefficiencies, violent Haitians or a corrupt “failed state.” They are instead the result of humanitarianism functioning as a mechanism of governance, the prioritization of security in the distribution of aid, and how Haitians and the Haitian state are discursively represented as both hopeless and caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and violence, and as potential security threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid workers.

Delivering humanitarian assistance, rebuilding an already impoverished country that has been destroyed by an earthquake and coordinating with multiple organizations and governments with different objectives and policies is difficult. As you walk through the streets of Haiti with piles of rubble and destroyed buildings all around, it can sometimes feel not just difficult but impossible. This thesis, however, is not about the operational barriers that humanitarian organizations and the Haitian government and people face. It is not about how there needs to be more coordination between organizations and the government or how to more efficiently distribute aid. I will discuss the very foundation of humanitarianism itself and the relationship between humanitarianism as an industry, the international system, security, representational practices and the construction of threats and ask how these multiple issues intersect to create the kind of humanitarianism that we see in post-earthquake Haiti.

In the following chapters I will explore the complexities of the relationships embedded in international humanitarian assistance. In the first chapter, I will discuss how humanitarianism is now the primary language and means of addressing global inequalities, poverty and violence. Humanitarianism also manifests itself in political interventions- when a state is deemed unable to adequately respond to the needs of its population, humanitarian organizations are expected to respond instead. How the
humanitarian organizations respond depends on the perceived causes of the inequalities or violence, the mandates of the organizations and the political goals of the organizations and their funders. As those perceived causes become increasingly framed as matters of “insecurity,” humanitarianism itself is reflecting a move towards securitization, which I will discuss in the second chapter. This is revealed on a variety of levels, from the deployment of military troops, to armored vehicles for aid workers, to how aid is distributed and how internally displaced population (IDP) camps are run. The focus on security as the primary goal of humanitarianism is justified by the construction of particular meanings and identities about the population receiving aid, in particular the constructing of the populations as a threat in need of being secured against.

Power dynamics are inherent in each of these sets of relationships and factors. The ability to decide who is able to give aid, and who deserves to receive it reflects the political landscape and the dominant discourses about poverty deployed by the international community. The language of humanitarianism is broadening to include military operations, embargoes, and even private business investment (as in the case of microcredit loans). The mandate of the United Nations as expressed in their charter is to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I 1945).

The United Nations was created to ensure peace and security, but how exactly the organization is expected to do so has changed in many ways since its formation in 1945.

The third chapter will explore how impoverished individuals, particularly young,
black men are considered a security threat. Haitians, with their “violent history” and extreme poverty, represent the epitome of a risky population. Moreover, Haiti, as a failed state, is considered a threat to the international system of nation-states. Military intervention in the name of humanitarianism is viewed as a viable and efficient means of ensuring human security. However, security is not necessarily about saving lives, but also about the management and maintenance of a population. Security is about maintaining a level of control over the population and ensuring continuity.

I will draw on Foucault’s (2008) notion of biopolitics and Agamben’s (1995) interpretation of homo sacer, or bare life. Biopolitics and the bare life are frequently discussed in articles critical of humanitarian practices and securitization. Haitians are discursively represented as being at the extremity of human suffering, as being able to be killed but not sacrificed (Agamben 1995). But the focus of this thesis is not on how Haitians are homo sacer, or even how humanitarianism is a representation of Foucault’s biopower, as some, like Fassin, have argued. According to Fassin,

Humanitarian intervention is a biopolitics insofar as it sets up and manages refugee camps, establishes protected corridors in order to gain access to war casualties, develops statistical tools to measure malnutrition, and makes use of communication media to bear witness to injustice in the world (Fassin 2007: 501)

The focus of the thesis, however, are the dualities and ambiguities that exist in discussions and understandings of humanitarianism. Understanding humanitarianism requires picking apart the seemingly disparate parts and contingencies, rather than relying on simple cause and effect. For example we cannot simply say the earthquake was one of the worst tragedies to happen in the 21st century because Haiti was poor or because Haiti is a failed state. We also should not suggest that it was difficult to distribute aid and
humanitarian organizations needed security mechanisms because Haitian males are violent and dangerous. Instead, I hope to explore how the multi-layered relationships and realities that exist between humanitarian organizations, the international system, the construction of threats, and the securitization of societies create a more complicated question, one that demands we ask more questions: Why is Haiti so poor? Why are Haitians males discursively represented as violent and dangerous? Why is Haiti a failed state? What, exactly, is a failed state? This thesis is a critical, political and theoretical engagement with humanitarianism and intervention and the processes and relationships of humanitarian aid.
Chapter One: Humanitarianism, Intervention, and Haiti

Understanding the international response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti first requires an analysis of humanitarian intervention both broadly and within the particular case of Haiti. This chapter will construct a framework through which to critically engage with the humanitarian response in Haiti by situating it within the theory and practice of humanitarianism and the history of intervention in Haiti. By conceptualizing humanitarianism as a form of political intervention, and placing it within an historical context the chapter will reveal how humanitarianism adapted to the relationships between states, international organizations and displaced populations. The chapter will present the history of humanitarianism in three parts: first, the origins of humanitarianism as the giving of assistance at the battlefield, second, the Cold War period and humanitarianism’s link to developmentalism, and third, the post Cold War period in which human rights became the main focus of humanitarian aid and action. Haiti is a particularly interesting site of humanitarian intervention because of the long history of international involvement and the ways in which Haitians are represented in Western media and academia.

The first section of this chapter explores how humanitarianism, as a form of intervention, has transformed due to changing interpretations of the role of the humanitarian organization in the global system of nation-states. The second section will discuss Haiti’s history of intervention. It will show that, on the one hand, the history of intervention mirrors the larger changes and themes within the humanitarian industry. Yet, the representational and discursive practices about Haiti (which I will discuss in chapter three) have particular historical roots in previous international interventions in Haiti. The last section will discuss the 2010 earthquake and the international response by focusing
on four of the major humanitarian organizations (which includes the United States military, operating in a “humanitarian” role), to illuminate how the international community responded to the earthquake in light of the historical and political developments influencing humanitarian operations and their move towards securitization.

How the world decides to respond to the seemingly endless number of crises and emergencies is a reflection of the political, economic and social environment. For many years humanitarianism was viewed as something entirely outside of politics: a salve for the wounds of global inequalities, wars, and injustice. Michael Barnett (2005, 2008), Joanna Macrae (2001) and Alex Bellamy (2003) write about how post Cold War humanitarianism is being transformed into a more politicized form of intervention. I argue, however, that the distance between politics and humanitarianism was never as great as many assume.

Humanitarianism is by nature a form of intervention. Regardless of the proclaimed apolitical and neutral foundation of humanitarianism, the very act of giving aid reflects global structures, conflicts and power relations. The perceived simplicity of giving humanitarian aid to persons in need reflects both global and domestic power dynamics: Who is able to give aid? Who is deemed to be both worthy of and in need? What form does aid come in, how should it be distributed, and for how long? The questions reveal the inherently political, non-neutral nature of humanitarian aid. Hans Haug in his book *Humanity for All: The International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement* suggests that, “an institution or a movement is neutral when it renounces to participate in a conflict or altercation and abstains from any interference” (1993: 3). His definition defends of the neutrality of the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. What I argue,
however, is that providing humanitarian aid, by virtue of being a form of interference, qualifies as participation in a conflict.

Relying on a definition of humanitarianism as intervention is not assigning a negative or positive value to humanitarianism, but instead allows for a more critical and nuanced analysis by placing humanitarian intervention in a political and historical context. The point is not to make a judgment and then dole out praise or condemnation, but instead to explore the complex history of intervention and consider the multiple reasons states and international organizations decide to intervene and the multiple ways in which they do. As humanitarianism changes in shape and form it is not transforming into something entirely different, but is adapting and morphing in response to changing relationships, situations, and discourses about who needs aid, and who has the ability and knowledge to give it.

Haiti is an interesting case because it is considered a “failed state,” and behind every humanitarian intervention, from food packets to military assistance, echo sentiments of the failure of the state. The nation-state is expected to provide for and protect its citizens and if a state is unable to respond adequately to crises and emergencies, it is failing to provide for its citizens. Humanitarian intervention is the action taken by state and non-state actors to respond to the state’s inability to respond. Analysis of the changing discourses of why states have crises and why some states are unable to adequately respond allows for an exploration of how humanitarianism both shapes and is shaped by dominant discourses of international relations and the international community.
History of Humanitarianism as a Form of Intervention

This section explores how ideas about and interpretations of humanitarianism go in and out of vogue depending on how organizations and states determine the causes of humanitarian crises, as well as the relationships of nation-states to each other and to the international community. Before proceeding to the historical analysis, it is important to note that humanitarianism has not simply followed a linear path from simple to more complex models. If one is to interpret all humanitarianism as an act of intervention, it may, along with situating humanitarianism in a historical context, be constructive to think of the types of humanitarian intervention as distributed along a spectrum. The giving of food aid following a natural disaster may be a less intrusive form of intervention than coordinating and funding infrastructure development projects. Development interventions, like the provision of microcredit to women in rural areas with the stated goal of “empowering women” is a less direct intervention than giving military aid to one side in a civil war or interstate conflict, which in turn is less of an intervention than military intervention in the name of human rights. However, they are all still forms of intervention and each is the result of the political environment and conditions of the conflict.

Humanitarianism will be loosely defined as an industry that is bureaucratically structured to provide assistance to people who are affected, or could be affected, by emergencies and crises (such as war, famine, extreme poverty or natural and man made disasters) across international lines. The thesis will focus on how the international humanitarian industry was created and perpetuated by international actors to deal with events across international lines, with a concentration on internally displaced populations.
By analyzing humanitarianism from this angle, the thesis will explore the relationships between the actors giving humanitarian assistance and the actors receiving it. By focusing particularly on issues of power, sovereignty and representational practices, I hope to offer the beginnings of a critical history of humanitarianism. I will start the discussion with the Red Cross Movement because it represents a particular moment in humanitarian assistance, and for many years was the model for humanitarian organizations.

Henry Dunant started the Red Cross Movement in 1863. The Red Cross and Red Crescent societies were not the first international humanitarian organizations, but their foundation represents a critical turning point for humanitarianism (Haug 1993). The Red Cross, which was envisioned by Dunant after witnessing the Battle of Solferino in 1859, was created to provide assistance to people wounded in battle. According to *A Memory of Solferino* published by the International Committee for the Red Cross,

> In normal circumstances, in the organized society in which he usually lives, man is protected by laws and finds sustenance close at hand. But there are also situations, such as armed conflicts or natural disasters, when society is thrown out of kilter, laws are violated, man’s natural environment is turned into chaos, and his safety, health and very survival are threatened: in times like those the Red Cross strives to help and protect the victims (Hay 1986: 1).

Populations throughout Europe quickly accepted the Red Cross Movement and began forming their own national societies and many agreed that there was a need for an international organization to address the human suffering caused by war. Before the Red Cross, there were many humanitarian societies that addressed poverty and other social ills, but the Red Cross represents a move toward the internationalization and bureaucratization of what would eventually become a full-blown industry.
The International Committee of the Red Cross is the international wing of the Red Cross Movement. It is not affiliated with any particular state and it has a different mandate and position from the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, which are the national organizations. Although National Red Cross and Red Crescent organizations often have different mandates and provide different services, they are generally concerned with direct service delivery. For example, during World War I, National Red Cross societies provided ambulance services and medical personnel and supplies.

One of the main distinctions of the National Red Cross movements, like other direct aid agencies like Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontiers), is how and to whom aid is distributed. Although life is rarely as clear-cut as policies might suggest, direct aid delivery ideally has no conditions attached or long-term goals in mind. Red Cross and MSF give aid, either as food packets or medical help to people in need. Naturally, the determination of who is able to give aid and who deserves to receive it reflect inherently unequal power relationships, but this type of aid is a more minor form of intervention. The organizations generally view themselves as apolitical, or outside the realm of politics.

An analysis of Red Cross documents from Haiti between 1970 and 1985, (chosen because of their public availability), show little to no focus on the political situation in the country at the time. In 1970, the ICRC helped the Haitian Red Cross open a blood bank. In 1971 the ICRC sent “two tons of powdered milk for the Haitian medico-social programme for the benefit of the waifs and strays of Cap-Haitien, and a Land Rover were loaded on a ship sailing from Rotterdam to Port-au-Prince” (Library of Congress 1970). In 1985 the ICRC sent a delegation to Haiti to explore the detention centers of political
prisoners. The ICRC makes no mention of what it found during its expedition, but it did
determine how much food aid was needed for Haitian citizens. (Library of Congress
1985). Jean-Claude Duvalier was the president of Haiti in 1985 and it can be assumed
that the conditions of the political prisoners did not match with international expectations
and norms. However, the only aid that was ultimately distributed was food aid. This
distribution of food aid represents, first, the international community’s unwillingness to
comment on the conditions of Haiti under the dictatorship and second, the focus of the
ICRC on direct aid distribution instead of the protection of human rights.

Traditional humanitarian intervention has been criticized for not just failing to
address root causes of conflict, but also for fueling war. As Ben Barber has argued,

Large numbers of refugees menaced by starvation and disease make for pathos
and dramatic press that attract aid dollars from international humanitarian
organizations and foreign governments. The aid that flows to the camps where the
refugees are gathered can be skimmed by militants based in the camps, as well as
local business people and military and administrative officials of the host
government (1997: 8).

Barber’s criticism has been repeated many times. Humanitarian workers have themselves
expressed concern about the inability to determine who truly “deserves” aid and the perils
of giving aid to people who are “cheating the system” or are not entitled to aid. The
inability of humanitarian aid workers to determine who constitutes a combatant and who
is a civilian is a particularly salient and recurring “problem”. The phenomenon of
“guerilla wars” in which the lines between “enemies” and “innocents” is difficult to
decipher has been seen in Haiti. The violence in Haiti is spread out among the population
and is generally directed at supporters of one political group by another, with the military
switching between backing the government or anti-government forces. The difficulty in
distinguishing between deserving and not deserving has become so acute in Haiti that
even before the earthquake the entire population was treated as if they were potential threats or combatants. Therefore, because the Haiti’s past humanitarian experiences, when the earthquake hit, Haitians were considered a threat to themselves and to others instead of merely disaster victims. This response by humanitarian organizations reveals this representation of Haitians. I will discuss this issue in greater detail in the third chapter.

The Red Cross and other emergency, need-based organizations were also frequently criticized for their desire to not to choose sides in political conflicts and remain “apolitical” despite the political nature of intervention. For example, the Red Cross was criticized for not speaking out against Nazi concentration camps during World War II (Esbrook 2007). Additionally, relief aid agencies are also criticized for not being “capacity building” or for creating a cycle of dependency (Okaru-Bisant 1999, Bauer and Sen 2001, Loxley and Sackey 2008). The stated “apolitical” nature of such organizations requires they should directly give aid and not address the structural issues for why countries need aid. This criticism came following the formal end of colonialism, when poverty in the third world was seen as the cause for the emergencies and displacement. The need for organizations to focus on the root causes allowed for a shift in humanitarianism. However, there are many humanitarian organizations that still focus on relief work. Following the end of WWII, developmentalism and its predecessor modernization theory became the prevalent schools of thought for understanding why

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2 Documents have surfaced following World War II that suggest the Red Cross societies were aware of the conditions at the Nazi concentration camps, but for various reasons chose to not publicly speak out against the camps.
some countries are poor and in need of aid. Development and modernization arose from the idea that societies can be ranked in stages, from the “traditional” underdeveloped societies to the modern industrialized societies (Rostow 1990). In the 1950s and 1960s development projects focused on modernizing infrastructures in the “third world.”

The development paradigm has undergone a variety of changes since the 1950s but the underlying assumption remains the same: Some countries are underdeveloped or developing, whereas others have become developed. It is up to the developed countries, and their humanitarian organizations, to help the developing societies “catch up.” Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully engage in criticisms of developmentalism, I bring up development because it is a form of “humanitarian intervention” from the international community. The attempt of humanitarian organizations to develop a country, society or community reflects the desire of the organization to help the populations “develop” in the image of Western nation-states. Developmentalism is a means of intervening in the economic policies, social structures, and governance of the population.

Developmentalism arose from the inability of international humanitarian institutions to address the root causes of emergencies and the displacement of populations (Rostow 1990). Following the World Wars, as many crises shifted to the newly independent colonies, states and international organizations adjusted many of their policies to address why some countries need aid and why some do not. This relates to the issue discussed earlier, namely the ability of a state to respond to its own emergencies. As colonialism ended and inequalities between nation states became more pronounced, the humanitarian industry shifted its focus to reflect this perceived inability of less developed
states to adequately respond to humanitarian crises. The level, amount or perhaps character of humanitarian intervention changed to adapt to the emerging development discourse.

Global economic development proved to be a more difficult task than originally perceived. Communities and countries that were targets of development programs did not always develop economically. According to Ovaska (2003),

Even though some countries, notably in East Asia, have managed to break out of poverty, many of the poorest countries have actually seen their real per capita incomes decline since the 1970s. More than one billion people still live on less than $1 a day. Many of the advances in basic health care and education in the last few decades have been negated by the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS, particularly in the world’s poorest countries (175).

The inability of countries to overcome poverty despite the large amounts of money, experts, and technology flowing from rich to poor countries led to questions about the causes of poverty. Why were some countries able to “develop” whereas others were not?

One infamous story about developmentalism gone awry is that of the elimination of the Haitian black pigs during the 1980s. “Starting in May 1982, all of Haiti’s pigs were slaughtered to prevent an epidemic of African swine fever from spreading to the U.S. mainland (to this day, Haitians point to this episode as a proof of a giant U.S. conspiracy to destroy Haiti)” (Girard 2002: 30). Joan Dayan, in A Few Stories about Haiti, or, Stigma Revisited (2004) describes how the United States encouraged the Haitian government to destroy the black pigs:

Black pigs, also known as "creole pigs," had always been the staple of the peasant’s life in the countryside. Black pigs were basic, necessary, and blessed. A few years before "Baby" Doc left for exile, the US Health Department warned about the dangers of a swine flu epidemic in Haiti. Hundreds of peasants lost their black pigs, their primary means of living (172).
The creole pigs were small and able to survive on the mountainous ranges of Haiti. The large, white Iowa pigs sent from the United States to replace the creole pigs were unable to survive. They needed expensive food and were unable to scavenge for themselves in the mountains. Most of the pigs either died or were sent to live on farms that were able to properly provide for them. This story is not just about pigs, or even about the United States’ insistence on providing development assistance without the background knowledge about whether their methods are compatible with the local environment. It also reflects the power that the United States health department had over the Haitian state. The ability to convince a government to kill all of its peasant’s pigs speaks volumes about the role the United States government has in the management of the Haitian state.

Economic development was the major focus of humanitarian intervention during the Cold War period. Developmentalism certainly still exists today, and other types of humanitarian intervention, such as direct aid or military intervention also existed during the Cold War, but during that period two issues in particular influenced the discourses of humanitarian intervention. The first was the stalemate within the United Nations and the Security Council. The Security Council, which is made up of five permanent members (China, France, United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States), was established with the stated aim of maintaining peace and security (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V, 1945). Military interventions in third world countries had a different nature and reflected the power struggles between Cold War actors. The second issue was the idea of fighting poverty as a means of fighting the Cold War. Third world countries were seen as the battleground of communism and capitalism, where different parties attempted to develop countries to prove the supremacy of their ideology. As Murphey writes, “Ideological
divergences virtually prevented the Security Council from acting in cases of outright aggression, let alone in cases involving widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights” (1996: 84).

The rise in the prominence of human rights discourses came with the decline of the Cold War politics. Human rights are defined by proponents as “rights held by individuals simply because they are part of the human species. They are rights shared equally be everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic development. They are universal in content” (Ishay 2008: 3). The 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the popularity of the Human Rights Regime, defined by Thomas Buergenthal as consisting of,

a web of institutions and mechanisms, and of an ever-expanding body of international human rights norms. The institutions and norms that constitute the UN human rights regime have their source in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the one hand and in a series of UN human rights treaties on the other. (1997: 1).

The 1990s also witnessed a rise in the number of human rights interventions. As the Cold War stalemate in the United Nations Security Council dissolved, intervening in the name of human rights violations became increasingly justified. Human rights organizations proliferated and by the 1990s,

you couldn’t escape it. The better-known Western organizations-the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch-roamed the globe looking for infractions. NATO prosecuted a war in the name of "human rights." Less well known to Europeans and North Americans were the hundreds of NGOs outside Europe and the United States defining themselves as human rights agencies, almost all of them with birth dates no earlier than 1985 (Cmiel 2004: 117).
According to Ottaway and Lacina (2003), the number of United Nations peacekeeping missions, or interventions in the name of peace or human rights, has increased dramatically. From the creation of the UN in 1945 to 1989 there were fifteen peacekeeping missions and all but three were interstate. However, from 1989 to 2003 there were forty missions and only seven of them were interstate. These numbers do not include the number of state-led interventions that were approved by the United Nations but deployed by individual states or coalitions of states (Ottaway and Lacina 2003).

Additionally, as humanitarian organizations became larger and better able to deal with complex issues, and as traditional forms of humanitarianism continued to fail to end or prevent conflict or massive population displacement, the human rights regime is increasingly framed as the manner in which the international community should respond. For example, Tanja Schumer (2008) writes, “The British variant of New Humanitarianism extends beyond the immediate mandate of traditional humanitarian emergency assistance to save life. It is intended to address the root causes of conflict, prevent the negative side effects of aid and support human rights” (1). Schumer uses “new humanitarianism” to describe how humanitarianism has changed in response to the human rights discourses.

It follows that if states, humanitarian organizations or human rights advocacy groups are unable to bring about human rights, it is then up to the international community to step in and force governments to uphold the human rights principles. Human rights and humanitarianism are now framed as broad justifications for military intervention:

U.S. military interventions since the Cold War have been in response to humanitarian crises. In the past traditional civilian relief organizations could
handle them with a good degree of success. Unfortunately contemporary humanitarian crises tend to result from internal conflicts that produce environments so unstable and so violent that relief organizations are unable to operate effectively (DiPrizio 2002: 3).

Changes in the discourses of international affairs, from poverty elimination to protecting human rights has led to an increase in the use of military force in the name of human rights. As Rony Brauman (2004) notes,

The Kosovo war provided the occasion for an extreme intensification of humanitarian rhetoric in its most militaristic version. The armed intervention was intended, or so it appeared, to “prevent a humanitarian crisis” (Jacques Chirac) by means of bombings similarly qualified as “humanitarian” (Vaclav Havel); charged with the task of maintaining spaces of humanity at the heart of the war, humanitarianism became a clear source of legitimization for violence (397).

With the end of the Cold War and decolonization and emergent human rights regime, issues of state sovereignty came to the fore in ways that have not done before. The debate between human rights or state sovereignty is often posed as a dichotomy in which one must choose a side, either for or against humanitarian intervention, either for state sovereignty or for an international human rights regime. Jennifer Welsh (2004) discusses the perceived conflict between human rights and state sovereignty as follows: “At the heart of the debate is the alleged tension between the principle of state sovereignty, a defining pillar of the United Nations system and international law, and the evolving international norms related to human rights and the use of force” (1). The international human rights regime is designed to protect the rights of persons who do not have the protection of their own state. However, this is more difficult than it appears. As Hannah Arendt remarked:

The Rights of Man, after all, had been defined as “inalienable” because they were supposed to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment
human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them (1958: 292).

Despite the attempts of the international community to internationalize a human rights regime, human rights instead are often only enforceable as citizen rights. The state is thus in charge of the protection of the “human rights” of its citizens, but when a state fails to do so, the international community is now expected, at least in some cases, to intervene on behalf of the populations who are no longer receive human rights from their country. The United Nations and other humanitarian institutions attempt to step in when governments fail, but despite their claim of impartiality they are still reflections of the very nation-state system of which they are attempting to subvert, because human rights are ultimately only enforceable by states.

The rise in the popularity and frequency of military interventions in the name of human rights has led many to bemoan the decline of original humanitarian principles. This is not necessarily the case. Perhaps human rights has been embraced by political actors who support military intervention, but this reflects not a complete shift in humanitarianism from apolitical to political, but instead indicates how humanitarianism has evolved in the last one hundred years. Intervention in the affairs of other states does not represent the break down of national sovereignty nor does it represent the globalization of a human rights regime. Absolute state sovereignty never truly existed and human rights interventions focus on the state as the main reason to intervene. In non-UN interventions it is nation states intervening on the behalf of populations who no longer have the protection of their own state and UN interventions are in the name of the nation-states that make up the UN and reflect the goals and intentions of these states.
Military humanitarian intervention has normalized the use of force in the name of human rights and humanitarianism. The justifications for the use of military and security mechanisms has been formalized and adopted by humanitarian organizations as human rights violations have become synonymous with security threats. Humanitarian organizations, backed by nation states are deployed to eliminate threats in conflict-ridden areas, once defined as states in the midst of war, though the definition is now being expanded to include countries that have been affected by natural disasters. In the following section, I will first outline of the history of Haiti and international intervention in Haiti, and end with the beginning of an analysis on the humanitarian response to the earthquake in 2010.

**Haiti’s History of Intervention**

No history of Haiti would be complete without attention to the implications of intervention (humanitarian or otherwise). For the purposes of this thesis I will focus mostly on the history of foreign intervention in Haiti. This section will provide both a historical context to the response to the Haitian earthquake as well as an historical overview of the relationship between Haiti and the international community. Understanding how the international community responded to the 2010 Haiti earthquake does not require a linear historical explanation, where we can explain the earthquake and its response by placing blame on a particular actors or historical events. For example, colonialism is not the sole cause of Haiti’s inability to cope with natural disasters. Instead, I hope to explore how the representations of Haiti both historically and currently reflect and influence the international community’s understanding of and relationship with Haiti and its people.
Dominant narratives of the history of Haiti begin with the first foreign interventions in the 15th century (Garrigus 2006, Bellegarde-Smith 1990). Starting with the first traces of colonialism in the 17th century I will discuss each era of intervention in Haiti’s history, showing that although the methods, representations, and justifications for intervention may have changed, Haiti has experienced near-constant intervention by outside powers. Its viability as an independent country has always been questioned, and while the term “failed state” has only been applied relatively recently, Haiti has long been treated as a state incapable of providing for its citizens.

Representations of the Haitian people and Haiti as a state have remained relatively unchanged in content. Haiti was the first black republic, achieving independence in 1804. From its inception it was seen as a threat to other slave-owning nations (Bellegarde-Smith 1990), especially the United States. Fears that the Haitian rebellion would spread to the United States struck a chord with white politicians and slave owners. Haiti was seen as a threat to international stability and to the wealth generated by owning slaves (Langley 1996). The first hundred years of the Haitian republic were marked by violence, instability, and deadly revolutions and the world continued to fear that the Haitian unrest and instability would spread. The Haitian people were seen as barbarians, and as voodoo practicing, illiterate peasants. Outsiders described Haitians’ revolutions and coups d’état as angry Haitian mobs wielding sabers (Girard 2005). The foreign intervention in Haiti from colonialism, to the 150 million francs in debt owed to France (Bellegarde-Smith 1990), to the embargos, and to full blown United States intervention in the early 1900s (Schmidt 1995) and then again in the 1990s (Zanotti 2008) was and
continues to be justified by the portrayal of Haitians as unable to rule themselves, as threats to international stability, as threats to themselves and to those intervening.

Haiti is located in the Caribbean on the island of Hispaniola. Haiti borders the Dominican Republic in the west. See map below.

Colonialism

Colonialism is an overt and obvious form of intervention and for hundreds of years, Haiti has been influenced and affected by foreign intervention. During colonialism, the French controlled almost all aspects of statecraft (Girard 2005). The economy was export oriented and the vast majority of the population was of African descent, brought to the country by the slave trade (Bellegard-Smith 1990).
The colonization of the island of Hispaniola began in 1492, when Christopher Columbus claimed the island for Spain. The native population of Hispaniola, the Tainos, was quickly decimated by both European diseases and enslavement by the Spanish. By the 1600s most inhabitants of Hispaniola were predominately African slaves and their decedents. By the mid 1600s, one third of the island was given to France and in 1664 the French West India Company took control. Over the next two hundred years, the western area of Hispaniola, then called Saint-Domingue, became one of the most prosperous colonies in the new world, exporting vast amounts of sugar, coffee, cotton and Indigo. (Girard 2005). The number of African slaves far outnumbered the white European settlers, and due to the frequent taking of slave women as concubines, a new class was created, the mulattoes. Called the “free colored population” (Garrigus 2006: 4), they were able to own property, unlike the lower class of African slaves. By the 1700s many of the “free colored” men had vast plantations and owned hundreds of slaves (Garrigus 2006).

The evils of colonialism have long been explored in academic work (Bhabha 1990, Said 1994, Fanon 2004, Spivak 2010) and an in-depth description is unnecessary. The inhabitants of Haiti, like many other post-colonial states, suffered immensely from the colonial system and the effects of colonialism are still felt today. There are a few major points that are necessary for this thesis to discuss concerning Haiti and its colonial history. First, colonialism completely changed the island of Hispaniola. Not only did colonialism change the economy of Haiti to an export oriented satellite of France, but also it changed the way society was organized. The large slave population was not native to the area and was kept in subordination to the much smaller white population. Colonialism restructured society into an extremely hierarchal system where the elites
controlled not only the natural resources, economy, and the government, but they also controlled the vast majority of the population, first as slaves, then after the revolution as laborers. As Langley (1996) writes, “With its forty thousand whites, thirty thousand free coloreds, and five hundred thousand African slaves, the colony possessed the tiered social structure ordinarily found in sugar plantation economies” (106).

Second, colonialism has had a lasting effect on how the international community perceives Haiti. Despite, or likely because of the revolution, Haiti has been perceived as a threat to the international community. The treatment of Haiti and Haitians by the international community has always been affected by this perception. There always exists a duality in the treatment of Haiti. On one hand Haitians are perceived as threatening; they are violent, mob like, devil worshippers, corrupt and militaristic. On the other hand, they are pitiful, voiceless and depraved. Haiti and Haitians are both feared and pitied in the same breath. I will discuss the representations of the Haitian state and its people in chapter three, but it is important to note that this representation is related to colonialism, racism, and the role of the international community in Haiti.

*The Haitian Revolution*

Understanding the Haitian revolution requires understanding the global political context at the time. The American Revolution ended in 1783 and the French revolution ended in the 1799. A civil war in Haiti broke out in 1790 following the onset of the French revolution, as both white and mulatto slave owners considered the implications of the new French laws would have on the colony. The revolution began a year later, after the mulatto claims for civil and political rights were denied. However, within a year the
French had aligned with the mulatto class against the slaves, temporarily pausing the war. The wars and revolutions in Europe gave the Haitian slaves a second chance the following year. As Philippe Girard argues,

Events in faraway Europe gave the slaves a second opportunity to free themselves. In 1793, the French revolution took a more radical turn—a tribunal sent Louis XVI to the guillotine, and all the conservative monarchies of Europe declared war on France. For the slaves, general war meant two things. First, France’s multifront war would leave few troops available for colonial duty should a new uprising erupt. Second the revolution’s leftist turn brought to the fore politicians sincerely dedicated to freedom and the equality of man (2005: 38).

As the war went on in Europe, British and Spanish troops arrived in Saint Dominique in hopes of taking the island for their own colonial interests. The Haitian revolt, under the General Toussaint Louverture defeated the British and Spanish troops. In 1793, France abolished slavery in an attempt to stabilize the country. By 1801 Louverture was in charge of the entire island of Hispaniola. Napoleon Bonaparte, hoping to reinstitute slavery, sent troops in 1801 to reclaim the island. The French were victorious initially, and Louverture was exiled in 1802. Yet the war swung back in favor of the Haitians in 1803 because of a series of setbacks to France. France went back to war with England, the French troops in Haiti died rapidly of yellow fever, and the British and American troops came to the aid of Haitian revolutionaries. In November 1803 it became clear that the French would not win the war. In 1804, Haiti became the first black republic, and the second country in the hemisphere to break away from its colonial powers.

Interestingly, the Haitian revolution was beneficial to the United States as well. Haiti was one of the few countries the young United States could trade with, and its defeat of France helped the United States gain the Louisiana territory. Many colonial powers, not just France, had a vested interest in Haiti during the years of revolution. On
one hand, the British and Spanish wanted France to lose its grip on Saint Dominque because its loss would aid them in their wars with France. On the other hand, European colonial powers feared the slave revolts would spread to their own Caribbean colonies. The Haitian revolution was a complex historical event. Each of the parties involved were in a constant state of flux and loyalties changed frequently. Sometimes the Haitian slaves fought beside the French, British or Spanish troops, sometimes they fought against them. Ultimately at the end of the revolution, the general mood was one of great distrust of Europeans and Americans. In the new black republic, the constitution stated that white people were unable to own property and land, and the systematic violence that was so rampant during colonialism and the long revolution was perpetuated against white settlers still residing in the country (Bellegarde-Smith 1990).

*Post Revolution Haiti*

“The Existence of Negro people in arms, occupying a country it has soiled by the most criminal acts, is a horrible spectacle for all white nations.”

French foreign Minister Prince Charles Talleyrand calling for the United States to embargo Haiti (Lupin 1968).

The years following the Haitian revolution were marked by instability both abroad and at home. Few countries accepted Haiti’s legitimacy immediately and many European countries and the United States placed trade embargos on the fledgling state. France only recognized Haiti in 1825 after Haitian President Jean Pierre Boyer agreed to pay 150 million Francs to France for the latter’s loss of property (Bellegarde-Smith 1990). The sum was later reduced to 60 million, but it took almost 100 years for Haiti to repay the debt (Bellegarde-Smith 1990). The Haitian customhouses were the “sole source of
revenue and, until 1915 [the year of the United States occupation], serviced the foreign debt to the tune of 80 percent, leaving 20 percent of revenues for all other state expenditures” (Bellegarde-Smith 1990: 73). The final payment for the debt to France was made in 1922 (Bellegarde-Smith).

Due to pressures from the United States government, Haiti was not allowed to attend the first Inter-American Panama Congress in 1826. The United States did not recognize Haiti until 1862, nearly 60 years after the end of the Haitian revolution, when United States President Abraham Lincoln abolished slavery. From the onset of Haiti’s establishment as a republic, the international community ostracized it, though it must be noted, still traded with it. Fear that the unrest and slave revolts would migrate to neighboring countries, and a general and widespread racism against the “black menace” (Bellegard-Smith 1990: 52) led to mistrust of Haiti by many countries. Additionally, much like Liberia, Haiti became a destination point for black Americans. Around 6,000 Americans of African descent went to Haiti under the Free Black Immigration act. Most either died or returned to the United States within a few years because of disease and heat exhaustion (Locket 1991).

The poor relationship with the international community and the large debt that Haiti owed to France helped to systematically change how Haitian society was structured as an early republic. The first is the creation of a militarized society. Fears that France or another colonial power could return led to an increase in the military capacity of Haiti. The new country focused heavily on creating a strong military to defend itself against both foreign invaders, but also against internal opposition groups (Bellegarde-Smith 1990). This militarization likely contributed to the multiple violent coups d’état and
general political unrest. Opposition was met with a strong hand and generally responded with an equal display of aggression.

In addition to the militarization of the early Haitian republic, the lack of international recognition and the debt owed to France also led to the institution of an economic class system similar to slavery, which reinforced the already existing class distinctions. Joan Dayan explains how the militarization and class structures contributed to the underdevelopment of Haiti:

It was Boyer’s Rural Code of Haiti … that most contributed to the legacy of militarism and compulsory labor that would continue to undermine Haitian democracy. This code of laws which figured containment as fundamental to the order of society reduced most Haitians, especially those who did not occupy positions of rank in the military or civil branches of the state, to essential slave status. A small fraction of Haiti’s population lived off the majority, collecting fees – with the help of the rural chefs de section- for the sale travel, and butchering of animals, and even for the cutting of trees (2004: 6)

Dayan later goes on to quote Louis-Joseph Janvier as saying the code in Haiti was “slavery without the whip” (2004: 6).

The international community’s refusal to recognize Haiti and the overt racism in their policies toward the country, the militarization of Haitian society, the constant coups d’état, the reinforcement of colonial-style class distinctions, and the insistence on an export-oriented economy to pay back France’s 60 million Franc debt all contributed to the impoverishment of the majority of Haitian civilians and the destabilization of the Haitian state and economy.
United States Intervention and Occupation (1915-1934)

“Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French!”

Oft quoted statement by U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1914 (Allen 1930)

The first United States occupation of Haiti officially began following the assassination of Haitian President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam on July 27, 1915. The United States Marines were already docked at Haitian ports prior to his assassination, and letters from as early as 1914 had been written to the Haitian government from the United States detailing the United States intentions, and suggesting the United States occupation had been in the works for at least two years (Schmidt 1995). The Haitians had seen almost every single one of their leaders assassinated or deposed in the hundred years since independence. Why did the United States choose 1915 to occupy Haiti? The intervention came at a time when the United States was gearing up to join World War One. Its main enemy was Germany, and there were many German businessmen who lived in Haiti (Schmidt 1995). American politicians were interested in securing the Caribbean against the spread of the European war into Haiti. Other Caribbean nations, like Cuba, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico had already witnessed American occupations. Additionally, the economic, political and military power of the United States was being consolidated. Prior to World War I the United States was on the cusp of being one of the wealthiest and most powerful countries in the world (Schmidt 1995). In order to cement this power, the United States needed to have a strong hold in the Caribbean, both politically and economically.

Though many politicians were frank about the need to open up Haiti to foreign investments through occupation, there was also the underlying glow of a civilizing
mission. United States President Woodrow Wilson’s desire to make the world safe for democracy was often used to justify and encourage the occupation. Wilson’s,

frequent insistence that the United States had a moral responsibility to promote constitutional democratic government in the Caribbean area... the belief that Haitians were inherently inferior, coupled with the dictates of state department diplomacy in the Caribbean, led to grotesque perversion of the declared missionary ideal of spreading liberal democracy. Indeed, the occupation, in the process of exercising unwelcome foreign military domination, consistently suppressed local democratic institutions and denied elementary political liberties. Wilson’s obsession with order, stability and constitutionalism, implying government by law and the sanctity of legal contracts, was translated into rigid authoritarianism based on the assertion that Haitians were incapable of self-government (Schmidt 1995: 10)

This civilizing mission also included “modernizing” the country and its people. Modernizing Haiti meant building roads, developing agribusiness, and educating the upper middle class. All three proved difficult, and in the end only the first two were successful. Building roads and railroads was accomplished by reinstating the Corvée, a law from the mid 1800s that required that Haitians either pay a tax or be forced to build roads through mandatory labor (Schmidt 1995). As most Haitians were unable to pay the taxes, they were conscripted into forced labor. The roads were built, but the cruel enforcement echoed Haiti’s legacy of slavery. The second modernization project, developing agribusiness, required a change in the Haitian constitution to allow white foreigners to own land. With American military pressures, a new constitution was passed in 1918 allowing foreigners to own property (Schmidt 1995). The roads and the new constitution each stood to consolidate the American power over Haiti and opened Haiti up for American economic interests. The education program failed due to a lack of participation and interest by the Haitians chosen for the education loans.
Most Haitians were displeased with the United States occupation. Both peasants and middle class Haitians began revolting. This began the Caco Wars of liberation, which lasted from 1915 to 1934. The United States called the wars “guerilla wars,” a term which signifies a lack of clarity regarding who is partaking in the revolt and who is a civilian. The Caco Wars were frequently met with Marine brutality, but continued for most of the occupation (Schmidt 1995). As a result, the United States Marines began training the Haitian military to help control and stabilize the country. The control and strength of the Haitian military would reach its peak during the Duvalier years and would only be halted in the 1990s by UN and NATO peacekeeping troops when the Haitian military was dismantled (Zanotti 2008). The United States Marine violence was not only accepted by United States politicians but also lauded. In November of 1915, United States forces killed every Haitian soldier during a battle at Fort Riviere. The General who oversaw the slaughter received the Congressional Medal of Honor. During the United States occupation, fifteen percent of Haiti’s two million population fled to the Dominican Republic or Cuba.

Although the United States officially left in 1934, its presence has been felt in Haiti ever since, whether through international aid, humanitarian organizations, support of presidents, or more military troops. The two countries also remain connected by the large Haitian Diaspora residing in the United States, on whose remittances many Haitians survive.

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3 Compare this number with the recent U.S. occupation in Iraq. According to most censes the war has caused around 7% of the Iraqi population to flee Iraq to neighboring countries.
The Duvalier Years: Papa and Baby Doc

“I know the Haitian people because I am the Haitian people.”

Infamous Quote by Haitian President Francois Duvalier

The Duvalier dictatorship that began with the election of Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) in 1957 and ended with the removal of his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc), in 1986 marks a particularly violent and disturbing period in Haiti’s history. Although the country was traditionally run by dictators, loosely defined as those not democratically elected and whose base of power is limited to an oligarchy supported by the military, the Duvalier years still stand out as particularly repressive. However, as with the other sections in the historical examination of Haiti, I will attempt to stress that the context and backdrop of Papa and Baby Doc’s twenty-nine-year reign is almost as important as the brutality and force they used to maintain power.

In this section, I will not go into great detail concerning the means by which the Duvalier regime maintained power domestically. For this I recommend Haiti, State Against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism by Michel Rolph Trouillot (1990) and Papa Doc: Haiti and Its Dictator by Bernard Diederich and Al Burt (1990) and instead will discuss how international involvement helped create the conditions that enabled them to take and hold on to power. In no way do I believe or support a theory that the international community created the Duvalier dictatorships. Instead, I hope to shed light on the roles various actors played and suggest that if we wish to understand the brutality of the dictatorship, we cannot look at it through an ahistorical lens.

Prior to Francois Duvalier’s election Haiti was experiencing relative stability. The lack of political upheaval and the increase in foreign aid money gave the appearance that
Haiti was improving. However, a growing economic crisis was facing the country. Agriculture represented eighty seven percent of the GNP, yet environmental degradation and overpopulation in rural areas was increasing, leading to a subsequent increase in migration to Port Au Prince (Trouillot 1990). An economy based on export-oriented agriculture is particularly sensitive to both the international economy and the effects of nature. Severe droughts, coupled with floods and hurricanes frequently disrupt the production of agricultural goods, while international instability can affect the price market. The massive migrations to Port Au Prince not only further impoverished the urban areas, it also paved the way for Duvalier to later increase manufacturing as a major industry.

When Duvalier was “elected” he was, according to some an unassuming and “stupid” man (Trouillot 1990). This perception helped him win supporters in the military who thought he could be easily manipulated. A rural doctor, who was not a mulatto, did have a base of support. Few could have guessed he would later go on to kill between twenty and fifty thousand Haitians, force one fifth of the population to flee the country, and routinely beat and imprison anyone who was seen as a threat to his power (Trouillot 1990). His power was consolidated by his use of both the military and the Volunteers for National Security, popularly known as the Tontons Macoutes. The military was, as previously mentioned, created and trained by the United States Marines who continued to support it during the Duvalier reign. (Schmidt 1995).

The United States also supported the Duvalier regime with international aid, an example of the previously discussed influence of Cold War politics. Cold War tensions led to the United States supporting dictatorships over Communist governments, and Papa
Doc manipulated this doctrine to maintain United States and United Nations support. The United States, provided $7 million in economic aid to the Duvalier government between February and September 1959 and almost $11 million in 1960. U.S. aid amounted to $13.5 million, almost 50 percent of the Haitian national budget, in 1961 alone, and from 1957 to 1986, U.S. aid to the Duvalier regime may have amounted to as much as $900 million. As late as 1983, 40 percent of the Haitian government’s budget and 60 percent of its development funds came from Western governments, including $54 million from the United States. Thus the Duvalier regime could ill afford to alienate its foreign benefactors in major areas affecting their economic interests. (Bellegard-Smith 1990: 100).

The Duvalier regime is a dark time in Haiti’s history. We cannot, however, see it as an exceptional or isolated event, for it was able to emerge in the context of Haiti’s past, both domestic and international and the geopolitical realities of the Cold War period. We can not only think of Papa and Baby Doc as cruel megalomaniacs, but must also understand that their rise to and consolidation of power is rooted in the history of a country that has long been plagued by both internal political upheaval and external intervention.

Aristide

Following Baby Doc’s ousting, power struggles resumed. New leaders followed much the same path as those who came before them, and none lasted very long as political coups replaced one dictator with another. As the political elite grabbed at power, a priest by the name of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was preaching in the streets against the Duvalierists, and then later their successors. Aristide, who was president three separate times (first in 1991, from 1994- 1996, and then 2001-2004), is an enigmatic character in Haiti’s long history of leaders. There are multiple books and articles written about the ex-president and they generally fall into one of two camps: Aristide as the savior or Aristide as the despot (Horton and Summerskill 2007). Although I will not engage fully in an
exploration of the two arguments, it is striking how clearly the lines are drawn. I will attempt to focus on the international involvement in the election, coups against and returns of President Aristide instead of attempting to evaluate his personality or purposes. In 1990 Aristide was “democratically elected” which can be defined in this case as receiving 67 percent of the popular vote and the fact that the elections were monitored by the OAS, the UN, and the Carter Center, which as Zartman argues, “contributed to their fairness and to the subsequent sense of responsibility and engagement of the international organizations as well” (Zartman 2005: 183). Aristide was overthrown in a military coup just eight months later. The military junta ruled from September 1991 to September of 1994, and was unofficially led by Army General Raoul Cedras, with Joseph Nerrete serving as the official president. Emmanuel Constant, was the founder of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) party, which was created to eliminate Aristide supporters. Constant was on the C.I.A. pay roll for a number of years, providing essential information about the political elites in Haiti (Girard 2004).

The international community, specifically the Organization of American States (OAS) decided to take action on this “assault on democracy” by first enacting an unsuccessful trade embargo (Girard 2004). The initial embargo was limited to weapons and oil, but was later expanded to include most things that were not humanitarian in nature. The embargo did not encourage the military junta to step down, but did hurt poor Haitians and further widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Following the unsuccessful embargo, the United States, with the support of the United Nations, set in motion a military intervention that would overthrow the junta and reinstate the democratically elected Aristide.
Although “restoring democracy” and protecting human rights were largely cited as the reasons for the 1994 occupation, it is relatively clear that there were multiple reasons for President Bill Clinton’s decision to intervene. The United States had just recently led a disastrous mission in Somalia, and though at first hesitant to make the same mistake twice, the administration did want to preserve the United States’ post-Cold War reputation as a super power (Girard 2004). The United States was also, at least nominally, concerned about drug trafficking. President Clinton was also concerned about the support of the Congressional Black Caucus and other influential Aristide supporters. Finally, the United States was deeply concerned with illegal immigration (Girard 2004). Fear of the Haitian migration is arguably one of the major reasons the United States ultimately decided to intervene. Unwilling to accept the Haitian immigrants, but also unwilling to support the junta, the American government was in a difficult position as to how to deal with the “boat people.” As Major Kent Simon writes in Two Strikes: American Intervention in Haiti, “The immigration and humanitarian crises created by the Haitian military certainly pulled at the heartstrings of American society” (Kent 2002: 44). In his speech prior to the invasion, Clinton stated the following,

Just four years ago the Haitian people held the first free and fair elections since their independence… But eight months later, Haitian dreams of democracy became a nightmare of bloodshed… No American should be surprised that the recent tide of migrants seeking refuge on our shores comes from Haiti and Cuba. After all, they are the only nations left in the Western Hemisphere where democratic government is denied; the only countries where dictators have managed to hold back the wave of democracy that has swept our entire region, and that our government has so actively promoted and supported for years… History has taught us that preserving democracy in our own hemisphere strengthens America’s security and prosperity… May God bless the people the United States and the cause of freedom (Clinton 1994).
It would be politically incorrect to directly admit that one of the major reasons for going to war is to prevent immigration, but it is still apparent in the speeches and policies that preventing more illegal immigration and avoiding giving refugee status to the perhaps hundreds of thousands of Haitians played a large part in the final decision to intervene. As Major Kent’s quote earlier suggests, immigration pulls at the heartstrings of American society. The situation of intervening to avoid illegal immigration was mirrored again following the 2004 Haitian uprising, and again after the 2010 earthquake.

In the short term, the 1994 intervention was largely considered successful. The “peacekeeping operation” was able to end the military rule and reinstated Aristide as president. The long-term results, however, are dubious. The long-term goal of sustaining peace and state building proved insufficient, as four years after Aristide was elected a second time, he was overthrown in another rebellion. Throughout the 1990s the UN, OAS, and the United States played a major role in training a new police force. The Haitian military, long seen as a major factor in the country’s violence and record of human rights violations, was systematically dismantled. Soldiers were trained to become police officers and the judicial system was changed to a “Western” model of rule of law (Zanotti 2004).

*The 2004 Uprising and the creation of MINUSTAH*

After the reinstatement of Aristide in 1994, the UN and other multinational forces maintained a steady involvement in Haiti. The first peacekeeping operation, United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNWIH) was established in 1993 and in 1994 the Security Council authorized a multinational police force to “maintain a secure and stable
environment in the country, and promote the rule of law” (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). Due to wavering support of members in the UN Security Council, the peacekeeping troops rarely reached the full-intended capacity and Haiti saw over five different “peacekeeping missions” from 1994-2004.

In June of 1995 Aristide’s party, Lavalas (“flood” in Creole), won a sweeping reelection victory. Rene Preval, a political ally of Aristide, was elected president. In 1996, however, Aristide broke his alliance with Preval and started the Lavalas Family party. The break caused a deadlock in Haiti’s politics until the 2000 elections when Aristide was reelected. According to the UN, the “instability” in Haiti waxed and waned during these years. Aristide was, at times, viewed as being cooperative and willing to compromise with the international community and Haitian political elites, and at other times as being a problem for the UN and its peacekeeping missions in Haiti (Einsiedel and Malone 2006). Sebastian Einsiedel and David Malone suggest, “The UN’s efforts were severely undermined by Aristide, who turned out to be an increasingly unhelpful and unreliable partner, and by other Haitian political actors” (2006: 160).

The goals and mandates of the peacekeeping missions in Haiti prior to the peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH were broad and according to Einsiedel and Malone, failed for two reasons: An insufficient amount of funds and military personnel, and a failure of the Haitian government to cooperate with the peacekeeping forces and the UN state-building goals (Einsiedel and Malone 2006). This line of thinking influenced how the UN and the international community structured the formation of MINUSTAH following the uprising in 2004, when Aristide was ousted. When MINUSTAH was formed in April 2004, it was given more power and more personnel than the previous
peacekeeping missions. MINUSTAH’s mandate was also more refined and specific than Multinational Interim Force, one of MINUSTAH’s predecessors, or the other missions. According to the MINUSTAH website,

MINUSTAH was originally set up to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; to support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; to support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011).

MINUSTAH’s mandate, originally conceived to be a short-term mission, has been renewed since 2004 and was renewed again following the earthquake of 2010. MINUSTAH has also changed and evolved according to the current political situation in Haiti (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). The widening of the goals allowed for both MINUSTAH and the UN to have a greater level of control over Haitian politics and the population. MINUSTAH is the main police force in Haiti and is in charge of training the Haitian National Police.
The International Response to the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti

On Tuesday January 24, 2010, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 Mw hit Haiti at approximately 16:53. See map below of the epicenter of the earthquake in Haiti.

As of February 12, 2010 the following statistics had been released: Three million people were affected by the earthquake; between 217,000 and 230,000 people were dead and 300,000 injured; 1.5 million people had been left homeless and internally displaced, about one sixth of the Haitian population (United Nations OCHA 2010)\(^4\).

One year later, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) suggests that one million people still reside in IDP camps across Haiti and less than five percent of IDPs have access to potable water and only twenty seven percent have access to

\(^4\) These are estimates by the UN and Haitian government. The true number of dead, injured and displaced will never be known because of the inability to take accurate censes directly following the earthquake.
sanitation. The humanitarian response proved difficult on multiple levels. Not only were the Haitian government, domestic and international NGOs and other international actors unprepared for a disaster of this scale, but the earthquake destroyed roads, government and NGO buildings and killed a large number of people, both Haitians and foreigners who had previously worked in the public sector. Areas outside of Port Au Prince often did not receive emergency aid and assistance until days or weeks after the earthquake because few humanitarian actors could make it out of the capital.

One could spend an entire thesis detailing the international response to Haiti. Hundreds of people and aid agencies were deployed to respond, and billions of dollars in aid have been pledged. It would be difficult to describe how each organization participated in the disaster assistance and recovery, so I will highlight instead how MINUSTAH, the UN’s World Food Program (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United States military responded in the months following the earthquake. What follows is in no way a monolithic description of how all aid organizations and international governments responded.

MINUSTAH, as discussed earlier, was deployed in response to the 2004 coup d’état that overthrew the Aristide government. Due to political instability, the mandate of MINUSTAH has been renewed annually. After the 2010 earthquake, the mandate was again renewed and additional troops were sent (United Nations MINUSTAH 2011). MINUSTAH is mandated to ensure political stability and is to “support of the Transitional Government, to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place” (United Nations Resolution 1542). Major Bruce Sand, a member of MINUSTAH from Canada wrote, “MINUSTAH
is the world’s effort to coach Haiti back onto the path of national stability and heading toward peace and prosperity” (National Defense and Canadian Forces 2010). In a speech after the passage of the resolution to send more troops to Haiti following the earthquake, Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon argued, “We must do all we can to get these extra forces on the ground as soon as possible so that they can help maintain order and deliver humanitarian assistance.” (United Nations Press Release 2010) MINUSTAH’s main role in the response to the earthquake has been to “maintain order” by securitizing the distribution of aid. It has been operating as a national policing force for the protection of aid workers and securitizing the distribution centers and the distribution process to safeguard against rioting and violence (United Nations MINUSTAH press release 2010).

The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) was also already operating in Haiti prior to January 2010, but dramatically scaled up its response in the first week after the earthquake. Within 24 hours, WFP was distributing emergency food packets. According to its website, WFP distributed food to over four million displaced Haitians (Haiti - World Food Program 2010). WFP set up at least 50 distribution centers in Port Au Prince and surrounding areas (WFP 2010). After the “emergency” stage was completed, the organization slowly switched to the “recovery” stage, in which they ended blanket (untargeted) mass distributions and began distributing aid to “vulnerable groups” (WFP Haiti: One Year Later report 2011). In the recovery stage, WFP is focusing its distributions on school children, the elderly, the disabled, pregnant women and single mothers. In the “Haiti: One Year After” report, the organization states that it is now attempting to coordinate more with the Haitian government to purchase foods grown
locally, and to streamline their services with the needs of the government. Additionally, the organization details its coordination with other humanitarian organizations, for example CARE, World Vision, and the Red Cross Red Crescent societies, as well as MINUSTAH and the United States army which provided security for the organization during some of the food distributions (WFP Haiti: One Year Later report 2011).

The International Organization of Migration (IOM) was also operational in Haiti prior to the earthquake, but its focus was largely on monitoring international migration patterns. After the earthquake, it began focusing on the internally displaced populations as well. The IOM fact sheet states that,

Under the overall leadership of the Government of Haiti, IOM is working closely with many other humanitarian and development organizations, including the UN country team, to ensure safe living locations and adequate shelter, as well as tracking population movements and informing on conditions at displacement sites (IOM Haiti Fact Sheet 2010).

IOM is in charge of the Camp Manager Cluster (CCIM), which trains and coordinates camp managers. It is also active in the Health, Shelter, and Sanitation clusters. Its main role in the response has been to help NGOs coordinate and collaborate, and to conduct data collection and monitor IDP campsites. The IOM is the largest international organization operating in Haiti, employing over four hundred people (IOM Haiti 2011).

The United States military, under the Operation Unified Response, deployed 22,000 forces in the months following the earthquake. Most of the military units were aboard ships in the waters surrounding Haiti, but some seven thousand were based on land (SOUTHCOM 2010). The units are under the control of Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, which is in charge of the United States military operations in South America and the Caribbean. The military was deployed the day after the earthquake hit.
The Department of Defense describes the mission as one intended “to save lives and provide security, when necessary, to support the delivery of water, food and medical care” (Department of Defense 2010). According to United States Marines interviewed in the summer of 2010, the United States military was unable to directly give aid to Haitians, but instead acted to support international humanitarian organizations. One serviceman I spoke to suggested that the military had stopped giving direct aid so that the United States military would not give the wrong impression about the role of the military.

In the same vein a Time magazine article presented the mission as follows:

The “Marines are definitely warriors first,” Captain Clark Carpenter said Friday as his unit prepared to ship out to Haiti from North Carolina. “But we are equally as compassionate when we need to be, and this is a role that we like to show — a compassionate warrior that can reach out that helping hand to those who need it” (Time Magazine 2010).

Why did the United States military and the UN peacekeeping troops play such an enormous role in the distribution of aid following the earthquake? I recognize the dominant arguments that only a military operation (the United States military and the already active peacekeeping mission in Haiti) has the logistical training and access to resources to adequately respond, but ultimately I believe there is a more complicated answer, which is tied to how humanitarianism is changing in response to a global pressures and agendas. As societies become increasingly concerned with issues of security, the mechanisms and functions of humanitarianism are changing to respond. An analysis of the discourses of the media, humanitarian organizations, governments, the UN, peacekeeping troops and the United States military illuminates a shift toward humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security. This chapter has illustrated how humanitarianism has evolved in light of the changing relationships between
humanitarianism and other discourses (developmentalism, human rights etc.) as well as the changing representations of humanitarianism, and humanitarian organizations and the internally displaced populations they are serving.
Chapter Two: Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Security

The previous chapter first explored changes and evolutions in understandings of humanitarianism as a form of intervention. In focusing on interventions in Haiti, the chapter examined not only how our perceptions of humanitarianism have changed historically, but also how humanitarianism can be understood as a means of intervention and how it fits among other forms of interventions in Haiti. This chapter will focus on humanitarianism as a mechanism of governmentality, and a reflection of global politics and sovereignty. As politicians, states and international organizations become increasingly concerned with issues of security, how does the humanitarian industry reflect these changes? In this chapter I argue that the humanitarian industry, operating as a mechanism of power, is currently grounded in discourses of security. Humanitarianism is intricately tied to the “international community” because of the distribution of power in society and the manner in which sovereignty has evolved due to global governance and globalization. The international community, represented by nation-states that desire to control and monitor populations is increasingly focusing on the construction and elimination of “security threats.” Humanitarianism is one mechanism that the international community deploys to create more secure communities, nations, and populations. This chapter will first outline how humanitarianism is a mechanism of governance and how this reflects the relationships between the international community, humanitarian organizations and the displaced populations they are serving. The chapter will then move toward understanding humanitarianism as means of securing and monitoring populations. With a focus on Haiti’s internally displaced population camps as
sites where the mechanisms of security are performed, the chapter will explore how humanitarianism as intervention is operating as a mechanism of security.

**Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Governance**

Foucault (2007) begins his discussion about governmentality and power by defining power “in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have a role or function and theme” (16). Humanitarianism is operating as a mechanism of governance because of the ways in which power is distributed, the organization and structure of humanitarian organizations, and humanitarian organizations’ relationship with the international community. Foucault argues, “mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all relations and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause” (2007:17). Thus cannot examine humanitarianism as a mechanism of governance without conceptualizing it first as a mechanism of power.

In the second section of this chapter I will discuss humanitarianism and sovereignty, but in this section I will outline how humanitarianism is a mechanism of power and of governance. Foucault explores power as the relations and procedures “whose role is to establish, maintain, and transform mechanisms of power, are not “self-generating” or “self- subsistent”; they are not founded on themselves. Power is not founded on itself or generated by itself” (2007: 17). Humanitarianism is one of the mechanisms through which power is exercised.

Although the intentionality and the stated aims and goals of humanitarian organizations might not suggest a direct tie with the political goals of the international community, there are a number of direct correlations between the two. To understand humanitarian organizations as mechanisms of governance, I will examine four aspects
that speak to not only their institutionalization and industrialization but also their connections to the international community.

Working from a broad, institutional level, humanitarian organizations are bureaucratized and are institutionally organized in much the same way corporations, government agencies, and the health care industry are organized. As organizations attempt to become more efficient and streamline services, they become increasingly bureaucratized. Humanitarian organizations, like corporations or government agencies, are organized in a top down manner. There is generally a CEO, or Executive Director at the top and power is distributed in a tiered manner down to the field workers. Each tier receives their orders from the tier above and is expected to not only obey those orders, but also enforce them on the tiers below. This method is considered to be the most efficient means of organization, partly because of how it distributes power. Each person has a certain amount of power, but also a certain amount of powerlessness, in that they have little control or means of opposing directives. Humanitarian workers even those who work in an office, are then, because of the institutional, bureaucratic structure of humanitarian organizations both explicitly enforced by and enforcing power.

This power distribution leads to humanitarian organizations becoming mechanisms of governance especially when one considers the funding and the directives that are enforced by funders. Nonprofit organizations, because of the manner in which they are structured and their almost constant battle for funds are dependent on funders. Funders are offered control in the operation of the organizations. This becomes problematic when the funding for many of the large scale humanitarian organizations, such UNHCR or the Red Cross, depends largely on governments, and more specifically,
the American government. This trend is on the rise, as Michael Barnett (2005) and Joanna Macrae (2001) discuss. Barnett, in *Humanitarianism Transformed* writes, “Although private contributions increased, they paled in comparison to official [government] assistance… A few donors were responsible for much of this increase, and they also now comprise an oligopoly. The United States is the lead donor by a factor of three” (Barnett 2005: 727). Funders are able to dictate policy changes and operational practices by either increasing or cutting funding. If the funder, be it a private individual, a corporation, or the United States government, does not agree with how a humanitarian organization is being run, they are able to tell the organization. If the contributions are large enough, the organization is likely to adjust their policies and programs. When power is distributed in a top down, bureaucratic way, it is easy to see how funders can affect the operations of humanitarian organizations, and in turn how the latter have limited space protesting or opposing the directives their funders.

Funding for the U.N. comes from individual member states’ dues and funding appeals for specific donations. However, the amount of dues corresponds to the size of GDP (United Nations 2010). Due to the vast economic inequalities between member states, the top 15 (out of 192) contributors give eighty four percent of the regular budget and eighty nine percent of the peacekeeping budget (United Nations 2010). The top five contributors are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Russian Federation and they contribute close to forty percent of the budget. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security council, not surprisingly, are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Russian Federation.
According to the International Committee of Red Cross 2007 annual report, ICRC “is funded by contributions from the States party to the Geneva Conventions (governments); national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies; supranational organizations (such as the European Commission); and public and private sources. All funding is voluntary” (ICRC Annual Report 2007). The International Committee of Red Cross is also primarily funded by the United States and Western, European countries (ICRC Annual Report 2007).

Humanitarian organizations are mechanism of governance because of the nature and purpose of their work. Humanitarian organizations, whose funding, staff and directives are coming largely from the “developed” world and operating in the “developing” world, are offering humanitarian assistance to those countries which are deemed underdeveloped or in need of additional support. This assistance, despite its best intentions, is based on certain assumptions that the organizations, the people who work for them, and their funders have about who needs assistance, who is qualified to give it, and what assistance looks like. These assumptions are generally based on dominant narratives and perceptions about development and human rights, which rely on Enlightenment ideals of a modernization and the linear path to achieving development (Mohanty 2003, Barker 2000, Harding 2000). The modernization ideology is also based on dichotomies, which function to create distinct spheres that stand in opposition to each other. This allows for the differentiation between two things in stark contrast, which in turn simplifies issues and denies socio-historical and economic factors by reducing issues to “traditional versus modern,” “male versus female,” “black versus white,” or “North versus South.” Humanitarian assistance is, therefore, a mechanism of governance that
reflects and propagates notions of development and human rights across the globe. Humanitarian organizations are mechanisms of governance that, through a variety of methods, enforce and reinforce existing power structures and relationships.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recently requested $103.3 million for the UNDP of Haiti. The money, as discussed earlier, comes from the international community. Although the U.N. acknowledges, “only Haitians can rebuild Haiti again” (UNDP 2010: 2) they will still have a large part in the coordination of that rebuilding. As the UNDP itself states,

The Haitian authorities are determined to build back a “new Haiti,” a Haiti transformed by seizing this historic moment and entering into a new partnership with the international community. The UN is committed to placing itself at the centre of this new partnership, which should rest on the principles of Haitian leadership and mutual accountability for results (UNDP 2010: 3 emphasis added).

Much of the funding is going towards a cash-for-work program, which creates jobs for displaced Haitians. The UNDP, and by proxy its funders, the “international community,” are contributing greatly to the restructuring of the Haitian government and economy. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) states as its goal developing Haiti economically, politically, and socially. Its goals include helping Haiti reduce internal conflict and provide the basis to rebuild by addressing key sources of stress and conflict in social, economic and political spheres, notably through creating employment and rebuilding assets for sustainable livelihoods (economic), increasing access to primary health services and primary education (social), and fostering improved rule of law and responsive governance (political) (USAID Strategic Plan 2010).

USAID and the United States government are operating under the assumption that they hold the key to improving the situation in Haiti. The model USAID employs in Haiti is the same model it uses in all “fragile states” and incorporates the ideals of economic
freedom, the rule of law, and democratically organized government. USAID has had the same goal of “developing Haiti” since its inception in the 1960s (USAID 2010).

Relationships of power are further evidenced in the increasing utilization of securitization discourses. Humanitarian organizations are operating as mechanisms of security through indirect means by controlling the distribution of food, water, and shelter. This level of control allows humanitarian organizations to practice biopower from an international level. Humanitarian organizations, which are dependent on the whims of the international community, are able to control the most basic of human functions and therefore are able to monitor, supervise and control people at the level of the population. The discourses of securitization are also increasingly evident in more direct ways, through the militarization of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. Aid has become tied to issues of “security” in a number of ways. Two main examples are the use of humanitarianism to justify military intervention and the use of security and military forces and technologies to distribute aid. I will address these issues in greater detail later.

Finally, on the local level, humanitarianism is a mechanism of governance and is practicing power in its everyday, on the ground, interactions. The unequal power distribution between aid workers and recipients of aid is discussed in Barbara Harrell-Bond’s seminal article, “Can Humanitarian Work with Refugees be Humane?” (2002). Harrell-Bond suggests that the very nature of giving and receiving aid is disempowering for refugees,

There are insufficient resources to meet needs, with the power to decide their allocation placed in the hands of humanitarian workers who have no responsibility to consider the views of those for whom they are intended. As a consequence, both humanitarian workers and refugees are “trapped” in asymmetrical relationships in a structure in which accountability is skewed in the
direction of the donors who pay for the assistance rather than the refugees (2002: 53).

Though Harrell-Bond never mentions Foucault, this is clearly an example of how power is distributed at all levels of society and is exercised through different relationships. Humanitarian aid workers, because of their position as a “helper” as Harrell-Bond suggests, are inherently in a relative position of power over the refugees. This power can often be detrimental to both refugees and the helpers themselves. The power exercised by aid workers is relative in relation to funders in that they do not have the position or authority to make decisions about how organizations are run.

After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, well-meaning aid workers descended on the country. Hundreds of organizations sent people to respond to the disaster. It was believed that Haiti alone would be unable to respond adequately, because of as discussed in the previous chapter, Haiti has long been represented as a failed or fragile state and its history of intervention and colonialism have helped create discourses about the inabilities and underdevelopment of the Haitian state. Aid workers came from around the world, with a variety of skills and vocations. Aid workers, with their ability to save or take lives by controlling the distribution of shelter, food, water, or medical treatment of the Haitian population who were displaced and affected by the earthquake. One volunteer from the organization World Vision described a trip to distribute tents and building materials on her blog, “Eileen’s Blog.” She and a veteran aid worker who has worked all over the world describe waking up one morning at 5:00 am to visit a camp and distribute tents: “The plan is to go early and make sure that only those who live in the camp get the help
they need,” wrote Eileen. Not only do aid workers have a monopoly on the distribution of aid (in this case tents) but they can, or must, determine who deserves and who does not.

At a shelter cluster meeting in Port Au Prince I heard a presentation from the representatives of Humanitarianism Accountability Partnership (HAP). HAP was conducting camp committee assessments to evaluate how camp committees shared information, and managed camp participation and complaint mechanisms. According to the representatives there were three levels of accountability: HAP, Interagency (the organizations managing the camps) and the camp committees. Their purpose was to assess participation and level of local ownership of the camp and its elected committees. HAP and the NGO camp managers were involved in restructuring the camp committees to change the power structures and encourage democratic participation. At one point in the presentation the speaker stated that part of HAP’s role in the shelter cluster was to “assess the camp committees to decide how much power to give them.” The presentation reveals the role and level of control of organizations like HAP and the UN have in the IDP camps: the humanitarian organizations have the ability to give power to Haitians if they behave in the way preferred by the international organizations.

Even though displaced Haitians have been placed in positions of relative powerlessness, they were still instances in which Haitians took matters into their own hands. Although humanitarian organizations claim to have the ability to give power, or to empower Haitians, in reality each day Haitians are empowering themselves. For example, when humanitarian organizations or the Haitian government fail to deliver essential services, or neglect particular camps because of their location or size, it is up to the community to deliver the services themselves. At one camp I visited, an international
humanitarian organization had ceased trash collection. Most sanitation operations are
controlled by humanitarian organizations, so it was difficult for this camp to find an
affordable option for garbage disposal. When the trash started to pile up, and no
organization would agree to help, the camp decided to borrow pick-up trucks and used
shovels to take the trash out. Even though international organizations control many of the
essential service delivery sectors, when they fail to do so, members of the camps are
forced to come up with their own solutions. Each camp I visited had tents devoted to the
different services a community might need. From food stores to barber shops, the camps
created their own survival mechanisms.

**Humanitarianism and Sovereignty**

The international community responds to humanitarian emergencies and crises by
deploying the humanitarian industry. What the response entails, who receives it, who
sends it, and the amount of aid are intimately linked to the political whims, needs, and
decisions of the international community. That the international community can decide to
either send troops or food aid to an area affected by a crisis reveals the complicated
nature of sovereignty and how nation-states relate to each other. The issue of sovereignty
and intervention is hotly debated, and the two are largely seen as in conflict with each
other. Carola Weil describes the debate as being between state rights and individual
rights: “The norms of sovereignty and nonintervention essentially protect borders.
Human rights norms, by contrast, aim to protect individuals” (2001: 83). Most argue that
the nation-state’s rights are being subsumed by the international community’s ability to
intervene either militarily or otherwise in the name of human rights. However, the nation-
state and the international human rights regime are intertwined and related. A globalized
human rights regime is not destroying the geographically rooted nation-state system of equally sovereign states.

The Westphalian treaty marks the historically acknowledged beginning of the state and was created to limit international intervention in European states. Sovereignty was conceptualized as being based around the state and as geographically rooted within the state’s borders. The state has the ability to levy taxes and to protect its land and its people with the end goal of defending and protecting the state and its interests because the state and the people are often conceived to be one and the same. Therefore, the state has sovereignty within its own borders. However, and this has been true since the inception of the state system, if the state feels its interests are being threatened, it is within its jurisdiction and its right as a state to intervene. Therefore, if a state feels it is within its economic interest to conduct international trade, or engage militarily with another state, it is able to justify that interaction. Accordingly, sovereignty and the relationships between states change when states engage in any kind of global interactions. These global interactions lead to the construction of varying layers and levels of sovereignty. Sovereignty, according to Stephen Krasner, can be conceptualized in four different ways:

Interdependence sovereignty refers to the ability of a government to regulate the movement of goods, capital, people, and ideas across its borders. Domestic sovereignty refers both to the structure of authority within a state and to the state’s effectiveness or control. International legal sovereignty refers to whether a state is recognized by other states, the basic rule being that only juridically independent territorial entities are accorded recognition. Westphalian sovereignty, which actually has almost nothing to do with the Peace of Westphalia, refers to the autonomy of domestic authority structures—that is, the absence of authoritative external influences. A political entity can be formally independent but de facto deeply penetrated. A state might claim to be the only legitimate enforcer of rules within its own territory, but the rules it enforces might not be of its own making (2001: 2).
The multiple ways in which sovereignty manifests itself reveals the social construction of sovereignty, nation-states and borders. Stuart Elden (2006) writes that absolute sovereignty is a “chimera and that international agreements of many kinds have created a system in which sovereignty is necessarily pooled, interdependent and limited. However, even the United Nations requires the ‘necessary fiction’ of sovereignty as a means of structuring international relations” (14). Absolute state sovereignty is not being replaced by an international human rights regime; instead sovereignty manifests itself differently depending on the needs and decisions of the international community at large.

The ability, or the decision, to intervene on an international level is rooted deeply in the construction of varying understandings of sovereignty. According the Carl Schmitt (1922), this ability to decide on the exception is what defines sovereignty. Sovereign is he “who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interests or interest of the state, public safety and order” (Schmitt 1922: 6). Therefore, the ability to decide on when intervention is required is rooted in sovereignty. The distribution of humanitarian aid or food aid, regardless of whether it involves the deployment of troops is still a form of intervention. The ability to decide to give aid, and who is deserving of it reflects a global sovereignty. Even if humanitarian intervention is based solely on the idea of “goodwill to fellow man” (Parekh 1997: 50), the ability to decide on the exception, in other words, the decision to intervene, rests on the shoulders of the sovereign because the sovereignty of another state is circumvented. Exceptional situations, a situation in which one state is deemed responsible or required to intervene in the affairs of another state are ultimately decided by the sovereign. The international community does not always
intervene when there are human rights abuses, natural disasters, famines, or underdevelopment in other states and if they do intervene, the type of intervention depends on the decisions of the sovereign.

Humanitarianism operates as a mechanism of governance and just as power circulates among individuals and institutions on a domestic level, so too does it circulate among and between nation-states. The humanitarian industry is one apparatus and discourse that is deployed to maintain and reproduce existing power structures. Therefore, the arguments that national sovereignty is declining because of the United Nations or the international human rights regime do not address the global power structures nor the shifting and constantly changing conceptions and realities of sovereignty. Anne Caldwell, drawing on Giorgio Agamben, uses the term “bio-sovereignty” to address the changing faces of sovereignty:

   The increasing difficulty of localizing sovereignty in its former areas is one reason sovereignty is often seen as declining. Agamben’s account of sovereignty as a space of indeterminacy is an important counter to those assumptions. The concept of bio-sovereignty lets us recognize the presence of sovereignty where older concepts built around the nation-state find only its disappearance. Insofar as sovereignty is a general power of regulating boundaries, whose ground is homo sacer, it has no necessary tie to particular territories of peoples. The impossibility of locating sovereignty in a precise territory or group does not signal a collapse of sovereignty but its transformation. (2004: 9).

The ability of some states to dictate and control international institutions of governance is evident, and as those institutions grow to fit the demands of a globalized world, sovereignty continues to be transformed. As Jacques Derrida (2005) writes, “to confer sense or meaning on sovereignty, to justify it, to find a reason for it, is already a compromise in its deciding exceptionality” (101). Attempts at classifying different modes and types sovereignty as Krasner does is useful to help conceptualize how sovereignty is
changing and transforming, but it is also reveals the impossibility of specifically locating it within a set of laws or international norms.

Foucault’s concepts of power and knowledge are also important to understanding global sovereignty. Discourses that are dominant and knowledges that are accepted reflect power relations and the exercise of power. In other words, power is exercised through the construction of subjects and objects and the knowledge about them. Discourse and knowledge perpetuate the current distribution of power and as well as the production of discourses and policies that posit certain countries as having the knowledge and understanding of what it takes to become developed and the proper way of ensuring the protection of human rights. Jens Bartleson (1995) in *Genealogy of Sovereignty* explores this relationship between global sovereignty, power, and knowledge. The dominant discourses from the human rights regime and developmentalism create a cycle of mutual perpetuation between sovereignty and knowledge.

The relationship between power and knowledge is also evidenced in the construction of identities. The ability of some nation-states to decide on what constitutes a valid reason for intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, is dependent on unequal power distributions. The justification for intervention, especially humanitarian intervention, is generally based on constructions of states as being either real, quasi or failed, which itself is often linked to the binaries of developed and developing. Roxanne Doty, in her book *Imperial Encounters* (1996), addresses this unequal distribution of power, and the ability of one state or entity to construct realities and discourses about the other failed or quasi or developing state. She suggests that Northern countries created labels and identities that
not only enforce, but also allow and perpetuate their intervention in Southern countries.

Discussing an MIT study on foreign aid, Doty argues that,

The presumption was that some subjects were the definers, delimiters, and boundary setters of important practices and ideas such as participation and democracy and that others not capable themselves of making such definitions, would have these things bestowed upon them and would be permitted to enjoy them only under the circumstances deemed suitable by the United States (1996: 139).

In the final chapter I will explore in greater detail how humanitarianism helps to construct the identities and meanings of displaced populations, Haitians, and failed states.

**Humanitarianism as a Mechanism of Security**

In the last few decades, many academics, policy makers, activists and advocates have discussed the increasing securitization of societies. The securitization of migration is one aspect that is hotly debated, but securitization is related not just to the closing down of borders, or the proliferation in technologies of security but also reflects a changing discourse through which nation-states and the citizen are being constructed. Foucault describes security as a mechanism to maintain and control at the level of the population. (Foucault 2007). The discourses of security are increasingly being deployed and power is functioning through the mechanisms of security. Foucault (2007) defines the relationship between governmentality and security apparatuses as:

The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. The tendency which over a long period and throughout the West has steadily led towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government, resulting on one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of saviors (102).
Humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security and governmentality can be understood by at least two related and interdependent processes. The first process is what Bigo (2002) describes as the “governmentality of unease,” which describes how the discourses of securitization are legitimized through various methods. This leads to (and is enforced by) the second process, which is biopower and the control and maintenance of internally displaced populations receiving humanitarian assistance at the level of the population. One fundamental aspect of this move to securitization is the framing of threats. Threats are constructed by the discourses and practices of security and security mechanisms are enacted to control and manage the threats.

Humanitarianism, an institution of global governance, is operating as a mechanism of securitization. Increasingly, humanitarian crises are being framed as threats to security and stability; the humanitarian industry is one global reaction to this. The 1990s saw an increase in the level of military involvement in humanitarian crises (Barnett 2005, Macrae 2001), from peacekeeping troops in Kosovo (1998) to the military occupation in Somalia (1992). The lines between military action and humanitarianism have become blurred and military action is justified in the name of human rights and peace. The use of the military in humanitarian crises reflects a shift in what humanitarian action looks like and means. When it comes to interventions, the framing of displaced persons as security threats justifies the use of military forces and other mechanisms of control over the displaced populations.

Additionally, humanitarian crises spark increased fears of immigration, in the case of the earthquake in Haiti to the United States and Canada. This fear coincides with the securitization of migration, in which immigrants are constructed as a threat to the order
and stability of the nation-state. Bigo (2002) discusses the securitization of immigration as not only the result of racism and the rise of the far right in the political arena, but also reflective of how we understand citizenship, the nation, and belonging:

Securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the *habitus* of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the foreigner but in the “immigrant.” These interests correlated with the globalization of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders. It is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life (2002: 3).

Huysman (2006) discusses the objective and subjective nature of security threats and insecurity and highlights the role politics and economics have in shaping the policies and procedures that further securitization. The level of attention security threats receive depends on a hierarchy of threats constructed by policy makers, the media and the public. One mechanism for dealing with these threats, especially persons who are displaced internally, is through humanitarianism and the humanitarian industry.

The treatment of displaced persons highlights the subjective nature of the framing and creating of security threats. Aradau (2004) describes how trafficked sex workers are both victims in need of aid and security threats at the same time. The coupling of humanitarian aid and security mechanisms is what Aradau calls the “politics of pity” merging with the “politics of risk.” In a sense, the very act of being at risk causes a population to be a risk. This is not a new process, but how the international community, governments and institutions deal with these risky populations is increasingly securitized. Aradau writes, “to expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical interventions
with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking” (2004: 253). The same can be said for international humanitarian aid. The humanitarian industry is a practical means of managing populations that have been displaced. The willingness of the international community to respond to disasters is not solely the result of displaced populations being framed as security threats, it also reflects the “politics of pity,” which rely on emotional appeals to help people in need. However, the “symptomatic subversion of pity by risk” (Aradau 2004: 255) is affecting humanitarian policies and programs.

Doty, as addressed earlier, discusses the politics of representation and how labeling and defining a population as the “other” creates a subjective reality to rely on when creating policies and programs. These identities have long been in place. Though they change, a fundamental divide in identity construction between the North and the South remains. This construction allows for intervention and

these representational strategies are intensified in times of crisis when naturalized identities and the existing order are at risk of being called into question. This is consistent with the notion of hegemonizing practices intensifying during times of organic crisis when the North was confronted with the potential loss of control and authority (Doty 1996: 12).

The times of crisis can be understood as environmental crises such as earthquakes, hurricanes, or droughts, or it can be tied to war, conflict and the failed state. In either case, as Huysman (2006) and Malmvig (2006) discuss, the decision to intervene is based on a series of factors in which risks are calculated and ranked.

Using humanitarianism as a mechanism of security relies on the framing of displaced persons as security threats. By constructing bodies or nations or communities as potential threats to stability and security, it allows, enables and justifies the use of humanitarianism. If populations are framed as violent and dangerous, it is necessary for
aid distribution to protect the safety of those involved. The case of the response to the Haiti earthquake highlights the level of control the international community has over displaced Haitians. The media and the humanitarian aid organizations represent Haitians, particularly Haitian men, as risks and threats. It is considered common knowledge that Haiti is a failed, fragile and/or insecure state, and that the men are volatile and dangerous. This was true even before the earthquake. As discussed in chapter one, the United States has sent military operations to Haiti since the early 1900s and since the coup d’état in 2004, the UN has maintained a peace keeping force in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Thus the construction of Haitian bodies as security threats has existed for years, but the international response to the earthquake of 2010 reveals how the securitization discourses and mechanisms have affected the distribution of aid. This is most readily seen in the military response to the humanitarian disaster, but is also evidenced in the use of humanitarian organization’s control over the Haitian population. The two are not unrelated and they reveal a trend towards securing, monitoring and controlling threatening populations.

The United States military sent sixteen thousand troops (BBC News 2010) and the UN deployed seven thousand troops to respond to the Haiti earthquake (Beaumont and Tran 2010). The military troops were sent for at least two reasons: The first was to effectively and efficiently distribute aid. The advanced technologies of the military, particularly the American military, were seen as better able to distribute aid than the humanitarian organizations on the ground. The second reason was security. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that, "In addition, the marines assigned to 24 MEU will be able to provide an additional force
capable of providing a secure environment for the ongoing relief efforts ashore in Haiti" (BBC News 2010). The United States military was one of the main distributors of aid and assisted most major humanitarian organizations, including World Health Organization, by creating a “secure environment” during the distribution of aid. The military presence was expected to reduce rioting and looting. Also, according to an Associated Press article, “Each American dollar roughly breaks down like this: 42 cents for disaster assistance, 33 cents for United States military aid, nine cents for food, nine cents to transport the food, five cents for paying Haitian survivors for recovery efforts, just less than one cent to the Haitian government, and about half a cent to the Dominican Republic” (Fisch 2010). The distribution of aid money reveals that the second highest amount goes to security.

International organizations and non-Haitian aid workers have the majority of the control in the distribution of aid. The earthquake in Haiti devastated the country’s capital and as such has greatly affected the economy and the ability of the country to produce and distribute food and water. The Haitian people needed assistance and will continue to need assistance in the coming months to survive. What is problematic, however, is the level of control the international community (by way of humanitarian organizations) have on the bodies of the Haitian people. The international community now controls not only the eating schedules of displaced Haitians, but also which Haitians receive food aid. It controls where they sleep and their access to health care. The camps are policed and securitized on a twenty-four-hour basis and they are under strict surveillance.

The media coverage of the humanitarian industry in Haiti following the earthquake highlights the level of control the international community has over the lives
and bodies of Haitians. One Al Jazeera headline reads, “The World Food Programme (WFP) has temporarily halted food aid to about 10,000 survivors of Haiti’s earthquake after some people tried to use fake coupons to secure rations” (2010). The WFP, in an attempt to punish a few Haitians who were cheating the system, is able to withhold food from tens of thousands of people, many of whom were obeying the rules dictated by the organization. The humanitarian aid workers are able to decide who is able to eat and who is not and the humanitarian organizations now wield much more power than the Haitian government, which is perceived as being largely ineffective at distributing aid. However, as is evidenced in how American aid has been distributed, the Haitian government, which was crippled by the earthquake, received little to no humanitarian assistance. In a New York Times article about the coupon system, Haitians who had not received food aid were described as “desperate, hungry and still not satisfied, they said they were looking for the white men in control of food distribution. They needed coupons. They needed to eat” (New York Times 2010)

“Aid workers helped Romaine Vincent Donal, 44, load her belongings in wheelbarrows... She said she couldn’t wait to leave, though she didn’t know where she was going” (Mozingo 2010) reads an article from the Los Angeles Times on 11 April 2010. With hurricane season approaching, fears of flooding in makeshift camps prompted many to be relocated. The international community and aid workers had complete control of where the camps were to be relocated and as the quote suggests, Haitians not only had no part in the decisions to relocate, but were often unaware of their destination or the location of the new camps.
Haitian IDP camps as security sites

International organizations, operating as mechanisms of governmentality, thus represent the importance of security in the distribution of aid and the management of IDP camps. Valerie Kaussen, deploying Agamben’s concept of the state of exception, details how the Haitian IDP camp reveals a move toward “the camp” as a site of exception:

What all these spaces share is the suspension of national, territorial law and its replacement by police power. Those who reside in these legal dead zones are no longer “citizens”; they live in a state of exception to the law of the land and—“exceptions” that are becoming more and more the rule. Haiti’s IDP camps are indeed “states of exception” that risk becoming permanent fixtures in the post-earthquake urban landscape in and around Port-au-Prince. While Haitian law applies as a matter of course to IDP residents who remain Haitian citizens, in practice, the “rights” of these individuals do not have the full backing of the law but depend on the goodwill of the organization or person in charge—often with the support of the Haitian National Police, privately hired gunmen, and the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (2011: 37).

The camps are states of exception in that they exist both within the realm of law, but also outside of it. There is no universal international governing body to regulate the operations of the camps and Haitian law seemingly does not apply. The inability of Haitian law to provide basic human rights for its displaced citizens is not a simple case of the state’s failure, as will be discussed in the final chapter, but also the power the humanitarian organizations wield over the Haitian population. This power, as illustrated in the IDP camp as a “state of exception,” means that humanitarian organizations are in complete control over the distribution of basic services to the majority of the Haitians displaced by the 2010 earthquake.

This analysis is critical to understanding Haitian IDP camps and Humanitarian organizations, but for the remainder of this chapter, I will examine how mechanisms of security are influencing how the displaced Haitians and IDP camps are dealt with and
administered. The issue of security is important to how the international community, the Haitian state, and the displaced population interact. Miguel De Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet in their 2008 article “Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security” articulate the increasing role of security in humanitarian practices:

Human security is instrumental in sovereign power’s ability to delineate the circumstances in which such a state of exception can be proclaimed. What the discourse of human security does, whether broad or narrow, is to help define the exceptional circumstances that require the international community’s intervention, whether on behalf of humanitarian imperatives as initially conceived or in the service of maintaining global order as made evident more recently (532).

Therefore, the humanitarian organization, operating as an apparatus of the sovereign exception, contributes to an increase in the securitization of particular societies. Security is articulated in two important ways in Haitian IDP camps. The first is the issue of the physical safety and security of Haitians and aid workers. The second is through the manner in which the camps are administered. The administration of camps reveals the ways in which security operates as a means of managing displaced Haitians as a population.

There is a large international police and military presence on the ground in Haiti. One cluster meeting I attended discussed the need for the foreign military in Haiti. The goals of the military were not necessarily to save lives, alleviate suffering, or prepare for another disaster but instead to “create security” (United Nations Cluster Meeting presentation 2010). International NGOs hire security consultants and security “concerns” dominate the conversations at UN cluster meetings. International aid workers have strict curfews and live in gated communities with security guards. Many voiced concern over the lack of security during aid distributions. The representative from Samaritan’s Purse I
spoke with said that security was a major concern during distributions, and that they were unable to afford their own private security. However, when pressed, he said that in the six months he had been working in Haiti there had only been one “security event” in which a group of men attempted to take over a distribution truck and the UN showed up within five minutes and “neutralized the situation.” According to the security advisor for ICRC, his number one priority was the protection of aid workers.

I am not arguing that the safety of aid workers is not important, or that an organization should not be concerned with the health and safety of its employees – because, as one Red Cross worker said, “who wants to call someone’s parents and tell them their child has been kidnapped and murdered?” (Interview with Red Cross aid worker 2010). However I do want to question the focus on security and the practical implementations of security measures on the displaced populations. How do security measures ultimately impact displaced Haitians and do they actually ensure their safety? Or are they instead just another mechanism of security in which populations are framed as being in need of security and certain lives (those of international aid workers) are deemed worthy of saving while others are not?

The emphasis on the security of aid workers from the threat of displaced Haitians reveals the power of representational practices of Haitians as security threats. Although the physical “security” presence is important for understanding the situation in the IDP camps, it is also important to understand how security is “managed.” The mechanisms of security do not attempt to eliminate security threats altogether, but instead attempt to manage them on the level of the population. Quoting Foucault, Larrinaga and Doucet explain the management of threat as follows:
One of the key dynamics in Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between security and circulation is, therefore, that security’s object remains beyond its grasp, that the deployment of the technologies of security is done within a context marked by the impossibility of eliminating insecurity altogether. It is a project, as Foucault (2007: 20) notes, that is oriented towards a future that is “not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable”, and good management “takes into account precisely what might happen” (2008: 524).

One MINUSTAH spokesman at an NGO coordination meeting defined security as safety and ensuring continuity. He stated, “the security protocol is monitoring.” Creating an atmosphere of “security” is not about eliminating security threats, which would be difficult given that Haitian men are often monolithically represented as potential threats, but instead is a means of managing and controlling threats.

One method of management is data collection. Data collection includes conducting censes of camp populations and services, map making, and creating labels and distinctions between populations, for example what constitutes a “camp” versus a “tent settlement”, or classifying levels of vulnerability. Data collection is, in one hand, the result of the bureaucratization of humanitarian organizations. Large bureaucratic organizations require data for grant reporting, accountability, and as a method of managing money, employees, and their constituents, in this case, the internally displaced Haitians.

Data collection, however, is also related to the mechanisms of security that seek to manage populations. As the MINUSTAH representative stated, security is managing. One of the major focuses of large humanitarian organizations is surveillance and data collection. One Haitian camp manager I spoke to complained that to the IOM “data is more important than camp infrastructure” (interview with camp manager 2010). The UN and IOM have sophisticated needs assessment surveys, for which it can take up to six
weeks to gather the information. There are comprehensive and rolling diagnoses to
determine the situations in the camps. Another camp manger said he went to an IOM
Camp Manager training session. He said it lasted four hours and focused almost
exclusively on gathering statistics and on how to “get a grip on the situation” (interview
with camp manager 2010).

Another important aspect of management is the ranking and categorizing of
vulnerabilities. Part of the data collection and surveillance is the determination of who is
most deserving of aid and who is most vulnerable. In the following chapter, I will explore
how Haitian women and children are framed as in need of protection from Haitian males.
What is also interesting is the role “vulnerability” plays in the distribution of aid in the
camps. After blanket distributions of aid ended, organizations began to focus on
distributing aid to “vulnerable populations.” The definition of vulnerability tended to vary
between organizations, but the theme of ranking vulnerabilities remained the same. For
example, Samaritan’s Purse had a form with boxes to check in order to receive food
packets. One had to check at least two boxes to receive the distributions. The checklist
included: displaced people without housing, people with AIDS, disabled, the very young,
the very old, pregnant, or single mothers. The ability to determine vulnerability is a
reflection of the power relations between humanitarian aid workers and the displaced
populations. Additionally, in order to check one of the boxes the Haitian had to provide
documentation proving vulnerability. Not only were Haitians forced to defend their
vulnerability, the documentation was a means of surveillance and a way of categorizing
them into distinguishable groups of vulnerable populations.
As illustrated before, a contradictory dualism exists in the narratives of displacement. The decision of who will receive humanitarian aid is not based solely on a perceived level of vulnerability but also on who most deserves aid. For example, a group of tents is not an IDP camp unless the IOM and the UN determine it is. The determination rests on an arbitrarily decided number of tents/people, location of the camp, and if there is camp management. With the distinction of an official “IDP camp” comes a promise of aid distributions and also surveillance. The process of deciding which camps are “real” camps and not just tent settlements is based on a series of surveys and censes. Additionally, “vulnerability” does not necessarily give a displaced “vulnerable” Haitian more access to services. Instead, aid workers also have the discretion to determine if a displaced person deserves the aid. In deciding who receives more permanent housing (wooden structures with plastic tarps as walls), people who were employed and owned houses prior to the earthquake are given preferential access.

Security is increasingly framed as the first step to achieving development, human rights, and good governance. As UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan stated in 2004:

Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in United Nations 2004: vii)

Annan is suggesting two things. The first is that without security, there is no development, yet ironically, he is also suggesting that poverty (and underdevelopment) breeds insecurity. This is a theme that I have suggested throughout this thesis, namely the cyclical and often contradictory ways in which poverty, security and humanitarianism are
represented within the discourses of politicians, the media and humanitarian organizations. It speaks first to the intangibility of the causes and sources of insecurity, as well as to the ultimate inability to fully achieve a secure society or a secure world and instead demands for an increase in the mechanisms of security.

Humanitarianism is a mechanism that is now being deployed by the international community in response to the growing influences of discourses of security. Humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security is related to the securitization of migration in that both are responses to global attempts to secure nation-states from real and perceived threats. It does not matter if the threats will actually endanger the nation-state or its citizens. Humanitarianism as a mechanism of security operates as a means and justification for controlling and monitoring populations. Humanitarianism, as a mechanism of global governance is one mechanism that responds to security threats through means of biopower and control. Agamben in *Homo Sacer* (1998) writes that, “humanitarian organizations are in perfect symmetry with state power” and “humanitarian organizations can only grasp human life in the figure of bare or sacred life and therefore, despite themselves maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight” (133). Humanitarianism has always been linked to governments and the international community and has always been an institutions of power, however, as the discourses of security become more influential, humanitarianism increasingly operates as a mechanism of securitization.
Chapter Three: Representational Practices and the Construction of Threat

Thus far this thesis has explored the relationships between security, governance, humanitarianism and intervention in Haiti. Critically analyzing the dominant discourses about humanitarianism and their relationship to sovereignty and governmentality shows the construction of Haitians and the Haitian state as being in need of security and security mechanisms. This chapter explores the importance of representational practices in relation to humanitarianism and the Haitian population and state. Haitians are discursively portrayed in a particular way that justifies intervention and securitization. Understanding the power dynamics and the relationships between power, sovereignty and the construction of meanings and identities is critical to understanding the humanitarian response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In this chapter, I hope to challenge the ahistorical and static representation of Haitians and the Haitian state as needing humanitarian assistance, as being violent and as posing a security threat. I will also interrogate the assumption that Haiti is a “failed” or “fragile” state. Instead, I suggest that these representations are reflections of the relationship between power and knowledge, humanitarian organizations and states, and the perceptions and construction of the “other.” The chapter will examine the relationships between humanitarianism, poverty and security to illuminate the power of discursive representations and identities in the construction of who needs humanitarian assistance and how to best deliver humanitarian aid.
Representational practices of Haitians

“Haiti was a disaster and then the earthquake happened”

Popular saying among humanitarian aid workers in Haiti

The popular representations of Haiti and the Haitian population have long been discussed in terms of race, culture, religion, poverty, and ideas of backwardness. Using the language of humanitarianism and intervention has allowed the interveners, be it the UN or the United States government, to influence how Haiti is portrayed. This portrayal of Haitians, as being in need of assistance, as being incapable of governing themselves, as being violent or mob like, has justified the long history of involvement of the international community in Haiti. The relationship of domination, or intervention, is not static or linear either, but instead works cyclically: Representational practices construct meaning and identities, which in turn justify interventions, which are then employed to further create and justify the constructed identities.

Foucault’s discussions about power can help to conceptualize the role of discursive power in interventions. Power cannot be understood as being unidirectional, as something that one owns or possesses, but instead as something one practices. Understanding power in a relational way helps us to see how humanitarian aid workers, by utilizing the narratives created by their organizations and the governments that fund them, are helping to perpetuate the dominant discourses of Haitians and the role of international interventions in Haiti. During my fieldwork in Haiti, I found that each time I sat with international aid workers and asked them questions about their work in Haiti, they were able to repeat almost verbatim the information found on the websites of their organizations. Most organizations have mission statements and protocols that must be
followed and predetermined talking points when dealing with reporters and researchers. Naturally, this is a result of the bureaucratization, institutionalization, and rationalization of humanitarian organizations, but it also reflects how discourses are produced and reproduced through the humanitarian organizations.

Drawing on Foucault and those influenced by his discourses, I will to discuss how the representational practices of Haitians, via humanitarian operations and institutions has helped, or justified, the framing of displaced Haitians and the Haitian state as security threats to themselves, to aid workers, and to the international community. This first section will outline the discursive representational practices of the international community about Haiti and Haitians and how interventions and humanitarian assistance aids in the production of meanings and identities. Roxanne Doty, in *Imperial Encounters* (1996) outlines the relationship between the North and the South and the discursive power of identity construction in understanding the presumed natural conflicts between the “north” and the “south.” She calls these interactions “asymmetrical encounters”:

Arguably one of the most consequential elements present in all of the encounters between the North and the South has been the practice(s) of representation by the North of the South. By representation I mean the ways in which the South has been discursively represented by policy makers, scholars, journalists and others in the North. This does not refer to the “truth” and “knowledge” that the North has discovered and accumulated about the South, but rather to the ways in which the regimes of “truth” and “knowledge” have been produced. The contexts within which specific encounters have taken place and the issues relevant to these contexts have been occasions for the proliferation and circulation of various representations (Doty 1996: 2).

Doty provides an important framework through which to understand not only identity, but also conceptualizations of culture, race, and poverty and how these issues are
intertwined with our understanding of identity as something that is not natural, but discursively produced.

There is a certain perceived naturalness about the relationship between Haiti and the international community. This perception is historically rooted in the past encounters of the international community with Haiti as was illustrated in the section about Haiti’s history of humanitarianism and intervention. Yet, the framing of displaced persons in Haiti is not unique. Citizens of the global south or migrant populations in the north are all discursively represented in particular ways that reflect unequal power distributions. I argue that the construction of dominant discourses about populations ‘in need’ of intervention allows for humanitarianism to function as a mechanism of governance. When intervention is framed as humanitarian or as a civilizing mission, or as bringing democracy or as a state building project, it reveals the ability of the interveners to construct what intervention is, who is able to intervene, and ultimately who is deserving of intervention. Those who are doing the intervention define the rules of the game and the actors involved. The reasons for intervention are presumed to be economic (for example, development or modernization projects) or militaristic (for example, human rights intervention, peacekeeping missions) but the social and cultural difference between communities is taken as a given.

Doty describes the realm of politics as the space “wherein the very identities of peoples, states, and regions are constructed through representational practices” (1996: 2). Doty focuses on how Foucault’s work on power can help to understand how political identities are constructed. When Judith Butler, in Precarious Life, asks, “What makes for a grievable life?” (2004: 20), she is ultimately asking who counts as a political subject?
What are the politics of mourning and grieving? Who gets mourned and who gets swept aside? Claudia Aradau (2004) discusses the politics of risk and the politics of pity when dealing with trafficked women. The women are represented as something to be both pitied and feared. However, these two politics are not contradictory but instead form and influence each other. As soon as the trafficked women are considered deserving of pity they also represent a risk. Haitians can be described in the same way; their poverty makes them both pitiful and dangerous. The depoliticization and repoliticization of populations and people is important in our understanding of how the millions of displaced Haitians are not only represented in the “realm of politics” but also how humanitarian organizations respond to their displacement. Agamben in his explorations of the phenomenon of “bare life” or homo sacer describes this space of politicization and depoliticization as a sovereign sphere “in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice and sacred life- that is life that may be killed but not sacrificed- is the life that has been captured in this sphere” (1995: 83). Creating representations of “others” is not an unbiased portrayal of cultural or ethnic difference, but instead occurs as a means of separating and constructing an identity that can be contrasted with others and dealt with accordingly.

This chapter will focus on the relationship between poverty, security and humanitarianism within this realm of politics. Haiti is represented as “the poorest country in the western hemisphere” and Haitians as being accustomed to violence and deprivation, poverty and hunger. “Haiti was a disaster and then the earthquake hit” was an oft-repeated slogan by aid and missionary workers in Haiti. What hope is there for this small, abject country where women and children eat mud? As a 2008 *Guardian* article
states, “Haiti: Mud cakes become staple diet as cost of food soars beyond a family’s reach”? The lives of Haitians are less grievable not just because of racism or imperialism, but also because of their poverty and the extremity of their situation. Haitians represent the limits of the possibilities of human suffering; the majority of the population was impoverished, hungry and abused even before the earthquake hit and their state has “failed.” Dominant discourses on Haiti portray it “as a place where the ordinary constraints of human society do not apply “(Fischer 2007: 2).

Sybille Fischer (2007) wrote Haiti: Fantasies of Bare Life in which she uses Agamben’s conceptualization of bare life to criticize media and photographic representations of Haitians. Understanding the portrayal of the Haitian body through the lens provided by the concept of bare life is crucial to understanding how Haitians are represented. Although for the remainder of this thesis I will focus on other aspects of representational practices, specifically the portrayal of Haitians as a population in need of intervention and security, I believe that this analysis deserves mention and is not unrelated. I think that Fischer’s article articulates well the representation of Haitians as depoliticized “others”, and the manner in which these representations are often manifested in portrayals of Haitians as bodies in suffering. Fischer explains her tactic as,

Appropriating Agamben’s term, fantasies of “bare life”—where I take “bare life” to be an emblem of a highly ambivalent attitude toward bodily degradation of humans. What happens when we rhetorically, philosophically, or photographically reduce human beings to their mere physical being, to their suffering, to their mortality? (2007: 4)

Focusing on a book of photographs by photographer Bruce Gilden, Haiti (1996), Fischer explores how the photographic representation of Haitians as bare lives, as depoliticized
bodies, is illustrative of not just the exploitative nature of disaster photography but also as a means of conceptualizing the political nature of suffering and leaving the viewer with a particular understanding of Haitians as bare life. In this way,

Haiti is returned to the reader as the bare-boned, incomprehensible place of unspeakable cruelty and bodily suffering, of Tonton Macoutes and “voodoo doctors” and corpses drifting in muddy swimming pools, as a liminal space on the edge of Western civilization, without the social and political practices and taboos that constitute life in Western society (Fischer 2007: 3).

Fischer wrote this article in 2007. Arguably, the photographic representations of Haitian earthquake victims only further serves to prove her (and Agamben’s) point. Haitians are portrayed as bodies that are caught in the limits of the sovereign exception. What purpose does it serve the public to show images of mass graves or of children in hospitals with amputated arms? Fischer’s argues that it reveals the depoliticized nature of Haitians in the public eye and ultimately it is reflective of the representational practices that produce identity and meaning that create and circulate (and thus perpetuate) our understandings of Haitians as apolitical, suffering beings. As Fischer argues,

Representation of violence creates a certain form of complicity because it engages psychical structures of attraction and repulsion. Historical, philosophical, or representational contextualization, the restoration of contingency, and the reflexive awareness of standpoint, by contrast, work against this complicity (2007: 8).

For the remainder of this section, I will discuss the discursive representation of Haiti and Haitians within academia, the media, and humanitarian organizations and how particular identities are constructed to encourage or explain intervention and humanitarianism. Two major themes can be discerned in academic articles and books, media reports and

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5 Disaster Photography is a sensationalist and objectifying means of portraying disaster victims. Disaster photography often portrays humans in a violent and inhumane way
humanitarian policies and programs that I would like to focus on concerning how Haiti is portrayed and represented. The first is the word hope. I would never suggest that hopes and dreams are problematic, but instead want to focus on the representational implications of one having “hope” for Haiti. The second is what I will call “blaming history.” Academic writing, the media and humanitarian policies about Haiti often discuss the reasons for Haiti’s underdevelopment and poverty and their portrayal of Haiti’s history is illustrative of how representations of Haiti are cultivated and constructed.

Is there “Hope” for Haiti?

“Haiti, poorest of countries in the Western Hemisphere, may now have some chance to move into the future with greater hope for peace and economic advancement” (Catholic Web 2006). Questioning if Haiti can ever move into the “future” and if Haiti has “hope” to overcome its instability and underdevelopment paints a particular discursive picture of Haiti and Haitians. Haitians are represented as the poorest of the poor and their poverty along with their violent history seems to be insurmountable. Hope, these authors seem to suggest, is something Haitians may not have or something that must be given to them. Hans Veeken, an MSF aid worker, wrote an article for British Medical Journal about his trip to Haiti in 1993 titled “Hope for Haiti?” Discussing the preparations for a trip to a small island off the coast of Haiti, Veeken provides us with a gold mine of stereotypical representations of Haiti and Haitians:

Nobody in town, however, could give me any sensible information on the current situation on the island. Nobody had been there, but everybody had a horror story to discourage me. “Take along drinking water because there is typhoid,” was the advice given to me as I left for the island. The “tap-tap”, a small van meant for
public transport, wriggled through the outskirts of Port au Prince. As usual, we first had to refuel. At the gas station I noticed, instead of the normal pool of oil, a pool of blood on the ground. To my astonishment I discovered in the bushes at the side a corpse, beheaded. “Military,” said my companion. The facts of the case did not seem to bother anybody; they are used to terror. (1993: 2)

Within a single paragraph Veeken broadly sweeps through the culture of rumors and paranoia, to a reference to “tap-taps” the “small van meant for public transport”, implying perhaps their inefficiency or in the very least their exoticness, to finally, of course, a beheaded corpse and the subsequent “used to terror” analysis. Not all academic articles are as blatant in their representations of Haiti, but the theme remains. Haiti is hopeless, caught in a vicious cycle of violence and poverty. It is a cycle that millions of dollars of aid and thousands of nonprofits have not been able to break and that Haitians, ultimately, are “used to.”

Following the 2010 earthquake celebrities and non-profit organizations quickly organized a fundraising event similar in nature to Band Aid, a “charity super group” founded in 1984 to donate money to famine relief in Ethiopia. Hope for Haiti was based on a similar principle: A large group of celebrities and musicians came together for a musical fundraising telethon. While there were multiple criticisms of organizational problems - Wyclf Jean’s organization, Yele Haiti, which hosted the event has had multiple problems with the Internal Revenue Service, and there has been speculation that some of the charity’s money has gone to rent and recording studios (The Smoking Gun 2010) - I would rather focus on the discursive importance of an entire population “having hope”, and on the power relations inherent in the idea that celebrities, bands, people from Western countries, etc., can “give hope”. Much like the language of “empowerment” through which development agencies attempt to give power to the powerless, giving
“hope”- an intangible but important emotion- to Haitians reveals the language of intervention and humanitarianism. Hope for Haiti is something that must be bestowed on Haitians by outside populations, because ultimately without foreign intervention, they are potentially hopeless.

The power of hope within the realm of humanitarian discourses is not lost on economists either. Paul Collier, a financial advisor for the United Nations states optimistically, “Haiti is not hopeless” in his report for the Secretary General of the United Nations: *Haiti: From Natural Disaster to Economic Security* in 2009. There is room for economic growth by focusing on the opening up of free trade agreements, reducing tariffs on exports, and improving the garment industry. Collier discusses the appropriately named HOPEII, a free trade agreement that “gave Haiti uniquely favorable preferential access to the US market” (2009: 3). Collier believes that Haiti does have hope and it lies in free market capitalism.

The deployment of the word hope in discussions about Haiti reveals both the power dynamics between Haiti and its benefactors, (i.e., the international community at large), and the ability to “give hope” to a potentially hopeless population caught in unimaginable poverty. This downward cycle of poverty and violence leads us to the second issue, namely, the blaming of Haiti’s history.

*History of Misery*

“The root explanation of errant Haiti probably lies in the circumstances of the independence of which it is so proud” (Crassweller 1971).

Academic and newspaper articles and policy reports about Haiti often start with a brief overview of the history of Haiti. They often begin with a discussion of Haiti as the “pearl
of Antilles,” the triumph of the first successful slave revolution, and then the subsequent decline into poverty and isolation. They rarely fail to mention the debt owed to France and the violent coups that have plagued the country since it achieved independence. What is problematic about this narrative is not the recognition that history has played a part in the making of modern Haiti, but instead the deterministic discussion about Haiti. Haiti is portrayed as being caught in a vicious cycle that it cannot escape. Haitians are portrayed as being caught in the past from which they cannot move forward. As the quote above by the first “Hope for Haiti” article suggests, they cannot move into the future. The lack of hope for Haiti, its inherent hopelessness, is due to its historical situation; it is trapped in its violent past. As Pamela Constable suggests,

After the promising 1990 election, which was heralded as the first step toward democracy, Haiti appears to have slipped back into the tradition of violent, absolutionist politics that have dominated the country during the two centuries of French plantation slavery and another 150 years of despotic, post revolutionary self-rule (1993: 175).

Blaming Haiti’s history, or Haiti’s culture or Haiti’s traditionalism allows for the construction of Haitians as a people who need of foreign assistance and intervention to help them out of their past and into the future, a culture or nation who seem unable to escape their “traditional” cycles of poverty. The academic tradition of painting Haiti’s history as deterministic and insurmountable silences and ignores other understandings of Haiti’s underdevelopment and political violence and constructs a vision of Haiti that allows for intervention and creates and recreates a particular discursive representation of Haiti.

“The Jan. 12, 2010 earthquake is only the latest tragedy in Haiti”s long history of torment and strife” reads the introduction to Time Magazine’s 2010 photo essay “History
of Misery.” In eleven slides, Haiti’s history is described from Christopher Columbus to Papa Doc to the earthquake. Time’s piece paints an easily digestible view of Haiti’s history. In simple terms, Haiti has always been in a state of crisis and Haitians have always been oppressed. Media portrayal of Haitian history as one of misery and torment and strife helps construct the identity of Haitians as that of people stuck in a downward cycle of oppression and violence. Haitians are victims of their own history, which continues to repeat itself in crisis after crisis: The earthquake, the cholera outbreaks, and the hurricanes are only the latest in a long series of events that have battered the small island.

These are only two examples of how discursive representations of Haiti help to construct identities and meanings about Haiti as a country in need of intervention. In the following section I will explore how the international community discursively represents Haiti and Haitians as security threats. The portrayal of Haitians as poor, hopeless and stuck in a cycle of poverty and violence aid in the construction of them as threats to themselves and to international security.

**Construction of the Haitian as a security threat**

Jef Huysmans in *The Politics of Insecurity* (2006) describes the widening of security studies to include non-military threats to states and communities. He focuses particularly on the reframing of immigrants and refugees as security threats to the European Union and the political implications of redefining what security is and how we understand and deal with issues of “security:”

When established knowledge patterns are challenged by means of shifting the meaning of one of its defining concepts both an identity and status problem occur. Moving the meaning of security beyond military threats in an inter-state world did
precisely something along these lines. In blurring the received meaning of the concept of security it challenged and by implication made visible the implicitly agreed and ritualized boundaries of the study of security in international relations (Huysmans 2006: 21).

The increasing number of threats placed under the umbrella of “security” makes defining security and security studies difficult and distracts from the understanding of “security as a technique of government” (Huysmans 2006: 6). However, this thesis is not concerned with how to define security as such, but instead how security, as a mechanism of power, and in turn, humanitarian organizations as a mechanism of security, construct and create security threats and then attend to them.

Constructing Haitians, especially young Haitian males, as security threats is not the result of a simple risk calculation in which the acts of Haitians are enumerated and counted and then determined to be risky, dangerous, or threatening. Instead, it is the result of a social and historical construction of Haitians as risky, dangerous and threatening. As the previous section discussed, Haitians “have a long history of violence” and their abject poverty puts them at the extremes of human suffering. As poverty increasingly becomes a security concern, so too do the impoverished individuals. Isin (2004), drawing on Foucault, describes how biopower developed as a means of managing populations:

Foucault called that power which took as its object to calibrate the relationship between the body and the species-body as biopower. What was new about biopower, he argued, was its simultaneously individualizing and totalizing character. In other words, the object of biopower was a peculiar “calibration”. Governing subjects required a calibration of their conduct to the requirements of species-bodies—economy, population, and society—in a manner that involved fine adjustments to both the body and the species-body (221)
In the case of framing Haitians as security threats, what is of particular interest in this passage is the concept of the “simultaneously individualizing and totalizing character” of biopower and governmentality under neoliberalism. The individual, in this case the Haitian, is constructed as a security threat to the community, to women and children, and to international aid workers. Within constructing the Haitian individual as a threat there is a simultaneous creation of a totalizing character of all Haitians as security threats. This construction thus allows for an increase in control over the population by humanitarian organizations.

Bigo’s analysis in “Governmentality of Unease” (2002) provides us with a framework for understanding how the professionals in the “management of unease” construct threats and identify risks to their polity:

It [the polity] is a “war-based polity,” a condition of generalized confrontation that is no longer able to distinguish between private and public enemies. Because it is based on claims about the need for survival at any price, on a real and permanent struggle anchored in an eschatology of the worst kind, it generates a distress policy, a misgiving policy, that transforms any change and any risk into an intentional threat or enemy. Here is the main technique of securitization, to transform structural difficulties and transformations into elements permitting specific groups to be blamed, even before they have done anything, simply by categorizing them, anticipating profiles of risk from previous trends, and projecting them by generalization upon the potential behavior of each individual pertaining to the risk category. (81)

Although framing Haitians as security threats may not be new, the professionalization and institutionalization of the unease about risks and threats is, as Bigo describes. Portraying Haitians as risks and threats to the international community, to Haitian women and to themselves is not just about racism (which I will discuss later), but is also about the management of unease. The securitization of Haitian IDPs and IDP camps is about
categorizing, blaming and transforming the Haitian into a risk that needs to be secured against.

Claudia Aradau (2004) describes the relationship between humanitarianism, security, and governmentality in the case of trafficked women:

To expose the perverse relation between the humanitarian and security articulations, I shall consider them as governmental processes: practical interventions with the purpose of managing the phenomenon of trafficking. Coined by Michel Foucault, “government” in this sense refers to acting on the actions of individuals, taken either singly or collectively, so as to shape, guide, conduct and modify the ways in which they conduct themselves. (253)

Humanitarian organizations, by identifying Haitians as security threats in need of securing against are thus able to maintain an increasing level of control over the internally displaced Haitians. The act of framing and constructing Haitians as threats is fundamental to humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security because it maintains that the Haitians need security and that “we” need to be secured against the Haitians. Security is necessary to development and only the international community, via humanitarian organizations and the military, are able to create a secure environment for Haitians. Haitians need to be secure in order to be protected from themselves.

MINUSTAH has been operating as a national policing force for the protection of aid workers and securitizing the distribution centers and the distribution process to safeguard against rioting and violence. The international community has framed Haitian men as violent bodies that threaten not only the political stability of Haiti, but also the lives of Haitian women and the aid workers distributing aid. In the New York Times of February 2, an article about the food distribution coupons states, “On at least two days last week, United Nations troops used tear gas after a mass of men rushed the food distribution point and began grabbing what they could” (Cave and Thompson 2010). The
use of MINUSTAH and military force during aid distribution and in the camps is a means of controlling and supervising Haitian bodies and Haitians are constructed as threats to themselves, to women, and to aid workers.

Haitians as Threats to Themselves

Haitian men are represented as rioting, looting and being generally violent. The earthquake caused massive chaos in which everyone in Haiti was a potential victim. The Times writes on January 18, “Convoys of lorries headed for the city’s worst-hit areas last night but there were signs they had come too late to prevent another tragedy, with Haitians turning on each other” (New York Times 2010). In the first month after the earthquake hit, nearly every news article made a comment on either rioting or looting. The international community was deeply concerned with the insecurity caused by the earthquake and the subsequent rioting and looting, as well as the prisoners who escaped from the Haitian jails:

UN officials believe the prisoners rioted after the quake, overwhelmed the guards and escaped, Anderson Cooper reported. "When you have criminals, bandits, assassins who terrorize the population - and we have all those types here – it’s a big problem for the country," the prison’s warden Alexandre Jean Herisse, told Cooper (CBS News 2010).

An Associated Press article reads, “Fear of looters and robbers has been one of the factors slowing the delivery of aid” (2010) and a Christian Science Monitor article states, “Haiti earthquake: despite fears of rioting, US starts airdrops: The US military has held off on doing airdrops of food and water to victims of the Haiti earthquake, fearing they could set off riots. But it now has troops in place to secure airdrop zones” (2010). The articles portray Haitian men as people to fear; the male body is seen as a threat to the order of things.
The discursive representation of Haitians, especially Haitian males as violent security threats not only justified the intervention, but also made it seem necessary, as if the international community had to secure the situation. The discursive representation of Haiti and Haitians as dangerous, desperate and lawless left little room for alternative ways of responding to the earthquake. When I tell people I am writing about the use of military and security apparatuses to respond to the earthquake, most people respond with criticism. The military had to be deployed, “there was chaos”, “the Haitian government was unable to respond”, “there was looting and rioting”. No one seems to questions the assumption that Haitians are threats, risks, and bodies in need of securing against. I am not arguing that rioting and looting did not happen, nor that prisoners did not escape from jails, nor that Haiti was not turned upside down by the earthquake, nor that everyone remained calm and no one resorted to violence. However, I am questioning the focus on insecurity, violence, and theft by the media and humanitarian organizations and what the portrayal of Haitians in this light reveals about the power relations and the means of securing a population from itself.

I also argue that the focus on insecurity was misguided, self-perpetuating, and racist. One example of the media portrayal of disasters, race and insecurity is from Hurricane Katrina. The photos and captions of two men, one black and one white, each carrying food from a grocery store provide a prime example of such framing. The caption under the black man describes the man as “looting” a grocery store, whereas the caption under the white man suggested he was salvaging food for his family. The example clearly exhibits the effects race has on public opinion and the media. Henry A. Giroux (2006),
quoting Zizek, examines how media representations of victims of Hurricane Katrina were racialized and a reflection of race relations in America:

The philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, argued that “what motivated these stories were not facts, but racist prejudices, the satisfaction felt by those who would be able to say: “You see, Blacks really are like that, violent barbarians under the thin layer of civilization!” (2005). It must be noted that there is more at stake here than the resurgence of old-style racism; there is the recognition that some groups have the power to protect themselves from such stereotypes and others do not, and for those who do not—especially poor blacks—racist myths have a way of producing precise, if not deadly, material consequences. Given the public’s preoccupation with violence and safety, crime and terror merge in the all-too-familiar equation of black culture with the culture of criminality, and images of poor blacks are made indistinguishable from images of crime and violence. (176)

The link between race and the portrayal of Haitian men as security threats is clear. Black men have long been framed as violent threatening. I will discuss the issue of race and gender further in the following section.

*Haitian Men as Security Threats to Haitian Women*

The media portrays women and children, lumped together in their vulnerability, as being the victims of Haitian male bodies. After the earthquake some headlines read “Children, women most endangered by post-quake chaos in Haiti” (Xinhua 2010) and “Haitian women become crime targets after quake” (ABC News 2010) and “Haitian girls face increased vulnerability after quake” (Guering 2010) Although it is true that women and children do have a higher level of vulnerability due to patriarchal power structures, it is problematic when all males are rendered as potential security threats, and all women as future rape victims. This obfuscates the multiple factors that contribute to the increase in violence in Haiti following the earthquake.

The monolithic construction of gender into a binary of oppressor versus oppressed, man versus woman, has influenced humanitarian aid distribution in Haiti. As
men are framed as security threats and women as victims in need of protection, the humanitarian aid agencies and other distributors of aid have adjusted their policies accordingly. Women, who are portrayed as domestic, caring, and family-oriented are viewed as more capable of receiving microcredit disaster assistance. Women are also considered less likely to riot and resort to violence while they are waiting in line for aid packages for hours on end. The humanitarian organizations do not trust men to wait patiently in line, nor do they trust them to distribute the aid properly among their families. This fear of rioting has led to the preference for one gender (female) to receive humanitarian aid and assistance (New York Times 2010).

Additionally, there is evidence of racism on an institutional level that suggests that the Haitian people need to be protected from themselves, especially the women from the men. In Gaytri Spivak’s seminal piece, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1985), Spivak made the now famous statement “white men saving brown women from brown men”(93). Although she made this statement a quarter of a decade ago and was referring to the abolition by the English of the suttee practice of women joining their deceased husbands on the funeral pyre during the Victorian era, it still rings true and is revealing of the manner in which the international community responded to the Haitian earthquake. Aid organizations gave preference to female Haitians in the distribution of aid as a means of protecting women from men who may turn violent while waiting in line. One of the main concerns of the humanitarian organizations operating in Haiti’s was the rape of women and children. Countless media articles were devoted to the increased number of in rapes in the aftermath of the earthquake. One Christian Science Monitor article is titled “As if providing food, shelter, and postquake health services wasn’t tough enough, Haiti relief
workers are also focusing on keeping women from being raped as frustrations grow in Port-au-Prince’s tent cities” (2010). In a similar vein, the Australian newspaper, *Herald Sun* writes, “BANDITS are preying on Haiti earthquake survivors, even raping women, in camps set up after the disaster” (2010). Most dramatically, *The Independent* writes “Death, destruction ... and now rape” (2010).

The framing of Haitian women as vulnerable victims and Haitian men as security threats who are undeserving of aid is problematic and potentially damaging. It denies the agency of both men and women who were affected by the disaster by reducing them to either deserving or undeserving, victims or perpetrators. It also has the grave potential of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which men either begin to view themselves as the security threats they are treated as and behave accordingly, or that by denying them access to the services of aid organizations they will be pushed even further into desperation and towards desperate acts.

*Haitians as Threats to Aid Workers*

An article titled, *Aid for the Aid Givers* by Lieutenant General Louis Lillywhite, describes how the health and safety of the humanitarian aid workers is an increasing concern for aid agencies and governments. Preventing attacks against aid workers is now a major theme for humanitarian organizations. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon describes the “threat environments” as:

differentiated by the lack or presence of political motivation. The first is in areas of general unrest where attacks on UN and humanitarian personnel are an extension of the violence being experienced by the civilian population, either as the target of local criminals, organised crime or by individuals in an unending search for survival. It is the second environment which should be of particular concern to the international community. It is in these zones, where the threats are essentially political or politically related, that UN and humanitarian personnel are
increasingly targeted by extremists, armed groups and disenfranchised elements in multiple areas of operation. (Lillywhite 2011: 13).

This article does not specifically address Haiti, but humanitarian organizations are restructuring policies and programs to maintain the safety of their aid workers internationally. In “unstable environments,” the protection of aid workers is a top priority; organizations are increasingly hiring private security firms, and have bodyguards and armored cars. Even though Haiti is not a “war-zone,” it is considered a “failed state” and a conflict zone and therefore the aid workers are in need of protection from the potential threats presented by Haitians.

Security as a mechanism of governmentality manifests itself differently in different spheres of life. For an internally displaced Haitian, security is more related to a form of biopower, an increase in control and surveillance for the purpose of ameliorating the threat posed by a population. Security means “peacekeeping” troops occupying a country for over ten years and differences in access to goods based on gender, or “level of vulnerability.” For aid workers, however, security manifests itself differently, although even for aid workers, security measures entail an increase in control and surveillance. As security presents itself as a dominating discourse in humanitarian aid distribution, aid workers are affected by the security measures from 9:00 p.m. curfews, to armored cars, to hourly “security situation” text messages.

However, the difference comes back to the questions asked at the beginning of this chapter: Whose lives matter? As Butler suggests,

Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to
sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable” (2004: 32)

Haitians as homo sacers, as exceptional bodies caught in the extremes of poverty and suffering, as a population used to violence, death and misery are ultimately less grievable than aid workers from Western countries. There are no mass graves for international aid workers. There are no obituaries for the deceased Haitians. Security for aid workers means keeping them alive and protecting them from the Haitian threat. Security for Haitians means containment.

The humanitarian industry, by framing Haitian men as security threats and Haitian women and international aid workers as needing protection, is better able to enact a heightened level of control over the aid distribution process and the lives of the Haitian people. This unequal power distribution allows the international organizations to have almost complete control of the distribution of food and water, sleeping arrangements, as well as the “security” of the population. Haitians are discursively constructed and represented as security threats, and, as I discuss in the final section, Haiti is constructed as an insecure, failed state.

**Threats to the World Order-The construction of Haiti as a “Failed State”**

What constitutes a threat to the international order, to the security of the system of the nation-states? The nation-state system, which blankets the world with a patchwork quilt of ostensibly equally sovereign states, is the twentieth century’s attempt to eliminate minorities, to give states to all “legitimate” nations and to create a system of states that all follow similar rules and norms. If a state does not follow the rules and norms of the “civilized,” modern world, what is it? How should the “international community”
respond? States that do not comply, states that do not fit into the blanket, states that are
failed, rogue, fragile or weak are considered threats to the system. Failed states are seen
as breeding grounds for international terrorism, for illicit drug smuggling, for refugees
and economic migrants. Bad governance makes one a bad neighbor. The problems of the
failed states spill over into the less failed, more stable states, creating insecurity and
havoc. Threatening their own stability and security, the infiltration of “the other” (e.g.
refugees, immigrants) disrupts the legitimacy of the nation and creates a less homogenous
state. The failed state is more than just a security threat because of terrorism and drugs.
The failed state represents a breakdown in the system of nation-states and produces
fissures in the ostensible desire of the United Nations to give all states equal and absolute
sovereignty, because as addressed earlier, absolute national sovereignty does not and can
not exist.

Labeling a state failed, fragile, weak or rogue, and identifying it as a threat to
national and international security, allows for an increase in military and humanitarian
intervention. The failed state label becomes a mechanism that allows some states to
decide what it means to be a state and to increase the control of the international
community in the failed state. Once a state is labeled “failed,” it is no longer considered a
legitimate nation-state.

The Failed State in International Relations Theory

Failed states, not so long ago, were discussed as a problem of foreign aid or social
theory. Only prescient thinkers and policy makers identified them as a priority of
national security. The atrocities of September 11, 2001, did not make failed states a
problem but very much did trigger recognition that severe civic dysfunction in one
part of the globe might well have consequences elsewhere. An Afghanistan or a
Somalia has first and final responsibility for its own future. At the same time, so
widely can such a state spread disruption that “its” affairs and “ours” now can be
said to be segregated only in a carefully qualified way. New alertness about
national security has brought an unprecedented increase in creative analysis of the problem: What to do about failed states? (Grant 2004: 1)

The prescient thinkers of the failed state as a security threat certainly had foresight about the implications of state failure on Western countries’ perceptions of state security, though perhaps not in the way Grant has suggested. Instead of foreseeing that failed states would become security threats, international relations theories have influenced the construction of what exactly is a threat to state security. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States explicitly states that failed (or in this case “weak”) states are a threat to American national security:

“The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders” (NSS 2002: 4).

The weak and fragile state is viewed as a security threat to the developed world and as such it is in the interest of the Western countries to help develop failed and weak states. Additionally, failed states cost the international community money. USAID reports that failed states “can be costly in financial as well as human terms. The UN estimates that the eight most expensive cases of state collapse in the 1990s cost the international community $250 billion” (2003: 18).

Seth D. Kaplan, one of the most well-known and prolific scholars of fragile states, writes extensively on how to better “develop” fragile states. In the Fixing Fragile States insert he writes,

Fragile states are a menace. Their lawless environments spread instability across borders, provide havens for terrorists, threaten access to natural resources, and consign millions of people to poverty. But Western attempts to reform these
benighted places have rarely made things better... to avoid revisiting the carnage and catastrophes seen in places like Iraq, Bosnia, and the Congo, the West needs to rethink its ideas on fragile states and start helping their peoples build governments and states that actually fit the local landscape (Kaplan 2008).

Kaplan’s approach, which I will explore in detail, reflects the strategy most scholars and policymakers have on “developing” failed and fragile states. Although he claims to offer an alternative approach, his assumptions about what fragile states are—“countries unable to administer their territories effectively” (5) - and the way of “fixing” them- only a sustained and coherent program lasting generations, led by one outside power, and featuring significant foreign involvement in the management of governing bodies and security forces and large investments in the education of local elites can hope to pay dividends” (31)—are strikingly similar to past and current interventions in failed states.

Kaplan argues that a lack of “social cohesiveness” is one of the main factors that influence state failure and weakness. In a chart comparing state characteristics, he lists 14 properties of fragile states (see table below)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragile States</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Formed around diverse population with little shared history and poorly established, weak formal institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Weak national identity overwhelmed by conflicting subnational or supranational identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National governing bodies viewed as illegitimate by a significant number of population; political order highly unstable and difficult to reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. No common set of informal institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dysfunctional governing system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. State sits on top of and is disconnected from society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. State security, administrative, and judicial organs so weak or discriminatory that they exacerbate political fragmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Borders not accepted as legitimate by a significant number of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Low levels of trust and social capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. High costs to hold property and conduct business transactions in most cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Little incentive to invest even if good policies are adopted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Typically unable to avoid natural resource curse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Usually found in region of fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. In some cases, state's undersized market, dearth of human resources, unfavorable geography, or population distribution makes it especially unstable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The first characteristic that is listed is “formed around cohesive group with shared
identity,” while the second is “common national identity.” Throughout *Fixing Fragile
States* the need for a “national identity” crops up again and again. For Kaplan, bad
governance comes from not having a cohesive national identity.

However, it is important to note that Kaplan does not describe Haiti as a “fragile
state.” It instead refers to Haiti as failed. “A completely failed state - such as Somalia,
Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)- is one where the state has
withered away in the face of violence, warlordism, or criminal activity” (Kaplan 2008: 5).
Kaplan’s characterization of state fragility is still useful for understanding discourses
about Haiti, because despite the fact that Kaplan says Haiti is not fragile, the only reason
it is not is because the state has “completely withered away.” If we use Kaplan’s
understanding of state fragility, as if there is a distinct path from stability to instability,
Haiti lies at the very end of the spectrum. But what does Kaplan’s first characteristic of
state fragility – i.e. “Formed around diverse populations with little shared history”- mean
in the case of Haiti? At first glance, it might seem that Kaplan leaves Haiti out because it
does not fit this definition, but if one takes into account the extreme class distinctions in
Haiti, and the extremely long history of class divisions between the very rich and the very
poor, perhaps his analysis is legitimate. Unfortunately, Kaplan is more likely referencing
ethnic diversity.

Robert I. Rotberg is another prolific scholar on the failed state. In his dramatic
slightly different approach to understanding state failure than Kaplan. Rotberg recognizes
that state failure is more complex than ethnic diversity. “Failed states are tense, deeply
conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions” (5). Rotberg outlines both the causes and indicators of failed states, though the differences between the two are obfuscated. The “causes” and “indicators” of state failure include the tendency to have “more potholes” in roads and privatized educational and health systems, which can only be accessed by the upper class (7). Rotberg also cites corruption as an indicator of state failure. “Corruption flourishes in many states, but in failed states it often does so on an unusually destructive scale” (8). Another indicator of state failure is a low or declining GDP. It seems almost a moot point to suggest that many if not all states exhibit at least some of these characteristics. In many, many countries, the United States included, quality healthcare and education is limited to those who can afford it, and one would be hard-pressed to find a single country without potholes in its roads. But Rotberg’s analysis is problematic on another level. States that are deemed failed, fragile, weak or rogue do have more extreme problems. It is difficult to find a road in post-earthquake Haiti without potholes, and in fact, “potholes” do not begin to describe road conditions there. Carrefour, a “suburb” of Port Au Prince, according to Google maps, is nine kilometers from Port Au Prince and should take twelve minutes to reach, but in reality the roads are so impassable it can take up to two hours. Haiti is extremely corrupt, and access to any kind of healthcare or education is and was extremely limited, even before the earthquake. The problem with Rotberg’s analysis is not that these things happen everywhere, but that they are not the causes of state failure. Although I argue in this paper that the failed state is a construction of the international community, there are reasons why Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world. Although it would be foolhardy to blame the international community entirely for impoverishing the world, it is equally ridiculous to not even
mention Western countries’ involvement in the underdevelopment of Haiti (other than referencing how corrupt politicians have misused international aid money).

*Haiti as a Failed, Fragile, Weak or Rogue State*

Locating Haiti in international relations debates about state failure and weakness is difficult because in many ways it does not fit the normal mold of the failed state as a security threat. On one hand, it fits the definitions by think-tanks and government policy makers. The United States Government Accountability Office defines failed and failing states as “nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the government as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security” (GAO 2007: 5). The Center for Global Development defines fragile states as poor countries that have difficulties performing the core functions of statehood, security, services, and legitimate government. They also have a lack of capacity and a lack of political will (Carment, Press and Stamy 2010). The National Security Council defines “weak states” as lacking “the capacity to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities,” and argues that weak states, “do not have enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert control over their entire territory” (National Security for Combating Terrorism 2003: 20). Haiti fits into each of these categories. However, when theorists attempt to understand why states fail, Haiti is seen as an anomaly. According to Rotberg,

Haiti has always been on the edge of failure, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But its entrenched weaknesses include no ethnic, religious or other communal cleavages. There are no insurgent movements. Nor has Haiti experienced radical or rapid deflation in standards of living and expectations, like Argentina in 2002 and Russia in the 1990s. Haiti has always been the poorest polity in the Western Hemisphere.
And,

Haiti, even under President Aristide (1990-91, 1994-96, 2001- [2004]), [was] gripped in a vise of weakness. Yet given very limited organized internal dissidence and almost no internal ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages within Haitian society - except a deep distrust by the majority of the upper classes, and of mulattos because of their historic class affiliations - the ingredients of major civil strife are absent. Failure demands communal differences capable of being transformed into consuming cross-group violence. Haiti thus seems condemned to remain weak, but without failing (2004: 19-20).

Organizations, such as the World Bank and Foreign Policy magazine with the Fund for Peace, have made attempts to quantify failed and weak states and rank each state accordingly. The World Bank uses Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) and Low Income Countries under Stress (LICUS) to rank states based on a set of criteria. The World Bank created the CPIA to help decide on resource allocation. The CPIA measures sixteen criteria based on four clusters, economic, social, structural and the public sector. According to worldbank.org, “The CPIA measures the extent to which a country’s policy and institutional framework supports sustainable growth and poverty reduction, and consequently the effective use of development assistance. The outcome of the exercise yields both an overall score and scores for all of the sixteen criteria that compose the CPIA” (The World Bank 2010). Therefore, the World Bank determines which states are more fragile than others and then allocates funds accordingly. Foreignpolicy.com and the Fund for Peace have been publishing The Failed State Index since 2005, and characterize failed states as the “world’s most vulnerable nations.” Foreign Policy examines twelve indicators, such as demographics, refugee flows, economic development, and intervention. Foreign policy uses the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to calculate The Failed State Index by rating twelve indicators,
assessing state institutions, identifying surprise factors, and mapping conflicts and in relation to the “failed state” index. According to Foreign Policy’s 2010 Failed State Index, Haiti ranks number eleven, falling directly behind Pakistan. Somalia takes first place for the third year in a row, followed by Chad and Sudan. According to a Rand report, “A National Academy of Public Administration report of 2006 on why foreign aid has failed in Haiti summarized general donor opinion which has variously characterized Haiti as a nightmare, predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual or pariah state” (2010). The RAND report is particularly interesting, because it reveals the social construction of “the failed state” and the lack of consistency in how to “label” Haiti. The international community sees Haiti as a failed state and this has a profound effect on how states and international humanitarian agencies interact with Haiti and the Haitian population.

Although it may initially seem counterproductive to my argument, in the following section I will use academic and media articles which suggest that Haiti fulfills most, if not all, the qualifications of a “failed state.” By doing this, I hope to explore how most international relations theories are misguided in their understanding of state failure and their assumption about what it means for the system of nation-states. Instead of failed states being a threat to the security of wealthier, stronger, more stable states, these failed weak fragile and rogue states are a threat to the very system of nation-states. By threat to the system I do not mean the human security of residents, nor the sanctity of the border, but to the legitimacy of the system itself.

What makes a failed, fragile, weak state? Even without delving into the problematic mixture of causes and effects, what are the characteristics? For the Failed State Project at
Purdue University state failure is defined “by the patterns of governmental collapse within a nation which often bring demands (because of the refugees they foster, the human rights they abridge and their inability to forestall starvation and disease) which threaten the security of their surrounding states and region” (quoted in Rotberg 2003: 24). According to most other sources, failed states are, as noted above, states that are unable to provide basic services for their citizens. Of course, there are thirty other definitions and terms to describe the basic premise of state failure and state weakness, but for simplicity’s sake this thesis will focus on these definitions. Failed states are framed as having problems with drug smuggling, inefficient bureaucracies, producing a vast number of refugees and migrants, and being hotbeds for international terrorism. In the following section I will describe how Haiti has experienced, or is perceived to experience all of the following problems.

*Drug Smuggling*

Drug smuggling, a major issue in Western media because of the “War on Drugs,” is seen not just as the infiltration of illegal drugs into countries, but also a lack of control of borders. The borders of failed states are seen as extremely fluid and unregulated, allowing for the passage of persons and other illicit materials. This makes Western borders even more difficult to patrol and securitize. In an article about “Haiti’s Drug Problem,” the United States Institute of Peace writes,

> The remaining ten percent of illicit drugs is shipped through central and eastern Caribbean. In recent years, successful enforcement efforts in Jamaica have reduced trafficking through that country. At the same time, President Chavez’s anti-American policies have reduced counter-narcotics cooperation and resulted in sharply increased cocaine shipments from Venezuela through Haiti and the Dominican Republic on the Island of Hispaniola. U.S. government agencies estimate that 83 metric tons or about eight percent of the cocaine entering the United States in 2006 transited either Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Haiti has
1,200 miles of unprotected coastline and 225 miles of un-patrolled land border. Drug shipments by "fast boats" and small planes land at tiny ports and on clandestine airstrips scattered along Haiti’s southern coast. Haiti’s under-strength and dysfunctional police force is unable to respond to the challenge, as traffickers often take as little as five minutes to offload their cargo and refuel. Haiti’s tiny coast guard has only two patrol boats, 95 personnel, and no air assets. Corruption among Haiti’s law enforcement authorities is common. A near-record seizure of 925 pounds of cocaine on May 31, 2007 in the coastal town of Loegane highlights these problems. The drugs were discovered at a roadside checkpoint in vehicles with government license plates. Five police officers were among the ten people arrested (USIP 2007)

*Inefficient Bureaucracies, Corrupt Politicians and Undemocratic Elections*

Corruption, elections and bad bureaucracies go hand in hand and each can be an indicator of a failed state, though, many countries that are not labeled as failed experience these problems as well. In many ways, Haiti is a prime example of each of these issues. It is difficult to find an article about Haiti that does not mention the word “corruption.” Haiti is considered to be corrupt from top to bottom. Whether it is politicians misusing aid funds or military and police forces taking bribes or intimidating citizens into extracting bribes, there is no end to stories about the misuse of funds. One question that is often asked of developing countries, especially Haiti, is why, after billions of dollars in aid money, development projects, and international trade, are these countries still poor and sometimes getting poorer. One relatively quick and easy answer is corruption and, as the RAND report suggests, political culture.

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was established because of the international community’s concerns about the inability of the Haitian state to manage and efficiently use the billions of dollars donated to the rebuilding effort. The lack of infrastructure, corruption and “political culture” are considered reflections of the failure of the Haitian state and barriers to rebuilding. The RAND report, *Rebuilding the Haitian
State remarks, “Haiti’s poverty, like its governmental weakness, is a product of its political culture” (RAND 2010: 47). The RAND report also argues that,

Historically, the Haitian state has served as an apparatus by which elites extract rents from the impoverished population, not as a means of serving Haiti’s citizens. Corruption is a serious problem; Haiti ranked 168 of 180 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2008, in the same league as Iran and Turkmenistan. Since 2002, when it was first included in the rankings, it has slipped slightly, from the 87th percentile to the 93rd. Haiti also ranks very low on broader governance indicators (46).

In 2007 the USAID operational planned summary focused much of its attention on the corruption in Haiti. Several anti-corruption programs were started because, as it suggests, “Haiti has suffered from bad governance for decades. Corruption is endemic and state resources are diverted; local governance is ignored; and Parliament often does not function. To avoid political unrest, Haiti urgently needs to become a democratic, well-governed state” (USAID 2007: 12).

Haitian Refugees and Migrants

A large exodus of displaced persons, regardless of their reasons for exit (war, economics, famine, or individual persecution) is seen as symptomatic of state failure and fragility. The state is no longer able to provide services for its people and they are forced to leave their country for another. A 1992 Foreign Policy article suggests that as states begin to fail and start to become more violent they “imperil their own citizens and threaten their neighbors through refugee flows” (Helman and Ratner 1992: 3). International humanitarian law and domestic policy-makers are generally unsure about how to intervene in cases of massive migration movements. However, there have been several interventionist attempts that have been spurned at least partially by refugee flows. In Dowety and Loescher in Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action (1997)
suggest that the unilateral interventions in Haiti were influenced by a desire to curb refugee flows. UN resolutions in 1994 included the need to end military behavior that was causing Haitian displacement.

The U.S. government at this point was impelled to push for a quick resolution to the situation, in part because of the continuing embarrassment and political difficulties of dealing with Haitian refugees and would-be refugees. In his public address on the eve of intervention, President Clinton stressed the need “to secure our borders and preserve stability in our hemisphere,” adding more specifically: “We have a particular interest in stopping brutality when it occurs so close to our shores.... As long as Cedras rules, Haitians will continue to seek sanctuary in our nation. This year, in less than two months, more than 21,000 Haitians were rescued at sea by our Coast Guard and Navy. Today more than 14,000 refugees are living at our naval base in Guantanamo. The American people have already spent $177 million to support them” (Dowety and Loescher 1996: 64).

This quote is of extreme importance to this thesis because I argue that failed states are constructed as security threats in order to justify intervention. The portrayal of refugees and displaced persons as threats plays a large part in the construction of Haiti and the failed state as security threats that need or deserve or require intervention.

*International Terrorism*

Although there has been plenty of “terrorism” within Haiti, there has been no “international terrorism” to speak of. There have been no Haitian bombings of United States or other foreign cities and buildings, and there does not seem to be an anti-west movement that operates inside of Haiti. However, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) suggests that without proper diligence this may change:

Haiti’s porous borders and less-than-sufficient controls create an environment that trans-border criminal networks tend to exploit, including some well-documented cases. More importantly, while Haiti has been spared major terrorist incidents so far, the lack of control makes Haiti a convenient “back office” that international terrorist networks might exploit in the future for training and planning action on foreign targets. The attraction of Haiti is likely to increase with the robust counter-terrorist and border security measures being taken in most other countries in the world (IOM 2007).
I think the previous examples show that even before the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, Haiti was considered, at least by policymakers, governments, and the media, as a failed state and because of this failed state status, a threat to the national security of the United States and other neighboring countries.

Risk
Failed states are risky. There is a great amount of uncertainty not only about what failed states are, but also how they will behave, what their populations will do, and the implications of state failure to the international community. The calculation of what constitutes a security threat relies on a calculation of risk and speculation about what might potentially occur to threaten a society. There has been a proliferation of scholarly examination of what constitutes the “new”, or post-Cold War, or post-9/11 threats or risks. According to Aradau,

Risk-based perspectives to security differ considerably from their threat-based counterparts in how they approach the question of security and in the policy prescriptions and governmental technologies they instantiate. Whereas the latter tend to emphasize agency and intent between conflicting parties, risk-based interpretations tend to emphasize systemic characteristics, such as populations at risk of disease or environmental hazard. Moreover, threat-based interpretations rely on intelligence in an attempt to eliminate danger, while risk relies on actuarial-like data, modeling and speculations that do not simply call for the elimination of risk but develop strategies to embrace it. In short, whereas the concept of threat brings us in to the domain of the production, management and destruction of dangers, the concept of risk mobilizes and focuses on different practices that arise from the construction, interpretation and management of contingency (2008: 148).

The construction of the failed state as a security threat is the result of risk calculations. Failed states are risky because they are unpredictable. The do not fit into the normal category of the “nation-state” that has been constructed as the legitimate means of governing territories. Their problems spill over into neighboring countries, and cause
forced migration, terrorism, and drug smuggling. They threaten the very system of nation-states.

That there are multiple definitions and nomenclatures for the “failed state” and that no one is entirely sure which states are actually “failed” and which are “fragile” or “weak” or “rogue” reveals the risk calculation involved. Risks are unpredictable and they are also impossible to control and, as Aradau (2008) suggests, the construction and interpretation of risk is more important than the elimination of threat. In the case of Haiti, as the IOM quote earlier suggests, there is a possibility that Haiti will become a haven for terrorists. The fear that Haitians would flood into the United States following the earthquake was not realized, but the risk of it happening was of great concern to US policymakers and politicians. Additionally, as the above quote suggests “systematic characteristics” are a foundation for the construction of risks. The failed, fragile state discourse focuses almost entirely on pinpointing the “characteristics” of failed states, and how they are systematic to the state, or the culture, or the people. For example, the Haitian people (or state, or politicians) suffer from systematic corruption. Characterizing failed states, creating charts, as Kaplan does, or ranking them, such as Foreignpolicy.com’s Failed State Index does, relies on calculating risks and constructing systematic characteristics of state failure.

Failed states are also constructed as risks because of the anxiety felt by the “international community” about the weakening of the “state.” State failure, coupled with the growth in power of a global political order, such as the increasing control by international non-governmental organizations has led to the fear that the state is “withering away.” As Doty suggests in Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies,
What has become known as the “globalization thesis” suggests that states have been weakened in the sense that they are often unable to fully control the movement of goods, capital, people, and culture, which are all elements of globalization. Losing control over borders erodes the effectiveness of states, undermines their sovereignty, and by extension raises questions about the type of international system that might be occurring (2003: 5).

The failed states offer a particularly difficult risk for states because one of their fundamental “characteristics” is that they do not have control over their territories and borders, and the porousness of their borders directly affects the inflow of goods and people into non-failed states. Also, on a different level, the failed state discourse brings up questions about what to do with those unfortunate failed states. They challenge the legitimacy of the nation-state system, because part of that system rests on the idea of each state having absolute state sovereignty.

In his piece on the governmentality of unease, Didier Bigo discusses how the construction of threats and risks is not just the result of xenophobia or distrust of immigrants, but is also the result of politicians, media, and bureaucrats constructing them. As Bigo argues,

the securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the habitus of the security professionals and their new interests not only in the foreigner, but in the “immigrant.” These interests are correlated with the globalization of technologies of surveillance and control going beyond the national borders. It is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainties of everyday life. This worry, or unease is not psychological. It is a structural unease in a “risk society” framed by neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated at its limits with danger and (in)security (2002: 65).

Although Bigo is discussing immigration directly, I think the theory can be applied to the failed state as well, and not just because of the immigrants it produces, but because of the general unease that is felt about failed states. State failure is hotly debated and discussed,
and as the NSS report suggested in 2002, the “weak” state is one of the greatest threats to national security.

The insistence that there are “good” states and “bad” states is a fundamental aspect of governmentality and sovereignty. The ability to decide which states are good and which are bad rests in the hands of the sovereign and is dependent on the ability to distinguish between the two, and act on the basis of this distinction. If a country that is “failed” poses no real threat (via terrorism, drugs, or immigration) is it truly a threat? Perhaps yes, because, as Aradau suggests, it may become a threat in the future or it possesses the necessary qualities of being a risk.

*Representational Power*

Finally, I wish to explore the significance of how countries are represented in the global order. Understanding why some states are “failed” or “fragile” is not just about pinpointing the characteristics of a “failed” state, but instead should explore the power dynamics and assumptions behind the act of labeling a state “failed,” as well as the global structures that have encouraged and/or discouraged failure or underdevelopment. Although it would be easy to suggest that, regardless of what one calls a state without a legitimate government, or a state with prolonged conflict, or a state that lacks the ability to enforce human rights and the security of its citizens, the state is still unable to provide for its citizens. The name or label does not change the state’s inabilities and failures as a state. However, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, the act of labeling is not only a reflection of global structures, inequalities, and relations. Labeling also affects how governments, nonprofit organizations and individuals understand what it means to be “legitimate” and the programs and policies which are designed to address not only the
rebuilding of the failed state, but also the needs and abilities of individuals who reside in
the fragile state. The performativity of labeling “failed” states is a reflection of global
power structures and discourses.

Underestimating the power of discourse and knowledge construction in a discussion
of failed states would deny not only the power to decide what constitutes a “good” or
“strong” state but how discourses determine and validate foreign intervention,
humanitarian or otherwise.

The construction of North and South identities is not a new phenomenon, but
different terms come in and out of vogue. During the Cold War there were three worlds.
From the 1970s on, countries were labeled “developing” and “developed.” Academia has
also had its fair share: Wallerstein labeled them the core, the semi periphery and the
periphery, and now it fashionable in some circles to say the Global North and the Global
South. Derrida (2005) explores the concept of the “rogue state” and by relating it to
Schmitt’s sovereign exception and Kant’s idea that “the reason of the strongest is always
best.” Derrida describes the sovereign exception as,

the de facto situation, the relations of force (military, economic, technoscientific,
and so on) and the differences of force end up determining through their intrinsic
effectiveness a world law that, in the aftermath of a world war, is in the hands of
certain sovereign states that are more powerful than other sovereign states (100).

Derrida argues that there are “(no) more rogue states” because “as soon as there is
sovereignty, there is abuse of power and a rogue state. Abuse is the law of use; it is the
law itself, the “logic” of a sovereignty that can reign only by not sharing” (2005: 102).
There are no rogue states because all states are rogue.

The construction of “failed states” is an exercise in deciding the exception. Failed
states like Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti are considered nation-states that no longer have functioning democratic governments. The definition of a functioning democratic government, as well as the ability to structure, label, and designate states as either failed or real, is derived from the sovereign exception. Nation-states are built on the premise of the ability of a state to govern and protect its own interests. The normative definition of legitimate states posits the nation and the sovereignty of the nation as the most important and defining feature within the geographical boundaries of states. However, as Derrida has suggested, some states are more sovereign than others and this allows them to decide what the exception is. In the case of a system of nation-states, the international community has the ability or the right to decide on the exception and the norm, in this case state failure. By deciding the exception, the state also decides the rule. The contrast between “real” states, such as the United States, and failed states, such as Haiti, allows for the denial of “sovereign rights.” When a state becomes a failed, rogue, or fragile state it becomes a threat to international stability.

The relationship between power and knowledge, as explored by Foucault (1994), helps to conceptualize the creation of the failed state in international relations. Foucault discusses how knowledge is created and sustained by power. Knowledge, argues Foucault, “circulates and functions in relation to power” (1994: 331). The “regime of knowledge” in the failed state discourses is used to create an understanding of what it means to be a good or bad state and the role of the state and government in individual societies. It relies on the assumption that the Western style of rationalization and individualization is the preferred and ideal way of organizing society. The international community, be it an international organization or a wealthy Western country, has the
power to conceptualize and create the knowledge of not only what represents a threat or a risk, but also the identities and labels of countries that are deemed threats and risks.

The modern system of nation-states relies on the stated assumption of ethnically homogenous, equally sovereign states as the only and ideal way of organizing societies. Additionally, the state is propagated as the set of institutions that must bestow its citizens with rights, services and protection. A “failed state” is the state that fails to fit into the model, the ideal. The failed state contradicts and threatens the system of nation-states and because of this, the failed state is constructed as both a risk and threat to the global order.
Conclusion

Humanitarian intervention has become an important mode and even a dominant frame of reference for Western political intervention in global scenes of misfortune, both in cases of armed conflict and natural disasters and around their more or less direct consequences in the form of epidemics, famine, physical injury, and emotional trauma. No war is now without its humanitarian corridors and its humanitarian workers. And no Western military intervention into another country is now without its justification on humanitarian grounds (Fassin 2007:508)

The previous chapters have all focused on the humanitarian response to the internally displaced Haitians following the earthquake of 2010. I focused primarily on humanitarianism as a mechanism of security and the framing of displaced Haitians as security threats. I engaged with the discourses of the media and humanitarian organizations, as well as interviews conducted with aid workers in Haiti following the earthquake. Exploring the dynamic relationships of humanitarian organizations, the international community, the Haitian government and the internally displaced Haitians, I attempted to problematize the many assumptions about international humanitarian aid and the Haitian population.

There were three major focuses of the thesis: the increasing use of security in the distribution of humanitarian aid, humanitarianism operating as a mechanism of security and the construction of meaning and threat. I situated both Haiti and the humanitarian industry historically to illustrate that although the current situation may be unique or extreme in some ways (for example, the use of military to directly distribute aid, or that one million Haitians are still internally displaced), when situating these seemingly separate events historically, we can see they are the result of existing sets of relationships
and patterns and most importantly, how the increasing use of security as a technique of government is being manifested in humanitarianism.

The first chapter engaged with humanitarianism as a form of political intervention and as a reflection of the presumed failure of a state to adequately respond to disasters and provide for its citizens. I described three particular epochs in humanitarian assistance and the ways in which global political power and changing conceptualizations of poverty, development and human rights have transformed humanitarian assistance. The chapter also detailed the history of intervention in Haiti to show how representations and discourses about Haiti as being “in need” of humanitarianism and intervention are grounded in past encounters with the international community. The genealogy of humanitarian intervention and Haiti’s history of intervention situated the response to the 2010 earthquake within a socio-historical context to illuminate the complexities of humanitarianism and Haiti’s relationship with the international community. Understanding these complexities allows us to understand the response as not an isolated event, but a reflection of multiple processes, trends and associations between the “North” and the “South” and Haiti and the international community.

The second chapter argued that humanitarianism, because of its particular relationship with sovereignty, power, and the global political order, and because of its bureaucratization, organizational structure and funding is functioning as a mechanism of governance and is increasingly operating as mechanism of security. By focusing on the Haitian IDP camp as a site of security, I attempted to show how humanitarianism works to monitor and control the IDP population in an attempt to create a more “secure” environment. Discourses about poverty and development are now tied to “security” and
humanitarian organizations operate under the assumption that without “security” there can be no development, human rights, or even aid distribution. However, how security mechanisms operate differs depending on the populations they engage. The lives of aid workers are secured in different ways than the lives of internally displaced Haitians. Aid and security are distributed based on levels of “vulnerability” and by constructing notions of who is deserving of humanitarian aid and who is not.

The final chapter discussed the construction of Haitians and the Haitian state as a threat in need of security and humanitarian assistance. The discursive power of constructing realities about the Haitian population is a political act that reveals the power of some to determine the knowledges and understandings of others. Humanitarian organizations operating in Haiti have the ability to create and recreate the identities of Haitians as hopeless, caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and as threats to themselves, to Haitian women and to aid workers. The final chapter also discussed the construction of Haiti as a failed state, and the power of deciding what constitutes a functioning state versus what constitutes a failure to the system of nation-states. It argued that our perception of Haitians, especially Haitian males, as threats in need of securing against and the Haitian state as failed, fragile or rogue, is a reflection of the discourses and practices of the international community.

Underlying this thesis is the power of telling a story and how knowledge and narration intersect with our understanding of events and actors. Our knowledge about the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the international humanitarian organizations, the international community and internally displaced Haitians is a reflection of the unequal power in the production of dominant discourses. Trouillot (1995), as mentioned in the
introduction, describes how power influences knowledge and narration. He focuses on the history of Haiti to illuminate the histories that have been kept silent, the histories that have created subjects and the histories that have influenced our current understandings of Haiti and Haitians. This thesis argues that dominant narratives about Haitians are a reflection of the power dynamics in knowledge construction and that those narratives influence not only how the world sees and understands Haiti, but also how the international community deals with Haiti. The construction of Haitians as being in need of intervention and security and as threats to be secured against allows for the international community, through humanitarian organizations, to engage with Haiti in a particular way.

Throughout the thesis I made mention of my time in Haiti doing field research in July of 2010. For the most part I did not focus on the interviews I did there because I did not receive a surplus of objective empirical data. Instead, my time in Haiti gave me a clearer understanding of what life in Haiti is like for both Haitians and aid workers. Although I did do formal interviews with aid workers, I found casual discussions with people to be more informative. Therefore, most of my research included attending UN cluster meetings and speaking to aid workers, both domestic and international, about what their day to day lives were like and what security meant for them and for the people they were serving. In those situations people were generally more candid and willing to talk. As my time in Haiti went on I grew to understand the complexities of humanitarian assistance. Most of the aid workers were not only emotionally and physically exhausted, but they also expressed concern and frustration with their own organizations, as well as the Haitian government. This is representative of Barbara Harrell-Bond’s (2002)
assertion that giving aid can be detrimental to both the refugee (or in this case the IDP) and the aid worker and reveals the multiple ways and levels in which power is distributed. With that said, most of the aid workers I spoke with believed they were doing the right thing, and were happy to be able to help Haitians during their time in need.

This leads me to another point, which is the question of intervention. For multiple reasons I did not give a definitive verdict for or against humanitarian intervention. I do not believe that doing so would be realistic or constructive. I do however, argue in this thesis that the current ways in which security is being articulated in humanitarian interventions is a problem, and that although there is no way I would ever argue all intervention is bad, I do believe we, meaning aid workers, scholars, refugees, donors, policy makers and anyone else involved in the humanitarian assistance process need to very seriously start rethinking our assumptions about humanitarianism and I believe this process of reimagining starts with our understanding of the people humanitarian organizations are helping and the relationship between the two. Until we dismantle the racist, sexist and classist perceptions about those in need of assistance, humanitarian aid will continue to fail to alleviate suffering, I recognize that not all humanitarian operations are failures, but I do believe there can be very different and more constructive ways of helping people who have been affected by a disaster, an emergency or a crisis and this process begins with understanding the relationships between the international community and the aid recipients. At some point in the thesis I state that behind international humanitarian assistance there echoes the sentiments of the failure of the state. I do not believe this is necessarily a bad thing either, because I also think that in order to improve humanitarian assistance we also need to reimagine what it means to be a citizen and the
relationship of the citizen and the state. I think that this includes the perceptions of threats and what it means for a population, or for a person to be a threat.

The Haitians who were internally displaced by the earthquake in 2010 are not telling their own stories. Stories, like this thesis, are being told about them. Throughout this thesis I have attempted to highlight how discourses about Haitians and humanitarianism are both problematic and potentially damaging. How the world describes and understands the internally displaced Haitian both reflects and constructs the humanitarian programs and policies that affect the day-to-day lives of Haitians. The level of control that humanitarian organizations exert, and the lack of voice and representation of the majority of the displaced Haitians has created an environment in which security is framed as necessary and is not questioned. By constructing Haitians as threats to be secured against, humanitarian organizations, western media, and academics are eliminating other alternatives to providing assistance to people who have lost friends, family, their homes and their jobs. When humanitarianism operates as a mechanism of security it presents a displaced person first as a security threat and last as a person in need of help and assistance.

The aim of this thesis was not just to argue that all humanitarianism is intervention, or that all Haitians are not security threats, but instead to explore how the dominant narratives about humanitarianism and Haitians are a reflection of the unequal power distribution of the international community and how those narratives construct to portray Haitians and internally displaced populations in a particular way to help justify political interventions, which in turn recreate and reconstruct the meanings and identities of the population. Deconstructing dominant narratives about humanitarianism allows for
a more nuanced exploration of what exactly humanitarianism is and how it functions as a mechanism of power, governance and security.
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