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Ousted Egyptian President Morsi in United States Media:

A Thesis Submitted to
The Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts

by Salma Hisham Halawa

under the supervision of Dr. Amani Ismail

Fall 2013
This study investigates the portrayal of the former Egyptian President, Mohamed Morsi, in the leading American press during six critical events that took place throughout his first six months of presidency. The study reviews coverage of Mr. Morsi’s presidency in two premier daily U.S. newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post.

Employing quantitative content analysis with framing theory as a framework, the study aims to determine how the two newspapers portrayed Mr. Morsi and to identify the employed frames and/or stereotypical words and phrases that were used to represent him. In addition, the study aims to explore U.S. foreign policy toward Egypt as characterized by the press.

The study identifies six critical events that took place during Mr. Morsi’s first six months in office as elements of discussion: Mr. Morsi’s inauguration as Egypt’s new president; Mr. Morsi’s dismissal of top military leaders; Mr. Morsi’s visit to Iran for the Non-Aligned Summit Movement; Mr. Morsi’s role in brokering the Hamas-Israel ceasefire; Mr. Morsi’s release of a constitutional declaration granting himself broader powers; and the unrest in Egypt over the constitution. The total sample generated 110 news articles.

The results show that, over the course of the six events, the U.S. media portrayed Mr. Morsi as a moderate Islamist leader of a significantly new era in Egyptian politics. Sometimes, the publications severely criticized Mr. Morsi’s decisions; yet, the media did not frame him as anti-American or a U.S. enemy. Additionally, it is obvious through the coverage that U.S. relations with Egypt
depended purely on strategic cooperation, and not on establishing a political system that would achieve basic practices of democracy and respect for human rights.
This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of my friend, Mahitab Khalil. I miss her every day; Mahi offered me the support to make this master possible, as well as plenty of friendly encouragement.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## 1. INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem statement</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of the study</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 U.S. coverage of international news</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Determinants of international news coverage</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Media and foreign policy, which influences which</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 U.S. attitude at the beginning of the 2011 uprising</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Post-Mubarak Egypt-U.S. relations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Implications of the Arab Spring on Arab-U.S. relations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Conceptualizing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt's transition</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 The Muslim Brotherhood-U.S. relations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 The significance of the study</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1 The concept of framing</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1 Framing effects</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2 Frames in political news</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 International news flow</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 4. METHODOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Content analysis</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.1 Defining the universe</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 Sampling</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3 Unit of analysis</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.4 Coding</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.5 Operationalization</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.6 Inter-coder reliability</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Research questions</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 Critical events as elements of discussion</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 5. FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Finding of research question one</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Event one 43
• Event two 51
• Event three 58
• Event four 65
• Event five 74
• Event six 83
• Summary of RQ1 findings 92

5.2 Research question two 104

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 108

Limitations to the study 113
Directions for further research 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY 115

APPENDIX 132

Coding sheet 132
Coding book 136
**LIST OF TABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table #</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Mr. Morsi’s ideology</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4</td>
<td>The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 5</td>
<td>The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relation with the Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 9</td>
<td>Value judgment that surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 10</td>
<td>Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 11</td>
<td>Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 12</td>
<td>Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. INTRODUCTION


But even after the pressing emergency was over, it seemed that policymakers in Washington perceived Egypt in terms of regional security, rather than considering its national problems: “During the first year after Mubarak fell, relations between the Obama administrations and the SCAF would display a familiar mix of public tension and unwavering strategic cooperation.” (Brownlee, 2012. P. 153)

Later, in May 2012, Egypt held its first-ever free presidential elections. The many secular and liberal candidates divided the voting masses, resulting in a runoff election between the top two vote recipients: Ahmed Shafik, a former general and Mubarak’s last Prime Minister, and Mohamed Morsi, a leader in the Muslim Brotherhood organization (MB) and the former Chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The winner in the runoff election was Mr. Morsi. The SCAF, however, took some of his power by suspending the Parliament, requesting a new assembly to write Egypt’s constitution, and restraining the president’s authority.

“The United States recognized the results of the apparently fair and democratic election, and in July 2012 Secretary Hilary Clinton met with Morsi in Cairo.” (Yambert and Telhami, 2013, p. 334).
As for the U.S. press coverage of these events, reporting on Egypt changed profoundly when Mr. Morsi was declared Egypt’s first elected president. American press reports on the election of the Muslim Brotherhood candidate seemed to be mostly optimistic, since he was believed to be the “revolutionary candidate.” However, the press voiced cautious optimism based on the expectation that the result could cause issues for the U.S.-Egyptian relations. The media opined that the American government would need to exert more effort to work effectively with the rising Islamist tide, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. In the past, consecutive American governments widely rejected the MB and viewed the organization as a group of threatening Islamist radicals, which resulted in its isolation for decades.

At the beginning of 2012, Mr. Morsi never expected that, in a few months, he would become the focus of most of the global media channels, and that his name and decisions would make it to the top foreign headlines. As described in Time Magazine, “The most important man in the Middle East started 2012 as much a stranger to the people he now rules as he was to the rest of the world.” (Ghosh, World Time Magazine, November 28, 2012)

Media coverage of Mr. Morsi began when the MB announced his candidacy for the presidential elections. At the beginning, he was mocked as the brotherhood’s «spare tire», since he was an alternative to the higher-profile candidate, Khairat Al-shater, whose candidacy was rejected due to his involvement in criminally charged activities.

During his campaign, Mr. Morsi’s character and performance received little media attention; rather, the press was primarily interested in the Muslim
Brotherhood’s plan to nominate a presidential candidate, as it regularly described the group as the most powerful and organized political force in Egypt. However, after Mr. Morsi won almost 25 percent of the vote in the first round of the presidential elections, there was a great shift in the way he was regarded by the press.

Furthermore, prior to the presidential elections run-off, the American press was more inclined to support Mr. Morsi because it considered him more connected to the revolution than Mr. Shafiq. “The outcome provoked frantic warnings on Friday of either a counterrevolution should Mr. Shafik win, or an Islamist takeover, should Mr. Morsi emerge as the next president.” (Kirkpatrick and Fahim, The New York Times, May 25, 2012).

At the same time, the U.S. press conveyed a fear of the “brotherhood’s Islamist ideology.” The Washington Post reported, “At first glance, Egyptian president-elect Mohamed Morsi might appear like a nightmare for Washington’s interests in the region. The low-key Islamist has spoken vitriolically about American policy in the Middle East, refers to Israelis as “tyrants” and has expressed doubts that the Sept. 11 attacks were carried out by terrorists.” (Londono and Brulliard, The Washington Post, June 25, 2012).

After he won the election, the media’s tone changed again, expressing careful enthusiasm regarding the prospects of establishing a constructive relationship with the new President. It was clearly reported that any differences in ideology between the United States and the new Islamist leader would probably be set aside, due to Mr. Morsi’s urgent need to stabilize the country, and revive the struggling economy.
During the first six months of his presidency, there were many flattering reactions from the American media. The press praised Mr. Morsi especially after a number of stances on different international events, most notably, when he gave a sharp-worded speech at the Non-Aligned Summit in Iran, and when he helped in brokering the Hamas-Israel cease-fire.

An image of Mr. Morsi as a highly controversial political leader emerged in the U.S. press because his performance confused many reporters and writers of different backgrounds. The Washington Post for example stated at the end of November 2012, “In recent weeks, he [Morsi] has been hailed as a peacemaker by the U.S. and Israel, a savior by the Palestinians, a statesman by much of the Arab world--and branded a tyrant by the tens of thousands who have jammed Cairo's iconic Tahrir Square since Nov. 22 to denounce him” (Ghosh, World Time Magazine, November 28, 2012)

In addition, the media regularly criticized his failure to achieve any progress on the key issues that concern Egyptians, particularly his failure to abide by the 100-day program, in addition to the glaring security failures in Sinai and the huge economic challenges facing the country.

On the other hand, the U.S. government occasionally praised Mr. Morsi for his international efforts, and rarely criticized him for his domestic practices.

**Problem Statement:**

Captivated by the claim of a prevailing politicized, alienated and biased narrative in the U.S. press, especially after the 2011 uprising and in the run-up to the
presidential elections, the researcher wanted to know more about the way the media portrayed Egypt’s first freely-elected president.

**Purpose of the Study:**

The purpose of the quantitative content analysis study is to determine if The New York Times and The Washington Post (as premier U.S. press outlets) employed frames and/or stereotypical words in portraying Former President Morsи over the first six months of his term in addition to exploring how the U.S. press informs our understanding of the American foreign policy towards Egypt during certain critical events.
2. Literature Review

2.1 U.S. Press Coverage of the International News

Several academic studies of international news coverage discovered that the Western press, and especially the U.S. press, is mostly negative in their reporting on the developing countries. These studies indicate that the representation of foreign news depends on whether a state is a fundamental country in the world system or just a marginal one. According to a study by Weaver and Wilhoit (1981), which evaluated the foreign news coverage models of two media corporations, articles on developing countries were more concerned about conflict, deadly events, and/or violence.

A comprehensive description of international news in the U.S. press is extremely complicated. However, it is well known that the U.S. media reports on the developing countries only during catastrophes or tragedies. In order to study the elements that affect international news in the U.S. press, researchers have broadly investigated the coverage of events that take place in developing countries. Results showed that there were significant differences in the depth and amount of news and reports that were published about developed countries compared with developing countries. In addition, research showed an extensive emphasis on “bad news” from the developing countries such as diseases, economic and political uncertainties, and civil wars (Riffe and Shaw, 1982).

As reported by Gerbner and Marvanyi (1977), the U.S. press has subjective international news coverage and concentrates on North America, Western Europe and the Middle East more than other regions in the world.
Many researchers claim that gatekeepers choose news based on proximity, prominence and cultural factors; in addition, the researchers claim that these aspects influence which foreign country will be reported on. Golan (2010) indicated that reporting affects the image that the public develops about other countries. Furthermore, the author blamed the U.S. press for disseminating a negative representation of developing countries to its audience by disregarding positive events or failing to cover events that help to improve the images of these countries. There is an assumption that dominant nations can utilize the media as an alternative source of power to affirm their prominence and positions all over the world.

### 2.2 Determinants of International News Coverage

Gans (1979) distinguishes seven of the most dominant story categories in U.S. traditional media: (1) U.S. activities overseas, involving major wars and presidential visits; (2) foreign happenings that have an effect on the U.S.; (3) things that are related to oppressive and autocratic nations; (4) foreign elections and transmissions of authority; (5) most important wars; (6) catastrophes with huge death rates; and (7) repression under autocrats.

### 2.3 Media and foreign policy, which influences which?

Media effects on foreign policy have been the focus of some major studies. The subject is argumentative due to two general views: first, some researchers think that the media does not certainly affect policymakers in a direct way, but can succeed via public opinion in influencing what the public understands and accepts as true about foreign politics, which can have a significant effect on policymakers that seek agreement from the voting public. The second view is that, the media conforms to the
government's agenda, and therefore represents the regime's ideas. However, Entman (2004) explained,

“Administration figures and other elites maintain social and professional contact with upper-tier journalists, exchanging information off the record and on, at receptions, conferences and elsewhere. This interface between journalists and elites is a key transmission point of spreading activation of frames, and it is not always easy to determine where the line between “elite” and “journalist” should be drawn, or who influences whom (…) A counterargument is that journalists simply reflect rather than influence the play of power because they so rigidly follow standard operating procedures.” (p. 11)

This means that in practice, the liaison between the ruling elite and news organizations is less detached and more collaborative than the model expects, particularly in foreign affairs.

Therefore, scholars have dedicated a considerable amount of thought to the link between what the media conveys and what the administration desires it to convey. “Ideally a free press balances official views with a more impartial perspective that allows the public to deliberate independently on the government’s decisions.” (Entman, 2004, p. 2)

The other viewpoint rejects the all-powerful media theory; it posits that the media obeys the regime's agenda, thus defending that regime's objectives (Entman, 2004). For example, when the U.S. media coverage outlines foreign news in
developing countries in a negative light, this gives the administration a chance to utilize the media as an extra arm of power and promote the government’s agenda (Shoemaker, Danielian, & Brendlinger, 1991). Herman and Chomsky (1988) agreed by declaring that the media are devices that regimes can use in numerous ways to acquire support for strategies, policies and to obtain power.

The media offers the administration a method to transfer authoritative information to the community by being the official source of news. Therefore, Herman & Chomsky affirmed that the media content in the U.S. would regularly support the formal foreign policies of the U.S. government (1988). This result is particularly present where the administration withholds foreign policy information, causing the media to conform to what the decision-making office desires (Meuller, 1973).

Scholars of international relations and foreign policy are inclined to minimize the influence of the media on policy-making, seeing the media as “no more than a pawn in the political game played by the powerful political authority and establishment in Washington” (Chang, 1992, p. 7). The revelation and concealment of policy-making in the press demonstrates how the press has become the instrument of governments to influence public opinion and selectively publicize policies (Y. Cohen, 1986 and Mosettig, 1981).

In the past, the dissemination of international news through authoritative sources was of relatively little importance to the public. International relationships were not a matter of great concern to people, except during wars. But more recently, the rise in global interconnection and the increase in exchanges of all kinds - including global communications - suggest that considerable and vital segments of
our lives are influenced, at different levels, by what is happening in other nations. Obviously, as a result, international news is of importance to us.

To completely grasp the kind of framing used by the U.S. media in portraying Mr. Morsi, it is essential to know the connection between “policy certainty,” as explained by Robinson (2002) and the media. Robinson believed that a strategy could be categorized as either ‘certain’ or ‘uncertain’. When administration officials announce a strategy with certainty, it is less likely that the media will have an influence on that strategy and it probably will not be able to change it. On the other hand, if administration officials express a strategy with uncertainty to the media concerning any particular matter, the media will have a better opportunity to shape that strategy.

In addition, Robinson concluded that as a result of this interplay, the media should have the highest effect on strategies when they are uncertain. Furthermore, he suggested that the most suitable way to measure if a strategy is certain or not might be to study the alterations made to a specific strategy over time, particularly if the media considered that strategy to be one of primary concern.

A report by Berry (1990), nevertheless, proposes that fruitful press management and manipulation only takes place when the undertaken policies succeed; in other words, press effects and influences occur only when policies fall short. Furthermore, Berry clarifies that the media is unable to provoke an argument during the process of strategy making and execution. The media takes action after the happening. In his opinion, journalists only work as policy evaluators because “they have knowledge and facts at the outcome stage” (p. 118).
2.4 U.S. attitude at the beginning of the 2011 Uprising


At the beginning of the events, the United States tried to tone down its position regarding Mubarak’s regime. “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people,” Former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, declared on January 25, 2011. (Brownlee, 2012, p. 143)

Then, due to the continuing protests in Egypt, Washington started to gradually change its statements in regards to supporting the Egyptian regime. “Reports show Obama wanted to ensure stability in Egypt while appearing to support gradual democratization.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 143). Afterwards, Clinton made a strong call for an "orderly transition" towards a democratic government in Egypt; however, she did not openly ask Mubarak to resign. Clinton stated that there had to be an attempt to establish a participatory government, while also urging Egyptian authorities to guarantee that a political void would not occur during the process of transition. "We want to see an orderly transition so that no one fills a void, that there not be a void, that there be a well thought-out plan that will bring about a democratic, participatory government," she said. (Clinton, Interview With Chris Wallace of Fox News Sunday, January 30, 2011).
“An orderly transition would ostensibly bring about liberalizing reforms, placate protestors and sustain a cornerstone of U.S. strategy. It would also reassure regional allies – mainly Israel and Saudi Arabia – who supported Mubarak.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 144)

Mubarak’s regime was believed to be a valued United States ally, and it was also understood that overthrowing his regime would jeopardize American interests in Egypt and the Middle East.

However, some White House officials preferred to position the United States behind the demonstrators. In his book, The Egyptian Revolution: Between Hope and Despair, Mubarak to Mr. Morsi, El Bendary wrote that “America’s most senior foreign policy figure, ex-presidential candidate John McCain, was, nonetheless, the first American politician to call on Mubarak to step down.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 31) While other officials debated against terminating the Mubarak regime, “the transition they envisioned would shift power not to the opposition but to Suleiman.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 144).

A few days after protestors called for Mubarak’s resignation, President Barack Obama said to Mr. Mubarak that the existing state of affairs was not maintainable, and that an organized, nonviolent transition should begin instantaneously. “With Egypt’s ruler on the ropes and its strategic role in jeopardy, anxiety gripped Washington. Congressional representatives unloaded their frustrations onto U.S. intelligence professionals, who purportedly had failed to notify U.S. policymakers of the threat to Mubarak.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 146)
Although the American public presented great support for Egyptian demonstrators from the minute the protests started, the U.S. government’s position was rather hesitant throughout the events. Some Middle East experts argued that Mr. Obama “feared taking a stance against Mubarak which he might regret in the future.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 31). Any person who monitored how the U.S. reacted to the events on the Egyptian streets during the first week of protests could say that Washington exerted a kind of “teenage diplomacy.” “Washington began by stating that Mubarak solved many of the region’s problems and contributed tremendously to world peace. It then changed tone of its statements by saying that it sees the government in Egypt as stable. After that Washington turned around and said that President Mubarak must respond to the demands of the people.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 139). These changes in positions were made within a one-week period and not months or years.

However, after Mr. Mubarak’s resignation, Mr. Obama portrayed the events that took place in Egypt as the beginning of a fresh chapter in the history of a great country, and a long-standing ally of the U.S.

2.5 Post-Mubarak Egypt-U.S. relations

The 2011 uprising kicked off a new phase in U.S.-Egyptian relations but did not crack the security alliance between the two governments.

The Obama administration was smart enough to “employ the situation to serve its benefits and dealt with Egypt as an American protectorate or a small country living under U.S. occupation.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 139).
It was not long before talks about U.S. aid to Egypt started. “After fretting about Intelligence failures during the Egyptian uprising, U.S. policymakers continued seeing U.S.-Egyptian relations and U.S. aid to Egypt through the prism of Israeli security.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 166)

Some writers and political experts emphasized Washington’s discomfort with the ascent of Islamist regimes in the Middle East. “Certainly, wrote Alaa Abdel Azeez, of the Arab Organization for Human Rights, Egypt is a vital alley for America in the region and U.S. policy necessitates that its peace treaty with Israel be maintained, and thus if the Muslim Brotherhood gains power in Parliament that will be the ‘biggest nightmare’ for America and Israel, let alone the possibility of the rise of a nationalist movement that will call for Cairo’s detachment from U.S. policy in the Middle East.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 173)

Although regular disagreements regarding the aid did not cause mutual conflicts between Cairo and Washington, the rapport between the Egyptian public and the U.S. administration was strained. “More Egyptians viewed the United States unfavorably (79 percent) than five years earlier (75%), although a majority favored sustaining or strengthening relations.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 167)

After the parliamentary elections of 2011, the core of Egyptian politics moved from Tahrir square to the lower house, and therefore, it was not clear how much the public would shape the U.S.-Egyptian relationship. There were indications that the military leadership would not allow popular feelings to hinder the U.S.-Egyptian collaboration. “When initial results of the legislative elections favored candidates from the FJP and the Nour party, the SCAF assured foreign journalists that the parliament’s power would be limited to ensure that elected politicians did not
endanger Egypt’s economy and security and relations with [the] international community.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 167).

In the post-revolution phase, Egyptian politicians and thinkers had distinct views about the United States and the way in which it related to the Arab world. In addition, many Egyptian think tanks were skeptical of the U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood ties. El-Bendary stated, “Gamal Assad, a writer and thinker, claims America knows nothing but protecting its interests and that is why it has unwritten agreements with the Muslim Brotherhood. It was because of this, he added, that Hilary Clinton called for handing authority to Mr. Morsi.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 342)

2.6 Implications of the Arab Uprisings on Arab-U.S. relations

The 2011 Arab uprisings have intensely transformed the Arab world; that period in history turned out to be more turbulent than ever expected. The unrest could have damaged the American economic and political interests in the region, which vary from accessing oil to defending Israel’s security. The United States, particularly under the Obama administration, displayed that it had no problem doing business with the Muslim Brotherhood or any other Islamist organization provided that it sustained American interests. (El Bendary, 2013, p. 343)

As a result, American foreign policy in the Arab world was met with intense opposition and dislike. “One factor that has harmed America’s image in the Arab World is the country’s unanimous support of Israel; Arabs believe that Israel is cashing in on the wide-spread anti-Arab attitude present in the United States since the 9/11 attacks. Arabs have often accused the United States, particularly after 9/11, of conspiring with Israel against them and their causes.” (El Bendary, 2011, 58).
Moreover, although the United States has been pressing Arabs on the subject of democracy for a long time, many scholars have posited that democracy might be a cover-up for American control.

“Their skepticism of the notion of American democracy goes back to when discrimination against African Americans was vibrant in the social fabric of [the] American society. Following a visit to the United States in the 1930s, the great journalist Mustapha Amin was astonished at how a nation that worshipped and idealized freedom was discriminating against blacks. He spoke of how he witnessed hotels, bars, restaurants, and cinemas displaying signs proclaiming that blacks were not welcome. This belief of a “racist America” remains deeply engraved in the minds of Arabs and is often reiterated in the Arab media, particularly when the United States calls on an Arab state to open up and embrace democracy.” (El Bendary, 2011, p. 80)

Some scholars believe that the U.S. utilizes the democracy card in the Middle East as a means to an end, considering that it is the single way to persuade Arabs to unstiffen their views and tolerate America. Some Arab regimes perceive America’s call for democracy as a maneuver to manipulate their citizens and control their countries. “America does not want true reform or democracy in the Arab world and will use all means possible to achieve its goal and protect its interests, wrote Salaheddine Hafez, vice chief editor of Al-Ahram and general secretary of the Federation of Arab Journalists.” (El Bendary, 2011, p. 82)
2.7 Conceptualizing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s transition

On June 30, 2012, Mr. Mohamed Morsi, a known leader of the long-banned Muslim Brotherhood organization became Egypt’s first democratically elected president. For observers and analysts, the event seemed bizarre because “[a]n Islamist Organization that had spent most of its existence denied legal status and subject to the depredations of a hostile authoritarian state was now in charge of the apparatus once used to repress it.” (Wickham, 2013, p. 1). And to everyone’s surprise, this happened not by a takeover or revolution but through elections.

Consequently, the issue of greatest concern nationally and internationally was the extent to which modern Islamist groups had changed their illiberal positions which formerly exemplified them, such as supporting violence, rejecting democracy as an “outlandish” procedure from the West, and calling for the implementation of Islamic law, or Shari’a, based on a fogyish interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts and juristic instances. “While Islamist leaders have welcomed and, indeed, actively supported recent democratic reforms, skeptics contend that they do not support democracy as an end in itself but as the first step toward establishing a system governed by the laws of God, as they define them.” (Wickham, 2013, p. 2)

Even the Muslim Brotherhood, for much of its eighty-four-year history, was ambiguous about its political objectives. While it repeatedly uttered, “Islam is the solution,” as its formal slogan, it refused to spell out what this slogan proposed. In general, this phrase communicates the basic devotion shared by most Egyptians; however, people question how implementing Shari’a or reestablishing the caliphate could solve the problems of domestic society in the twenty-first century.
After the revolution, the Brotherhood — like so many other political forces in Egypt’s toxic political scene — became overwhelmed by wariness, fearing that some combination of liberals, leftists, and old regime elements were going against them. An opportunity for democracy, as welcome as it was, came with its own risks.

It was expected that the Brotherhood, having been sidelined for decades, would want to take advantage of the momentum generated by the uprising to guarantee a leading role for itself in Egypt’s latest political system. “The Brotherhood’s decision to contest more than 50% of the seats in parliament and to run its own candidate for presidency, in violation of previous commitments, as well as its efforts to stack the Constitutional Assembly with an Islamist majority, exhibit the group’s eagerness to ‘seize the moment,’ that is, to maximize its influence at a crucial early phase in the transition process.” (Wickham, 2013, p. 248)

This wariness, combined with the traditional amount of political uncertainty, seeped into the organization’s discussion of Egypt’s foreign policy.

“When Egypt’s ruling military council lifted a travel ban on American NGO workers in an attempt to defuse a political crisis, the Brotherhood-led parliament pounced, using the episode to call for a no-confidence vote and demand the removal of the military-appointed government. Brotherhood parliamentarians blamed the Egyptian government for giving into American pressure and called on Egypt to refuse U.S. aid.” (Hamid, Foreign Policy Magazine, July 7, 2012)
2.8 The Muslim Brotherhood – U.S. relations

The Brotherhood demonstrated that it was pursuing a difficult strategy, believing one thing in secret and expressing a different view in public. Such blended communications exemplified the love-hate schizophrenia that several MB members showed towards the United States.

It is true that the MB, like most Egyptians, abhors specific U.S. policies, especially those that affect Palestine. In addition, the MB is inclined to believe that, by some measure, the United States is responsible for several evil conspiracies against Egypt. However, such attitudes did not mean that a Brotherhood-dominated administration would restructure Cairo’s international partnerships. To the Egyptians people’s astonishment, the Brotherhood in fact acted more approving of the U.S. than it did of America’s opponents. Shadi Hamid quoted a Brotherhood Official in his article, Brother Number One, “‘The U.S. is a superpower that is there and will be there, and it is not to anyone’s benefit to have this superpower going down, but we want it to go up with its values and not with its dark side,’ one senior Brotherhood official told me. ‘What are the values driving China across the globe?... It’s just pure profit. The Russians and the Chinese, I don’t know their values! Western European and American core values of human rights and pluralism — we practiced this when we were living there.’” (Hamid, Foreign Policy Magazine, July 7, 2012).

What was obvious prior to the elections was that a Brotherhood government would basically not be able to handle a break in relations with America. Everyone expected that a Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt would focus on rebuilding the diminishing economy and that American and European investment, advances, and aid would be vital to reach that goal. “There’s also no certainty that a President Morsi
could drastically alter Egypt’s foreign policy even if he wanted to.” (Hamid, Foreign Policy Magazine, July 7, 2012).

Indeed, there were limits on the extent to which the MB could change Egypt’s foreign policy; in addition, there were restrictions on how far it could go to fulfill U.S. interests. Since Egypt was on its way to becoming a more democratic country, elected leaders had to take into account the public’s sentiment on foreign policy. But, as public sentiment in Egypt was divided, the single point of actual agreement was the demand for a sovereign, positive foreign policy that re-launched Egypt’s prominent role in the Middle East. That meant that pressure and conflict with the United States would develop into a constant trait of U.S.-Middle East relations. “The model to look to is Turkey, led by the Islamically oriented Justice and Development Party, which has employed anti-Israel rhetoric to useful domestic effect.” (Hamid, Foreign Policy Magazine, July 7, 2012)

Although the Brotherhood could have adopted an anti-American rhetoric, that was not the manner in which its leaders politically positioned themselves because such rhetoric was no longer in their interests once they were in power. If the economy failed, populist patriotism could have become more attractive.

Incidentally, Mr. Morsi’s slim victory had allowed the White House to avoid a very uncomfortable situation. If Shafiq had been declared the victor, the U.S. would have been forced back into maximum confrontation with the Egyptian army. Especially given that the Egyptian military had received its aid in March, the U.S. would have found itself with extremely ineffective cards to play.
“In some sense, Mr. Morsi needs us more than Ahmed Shafiq would have needed us. The Brotherhood knows that external pressure on SCAF will be critical as the long struggle for power with old regime elements ensues. In a recent interview, Khairat al-Shater, the Brotherhood’s lead strategist, spoke of the need for a “strategic partnership” with the U.S. Mr. Morsi knows he has to deliver on the economy and Western aid, loans, and investment will be critical to this end.” (Indyk, Wittes, Elgindy, & Hamid, The Brookings Institution, June 26, 2012).

Therefore, experts advised the U.S. government that, with the Brotherhood in the presidency, the Obama administration, if it played its cards right, would have more leverage with SCAF, which feared the advent of closer relations between the U.S. and the Brotherhood. “From that perspective, the rise of Islamists actually provides an opportunity to re-engage on the Arab spring. That, however, will require a real re-think and re-orientation on the part of American policymakers.” (Indyk, Wittes, Elgindy, & Hamid, The Brookings Institution, June 26, 2012).

2.9 The significance of this study

This study is significant for several reasons. First, there is hardly any research about the portrayal of Mr. Morsi in the U.S. media. In addition, Egyptians want to know more about the U.S.-Egypt relations during Mr. Morsi’s presidency, especially after the growing debate over the inconsistent U.S. foreign policy toward Egypt after Mr. Morsi was ousted in June 30, 2013. Finally, the fact that these incidents took place in recent times lends an important element of timeliness and per se significance to this research project.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Servin and Tankard (2001) have suggested that theory promotes a valuable interpretation of how the world around us works. One of the main objectives of mass communication theories is to study the effects of mass communication. This chapter describes the different theories that facilitate further examination and defense of the thesis subject from a systematic viewpoint.

3.1 The Concept of Framing

Entman (1993) referred to Framing as an act that basically entails selection and salience. He explained that framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, so as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). Servin and Tankard (2001) also theorized that the news media tends to frame issues in various ways. They defined a frame as “a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration.” (p. 277)

Therefore, a frame represents the approach of media channels and media gatekeepers in classifying and portraying the events and topics they cover, which affects the perception of the news by the audience. It is important not only to note that news pieces bring particular issues to the public’s attention, but also to observe the way in which the news is delivered and the frames in which it is portrayed. Entman (1993) suggested that communicators make conscious or unconscious framing judgments when choosing their expressions. He further pointed that the text “contains
frames, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain key-words, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.” (p. 52). When the previously mentioned factors are present in a news narrative, they simply encourage those perceiving and thinking about events to develop particular understandings of them.

Texts can make a piece of information more salient by placing it in a certain context, repeating it over and over, or connecting it with culturally recognizable symbols. Even a single unexplained presence of an idea in a vague part of the text could be extremely salient, but only if it fits with the existing schemata in the audience’s belief structures. Servin and Tankard (2001) highlighted the way schemata works by saying “some ways of framing the news may ‘hook up’ better than others with existing ideas or schemas about a topic that people already have in minds.” (p. 278). On the other hand, a notion highlighted in a text can be challenging for audiences to observe, understand, or recall due to their existing schemata. Entman (1993) emphasized, “For our purposes, schemata and closely related concepts such as categories, scripts, or stereotypes connote mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals’ processing of information.” (p. 53). Therefore, in order to categorize a meaning as principal or favored, it is necessary to propose a certain framing of the contexts that is most profoundly sustained by the text and is consistent with the most common audience schemata.

For Entman, the framing process arises with the communication between sources and journalists. Once initiated, the frame directs the audience’s and journalist’s judgment. Entman termed this preliminary communication “event-specific schema.” Entman observed, “Once in place, event-specific schema encourages
journalists to “perceive, process, and report all further information about the event in ways supporting the basic interpretation encoded in the schema.” (Entman, 1993, p. 11).

The more frequently journalists receive similar views communicated by their sources and by other news outlets, the more their own judgments are expected to run along those lines, which causes the news they generate to feature words and illustrations that indorse the same framing. But if the ideas communicated are more diverse, framing may be less one-sided and less biased. (Entman, 2004, p. 9).

Frames are fundamental in classifying ideas within a narrative description of a subject or an incident. Frames deliver the interpretative signals used by audiences to make sense of impersonal realities. Kuypers observed, “In framing, it’s not the frequency of a word, metaphor, or concept that accounts for its strength, but rather how it is consistently framed across time.” (p. 199).

3.1.1 Framing Effects

The framing of news stories may have more subtle yet influential effects on audiences than ordinary bias in news stories. Servin and Tankard (2001) explained, “Audience members may be able to detect that a story is biased against a particular political candidate. But they may not detect as easily that a news event in being packaged as a certain type of story.” (p. 278). Especially when it comes to topics that the public is not so well informed about and cognitively committed to, framing greatly affects the audience’s responses to communications. Entman (1993) suggested, “journalists may follow the rules for ‘objectivity’ reporting and yet convey a dominant framing of the news text that prevent most audience members from
making a balanced assessment of the situation.” Illustrative of this theory, several previous research studies have shown that framing can influence the way audience members end up understanding an issue.

One of the most important aspects of framing is the ability to propose who is blameworthy for a drawback and who has the ability to resolve it. One researcher (Iyengar, 1991) argued, “Some of the most important framing done by the media has to do with suggesting who is responsible for a problem and who can help provide a remedy for the problem.” (Servin and Tankard, p. 278).

According to political scientist Doris Graber, “various media effects are modulated by the sensitivity of audiences to particular issues, and the effects vary with background, demographic characteristics, and experiences of individual audience members.” (Kuypers, 2002, p. 9).

The author projected that the efficiency of a frame could be established through a group of factors: a frame that is effective (influential) or a frame that has excessive frequency is expected to be persuasive for the public. This conclusion can be proved or invalidated by the past positions of the audience: if the audience already has a solid stance towards the issue, it is less likely to be influenced and, in addition, may or may not be encouraged to undertake or deal with the presented frames. Individuals who are extremely interested (politically aware) will tend to evaluate competitive frames and will select the solidest frame whether in a competitive or noncompetitive setting. Unsturdy or flimsy frames will affect individuals who have little motivation, especially when the frames are offered in an inactive setting (with minor competition between frames). However, when in a competitive environment, those individuals will gravitate toward the sturdier frame.
Academics and researchers widely agree that media framing of news coverage is capable of molding the audience’s views and attitudes about strategies regarding both local and international issues (Brewer, 2006; Druckman, 2001; Entman, 2004; Harmon & Muenchen, 2009; Kuypers, 2002; Morris, 2007).

In the political setting, the power of framing in altering the mindsets of the public can be intricately related to priming and agenda setting theories too. This concept can be defended by a research study that hypothesized that: if a team can generate the appropriate terms to debate a certain issue, it can effectively encourage individuals to adopt its viewpoint (Chong & Druckman, 2007).

3.1.2 Frames in Political News

It is essential to study news in a framing context. Since audiences may have no direct involvement with the political events reported in the news, they mainly rely on media accounts to keep themselves informed and make reasonable evaluations (Entman, 1991).

The description of framing has significant implications for political communication. Frames highlight some sides of the truth while concealing other sides, which might direct audiences to have different responses. Entman (1993) observed, “Politicians seeking support are thus compelled to compete with each other and with journalists over news frames” (qtd. In Entman, 55). Thus, framing plays a very important role in the exertion of political power. Indeed, the frame in a news text is actually the inscription of power: it conveys the characteristics of actors and/or the benefits that competed to lead the text.
Generally, media bias can facilitate the distribution of political power. That elucidates exactly how politicians with the media’s assistance play a substantial role in shaping the political sphere.

As Zaller (1992) explained, framing seems to be a significant tool in the democratic practice, because political elites direct the framing of topics. These frames can define what “public opinion” is. According to Entman (1993) “[Zaller’s] theory, along with that of Kahneman and Tversky, seems to raise radical doubts about democracy itself. If by shaping frames elites can determine the major manifestations of ‘true’ public opinion that are available to government (via polls or voting), what can true public opinion be?” (p. 57). The question here is how can sincere democratic moderators react appropriately to public opinion when research indicates that public opinion is so flexible, so susceptible to framing effects?

As Graber noted, this kind of “manipulative journalism raises philosophical, ethical, and news policies question.” (Kuypers, 2002, p. 7). Graber referred to this influential press agenda-building as the “process whereby news stories influence how people perceive and evaluate issues and policies.” (Kuypers, 2002, p. 8). As such, this process obviously goes beyond agenda setting and encompasses the manipulation of public opinion.

Evidence from political campaigns, surveys, and experiments suggests that the frames that political elites choose to use often influence public opinion (Druckman, 2001). For example, in the framing of the Iraqi war in the U.S. media, the debate over American policy toward Iraq (prior to the war) presented only two possibilities: imminent war and more time for sanctions. The debate did not offer the public a third option for the Iraqi aggression, such as negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait. This
framing was formulated by the political elites. Therefore, information that did not conform to that framing was judged as “not newsworthy” and consequently not covered by the media (Entman, 1993).

Theoretically, journalists in a society with free press should be able to report official stances and politicians’ positions with an independent, neutral and nonaligned perspective, in order to help their audiences construct their own opinions. However, the fact is that the connection between governing elites and news organizations is “less distant and more cooperative than the ideal envisions.” (Entman, 2004).

3.2 International News Flow

Numerous studies offer suggestions about theoretical frameworks for international coverage research. Several important research studies concentrating on international news have relied heavily on the research of Galtung and Ruge (1965), who explored the structure of international news, focusing on reports about the crises in Cyprus, Congo, and Cuba in four Norwegian newspapers. With respect to the sequence of news communication, the authors determined that world events are observed as media pictures with distortion; furthermore, these pictures construct the individual image across “selective distortion” which takes place at each level of the “interpersonal relationship” and “collective perception” (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). As reported by Galtung (1971), the global structure can be split into domains of core and marginal countries; the core is made up of Western industrial countries and the marginal are the developing countries. Conforming to Galtung’s (1971) analysis, Rosengren (1977) examined the probability that an international news item would be included in a foreign news publication. Rosengren discovered that a country’s geographic size and population are positively correlated to the amount of the news
reporting it gets. However, this was only noticeable in media entities in some European countries and not in others.

Similarly, Chang (1998) claimed that all nations are not portrayed evenly in the U.S. media. His research is founded on the theoretical framework of the global system and worldwide communication observed in relation to news flow. Chang’s (1998) theoretical premise was that distant and global occurrences generally happen in one country; if they are reported in another country, several fundamental boundaries define its track. In addition, Shannon (1996) noted that geographical regions in the global system could be categorized into central, marginal, and semi-marginal nations. Therefore, conforming to this global system classification (Galtung, 1971; Wallerstain, 1974; Shannon, 1996), particular news productions incorporating reports about what central nations do to semi-marginal and/or marginal nations would have an influence on news produced in marginal nations (Chang, 1998).

Chang, Shoemaker, and Brendlinger (1987) investigated international news coverage by the U.S. media to identify the determining factors of international news reporting, using two theoretical and operational approaches.

The first is the “context-oriented” notion, which examines the source of international news and its connections with circumstantial factors, such as political relationship, geographical proximity, economic associations, cultural similarity and social distance. The hypothesis behind this notion is that the background—both international and national—in which news events take place affects the international coverage (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987).
Second is the “event-oriented” notion, which proposes that, regardless of the afore-mentioned external elements, some foreign events are necessarily covered. For example, the level of irregularity and negativity of the incident tends to define whether an international happening will be reported in the media or not (Chang, Shoemaker, & Brendlinger, 1987).

In a study of the determining factors of foreign news flow through meta-analysis, Wu (1998) examined the hypothesized factors of foreign news flow and declared that these determinants can be split into two comprehensive categories: the “gatekeeper perspective” and the “logistical perspective.” The determinants of the gatekeeper perspective incorporate the usual newsworthiness, socio-cultural composition, and organizational restraints that impact foreign news flow. Conversely, logistical factors include the gross national product (GNP) of a country, the size of commerce and business, economic/political benefits of newscaster nations, population, geographic size and magnitude, geographic closeness, “eliteness”\(^1\), media assets and foundation, and finally, cultural sympathy (Wu, 1998).

Also, in Hester’s (1971, 1974) research about news flow into the U.S. media through The Associated Press (AP), he declared that direct immersion of U.S. interests is a key condition of newsworthiness for picking foreign reporting. Various earlier analyses realized that the political, geographic, economic, and social features of a country additionally control the amount of attention a nation gets in the media channels of a different nation (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Hester, 1974; Ostgaard, 1965; Rosengren, 1974). These elements include the elite position of a country, regionalism, and

\(^1\) Wu (1998) explained that eliteness is a unique characteristic of a country, showing that there is some kind of charisma linked with particular nations catching the attention of international press.
cultural and geographic closeness, GNP per capita, indication of economic growth, population of the nation, earlier colonial connections, language of the country, and media foundation (Ahern, 1984; Chang, 1998; Galtung, 1971; Larson, 1984; Ostgaard, 1965).
4. METHODOLOGY

This study uses quantitative content analysis methodology in studying the U.S. media framing of Mr. Morsi during six critical events that took place in his first six months of presidency. The study analyzes news stories, editorials, features and op-eds of two premier U.S. newspapers (The New York Times and The Washington Post).

4.1 Content Analysis

Frames are capable of having considerable influence on public opinion, but as Kuypers (2002) said,

“Looking for bias within press accounts of events is not an easy task. Bias is not highlighted as such, and newspapers certainly do not advertise their political leanings on the front page. However, by using framing analysis, one may discover how the press frames an issue and then look at that frame for bias.” (p. 18)

Content analysis is believed to be the most useful method when it comes to examining the portrayal of a particular issue or group in any specified medium. As reported by Wimmer and Dominick (2001), content analysis is “a method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic manner for the purpose of measuring variable.” Additionally, the authors explained that content analysis is utilized to examine the representation of certain groups and issues; therefore content analysis, in the context of this study, is implemented in investigating the U.S. media representation of Mr. Morsi.
Content analysis methodology is considered very successful when examining media content especially with respect to the quantity and quality of content (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). Generally, framing studies depend to a great extent on content analysis to evaluate media content and clarify the importance of news focuses. Furthermore, content analysis is extremely beneficial when investigating the transformations in media policy towards a specific group or topic, which is one of the objectives of this study (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).

4.1.1 Defining the Universe

The first phase of executing content analysis is to define the universe, which is fundamental in recognizing the constraints of the study (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011).

This study examines news stories, editorials, features and op-eds that reported on the Mr. Morsi in The New York Times and The Washington Post, during six critical events that took place from June 24, 2012 to December 31, 2012.


In this study, the researcher analyzes the two leading American newspapers, The New York Times and The Washington Post. These papers are chosen because they are considered prestigious national publications, as they have high readership and are powerful in setting the tone for reporting in America (Carroll, 2006). Also, they include important columns for key opinion leaders, in addition to representing a rather inclusive range of diverse political ideologies.

The New York Times, moreover, has a considerable effect on decision-making leaders when it comes to global events (Bloch-Elkon, 2007).
In addition, The New York times and The Washington Post offer inclusive coverage of world events and they are considered prominent internationally. Furthermore, these newspapers were selected over other local or middlebrow tabloid papers, since they were expected to incorporate more significant and fruitful amount of international news coverage.

It is essential to mention that premier newspapers “provide cues to other types of news organizations about what is newsworthy. Their importance therefore extends beyond their own readership to the content of other news media” (Lawrence, 2000).

4.1.2 Sampling

This study employs a purposive sample. As mentioned by Wimmer & Dominick (2011), purposive sample is a non-probability sample that “includes subjects or elements selected for specific characteristics or qualities and eliminates those who fail to meet these criteria”. The purposive sample in this study includes stories that only discussed Mr. Morsi’s actions and were produced during the six months timeframe (From June 24, 2012 to December 31, 2012).

Riffe and Fretag (1997) proved the significance of purposive sampling in research studies that apply a content analysis methodology; they discovered that 68 percent of the Journalism Quarterly’s content analysis papers applied purposive sampling (as cited in Wimmer & Dominick (2011). Moreover, it is essential to state that U.S. newspapers and news media are very extensive; consequently, improving the topic field or limiting the population under investigation was more likely to decrease the degree of sampling error.
The total sample yields 110 articles; 60 from The New York Times and 50 from the Washington Post. The articles were divided into 74 news reports, 21 columns and op-eds, and 15 editorials.

4.1.3 Unit of Analysis

This study analyzes news stories, editorials, and columns/op-eds that covered Mr. Morsi’s actions. Images included in those stories were not studied. In addition, the sample was compiled using LexisNexis, for each newspaper the following keywords were used, in order to yield the most comprehensive sample: (Morsi AND elections), (Morsi AND SCAF), (Morsi AND army), (Morsi AND military), (Morsi AND Iran), (Morsi AND Hamas), (Morsi AND Israel), (Morsi AND Gaza), (Morsi AND the constitutional decree), (Morsi AND Constitution) and (Morsi AND protestors). The study examines newspaper articles during the period from June 24, 2012 (the day Mr. Morsi was announced as Egypt’s new president) to December 2012 (almost six months after Mr. Morsi consolidated power). Further divisions of the newspaper are not reviewed. Duplicate articles are excluded as well.

4.1.4 Coding

The relevant articles are coded according to the date of the article, its origin (the source from which the article was taken), and its format (news and new analysis, editorials, and op-ed pieces).

While preparing the coding sheet, the researcher randomly examined news stories, news analyses, editorials and commentaries that were published in the two newspapers and created a set of inductively chosen attributes and stereotypes that
were used in framing Mr. Morsi. The researcher then used these attributes and stereotypes as coding schemes.

Another cluster of questions in the coding sheet aimed to assess the depiction of Mr. Morsi’s character. Research has indicated that frames tend to have either covertly or overtly positive or negative assessments (Matthes, 2012). To capture direction, questions probed whether there were positive or negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi in the news story, because when semantic features are found in the story, they work to produce frames.

Another coding category tackled Mr. Morsi’s decisions and policies. The category intended to grab hold of the diverse interpretive sets or themes that were present in the tested news articles. Such themes consisted of background information, quotes, descriptions, in addition to symbolic means involving catch-phases and metaphors that mutually cooperate to create a "central organizing idea," or frame (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).

Assigning responsibility for troubles and proposing a corrective player or technique is a well-established media frame (Iyengar, 1991). To reveal the existence of an “attribution of responsibility” frame, the coders had to analyze the “overall faming of Mr. Morsi’s decisions” and determine whether the articles proposed that Mr. Morsi’s decisions were worsening Egypt’s state of affairs, or improving it or if the articles did not tackle his decisions’ impact on the state of affairs. As Entman (1993) explained, outlining problems, identifying reasons, proposing solutions, and making ethical conclusions are the four main capacities of frames.
The coding sheet also addressed Mr. Morsi’s connection to the Muslim Brotherhood and whether this relationship was presented as an influential factor or not. In addition, another coding category intended to find out whether Islam and democracy were portrayed as contradictory or not.

Afterwards, coding categories inquired about the portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy. This section aimed to discover the way Mr. Morsi’s governance style was judged.

Finally, the overall framing of U.S.-Egyptian relations was also studied. The coding sheet, consequently, asked whether the news story judged Mr. Morsi as a U.S. enemy or partner.

The researcher randomly examined news stories, news analyses, editorials and commentaries that were published in the two newspapers and created a set of inductively chosen attributes and stereotypes that were used in framing Mr. Morsi. The researcher then used these attributes and stereotypes as coding schemes and basically applied a 3-point Likert scale and nominal levels of measurement.

### 4.1.5 Operationalization

- **Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Character:** In this study, the word character means the combination of qualities or features that distinguish Mr. Morsi.
  - *Positive Stereotypes about Mr. Morsi:* (Pro-America, pro-west, culturally rich, modern, talented, pragmatic, negotiator, self-disciplined and capable of leadership) or attributes along the aforementioned lines.
  - *Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi:* (Irresponsible, extremist, aggressive, hard-liner, fanatic, insurgent, irrational, intolerable, anti-American, anti-
modern, frenzied, backward, dangerous, lawless, and isolated.) or attributes of the aforementioned lines.

- Egypt’s state of affairs: the general state of the country; the combination of political, economic, societal, and security conditions at the given time.

- Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood: In this study, Mr. Morsi’s relationship with the MB refers to his devotion and compliance to the MB leadership; as well as Mr. Morsi’s readiness to implement the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.

- Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy: In this study, western style democracy refers to honest government, rule of law and free speech, and respecting human rights, political rights and civil liberties.

- Portrayal of U.S.-Egyptian Relations: it refers to the portrayal of Egypt as a strategically important U.S. ally, and a cornerstone for Israel’s security. Also it looks at the U.S. aid to Egypt, including the military and economic assistance, which are considered a very important aspect of the relations. Therefore, the analysis aimed to determine whether Mr. Morsi was framed as friendly and cooperative or not.

4.1.6 Intercoder Reliability

Lombard, Synder-Duch, & Bracken (2002) defined Intercoder reliability as "the extent to which independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message or artifact and reach the same conclusion" (p. 589). Therefore, intercoder reliability is considered a crucial element when it comes to validating data that can be coded subjectively. It measures the level of compliance between two or more coders considering their evaluations of messages (Freelon, 2010).
In this research, two coders worked together to analyze the material: the researcher, a 26-year-old female graduate student in Mass Communications and Journalism, and a 30-year-old male graduate student in Mass Communication and Journalism, who works as a marketing executive for a multinational company. Each coder individually evaluated the sample articles.

The Intercoder reliability testing was executed on 23 articles to guarantee that the coders were in harmony in respect of their coding choices. The testing occurred after many training sessions premeditated to revise and fine-tune the coding sheet in addition to producing precise coding rules.

Intercoder reliability was verified using two procedures; percentage agreement and Scott’s Pi, because singular methods of reliability might not be adequate, and content examiners could be instructed to employ several additional measures (Riffe et al., 2005). This study employed an online intercoder reliability web service, ReCal, which is created by researcher Deen Freelon, a Reliability Calculator, accessible at (http://www.dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/). ReCal is an independent operating method that offers several reliability coefficients. A global range of computer configurations has verified the system’s efficiency, and many users have positively endorsed it since its public launch in October 2008. (Freelon, 2011).

Generally, the inter-coder reliability testing yielded valid results with a 93% overall reliability percentage.

The two coders identified a similar format for articles in 86% (Scott's Pi= 0.77) of the sample. In addition, the coders agreed on coding decisions for the critical events period in 91% (Scott's Pi= 0.892) of the sample.
As for the overall representation of Mr. Morsi as secular or not, the two coders agreed in 91% (Scott's Pi = 0.629) of the sample. In addition, the coders agreed on coding decisions for the positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi in 91% (Scott's Pi = 0.744) of the sample and 87% (Scott's Pi = 0.731) for the negative stereotypes.

Regarding the Value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s decisions, the two coders agreed in 96% (Scott's Pi = 0.928) of the sample, 91% (Scott's Pi = 0.856) for Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ consistency, 83% (Scott's Pi = 0.734) for Mr. Morsi’s decisions' impact on Egypt’s state of affairs, 87% (Scott's Pi = 0.782) for Mr. Morsi’s decisions' relevance to revolutionary goals, 96% (Scott's Pi = 0.922) for transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process, and 87% (Scott's Pi = 0.8) for the quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process in terms of its calculation and planning.

The two coders agreed in 100% of the sample when coding two main variables; the influence of MB membership on Mr. Morsi, and the value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic.

When coding the representation of Mr. Morsi’s governance style, the two coders agreed in 96% (Scott's Pi = 0.934) of the sample. In addition the coders agreed in 91% (Scott's Pi = 0.849) of the sample when evaluating Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian Military. Finally, the coders agreed in 96% (Scott's Pi = 0.928) of the sample when coding the overall representation of Mr. Morsi’s status as enemy/partner to the U.S.

The coding sheet was updated after reviewing the results of the inter-coder reliability testing to fine-tune variables that scored relatively lower than others.
4.2 Research Questions

Why this research employed research questions and not research hypothesis:

Although this research uses quantitative content analysis, but it has a strong element of qualitative approach to it, for example, some coding categories are constructed by randomly examining news stories, news analyses, editorials and commentaries that were published in the two newspapers and creating a set of inductively chosen attributes and stereotypes that are used in framing Mr. Morsi, to be used as coding schemes. Therefore, the researcher decided that research questions would be better than hypothesis because the study started the investigation with a concept, but used inductive methods to reach a final conclusion about the research.

RQ1: What are the dominant frames that characterize the U.S. press coverage of Mr. Morsi?

RQ2: How does U.S. press coverage of Mr. Morsi inform our understanding of U.S. foreign policy toward Egypt?

Research question two does not employ quantitative content analysis as a methodology because the researcher constructed this question to provide a bigger picture of the purpose of the study. The answer of RQ2 sheds more proper and meaningful light on the answer of RQ1, it answers the basic questions of what does that tell us, and what do we learn regarding the U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt?

Also, the researcher aims to conceptualize the findings from RQ1 in light of the literature review, so as to create a "Kung Fu Circle".
4.3 Critical Events as Elements of Discussion

EVENT 1: Mohamed Morsi, named as Egypt’s new president, June 24, 2012.

Mohamed Morsi was announced as the winner of Egypt’s presidential elections. He was the first Islamist selected to be the president of an Arab country.

EVENT 2: Mr. Morsi dismisses top military generals, August 12, 2012.

After militants in Sinai killed 16 Egyptian border guards, Mr. Morsi compelled the retirement of the Minister of Defense, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi; Lieutenant General, Sami Hafez Anan; and other few leading generals.

EVENT 3: Mr. Morsi visits Iran for the Non-Aligned Summit Movement, August 30, 2012

Mr. Morsi visited Iran after decades since the two countries broke off diplomatic relations in the 1980s after Egypt’s recognition of Israel to attend the Non-Aligned Summit Movement meeting.

EVENT 4: President Morsi acts as a vital link in the Hamas/Israel truce, November 20, 2012

Mr. Morsi was successful in brokering a cease-fire that ended eight days of warfare between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

EVENT 5: Mr. Morsi asserts broader powers, November 22, 2012.

Mr. Morsi issued a constitutional declaration, which elevated his decisions above judicial review. Mr. Morsi’s declaration provoked weeks of huge street protests,
which additionally heightened after the Islamist-dominated Constitutional Assembly pushed the approval of the draft charter before judges could take action to prevent it.

**EVENT 6: Unrest in Egypt over the constitution, December 2012.**

First, thousands of activists marched to the Presidential Palace in Cairo to request the delay of the constitutional vote, which President Mr. Morsi had arranged for December 15, 2012. Afterwards, clashes broke out between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi demonstrators, bringing about seven deaths. Then, Mr. Morsi cancelled the provocative decree that granted him extensive authorities, but the president declared that the vote would occur as scheduled. Finally, a nationwide vote approved Egypt’s new constitution. The constitution was approved in two rounds of voting.
5. FINDINGS

5.1 This section provides the findings for research question one: What are the dominant frames that characterized the U.S. press coverage of Mr. Morsi?

EVENT ONE: Mohamed Morsi, named Egypt’s new president, June 25, 2012.

1. Mr. Morsi’s ideology

   The articles constantly insinuated that Mr. Morsi was a non-secular leader, regularly referred to him as “Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood,” and framed him as “an Islamist president” (Londono, The Washington Post, June 30, 2012). One article described him as “the first Islamist elected to lead an Arab state.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 30, 2012)

   Also in order to show his fundamentalist Islamist background, the article mentioned that during his inaugural speech, “Mr. Morsi missed no opportunity to invoke God’s oversight. But he never mentioned Islamic law. Its adoption had been a staple of his stump speeches during the first round of Egypt’s presidential elections, when he campaigned against rival Islamists, but he dropped it when he pivoted into the runoff against a more secular opponent.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 30, 2012)

2. Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

   For the variable investigating positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, the results showed that only 21.1% of the articles (n= 19) carried positive stereotypes about him. These stereotypes mostly portrayed Mr. Morsi as a devoted, pragmatic Islamist, who spent time in prison during the Mubarak era for his membership in the once-restricted Muslim Brotherhood. The articles also commonly mentioned that he was well

The articles also positively talked about Mr. Morsi’s tactic of expressing an assertive principle with short-term pragmatism. So for instance, he was anti-Israel but did not request to terminate the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty (Greenberg, The Washington Post, June 25, 2012).

3. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

For the variable investigating negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, the results showed that 42.1% of the articles investigated (n= 19) carried negative stereotypes about him. For example, one article mentioned that Mr. Morsi was “[a] lackluster, accidental candidate, he was chosen to run after the brotherhood’s first choice, Khairat el-Shater, was disqualified.” (Fahim, The New York Times, June 25, 2012) Another mentioned that he was a “bearded and bespectacled former prisoner.” (Sly, The Washington Post, July 1, 2012)

Besides, the articles showed that Mr. Morsi belonged to the radical wing of the Brotherhood, which formerly exhibited little flexibility or readiness to cooperate and/or negotiate. “As he rose in leadership (in the MB), he gained a reputation as a conservative enforcer, known for discouraging dissent.”(Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 25, 2012)

4. The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies

Since the articles mainly covered Mr. Morsi’s narrow victory in the presidential elections and his swearing-in ceremony, there was no value judgment casted regarding his policies. In addition, the articles conveyed that it was too early to
evaluate his policies as he was just sworn in and had not made any decisions at that early stage of his tenure.

5. **The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency:**

   Mr. Morsi’s policies’ consistency (or their inconsistency) did not figure into the articles because it was too early to evaluate them as he was just sworn in and had not made any decisions at that early stage of his tenure.

6. **Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on the state of affairs**

   Mr. Morsi’s decisions' impact on the state of affairs in Egypt did not figure into the articles.

7. **Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals**

   The articles did not tackle Mr. Morsi’s decisions' relevance to revolutionary goals. However, most of the articles expected that he would work on achieving those goals as he was framed as the “revolutionary candidate.”

8. **Transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process**

   The articles did not tackle the transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision making.

9. **The quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process**

   The quality of the decision-making process did not figure into the articles.

10. **Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood**

    All the articles mentioned -in a way- that Mr. Morsi had continuously campaigned not as an independent individual with his own distinct vision but rather as an implementer of the MB’s program (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 25, 2012).
One article reported, “Mohamed Morsi’s ascent was the culmination of a far longer journey, the 84-year quest for power by the once-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.” (Sly, The Washington Post, July 1, 2012)

Another article stated, “Mr. Morsi faces scrutiny over his relationship with the Brotherhood. He resigned from the group on Sunday, but many people believe his years in the organization mean his ties to it will persist.” The article continued, “During his campaign, Mr. Morsi never made a major decision without the approval of the Brotherhood’s guidance council.” (Fahim, The New York Times, June 25, 2012)

Also another article stated that Mr. Morsi only won the elations because he “ran on a Brotherhood ticket.” (Sly, The Washington Post, July 1, 2012)

11. Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

The analysis showed that only 68.4% of the articles (n= 19) contained words that framed Islam and democracy as contradictory. This was evident in the way political Islam was portrayed as aggressive, militant, radical, narrow-minded, undemocratic, anti-American, and anti-Christian. One article stated, “Mrs. Clinton’s afternoon meeting with leaders of Egypt’s Christian minority touched on one of the transition’s rawest nerves: the fear that Mr. Morsi and his allies would move swiftly to lay the foundations of a pious, Muslim state.” (Fahim, The New York Times, July 16, 2012)

The same article mentioned, “Though there is little evidence that the Islamists needed American help in gaining power — or indeed, received it — the complaints reflected the country’s anxious politics and growing concerns among many Christians and secular-minded Egyptians about Islamist rule.” It further added that “[t]hose
anxieties have caused some liberals and Coptic leaders to support the military in its feud with the Brotherhood.” (Fahim, The New York Times, July 16, 2012)

12. **Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:**

   For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s governance style, 52.6% of the articles stressed that Mr. Morsi was highly expected to support the public and to be a democratic leader. For example, one article praised his inaugural speech in which he vowed to be a president for all Egyptians. The article mentioned that the speech was “an encouraging olive branch to the military, liberals and minority groups.” (Editorial, The New York Times, July 16, 2012)

   Another article predicted that Mr. Morsi would not go into political battles and would primarily work on the country’s ill economy. “Mr. Morsi is more likely to attend to Egypt’s ailing economy and save political battles with the generals for another day.” (Stacher, The New York Times, June 30, 2012)

   While 26.3% viewed him as an autocrat, they basically conveyed –indirectly– that they were not sure how Mr. Morsi would handle his secular, leftist and liberal opponents, in addition to Egypt’s Christian minority.

13. **Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military**

   As for the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s relationship with the Egyptian army, 84.2% of the articles considered the relationship between Mr. Morsi and the Egyptian army as quite complex. The articles mentioned that the relationship between Mr. Morsi and the SCAF would continue to be one of the most challenging matters the president would face. One article argued that it was relatively vague how much power Mr. Morsi truly had at the beginning of his term (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 26, 2012).
A very important point was that Mr. Morsi and the military had a mutually bad record since Mubarak’s era. For example, one article mentioned, “Military officers and former top officials of the Mubarak government smiled as they escorted Mr. Morsi on his walk through the office – a breathtaking contrast to the days when their government had jailed him for his role as a Brotherhood leader.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 26, 2012).

Also the articles suggested that Mr. Morsi decided to maintain the situation and lessen conflicts between the presidency and SCAF. “Although supporters of Mr. Morsi in Tahrir Square still chant for the end of military rule, he played along and commended Field Marshal Tantawi for submitting voluntarily to the will of the people. ‘It is a grand day for Egypt,’ Mr. Morsi said. Then he posed for a picture surrounded by generals.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, July 1, 2012)

In contrast, other articles proposed that he pushed for a better balance of authority: “Now Mr. Morsi will have to press for a better and more enduring balance of power.” (Editorial, The New York Times, June 26, 2012)

14. Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations:

As for the U.S. Egyptian relation, 52.6% of the articles (n= 19) affirmed that Mr. Morsi would probably work on being a U.S. ally.

The articles founded their optimism on Mr. Morsi’s irrefutable need to work on calming Egypt and developing its struggling economy, where he definitely needed support from Washington. “Egyptians are responsible for their own future but will need help from the United States and others to revive their economy and achieve a democratic transition. The Obama administration is right to say that Egypt’s new government will be judged on its actions.” (Editoral, The New York Times, June 26,
Another article mentioned that the secular activists claimed that the Obama administration might have pushed SCAF to announce Mr. Morsi as the winner of the elections. “And incongruously, given Washington’s history of antagonism toward the Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, the secular lawmakers argued that the United States had improperly tried to sway the presidential race in Mr. Morsi’s favor.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, June 30, 2012)

In addition, the articles extensively tackled the effect of Mr. Morsi’s victory on the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty. They considered keeping the treaty as a crucial element for maintaining good relations with the U.S. One article mentioned, “Is the election of Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, as president of Egypt the beginning of the end of the Camp David peace treaty between Israel and Egypt? It doesn’t have to be. In fact, it could actually be the beginning of a real peace between the Israeli and the Egyptian people, instead of what we’ve had: a cold, formal peace between Israel and a single Egyptian pharaoh. But, for that to be the case, both sides will have to change some deeply ingrained behaviors, and fast.” (Friedman, The New York Times, July 3, 2012)
EVENT TWO: After Sinai attacks, Mr. Morsi dismisses top military generals, August 12, 2012.

1. Mr. Morsi’s ideology

Sixty percent of the articles did not address Mr. Morsi’s ideological background. However, 40% of the articles mentioned that he belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood.

2. Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

For the variable investigating positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, the results showed that only 50% of the articles (n= 10) carried positive stereotypes about him. These stereotypes mostly portrayed Mr. Morsi as a president who emerged as more commanding than his forerunners (Fahim and El Sheikh, The New York Times, August 14, 2012).

In addition, many of the articles questioned whether Mr. Morsi’s ability to grab power had been miscalculated, since he took serious actions towards the ruling SCAF at a very early stage of his tenure, while many thought that the power struggle between the powerful military officials and him would last longer. (Londono, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012).

3. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

On the other hand, only 10% of the articles (n= 10) carried negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi. In one article they mentioned that Mr. Morsi was expected to be a “relatively powerless leader” (Londono, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012). The same article said that Mr. Morsi was regarded as “a charmless, accidental president.”

Other articles talked about Mr. Morsi’s unlawful movements as he took
actions against the law and the constitution to expand his authority.

4. The media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies

For the variable investigating the media’s stance towards Mr. Morsi’s policies, 70% of the articles (n= 10) defended the decisions. One article mentioned, “Mr. Morsi had no alternative but to face off with the generals and consolidate his political standing” (Editorial, The Washington Post, August, 14, 2012).

In addition, Mr. Morsi's sacking of Tantawi and Anan was portrayed as synonymous to a civilian coup, which surprised many observers in addition to the Egyptian public itself (Ross, The Washington Post, August 20, 2012). The articles constantly mentioned that Mr. Morsi’s actions would lead to a significantly new era in the Egyptian politics (Ross, The Washington Post, August 20, 2012).

However, 30% of the articles criticized the move since it was extralegal, especially noting that the Supreme Constitutional Court had ruled that the SCAF’s road map was fine. (Fahim, The New York Times, August 12, 2012)

5. The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency:

Seventy percent of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as consistent and harmonious. The articles said that the decisions made complete sense because as Egypt’s new president, Mr. Morsi had all the right to lay a solid foundation for a new civilian democratic rule, especially given that the country was ruled by the army since the 1950s. (Fahim, The New York Times, August 12, 2012)

However, 30% viewed the decisions as inconsistent. The articles mainly criticized the move because it was not clear how far the actions were agreed upon with the retired Field Marshal, Tantawi, nor how far they wanted to modify the authority balance between the army generals and Mr. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood.
6. **Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs**

   For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state affairs, 60% of the articles (n= 10) concluded that his actions were improving Egypt’s state of affairs. The articles stated that the military suffered a serious decline in public approval after a number of intense clashes with protestors throughout the 18 months prior to Mr. Morsi’s elections, which incited an unpleasant chorus of disapproval and rage amid the public (Shull and Hassib, The Washington Post, August 15, 2012). The articles expected this rage to soften after Mr. Morsi dismissed the top generals. (Londono, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012).

   However, 20% of the articles framed the actions as worsening Egypt’s state of affairs because it wasn't clear how much turmoil his actions would cause in the army. “Still, it was unclear on Sunday whether the generals would accept Mr. Morsi’s latest moves.” (Fahim, The New York Times, August 12, 2012).

7. **Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals**

   For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals, 80% of the articles (n= 10) defended the decisions. Many articles referred to Mr. Morsi’s decision to retire Gen. Tantawi and Gen. Anan as a “revolutionary decision.” The articles mainly stressed that the revolutionaries who took part in the 2011 uprising remained in opposition to the military during the transitional phase. Therefore, ending the “military control of post-transitional Egypt” and cancelling the constitutional document that provided the military lawmaking and additional powers were framed as great steps in the transition towards democracy. (Ross, The Washington Post, August 20, 2012)
“Many see Mr. Morsi’s move to control the SCAF (...) as finally giving Egypt’s revolution the chance to remove key remnants of the Mubarak regime and fulfill its promises.” (Ross, The Washington Post, August 20, 2012).

8. Transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

Sixty percent of the articles (n=10) did not tackle the transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process, while 40% of the articles framed his decisions as lacking transparency and clarity. “Mr. Morsi ousted the two in a dramatic and unexpected shake-up of the military leadership” (Shull and Hassib, The Washington Post, August 15, 2012).

Also another article stated, “It was not clear whether Mr. Morsi acted unilaterally or whether the shake-up was part of a deal with the generals.” (Editorial, The New York Times, August 11, 2012). Another article reported that “analysts struggled to tell whether the shake-up represented a break between Mr. Morsi and the military, or a carefully brokered deal, many looked for clues in the replacements named for the retired generals.” (Fahim, The New York Times, August 12, 2012)

9. The quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

For the variable investigating the quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process, 60% of the articles (n=10) framed his decisions as far-sighted, organized and calculated. “Mr. Morsi seems to have shrewdly capitalized on the Aug. 5 security debacle…” (Editorial, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012). The articles mainly conveyed that Mr. Morsi waited for the right timing to change the leaders; one article mentioned that the move was “smart from Mr. Morsi” (Fahim and El Sheikh, August 14, 2012).

However, 10% of the articles saw the actions as shortsighted and
miscalculated, because they would lead to an endless power struggle between the Mr. Morsi, the military and the courts. “Mr. Morsi’s abolishment of the constitutional declaration posed a more fundamental challenge to the military. It also raised the possibility of a new confrontation with one of Egypt’s highest courts.” (Fahim, The New York Times, August 12, 2012)

10. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relation with the Muslim Brotherhood

Sixty percent of the articles (n=10) viewed Mr. Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood as influential. The articles mostly mentioned his membership in the MB when discussing his decisions’ effect on “his credibility with political forces outside the brotherhood that had clamored for an end to military rule” (Fahim and El Sheikh, August 14, 2012). Also the same article raised questions of whether the Brotherhood was planning to take control of the military or not.

The articles additionally questioned if Mr. Morsi was attempting to change Egypt into a civilian well-ordered nation, or if he was aiming to establish the Muslim Brotherhood completely in power (Shull and Hassib, The Washington Post, August 15, 2012).

Furthermore, another article casted Mr. Morsi’s relationship with the MB group as a serious problem because the MB was viewed as a parent organization to Hamas, which was believed to have played some role in the attack on the soldiers in Sinai, earlier that month. (Fahim, The New York Times, August 8, 2012)

11. Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

Seventy percent of the articles did not cast a value judgment regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic. While 30% viewed Islam and democracy as contradictory, they said that the Islamist President took actions against the law and the constitution.
12. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:

Ninety percent of the articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi was a democratic leader and that his decision to retire Gen. Tantawy and Gen. Anan was an attempt to restore the authority of his office.

Also, the articles showed that all political sectors greeted Mr. Morsi’s actions with approval: “the president’s supporters held large rallies in Cairo and other figures from across the political spectrum hailed Mr. Morsi’s decision.” (Fahim, The New York Times, August 8, 2012)

Another article framed the moves as “a step toward a truly democratic Egypt, a positive turn of events.” (Editorial, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012)

13. Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military

As for the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s relationship with the Egyptian army, 60% of the articles considered his decisions to be hostile to the army. One article considered Mr. Morsi's move as the deadliest blow in the struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military over leading post-transitional Egypt (Londono, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012). Another suggested that the move exhibited the balance of authority between Egypt's first civilian president and the army that had moved to restrain his authority and politically led the country for more than 60 years (Ross, The Washington Post, August 20, 2012) (Shull and Hassib, The Washington Post, August 15, 2012).

“For Mr. Morsi, it is a major gamble to decisively take the reins of power just as Egypt launches a military offensive in the restive Sinai Peninsula and contends with an economic crisis.” (Londono, The Washington Post, August 14, 2012)

14. Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations:
One hundred percent of the articles examined did not address Mr. Morsi’s status as a U.S. enemy or partner.
EVENT THREE: Mr. Morsi visits Iran for the Non-Aligned Summit

Movement, August 26, 2012

1. Mr. Morsi’s ideology

For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s ideology, 63.6% of the articles (n=11) did not address his ideological background. Conversely, 36.4% of the articles portrayed Mr. Morsi as a non-secular president, tracing this to his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, one article mentioned, “Mr. Morsi comes from the Muslim Brotherhood, a pan-Arab Islamist movement.” (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, August 26, 2012) The article later added that Mr. Morsi’s had “connections through the Muslim Brotherhood to its militant Palestinian offshoot Hamas.”

2. Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

For the variable investigating positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, 63.6% of the articles (n=11) carried positive stereotypes about him.

Thomas L. Friedman said, “But Morsi surprised me, for the better, by using his visit to Tehran to call out the Iranian leadership for supporting Syria’s oppressive regime” (Friedman, The New York Times, September 5, 2012).

3. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

For the variable investigating negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, 36.4% of the articles (n=11) carried negative stereotypes about him. The negative signals were mainly conveyed when the articles mentioned the part in Mr. Morsi’s speech about Iran’s right to “peaceful use of atomic energy.” (Pincus, The Washington Post, September 4, 2012).

4. The media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies
For the media’s value judgment regarding Mr. Morsi’s policies, 63.6% of the articles (n=11) defended his visit to Iran for the following reasons: The articles mentioned that his visit was primarily about local politics. They highlighted that Mubarak’s foreign policy was despised by the majority of Egyptians; therefore, Mr. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to show the people that Egyptian foreign policy would witness a "new era". (Rudoren, The New York Times, August 23, 2012).

In addition, the articles stressed that Mr. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood sought to establish an Egyptian foreign policy that was untethered to the United States. By doing that, they hoped that Egypt would restore its lost regional gleam and influence. (Afrasiabi, The New York Times, August 24, 2012).

Furthermore, many of the articles discussed that the visit might not necessarily be a terrible thing for the United States, especially if Mr. Morsi's tactic was successful in repositioning Egypt as a regional leader of the Middle East; consequently, Egypt would be a more suitable mediator for the United States. (Rudoren, The New York Times, August 23, 2012).

However, 27.3% of the articles criticized Mr. Morsi’s visit to Iran, finding it very troubling that Tehran was one of the primary visits by Egypt’s newly elected president. (Friedman, The New York Times, August 29, 2012).

“Mr. Morsi’s first big trip shouldn’t have been to just China and Iran. It should have been all across Europe and Asia to reassure investors and tourists that Egypt is open for business again — and maybe on to Silicon Valley and then Caltech to meet with Egypt’s Nobel Prize-winning chemist, Ahmed Zewail, to signal a
commitment to reviving education in Egypt, where half the women are illiterate.” (Friedman, The New York Times, August 29, 2012).

5. The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency:

With respect to the value judgment of consistency, 54.5% of the articles (n=11) framed Mr. Morsi’s policies as consistent. The articles showed that Mr. Morsi’s visit to Tehran did not mean a complete regularization in relations; but rather, a move towards restoring Egypt’s regional leadership.

“Staking out a new leadership role for Egypt in the shaken landscape of the Arab uprisings, President Mohamed Morsi is reaching out to Iran and other regional powers in an initiative to halt the escalating violence in Syria.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, August 27, 2012). The article added, “Mr. Morsi is visiting Tehran this week (…) but his spokesman, Mr. Ali, said the visit would last only a few hours, without any bilateral talks. He also dismissed speculation that Mr. Morsi planned to upgrade Egypt's relations with Iran to full diplomatic relations.”

Only 27.3% framed the decisions as inconsistent. The New York Times, for example, recommended that Mr. Morsi get informed as to the incidents of 2009, when the Iranian regime suppressed the Green Movement by jailing and killing protesters demanding reforms in a manner similar to the uprising that got Mr. Morsi elected as the President of Egypt. (Friedman, The New York Times, August 29, 2012).

6. Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs

One hundred percent of the articles (n=11) of the articles did not discuss Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on Egypt state of affairs.
7. **Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals**

One hundred percent of the articles (n= 11) did not discuss Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals, due to the absence of a direct relation between the revolutionary goals and Mr. Morsi’s visit to Iran.

8. **Transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process**

One hundred percent of the articles (n= 11) did not discuss Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process in terms of transparency and clarity.

9. **The quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process**

As for the quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process, 45.5% of the articles (n=19) considered his decision to visit Iran a far-sighted, organized and calculated decision. They mainly endorsed his plan to spend just a few hours in Tehran without scheduling any meetings with Iranian officials, commenting that the trip was lengthy enough to mark a fresh foreign policy direction while also short enough to assure Egypt's supporters in the Arabian Gulf and Washington that he was not pushing them away. (Rudoren, The New York Times, August 23, 2012).

Also some articles highly praised him after he openly criticized the Syrian regime, despite being hosted by Damascus's chief ally Iran. They praised him for saying the truth regardless of power. (Friedman, The New York Times, September 5, 2012).

On the other hand, 36.4% of the articles viewed the decision to visit Iran as shortsighted and haphazard. The articles mainly criticized Mr. Morsi for lending a hand to "sanitize" the Iranian regime by attending the Nonaligned Movement's summit meeting in Tehran. (Friedman, The New York Times, August 29, 2012)
The writer said, “there is only one reason the Iranian regime wants to hold the meeting in Tehran and have heads of state like you attend, and that is to signal to Iran's people that the world approves of their country's clerical leadership and therefore they should never, ever, ever again think about launching a democracy movement -- the exact same kind of democracy movement that brought you, Mr. Morsi, to power in Egypt.” (Friedman, The New York Times, August 29, 2012).

10. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relation with the Muslim Brotherhood

As for the article investigating Mr. Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, 54.5% of the articles did not mention that he belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood.

While 36.4% mentioned his alliance to the group, for example, one article stated, “But a more democratic, Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt will not behave like the automatic ally it was before.” (Friedman, The New York Times, September 5, 2012).

11. Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

Seventy percent of the articles didn not deal with the Islam-democracy dynamic, while 30% portrayed Islam and democracy as contradictory.

One article mentioned, “Mr. Morsi, pointedly, did not mention unrest in Bahrain, possibly to avoid offending Saudi Arabia, which has helped Bahrain’s monarchy suppress the uprising.” (Erdbrink and Gladstone, The New York Times, August 21, 2012).

Another article stated “Mr. Morsi, who was brought to power by a courageous democracy revolution that neither he nor his Muslim Brotherhood party started -- but who benefited from the free and fair election that followed -- is lending his legitimacy
to an Iranian regime that brutally crushed just such a movement in Tehran. This does not augur well for Mr. Morsi's presidency. In fact, he should be ashamed of himself.” (Friedman, The New York Times, August 28, 2012).

12. **Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:**

   For the variable investigating the commitment of Mr. Morsi to a western style democracy, none of the articles (n=11) tackled his governance style.

13. **Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military**

   None of the articles (n=11) discussed Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military, due to the lack of a direct relation between his visit to Iran and his relationship with the military.

14. **Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations:**

   For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s status as enemy/partner to the U.S., 45.5% did not tackle his status, while 54.5% of the articles portrayed him as a U.S. Partner. The articles reported that while his short visit was criticized beforehand by Israel and the United States, he gave a nuanced speech that pointed out some American and Israeli strategies but also obstinately supported the Syrian rebel’s battle to overthrow the Assad regime. The article applauded Mr. Morsi’s harsh speech, in which he backed the Syrian revolutionaries, and therefore, intimidated his Iranian hosts (Pincus, The Washington Post, September 4, 2012).

   Another article expressed pleasure that the Syrian Foreign Minister left the hall in objection of Mr. Morsi’s words. Moreover, the article mentioned that the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was sitting next to Mr. Morsi, was unsmiling during most of his speech. (Erdbrink, The New York Times, September 1, 2012).
The main concern of most of the articles was that Mr. Morsi’s remarks disappointed the Iranian attempts to depict the summit as an anti-American event and clearly conflicted with the words of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. (Ernbrink and Galdstone, The New York Times, August 31, 2012).
EVENT FOUR: Mr. Morsi, a vital link in the Hamas/Israel truce, November 2012

1. Mr. Morsi’s ideology

Seventy-five percent of the articles (n=20) did not view Mr. Morsi as a secular president. Most of the articles portrayed him as a non-secular president, tracing this to his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood, which was cited as a conservative Islamist organization. Also some articles were skeptical that Mr. Morsi had really distanced himself from his ideological roots after becoming Egypt’s first civilian president (Baker and Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 22, 2012). Another important aspect was tying the Brotherhood to Hamas, which was constantly framed as an “offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Editorial, The New York Times, November 22, 2012). For example, another article referred to Morsi as someone “whose political roots lie in the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sunni Islamist movement that helped found Hamas” (Arango, The New York Times, November 21, 2012).

2. Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

For the variable investigating positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, the results showed that 70% of the articles (n=20) carried positive stereotypes about him, mainly admiring how he chose pragmatism over ideology, acting effectively with Washington to bring the opponents to an agreement (Kirkpatrik and Rudoren, The New York Times, November 22, 2012) and “preferring to be Deng Xiaoping than Ayatollah Khomeini” (Friedman, The New York Times, November 25, 2012).

“Mr. Obama told aides he was impressed with the Egyptian leader’s pragmatic confidence. He sensed an engineer’s precision with surprisingly little ideology. Most important, Mr. Obama told aides
that he considered Mr. Morsi a straight shooter who delivered on what he promised and did not promise what he could not deliver.” (Baker and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

Also another article discussed his “shown leadership and responsibility” during the negotiations to de-escalate the situations, and one article mentioned, “nobody was better placed to broker this truce than Morsi” (Cohen, The New York Times, November 23, 2012).

3. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

For the variable investigating negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, the results showed that only 5% of the articles (n= 20) carried negative stereotypes about him, mainly the ones at the beginning of the crisis. The articles mainly criticized sending his prime minister to Gaza in an expression of unity with Hamas and reopening the Rafah border crossing, permitting more freedom of movement for individuals and products between Gaza and Egypt. (Kirkpatrick and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 16, 2012).

Another article said, “The heavy lifting unfolded in Cairo under the inexperienced hand of Egypt’s new president, Mohamed Morsi, whose political roots lie in the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sunni Islamist movement that helped found Hamas.” (Arango, The New York Times, November 21, 2012).

4. The media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies

For the variable investigating the media’s stance towards Mr. Morsi’s policies, 70% of the articles (n= 20) defended his decisions. One article admired Mr. Morsi for announcing his sympathy to Hamas while also preserving Egypt’s peace treaty with

Another article applauded Mr. Morsi for taking a vital role in the negotiations process and mentioned that this was not “easy for him politically” (Londono and Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 22, 2012).

The articles also showed that Mr. Morsi took those steps after considering well the foreign aid Egypt needed to get over its economic struggle and the support from Washington that Egypt need to ensure any sort of economic upturn.

On the other hand, 10% of the articles criticized Mr. Morsi’s policies. For example, one article criticized Mr. Morsi for condemning the Israelis and calling them "vampires" for killing Palestinian civilians. (Kirkpatrik and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 16, 2012).

5. **The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency:**

Sixty percent of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as consistent. The articles showed that Mr. Morsi managed to retain Israel’s trust while mirroring the Egyptian public opinion. “Egypt came down firmly on the side of Palestinians, while still keeping its peace with Israel and shutting between the warring sides.” (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 21, 2012).

Another article mentioned that Mr. Morsi “sensed the pressure of the Egyptian electorate’s strong support for the Palestinian cause and antipathy toward Israel as well as his own personal and ideological ties to the Islamists in Hamas.” However, the article proceeded to state, “on the other side, Mr. Morsi had committed to the cause of regional stability, even if it meant disappointing his public.” (Baker and Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).
However, 30% of the articles saw Mr. Morsi’s policies as inconsistent. The articles mentioned that, as Egypt's first freely elected president, Mr. Morsi had to carry out a policy that totally went against former President Hosni Mubarak's passivity during the Israeli assault against the Palestinians in 2009. But, at the beginning of the assault, Mr. Morsi disappointed Hamas, because he did not open Egypt's border to Gaza. (Kirkpatrik and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 16, 2012).

Another article mentioned, “Even President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt who, at American urging, is trying to broker a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, blamed only Israel for the violence.” (Editorial, The New York Times, November 20, 2012)

6. **Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs**

Seventy percent of the articles did not tackle the decisions' impact on Egypt’s state of affairs. However, 30% mentioned that Mr. Morsi, by playing a constructive role in brokering the deal, avoided the U.S. withholding of international financing that he needed to rebuild the country (Editorial, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

7. **Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals**

One hundred percent of the articles (n= 20) of the articles did not discuss Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals.

8. **Transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process**

For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process in terms of transparency and clarity, the results showed that 65% of the articles viewed his decisions as transparent and clear. One article said that Mr. Morsi took actions to give himself some time with the Egyptian public and bring about diplomatic channels to
reduce the hostilities; for example, he recalled the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv and sent former prime minister Kandil to Gaza to denounce the Israeli attack. (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 21, 2012).

Another article declared that Mr. Morsi was cautious enough to set himself apart from the strategies of his predecessor, Mubarak. (Editorial, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

Also the articles mentioned that it was evident that Mr. Morsi made the post-revolutionary Egypt turn a new page on Gaza and that he himself announced that the Mubarak-era Gaza strategies ended with the revolution. (Hauslohner, The Washington Post, November 17, 2012).

On the other hand, 35% of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as lacking transparency and clarity as they expected him to take more hostile actions towards Israel to defend the Brotherhood’s sister organization, Hamas. (Associated Press, The Washington Post, November 23, 2012).

9. The quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

Sixty percent of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as farsighted, organized and well calculated, while 40% did not cast a value judgment for the transparency/clarity of his decision-making process. The articles basically said that Mr. Morsi faced a challenging situation, where he had to consider the Egyptian public’s and his sincere inclination to support Hamas against Israel, and noted his rational reasons for tempering the situation so as to work on improving Egypt’s economic, political, and security conditions. Finally, one article concluded that Mr. Morsi’s pragmatism directed his decision-making (Editorial, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).
Another article mentioned that Mr. Morsi aspired to be the leader of the new Islamist regimes in the area. Therefore, he cautiously weighed his words and actions to work on his long-term objective of an Islamic Caliphate governing the area. The articles said that this was evident in Mr. Morsi’s fundamental role in forcing Hamas to reach a temporary cease-fire with Israel. (Baker and Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

10. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relation with the Muslim Brotherhood

All the articles mentioned -in a way- that Mr. Morsi was affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. One article mentioned, “Mr. Obama has decided to invest heavily in the leader whose election caused concern because of his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood” (Baker and Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

Also Mr. Morsi’s affiliation with the MB was mentioned frequently to indirectly associate him with Hamas, which was presented as “the Islamist Palestinian offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood” (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 15, 2012). This article, for instance, said that Hamas “is pushing to see how much support it can draw from its ideological big brother (the Muslim Brotherhood) now that it governs the largest Arab state.”

11. Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

The results showed that 100% of the articles investigated (n= 20) did not cast a value judgment regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic.

12. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:

For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a western style democracy, 75% of the articles framed Mr. Morsi as a democratic leader who gave much care to the Egyptian public’s principles. The articles referred to the way Mr.
Morsi embraced society's strong support of the Palestinian cause and primarily took actions in support of Hamas.

In addition, the articles also applauded his commitment to the Egypt-Israel 1979 peace treaty, and accordingly, maintaining regional stability. (Baker and Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

“Mr. Morsi’s balancing act left Israelis appreciative even as Egyptians felt he had taken a hard line. Conservative Egyptians who could have been pushing their leader to escalate the confrontation were instead applauding his actions. Coupled with an overhaul of the Egyptian military that has greatly reduced its power, Mr. Morsi has radically revised some of the central tenets of the old order in his country” (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 22, 2012).

13. Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military

The results showed that 95% of the articles investigated (n= 20) did not carry words that portrayed Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military.

14. Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations:

For the variable investigating the portrayal of the U.S. – Egyptian relations, 90% of the articles framed Mr. Morsi as a U.S. partner, while 10% did not reach the issue. The articles substantially credited Mr. Morsi for brokering the cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. They also extensively discussed both Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s and President Obama’s praise of Mr. Morsi. The articles focused on the phone calls between Mr. Obama and Mr. Morsi, especially those in which the U.S. president thanked Mr. Morsi for his efforts in the negotiations. In addition, the articles
also emphasized Clinton’s words during the press conference when she announced the deal and expressed her gratitude to Mr. Morsi for his efforts.

Furthermore, the articles demonstrated that Mr. Morsi rose as a key regional player and that he gained the trust of Israel and the U.S., which were uncomfortable with the ascent of an Islamist leader in Egypt. The articles also said that the U.S. and Israel, during the week-long Gaza crisis, perceived him as the figure most capable of brokering a deal with Hamas. One article mentioned, “The Egyptian leader must be required to help the United States achieve its interests in the Middle East.” (Raviv and Melman, The New York Times, November 20, 2012)

Another article mentioned,

“It is impossible not to be tantalized by how much leverage Mr. Morsi could wield in the peace process, if he ever chose to engage Israel. Precisely because he represents the Muslim Brotherhood, the vanguard of Arab Islam, and precisely because he was democratically elected, if Mr. Morsi threw his weight behind an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, it would be so much more valuable to Israel than the cold peace that Sadat delivered and Hosni Mubarak maintained. Sadat offered Israelis peace with the Egyptian state. Mr. Morsi could offer Israel peace with the Egyptian people and, through them, with the Muslim world beyond” (Friedman, The New York Times, November 25, 2012).

Also the articles revealed that U.S. officials and Mr. Morsi’s advisers said that Mr. Obama and Mr. Morsi had given each other the space to achieve the requests of their domestic electorates. The articles reported that “they spoke by telephone at least
six times during the week of fighting, officials said. Mr. Morsi had looked past Mr. Obama’s repeated statements of support for Israel’s right to self-defense, while Mr. Obama did not object as Mr. Morsi publicly blamed the Israelis for both instigating the conflict and then using excessive force” (Kirkpatrik and Rudoren, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

One article framed Mr. Morsi as “new wild card in the middle east calculations” (Baker and Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, November 22, 2012). In addition, the article affirmed, “As he (Mr. Obama) and Mr. Morsi talked, Mr. Obama felt they were making a connection.”
EVENT FIVE: Mr. Morsi asserts broader powers, November 22, 2012.

1. Mr. Morsi’s ideology

Mr. Morsi was described in almost all the articles (n=15) as Egypt's Islamist president. Also many articles mentioned that liberals, leftists and secular leaders were predominantly opposing his decisions (Cohen, The New York Times, November 30, 2012). In addition, Mr. Morsi’s supporters were frequently framed as his “Islamist allies” (Kirkpatric, The New York Times, November 26, 2012).

One article quoted Mr. Morsi as he spoke to his supporters in front of the presidential palace to implore the public to trust his intentions. Mr. Morsi said, “God’s will and elections made me the captain of this ship,” which was widely perceived as a clerical kind of talk. (Fahim and Kirkpatrnik, The New York Times, November 24, 2012).

2. Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

Eighty percent of the articles (n=15) did not include positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, whereas only 20% casted positive stereotypes about him. For example, one article mentioned that Mr. Morsi’s “pragmatism” would lead him to find a “face saving measure” that might satisfy his critics (Editorial, The New York Times, November 27, 2012).

3. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

Only 26.7% of the articles (n=15) had negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi. One article portrayed him as fulfilling a dangerous, growing Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy that aims to impose an Islamist system in Egypt and transfer it to the region. (Cohen, The New York Times, November 3, 2012)

4. The media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies
As for the variable investigating the media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies, 33.3% of the articles (n=15) defended the decisions while 46.7% criticized them.

Many articles condemned Mr. Morsi for giving himself sweeping and unchecked authority. The articles also did not trust that his move was temporary, like he said, to fast-forward Egypt out of its post-revolutionary midpoint. The articles discredited the word “temporary” in a country where former President Mubarak’s “emergency” law lasted for decades. “President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt has made a big blunder. His motives may have been honorable — I am inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt — but the error is grave and needs to be rectified.” (Cohen, The New York Times, November 30, 2012)

The articles framed the decrees as tyrannical and bound to split a country already stumbling from months of unrest following Mubarak's resignation. Some articles mentioned that the powers Mr. Morsi grabbed surpassed the powers previously possessed by Mubarak.

On the other hand, some articles supported Mr. Morsi’s decisions, saying that they were essential to protect the revolution and move forward with the constitution, which they thought would strengthen the country's evolution toward a stable democratic rule.

Moreover, the articles appreciated Mr. Morsi’s decision to put Mubarak and top officials on retrial for accusations of killing demonstrators during the uprising (Kirkpatric and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 23, 2012).

5. The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency:
Forty percent of the articles (n=15) viewed the decisions as consistent because they were meant to protect the revolution from “obstacles erected by judges and prosecutors installed under Mubarak,” which were blocking the new president’s agenda (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 24, 2012).

Another article mentioned, “There were rumors that the courts were about to dissolve the elected constitutional assembly and the upper house of Parliament. If that had happened, the popular would have been stymied again and it would have been impossible to build the state institutions needed to carry Egypt forward.” (Editorial, the New York Times, November 26, 2012)

On the other hand, 60% of the articles saw the decisions as inconsistent because Mr. Morsi came to power after an uprising against Mubarak who imposed emergency law for three decades. Another important dispute was the fact that Mr. Morsi asked his supporters in front of the presidential palace to “trust his intentions as he cast himself as a protector of the revolution and a fledging democracy” while neglecting those who protested in Tahrir square rejecting his decree (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York times, November 24, 2012). In the same article, the writers said, “For Mr. Morsi, who seemed to be saying to the nation that it needed to surrender the last checks on his power in order to save democracy from Mubarak-era judges, the challenge was to convince Egyptians that the ends justified his means.”

6. Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs

All the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as worsening Egypt’s state of affairs by polarizing a previously divided country. In addition, several articles mentioned that the stock market was negatively affected. One article mentioned, “instead of rallying the public to his side and speeding the country’s political
transition, as Mr. Morsi evidently hoped, his decree has unleashed new instability across the country. On Sunday, the first day of business here since the decree was issued, the Egyptian stock market fell by about 9.5 percent, erasing more than $4 billion of value.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York times, November 25, 2012).

The articles mentioned that the street fighting was an indication of a split in Egyptian society. Also, they were worried because Egyptian prosecutors and judges declared a strike and commanded, accompanied by secular parties and leaders, that Mr. Morsi withdraw his power grab.

Another article made the important point that Mr. Morsi should have made “space in the constitutional assembly for more of his opponents and work to negotiate political solutions on behalf of all Egyptians. His dictatorial edict has set back that cause” (Editorial, the New York Times, November 26, 2012).

7. **Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals**

This study found that 66.7% of the articles framed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as unsuccessful in achieving revolutionary goals. One article stated, “with many judges and prosecutors threatening a strike, Egypt has quickly been embroiled in a crisis that may threaten the democratic ideals of the revolution more than any other development in the tumultuous 21 months since Mubarak was deposed” (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 26, 2012)

Another article criticized the way Mr. Morsi decided to “put himself in the position of the sole protector of the revolution and its spokesman” (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 23, 2012). The articles described Mr. Morsi’s decision to pass a revolutionary demand (ordering the retrial of Mubarak) within a set of
autocratic decisions as “a setback for the revolution” (Kirkpatrick and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 22, 2012)

On the other hand, 33% of the articles framed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as successful in achieving the revolutionary goals. These articles portrayed the declaration as an effort to cut through the block that has hedged Egypt’s complex political transition since the resignation of Mubarak. One article mentioned that Mr. Morsi used his new powers to command the retrial of Hosni Mubarak, and to replace the public prosecutor, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, a Mubarak appointee widely criticized for failing to win stronger sentences against Mr. Mubarak and his associates, and against abusive police officers.” (Kirkpatrick and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 22, 2012)

8. Transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

All the articles (n=11) viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as lacking transparency and clarity. The articles declared that the wordings of Mr. Morsi’s decree were vague, and there was no specific definition for the terms that appeared in the declaration. For example, Mr. Morsi vowed to take any actions needed to stop "threats to the revolution," public safety or the functions of state institutions. “Rights activists warned that the vague – and unexplained – wording could give him even greater authority than Mubarak had under emergency laws throughout his rule” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 26, 2012).

In addition, some articles mentioned that there wasn't clear evidence that this declaration would end after the ratification of the constitution.

Other articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi promised that his intention was to give power to himself only to stop judges, chosen by former President Mubarak, from
suspending the constituent assembly, which is controlled by his Islamists colleagues of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, “but the text of the original decree had exempted all presidential edicts from judicial review until the ratification of a constitution, not just those edicts related to the assembly or justified as “acts of sovereignty” (Kirkpatric and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 23, 2012).

9. The quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

Significantly, 73.3% of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as shortsighted, haphazard and miscalculated. “Mr. Morsi’s critics say he could have found a less confrontational tactic to achieve his goals” (Kirkpatric and Fahim, The New York Times, November 25, 2012). Also another article said that Mr. Morsi did not calculate well the society’s support for the judicial system (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012).

Other articles mentioned that although the decisions were miscalculated, it was impossible for Mr. Morsi to retract them so as not to appear as a hesitant leader. “Analysts say that a compromise on Mr. Morsi’s decree is likely but that annulling it would cost the president his credibility” (Hauslohner, The Washington Post, November 28, 2012).

However, 20% of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as calculated and far-sighted. Many articles said that Mr. Morsi planned well the timing for his decisions as he took those decisions after succeeding in achieving the truce between Hamas and Israel. “The crisis over his power grab came just days after the Islamist leader won international praise for his pragmatism, including from the United States, for brokering a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012).
Also the articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi calculated the decisions well because he wanted to protect the constituent Assembly from Mubarak-era judges who wanted to dissolve it like they did with the first assembly and the parliament. “The decree insulated the Constituent Assembly which is drafting the constitution, from meddling by Mubarak-era judges. (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012).

10. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood

All the articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization and that it effectively supported him. The phrase “Mr. Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood allies” was mentioned frequently in many of the articles.

Also one article stated that Mr. Morsi and the Brotherhood might have had organizational problems that only appeared after they came to power. “Mr. Morsi’s decree--- has played into decades-old fears of the brotherhood as an insular, authoritarian movement shaped by decades as an underground secret society.” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012)

11. Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

While 86.7% of the articles did not cast a value judgment regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic, 13.3% portrayed Islam and democracy as contradictory. The articles believed that the regime in Egypt was not a secular democratic one that aimed to protect the rule of law and individual rights; on the contrary, it was an “Islamist authoritarian” regime (Hauslohner, The Washington Post, November 28, 2012).

Another article quoted Mr. Morsi as stating that he was not trying to form an “Islamic dictatorship” (Editorial, The Washington Post, November 27, 2012). The
same article commented that, “the Islamists are preparing a document (constitution) that strengthens the role of Islamic law in Egypt’s domestic legalization, weakens protections for women and opens the way to new restrictions on media freedom.”

Another article stated, “Secular representatives in the constitutional assembly had walked out in part over their accusation that the Islamists were unfairly rushing the work.” (Kirkpatric and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

12. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:

In the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a western style democracy, 53.3% of the articles framed his decision as a “step towards autocracy,” arguing that Mr. Morsi grabbed limitless powers that none of his predecessors dreamt of having. He was also highly criticized for talking to his supporters at the presidential palace and totally ignoring his opponents. “In a speech that was by turns defensive and conciliatory, he ultimately gave no ground to the critics who now were describing him as a pharaoh, in another echo of the insult once reserved for the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak.” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012)

However, 46.7% of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi as a democratic leader who took decisions “to help end the transitional period as soon as possible” (Kirkpatric and El Sheikh, The New York Times, November 23, 2012).

13. Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military

The articles did not tackle Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military.

14. Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations:

While 66.7% of the articles did not tackle Mr. Morsi’s status as a U.S. enemy/partner, 33.3% viewed him as a U.S. partner.
The articles described the close relationship between Mr. Morsi and the Obama administration by stating that Mr. Obama had “considerable leverage over the Mr. Morsi government.” Therefore, Mr. Obama had to convey that “Egypt’s relations with the United States depend not only on such strategic cooperation but also on the creation of a political system that meets basic tests of democracy and respect for human rights” (Editorial, The Washington Post, November 27, 2012).

Another article said that the “State department expressed muted concern” over Morsi’s decree. (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012). The article added that the White house was “notably silent” after it had overly praised -earlier that week- the connection between Mr. Morsi and Mr. Obama to finalize the cease-fire in Gaza.
EVENT SIX: Unrest in Egypt over constitution, December 2012.

1. Mr. Morsi’s ideology

   All the articles framed Mr. Morsi as a non-secular leader; they regularly referred to him as “Egypt’s Islamist President.” Also most of the articles portrayed Mr. Morsi’s call for a national ballot on the Islamist-constructed charter as a method to guarantee that political Islam was permanently enforced on all citizens, which posed a challenge to the sectarian nature of the Egyptian state.

   Also, the articles regularly referred to Mr. Morsi’s backers as his Islamist supporters. One article reported, “Mr. Morsi’s Islamist backers and his secular, liberal and non-Islamist opponents were beating each other bloodily with rocks, sticks and clubs.” (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012)

2. Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

   While 94.3% of the articles did not carry positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, however, 5.7% did cast some positive signals about him. The word “pragmatic” was frequently used to describe Mr. Morsi’s way of dealing with his opponents especially after he rescinded the decree (that sparked protests) and called for “national dialogue.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, December 10, 2012)

3. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

   Although 71.4% of the articles did not mention negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi, 28.6% did. The articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi wanted to “stubbornly” achieve the MB’s broader objectives by centralizing authority and permitting the MB to state the basics of Egypt’s new political system.

   Another article compared pro-Morsi rallies to “pro-Hitler demonstrations in Germany in the 1930s.” (Fahim, The New York Times, December 4, 2012).
4. The media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies

For the variable investigating the media’s value judgment regarding Mr. Morsi’s policies, the results showed that 80% of the articles criticized the decisions, while 20% defended them.

The articles mainly criticized Mr. Morsi for making no offers to his adversaries, and his inflexibility in cancelling the declarations which he previously issued in November 2012. Also they were very critical of the way he kept a hold of December 15, 2012, as a date for the ballot on the rapidly written Islamist charter.

In addition, some articles condemned Mr. Morsi's meaningless invitations for national dialogues. It was frequently mentioned that Mr. Morsi's rule divided the country especially after he accused the opposition of being responsible for the sequence of violent attacks that erupted on the streets outside the presidential palace. (Fahim and El Sheikh, The New York Times, December 17, 2012)

Moreover, many articles stated that Mr. Morsi blamed famous opposition leaders for the escalation of violence and indicated secretive "foreign powers" exactly like Mubarak did in his very last speeches. (Kirkpatric, The New York Times, December 7, 2012)

On the other hand, other articles (20%) defended Mr. Morsi’s decisions to quickly push the constitution to a ballot; they said that the decrees were essential to put an end to instability and pave the way for development. They applauded the decrees because Mr. Morsi said that, after the constitution was approved, the Islamist-dominated Shura Council would be granted interim legislative authorities so that it could enact laws until elections for the new parliament were conducted. Furthermore, the articles favorably regarded Mr. Morsi’s request from former Prime Minister

5. **The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency**

Although 62.9% of the articles did not cast a value judgment regarding Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency, 37.1% viewed them as inconsistent.

Many articles criticized Mr. Morsi’s decision to transfer a defective and ambiguous constitutional draft to a referendum. They mentioned that it was inconsistent with the revolutionary virtues and was not the right way to secure essential rights or to promote respect for the rule of law. (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 2, 2012)

In addition, the articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi's speeches showed the inconsistencies between his words and real progresses. For example, he called for "national dialogue," but there was not much to be discussed because the referendum was going to take place anyway. (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, December 26, 2012).

Other articles highlighted the inconsistency of Mr. Morsi’s decisions. They said that it was very irregular for a democratically elected leader to insist on keeping unprecedented and exceptional authority. They emphasized that soon as he ended the rigorous military rule, he forced the nation into its greatest political crisis. (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012)

6. **Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs**

Significantly, 94% of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as worsening Egypt’s state of affairs, while only 5.7% viewed them as improving the conditions in Egypt.
The articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi caused a public firestorm due to his decree; as a result, Egyptians were divided into Islamists on one side and liberals, leftist and secular parties on the other side. They mentioned that, Mr. Morsi’s opponents described him as a “new pharaoh” and demonstrated in front of the presidential palace to push their point to postpone the vote and abandon the Constitution. (Birnbaum, The Washington Post, November 22, 2012)

The articles also criticized Mr. Morsi for ordering the military out of its barracks to maintain calmness on the streets before the referendum took place; they disapproved Mr. Morsi’s command to detain civilians when necessary. (Hauslohner and Mccrummen, The Washington Post, December 6, 2012).

However, other articles painted Mr. Morsi’s decisions “as necessary to bring stability to Egypt.” They also highlighted that the new Constitution would let the nation advance with new parliamentary elections. (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, December 10, 2012)

7. Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals

While 74.3% of the articles framed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as unsuccessful in achieving revolutionary goals, 5.7% framed them as successful and 20% did not address the decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals.

The articles mentioned that although the revolutionary demands were well defined (bread, freedom, social justice), Mr. Morsi did nothing to achieve them. Regarding "freedom", Mr. Morsi gave the military the right to detain citizens if necessary. Concerning the economy the president did not take any steps toward employing minimum and maximum wages. On the other hand, the president gave himself exceptional authorities to push through a ballot on a greatly defective
constitution. The articles mentioned that, the results were dreadful because many Egyptians protested and clashes lead to casualties on both sides.

The articles, additionally, said that Mr. Morsi should have put party politics aside and struggled to rule fairly and achieve the welfare of the people. (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, December 8, 2012).

“Distrust and animosity between Islamists and their secular opponents have mired the outcome of Egypt’s promised transition to democracy in debates about the legitimacy of the new government and its new leaders’ commitment to the rule of law.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, December 6, 2012)

On the other hand, some articles presented Mr. Morsi’s approval of the draft constitution as a step towards stability and a finale to his authoritarian powers. Also the articles said that the rejection of the draft, conversely, would lead to the formation of a new constitutional assembly that would have to prepare a new charter and therefore, the result would be months of uncertainty. (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012)

8. Transparency/clarity of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process, in terms of transparency and clarity, 80% did not cast a value judgment towards his decision-making process, while 20% of the articles framed his decisions as lacking transparency and clarity.

The articles stressed that Mr. Morsi did not present any tangible evidence that the Mubarak-selected court was going to suspend the constitutional assembly and stop the democratic process. In addition, he did not give any concrete verification that
Mubarak’s beneficiaries had been appointing thugs to attack the protestors as he said. (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, December 8, 2012).

Also the articles criticized Mr. Morsi for not saying anything about what he framed as an “interference by foreign enemies and cynical opposition leaders” that were keen to “disrupt democracy rather than let Islamists win elections.” (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, December 7, 2012).

Another article criticized the speech Mr. Morsi gave after the referendum took place because he did not mention any errors or mistakes in the balloting process. “Mr. Morsi offered no concrete concessions, and he did not acknowledge any specific errors.” (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, December 27, 2012).

9. The quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process

Although 40% of the articles did not address the quality of Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process, 51.4% of the articles framed Mr. Morsi’s actions as shortsighted and miscalculated, and 8.6% framed them as organized and calculated.

Many articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi probably did not expect the public rage that came to the surface by announcing that the Constitution was drafted and the referendum date was set. “Mr. Morsi should have worked much harder to bring opposition figures into his government, ensure the constitutional assembly was fully representative and that there were broad consensus for the constitution before the referendum date was set.” (Editorial, The New York Times, December 7, 2012).

However, 8.6% framed the decisions as organized because they would push the country forward with electing a new parliament and would allow a space to work on the falling economy.

10. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood
The articles reported that Mr. Morsi continued to be solely focused on obeying the program of the Muslim Brotherhood. The articles referred to the MB as the Islamist group that was “betting on their political muscle to push through a decisive victory in the referendum on Egypt’s divisive draft constitution.” They further stated Mr. Morsi, as part of the Muslim Brotherhood, was not ready for any compromises; nevertheless, the MB decided to grab their chance in dominating the country’s political arena. (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, December 8, 2012)

11. Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

Although 85% of the articles did not address the Islam-democracy dynamic, 14.3% depicted them as contradictory.

The articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi could not be trusted and that “he and his Muslim Brotherhood supporters are interested only in Islamist power.” (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012). Another article said “Tens of thousands of protestors poured into the street, calling Mr. Morsi an Islamist dictator in the making.” (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 16, 2012).

Another article talked about the brutality of the Islamist protestors, because other liberal demonstrators said, “their Islamist captors called them “infidels” and forced them to “confess” to being paid to stoke violence.” (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 12, 2012)

“Mr. Morsi’s secular critics have accused him and the Islamists of seeking to establish a new dictatorship, in part by ramming through a rushed constitution that they charge could ultimately give new power over society to Muslim scholars and Islamists groups.” (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, December 6, 2012)

12. Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:
The articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi’s decisions showed an urgency to prove himself as a “strong” president; however, he only demonstrated the contrary. Some articles stated that the clashes between Mr. Morsi’s supporters and opponents recall the clashes between pro and anti Mubarak in 2011. They added that the only distinction was that this occurred only three months after Mr. Morsi came to office, while the other one happened after three decades of Mubarak’s rule. (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012).

The articles also declared that Mr. Morsi had thought that solidifying power should happen by incitement, not conciliation. They added that Mr. Morsi’s victory in overthrowing the army generals stimulated him to act similarly with the judiciary, which showed a lack of wisdom and doubtful political skills. Also, Mr. Morsi added an extra layer of resistance by clashing with the judges. “Although the judiciary needs reform, Mr. Morsi’s tactics were counterproductive in achieving a goal that most of the country supports.” (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 3, 2012)

Another important aspect of his autocratic rule was the fact that he pushed for a constitutional referendum while the charter was flawed and many political groups objected to it. “The opposition says the charter restricts freedoms, ignores the rights of minorities and women, and enriches Islamic rule.” (El Deeb, The Washington Post, December 27, 2012)

13. Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian military

The results showed that 62.9% of the articles did not tackle Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the military, while, 37.1% saw him as cooperative. The articles observed that Mr. Morsi’s Brotherhood and the military—once fierce opponents—
were firmly embedded on the same side. (Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, December 10, 2012)

The articles mentioned that Mr. Morsi relied more on the military after he imposed emergency law and gave soldiers the privilege to arrest civilians, in order to halt the fatal clashes between Islamists and the generally secular opposition. (Hauslohner and McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 6, 2012)

The articles also referred to a deal between the army and Mr. Morsi, in which the Brotherhood pleased the generals by maintaining the military's extensive authorities in the constitution, and the secular army accepted the charter, even with its references to sharia and Islamic law. The articles mentioned that this was the reason both groups united in wanting the ballot to take place. (McCrummen, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012)

14. Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations

The results showed that 85.7% of the articles did not tackle Mr. Morsi’s status as enemy/partner to the U.S., while 14.3% did see him as a U.S. partner.

“After taking a notably evenhanded tone toward Mr. Morsi and his opponents through the stormy days after his power grab, the United States State Department said this week that the onus was on Mr. Morsi to pull Egypt back together.” (Kirkpatrik, The New York Times, December 26, 2012).

Another article criticized the U.S. silent stance regarding the conditions in Egypt. “Though it continues to fund the military and partnered with Mr. Morsi’s government during the recent Gaza crisis, the United States has been a bystander in the latest drama.” (Editorial, The Washington Post, December 9, 2012)
Summary of RQ1 findings

Mr. Morsi’s ideology:

Mr. Morsi was predominantly framed as a non-secular leader during event one, when he was announced as Egypt’s’ president (20.7%, n=19) and during event six, when he pushed for the constitutional referendum (38%, n=35).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant: $\chi^2 (15, N=110) = 35.78, p= .05$.

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical events period: * Overall representation of Morsi as: Cross tabulation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall representation of Morsi as:</td>
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<td>EVENT 1</td>
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<td>EVENT 2</td>
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<td>EVENT 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (15, N=110) = 35.78, p= .05$. 
Positive stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

In addition, Mr. Morsi was positively stereotyped in event three, when he visited Iran (20%, n=7) and event four, when he brokered the Hamas/Israel cease-fire (40%, n=14).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 89, p= .04.$

| Table 2: Critical events period: * Positive stereotypes about Morsi: Cross tabulation |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Positive stereotypes about Morsi: | Total           |
| Present                        | Absent          |
| EVENT 1                        | 11.4%           | 20.0%           | 17.3%           |
| EVENT 2                        | 14.3%           | 6.7%            | 9.1%            |
| EVENT 3                        | 20.0%           | 5.3%            | 10.0%           |
| EVENT 4                        | 40.0%           | 8.0%            | 18.2%           |
| EVENT 5                        | 8.6%            | 16.0%           | 13.6%           |
| EVENT 6                        | 5.7%            | 44.0%           | 31.8%           |
| Total                          | 100.0%          | 100.0%          | 100.0%          |

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 89, p=.04.$
Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi

On the other hand, Mr. Morsi was negatively stereotyped during event one, when he was announced Egypt’s president (25%, n=8), and during event six, when he pushed the constitution to referendum (31.3%, n=10).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically insignificant; $\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 8.1, p = .527$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Absent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 8.1, p = .527$
The media’s value judgment towards Mr. Morsi’s policies

For the variable investigating the media’s stance towards Mr. Morsi’s policies, the articles mostly defended his decisions during event four, when he brokered the Hamas-Israel cease-fire (35%, n=14). On the other hand, the articles highly criticized him in event six (65.1%, n=28), when he pushed for the constitutional referendum. As for event five, the coverage was divided as (12.5%, n=5) defended Mr. Morsi’s moves and (16.3%, n=7) criticized his moves.

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 7.6, p= .032$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical events period:</th>
<th>* Morsi's policies are generally:</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defended</td>
<td>Criticized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 7.6, p= .032$
The media’s value judgment of Mr. Morsi’s policies in terms of their consistency:

The articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as consistent during event two (21.9%, n=7) when he sacked SCAF generals, during event three (18.8%, n=6) when he went to Iran, and during event four (37.5%, n=12), when he brokered the Hamas-Israel cease-fire. However, Mr. Morsi’s decisions were seen as inconsistent during event five, when he issued the constitutional declaration (26.5, n=9). Also Mr. Morsi’s decisions were seen as inconsistent during event six, when he pushed the constitutional draft to a national referendum (38.2%, n=13).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; \( \chi^2 (5, N=110) = 95.27, p = .009 \).

| Table 5: Critical events period: * Overall framing of Morsi’s decisions as: |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| **Cross tabulation**        | Overall framing of Morsi's decisions as: | Total |
|                            | Inconsistent | Consistent | N/A |
| EVENT 1                    | 0.0%         | 3.1%       | 40.9% | 17.3% |
| EVENT 2                    | 8.8%         | 21.9%      | 0.0%  | 9.1%  |
| EVENT 3                    | 8.8%         | 18.8%      | 4.5%  | 10.0% |
| EVENT 4                    | 17.6%        | 37.5%      | 4.5%  | 18.2% |
| EVENT 5                    | 26.5%        | 18.8%      | 0.0%  | 13.6% |
| EVENT 6                    | 38.2%        | 0.0%       | 50.0% | 31.8% |
| Total                      | 100.0%       | 100.0%     | 100.0%| 100.0%|

\( \chi^2 (5, N=110) = 95.27, p = .009 \).
Framing of Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ impact on state of affairs

Additionally, most of the articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as worsening Egypt’s state of affairs, especially during event five, when he issued the constitutional declaration (30%, n=15) and during event six, when he pushed for the referendum (66%, n=33). On the other hand, some articles viewed Mr. Morsi’s decisions as improving Egypt’s state of affairs, especially during event two, when he sacked SCAF leaders (42.9%, n=6) and event four, when he brokered the Hamas-Israel truce (42.9%, n=6)).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (2, N=110) = 93.8, p = .043$.

Table 6:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical events period: * Overall framing of Morsi's decisions as:</th>
<th>Cross tabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall framing of Morsi's decisions as:</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsening Egypt's state of affairs</td>
<td>Improving Egypt's state of affairs</td>
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<td>EVENT 2</td>
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<td>EVENT 3</td>
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<td>EVENT 4</td>
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<td>EVENT 5</td>
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<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (2, N=110) = 93.8, p = .043.$
Decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals

For the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s decisions’ relevance to revolutionary goals, the articles viewed his decisions as successful in achieving the revolutionary goals during event two, when he sacked the military leaders (53.3%, n=8). However, his decisions were viewed as unsuccessful in achieving the revolutionary goals during event six, when he pushed for the constitution draft referendum (72.2%, n=26). As for event five, the coverage was divided as (33.3%, n=5) viewed Mr. Morsi’s moves as successful in achieving the revolutionary goals, and (27.8%, n=10) viewed them and unsuccessful.

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 135.16, p = .002.$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Successful in achieving revolutionary goals</th>
<th>Unsuccessful in achieving revolutionary goals</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 135.16, p = .002.$
**Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood**

The articles constantly mentioned that Mr. Morsi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, especially during event one, when he was announced Egypt’s president (19.4%, n=19), during event four (20.4%, n=20), during event five (15.3%, n=15) and during event six (34.7%, n=34).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 40.9$, $p = .001$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8:</th>
<th>Critical events period: * Is Morsi’s affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood presented as an influential factor? Cross tabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is Morsi’s affiliation to the MB presented as an influential factor?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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</table>

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 40.9$, $p = .001$. 
Value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic

The results showed that the articles carried words that portrayed Islam and democracy as contradictory, especially during event one (41.9%, n=13) and five (22.6%, n=7).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (5, N=110) = 32.59, p = .004$.

<p>| Critical events period: * Are 'Islam' and 'Democracy' depicted as contradictory? Cross tabulation |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are 'Islam' and 'Democracy' depicted as contradictory?</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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$\chi^2 (5, N=110) = 32.59, p = .004$
**Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy:**

Mr. Morsi was viewed as a democratic leader in events one (25%, n= 10), two (20%, n=8), and four (37.5%, n=15). However, he was viewed as an autocratic leader during event six (72.9%, n=35). As for event five, the coverage was divided, as (16.7%, n=8) viewed Mr. Morsi’s as an autocratic leader and (17.5%, n=7) saw him as a democratic leader.

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2 (5, N=110) = 19.5, p=.007$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical events period: * Representation of Morsi as: Cross tabulation</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representation of Morsi as:</td>
<td>Autocrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>72.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (5, N=110) = 19.5, p=.007$. 
Mr. Morsi's attitude towards the Egyptian military

As for the variable investigating Mr. Morsi’s relationship with the Egyptian Army, Mr. Morsi was seen as uncooperative with the army, especially during event one (72.7%, n=16), and event two (27.3%, n=6). However, later at event six, the articles showed that Mr. Morsi was cooperative with the army (86.7%, n=13).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant; $\chi^2(10, N=110) = 98.7$, $p = .005$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Uncooperative</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
<td>86.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 98.7$, $p = .005$
Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations:

Finally, Mr. Morsi was predominantly viewed as a U.S. partner, especially during event one (22.7%, n=10), during event three (13.6%, n=6), and of course, during event four (40.9%, n=18).

A chi-square test proved these differences to be statistically significant $\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 66.7, p = .002$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12: Critical events period: * Overall representation of Morsi as a: Cross tabulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall representation of Morsi as a:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENT 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 (10, N=110) = 66.7, p = .002$
This section explains the findings of the second research question: How does U.S. press coverage of president Morsi inform our understanding of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Egypt?

The United States press coverage showed that policymakers in Washington encountered a set of challenges as a result of more than two years of remarkable transformations in Egypt since 2011. The U.S. Administration had different interests at risk in Egypt together with some possible levers of impact. The country’s interests included retaining U.S. marine access to the Suez Canal, sustaining the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and strengthening democracy and helping economic development in Egypt. “The primary functions of post 1973 U.S.-Egyptian relations are Israeli security and U.S. force projection to the gulf.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 9)

However, the Obama administration was smart enough to “employ the situation to serve its benefits and dealt with Egypt as an American protectorate or a small country living under U.S. occupation, as we have seen in many of official American statements.” (El Bendary, 2013, p. 139)

As soon as Mr. Morsi was declared Egypt's first democratically elected president, the U.S. press indicated that the Obama administration was ready to deal with the Islamist leader. The administration expected that he might choose to join forces with the United States on certain economic and security issues, yet his government might sometimes perform undemocratically, be more hostile to Israel, and/or reduce its collaboration with the U.S. on terrorism-related matters and intelligence disputes. However, it was evident through the press coverage that the administration knew Egypt might not adhere to the U.S. style, as strictly as in the previous eras. At the same time, its profound need for U.S. help to develop its
Mr. Morsi administration simply would not be able to afford a rupture in relations with the United States. A Muslim Brotherhood-led Egypt will need to rebuild its deteriorating economy, and U.S. and European loans, assistance, and investment will be crucial to this effort.” (Hamid, Foreign Policy, June 7, 2012)

The coverage also showed that the debate –in Washington- regarding the U.S. policy towards Egypt was mainly about the level of support the U.S. should give to a regime managed by a previous leader in the Muslim Brotherhood. It was evident that while the majority of stakeholders preferred to work towards avoiding the breakdown of the Egyptian state due to the damaging effects it would undoubtedly cause for the U.S. and the rest of the world’s security, there was a lesser amount of agreement over the level of support the U.S. should give to an Egyptian authority that might or might not practice strategies consistent with American standards. Also it seemed that there was variance in the scope of influence the United States would gain as a result of the different means of providing financial support. “Again, timing matters. Such relationships should be developed before these parties [MB] come to power, rather than afterward, when American leverage is likely to be less effective. With such channels, the United States can exert influence—and, if necessary, pressure—when Islamist parties overreach and take action that threatens vital U.S. interests in the region.” (Hamid, The Brookings Institution, June 20, 2012)

Generally, U.S. officials put an emphasis on political enclosure and economic maintenance while covertly maintaining their involvement in Egypt’s internal politics.

When Mr. Morsi forced the retirement of the powerful SCAF generals, it was obvious in the press that the Obama administration seemed hesitant to condemn Mr.
Morsi. “Neither the White House nor the State Department offered any immediate reaction to the command shake-up ordered by Mr. Morsi.” (Fahim, The New York Times, August 12, 2012). Afterwards, the coverage reflected that the administration was more inclined to back Mr. Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood against SCAF and the armed forces.

Also when Mr. Morsi decided to visit Iran to attend the Sixteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Washington’s response was near silence.

In general, the American press showed that the administration was primarily concerned with the extended anti-Israel/anti-Semitic practice within the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States and Israel seemed to be extremely apprehensive over the trail of Egyptian politics and its effects on the 1979 peace treaty and the Egyptian-Israeli relations. However, after Mr. Morsi emerged as the most pivotal figure in the war between Hamas and Israel, the Obama administration probably decided to “live with some of Mr. Morsi’s more populist talk as long as he proves constructive on the substance” (Baker and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 21, 2012). Another article mentioned that Mr. Morsi was a “new wild card in the middle east calculations” (Baker and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 22, 2012).

In other words, Washington got the message; Mr. Morsi was ready to acknowledge diplomatic relations with Israel through his intermediation in the Hamas-Israel truce; therefore, the administration had to turn a blind eye when he squashed the democratic values at home.

So, when Mr. Morsi turned around and issued a decree that was against all rules of democracy, Washington's reaction was unsympathetic at best, expressing
“muted concern” and asking for serenity but certainly not criticizing Mr. Morsi openly. Jay Carney, White House Spokesperson, was straightforwardly asked whether the administration "condemned" Mr. Morsi's dictatorial power grab. Carney said, "We are concerned about it and have raised those concerns.” And on the next day, the State Department stated, “One of the aspirations of the revolution was to ensure that power would not be overly concentrated in the hands of any one person or institution,” said the State Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland.” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 23, 2012)

Also, amidst the extensive controversy over the constitution in December 2012, some of the Administration’s critics seemed to urge President Obama to employ additional pressure on the Egyptian authorities, particularly in supporting women’s rights and religious minorities. In response, the Administration suggested being more patient.

Washington’s silence over Mr. Morsi’s actions throughout his first six months of presidency was very much criticized by the Egyptian public. “Egyptians say the Obama administration should have cautioned Mr. Morsi’s government that unless it responds to people’s demands Washington will not support it and could cut economic aid to Cairo.” (El-Bendary, 2013, p. 345)

Finally, it was obvious in the articles that United States relations with Egypt depended purely on strategic cooperation (being a dedicated associate abroad, particularly in working towards making peace between Palestinians and Israelis), but not on establishing a political system that would achieve basic practices of democracy and respect for human rights.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis examined the United States premier press coverage –The New York Times and The Washington Post– of six critical events that took place between June 2012 and December 2012, in Egypt. The research findings provide a range of key frames and stereotypical words and phrases that were used to portray Mr. Morsi. In addition, by studying the U.S. press coverage of the events in Egypt, the findings interpret the U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Egypt.

The power of words in reporting events is undeniable. When Mr. Morsi came into office, he was mostly portrayed as a pragmatic president whose actions would lead to a significantly new era in the Egyptian politics. The articles expected that Mr. Morsi would be cautious when moving along the fine line between pragmatism and ideology, and between what he campaigned on and how he ruled. They also applauded his inaugural speech, and one article mentioned, “The speech was an encouraging olive branch to the military, liberals and minority groups.” (Editorial, The New York Times, July 16, 2012)

Moreover, the quotes in the article revealed that the White House was ready to deal with the Islamist leader "on the basis of mutual respect, to advance the many shared interests between Egypt and the United States." By studying the articles, it was obvious that, to the Obama administration, election results did not mean weakening the U.S. influence in Egypt because it knew that Mr. Morsi needed the United States to be able to effectively and quickly work on the deteriorating economy, in which western loans, aid, assistance, and investment would be essential. Shadi Hamid wrote in Brookings, “With the Brotherhood in the presidency, the Obama administration, if
it plays its cards right, could have more leverage (…) the rise of Islamists actually provides an opportunity to re-engage on the Arab spring. That, however, will require a real re-think and re-orientation on the part of American policymakers.” (Hamid, The Brookings Institution, August 26, 2012)

During the second event, the publications used loaded words to back Mr. Morsi’s decision to retire General Tantawi and Anan. The articles constantly framed the decision as a “revolutionary decision,” taken at a very early stage of his tenure. For example, “Many see Morsi’s move to control the SCAF (…) as finally giving Egypt’s revolution the chance to remove key remnants of the Mubarak regime and fulfill its promises” (Ross, The Washington Post, August 20, 2012).

In addition, it was obvious throughout the coverage that Washington was hesitant to condemn Mr. Morsi for his severe actions, and therefore, the administration appeared to be more inclined towards backing him and the Muslim Brotherhood against SCAF and the armed forces.

Also, when Mr. Morsi announced his intention to visit Iran for the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, he was heavily criticized for lending a hand to "sanitize" the Iranian regime by attending the summit meeting in Tehran. However, after giving nuanced remarks that pointed out some American and Israeli strategies and obstinately supported the Syrian rebel’s battle to overthrow the Assad regime, the tone of the U.S. coverage completely changed and started to defend the visit, stating that it was primarily about local politics because Morsi wanted to show that Egyptian foreign policy would witness a "new era". Also they stressed that if Morsi was successful in regaining Egypt’s leading position in the region, it would enable the U.S. to achieve broader goals. This proves Herman & Chomsky’s theory that the
media content in the U.S. would regularly support the formal foreign policies of the
U.S. government (1988). It is important to note that there was no official response
towards Mr. Morsi’s visit.

Later, the American media, expectedly, made its greatest effort to paint Mr.
Morsi in a positive way; the broad applause was in return for his effort in brokering
the Hamas-Israel truce. Although there were absolutely justified points communicated
about the war between Hamas and Israel, studying how the media promoted this story
and the standards it applied was crucial. The publications emphasized that Egypt
acted diligently with Washington to bring the opponents to an agreement, choosing
pragmatism over ideology, because the Muslim Brotherhood was known to be
associated with Hamas leaders. The articles reported that Mr. Morsi appeared as the
main diplomatic figure in the process and was extensively praised by the West for his
‘pragmatism.’ They stated that Mr. Morsi faced a challenging situation, because as a
statesman, he had to address the interests of the two sides without imposing his own
pro-Palestinian stance. In addition, the publications extensively reported that both
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Obama greatly praised Morsi for his
distinguished role, which meant that Mr. Morsi was a “new wild card in the middle
This proves that the Obama administration had demonstrated that it had no problem
doing business with the Muslim Brotherhood or any other Islamist organization,
provided that, it protected American interests. (El Bendary, 2013, p. 343)

Mixed coverage appeared when Morsi gave himself sweeping and unchecked
authority: some articles condemned the tyrannical decrees claiming that they were
going to split a country already stumbling from months of unrest following Mubarak's
resignation, while other articles approved Morsi’s decisions saying that they were essential to protect the revolution and move forward with the constitution. They expected Mr. Morsi’s moves would strengthen the country's evolution to a stable democratic rule.

Also, most of the articles stated that Morsi planned well the timing for his decisions, as he took the actions after his success in achieving the truce between Hamas and Israel. “The crisis over his power grab came just days after the Islamist leader won international praise for his pragmatism, including from the United States, for brokering a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel” (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, The New York Times, November 24, 2012). It was clear throughout the articles that the White House was “notably silent” after it had overly praised the cooperation between Mr. Morsi and Mr. Obama to finalize the cease-fire in Gaza. Again, this proved that the U.S. utilized the democracy card in the Middle East as a means to an end (El Bendary, 2011, p. 80). Washington was ready to accept Mr. Morsi’s trampling over democratic values at home as long as he maintained the U.S.’s interests and acknowledged diplomatic relations with Israel. In addition, Washington wanted to provide billions of dollars for Egypt’s debt relief and backed a $4.8 billion loan by the International Monetary Fund. By that time, Obama was perceived as the primary foreign sponsor of the Muslim Brotherhood administration.

In addition, during event six, when deadly clashes broke out as a result of the extensive dispute over the constitution, the United States was more of a spectator. “After taking a notably evenhanded tone towards Mr. Morsi and his opponents through the stormy days after his power grab, the United States State Department said this week that the onus was on Mr. Morsi to pull Egypt back together.” (Kirkpatrick,
The New York Times, December 26, 2012). It seemed that the U.S. was waiting to see how far things would go. As Brownlee stated, “Amid the crisis, the administration would urge calm – and by implication a return to the undemocratic status quo – but if opposition forces the ruler out, U.S. officials would extol the victory as if they had been seeking democratic change all along.” (p. 170).

Generally, throughout the six events, it was obvious that Mr. Morsi was regularly framed as a non-secular leader, especially during event one and six. Also he was positively stereotyped on events that exhibited his foreign relations (event three and four) more than those which exhibited his domestic efforts. The results further showed that Mr. Morsi’s actions were defended during event four, criticized during event six, and resulted in highly divided coverage during event five. In addition, he was seen as a democratic leader during event one, two and four, but undemocratic during event six, and again the coverage was severely divided about Mr. Morsi’s governance style during event five. Mr. Morsi was also regularly regarded as a U.S. partner, especially during event one and four.

The U.S. media portrayed Mr. Morsi as a moderate who was trying to balance between uncompromising Islamists and his more pragmatic allies of the West. Sometimes, the publications severely criticized Morsi’s decisions; yet, they did not tend to frame him as anti-American or a U.S. enemy because that would contradict U.S. interests, as he helped the United States to protect its interests. It was obvious throughout the articles that the United States’ relations with Egypt depended purely on strategic cooperation, but not on establishing a political system that would achieve basic practices of democracy and respect for human rights.
Finally, Obama’s support for Mr. Morsi affected Washington negatively because the enormous pro-democracy opposition in Egypt expected him to back the legitimate demands of the people. “If U.S. officials took Egyptian public opinion seriously as they formulated their goals in the Middle East rather than assuming their aims first and trying to mold local views afterward), they would harmonize U.S. policy with Egyptians generally and reduce their need for autocratic partners.” (Brownlee, 2012, p. 176)

**Limitations to the study**

Although this study reviewed the key frames and stereotypical words and phrases that were conveyed about Mr. Morsi, only two newspapers were chosen for analysis out of many, excluding a potential variety of different or similar opinions in the media. Therefore, taking a wider sample is highly recommended in further studies.

In addition, it would have been very effective to interview some of the journalists and/or reporters who wrote the stories to determine if they made conscious or unconscious framing judgments when choosing their expressions.

**Directions for future research**

A study could be done on the portrayal of Mr. Morsi in other critical events and in different U.S. media vehicles. In addition, future research could concentrate on critical events before Morsi’s term or after he was ousted and compare them. Further, it would be worthwhile to contrast the coverage of Morsi in the U.S. media with that of Obama in the Egyptian media.
Lastly, future studies could also analyze the effect of such coverage on public opinion and how it contributes to developing a certain image of a particular person and/or group. In addition, it would be helpful to study how citizens, Egyptian and American, reacted to the critical events.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Communication Research, 28, 587-604.


APPENDIX A
Coding Sheet for Mr. Morsi Portrayal in U.S. Media

Technical Data:

A. Article Number:

B. Date: given in full (Day. Month. Year).

C. Article Originator: (The source article was taken from)
   1. The New York Times;

D. Format:
   1. News report (presents incidents/facts about happenings taking place);
   2. Column/op-ed pieces; (Op-Ed feature opinion pieces written by outside contributors and the newspaper’s own team of columnists).
   3. Editorial (written by individual newspapers’ editorial board members in consultation with their colleagues and editors and reflect the opinions of the diverse members of the editorial board).

E. Critical Events Period:

The 6 critical events occurred between June 24, 2012 and December 31, 2012 and are numbered as follows:

   1. Event 1;
   2. Event 2;
   3. Event 3;
   4. Event 4;
   5. Event 5;
   7. N/A
Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Character

F. Overall Representation of Mr. Morsi as:
   1. Secular;
   2. Non-secular;
   3. N/A.

G. Positive Stereotypes about Mr. Morsi:
   1. Present, please specify......................................................
   2. Absent

H. Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi:
   1. Present, please specify......................................................
   2. Absent

Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Policies and Decisions

I. Mr. Morsi’s policies are generally:
   1. Defended;
   2. Criticized;
   3. N/A.

J. Framing Mr. Morsi’s decisions as:
   1. Inconsistent;
   2. Consistent;
   3. N/A.

K. Overall Framing Mr. Morsi’s decisions as:
   1. Worsening Egypt’s state of affairs;
   2. Improving Egypt’s state of affairs;
   3. N/A.
L. **Framing Mr. Morsi’s decisions as:**

1. Successful in achieving revolutionary goals;
2. Unsuccessful in achieving revolutionary goals;
3. N/A.

M. **Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process is:**

1. Lacking transparency and clarity;
2. Transparent and clear;
3. N/A.

N. **Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process is:**

1. Shortsighted, haphazard and/or miscalculated;
2. Far-sighted, organized and/or calculated;
3. N/A.

**Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relation with the Muslim Brotherhood**

O. **Is Mr. Morsi’s affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood presented as an influential factor?**

1. Yes;
2. No;
3. N/A.

P. **Are ‘Islam’ and ‘Democracy’ depicted as contradictory?**

1. Yes;
2. No;
3. N/A.

**Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy**

Q. **Representation of Mr. Morsi as:**
1. Autocratic;
2. Democratic;
3. N/A.

R. Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian Military:

1. Cooperative;
2. Uncooperative;
3. N/A

Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations

S. Overall Representation of Mr. Morsi as a:

1. U.S. Enemy;
2. U.S. Partner;
3. N/A.
APPENDIX B
Coding Book for Mr. Morsi Portrayal in U.S. Media

Technical Data:

A. Article Number:

B. Date:

C. Article Originator:

1. The New York Times;

D. Format:

1. News report;
2. Column/op-ed pieces;
3. Editorial.

E. Critical Events Period:

The 6 critical events occurred between June 24, 2012 and December 31, 2012 and are numbered as follows:

8. EVENT 1: Mr. Morsi, named as Egypt’s new president;
9. EVENT 2: Mr. Morsi dismisses top military generals;
10. EVENT 3: Mr. Morsi visits Iran for the Non-Aligned Summit Movement;
11. EVENT 4: Mr. Morsi brokers the Hamas/Israel truce;
12. EVENT 5: Morsi asserts broader powers;
13. EVENT 6: Unrest in Egypt over constitution.
14. N/A

Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Character
F. **Overall Representation of Mr. Morsi as:**

4. Secular (not specifically relating to religion or to a religious body);

5. Non-secular (advocating the implementation of religion in many everyday events of civic life, and employing it as part of the government);

6. N/A (secularism or like there of did not figure into the article)

G. **Positive Stereotypes about Mr. Morsi:** (Pro-America, pro-west, culturally rich, modern, talented, pragmatic, negotiator, self-disciplined and capable of leadership) or attributes of the aforementioned lines.

3. Present, please specify……………………………………………………..

4. Absent

H. **Negative stereotypes about Mr. Morsi:** (Irresponsible, extremist, aggressive, hard-liner, fanatic, insurgent, irrational, intolerable, anti-American, anti-modern, frenzied, backward, dangerous, lawless, and isolated.) or attributes of the aforementioned lines.

3. Present, please specify……………………………………………………..

4. Absent

*Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Policies and Decisions*

I. **Mr. Morsi’s policies are generally:**

4. Defended (writing in favor of Mr. Morsi’s policies and/or justifying it);

5. Criticized (indicating the faults of Mr. Morsi policies in a disapproving way);

6. N/A (No value judgment seemed to be cast on the policies or policies did not figure into the article).

J. **Framing Mr. Morsi’s decisions as:**
4. Inconsistent (Not staying the same throughout, acting at variance with his own principles or former conduct, not regular or predictable);

5. Consistent (marked by harmony, regularity, free from variation or contradiction and compatible with his other decisions);

6. N/A (decisions (or their (in)consistency) did not figure into the article).

K. Overall Framing Mr. Morsi’s decisions as:

4. Worsening Egypt’s state of affairs (deteriorating Egypt’s socioeconomic, political and security status);

5. Improving Egypt’s state of affairs (enhancing Egypt’s socioeconomic, political and security status);

6. N/A (decisions' impact on state of affairs did not figure into the article).

L. Framing Mr. Morsi’s decisions as:

4. Successful in achieving revolutionary goals (attaining political reform and social justice);

5. Unsuccessful in achieving revolutionary goals (failing to accomplish political reform and social justice);

6. N/A (decisions' relevance to revolutionary goals did not figure into the article).

M. Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process is:

4. Lacking transparency and clarity;

5. Transparent and clear;

6. N/A (transparency/clarity of the decision-making process did not figure into the article).
Note: Transparent decisions are decisions in which the decision maker clearly presents to others the normative and factual premises behind the conclusions and explains the reasoning leading from these premises to the conclusion.

N. **Mr. Morsi’s decision-making process is:**

4. Shortsighted, haphazard and/or miscalculated (no clear vision in running state affairs);

5. Far-sighted, organized and/or calculated (planned and intended decisions that reflect clear objectives);

6. N/A (The quality of the decision-making process did not figure into the article).

*Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s Relation with the Muslim Brotherhood*

O. **Is Mr. Morsi’s affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood presented as an influential factor?**

4. Yes (Mr. Morsi defers major decisions to the Muslim Brotherhood; the group has monopolized decision-making and encroached on the governing of the country and/or Mr. Morsi has given the Muslim Brotherhood greater influence in Egypt’s government);

5. No (the group does not intervene in decision-making, Mr. Morsi is keeping his administration open to a diverse set of experts regardless of their political affiliation);

6. N/A (influence of MB membership on Mr. Morsi did not figure into the article).

P. **Are ‘Islam’ and ‘Democracy’ depicted as contradictory?**

4. Yes (Islam and democracy are totally incompatible);
5. No (there is no conflict between Islam principles and democratic values);
6. N/A (No value judgment surfaced regarding the Islam-democracy dynamic).

Portrayal of Mr. Morsi’s commitment to a Western Style Democracy

Q. Representation of Mr. Morsi as:

4. Autocratic (ruling with unlimited authority and has undisputed influence or power holds and exercises the powers of government as by inherent right, not subject to restrictions, in addition to discounting his opponents);
5. Democratic (appealing to the benefit of the people at large and pertaining to political or social equality);
6. N/A (Governance style did not figure into the article (or, if it did, was not subjected to value judgment).

R. Mr. Morsi’s attitude towards the Egyptian Military:

4. Cooperative (working or acting together willingly for a common purpose or benefit);
5. Uncooperative (intentionally unaccommodating, providing no assistance and working on weakening them and stripping their powers);
6. N/A (Attitude towards the military was either too vague to capture or was altogether absent from the article).

Portrayal of U.S. – Egyptian Relations

S. Overall Representation of Mr. Morsi as a:

4. U.S. Enemy (major headaches, often subverting U.S. goals and interests);
5. U.S. Partner (working with regards to common goals and interests, advancing peace and stability in the Middle East, promoting moderate
Islamic values, working closely on counter-terrorism, keeping the Israeli-Palestinian peace process going, and maintaining the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty);

6. N/A (Mr. Morsi's status as enemy/partner to the U.S. was either unclear or did not figure into the article).