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FEDERALISM AND
POLITICAL STABILITY
IN THE SUDAN

BY
AMIR HASSAN IDRIS

Thesis
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FEDERALISM AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE SUDAN

A THESIS PRESENTED
TO

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THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT
AT THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE MASTER'S DEGREE
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Thesis
1992/989

BY
AMIR HASSAN IDRIS


THE THESIS FOR THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE

BY
AMIR HASSAN IDRIS
HAS BEEN APPROVED


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
JUNE 1992

TO THE MEMORY OF MY MOTHER
AMNA ADAM


Dr. Cyrus Reed
Chairman, Thesis Committee

for 
Dr. Enid Hill
Reader, Thesis Committee


Dr. Noha Mekawy
Reader, Thesis Committee

for 
Dr. Enid Hill
Chairman, Department of
Economics, and
Political Science

The American University in Cairo

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Reader, Thesis Committee

[REDACTED]

Dr. Nona Mekawy
Reader, Thesis Committee

[REDACTED]

Dr. Enid Hill
Chairman, Department of
Economics, and
Political Science

The American University in Cairo

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my appreciation to various individuals, without whose help the completion of this work would to say the least have been delayed.

I would like to thank Dr. Cyrus Reed my advisor for his continuous encouragement at every stage of my study. I appreciate what he has done and cannot thank him enough for all that he has taught me in pursuing my work.

I would also like to express my deep gratitude to . Dr. Ken Menkhaus Dr. Enid Hill and Dr. Noha Mekawy for their great support and sincere advice, I have benefited from their comments that greatly improved the quality of this thesis.

I would like to thank the Ford Foundation for their scholarship during the past two years, without which I could not even started on my studies.

I would also like to thank Ms. Emma Playfair, program officer, for the Ford Foundation and Ms. Carol King Reed, African Students Advisor, who through their support were a source of strength in the process of writing my work.

My thanks are also expressed to my friends in school whose encouragement was also helpful.

I would like also to extend my gratefulness to Mr. Ottom who read and corrected grammatical errors, I am very grateful to him.

Finally, I would like to thank Ms. Gehan for typing my thesis and for the effort she has put into it to make it a presentable work. I am very grateful to her.

Amir Hassan
June 1992

Contents

	page
Acknowledgment	
Introduction	
Why Federalism as an Option	4
Purpose and Organization	5
Chapter One	
Federalism: The Basic Assumptions and Practices	7
- Federalism	12
- Consociational Democracy and Elite Accomodation.	15
- Federalism in the United States.	22
- Federalism in Switzerland.	27
- Federalism in Nigeria.	
Chapter Two	
Civil War and Federalism in Sudanese Politics	
- The Southern Policy of 1930.	34
- United Sudan and Federalism, 1940-1951.	37
- Southern Sudan and Political independence.	42
Chapter Three	
Regional Autonomy or Federalism	
- Central Government's Policies Toward the South 1956-1969.	45
- Addis Ababa Agreement 1972.	48
- The Dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement.	50
- The Civil War in the Sudan and Nigeria.	55
Chapter Four	
Federalism and the Political Forces in the Sudan.	
- The Federal Features in the Political Platform Since 1980s.	62
- Legitimacy and Democracy in the Sudanese state	69
Conclusion	75
Footnotes	
Bibliography	

Introduction

Sudan is the largest country in Africa. It occupies a special position in more than one sense: It is uniquely positioned between the Arab and African states. It has common borders with eight other countries. Sudan is physically a heterogeneous state with an environment varying from deserts, savannah areas, to mountains and equatorial forest.(1) Two thirds of the people are concentrated in central Sudan where the economic development has been situated. This unequal economic development led to regional inequalities. Moreover, because of its relatively small population, Sudan has had to face the problem that its people are highly mobile. The Sudan is not only a diverse country in its physical and environmental setting but also in its racial and ethnic grouping, variety of life, competitive religious and ideological relationships. On the one hand, the Northern Sudanese consider themselves Arab, and on the other the Southern Sudanese define themselves as African. Historically, this profound difference negates the possibility of creating or forming one nation. Mudathir Abd Al-Rahim, a Northerner claims that the most Northern Sudanese feel that they are both Arab and African:

The fact that they are predominantly Muslim and Arab does not indeed distinguish the Northern Sudanese from their southern compatriots, who are mainly pagan and to a much less extent either Christian or Muslim, but it does not mean that they are not African. (2)

Inspite of Abd AL-Rahim's claims, most scholars, classify the Sudanese into broad groupings, such as, Hamitic, Nilotic Negorid, and Arab. The Northern Sudanese appear to be Arabicized in terms of cultural outlook with a number of important exceptions such as the Nubians in the North and the Beja in the East, the Fur in the West, the Nuba and the Funj in the Nuba mountains and the blue Nile where Christianity and African traditions are practiced.(3)

Recently, the population was estimated to be growing at nearly 2.8 percent a year. More than 65 percent of the people however are rural based, but because of urban growth rates and rural-urban migration the population density has risen from about 4,0 per Km² to 8.8 per Km².(4) Infact, there are large regional variations, and many areas of the country, especially in the Northern and Western regions, are uninhabited and it is only the central region that has a large population groups. It is also estimated that almost 40 per cent of the population were Arabs, followed by Dinka (12 %), Beja (7%) and Western African (6%). The Southern region constituted about 25 per cent of the total population. (5) In contrast to the conventional method that used to define the Sudanese people into two main groups: Arab and African, it is obvious there is no a pure ethnic groups in Sudan as Hair P.E stated:

Northerns and Southerners have intermingled for centuries, thus breaking down the ethnic barriers between Arab and African. There are no areas or ethnic groups which have been unaffected by ethnic mixing.(6)

The linguistic map of Sudan is also complex, with 115 languages, twenty six of which are spoken by more than 100,000 people.(7) Arabic is Sudan's official language while English is the *linguefrance* in the South. Both are used as second languages for communication between individuals of different ethnic groups. Although the conventional views are that Northern Sudan is Muslim, while the South is Christian, both are inaccurate. While the majority of the Northerns are Muslim, there are important areas of non-Muslims particularly in the Nuba Mountains. Moreover, Islam in Sudan is aculturated with pre-Islamic elements and there are many unorthodox Muslim sects. Similarly, in parts of the Southern Sudan there is a wide mixture of religions. With both traditional worship and Christianity, as well as Islam practised.(8)

According to estimates made during the last census, as many as 2.2 million people were entirely nomadic, especially in the North and West.(9) They are highly mobile. In addition, there are very large numbers of semi-nomadic pastoralists from Southern Sudan belonging to Nilotic groups such as the Dinka and Nuer whose young men

used to drive their herds north during the summer rains, and return with their cattle to their traditional places in the Sudd flood plain at Bahrel Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces during the dry season. These traditional movements lead to clashes between these different groups over water resources.

Why Federalism as an Option:

A few years ago, the idea of a federal alternative to the question of government in the Sudan was proposed by different political and ideological forces. The idea of a federal system was, however, never seriously considered. Historically, it had been the demand of Southern political leaders. It was rejected by the dominant Northern political forces who defined it as an attempt to weaken their central government and a primary step to separation, and disintegration of the Sudan.

Recently, the goals and strategies of different Sudanese political parties have been changed. The federal option, which used to be an undesirable idea in the North, is gaining respect among many political parties. However, some Northern groups are moving to the other extreme by encouraging the secession of the South. The Sudan's People Liberation Army (SPLA), the dominant political-military movement in the South, is rejecting secession and demanding the redistribution of power in the country on an equitable regional or federal basis.

In this respect, the federal system has been advocated as a strategy, for resolving of diversity problems while recognizing the sense of nationality in the Sudan. However, the convergence has produced a confusion of objectives rather than common areas of national agreement in the Sudanese politics.

Purpose and Organization:

The purpose of this thesis is to examine ways in which a federal system can be used to manage the conflicts between the North and the South which has threatened Sudanese political system for nearly 100 years. The thesis will assess the utility of Lijphart's work on consociational democracy in a regionally and culturally divided country like the Sudan.

The thesis is divided into four chapters: The first chapter examines the basic theoretical assumptions underlying the concept of federalism and examines three case studies. The second deals with the history of political development and evolution of public policy in the Sudan. The third chapter examines the institutional framework of the regional autonomy in the Sudan, while the fourth seeks to analyse critically the federal features in the political platform since 1980s.

Chapter One

Federalism: The Basic Assumptions and Practices

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the basic theoretical assumptions underlying the concept of federalism and to relate them to the three case studies- the United States, Switzerland, and Nigeria. Federalism in the United States and Switzerland, can be regarded as very much alive, in the sense of being more instructive and more relevant to societies still seeking unity in diversity. The Nigerian federal system had problems of regional imbalance which threatened the existence of the political system. Regional imbalance existed from the federal structure and the impact of colonial policy on the country. These case studies are intended to shed some light on the viability of the federal system in resolving the problems of government in a divided country like the Sudan.

Federalism:

It is difficult to define the concept of a federal system exactly. The difficulty of definition is exacerbated by the fact that many countries adopt the federal system, but they operate under different constitutions. The term has sometimes been equated with regionalism and devolution of power. Decentralization, and regionalism, however, imply the existence of a primary center of power, and their purpose is to maintain the unitary state by distributing powers to regional and local units.

Federalism is defined by K.C. Wheare as the division of power between autonomous units of government which constitute an institution of states. Wheare bases his definition of federalism on the principle "of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each within a sphere, coordinate and independent." (1) Moreover, A.H. Birch adopts Wheare's definition, but denies the idea that the two levels of governments should be independent because relations in a federal system are characterized by interdependence not independence. (2)

In his definition of federalism, Wheare takes the United States constitution as the example of a federal system. Wheare writes, federal systems exist

when the powers of government for a community are divided substantially according to the principle that there is a single independent authority for the whole area in respect of some matters and that there are independent regional authorities for other matters, each set of authorities being coordinated with and not subordinate to the others within its own preserved sphere. (3)

Therefore, the general and regional governments operate directly on the people and each citizen is subject to the two governments. According to Wheare "The principle of association is that of the division of power between distinct and coordinate government." (4) However, Wheare

makes a distinction between the federal principle as applied in the United States constitution, and the confederate principle in systems where the general government is dependent on the regional governments, and where those governments alone operate directly with the people. From this classification, Wheare infers the conditions needed for the adoption of the federal system. In the first place, the society concerned must prefer this particular system as distinct from a unitary or a confederal system. Moreover, "they must desire to be united but not to be unitary" and more important, "they must not only desire it, they must be able to operate it."(5)

In Wheare's view, the conditions that are conducive to a desire for a federal union are many: a sense of military insecurity; the need to preserve the union's is political independence or economic advantages; geographical contiguity; and similarity of political institutions. However, Wheare does not include community of languages, race, religion or nationality as essential conditions for the desire for union because in some cases, such as Canada and Switzerland, the desire to unite arose despite differences in these aspects. But he admits "there is a limit to the degree of divergence that is compatible with the existence of a desire to unite."(6)

In contrast to Wheare's idea. M.D. Reagan and J.G. Sanzone define federalism as intergovernmental relations and claim that conventional federalism is a static notion. They state that "the modern notion of federalism in keeping with the more realistic approach for present day political analysis, is dynamic; it pictures the intergovernmental relationship as one of constant change in response to social and economic forces, as well as to such significant political forces, as the party and the electoral system." (7)

Thus, both reject Wheare's constitutional pluralism of dual federalism on the ground that it conceives coordinate power relationships as distinguished from superordinate. When, in practice, as well as in constitutional terms, the relationship is characterized by power concurrence and not the division of power. Reagan and Sanzone stated that "the national and state governments work together in the same areas sharing functions and therefore power." (8) Moreover, they challenge Wheare's idea that the regional governments must be financially independent of the central government. They argue that intergovernmental relations and the sharing of functions are most clearly seen in the explosive growth of federal grants-in-aid in the United States, as a result of the inability of state governments to finance all the services

under their authority. While cooperative federalism assumes joint action of the levels of government, it is still conceptually inadequate because it defines that the responsibilities of state and national governments were coordinate, whereas in reality the national government is nearly always in a superior position. (9)

Thus, the new federalism as defined by Reagan and Sanzone, is concerned with what governments do in multifaceted positive relation of shared action. The emphasis is on action not structure. What is required is the extension of the range of new forms of direct federalism or the "permissive federalism" by which Reagan and Sanzone mean, "a system of shared functions and shared power under federal leadership and within the boundaries set by whatever priorities a national consensus is able to agree upon." (10) Such a system can strengthen the national government by:

permitting firm national definition of policy objectives and program approaches at the same time that it can make all the room needed for appropriate state-local inputs to the details of program implementation. (11)

The main task of the political leadership in the Sudan is to agree on national issues, especially, the issue of distribution of political power, and constitution under a federal system.

In the case of the Sudan, federalism must emphasize the action not the structure of governments. If federalism is to work political elites in the Sudan need to establish a system of shared functions and power under combined leadership. The purpose is to prevent the superiority of the national government, and to create a strong national consensus. All these measures, however, can not work unless there is an agreement about the type of state.

Consociational Democracy and Elite Accomodation

In this part I am going to study the relationship between democracy and political stability with special reference to Arend Lijphart's work on "Consociational Deomocracy". Lijphart wrote in response to work by G. Almond who argued that political stability was a function of political culture and the role of political system. In contrast, Lijphart argues that patterns of elite interaction play a critical role in determining political stability. For example, according to Almond, countries which have deep regional and cultural divisions, such as Switzerland, should be highly unstable, when in fact they are not. (12) According to Lijphart, these situations of fragmented societies but stable democracies are called consociational democracies. According to Lijphart :

The leaders of the rival [political] sub-cultures may engage in competitive behavior and the further aggravate mutual tensions and political instability that they may also make deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. (13)

There are several examples of consociational experiences. Although the grand coalition cabinet is the best known form, the essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not any particular institutional arrangement. However, a grand coalition cabinet as in Austria after the Second World War represents the most comprehensive type of coalescent elites. Its Coalition Committee (composed of the top Socialist and Catholic leaders) made the crucial decisions.(14) The alternative option provided by the Lebanese National Pact of 1943 is that the President must be a Maronite and the President of the Council a Sunni; thus, guaranteeing representation to the country's two main religious groups. In Colombia, the Liberal and Conservative parties decided in 1958 to set up a consociational arrangement in order to pull the country out of its civil wars and dictatorship. The agreement stated that the presidency would be alternated, for four-year terms between the two parties and that each would be equally represented at all lower levels of government.

The purpose of the consociational democracy is to create government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy. The successful consociational democracy requires a number of conditions: that the elites have the ability to accomodate the divergent interests and demands of the sub-cultures; that they have the ability to transcend cleavage; that the elites remain committed to the maintenance of the system and to the improvements of its stability.(15) Moreover, Lijphart assumes that there are three factors conducive to the establishment of cooperation among elites. The most obvious is the existence of external threats to the country. In all of the consociational democracies, the cartel of elites was either initiated or developed during periods of international crisis. The First and Second World Wars marked the beginning of consociational democracy in Lebanon. In Switzerland, consociational democracy developed gradually but reached its peak with the admission of the socialists to the grand coalition of the Federal Council in 1943. A second factor is the multiple balance of power among the sub-cultures. As Lijphart explains:

Instead of either a dual balance of power or a clear hegemony by one sub-culture, when one group is in the majority, its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate with a minority.

Similarly, in a society with two evenly matched sub-cultures, the leaders of both may hope to achieve their aims by domination rather than cooperation. (16)

Thus, when the political parties in a fragmented system are the organized products of political sub-cultures, the multiparty system is more conducive to consociational democracy and stability than a two-party system because in a multi party system in which no party is close to a majority (as in Switzerland and Lebanon) no single party has the option to dominate the other. Rather, in order to have any role, the parties must strive to work together. (17)

In the Sudan, the two dominant Northern sectarian parties controlled political power during the short democratic periods. As a result, the other sub cultures have been marginalized in Sudanese politics. Moreover, the political elites have the same political outlook that is based on religious supremacy and sectarianism and local and regional attachments tend to be strong in the Sudanese politics with nationalism slightly weaker than it is in the European cases of consociationalism. Thus, in the Sudan, the elites have not the ability to accomodate the divergent interests of the different groups, let alone the maintenance of the political stability within the multiple balance of power as Lijphart defined.

Federalism in the United States

In this section I will examine the federalism in the USA because it can be regarded as very much alive. In the sense of being instructive to society seeking unity in diversity like the Sudan. In the United States the people agreed on the necessity of government to create one nation under one federal government. They succeeded to create a union because as Hamilton, a writer of the Federalist Papers, argued:

Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people, a people, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government. (18)

In case of the USA, the similarity of culture, political system, and historical experience has paved the way for a common desire that encouraged the people toward union. Boorstin, argued that American federalism is not a product of preconceived principle, but rather was the product of expediency. It is the expression of the main characteristics of American society, namely unity and diversity. (19)

The first characteristic features of every political system is sovereignty. In fact, the idea of sovereignty represents particular difficulties in a federal system. In the USA, the discussion about sovereignty has centered

around two questions: whether sovereignty is capable of being divided between federal and state governments and if sovereignty is indivisible, whether it resides in the federal or in the state governments. Historically, before the establishment of the union, the states acted on the idea that they were thirteen independent and sovereign states. As the second Article of Confederation stated:

Each state retains its sovereignty
freedom, and independence and every
power, jurisdiction and right which
is not by this confederation
expressly delegated to the United
States in congress assembled. (20)

However, the Constitution of 1789 made a compromise between those who called for a strong unitary central government, and those who recognized the need for some central authority but wanted to keep it as weak as possible. Thus, to avoid the consequences of such centralization, federalists established the idea of a sovereignty divided between federal and state government. Compromise reconciled states rights with the need for an effective federal government.

In Calhoun's view, the idea of dividing sovereignty was unacceptable and impractical:

"To talk of dividing the supreme
power in the state was like talking
of half a square of half a
triangle." (21)

The civil war settled the question of secession, it did not, however, set up a clear notion of national sovereignty. As was said of Lincoln,

The sovereign power of the nation rested in his hands and he exercised it. The rebellious south was beaten back into the union and the great debate was finally over. (22)

The problem had hardly been solved by the time that the Supreme Court in 1871 declared the mutual limits on federal and state taxation powers which created part of a constitution. Even recently, however, recognition of the federal right to legislate within its fields without hindrance from states does not prevent the idea of the sovereignty of the states playing a part in federal politics and judicial decisions in the USA.

Democracy in the USA has a number of elements such as a belief in majority rule, a desire to safeguard minority interests and a desire to prevent the domination of the few as well as the many. In fact, the relation of the idea of majority rule to federalism represents the American manner towards democracy. However, Calhoun argued that in contrast to the simple majority, society is composed of different and conflicting interests and a constitutional system of government is one in which the majority view within each interest was taken into account. In Calhoun's view:

The important interests in the USA were almost exclusively geographical resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, industry and production. (23)

Moreover, Calhoun argues that the isolated geographical interests represented by the states were true national units within which the simple majority rule could prevail within these groups. Thus, the idea of the concurrent majority would lead to secession. Although the civil war settled the idea of secession, but it did not put an end to the elements of heterogeneity in the United States. However, recently, federalism has been affected by the developments which tend to emphasize the national aspects rather than local aspects of the USA, as a result of the development of communication and the emergence of new economic problems.

The principle of separating the legislative, executive, and judicial powers is an expression of the American limitations on majority-rule, and also a check on the possible development of individualistic rule by the President. But the essential element of the separation of powers for federal system is that the American federalism owes great concern to the way in which power is fragmented at the centre. The importance of a judiciary is that it has a high degree of independence in a federal system. However, in

the USA the judiciary is subject to checks. Therefore, there are three distinctive procedures: the legislative procedure provides the maximum participation in decision making; and the judicial procedure safeguards the rights of those affected by a decision; the executive procedure gives direction and coordination to the whole. (24) Thus, the impact of the separation of powers between the executive and legislative is that it weakens the Federal Government and makes it a less effective tool for an attack on the states. Because before the Federal Government could make any attack on state power, it would need a President and two Houses of Congress united by a political unity which is not easy.

W.S. Livingston has argued that federalism becomes nothing if it is held to embrace diversities that are territorially grouped. (25) Historically, the federal structure of the United States has been an instrument in contacts between geographical interests and pluralist interests. Thus, the interaction between Federal and state politics, and the function of the national political parties has been to bring the sectional interests together by representing the whole of the country. Infact, the political parties have been successful in this mission. However, the importance of pluralist ideas can be seen in the Federalist Papers when Madison saw the building of a

federal state not in terms of its geographic effects, but in terms of its "tendency of break and control the violence of function." (26) Therefore, the federal structure is an integral unit of the form of government in the United States, and pluralism becomes an essential factor in maintenance of the federal system:

All authority in the federal republic of the United States will be derived from and dependent on the society. The society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens that the rights of individuals or minority, will be in little danger from interested combination of the majority. (27)

What we learn from the American federal system is that the American federal system has resulted from decentralization and the evolution of a strong federal government. Thus, the state and local governments make meaningful policy choices and resolve conflict without the intervention of the national government.

Although the United States is a multi-ethnic state, the similarity of culture, political system and historical experience has paved the way for a common desire that encouraged the people toward union. In contrast, in the Sudan, the dissimilarity of culture, political system and historical experience has blocked any attempts to create one nation since the political independence.

The experience of the USA shows that federalism as a policy and a process certainly involves a particular institutional, constitutional change structure. of wide-ranging. However, the essential operative factor is not so much the institutional framework of the federal system but the political framework within it operates, and the quality of political leadership operating it.

As we have seen the formation of federalism in the USA is to create a workable balance between the different social and political forces in society. Thus, in case of the Sudan constitutional change must also be accompanied by changes in established political values without which the process of federalism would become impossible.

Federalism In Switzerland

The Swiss Federal constitution of 1848 made certain compromises that made the Swiss Federal Government different from those in other European political systems. It established a bicameral legislature based on the American model. The main purpose of the constitution is

To create a system of government that would provide security against external enemies and internal conflicts and furnish the conditions necessary for the attainment of a good life for a maximum number of individuals. (28)

The constitution had to face several problems such as: religious and linguistic pluralism, limited natural resources and political tradition based on the Canton as the main unit of government. Therefore, the federal constitution adopted three main principles: federalism, liberalism, and democracy. Federalism was recognized not only to form national unity, but also to preserve the historical importance of the cantonal units, and the cultural differences. The constitution recognized the establishment of the direct political participation within a federal system:

The confederation guarantees to the cantons their territory, their sovereignty their constitutions, their liberty and rights of their people and the

constitutional rights of citizens,
and the rights and powers conferred
by the people on the authorities.(29)

Therefore, the division of powers between the central and the local government has been recognized by the constitution. However any desire to create modifications to the existing constitution will be accepted only if: 1) it contains nothing contrary to the provisions of the federal constitution or 2) if it assures the exercise of political rights according to republican forms, representative or democratic, and can be amended by the people and can be amended when in absolute majority of citizens so demand.(30)

Similar to that of the American constitution, Article 60 in the Swiss constitution states that

every canton is bound to accord to citizens of other confederate states the same treatment that it accords its own citizens as regards legislation and judicial proceeding. (31)

The Swiss constitution also guarantees the freedom of religions:

No person may be compelled to become a member of any religious body, to submit to any religious institutions, to perform of religious act, or to incur any punishment of any sort by reason of religious option.(32)

Moreover, democracy in Switzerland is based on the instrument of direct democracy. In order to pursue the political participation, there are three types of direct democracy at the federal level: The compulsory referendum on constitutional amendments; the popular initiative for proposing constitutional revisions and amendment; and the optional referendum on laws and treaties. In the first type, all constitutional amendments must get the approval of a majority of voters. In the second, the people have been given the power to initiate changes in the constitution and finally, in the third, people are given the constitutional right to force the federal power to submit most important legislation and treaties for popular approval. (33)

The supreme authority of the constitution is exercised by the Federal Assembly. It composed of two councils: the National Council and the Council of States. They are given the power to introduce all federal laws. The Swiss federal executive is composed of seven men elected by the Federal Assembly. This executive system was managed to deal with the importance of the Swiss Cantons.

Although the power of the Swiss federal government has increased, federalism is still an important tool in the Swiss political system. There are three main factors tending to pursue federalism in Switzerland: each canton is

a center of political activity of its own; the cantons have defensive measures such as the initiative, referendum and equal representation in the upper house of the legislature; and political parties are organized on a canton basis.

Historically, the central power was weak, and cantons maintained themselves with a high level of political self-sufficiency and independence. Although the Swiss national system was decided by the force of arms against foreign forces, its political character remained a consociational arrangement. Moreover, the powerful cantons did not attempt to challenge the central power or to become independent and the local tradition and local authorities were allowed to exist. This very dispersed power structure gave a wider scope for local elites to maintain their power and for the confederation to continue irrespective of political change within any of the political communities. Therefore, Switzerland emerged as an independent political state without either a strong central government or an articulate national identity:

The Swiss tradition consistently regarded an entrenched pluralism as the safeguard of liberties, thus the Swiss nation became the product of a slow development of genuine national integration rather than that of deliberate nation building because it would be difficult to define one group or one political centre that might be regarded as the leading nation building force. (34)

Therefore, the slow development of a strong national sentiment has paved the way for the high level of accomodating elites in a complementary rather than destructive situation. Thus, to preserve the political balance and stability in Switzerland "a strong emphasis was needed to ensure that political power could not become concentrated in one political centre, and the local governments have remained relatively independent political units. Moreover, the central government institutions have been so arranged to insure a definite duality between the executive and legislative".(35)

In case of Switzerland, the role of the political elites and the multiple balance of power are the basic conditions for the successful consociational democracy. The political elites are playing a very important role in moderating communal conflict, and the multiple balance of power guards against attempts of one group to dominate the others. In the Sudan, the two dominant Northern parties controlled political power during the short period of the democratic periods. Thus, the other political forces have been marginalized in the Sudanese politics. In contrast to Switzerland, the elite in the Sudan is not small group. Thus, the chance of enhancing a spirit of cooperativeness is also small. As we will see the conditions for successful consociational federal democracy are distinctly absent in the Sudan.

Federalism in Nigeria

My attempt is to focus on the problems of regional inequality within the federal system, in Nigeria by looking at the federal structure and the dynamics of presidential federalism. The Nigerian federal system had outstanding problems of regional inequality which had threatened the whole existence of the political system. Historically, during the colonial rule of Nigeria in 1914, Britain did make many attempts to maintain and encourage divide and rule policy. However, colonialism encouraged vertical relationships between the local administrative units and the colonial centers of power. This created a sense of suspicion between the Northern and Southern provinces, because they did not get a chance to interact politically until 1947, when the Nigerians were forced to choose a federal system of government within a secular constitutional. (36)

There are two factors within a secular constitution which encouraged suspicions among the Nigerian groups: The regional inequality within the Nigerian federal system, and different levels of formal education. In fact, Nigeria is divided into two regions: North and South. In the South, there was always the fear of domination by virtue of the fact that the North comprised 60% of the total population. (37) For the Southerners, the federal system made it impossible for them to control political power. Southern's political power grew out of their access to

Western education which had become a passport into occupational roles in the modern sector at the Nigerian Political system.(38) Thus, Southerner's had greater access to Western education as a result of British colonial policy toward the South: thus there was a relative division of functions between the North and South. The North controlled political power and the South controlled economic and administrative or the bureaucratic power.

In January 1966, the military assumed power in a coup and the old Nigerian balance changed, both politically and economically. It was a Southern dominated coup, though, and it seemed as if centralization would guarantee Ibo or Southern domination of the country. Thus the North reacted violently against this change, because the political power had been the North's safeguard against the South's economic and educational advantage.(39) These imbalances created problems for the federal system, such as threats of secessions by many regions, in 1950, 1953 and 1964, which culminated in the abortive secession of Eastern Nigeria in 1967. The Ibo political leadership saw the division of the existing region as an attempt to sever the Ibo heartland from its oil. After 1967 Nigeria's military government moved to add additional states and moreover, took some measures to reduce the powers of each . In the 1978 constitution, several powers were enumerated in an exclusive legislative list. The exclusive list assigns 66 powers to the federal government such as defence, external

affairs police, and customs. The task of post-war reconstruction and national development required further federal involvement in the new states' matters. (40) Therefore from a federal system with a weak center, Nigeria moved to a civilian ground in October 1979 with a strong federal system.

Some scholars argued that the 1979 Nigerian constitution is an attempt to correct and avoid the regional imbalance. Section (3) of the constitution describes the structure of Nigeria "as comprising nineteen states".(41) Moreover, a new aspect of the presidential system was established in the new constitution because some beleived that the failure of the First Republic could be traced back to the Westminster system of government of sectarian based political parties. Sections 201 and 209 of the new constitution stated that:

For the formation of national political parties which must reflect the federal character of Nigeria and which must be open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place or origin, sex, religion or ethnic grouping. (42)

Although the federal structure in Nigeria is composed of nineteen states (in 1979 constitution) there have been strong desires for the creation of additional states. Many Nigerians, especially those from the Southern states, reacted against the imbalance created by the federal structure of 1979, because there were ten states in the Northern region and nine states in the South. It bothered

some Nigerians because the demand for additional states has been seen in economic and democratic interpretation of the role of states in the federal system(43). The economic logic behind these agitations is that if one state is split into two states, more resources would be allocated to the area.

In fact, the idea of creating more states has continued to threaten the presidential system in Nigeria. While the creation of states, helped to reconcile the problem of imbalance, it has had its own side effects. The centralization which characterized military rule from 1960-79 has not been changed by the return to civilian government; The states are no less dependent on central funding; the federal government continues to control the revenue distribution. Since 1967, states have become more dependent on the federal government for their budgetary demands. However, while oil revenue has been helpful, it increased the powers of the central government at the expense of states. The dynamics of the political process in Nigeria show that there were many aspects of the past which still exist. The South-North conflict persists, regardless of the creation of states, and the minority-majority ethnic group conducts still appear in many political parties, in addition to the ethno regional factors of the political parties are becoming more apparent than in 1979. Ivo Duchacek describes the problem of majority minority relations in federal balance:

The problem for most ethnic minorities is that they are permanent minorities and the ruling group a permanent majority in inter ethnic relations. Therefore, the convenient democratic game of numbers majoritarian decision-making in the framework of a broad consensus does not work since the unalterable power symmetry between permanent majority and minorities impedes the formation of a consensual community. (44)

Nigeria's experience indicated that one may question the federal structure in which one region is larger, and more powerful than all the others combined.

Federalism in Nigeria provides some lessons for the application of federalism in the Sudan. After the civil war in 1960's, Nigeria gradually approached the equilibrium of a true federal balance, having experimented disastrously with the two opposing extremes of confederalism and strict unitanism. In the Sudan, the political elites must recognize the need of adjusting the boundaries of the constituent state to ensure that no one region dominates, and that smaller ethnic groups have their own political representation. These lessons deserve to be carefully digested by those who seek to establish federal system in the Sudan. In Nigeria, the political elites agreed to create federalism within a secular constitution to preserve the interests of all ethnic group. In the Sudan, any attempt to enforce federal system within an Islamic constitution, may well led to mere problems than those experienced by Nigeria.

Chapter Two

Civil War and Federalism in Sudanese Politics

This chapter argues that the Anglo-Egyptian condominium policy of separate administration for the North and South of the Sudan was a correct policy. The crucial error was its reversal and the political unification of the two regions without providing the kind of social development and constitutional transition that might have had the chance of safeguarding the political position of the South.

The conflict in Sudan essentially reflects much deeper cultural and ethnic cleavages. Although some have argued that the main conflict in Sudan is between the Arab North and African South or Muslims versus Christians, reality is more complex than this simple classification. Historically, we can argue that the modern state in Sudan goes back to the Turko-Egyptian invasion of 1820 which led to the establishment of the Mahdist state after the successful revolt of Al-Mahdi in 1885. Thus, Sudan was independent for 13 years until the Anglo-Egyptian reinvasion of 1898, and the establishment of the condominium rule under Britain's control.

The Southern Policy

Some European countries were interested in the Sudan during that period, especially the Southern regions. Belgium tried to claim Bahr El Ghazal as part of its Congo colony, and the French sent military forces as far as Fashoda in the upper Nile, but the British were able to sustain their rule over the region. (1) But colonial administration in the Sudan did not establish a centralized system in the South. The traditional leaders implemented policies, with a limited power. Moreover, several British District Commissioners had been introduced and they had executive and judicial powers. (2)

In 1902, the colonial government decided to administer the six Northern provinces, and three Southern provinces as the separate and distinct regions as they had always been. Thus, Christian missionaries were banned from working in the Muslim Northern areas. However, the indigenous African religions were not respected, and the Southern Sudan was divided into areas of influences between several Christian missionary organizations. In 1930 however, the colonial government changed its understanding of the divisions between the North and South of the Sudan. This change came under a new policy called "Southern Policy". This policy was based on two main themes: that the Negroid Africans of the South were culturally and

racially different from the Northern Arabs; and that the Southern provinces would either develop as a separate political entity or be integrated into what was then British East Africa. The Civil Secretary, Sir Harold MacMichael, defined the goals of his new colonial policy:

The policy of the government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the structure and organization based to what ever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit upon the indigeneous customs.(3)

Moreover, in order to eliminate the Arab influences in the South, the colonial government decided to implement a number of measures to maintain the Southern policy. These included: the encouragement of English language in schools and in offices; the prohibition of the Arabic language and Arab dress; the replacement of Arab administrators by indigeneous staffs; the removal of Arab traders from the South and the encouragement of non-Arab traders like the Greek to work into the South; and the recognition and use of African customary laws. All these policies were pursued by the British colonial government to maintain the separateness of the Southern Sudan. As noted by Alier, a leading Southern Sudanese politician:

intercourse between the South and North was not encouraged-Northerners were allowed to trade in the South only after careful screening. Likewise Southerners were prohibited from coming to the North. (4)

Moreover, in response to the rise of nationalism in the Northern Sudan, the British Administration created an Advisory Council in 1943. The Council was limited to the North on the basis that:

The general conditions, social, cultural, economic, and linguistic are sharply distinguished from those of the Southern Sudan: and that the ethnic diversity and comparative backwardness of the tribes preclude the selection of suitable indigenous representatives - in short, the South can not at present be adequately represented in the North, nor can the North represent the South. (5)

Although the Southern policy went on to function during the 1940's, the policy was criticized by the Northerners and by Egypt. The Northern Sudanese leaders accused the British of either working to separate the Sudan into two regions or of planning to attach the South to Uganda. However, the British Administration became more sensitive to external pressure, particularly from Egypt. Egypt pressed Britain not to keep the South as a separate region from the North, with the hope that after its independence, the Sudan might be united with Egypt.

United Sudan and Federalism 1940-1951

In April, 1940, the Sudan Administration Conference was held in Khartoum. The crucial decision to change the southern policy was reflected in the following report:

We are fully aware of the relative backwardness of the peoples of the Southern Provinces and the advances which they must make. Therefore, before they can reach the height of civilization attained by many peoples in the North, but at the same time a decision must be made, and made now, that the Sudan must be administered as one country.(6)

By December 1946, the status of the Southern Sudan was decided and the Civil Secretary had pointed out two other options open to the Southern Sudan: "having an independent self-governing African state; or being united with East Africa."(7) However, we can see that even during the decision making process, the South was not consulted at any stage. A British Southern Governor criticized the Civil Secretary and warned that "as a result of his decision the Northerners will dominate the Southerners and treat them as their fathers did and that the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon their children into the third and fourth generation."(8) Moreover, the argument for retaining the separate administration of the Southern Sudan and opposition to the New Southern policy also came from the Fabian Colonial Bureau in London:

The South like the Northern Sudan to Egypt is also a source of cheap labour and servants, on all other grounds the South ought not to be united to the Arab North. In human terms of it, there is a great deal to be said for maintaining the present policy of administering the South almost as a separate mandate, without making any decision to separate it in sovereignty from the North a step which would be bitterly opposed politically just now in Egypt and in the Northern Sudan. Time, education and gradual economic development may show in the end whether it can be more suitably attached to the middle East or to Africa.(9)

The Northern Arab Sudanese in senior government posts were brought to the South, and Southern Sudanese were assigned to junior administrative positions; the government decided that Arabic language should be taught in Southern secondary schools; and the prohibition against the propagation of Islam was lifted. These measures were established to promote a sense of common outlook between the peoples of the North and the South. But this policy did not succeed in changing the attitudes of the North toward the South, nor in improving the level of modernization in places in the South as it had in the North. Although this new policy led to the birth of one political and administrative country, some British administrators in the South had objectives. The

governor of Barherl Ghazal addressed himself to the "issue of safeguards for the integrity of the South which must need discussion." He proposed regional autonomy or federal measures.(10) In response to that pressure the civil Secretary suggested a conference in Juba. There were five terms of reference of the conference: to discuss the advisability of the Southern Sudanese being represented in the Assembly proposed by the Civil Secretary; to discuss whether safeguards could be incorporated into the legislation setting up the new Assembly, so as to insure that the Southern Sudan with its differences in race, language and tradition would not be prevented from its social and political development; to discuss whether or not an Advisory Council for the Southern Sudan should be set up to cope with Southern affairs; and finally, to consider the recommendations of the Sudan Administration Conference.(11)

The Juba Conference was attended by the seventeen Southern Sudanese chiefs and junior government officials, six well-educated Northerners, and the Governors of the Southern provinces. Ironically, some Northern Sudanese scholars, such as, have argued that the Juba Conference concluded that "the wish of the Southern Sudanese was to be united.(12) But in reality, the unity of the North and South had already been decided by the Civil Secretary as a product of pressure from Northern Sudanese leaders

and British Middle Eastern interests. Moreover, the Southern Sudanese participants in the conference were not free actors. They were chosen by the Administration and most of them were chiefs who were illiterate. So whatever decision they made, they had no power from their people.

The British officials in the South, however, protested against the decision to ignore specific safeguards for the South in the Legislative Assembly Ordinance of 1948. They pointed out that "without protection the Southerners will not be able to develop a long indigenous lines, will be overwhelmed and swamped by the North." (13) In response to this criticism, the Civil Secretary decided to include specific safeguards for the South. These safeguards were contained in Articles 14 and 100 of a draft of the self-government statute. In Article 100, the Governor General was given special responsibility for the public service and the Southern provinces and also power to protect special interests of the Southern provinces. (14) Moreover, in Article 14 (2) the Governor General was asked to appoint not less than ten or more than fifteen ministers on the advice of the prime minister; and not less than two ministers in each council shall be elected from the South. The 1948 Ordinance also created an Executive Council of 12 members at least half of whom had to be Sudanese, and the Legislative Assembly was composed

of 65 elected members, 10 nominated members and under secretaries making a total of 93 members. There were only 13 representatives from the South and the remainder from the North. Thus, the South was totally under represented.

In March 1951, the Governor General set up a Constitutional Amendment Commission composed of 13 Sudanese, only one of whom was from the South. The only Southern member proposed a federal system as an option between the North and South. The Commission suggested two other proposals that the Governor General be given powers to protect the special interests of the Southern Sudan and that a ministry for Southern affairs be established. In addition, the commission suggested two further measures to deal with the political status of the South: the first measure gave the Governor General the right to withhold his assent from any executive act and to reserve for the consideration of the Condominium Government any legislative measures which in his judgement would affect the interest of the Southern Sudanese.(15) In the second, a Ministry of Southern Affairs was to be created. The minister, who himself would have been a Southerner and was to be responsible for promoting the interest of the South in the Council of Ministers and introducing legislation in the Assembly. The Legislative Assembly however, accepted the first option and rejected the second.

political Independence and Southern Sudan:

In May 1952, the Northern political forces submitted a proposal for self-government to the Condominium Government. A conference had been set up by the colonial government in Cairo to discuss this issue. Ironically, all the Northern political parties attended the conference, but the Southerners were not invited to express their position. Although, the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953 and the self government statute did not offer any special safeguards for the Southern Sudan, it recognized several issues. For the first time, Egypt recognized the right of the Sudanese to self-determination, and it was agreed that there should be a transitional period not more than three years during which the colonial rule would be terminated. Also the conference established three International Commissions: one to supervise elections; one to control the power exercised by the Governor General; and one to pursue Sudanization of the administration.(16) Finally, the conference agreed that self-determination was to be exercised by Sudanese through a Constituent Assembly which was to have the right to choose between union with Egypt or independence for the Sudan. Therefore, the Agreement - or the conference decided that the North and South were one united country.

Although the Northern Sudan was represented fully in the conference, the South was neither represented nor

consulted. Some Northern Sudanese argued that the South had no political organization to send representatives to Cairo. Moreover, they claimed that the unity between the North and South had already been established in 1947 during the Juba Conference. Thus the Northerners argued at the time that it was quite legitimate for Northern Sudanese to govern the Sudan as a single political unit.(17) In fact this type of argument underestimated the profound schism between the North and the South. As noted by Dunstan. M. Wai:

There is no argument to justify the exclusion of the South at the pre-self government negotiations. It must therefore, be concluded that the destiny of the North and South was unilaterally decided upon by the Civil Secretary with the support and pressure from the North and without the prior consultation of the blessing of the South. (18)

Therefore, the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 and the self-government statute did not recognized any special safeguards for the Southern Sudan. As a result in August 1955, the Equatoria Corps of the Sudan's Defence Force which was stationed in the South, mutined. The tragic events carried out by the mutiny forced the Northern political parties to focus their attention on the South/North relations. Thus, they agreed to consider a federal solution for the future government of the Sudan. In response to that promise, Southern representatives in the

Chapter Three
Constituent Assembly agreed to the Declaration of Independence on January 1, 1956 and a special Commission was set up to prepare a draft constitution (out of the forty three members only three were Southerners). Thus, the Commission voted against the federal system. As a result the civil war which continues today, erupted in 1955, shortly before independence.

Chapter Three

Regional Autonomy or Federalism

Central Governments Policies Toward the South 1956-1969:

After independence, Sudan was governed under the Transitional Constitution of 1956, which established a Westminster system with a cabinet government subject to the control of a parliament with an independent judiciary. The constitution stated certain important rights. These included the right of all Sudanese to equality before the court and the right not to be deprived of the use of their property. However, the new institutions of government lacked any legal foundation. Those who ruled had little experience and the unstable coalitions of the civilian governments contributed to the lack of effective development and even the basic issue of a permanent constitution remained unaccomplished. In 1958, the first military government took power in Sudan under the leadership of General Abboud. The military regime decided to implement the process of islamization in the South by force. The outcome increased the civil war. Thus, the Southern political movement which had grown up in exile, emerged in 1962 as the Sudan African National Union (SANU). They were fighting for secession, but the immediate result of the civil war was the downfall of the military regime in 1964.

In 1964 the new transitional civilian government began to change the repressive policy of the military regime towards peaceful resolution with the South. In 1965 the Round Table Conference opened at Khartoum to discuss the question of the civil war. Both Northern and Southern parties came together to discuss some alternatives, varying from self-determination and federalism, to local government. However, the Northern political parties rejected the idea of self-determination on the grounds that "no group or region had an absolute right to self-determination, and federalism was regarded as being an unworkable option in terms of human and natural resources." (1) The Northerners agreed to apply regional government but the Southerners were divided between the supporters of self-determination and those who demanded a kind of union.

In 1968 Sudan went back to search for a permanent constitution. In January 1968 a draft constitution was presented to the Constituent Assembly. Some argued that the presidential system was the only system which could secure the stability of the government and maintain national unity, because the executive president would be affected by the changing conditions and political groupings within the assembly. (2) Moreover, the Westminster System, as experienced in the Sudan, had failed to provide strong

and stable executive authority that would respond to the cause of national integration and economic development. The new draft constitution, however, embodied a new modification. It defined the state as a democratic socialist republic based on the guidance of Islam which is considered the official religion. In response to this idea, many non-muslims rejected the modification, especially the southerners who argued for a secular constitution that would depoliticise the issue of religion so as to preserve the interests of all groups.

From 1965-68 the country became ungovernable as the struggle between the two dominant political parties, the National Democratic Unionist and Umma Party increased as each of the parties involved wanted to design the draft constitution to the size of its political interests. The NDU wanted a presidential constitution, while the Umma party wanted both Islamic and presidential constitution and the Islamic Charter Front wanted an Islamic constitution only. In addition, the Southern Front and the Communist Party were opposed to an Islamic constitution and a presidential system of government. Therefore, by the end of 1968, it became clear that the country was not being governed.

Addis Ababa Agreement 1972:

A new military regime took power in May 1969 and outlined its policy on the Southern Sudan in what has been known as the June 9th Declaration. The June 9th Declaration recognized the fact that the South is historically and culturally different from the North and that "the southerners have the right to improve and develop their cultures and traditions within a united Sudan and most importantly it noted that the South needed quick economic development." (3) The government and the Southerners began to talk in Addis Ababa and in 1972, they signed what has become known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, in which the government offered regional autonomy to the South.

The military government had, however, committed itself to a regional autonomy as a basis for its administration. This occurred not only in the elaborate People's Local Government in 1971 and the Regional Autonomy Act of 1972, but also in more decentralization of the country. After the Addis Ababa Agreement other regions, especially in Western Sudan, felt that they were in a similar position to that of south. The demand for autonomy for the West had been raised by their organizations. The same occurred in Eastern Sudan. The Addis Agreement was based on two themes: decentralization in the administrative

organization of the state organs, and the people's participation in exercising political authority. It provided the South a legislative body responsible for legislation, and a executive organ, called High Executive Council. While the national government provided funds from the National Treasury.(4)

Furthermore, in 1973 the government introduced a new constitution in which Southern autonomy was recognized. The two purposes of this constitution were to serve domestic peace and enhance economic growth. Also, for the first time, the constitution defined the Arab- African balance in Sudan. According to the constitution, Sudan was to be administered according to a decentralized system and Islamic law and custom were to be the basic sources of law.(5) Moreover, the government divided the country into nine provinces and introduced a permanent constitution ensuring popular participation in government.

Regional autonomy faced some obstacles in its implementation, though, one of which was that of how to bridge the time between the end of the war and the introduction of the first definitive organizational form of the regional self-government in the South. In the sense that it entailed not only an administrative transfer of authority to local units, but also the distribution of power from the central to the region, together with the

creation of regional legislative and executive bodies. Furthermore, the Regional Government was silent on some of the basic issues connected with the executive and the legislative functions.(6) While self government in the south was set up on a parliamentary system with the executive dependent on the support of the legislative body, the National constitution provided for a presidential system in which executive authority was determined by the president of the state.

The Dismantling of the Addis Ababa Agreement

In July 1977, the military government, however signed National Reconciliation Agreement with the three traditional political parties (Umma, DUP and Muslim Brothers). The outcome of this agreement was that the issue of the Islamic laws was raised again in Sudanese politics. Moreover, in June 1983 the government decided to divide the Southern region into three regions and brought the South under the domination of the central government. Finally, in September 1983 the government introduced the Islamic laws to retain the support of the Muslim North and to spread an atmosphere of intimidation to curb the rising political opposition.

Although, the successful conclusion of the peace agreement between the North and the South and ending of the military confrontation brought a considerable relief in the Sudan, especially in the Southern Region, relations between the Arabized Northern Sudanese and the African southerners Sudanese seemed uncertain in the long term. Thus, we have to look at the life of the regional government and its relations with the center, and that may give us a clue to understand the process of South-North relations following the ratification of the agreement.

During the seventeen years of war (1955-1972), the Northern Sudanese were divided into two sections on the Southern question -- those who believed that the Sudan could not exist without the Southern region, and those who believed that the Sudan could not function effectively with the Southern Region. The anti-southern region elements are the Pan-Arabists (The Muslim Brothers, Arab Socialism, and traditional sectarian - Umma and DUP leaders). The other Northern group argued that granting regional autonomy to the South would lead to the balkanization of the Sudan. Outside this anti-southern bloc, there was the other faction which believed that South and the North are both integral parts of the Sudan, and that attempts should be made to keep the South at peace with the North but without making the South strong enough

to challenge the perpetual hegemony of the North at the central decision making.

Thus, the various elements within the anti-southern bloc had resorted to many manipulative strategies to render the regional autonomy arrangement ineffectual. They created and contributed to some of the stress in North-South relations since 1972 by sabotaging the effective institutionalization of autonomy in the South. First, although Article 5 of the Addis Ababa Agreement recognized that English would be the main language for southern region and Arabic the official language of the Sudan, more concern was put on the teaching of Arabic in schools at the expense of English and local languages. Moreover, related to the language issue is the fanaticism of Islamic resurgence and moves in the North to legislate Islam as the state religion, inspite of explicit acceptance in both the Addis Ababa Agreement and in the permanent constitution that the Sudan will not define itself as an Islamic and Arabic state.

Secondly, the South is neither proportionally nor adequately represented at the National level. As of May 1982, the only Southern who was a member of the Central cabinet was vice president Abel Alier. Thus, the North has exclusive monopoly and control of the decision making

process in the country and South plays no role in the formulation and implementation of domestic and foreign policies.

Third, the Southern region has not been getting a fair share of revenue and development project allocations:

Sugar projects in Mongalla and Molut in the south were abandoned in preference for West Sennar and Kenana Sugar schemes in the north. (7)

In contrast to Nigeria, the central bureaucracy is entirely Northern Sudanese because they had greater access to Western education, and so national planning, and allocation of revenue as well as foreign aid remains in the hands of the North:

The south remains at the periphery of central decision making. A feeling of relative economic deprivation is growing, and the power and revenue from within and aid from without with the southern Sudan. (8)

The Addis Ababa Agreement was not a federal system, yet it is more than a simple decentralized system. It gave the South an autonomous status within a united Sudan. It was a political settlement and a power sharing arrangement between the North and the South, but it failed in facilitating the development of a new constitution, and it did not provide a framework for conflict regulation. The political process had been weakened by tribal

sensitivities. While the Southern leaders used to agree in their basic issues in relations to the North, they disagreed amongst themselves, as Mohamed, Beshir explains:

The re-emergence of divisions and tensions was largely due to personal rivalries and tribal animosities; the differences between lagu and Alier were differences of personality and tribal affiliation, not of policy and still less of ideology. (9)

Therefore, the failure of the Southern leaders was that their inability to offer an alternative policy deprived their provinces of any real political options; while their pre-occupation with regional politics deprived the South of any significant influence on national policies. Thus, the Southern region became vulnerable to manipulation from the central government.

In order to study the similarities between the civil war in the Sudan and Nigerian-Biafran war and the extent to which cultural pluralism was the main element in fostering domestic conflict, it is important to recognize the fact that the extreme cultural fragmentation may be in itself a kind of social fabric against ethnic conflict if there is no dominant ethnic group capable of exploiting others. However, when differences in culture and severe economic inequalities coincided with historical hostilities

cries of political leadership as in the Sudan, they can lead to ethnic conflict.

The parallel situation in Nigeria was the Biafran civil war, from July 1967 to January 1970. To some extent this was a struggle between traditionally - minded Muslims and Westernized non-Muslims. Some saw the struggle as an educational issue. But the basic issues were economic and political. The Muslim states were far from the coast and the old trade routes have been disrupted. The new trade routes were based on railways to the coast and this new pattern made it difficult for them to be two separate states. Moreover, the achievement oriented Ibos, who used the Westernized educational system successfully to obtain government posts and positions of authority in society, became a political threat. Biafran secession happened after the division of the existing region into three states which left the Ibos of the New East-Central state cut off from direct access to the sea and without the oil-fields. The Ibo political leadership saw this move as an attempt to sever the Ibo heartland from the oil and from the sea. (10)

The Civil War: In the Sudan and Nigeria

The greatest problem of the Sudan from the mid-1950s was the civil war between North and South, this was seen by some as religious issue: Christian missionaries were

expelled by Muslim Northerners. To others it appeared to be an educational issue, and attacks were made upon Condominium educational policy, some deserved, some less deserved. But the basic issues were economic and political struggle for the limited resources. Particularly important was the fact that the Southern elites, from which the region's political representatives in National politics were drawn, emerged later than their counterparts in the North with lower standard of education, less well organized political support, and a growing regional consciousness. They realized that the Northern Sudanese had taken control of the government and the state and there was eventually talk of secession and independence.(11)

In the Sudan, conflicting claim existed between the central government based on Islamic traditions and diverse African cultures. That was reflected in conflicting ideas concerning the best form of independent statehood (federal or central). In Nigeria, unequal economic development during the colonial period and cultural differences increased the fear of the Hausa-Fulani people in the North. The failure of achieving national consensus on the proper form of government culminated in the break down of civil war in 1960. In Dunstan Wai's view:

Despite such similarities to the Sudanese war, the origin and thrust of geo ethnic conflicts in Nigeria fall far short of the phenomenon of internal colonialism which prevailed

in the Sudan. Where cultural characteristics and objectives and state coercion and policy making combined to create a unique form of political and cultural oppression. (12)

In Wai's view, the dissolution of Sudanese national institutions and the eruption of armed conflict came as a result of prolonged competition between elites who attempted to change the balance of power. The Biafran crises was produced by elite forces for competitive interests which were unrelated to the value differences inherent in the cultural pluralism of the state. Partly, the ethnic conflict at the national level can be related to the British policy of separated administration which limited interaction between the various regions. In Nigeria the people remained within its local traditional system until the political independence. In the South Sudan, political institutions were limited to villages. However, in both countries the intensification of party rivalries made the question of cultural pluralism crucial to the determination of the proper forms of governments. (13)

Although the Nigerian crisis reflected conflicting interests among a small group of the population, the Sudanese conflict was inherent in the history of North-South relations. Thus, the issue of cultural differences

made by the Biafran leaders and the manipulation of communal sentiment paved the way for the war and all the prospect for accommodation failed. However, the Nigerian state had been established by a political contract between elites and different ethnic groups who were able to participate in national politics and the Northern region emerged as the dominant force in the independent federal government. Therefore there was no similarity in the Nigerian case to that of the Southern region of the Sudan which was not involved in the independence process and did not call for a union of the North and South and was denied participation in the negotiations which proposed a united Sudan.

Convinced of the correctness of our understanding of the political situation in the country as it stood after the abdication of Nimeiri, mainly that Nimeiri's generals had stolen the people's revolution ... they were in our view stark evidence of the continuation of the regime without Nimeiri. (7)

In the 1980s, the military government dismantled and the Addis Ababa Agreement and the 1991 Declaration of the Charter of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) called for the convening of a constitutional conference of all the

Chapter Four

Federalism and the Political Forces in the Sudan

The popular uprising of March - April 1985 succeeded in overthrowing the military government under the leadership of the National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS). The Army Command supported the uprising instead of suppressing it. A transitional government composed of a civilian cabinet and a military council was established to prepare the country for general elections and the return to a civilian system within a one-year period. However, the Sudan people's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the Sudan's People's Liberation Army (SPLA) turned down the invitation to join the new government on the grounds that the army officers had deprived the people's of a revolution, thereby diffusing the people's power and putting it under their direction. As stated in New Sudan, Pilot issue.

Convinced of the correctness of our understanding of the political situation in the country as it stood after the abdication of Nimeiri, mainly that Nimeiri's generals had stolen the people's revolution they were in our view stark evidence of the continuation of May regime without Nimeiri. (1)

In the 1980s, the military government dismantled and the Addis Ababa Agreement and the 1983 declaration of Sharia Law caused renewed fighting. The SPLA/SPLM called for the convening of a constitutional conference of all the

political forces in the country and for a national dialogue with the purpose of reaching a consensus over the fundamental issues facing the country. These basic issues could not be left to one or two parties. These included the system of rule in the Sudan, the position of religion, the civil war, the economy, foreign relations, and the organization of the armed forces. Therefore, the SPLA/SPLM called for a new interim government of National Unity:

SPLA/SPLM has required them to give a prior public commitment to dissolve themselves in the event that the conference resolved to set up an interim government at National unity. (2)

However, the SPLA/SPLM, and the delegates of the National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS), had a meeting in Addis Ababa in April 1986. They signed the Koka Dam declaration. Its recommendations were: (3)

- that matters under discussion be defined as not the southern problem but the National problem, i.e. concerning the national system of government;
- Repeal of Sharia law;
- Lifting of the State emergency;
- Abrogation of military agreements made between Nimeiri and other countries;
- a constitutional conference be convened as soon as possible and that the government resign if the conference decided to set up a broadly based transitional government of national unity;

- A joint liaison committee be set up with five members from each side to follow up the recommendations.

Although the Koka Dam declaration represents preconditions for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the holding of a national constitutional conference, both the military council and the civilian cabinet did not take it seriously. Since the interests of the Umma and the Democratic Unionist Parties were based on preserving the Sharia law, it was also in their interests to carry out partial elections in the country because most of the constituencies in the South would have returned secularists. Therefore, the Transitional Military Council supervised elections in the whole of Northern areas and limited areas of the Southern Sudan because of the civil war in the South. The new constituent assembly was dominated by the two-Northern sectarian parties and the Muslims brothers. The political power has again fallen in the hands of those who had used it to marginalize the South since the independence negotiations. The response of colonel John Garang, the leader of the SPAL/SPLM, was:

No elections can serve any useful purpose if no national consensus is first reached on the fundamental constitutional problems which underlie the present instability in the country. (4)

All these factors led to the failure of the democratic process. On June, 1989, Sudan's civilian government was overthrown by a military coup d' etat. A strong clue to the orientation of the new government is provided by the fact that two thirds of the New Council of Ministers were presumed to be either members or sympathetic to the National Islamic Front "Muslim fundamentalist".

The Federal Features in the Political Platform since 1980's

The most essential trend during 1980s, as opposed to the 1960s and 1970s, was the Southern concern about the question of political power. In fact, the regional system has come to be taken for granted since the Addis Ababa Agreement, and the federal system has found its way into the political discourses of most political forces both in the North and the South.

Since its inception in the mid 1950s the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood has changed its name several times. Until the mid 1960s, the influence of the Brotherhood was confined to students and a small group of professionals, but after the popular uprising in 1985, the Brotherhood emerged as a considerable political force under the name "The National Islamic Front."

The Umma Party and DUP were formed in 1945. Historically, the Umma Party and DUP have evolved around the Ansar and Khatmiya religious sects, respectively. (5) Over half a century, the two dominant parties' proclaimed

objective has been the building of Islamic state in the Sudan, but they were not seen keen to declare an Islamic constitution when they came to power several times.

The main political programme of a federal option, is the one proposed by the National Islamic Front (NIF), in its Sudan charter entitled National Unity and Diversity A proposal, issued in January 1987. The NIF proposal calls for the adoption of a federal system in the constitutional regulation of decentralization in the Sudan, with equal regard to all regions. Moreover, the charter claims that a federal system would transfer to the federated regions even wider matters than the self government act of 1972.

The detained evaluation of the respective government powers and relationships in the Sudan may lead to preference for a mixed system - comprising federal and regional elements in any equation or with respect to different matters. Besides this system of decentralization a measure of decentralization be introduced. (6)

The programme's main concern however, is on the Islamic context being the general source of law and it claims that this is the expression of the majority.

The Sudanese are one nation
and the bulk of the Sudanese are religious and that the Muslims are the majority among the nation of the Sudan. (7)

The programme recognizes that there is a large number of those who "adhere to African religions, a substantial number of christians, and a few jews, and that there should be freedom of choice of religious creed." (8) Thus, in order to solve the contradiction between the Islamic constitution and the supremacy of one religion on one hand, and federalism and democracy on other hand, the charter pointed out:

In these matters exclusive local rules can be established in the areas based on local majority mandate, and local minority remaining subject to the democratic principle. (9)

The Umma party political programme, Nahj al Sahwas (The Path to Re-awakening) claims that the right way to discuss how the country should be governed and to resolve political differences concerning national issues is the proposed constitutional conference. Moreover, it emphasised the importance of defining the relationships between center and region.

What is needed is to provide enough guarantees that would preserve regional jurisdiction from central intrusions and to ensure that each region has sufficient economic resources that are independent from central government. (10)

However, in order to set up a proper regional government, the programme proposed several principles:

The region should have legislative power within the limits of the areas of jurisdictions allotted to it; the executive of the region should be directly elected; and the region should be required to create democratically ideal institutes within the region as specified by laws. (11)

The SPLA/SPLM is committed to the establishment of a democratic Sudan in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice, and respect for human right exist, in view of the cultural and ethnic diversities of the Sudanese people. The SPLA/SPLM stand for the creation of federal or autonomus governments for the various regions and for an end to the monopoly of government by the minority. Moreover, the movement is committed to a radical restructuring of power of the central government. Thus, the SPLA/SPLM is fighting for a united Sudan rather than calling for secession because it addressed the root cause of the problem which is the power structure in the Sudan:

The original sin was the removal of the self-government constitution of 1956 of the provisions giving southerners the right to opt for federation as if federation was tantamount to separation or treason. Countries as vast and diversified as Sudan like India... could not have been ruled effectively except in that way - those who called for federation in the early 1950s were not seeking to dismember the country, they were advocating a decentralization that would enable the disenfranchised to do most with least. What was and is challenged is political religion as it is interpreted by the fundamentalists (12)

Although, it is a Southern based movement, the SPLA/SPLM has been committed to solving the national and religious issues within the context of a united and secular Sudan. The manifesto of the movement states that "the need to establish a democratic and secular state in which religious freedom will be granted for all religions and beliefs." (13) At the Koka Dam Conference the chairman of the SPLA/SPLM, Dr. John Garang, drew a line between the Arab culture and the Arab racial and religious supremacy:

Arab culture is our culture and Arabic is our language and they are there to stay... Islam maybe the religion of the majority but it should not be a stumbling work in the way of non-muslims to have full political rights including the right to assume all political positions were they to seek them. (14)

Moreover the movement refused to discuss the question of distribution of the political power on the basis of the so-called "Southern problem". The SPLA defines it as a national problem. Thus, to ensure lasting peace and development in the Sudan, the political parties in the North have to deal with the problems of the whole country. A leading member of the SPLA-SPLM explains the idea of "restructuring of power":

We beleive Sudan is a big country of plurality in terms of culture and languages. The only way to rule it is to devolve power. It can not run

centrally, so you must have power delegated to regions, federally or confederally. What is important is that certain powers are given to the regions so that they can run their own affairs; their development whether cultural or political. They should also have a say in the central powers.(15)

Therefore, the movement argued that the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 failed because it only addressed itself to a partial solution that of the South and underestimated that "regionalism should be all encompassing to embrace the entire Sudan because there are areas in the North which are as underdeveloped as the South is".(16)

Although the Koka Dam conference of March 1986 was attended by all the political parties, except the DUP, the NIF and the NDP, and called for the constitutional conference to be held in Khartoum in the first week of June 1986, these political parties which controlled the political power after the end of the transitional period, were not in agreement on the peace process. The civilian government ignored the Koka Dam Declaration, while the SPLA/SPLM, exasperated by the government inaction to implement the agreement, intensified its military operations. In turn, the government became more preoccupied with attempts to justify its military option, and to put Koka Dam Declaration on hold. Moreover, the government implemented the sectarian formula to deal with

the question of national unity. The Prime Minister, Mr. Sadiq, declared that the non Muslim can only ask for protection and nothing else. This idea is essentially against the essence of the constitutional conference:

Non-Muslims can ask us to protect their rights and we will do that but that's all they can ask. We wish to establish Islam as a source of law in the Sudan because Sudan has a Muslim majority. (17)

After the overthrow of the Military government in 1985, the political developments in the Sudan paved the way for the same sectarian and traditional forces that have governed the country in the short democratic period since independence. Ironically, the lessons of history has been lost in Sudanese politics as Mohamed Beshir defined:

Political awareness, consciousness and sophistication on which northerners used to justifiably pride themselves have remained dormant, in a sense, politics in the north has become more tribalized in ideological terms. (18)

While there have been changes of political positions, the political mentalities have never changed. All the political forces recognized the cultural diversities of the country. Ironically, the NIF has proposed a federal alternative that reflects the reality of this diversity. The NIF proposal's promise freedom of religious choice to non-Muslims might look less convincing in view of the lack

of tolerance the NIF has been showing to their Muslim political opponents in the North.

The DNP ideas on this issue are rather vague and lack detailed proposals as a result of the political disunity within the party. It has become more of a combination of conflicting factions than an organized party with a clear policy programmes. The party stated that :

The problem should be reviewed along the basic terms included in the draft constitution on the basis of which the Addis Ababa of 1972 was established and it should consider the changes imposed by the recent historical development and the product of practical experiences.(19)

Legitimacy and Democracy in the Sudanese State?

The development of nation-states has shown that the process of national integration is impossible to achieve without political legitimacy and national consensus. Legitimacy is the quality acquired by a political system through the justification of power, and obedience in the power structure which it represents. It embodies :

The foundation of such government power as is exercised with a consciousness on the government's part that it has a right to govern and with some recognition by the governed at the right.(20)

Moreover, the legitimacy of the state is based on the tacit consent of the governed. Herbert Kelman has pointed out, legitimacy is primarily a perceptual concept. A state is only legitimate to the extent that its subjects perceive it so and there are two basic perceptions that make people loyal to the nation state: 1) the perception that the state represents an ethnic identity, which creates a sentimental attachment to the nation-state; and 2) the perception that the state promotes their needs and interests, which Kelman calls and instrumental attachment. Thus, a stable relationship between the state and the governed emerges when the latter feel some attachment to the former and have accepted its authority as legitimate.(21)

Legitimacy is, however related to the concept of national consensus ... collective agreement on some basic principles. The subjects of the state must collectively, through some democratic process, consent to be governed, or there cannot be effective government. In the Sudan, consensus developed on two regional forms, South and North. In the South, there is a widely shared distrust of the Northern Sudanese and in the North a sense of superiority to the Southern Sudanese exists. Historically, no general consensus existed between the North and South (except a short period of Addis Ababa agreement). On such issues as

state and legitimacy, national identity, foreign affairs ...etc., the state, controlled by dominant Northern forces, is not considered legitimate by the Southern Sudanese because they feel neither sentimental nor instrumental attachment to the central government. All successive central governments have failed to understand that cultural domination as it has appeared in the policies of Islamization and Arabization implemented in the South, and backed by repressive military actions, would unite the Southerners and solidify their desire to struggle for their right to self-determination. As Edward Shils has noted:

a society which inflicts the distress of a sense of exclusion and inferiority cannot wholly succeed in assimilating into its affirmative consensus those whom it wounds. (22)

Recently, the military government in the Sudan has introduced federation throughout Sudan, at the same time the government announced the implementation of Islamic law. In fact, the military government is working in two different ways: it wants to create a federal state in order to preserve the national unity: and it wants to impose Islamic law on non-muslims. Ironically, these manners are against the contents of federalism based on democracy. Successfull federalism is always a democratic system. In the sense that, it is based on a liberal constitution as in case of the USA and Switzerland.

In contrast to the liberal constitution, the Islamic constitution can't preserve the rights of non-muslims, thus in case of the Sudan, under the islamic law, non muslims can't serve in high governmental offices. (The judiciary or the military) or in any position in which they will have authority over a muslim.(23) In addition, they may not practice their religion except in a discreet manner. Islamic law also condemns non-muslim Sudanese to the status of second class citizens in accordance with law prevailing in the North. Several million non-muslims resident in the North have limited rights. In other words, non-muslims in the South may only enjoy their right by remaining in the South and not participating in central government.

The military government claims that the purpose of federalism is to maintain national integration by giving the people more power, but the government is working to create further disintegration by dividing the country into several states without considering even the basic prerequisites of federalism, let alone the lack of economic resources and little control over the South because of the civil war. In fact, Sudan is a large country. It has a multiethnic, religion, and cultural groups. Ironically, it is easy for some people to argue that federalism is a

proper model for the Sudan because it can make stability and national integration, but this simple argument can't be testified without understanding what are the factors which lead ethnic groups to desire union in a federal state. It is a sense of military insecurity and the need for common defense and a hope of economic advantage from union. (24) There are some factors, however, which make federal system too difficult in the Third World and can destroy the national unity, namely: ethnic, religion, and political ideology. Further-more it is necessary to consider the economic and financial issues. Finally, the dissimilarity of social and political institutions will lead to separation, and the obvious example was the Nigerian - Biafran war. The Nigerian experience indicated that in order to form a proper and stable federal union, the states should have sufficient economic resources to maintain both an independent state government and federal government. And it is not sufficient that the federal government should be capable to finance itself, but it is also important that state governments have the same ability. Timothy Rotimi describes the problems in Nigeria's federal arrangement as:

Federal character is seen by many as federal discrimination, competition for rulership continues to generate intense sectional acrimony. The widespread it

suppressed, demands for additional states indicate that the present territorial structure of the Nigerian federation lacks legitimacy. Statism remains an obstacle to National Integration ... And federalism as a liberal political device nourished on toleration and compromise has been distigured by the inordinate premium on political power. (25)

Conclusion

When we turn to those conditions posited by Lijphart as particularly favorable to elite accommodation, it can be shown that they do not obtain in the Sudanese case. The consociational model is derived from a major hypothesis in pluralist theory: social cleavages are moderated if they are cross-cutting, but tend to generate conflict if they are mutually reinforcing. In this manner, the role of the political elite is seen as essential in moderating communal conflict. It is now necessary to examine their relevance to Sudan.

First, a multiple balance of Power among the sub culture is the most important condition for Lijphart because the multiple balance of power guarding against attempts of one group to dominate the others. In the Sudan, the two dominant Northern sectarian parties controlled political power during the short democratic periods. As a result of that, the other sub-cultures have been marginalized in the Sudanese politics. Moreover, the two parties have the same political outlook that is based on religious supremacy and sectarianism.

Secondly: small size the elite is not small as the case of Colombia where its elite is small enough for most members to know each other. Thus, the chance of enhancing

a spirit of cooperativeness is too little. Sudan was already larger in population than the largest of Lijphart's successful cases of consociationalism (the Netherlands). Sudan is also many times the geographic dimensions of other countries and ethnically much more fragmented. Its internal decisional load is heavy in contrast to the case in the European instances of consociationalism (Switzerland) nor do the external threats provide much of an incentive to internal solidarity because it is difficult to define what the national interests, especially if we considered the historical hostility between the South and the North.

Thirdly: Cohesion in Sub cultures; Historically, local and regional attachments tend to be strong in the Sudan with nationalism slightly weaker than it is in the European cases of consociationalism. It is doubtful therefore, that nationalism has played much of a role in moderating the conflict between North-North or South-South let alone South-North interaction. A dynamic factor which tends to maximize conflict within the elite level is the lack of cohesion in each sub culture. At times, the sectarian Ansar's fractions fight with each other more than they do with those of another sect (Khatmiya). Each sectarian group is segmented along geographical, tribe and class lines, moreover, the horizontal struggle for power

between the top Khatmiya leaders of each sect is complicated by the appearance of a vertical struggle between the top leaders and lower level elites aspiring for upward mobility.

Fourthly, Segmental Isolation of the Sub Cultures: which limits contacts and minimizes mutual antagonisms. Unlike Switzerland, the social groups of the Sudan were not geographically isolated. While certain group predominate numerically in various regions, much of the Sudanese population was intermingled both in urban and rural areas. Increasing urbanization, especially in the central Sudan, beside the state of drought, famine, and civil war, reduced the separateness of segmental groups. In addition, certain organizations, such as trade unions and newspapers, have heavily partisan allegiances. While partisan allegiances do not prevent regular interaction, they increase the possibility of communal conflict.

As we have seen, these conditions were distinctly absent in Sudanese politics. Thus, all Lijphart's conditions are not relevant to the Sudanese case. What - ever their possible value in accounting for the maintenance of consociational manner. It is difficult to ignore them in examining the future of elite accommodation, but also the Sudanese case indicates the need to look for additional favorable conditions.

There were present in the Sudan during 1960s and 1980s several factors that tended to unite the interests of elites of the contending political forces inspite of their differences. These unifying factors included above all, a desire to rid the country of military rule with its repressive actions. In addition to the desire to put an end to military dictatorship, there were some self-serving political motives that stirred the various factions severally to seek out coalition. For example, in 1985, the dominant sectarian forces tended to be restored to their majoritarian position in the country, but they realized that they would need the cooperation and tolerance of the other groups to accomplish such a goal.

Infact, all factions had some quite particularistic interests, notably in the areas of political careers and government jobs, for joining a large broad coalition together with opposition to military rule and repressive actions. These factors constituted ample motivation for elites of all political parties to engage in a serious effort at conflict regulation.

Historically, the root causes of the conflict in the Sudanese politics has evolved along divisive lines of the Arabism in the North and Africanism in the South. Arabism is consolidated by the Arabic language, Islam and Arab culture. The Africanism is inspired by the struggle of the

African peoples, for freedom from Arabism, and a new concept of nation formation that eliminates all policies based on racial, ethnic cultural or religious identification.

Ethnicity and national integration despite their apparent antagonism, are not necessarily anti nation formation, in the sense that one ethnic group is a negation of the other. If ethnic diversity and politics is kept within the democratic political process, it may be regarded as responsive political behaviour to enrich national integration. Although, ethnic hegemonic forces reinforced by forced assimilation, have conspired to seriously undermine national integration efforts in the Sudan, regionalization of the South has not proved the stepping stone for secession that was feared. Moreover, the splitting of the south under ethnic lines, a process mobilized by Southern region's leaders undermined Southern unity, and solidarity, thereby creating seeds of internal regional conflicts.

Experiences of some African countries indicated that there is no ideal system of governance that can provide an absolute solution for the problem of ethnicity or the demands of national integration, and that are applicable to both Sudan to Nigeria. Therefore, it is important before we can go very far in solving the difficult specific

problems of political development to settle several fundamental issues relating to the nature of the state and its political structures. The national debate since Sudan's independence has evolved primarily around three main issues: perception of national identity; sharing of political power; uneven socio-economic development.

The essence of the federal system is that federation always appears as a compromise between different communities and its policy is organized deliberately to preserve diversity while providing the form of consensus essential for keeping the country together. The immediate goal is not one of creating the proper institutional framework, but establishing a mutuality of trust and recognizing a mutuality of interest as the essential prerequisites of federalism. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 was a good lesson in Sudanese politics. The leaders of both regions proved incapable of taking advantage of the regional government. They failed to solve the regions underlying economic and social problems because they were affected by personal interests, group animosities, and sectarianism. However, the situation was made even more complex for the several interventions by the central government in regional issues. Thus, the essential

operative factor is not the institutional framework of regionalism or federalism, but the political will of the political leadership.

Although, the experience of regional autonomy has made the federal option acceptable to the Northern political forces who had rejected it in the past, all the political forces take some kind of devolutionary system for granted. The SPLA/SPLM is rejecting secession and calling for restructuring of power relations along regional or federal structures.

But it is difficult to say whether this is fully accepted by the members, and there is evidence of disunity with this trend even among the leaders of the SPLA-SPLM. In late August, 1991, some leaders attempted a coup within the movement in order to affect what they called a temporary secession. It is inevitable that the secessionist trend will gain support as the people of the South continue to suffer the starvation, and other problems caused by the civil war with no prospects of either clear military victory or an acceptable peaceful agreement.

These changes have not been followed by the required changes of perception essential for the form of political accomodation that is a prerequisite of federalism. Thus, in spite of the public demand for the necessity of some sort

of national agreement the manners of mutual mistrust have existed in the political platforms, and the political forces have not gone beyond generalization of federal or regional structural aspects to discuss seriously some of the fundamental issues of creating the prerequisites conducive to establishing a successfully acceptable framework.

Despite these parallel, divisive lines, and lack of national consensus it would have been possible for an enlightened leadership to build on the common factors among the Sudanese people to foster a nation-state that is responsive to the basic demands of the people. In order to pursue that task it is important to redefine our national doctrine and constitutional principles in a way that is genuinely free of any discrimination based on race, religion. Such political system must be religiously neutral and culturally of pluralistic.

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