Politics on the margins: A case study of neoliberal subject formation in the popular quarters of Cairo

Bassem Zakaria Al-Samragy

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Politics on the Margins

A Case Study of Neoliberal Subject Formation in the Popular Quarters of Cairo

A Thesis Submitted to the
Department of Political Science

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

by Bassem Zakaria Al-Samragy

under the supervision of Dr. James H. Sunday

August/2017
Abstract

This thesis focuses on one instance on the margin of the events of January 2011 in Egypt. It aims to conceptualize the moment of January 28th as a moment of popular contention through the context of neoliberal subject formation. In doing so, this thesis revisits the role and the nature of the neoliberal state emerging from the welfare state in contemporary Egypt.

Against the backdrop of governmentality as a conceptual framework, this study will investigate how neoliberalism informs our experience of time and space in everyday life; and, more specifically, how the process of neoliberal subject formation shapes the public space of popular quarters of Cairo in a way that made the moment of January 28th inevitable. Following governmentality as a conceptual framework, this thesis provides different layers of contextualization and analysis to the neighborhood of Al-Mataria, i.e., historical, social, political, economic and theoretical. Hence, this thesis ventures beyond targeted approaches that tend to focus on moments of popular explosion in relative disregard for the underlying factors that lend to their explanation.

By means of ethnography and qualitative inquiry, this study will explain the dynamics of Al-Mataria and unpack the logic of government there. Following the assumption that governing the space of Al-Mataria takes a hybrid form combining formal and informal techniques and networks, this study aims at observing closely how the state is both part of, and interacts with, the everyday life of the people, and how that dynamism creates specific types of state-society relations whose contradictions made the moment of contention possible. As such, this thesis provides us the chance to understand and reveal an oft-understudied background behind, yet also at the heart, of the 2011 Egyptian uprising more broadly.

Keywords: Governmentality, Foucault, Popular Quarters, Revolution, Uprising, January 28th, Egypt, Al-Mataria
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Chapter 1: Setting the Stage/ On the Margins of the State/
Approaching the Margins

1.1 The Research Puzzle

1.1.1 The Research Question

Is it possible to situate the moment of 28th of January 2011, in the popular quarters of Cairo, within the context of neoliberal subject formation in contemporary Egypt?

It has been few years since the events of January 2011, and with the enormous amount of literature trying to analyze the events, it has become challenging for the scholar to find something to add. However, most of those studies tried to frame the moments of January 2011 within the social movement framework, or tried to offer an explanation to the events through looking at the state institutions. While important, the attention given to those approaches was at the account of ignoring other possible explanations like that offered within the context of the neoliberal subject formation. This thesis, then, is an attempt to contribute to this marginalized area, by trying to situate the moment of 28th January within the context of the neoliberal subject formation. However, although the starting point of the analysis is the moment of Jan 28th, the moment in and of itself is being studied as a moment within a broader context of social processes. I believe that trying to fill in those marginalized areas is the only way a research project about January 2011 uprising acquires meaning, and expands our understanding of the popular uprising.

The research question proposed above is part of a broader research puzzle which cannot be explained through one question or even a set of sub-questions. Hence, this section will be dedicated to unpacking the broader research puzzle and to tackle some of the challenges it brings.

The moment of January 28th, which informs the locus of this thesis, is the moment when the inhabitants of the marginalized popular quarters of Cairo stormed their local police station, as a representation of anger. Through the lengthy literature about January 2011 events in Egypt, questions about mobilization at the margins were sidelined in favor of chanting mass mobilizations in Tahrir Square, which was the main theater of the events. Moreover, political studies in Egypt have been limited to the study of institutional behaviors practiced by the state apparatus as well as on procedural electoral and constitutional matters. While important, those regularly studied issues are just at the surface of the politics. This thesis suggests that it is at the margins of the institutional behavior, in the daily life, that the spark of the politics is being charged. In such margins, politics are being enlivened, crystallized, and intertwined with the everyday. Hence, this thesis is an attempt to contribute into the discussion of January 2011 uprising, by shedding the light on these marginalized forms of mobilization. Al-Mataria will be the neighborhood that exemplifies the popular quarters of Cairo.

1.1.2. Subquestions

Before delving into the rationale behind choosing the neighborhood of Al-Mataria as the focus of this study, I would like to state some subquestions that will guide the endeavor of this thesis. For example, in light of the withdrawal of the welfare state in Egypt, how can we understand the development of the neoliberal subject formation process in contemporary Egypt? How does the government respond to the challenge posed by the popular quarters of Cairo? Why is it important to focus the analysis towards the police station as a social dynamic? How can we understand the different policing and surveillance techniques taking place in the popular quarters of Cairo? How can we understand the governmentality of the informal areas?
1.2. Strategies of governmentality in Mataria

1.2.1. Al-Mataria in Context

I had the privilege to growing up in Al-Mataria. I have lived in the neighborhood of Al-Mataria for more than a decade prior to the 2011 uprising and continue to live there to this day. Part of growing up in a popular neighborhood was getting in relations with other popular neighborhood, since as young guys, we share a lot of places to be for spending times. For example, all the young guys from popular quarters on the northern edge of the capital, Al-Mataria, Ain-Shams, Ezbet El-Nakhl, Waily, Al-Zawya, etc., hang out in Nasr City and Heliopolis. My parents, also, came from another popular quarters, which is Al-Waily. This also allowed me to encounter the everyday life of other popular neighborhoods. This close interaction with the neighborhood and its dynamics has allowed me to examine the nature of the government and the techniques of governmentality in the space of the neighborhood. My experience of other popular neighborhoods, as well, allowed me to notice that these neighborhoods share a commonality regarding the creative informal ways of life they create to fill in the gaps, left out by the absence of the formal presence of the state. This commonality entails another commonality in how the state responds to this creativity. As a proof of that, all police stations in the popular quarters has been stormed in the day of January 28th, unlike the local police stations located in more urbanized areas like Maadi and Zamalek.

Hence, this study is not trying to study the neighborhood of Al-Mataria as isolated from its social context. It does not also suggests that Al-Mataria is a mere example of all popular quarters of Cairo. Hence, this thesis attempts at nuancing the social dynamics of Al-Mataria in the broader context of the popular quarters of Cairo, and by the popular quarters of Cairo, I refer to the neighborhood at the outskirts of the city of Cairo, which have started as popular housing projects, and then developed into what the government used to call Ashwa'iyat.
1.2.2. The Police Dynamics of Al-Mataria

For more than ten years, I have witnessed the unmistakable presence of the dynamics of surveillance administrated by the local police station in the public space of Al-Mataria. For the people of Al-Mataria, personnel in uniform were not just agents of the Ministry of Interior, which is in turn part of the executive authority; they were the actual government. Like people in all popular quarters they were referring to the police personnel and apparatus as Hokoma: The Government. However, the variety of techniques of surveillance, which took different formal and informal forms, are not limited to the physical presence of the police personnel in their uniforms, that is, the ‘visible’ state. Therefore, being members of the law-enforcing organism was not the only way of exercising power in the neighborhood.

Al-Mataria has been informally emerging as a result of the encroachment of the rural areas to the city of Cairo. Hence the neighborhood still bears some of the characteristics of the rural communities. The power structure of the space is governed by traditional power structure like those of the big clans and family politics. An important source of the police officers’ power in the neighborhood is that they manage to formulate relations of exchange with the big clans of the neighborhood, even if those clans deal illegally in drugs and antiques. Both the police officers and the big clans form the mesh of power which governs the public space of the neighborhood.

1.2.3. Al-Mataria in January 2011

This mesh of power was markedly pervasive. It encircles the people, both formally and informally, interferes in their daily lives and leaves them with unforeseeable escape. This is why even in the eve of the calling for big protests against the Egyptian Regime on January 28th, 2011, Al-Mataria was not one of the planned sites of protests. Left with very limited political activism, the ordinary people of Al-Mataria decided that they have to have a say in what is going on. Mass unplanned protests erupted in the neighborhood, and flowed spontaneously to the main square of Al-Mataria, a couple of hours of clashes with the police were enough trigger for the people to channel their flow towards
torching the police station. On that day, January 28th, 2011 Al-Mataria, left out by the political activism, was the neighborhood that suffered the most killing by the police in Cairo, a notable starting point which warrants further study of the local dynamics of the neighborhood.

After only four days of intense mobilization in other areas of Cairo, by Saturday, 29 January 2011, the most prominent state apparatus in this area ceased to exist. State television was the only source of information, since both internet and mobile networks were cut, spreading fear and calling for people to go to the streets to protect “themselves, their personal properties and their honor” for nobody is there to protect them anymore. At this time in Matatria, people went to the streets with spears made of kitchen knives, broomsticks, and other kinds of homemade weapons. Men in every building gathered in front of their buildings ready for any attack from the outlaws who were now released or escaped from the local police station.

1.2.4. The Popular Committee of Al-Mataria

Although the first couple of days were tense, the tension, in the following few days, was clear. People started to talk to each other, to know each other and they started to exchange interdependently, time, goods and even some much-needed cheer. The absence of the visible state apparatus led people to rely on each other for protection, intensifying their interdependence outside the mesh of government. Even if some of the participants of the so-called “self protection committee”, which was established, then were against the idea of the broader uprising, and some were outlaws released from the police station, the absence of the police presence in the public space had interrupted daily life and begged questions of subject formation and what led to the outcomes seen at the time. Around the tenth day, the military claimed full presence over the streets and hence the popular committee was dissolved. Only two things remained, the first one is that people knew each other more, and the second one is the Coalition of Al-Mataria Youth. I knew the Coalition of Al-Mataria Youth, in March 2011 via social media accounts like those on Facebook. However, its story dates back to the parliamentary elections of 2010. While the candidates were campaigning, some of Mataria’s youth decided that
they had enough of being ignored and excluded from the whole political process that should normatively represent them. The members consisted of a group of twenty friends, aging from twenty-five to forty years of age, not highly-educated but very well connected to their neighborhoods and its inhabitants. They gathered on the premise that together they would be able reclaim their voice and the power to speak. However, their contentious reactions posted on social media and exclaimed in public gatherings suggested that they viewed the 2010 elections as a farce and, beyond repair, and they did not manage to achieve any success. After playing what they viewed as a role in ousting Mubarak, they started to unite again for a different goal. Rather than regaining the power to speak, they sought the power to act. They had very ambitious plans about reforming their neighborhood. Although these plans were short-lived, witnessing their dynamics vis-à-vis the old power houses of the neighborhoods inspired me to carry on with this thesis in order to understand the impact of the context and the broader social dynamics on the neighborhood and the youth choices.

I would like to explore more these dynamics by studying two additional events which highlight the encounter of those youth with the power structure of Al-Mataria. The first event was a town hall meeting held in a mosque, in mid-March 2011, to seal the reconciliation between police forces and the people. One sheikh, a retired high-ranking police officer, as well as the chief of one of the largest clan, the family of Abou-Eida, were on the panel. The Youth of the Coalition also attended the conference. While the police officer was talking about how the police restoration is necessary for the people, the youth interrupted him crying that reconciliation cannot be established before seeing the police officers punished for all their past crimes. The sheikh tried to calm down the people by preaching about the virtue of tolerance, and he was interrupted again by the youth recalling their brothers killed a couple of months ago. Finally, the chief of Abou-Eida clan started to talk trying to calm the youth and here all the attendants, not only the youth, were outraged. The people cried “enough, enough with your lies. Don’t you ever change?” and the people left the conference which was terminated accordingly. Through this incident one can see a clear interruption, by the people, of the police’s formal authority, Abou-Eida’s informal authority and the sheikh’s religious authority.
The other incident took place by the end of the same month, where the Coalition's youth decided to hold an event to introduce the Coalition to the people and honoring the mothers’ of the martyrs on Mothers’ Day, and although some of the powerful big clans offered to sponsor it and some others threatened that they will not let this event happen, the youth refused to respond to either proposition. The event was completely self-funded and was successful and safe. One of the interesting questions people were asking was whether the event was sponsored by a big family or by the Muslim Brotherhood. This question reveals that, in the people's minds, these were the only ones who have access to the public space. It is easy to assume that the question, which guides this thesis, emanates from the assumption which draws a distinction between two parties; the people of Al-Mataria and the state manifested in the police station. Hence, it is fair to frame the answer to the question in the manner of the encounter between those two parties, by analyzing the mechanisms of state oppression and the mechanisms of resistance by the people who act upon their shared grievances. However, my firsthand experience with the event, necessitates one to rethink this supposed distinction between the local police station, as representing the state, and the people.

The physical presence of personnel in uniform in Al-Mataria was only concentrated in two spots; Al-Mataria main square which is the main entrance to the neighborhood and a small strip of Matarawy street in front of the police station. The main task of the police personnel in these two spots was only to organize traffic. This was the only ostensible police presence in the public space of the neighborhood. On the other hand, Al-Mataria police station has always been famous for its cruelty with the detainees. Then, there was another subtle role played by the police station igniting fear as a way of disciplining people. However, this terrorizing role was not visible in the public, and only a small fragment of the neighborhood population was affected by it. Hence, this cannot explain the masses storming the local police station whose members were almost absent from the real lives of the majority of the people. This presents this thesis with another epistemological challenge which is how to bridge the gap between the real and the
actual; the real police presence in the public space of Al-Mataria and the actual reaction of the people towards it in a cycle of contention.\(^5\)

This gap cannot be bridged using any causal approach, since the direct link that connects the cause and the effect is absent. Hence, we have to examine cause and effect not as two separate entities, but as intertwined dynamics that feed into an overarching rationality. This rationality is coined by Michel Foucault as governmentality. The main contribution of the Foucauldian governmentality is abolishing the dualism between state and society, subject, structure of power, and the actual and the real, trying to analyze all these concepts on a plane of immanence. Abolishing these dualisms allows for a more comprehensive account of the current social reality.\(^6\)

Following the thread that starts with abolishing the state society dualism, the police presence in Al-Mataria needs to be revisited. Our examination of the police should not be limited to the real encounter of the police personnel with the people. We should rather look broadly and see the different disciplining techniques and strategies as creating the milieu through which the relations between the state and the people are realized, not as separate entities but as intertwined relationality which enacts the subject formation process. Creating this milieu, which becomes the site of interaction between technologies of the self and technologies of domination, is the raison d'etre of the government.

“I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, he has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the self. Let’s say: he has to take into account the interaction between those two types of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination. The contact point, where the individuals


are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think government. Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself”.

It is now fair to revisit the supposed absence of the local police station of Al-Mataria. As a matter of fact, the police do not need to be present in the commonsensical manner. It is rather present as the main tool of the neoliberal subject formation process through different techniques of surveillance. By placing itself within the traditional local power network, which is controlled by big clans, the police station has managed to achieve discipline in the public space of the neighborhood. This approach infiltrates the line that separates the private and the public, the reality and the perception. It is discipline that conducts the conduct and draws the limitation of action in the minds and the imagination of the people to achieve the end of making the self-disciplined subject.

This conductive conduct also explains the repertoire of contention of the January 28th moment in Al-Mataria, since the repertoires are not just a set of means or strategies according to which people act upon their shared grievances. The repertoire is rather the array of meanings which arise in relation to the rationality of government. As Tilly comments, “repertoires are learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge from struggle.”

In conclusion, this thesis attempts to offer a possible explanation to why the people of Al-Mataria stormed the police station despite its absence from their reality. Against the backdrop of governmentality, this thesis will investigate the hybrid network of government in Al-Mataria. Within this network, the police station is being examined as social dynamics not as stand-alone entity. Furthermore, these social dynamics are being

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examined inasmuch as they control the perceptions of the population, which informs the subject formation process.

1.3. State, Society and vice versa

Since this is a study about the state-society relations, its point of departure is the state, or to be more specific, our conception of the state. The first thing to say about our conception of the state is that it cannot be reduced to its apparatus, codes and institutions. Because, if we are doing so, we are in fact reducing the society to be only governed by how those apparatus behave. Therefore, the state should be looked at as a set of processes and tactics that seeks control over the hearts and minds of the population within a certain territory. Hence, state-society relations cannot be reduced to the institutional procedures towards the people. Rather, the forms of state presence and state interaction in the everyday lives of the people should be taken into consideration since this type of interaction is what creates the milieu where the state-society relations are being realized.

After laying out the state as set of processes and techniques directing at the population, it is important to understand the nature of the public space where this set of processes and techniques takes place. This study argues that the public sphere of modernity as depicted by Hannah Arendt or Habermas does not exist anymore. The public space that constitutes the locus of this study is where the neoliberal subject formation takes place on a daily basis, i.e., the neighborhood. In light of neoliberal governmentality, the state approaches the public space differently depending on the social structure of the neighborhood. Following this line of thought, the informality of the popular quarters of Cairo, which interrupts the logic of control of modernity, entails a resembling form of government to govern those spaces. Hence, the set of techniques of government of Al-Mataria takes an informal form to resemble the informality of the neighborhood. More accurately, they combine informal techniques with formal ones to achieve the aim of the government. This thesis suggests that within the dynamics and contradictions of this combined form of governmentality, the moment of January 28th can be situated.
In light of this, the state's presence in Al-Mataria takes the form of surveillance techniques of the public space drawing its boundaries and disciplining the people's movement in it. These techniques are not directly performed by the police personnel, but instead, through situating the local police station within the traditional local power structure. This composite social network makes enacting the techniques of surveillance possible through different informal techniques, which will be analyzed through the study. The composite nature of the power structure of the neighborhood and the intertwining of the formal police station with the informal power structure makes the people perceive the state as a bully who encounters them with violence on an everyday basis. According to activists within the case study, this form of the state cannot be reformed merely by chanting alone, but instead something has to be physically encountered for real change and representation to occur.

1.4. Revisiting the State

Broadly speaking, this study is a descending analysis of events in January 2011 that aims at suggesting to conceptualize a moment of popular contention against the backdrop of the neoliberal governmentality. Hence, the coming section will be dedicated to elaborating more on the conceptual framework centered on the neoliberal governmentality approach. After all, it is through this lens that I understand how the different themes emerging from this study play out in the everyday politics of informal areas in Cairo, and specifically in the moment targeted in the case study.

1.4.1. Governmentalization of the State: Revisiting Power Relations

One of the most important theories of the state has been casted by the German sociologist Max Weber, as he provided a definition of the state as the human community which claims the monopoly use of force for itself within a definite territory⁹. Here,

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Weber introduced legitimacy an important concept through which the state practices the main tool of ruling, which is violence. It is legitimacy which distinguishes the state use of violence from any other form of political and social violence. Through legitimacy, the state is supposed to be an autonomous neutral entity that is elevated from the social conflict. Weber discussed three kinds of legitimation: firstly, traditional legitimation which effectively legitimizes the domination by tradition and habit which was dominating the tribal society for example. The second type is the charismatic legitimation, which revolves around the personal traits of the ruling elite. The last type is the rational type which gives legitimacy to certain people who master certain rules in a strictly defined sphere of action. However, this supposed autonomy of the state, along with the aforementioned sources of legitimation has been contested by literature from various positions along the spectrum of the critical school of thought.

For Althusser, the ultimate end of the state to reproduce the conditions of production which created the social conditions from which the state emerged at the first place. Althusser builds on Marx's conception of history as it is the product of the class struggle. Hence, the modern state's objective is the reproduction of specific conditions which made the emergence of the contemporary form of the state possible, i.e., the conditions of the capitalist mode of production. The autonomy of the state, then, becomes a mere illusion; it is rather the instrument of the capitalist class.

According to Althusser, the state, through both the ideological and the repressive state apparatus, becomes the primary author of the power which ensures the prolongation of the status quo. After putting the state autonomy under close scrutiny by Althusser among others, Foucault came to abolish state centrism altogether, trying to shift our focus to different forms of exercise of power. He explicitly and derided the notion of the state as the locus of power as state-phobia.

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For Foucault, neither the state nor any other defined entity is being elevated to the position of the author of the power. Hence, for him, power is diffused in a capillary form functioning through decentered networks of institutions and apparatuses.\(^\text{15}\) However, Foucault doesn’t deny the existence of the state nor the existence of the roles of coercion and consent. However, he started by the premise that power is not a substance, that derives from a definite source.\(^\text{16}\) What Foucault denies, then, is the assumption that the role of the state can be separated, divided, and assigned to certain institutions, or that it is a stagnant entity to be fetishized. He rather perceives the state as set of processes and tactics, with the security apparatus as its essential technique, which are practiced within society not from a place above it.\(^\text{17}\) He denies the relative importance attributed to the state as the responsible entity for reproduction of the conditions of production. He explicitly maintains that "the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think. Maybe. What is important for our modernity, that is to say for our present, is not then the state’s takeover (étatisation) of society, so much as what I would call the “governmentalization” of the state”\(^\text{18}\)

This composite reality, these set of heterogeneous ensemble of "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument" is what Foucault called governmentality.\(^\text{19}\) These set of processes are necessary for the state's salvation. This necessity is not a written a law but it goes beyond and above all other forms of laws, natural law, positive law, and even the law of God’s commandments. It forms what Foucault called, the raison d’État, or the broadly speaking, the ‘reason of the state’.\(^\text{20}\) By introducing the concept of

\(^{15}\) Ibid: 152.  
\(^{19}\) Ibid: 144.  
governmentality according to which, government is the “conduct of conduct”, Foucault opens for us a new horizon to understand the state-society relations in a comprehensive way. This conception of the state as the set of processes and techniques by the name of governmentality will be the guiding conceptual idea of this project, through which, the process of the neoliberal subject formation in the popular quarters of Cairo is going to be examined. The next section will follow this one as it tries to explain how the governmentalization of the state has been reflected in the process of the subject formation.

1.4.2. The Process of the Neoliberal Subject Formation

Since the process of the neoliberal subject formation is the focus of the analysis, this section will complement the theoretical framework with a discussion of different approaches to the process of the subject formation. To resemble the governmentalization of the state, I will start by explaining the Althusserian understanding of the subject, vis-à-vis the state. Then I will contest this approach by the Foucauldian understanding of the process of neoliberal subject formation under neoliberal governmentality.

For Althusser, the individual is being transformed into a subject in the Althusserian framework through the process of ideological interpellation. To understand the process of ideological interpellation we have firstly to understand what Althusser meant by the concept of ideology. For him ideology is an eternal, an omnipresent and a trans-historical “reality” which he related to “Freud’s proposition that unconscious is eternal”. However, the ideology in its abstract form does not exist. What really exist are ideologies produced by the Ideological State Apparatus to ensure the prolongation of the social conditions which produced the State through ensuring the reproduction of the relations of production. So, the subject is the production and the producer of the


ideology, and hence there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject. So, in a way or another we are all subjects of ideology and bearers of structure even if we think that we are outside it, for ideology doesn’t explicitly claim its ideological manner. On the contrary, ideology takes place outside ideology, as a scientific knowledge and this constitutes ideology as a “reality”. The inevitability of ideological subject making is clear in the fact that even before one is becoming conscious of the world, he/she bears the father’s name and is given a sexual identity. So, one is being transformed into subject through familial structure even before he/she is born.\(^\text{23}\)

Althusser also asserted on the seizure of the state power, while leaving the state apparatus intact, as the main aim of the class struggle or the revolution. By this assertion, we can think that what Althusser wanted us to believe was that what trans-historical is not just only ideology in general but rather the ideologies in their conditional nature and hence the State as a set of apparatuses, and we are all subjects of it either by defending it or by pursuing to seize it. For Althusser, it is only about the state.

As we have seen, the Althusserian understanding of the subject entails an understanding of the process of the subject formation as a monolithic homogenous process. For Althusser, the state is the author of this process. Through the ISA the state aims at creating subjects in a way to ensure the reproduction of the conditions of the production. On the other hand, Foucault pictures the process of the subject formation in a more heterogeneous way. He did that by suggesting to look beyond the author, to perceive power as authorless social dynamics, which takes different forms in time and space.

In his archeological mission, Foucault managed to deconstruct all the hopes of locating the source of the power relations. For Foucault, the regularity of the structure in Althusser became the regularity in dispersion of the discursive formation. The discursive formation is the all-inclusive plane which includes each and every component of the social reality.\(^\text{24}\) It is neither produced nor can be broken and thus the subject does not have agency over the process of the subject formation. The Foucauldian subject is a

\(^\text{23}\) ibid
\(^\text{24}\) Foucault, Michel. 1972. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language. Pantheon Books
mere positionality within this network of the discursive formation. So, even if a social change happens it is nothing but a mere transformation and reproduction of the power relations which are diffused and always ready to strike back if challenged. This transformation and reproduction was elaborated by Foucault in his analysis of the development of the disciplining mechanism in the western society.\textsuperscript{25}

However, Michael Hardt pointed out a tension in the Foucauldian understanding of the subject. This tension, as per Hardt, was mainly because his critique of power left him with no hope of militancy as a political activist. So, in his late period, Foucault, identifying that tension, chose to go back to the ancient political thought of the Greeks in order to investigate the possibility of any alternative approach to the contemporary reality. He found his inspiration in the Cynics. In the Cynics, Foucault found the militancy in breaking with the social reality by ridiculing it. Hence, the unfinished project of Foucault stopped at the point where he was searching for a source of Ethics out of the power relations.\textsuperscript{26}

The process of the neoliberal subject formation, in this thesis, will be examined as a heterogenous process, according to which, different forms of subjectivity emerge. Within the society of entrepreneurs, explained by Lazzarato,\textsuperscript{27} this thesis will track the development of different subjectivities emerge within the social dynamics of Al-Mataria, as a representation of the popular quarters of Cairo, and how they have been transformed through the neoliberal subject formation process within the society of entrepreneurs.

\textbf{1.5. Methodology}

This thesis deals with the experience of the everyday as being experienced by the people of the popular quarters of Cairo. In another words, how the everyday is being constructed through the social dynamics of the state-society interaction in the spaces of the popular neighborhoods. This project, also, rests upon my personal experience with

\textsuperscript{25} Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish and the Birth of the Prison. Vintage
\textsuperscript{26} Hardt, Michael. 2010. “Militant Life” New Left Review 64: 151-160
\textsuperscript{27} A further discussion of Lazzarato will be in section 2.2.4 in this thesis
the neighborhood coupled with my studies in political science. Hence, this research is a qualitative research deploying the method of autoethnography, which is defined by Ellis and Bochner "...an autobiographical genre of writing that displays multiple layers of consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural." Autoethnography has emerged as a method with the qualitative research due to "the calls to place greater emphasis on the ways in which the ethnographer interacts with the culture being researched". Thus, through autoethnography I, as a researcher, aim at capitalizing on my position as a local inhabitant of Al-Mataria to understand the social dynamics of the neighborhood.

Adopting the method of autoethnography invites dealing with the concept of reflexivity which is broadly defined as a "turning back on oneself, a process of self-reference. In the context of social research, reflexivity at its most immediately obvious level refers to the ways in which the products of research are affected by the personnel and process of doing research". Reflexivity does not deny the existence of a social reality outside ourselves. Rather it acknowledges the effect of human involvement on the process of knowledge creation produced by a social research. Reflexivity tried to bridge the gap between absolute relativism, which makes it impossible to produce credible knowledge, and absolute empiricism, which suffers theoretical impoverishment. Bhaskar's critical realism is a philosophical attempt to bridge this gap between empiricism and relativism. He suggested that we can neither take behavioural observations as simply representative of some given social world nor fully reveal or reconstruct the social through our understanding of actors' meanings and beliefs. Building on this acknowledgment of the effect of the researcher on the research and by including the different techniques of ethnomethodology mentioned above is the only way that ensures that the endeavor of this thesis will be tackled in full picture.

More specifically, this thesis sheds light on certain political behavior in a certain point of time, namely the behavior of the people towards the police station in their

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31 Ibid: 18-19
neighborhood during the 2011 uprising. Such an endeavor necessitates dealing with number of issues, which dictates the variables to be studied and shapes the methodology guiding the research.

These issues are police station as a social interaction taking place in the public space, roles of the state and the techniques of governing the public space in the popular quarters, the sort of the neoliberal subject formation inherent in contemporary Egypt.

The themes, which will be investigated through the research will be the social dynamics of the clans of Al-Mataria; how they emerged and how they relate to the state and the space. I will also examine how the local police station relates to different social structures of the neighborhood, and how it interferes with the traditional power structure of the neighborhood.

1.6. Thesis Outline

The chapters of this thesis were interwoven, so that each section of each chapter is related to the other chapters and to the whole thesis. Through the progression of the chapters I will not be moving linearly from one topic to another. Instead, I will be layering the contextualization revolving around the main two themes of the thesis: public space and the transition from the welfare state to neoliberalism.

Since it is a theoretical thesis, it attempts to engage with a specific theoretical discussion. Hence, chapter 2 will be dedicated to layout the theoretical discussion of the themes of the thesis, and tries to situate my position within the broader discussion.

Chapter 3 will be focusing on the history of the public space of the modern city of Cairo. The chapter will situate the public space of Al-Mataria within the broad historical context of modernity in Egypt. The argument of the chapter is that the informality of Al-Mataria has posited and interruption to the project of modernity. Chapter 4 will have the entry point of the shift from welfare state to neoliberalism as theme. It will include a discussion of the contemporary socioeconomic transformation in Egypt from the welfare state to the neoliberal state, within the process of neoliberal subject formation.
It will examine how this socioeconomic shift affected the lives of the people living in the popular quarters, and forced them to depend more on informal ways of life outside the borders of the government. That shift to neoliberalism also entailed a shift in the techniques of policing the public space by integrating informal techniques resembling the emerging informal life of the popular quarters.

Chapter 5 will be dedicated to understand the nature of the integration between of informal policing techniques within the neoliberal governmentality. In doing so, the chapter will examine the nature of the clans controlling the neighborhood, how they emerged and how the local police station is involved with them, to create the hybrid government controlling the public space. The chapter will close by explaining how the instance of January 28th exposed the contradiction of this form of government. Finally, the Conclusion will be the sixth chapter through which I will elaborate more on the research problem of this thesis, by engaging with the contentious politics approach, as it is one of the possible explanations for the moment within the social movement theory.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

This thesis is a theoretical one, which intends to engage primary with theory. That makes it close to a long literature review. However, I believe that it is important to have a chapter dedicated to laying out the theoretical discussion, which this thesis tries to engage with. By doing this, I am intending to clear the space for the next three core chapters to pinpoint my position within the broader discussion, and to operationalize the concepts within the case under study.

That being said, this chapter will review the different theoretical approaches to the themes of this thesis; public space and the shift to neoliberalism. I will start by laying out the historical development of theories approaching the issue of the public space. I will then elaborate more on the lefebvrian concept of the production of space, as it will be the understanding of the public space, upon which this thesis will build on, in accordance with the theoretical framework of neoliberal subject formation. The second part of this chapter will be dedicated to elaborating on the theme of the shift to neoliberalism. Since it is a vast theme which can be approached from various points of departure, I will specify my endeavor to situating the shift from welfarism to neoliberalism within the neoliberal context as policy, ideology and governmentality.

2.1. Approaching the Public

2.1.1. The Public as the Medium of the Political

We can trace theorizing the public space back to Aristotle. He was the first one to speak about the public sphere as distinguished from the private sphere. He described the private as the sphere of the individual beings, it is where the human being realizes himself as an individual man, woman, slave .. etc. On the other hand, the public sphere is the sphere of the polis.32

It is the space where the individual becomes a citizen and engage with other citizens in the public debate about the state. However, these two spheres are not separate; rather,

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they share a relation of interdependency, according to which, the citizen in the public sphere cannot be separated from his identity as an individual. His relations with himself and his family determine his interactions with the state.\textsuperscript{33} However, the private and the public spheres cannot coexist at the same instance. Simply put, the individual can either exist in his household with his family as an individual or in the public sphere as a citizen. In sum, we can say that Aristotle based his understanding of the public on the distinction between the public and the private, of course limited to his understanding of ‘the social’ in the existent structures of his time.

One important functions of the public sphere as described by Aristotle, is communication. This has remained the guiding principle of the modern theorizations of the public sphere. We can see this in two of the most important understanding of the public sphere of modernity, which was explained by Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas. Although both understandings stemmed out of the idea that the public sphere is the sphere of communication, each took a different turn. Unlike Aristotle, who did not pay attention to the geography of the public sphere, Arendt acknowledged the spatiality of the sphere of public interaction.\textsuperscript{34} Hence, we can say that Arendt was one of the earliest interpreters of the public space as a location and topography not just a virtual sphere of ideas. The public space, for Arendt, is not limited to the communication; rather, it is where people act in concert or exercise power/freedom. It is the place where people meet face-to-face and act together.\textsuperscript{35} Hence, it is the site of political interaction.

On the other hand, Habermas criticized the Arendtian interest in the topographic element of the public sphere. This critique of the Arendtian concept of the public space was not based on the Aristotelian approach to the public sphere. It was, instead, based on Habermas’ understanding of the development of the means of communication; since communication is the most important functions of the public sphere. The rise of the

\textsuperscript{33} ibid: 53-62.
printed media and other ways of communication expanded the concept of the public and dilute it to be not limited to the Arendtian "space of appearance".  

As we can see, the previous approaches to the public space are based on the distinction. Be it the distinction between the public and the private or the distinction between the sphere of communication and dialogue and the space of exercise of power. However, they all share one embedded static understanding of the public sphere. For them, the public space is just the location or the medium, where political interaction amongst citizens and the state takes place. This belief ignores the dynamic nature of the public space, by which the political interaction is shaped. If we accept the general definition of the public space as just the site or the medium of the political interaction, we will fail to answer some vital questions concerning the public, like how is the political shaped by space? How the space is shaped by the political? Hence, in order to feed into the research problem of this thesis, we have to look for an understanding of the public space, which takes it dynamic aspect into consideration. This understanding can be found in Lefebvre’s understanding of the production of space. Therefore, the next couple of sections will be dedicated to introduce the lefebvrian concept of the public space, as my intention is to understand the theme of the public space beyond being a static location of the political action; rather as a process of social production.

2.1.2. Lefebvre and the Production of Space

The aforementioned approaches assume the public space as just the backdrop to life. It is just there to be filled up, used, crossed over or negotiated in everyday life. This view of the public space contradicts with how the theoretical framework of this thesis understands the social reality. As explained in the introduction, the neoliberal governmentality approach perceives the social reality as intertwined tactics and strategies. Hence, this thesis approaches the public space, not as a realm of existence of

the citizens. It is rather a social production and a space of exchange, not just the exchange of communication, but the exchange of commodities and social relations of exchange. Hence, the public space develops and takes different shapes corresponding to the development of the commodities and the nature of exchange.

Henri Lefebvre was one of the most important interlocutors of the theme of the public space. As a social phenomenon, Lefebvre did not define it. He unpacked its dynamism and elements instead. In his work on the production of space, he described the public space it as “the intangible outcome of history, society and culture, all of which are supposedly combined within it”. His aim was to demonstrate that space is not only the site of the political. Rather, it is a political phenomenon, which means it is shaped by the political as much as it draws its boundaries. He asserted that “authentic knowledge of space must address the question of its production”. This understanding suggests that the public space should neither be studied as an object nor as a subject. In that sense, Lefebvre did not provide us with a definition for public space, but he tried to unpack its complexities and nuances, since he perceives the public space is a social reality which consists of sets of relations and forms. In other words, the space is a social phenomenon contingent to the social relations of a specific historical epoch. For example, capitalism as the prevailing mode of production dictates a certain type of social relations which in turn dictate a certain type of public space. Later on, through out the following chapters, the thesis will elaborate more on this relation between the social relations and the public space, and how this relationality can be perceived within the process of neoliberal subject formation.

Although space is a social product, it cannot be reduced to a thing among other things, nor is it a product in the banal meaning of the term. It is rather the space, which encompasses the social relations of production and exchange as much as it is shaped by them. The main difference between social space and other produced things is that all products are mere objects of the social processes of production and exchange. Simply

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40 Ibid: 111
put, labor changes natural material into products. In that sense, the process of production stops after the manifestation of the product, and then the product lends itself to the process of exchange. On the other hand, social space is not a mere object of production and exchange. We can identify neither a starting nor an ending point to the process of production of social space. It is by the very fact that society exists in a space that social space starts to manifest. From that moment on, society has been grappling with social space, challenging spatial limits and being shaped by them. Hence, space has to be approached as a dynamic social process. Lefebvre, suggests that this approach can be pursued through understanding the three elements of the production of space, which will be explained through the following section.

2.1.2.1. The Three elements of the Production of the Space

Lefebvre, described the process of the production of space in a threefold sense. It consists of three intertwined elements: spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation. By spatial practices, Lefebvre meant the flow of relations of exchange which takes place in space including the way according to which space is deciphered in order to ensure a certain flow of the everyday life which in turn ensures the production and the reproduction of social life in accordance with the mode of production. The representations of space can refer to the ideology or the discourse of space. They are the system of meanings, “the ideological content of codes, theories, and the conceptual depiction of space linked to production relation”, or the system of meaning embedded within the social practices ensuring the reproduction of the relations of production. It is safe to say that spatial practices are the set of practices from above to ensure the application of the representations of space coming from above too. More specifically, we can say that spatial practices are the concern of the government, While the representations of space are the concern of urbanists for example whoever controls

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45 Ibid: 73
how the space is planned and used. The third element of Lefebvre’s system of approaching the space is the concern of the users of the space. Spaces of representation are the attempts to generate alternative meanings to the space by its users through the everyday life practices. Hence, “representational spaces may be said, though again with certain exceptions, to tend towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs”. They are the everyday practices of the people in pursuit of deciphering a counter hegemonic system of meaning associated with the space, resisting the hegemonic one imposed by the hegemonic power.

The relations of those three elements (spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation) are reciprocal. The spatial practices along with the representations of space are trying to impose a specific reality of the public space, which is resisted and negotiated by the everyday lives through the spaces of representation, which necessitates an adaptation of the spatial practices and the representations of space, and so on and so forth. As Don Mitchell noted: “Whatever the origins of any public space, its status as ‘public’ is created and maintained through the ongoing opposition of visions that have been held, on the one hand by those who seek order and control and, on the other, by those who seek places for oppositional political activity and unmediated).

Understanding the space as a dynamic social process cannot be accomplished unless we take into consideration the reciprocal relations of these three elements. In that sense, the everyday life in space is not only dictated from above by the hegemonic forces. It is rather, the product of the interaction among social practices and representation of space, which are planned from above and the spaces of representation, which are appropriated from below. In that sense, the public space becomes an encompassing social phenomenon which, by compromising the limitation of location, transcended also

48 Ibid: 75
the differentiation between the public and the private. As a social phenomenon, it includes multiple subjectivities rather than just being the location or the medium of the political communication. If we are going to understand the public space as a dynamic social phenomenon, we have to study the social relations under neoliberalism. Therefore, we can understand how social relations shape the public space and vice versa. Hence, the rest of this chapter will layout the theoretical discussion of the theme of the neoliberal state, emerging as a response to the crisis of the welfare state.

2.2. From Welfare State to Neoliberalism, in Theory

2.2.1 Ideals of the Welfare State

“The welfare state has been defined by the ideals of collective social responsibility for all citizens within the polity including the most vulnerable” ⁵² However, the welfare state and the ideals defining its parameters has a specific socioeconomic history. It used to describe the post-war labour Britain ⁵³ which emerged as a result of the 1945 elections, when the British voters chose to end the wartime austerity and stopped backing up Winston Churchill.⁵⁴ From Britain the concept has been used to describe a the state-society relations where state intervenes in economy to provide employment, price control, housing, health care and other types of social benefits for the population.⁵⁵ The welfare state has been the dominating mode of government until the Thatcher’s who is thought to be the one started the neoliberal era as this chapter will explain in the following sections, through unpacking the threefold nature of neoliberalism, as policy, ideology and governmentality

2.2.2. Neoliberalism as Policy and Ideology

Critics of the welfare state have centered their critique to the welfare state around the idea that state intervention in the economy has created “a culture of poverty” by creating an underclass depending on the state to provide one’s subsistence. It has been believed by those critics that the welfare state has deprived people from their freedoms while failing to live up to the expectations regarding the living conditions of the people. Hence, the welfare state needed to be reformed. This reform has resulted in the rise of neoliberalism. Since the late 1980s, neoliberalism has been the dominating mode of government, which governs the state society relations. It has been a term used to describe the way things are, as Terry Flew suggested.

As broad as it seems, the term used to describe “the way things are” has a specific history and some elements according to which it operates. How neoliberalism operates is best understood through understanding its threefold nature as policy, ideology and governmentality, as suggested by Wendy Larner. Although the usage of the term can be traced back to the 1930s economists, this thesis is concerned with its recent usages. Unlike the former usages of the term, which used to describe an incomplete ideology, the recent usages of the term are dealing with an ongoing-materialized political project. These recent usages of the term always refer to the political project spearheaded by Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Donald Regan in the United States in the early 1980s. As a set of policies, neoliberalism was a response to the financial crisis of Keynesianism after the oil crisis of 1973 which drove stagflation to its highest as David Harvey and Terry Flew noted. The course of action Thatcher took, followed by Regan, to overcome the crisis was to deregulate industry and agriculture and to give more power to monetism. In other words, what constitutes the neoliberalism as policy is forcing governments to open up their borders in compliance with global economy to ensure the perpetuation of the circulation of commodities. This openness necessitated limiting the

role of the interventionist state in favor of self-regulative markets, which also includes rolling back from providing public services to the population.  

As a response to the crisis of the welfare state, neoliberalism had to challenge Keynesianism on an ideological basis too, in order to overthrow the Keynesian legitimacy and impose the neoliberal one over society. This ideological challenge to Keynesianism was based upon five values, which are:

“the individual; freedom of choice; market security; laissez faire; and minimal government ... which together with a new emphasis on managerialism, comprise the intellectual basis of the neo-liberal challenge to Keynesian welfarism, and provide the theoretical impetus for deregulation and privatization”.  

The role of ideology in governing the population cannot be underestimated. On the contrary, it is an essential component of the equation of ruling as explained by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci who introduced the concept of the cultural hegemony.

As a Marxist, Gramsci believed that ruling a capitalist society was concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisie. However, for him, controlling means of production was not enough to rule. Hence, he realized the importance of manipulation to sustain this rule. To understand the manipulation as the wielding power of the bourgeois-ruled human society he offered us the concept of cultural hegemony.

For Gramsci, Social order is maintained by maintaining the legitimacy of the ruling class through two ways: coercion and consent. The historical development of the human society did not eliminate completely any of these two components. It rather increased the percentage of the consent against the coercion in the social order formula.

According to Gramsci, the consent is taking the form of intellectual and moral leadership practiced by the ruling class in society. This moral supremacy constitutes the cultural hegemony which is practiced through the civil society, which is the set of the

63 Ibid: 7
intermediary institutions between the people and the state, unlike coercion which is being practiced by the state apparatus.

Through state apparatus, the ruling classes are practicing external domination over people’s behavior through punishments as well as rewards. On the other hand, Hegemony is what saves the ruling classes the effort of practicing external control through shaping personal convictions of the ruled to fit the culture of the dominant classes. The institutions of the civil society i.e.: education, media, religion ...etc. takes the responsibility of normalizing and legitimizing the culture of the dominant classes by introducing their concept of reality as the only valid one. Hence, any other concept of reality or any alternative cultures, which resist the dominant ones, become abnormal, immoral and illegitimate, and the advocates of these alternatives become alienated from society.64

The Gramscian understanding of how hegemony works presupposes the existence of the author of power, who is the ruling class. This assumption is challenged by later trends within the critical literature. As explained in the previous chapter about space, Lefebvre has concluded that the production of space is a process of struggle between views and practices from above and practices which suggest alternative views from below. On a broader scheme, Foucault has understood power as an authorless fluid social phenomenon which can be understood through exploring how it is practiced on the micro level. Following the Foucauldian approach, we can understand how neoliberalism responded the rights movements which addressed issues like gender and ethnic ones. Although these movements posed serious challenges to the alienation resulted from the excessive financialization of society, neoliberalism has managed to contain them through the extension of politics into lifestyle,65 and to create human capitalism which is interested in investing in the individuals.66 Neoliberalism has managed to appear as an inclusive multi-vocal system which makes room for everyone within the society67 in their individual capacities as set of “equal” individuals who are entitled to and responsible for

this equality. In a world where competition and consumer demands have replaced the government’s obligation to take care of the population, citizens have been redefined as subjects who are responsible for their welfare through constantly work on themselves to remain employable.68

Although neoliberalism rests upon less government, it does not mean that it requires less governance,69 which will be explained through the next sections. However, I would like to conclude this section by the definition Harvey, has provided for neoliberalism which explains how policy and ideology work in an intertwined manner. For Harvey, Neoliberalism is ‘a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets and free trade’70

2.2.3. Commodityfying the Everyday

Through the previous sections, we have seen that how neoliberalism challenged the welfare state on both fronts, the policy and the ideology. Before elaborating on neoliberalism as governmentality, this section is going to examine the nature of the neoliberal commodity. The importance of the form of commodity comes from the importance of commodity within the capitalist mode of production. As Henri Lefebvre noted, the first glance at the modern era, by which he meant the world after the French revolution, reveals the prevalence of commodity over everything. The exchange of commodity has been the dominating determinant of space and time. Social space and social time has been dominated by the logic of exchange. They have become the space and time of market. Upon these facts of the modern era, the everyday life established

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itself.\textsuperscript{71} Hence, it is important to trace the development of the commodity in order to understand the everyday life under neoliberalism.

At the early stages of capitalism, the dominant form of commodity was industrial. Commodity has never been more obvious and easy to understand: it was the result of human labor transforming natural material into useful things. Commodities has been of physical nature. Its production and exchange was bound by time and space. Production used to take place during working hours in the space of the factory or the workshop. Exchange also used to take place in the space of the market with the physical presence of the buyer and the seller. under neoliberalism, which dominated by the shift to monetarism, the commodity has been changed dramatically. Before the primacy of monetarism, money has always been viewed as a representation of the exchange value of goods. As Marx argued, the circulation of capital has been starting with a commodity and ends with another commodity. It starts with a movement from a physical commodity to money leading to a second movement from money to another physical commodity. Hence it negates and excludes money in the process.\textsuperscript{72} What monetarism has done to this form of exchange was that money has gone beyond being just means of representation of the exchange value of physical commodities. Money has been elevated to bear value in and of itself. Hence, we have seen a noticeable rise in the industry of money exemplified by the rise of the stock market for example. This also gave rise to other forms of work other than the physical labor like the service industry and other forms of intellectual labor like research and consultancy.

This shift has been reflected upon the social space and time, and hence the everyday life. Production of value has stopped being bound in time and space. A single human being has his own intellectual capacity on all the time and at any place, using a simple tool like a laptop at any time and any place he can transform his private time into working time and his private space into a space of production. In other words production and exchange have stopped being bound by time and space and personal life has become a potential commodity.

2.2.4. Neoliberalism as Governmentality

After explaining the nature of the neoliberal commodity, we can elaborate on the third manifestation of neoliberalism as governmentality. It had not been until Foucault's writings about discourse which is understood “as a system of meaning which constitutes institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways”\(^\text{73}\) we came to understand a government spilled over the boundaries of time and space to dominate all aspects of the social reality. Decades before neoliberalism, Foucault has noticed its logic of pervasive government embedded in the early stages of capitalism following the French revolution.

In his analysis of different societal institutions, Foucault has explained how the art of government developed from being an art of domination to be an art of discipline. For instance, in analyzing the development of the prison he traced this development which was accompanied by a movement from punishment to discipline within the penal institutions. Firstly, the body of the condemned was the object of a brutal torture. It was not disciplinary punishment but a revenge of the king since breaking the law was perceived as attacking the King's sovereignty. During the turbulent times of the French revolution, a class conflict was taking place between the bourgeoisie and the aristocrats who were represented by the King. The conflict was about limiting the power of the King, which was exemplified by delegitimizing the revenge of the King by transforming it to punishment for discipline which seeks correcting the condemned instead of destroying it. Breaking the law, then, became an attack against the people's sovereignty not the King's, and hence the new emerging ruling class i.e.: bourgeoisie emerged as if they were representing the people. Hence, instead of the punishment being a spectacle for the public, the trial was the spectacle, and punishment was a disciplinary correction to transform the criminal to a good citizen afterwards.\(^\text{74}\)

The concept of governmentality, discussed in the introduction, was used to explain this shift and its implications in the broader context of the social reality. Governmentality expands the act of government to not be limited to the political leadership. It deals with the line between the public and private. government is a continuum from political to technologies of the self. Government then includes all forms of tactics and techniques deliberately attempting to draw boundaries on the human conduct, limiting its potentials to ensure the creation of a subject who individualizes the power dynamics and becomes his/her own self-government. Applying this conceptual apparatus to the Neoliberal form of government allows us to see what sort of subject it creates.

By elevating the concept of the individual responsibility and by the rapid growth of financialization of the economy neoliberalism encourages people to be master of their own commodification of their time, i.e.: to be entrepreneurs. This process of individuation expands the political to include every aspect of even the mere personal life of the individual. As explained by Mitchell Dean, this government of the self is a four-façade form of strategy. First the ontological façade according to which people is being taught what to seek and the ethical existential reasons for it. Secondly, the ascetics which involves the individual spirituality as part of the subject making process. Third, the deontology which is concerned by the mode of subjectification of the governed. Fourth, the teleology which goes back to why we are governed and continue being governed. In his work on the genealogy of the modern subject, Foucault explains more how technologies of the self are interwined within the governmentalized process of subject making.

I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, he has to take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of the self. Let’s say: he has to take into account the interaction

80 Ibid: 203-204

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between those two types of techniques – techniques of domination and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government.

Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself.
Chapter 3: Governmentalizing the Public Space of Modern Cairo

As explained in the introduction, the two themes emerge from this thesis are the public space and the shift from the welfare state to neoliberalism. This chapter will be dedicated to elaborating on the theme of the public space and the power relations embedded in its dynamics, building on the theoretical discussion of the theme reviewed in (section 2.1). Building on Lefebvre’s understanding of the public space, explained (in section 2.1.2), this chapter will aims at framing the production of space within the framework of the neoliberal subject formation. This framing will then move forward to operationalize the concept of the public space within the context of the modern city of Cairo, by contextualizing the emergence of the popular quarter within the history of planning the modern city of Cairo. But before that, the chapter will start by explaining the importance of the city as a form of public space under capitalism. Finally, this chapter will end by bringing back the theoretical framework of the thesis, which rests upon governmentality, as the lens through which we can perceive the theme of the public space and how is it being governed under neoliberalism in the popular quarters of Cairo.

3.1. The City under Capitalism

Building on theory of Lefebvre, discussed in (section 2.1.2), this section will be dedicated to elaborate on how to operate the Lefebvrian approach to understand the contemporary space. Resting upon the ideas of modernity and the economic activities resulted from industrialization, the capitalist mode of production dictated a certain relationship to nature. This relationship is manifested in the creation of the city as the site of modernity and the locus of the industrialization. Nevertheless, the city has to be perceived not as a mere product of industrialization. Rather, it is the locus of the

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activities of production and circulation of material goods and ideas, and hence of the
conduct of the population.\textsuperscript{82} As Lefebvre put it,

The urban is social centrality, where the many elements and aspects of capitalism
intersect in space, despite often merely being part of the place for a short time,
as is the case with goods or people in transit. ‘City-ness’ is the simultaneous
gathering and dispersing of goods, information and people . . . The city was the
seat of intellectual development and administration – by necessity given the
growing, restless population, given the wealth generated by urban trade, and
given the plagues and contagions, which demanded the development,
administration and enforcement of forms of quarantine and regulation.\textsuperscript{83}

Hence, the city - as the place where people experience their day-to-day lives - is the
form of the public space that concerns this project. The coming section will move from
the general to the specific explaining the process of production the space of the modern
city of Cairo within the process of neoliberal subject formation.

3.2. Planning the Public Space of the Modern City of Cairo

The first Egyptian ruler to take serious steps towards building the modern city of Cairo
was Ismail (1863–1879), the grandson of Muhammed Ali, the founder of modern Egypt.\textsuperscript{84} Modernizing the city of Cairo has become one of the main tasks of Ismail in his
preparation to receive his guests from the royal families in Europe to celebrate the
opening of Suez Canal. The British, who occupied the country from 1882 invested in the
project of modernizing the city of Cairo to open its space to the European markets.\textsuperscript{85} It is
obvious that resembling the European city was the main aim of the project of
modernizing the city of Cairo. Hence, it is important to elaborate more on the links
between Cairo and the European city.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid: 65
\textsuperscript{84} Remaking: 27
\textsuperscript{85} Ghannam, F. (2002). Remaking the Modern: Space, Relocation, and the Politics of Identity in a Global Cairo. University of
California Press: 27
The French expedition to Egypt (1798-1801), was one of the most important stops of the European colonial march towards the middle east. Napoleon and his army were accompanied by scholars, and artists who were interested in studying the Egyptian society. This expedition was thought of as bringing the light to the dark orient. Until recently, some of the Egyptians celebrate the memory of the French expedition as the real kick-off for modernizing Egypt. Hence, the project of modernizing the city of Cairo was embedded with was driven by installing the values lacked by the Orient like rationality and order. The modernizing project was also contextualized within the European conception of the Orient.

We can find the roots of the modern western values in the values of the enlightenment. One of the central ideas of the enlightenment was bringing back the human being to the center of the universe. In Kant's words, "Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! "Have courage to use your own reason!" - that is the motto of enlightenment"

The main war waged by the enlightenment was against the dominance of religion and the religious institutions, which were dominating Europe pre the enlightenment. By bringing the human being to the center, the human intellect was elevated so that the world became an object of knowledge. Unlike preceding eras, the post enlightenment world had to be rationalized in order to be controlled and optimized to serve the man. The modern world of Europe emerged as the manifestation of such ideas. This manifestation was reflected in the different aspects of the social reality, like the rise of

87 http://daharchives.alhayat.com/issue_archive/Wasat%20magazine/1998/2/16/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1.html
89 Kant, I. http://www.artoftheory.com/what-is-enlightenment_immanuel-kant/
bureaucracy for example, which is a manifestation of the Weberian understanding of rationalization of the modern capitalist state.  

However, the ideas of enlightenment were not as universal as they seem. They have emerged in the context of the French Revolution which is a historical phenomena bound by a conflict happened in time and space. The man in the minds of enlightenment thinkers was not a universal man. Instead, he was the European man. The world which was the object of this man's control was not only the world of nature and things, it was also the world of other men. In that sense, we can understand the curiosity of the European towards the orient in the nineteenth century as described my Mitchell.  

For the European man of the early nineteenth century, the “Orient” was the land of Islam, which is occupied with superstitions and fancies. Hence, the “Orient” has to be put in order. As part of controlling the orient, the public space of the city has to be disciplined. Along these lines, we can understand the remarks made by Herman Milvelle on the city of Constantinople in 1856. He complained about the absence of plans of the streets, which were narrow, close and shut in. There were neither signs nor names to the streets.  

These maze-like cities are difficult to be spaces controlled and grasped by man. On the contrary, this maze swallows the man in a way which makes it impossible for him to overlook it from a vantage point and then control it. Hence, these cities - to fit modernity - they had to be rebuilt in a way to provide a proper point of view for the man to be able to grasp them, and for the government to be able to control them. In the case of Cairo, we can see this tendency in the words of one of those responsible for planning the city of Cairo in the 19th century. 'The transformation of the city of Cairo from an aesthetic point of view required the filling in and levelling of the waste land around the city, the opening up of main streets and new arteries, the creation of squares and open places, the planting of trees, the surfacing of roads, the construction of drains, and

regular cleaning and watering. Following this agenda, of modernizing the city of Cairo, Khedive Ismail has established the neighborhood of Ismailiya, which was known afterwards as downtown. Ismail has established this neighborhood to resemble Paris and thus "Paris on the Nile" was the nickname of the neighborhood.

Modernizing Cairo was not limited to modernizing downtown. On the contrary, As Fahmy explained, it was a large-scale encompassing project aimed at replacing the traditional society with a modern one. The locus of such a project was building a modern Egyptian army by Muhammed Ali Pasha. Around the project of building a modern army, managing all other aspects of the life of Egyptian evolved. To build a modern army, the government needed to recruit able citizens on the national background. To do that, the government needs to keep record of their citizens. Hence, the space of the country had to be rebuilt so that this maze-like city would be replaced by a preplanned barracks-like one. This was resembled in Ali Pasha Mubarak project in both areas, education and urban planning. After returning from his mission to Paris, he has established the Bureau of Public Works and the Bureau of Endowments. Both bureau were responsible for reshaping the space of Egypt, especially that of the city of Cairo, so that the city gets rid of its pre modern characteristics, and basically to resemble the organization of the army. Depending on wide streets and roundabouts, the city of Cairo has been rebuilt.

3.2.1. Challenging the Project of Modern Cairo: Al-Mataria as a Case

This project of planning the city of Cairo from above was an ongoing project until the seventies. The retreat of government followed the open door policy of Anwar Sadat has been reflected in the housing sector. Before Sadat, Nasser built cheap poplar houses for the new population coming to Cairo from rural areas adjacent to the capital. This was the case with the popular housing (Masaken Sha'beyya) in Al-Mataria, and Waili for example. On the other hand, Sadat's era has witnessed a noticeable rise in the informal

94 Ibid: 65
housing especially in those neighborhoods at the borders of Cairo. Al-Mataria is one of those neighborhoods which falls at the northern borders of Cairo next to Qaliubiyya. As such, the neighborhood has witnessed a huge number of unplanned migration from people of Qaliubiyya trying to harness the economic opportunities in the capital. This informal encroachment along side with the retreat of the welfare state, resulted in the rise of informal life in the neighborhood, like informal labor market and informal housing.

This informal housing was an interruption to the project of modernizing Cairo. The encroachment of the people from rural areas to Al-Mataria and other popular quarters was in the form of families migration. Their behavior of the informal planning of the space of Al-Mataria was in no way like the project of Khedive Ismail in downtown. Instead of the wide streets planning which capitalizes on the individuality, the main theme of remaking the space of Al-Mataria was adjacent and small houses occupying narrow streets to form blocks of territories for the different families in the neighborhood. This brought back the maze-like city to interrupt the project of modernizing the spaces of Cairo. In that regard I remember my Aunt, without knowing of Milvelle's remarks on the city of Constantinople used to tell us every time she came to visit us: "I always get lost in Al-Mataria. The streets are narrow and closed, and they all look the same with no signs or numbers. Al-Mataria is a maze". I still get similar comment from taxi drivers driving me from Heliopolis, downtown, or any other more urbanized place back to Al-Mataria. This maze of Al-Mataria developed its own logic of transportation which relates the neighborhood to the rest of the city. The neighborhood can be accessed through three main access points: Al-Mataria square, the metro station and the bus station of Mesalah. In order for you to move beyond these three points to the depth of the neighborhood, the main mean of transportation is the rickshaw which known as tuktuk. Before the tuktuk, the main mean of transportation through the maze of Al-Mataria was the unauthorized minibuses. It is noteworthy that neither the tuktuk nor the minibuses moving within Al-Mataria were legally authorized. However, they were under informal surveillance of the police personnel. This surveillance is one form of informal techniques of disciplining the everyday life of Al-Mataria, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
From this section and the one before it, we can conclude by saying that the project of modernity in Egypt had the purpose of disciplining the lives of the citizen to the rationale of the government. This was reflected in planning the public space of the city of Cairo to resemble that of Europe. However, a modernity from above has failed to replace the premodern power relations. The project of modernizing Egypt was interrupted by the expansion of the society which surpassed the capacity of the government. Hence, society has invented creative forms of managing their everyday outside the scope of government planning. Parallel to these informal ways of living invented by the society, the government has combined informal techniques, with formal ones, to discipline these informal ways of living in a reciprocal movement which brings back the Lefebvrian understanding of representations of space and spaces of representation. This combination of formal and informal techniques of government in the popular quarters was orchestrated by the local police station. In the following chapter we will contextualize these techniques of government through the lens of governmentality.

3.3. Foucault in Cairo

Building on the previous sections, we will bring the concept of governmentality as the theoretical lens through which we can understand the power dynamics of the public space of the popular quarters of Cairo. Before moving forward with the concept of governmentality, a quick remark should be made regarding the relevance of the concept of governmentality in the context of Cairo, being the capital of a country from the global south. Some people argue that Foucault’s theories are bound by the modern European context i.e.: Europe after the French Revolution. Although most of the Foucauldian theorization discussed the exercise of power in the modern Europe, he did not suppose a rupture between this era and preceding times. On the contrary, his goal was to unpack
the archaeological continuities, which underlie presupposed ruptures. By investigating the transformations of the exercise of power, he managed to unpack the continuity of power as a central binding phenomenon of the social, no matter how it is being exercised and enacted. In that sense, we can argue that one of the main Foucauldian tenets was that the exercise of power only takes different forms corresponding to development of the political economy of the government. This continuity was more present in his later works discussing the ancient Greek political philosophy, in search for an ethics. He was trying to understand how biopolitics and biopower are continuous form of power regardless of the different forms they take over different periods. He focused the third part of his genealogy of the ancient Greeks to explain the patterns of biopolitics practiced by the Cynics.

As a matter of fact, I believe that the Foucauldian theorization are more relevant to the context of the global south more than anything else. The continuity, which Foucault supposed in the European context, becomes coexistence in the context of the global south. For example, Foucault was trying to expose the fact the modern liberal government project did not make a complete rupture with the pre modern police project in seventeenth century in Europe. On the other hand, in the context of the global south (Egypt for example), you do not need to exert the effort of exposing an enclosed continuity; both forms of the exercise of power (modern and pre modern) coexist. On one hand, you can easily notice the existence of modern-like institutions. On the other hand, these institutions are underdeveloped that they only function by harnessing the traditional pre modern techniques of governing. This has to be explained through the genealogy of the modern institutions in Egypt. Unlike modernism in Europe, which was a bottom up project emerging from a social conflict among different fractions of society, modernism in Egypt was far from being an organic bottom up project. On the contrary, it was enacted through an attempt from above to modernize Egypt in a way that it imitates Europe. This resulted in modern institutions in the country do not resemble the social reality and hence modern techniques of government being alien to Egyptian society. This

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posed the state of Egypt with a challenge: how to establish a modern government in a pre modern society. This challenge was responded to by interweaving those institutions’ techniques with the traditional structures and exercise of power, which is how we can explain the intertwining of the local police station in Al-Mataria and the traditional power structures of the neighborhood. Before moving to discuss this more in-depth, I would like to situate the emerging popular quarters of Cairo in the broader context of the project of modernizing Egypt.

3.4. Governmentality of the Public Space of the City under Neoliberalism

In previous sections we have explained the importance of the city as the main form of the public space under capitalism. This section will be dedicated to explain how to understand the public space of the city within the process of neoliberal subject formation. Neoliberalism has often been celebrated as a "retreat" of the state in favor of unleashing the freedom of the people. However a closer look at this form of "retreat" tells us that this rolling back of the state is nothing but a different technique of government corresponding to the neoliberal sociopolitical and economic developments. Simply put, government has transferred the task of the government to nonstate entities, via "the fabrication of techniques that can produce a degree of 'autonomization' of entities of government from the state". Those different techniques of governing are the means to achieve the "vertical encompassment" according to which the state is able to achieve a twofold mission of overseeing the whole society and also intervene in the everyday life of the people, a task that is never completed without the mediation of the civil society. It is important here to note that civil society is not the civil society explained by Gramsci. It is not set of institutions. Rather, it is various assemblages of non-state actors.

An example of such mediation is taken from the Egyptian case. Due to its rapid economic growth compared to other parts of the country, Cairo attracts numerous people from rural areas. The bulk of those immigrants work in transportation as it has a relatively easy admission. Since the state is being outnumbered by all those newcomers, another informal technique has to be deployed. The security apparatus informally recruits someone from the same village to ensure the surveillance over those newcomers. This person is one example of the civil society. This project will deploy this understanding of how neoliberalism works in the space of the city to understand the social dynamics of the neighborhood of Al-Mataria.

As discussed previously in the (introduction) of this thesis, neoliberalism enforced the financialization on the social reality. Space, among various aspects of the social reality, has become a subject of financialization. Hence, we are noticing a shrinkage in the public spaces which offer access to everyone. Privatization and financial optimization of space has turned many public places to restricted-access-private-places. Instead of architects being the primary authority over designing spaces, this authority has moved to the hands of property developer. On the other hand, space cannot be separated from time. “As Lefebvre noted, Space is nothing but the inscription of time in the world; spaces are the realizations, inscriptions in the simultaneity of the external world of a series of times, the rhythms of the city, the rhythms of the urban population. (Lefebvre, 1970, cited in Kofman and Lebas, 1996: 17). As time has become a commodity as a result of neoliberal mode of production and exchange being spilled over the boundaries of space and time, all spaces has become spaces of exchange. The space has become a place of transit which can receive any commodity, and be a space of any exchange whatsoever. It is common to see people in public parks (where they enjoy public access) or in cafes (where they have limited access) during weekends are glued to their chairs, their eyes are glued to the screens of their laptops and their fingers are flying over their laptops' keyboards typing. It is also common to see all sorts of street vendors, who occupies the spaces of the popular quarters, available 24/7 trying to make

106 Ibid: 54
a commodity out of their time and the public space. The time and space used to be free
time and spaces of leisure have become time and space which can and should be utilized
to produce a commodity and then generate money. These two developments have
destroyed the line which has long thought of as separating the private from the public.
This leads us back to our theoretical framework resting upon governmentality, which
works along the line that separates the public and the private, and make it porous.
The distinction between private and public then has become problematic.

Michel Foucault has problematized this distinction even more. He suggested that, one of
the consequences of industrialization and rationalization is to extend the disciplinary
scheme to include the government of the self. For Foucault, discipline begins from the
organization of individuals in space which is manifested in the organization of the ‘docile
bodies’ of the individuals in different social institutions like the barracks, the hospitals,
the prison, the factory and the school.

Disciplinary space tends to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies
or elements to be distributed. One must eliminate the effects of imprecise
distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse
circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-
desertion, anti-vagabondage, anti-concentration. Its aim was to establish
presences and absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up
useful communications, to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to
supervise the conduct of each individual, to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its
qualities or merits. It was a procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering
and using. Discipline organises an analytical space.

The interest in controlling the individuals’ conducts has a specific purpose, which is to
ensure the enrollment of each and every individual in the perpetuated process of
production and circulation. Space of the city - as the locus of modernity,
industrialization, and then capitalism – was perceived as the representations of spaces

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of maximum efficiency and productivity of the individuals. Another aspect of imagining the modern city was to ensure the surveillance of individuals to prevent any revolutionary potential. Hence, the modern city was planned in order to enable the government to accumulate the necessary information and knowledge about individuals in order to ensure their discipline within the limits of the social reality inscribed by the capitalist mode of production.  

3.4.1. Public Space and Police through the Lens of Governmentality

That being said, we can begin to elaborate on how space is being shaped by the contemporary logic of government, this chapter will follow Foucault’s understanding of space as an element of power. In Foucault’s concept of governmentality, he provided us with a basis upon which we can understand the relation between government and space. First, it is power, which informs the techniques of governing, to an end of conducting the conduct of the population. But power, as understood by Foucault, is dispersed, fluid, and has no center. Hence, it does not suffice to investigate neoliberal government institutional behavior to understand the dynamism of the neoliberal social space. In that sense, unpacking the power is only possible by shifting the focus to how power is being exercised at the micro level i.e.: how the state and society interacts in the everyday. Hence, we can understand how state institutions are liquefied in the form of processes intertwined with the society on the same plane of relationality. It is worth noting that this relationality is not limited to the state society interaction in the public space, since conducting the conduct of the population extends to the private space as explained by Foucault in his analysis of the government of the self.

For Foucault, the most important tool of the neoliberal government is the police. However, Foucault conceptualizes the police as social dynamics not as an apparatus. His

111 A Companion to Foucault: 385
understanding of the police as such comes from the seventeenth century understanding of the term as the raison d’État of the state.\textsuperscript{114} In that sense, police is an encompassing phenomenon, which aims at disciplining the population in order for the government to make sure that the subjects will reproduce the "good order".\textsuperscript{115} The main difference between this old conceptualization of the police and the contemporary one lies merely in the strategy of government which shifts from punishment to discipline. Back then the primary strategy was coercion directed at the "docile bodies" of the subjects,\textsuperscript{116} and then this task of punishment was mainly the task of the police. On the other hand, the post French revolution government rests upon the idea of discipline and the process of making a self-disciplined subject through a conductive conduct, which is being performed through hybrid techniques and strategies. However, both understandings of the police - pre and modern ones- intertwine, since most of the policing tasks are being taken care of by the institution of the police, especially when it comes to policing the public space. In later sections, this project will elaborate more on how the local police station plays the most important role in harnessing the power structure of the neighborhood to achieve the purpose of the government i.e.: the making of self disciplining subjects.

I would like to close this section by a brief note on the role of the police in the public space as constructed by neoliberal governmentalitity in the poor countries. Neoliberalism has reworked the social reality in a way to ensure a constant motion of the subjects, which feeds into the process of circulation of commodities not to be bound by time or space. As such, Neoliberalism has created an atomized society where each and every individual should bear the full responsibility of making out of his time a commodity eligible for circulation.\textsuperscript{117} This logic, in turn, gave a rise to the individual competition for acquiring social status. This logic of competition as random as it seems is carefully organized through social

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institutions: public or private. However, in poor countries, which suffer from the weakness of the institutional order, the social institutions cannot contain and rationalize the logic of an atomized society. This is more present in the poor areas of the poor countries, which emerged beyond the planning of the government. In an absence of the state as the primary service provider, the immediate interaction between the people in those neighborhoods and the state is limited to the local police station. Hence, police as an apparatus plays the primary role in the disciplining/policing project, and since it also suffers weakness as an apparatus it combines formal and informal techniques to achieve this purpose.

3.5. Neoliberal Subject Formation in the Ashwaiyyat: The Police in the Everyday

As mentioned above, the informality of the popular quarters challenges the logic of control of modernity. The randomness of these neighborhoods and their independence vis-a-vis the state makes them hard to control through the modern techniques of government. The narrow streets, the predominance of family politics, and their dependence on informal sources of services, like water and electricity makes it hard for the government to perform its basic tool of control over the population, which is counting and keeping record of the population. For example, it is rare to find an apartment in Al-Mataria with a formal electricity meter, for most of the building are built without governmental permission and hence they depend on informal electric connections from public source of power. Hence, these neighborhoods are given the name of ashwa‘iyyat (the haphazards) by the government-- a name which perhaps illustrates how the government perceives those neighborhoods and how these neighborhoods are related to the government.

The word ashwai‘yyat was not an objective term to describe the relative independence of the popular quarters. It was a discursive process to categorize these quarters and the
people live there.\textsuperscript{118} Hence, the word itself was a political tool emerged out of a political process, which needs to be contextualized. Understanding the political context of the term Ashwai’yyat will help us understand how the government perceives the new popular quarters as per the official discourse, and then understand the formal governmental techniques controlling the popular quarters.

Parallel to the emergence of the popular quarters in Cairo in the 1970s, the country witnessed a rise in the Islamist movement. This was part of the war waged by Anwar Sadat against the nationalists, Nasserites, and the leftists in the country. He invited back the Islamists who were exiled by Nasser. He opened the spaces for the Islamists to be politically active, especially in the public universities where the student activism was monopolized by the leftists. Many fights were reported during the 1970s in the universities where Islamists students used to chase leftists students and hit them with steel chains.

The retreat of the state from providing services, gave the Islamists another area to exist actively. In the popular quarters, especially at the early stage of their emergence, most of the public services were provided by Islamic organization like the Muslim Brotherhood and Game'yya Share'yya. They used to build mosques and attached to them local hospital and small schools. Until now, one of the most important hospitals in Al-Mataria is the hospital attached to Nour Mohammadi Mosque which is known as Nour Mohammadi Hospital. Hence, the Islamists earned a great amount of social respect in these quarters. Capitalizing on this respect and making use of the absence of government in those popular quarters, the Islamists thought of those neighborhoods as safe haven. The Islamists’ existence in the popular quarters has evolved into an Islamic militancy in the early nineties, where a group of militants declared the Islamic Republic of Imbaba in the popular quarters of Imbaba( another popular quarter on the north-west bank of the Nile in Greater Cairo) in 1992.\textsuperscript{119} This premature group was crushed in just few months, by December 1992 after deploying about 18,000 heavily-armed security forces troops to lay a siege of the quarter.

After this incident, the government started to pay more attention towards the social
dynamics of popular quarters. Which started by police campaigns to arrest suspicious
Islamist extremists in the popular quarters. For example, there was Fateh mosque, in Al-
Mataria, which was controlled by Muslim Brotherhood and Game'yya Share'yya (The
Islamic Association)\textsuperscript{120}. The mosque used to invite prominent Muslim scholars preachers,
like Wagdy Ghonaim, A Muslim Brother from Alexandria, and Mohamed Hassan, a salafi
preacher, to give lectures in the mosque. The audience of those lectures was by
hundreds filling the mosque and blocking the street also. After 1992, the people in
charge of the mosque were attacked, some of them were detained for years by the state
security apparatus, and the ministry of endowment took over the mosque preventing
appointing official Imams from the ministry, authorized by Azhar, replacing the former
popular extremist ones.

Dealing with Ashwai'yyat has become a problem to be dealt with on the national scale.
Both state-controlled and opposition media started to present people from Ashwai'yyat
as uncivilized, potentially criminals, and almost savages. They used to interpret the rise
of Islamism in those quarters as a result of the backwardness of its inhabitants.
President Mubarak in his speech on the occasion of May day 1993, addressed the
problem of Ashwai'yyat as a problem of national security, and it has to be dealt with in
order to preserve country's stability. Afterwards, the government has announced a
large-scale plan to upgrade the informal neighborhood. Roughly eighty neighborhoods
were to declared as the subject of this plan. They should be comprehensively serviced,
both with basic infrastructure—water, wastewater and electricity connections—as well
as “streetwidening, lighting and paving. In other words, the government was hoping to
resume the project of modernity in those neighborhoods, aiming at reorganize their
public spaces to fit the more recent project of modernity.

This upgrade plan was a mere reaction to the 1992 Imbaba incident. Although it
managed to upgrade some of the popular quarters of Cairo by providing some public
services, these provisions were lacking and uneven in a number of respects, namely for
two reasons. The first is that this plan dealt with the emergence of the popular quarters

\textsuperscript{120} Translated by the author
as a static phenomenon turning a blind eye to potential expansion. The popular quarters of Cairo expanded more, and their expansion surpassed the government capacity to upgrade and hence modernize them. The second reason why the government's upgrade plan was not successful in the popular quarters was that it was not aligned with the general governmental policies. The 1990s has witnessed a rise in the neoliberalization policies, with the rise of privatization and the retreat of government from providing public services.

The failure of the government upgrade plan intensified the failure of modernity in the popular quarters of Cairo. This necessitated the government combine informal techniques with the formal techniques of government to control those neighborhood.

\section*{3.6. Conclusion}

In this chapter, I tried to elaborate on how the relations of social practices, representations of spaces and spaces of representations, informed the dynamics of public spaces of the popular quarters of Cairo. By focusing on the “spatial practices of the ordinary practitioners of the city”,\textsuperscript{121} as well as the government intended plans to the city, this chapter examined the historic roots of the tension between the \textit{ashwai‘yyat} and the government, dated back to the project of modernity.

My argument is that the emergence of the \textit{Ashwai‘yyat} interrupts the project of modernity which aims at planning the city of Cairo to resemble the European city. To do so, I have started by situating the thesis within the theoretical approaches to the issue of the public space. Section (2.1.2) is dedicated to elaborate more on Lefebvre’s understating of the process of production of space. However, the social space cannot be equated with other products, since things are mere products of the social relations. The actualization of the product follows the completion of the process of production. However, the social space is conditioning the social relations of production and exchange as much as it is produced by them. The actualization of the social space exists on the same plane with the social relations of production not subsequent to them.

\textsuperscript{121} Remaking: 22
Building on Lefebvre’s understanding of space, I have discussed the public space of the city and then gave a historical overview of the planning of the city of Cairo, according to the values of modernity. Situating the popular quarters of Cairo within the project of modernity in Egypt, I have elaborated on how the emergence of those quarters challenge the project of modernity, by preserving the premodern power relations, along with The maze-like spaces which do not offer the government a point of view, and hence make the space impossible to control by the logic of modernity.

Afterwards, I have situated the discussion of spaces of Cairo within the lens of governmentality. I have started by elaborating on the relevance of the Foucauldian governmentality to the Egyptian context, which witnesses the coexistence of the pre-modern and modern techniques of power. Then I have elaborated on how the lens of governmentality can help us to understand the social dynamics of the neoliberal city. An essential technique of government is the police. By police, I do not mean the modern institutions of security apparatus. Instead, I am building on the seventeenth century understanding of the police, as explained by Foucault, as an encompassing social phenomenon prevails over the public space.

Following the thread of police and space through the lens of governmentality, I have closed the chapter by elaborating on how the spaces of the ashwai’yyat were informed under neoliberalism. The challenge posed by the spaces of the popular quarters was intensified under neoliberalism. The retreat of government from providing social services, like healthcare, proper education, jobs, and proper housing encouraged the inhabitants of the popular quarters to acquire more independence vis-a-vis the state, and then informal life has prevailed over those neighborhoods. The population of the Ashwai’yyat depended more on informal economic activities, informal services like power and water connections, and charity networks, mainly controlled by Islamists. In the early 1990s all these factors came together to make the popular quarters a threat to the security of the state by providing Islamists with safe haven.

After dealing with the Islamic Republic of Imbaba, the state has started to deal with the Ashwai’yyat as a threat. The spaces of the neighborhoods were heavily policed. The local police station was more integrated within the traditional power structures of the neighborhood, and the charity networks were infiltrated by members of the National Democratic Party (NDP). From the 1990s on, the local police station has been the manifestation of the state with which interferes with the everyday of the people, the most. This interference was accomplished through the hybrid networks combining formal and informal techniques of policing the public space. In the following chapter I will explain the emergence of
this hybrid networks through examining the contemporary development of the rationale of the Egyptian government from welfare state of Nasser to the neoliberal state of Sadat and Mubarak.
Chapter 4: Egypt from welfare to neoliberalism:

This chapter will build on the theoretical discussion of the shift from the welfare to the neoliberal state in (section 2.2). In the following sections, we will see how neoliberalism has challenged the welfare state, in Egypt, on the three fronts as policy, ideology and governmentality, and how this shift informed the neoliberal subject formation in the popular quarters of Cairo.

This shift from welfare to neoliberal state in Egypt was an incremental process started by Sadat’s open door policy around the mid 1970s\textsuperscript{122} according to which he wanted to restructure the Egyptian economy to be a more export-oriented economy.\textsuperscript{123} The open door policy has been transformed into neoliberal policy by Mubarak in the early 1990s. For example, in 1991 holding companies has been established for 314 public sector enterprises which marks the start of the privatization process.\textsuperscript{124} For the people, it has been a dramatic transformation in the way they experience their everyday life; from living under a caretaker state to a state which withdrew from providing basic needs.

Before elaborating more on the transition from welfare to neoliberalism, which will be started by elaborating on the origins of the welfare state in Egypt, I would like to start by giving some examples from the public discourse on how this shift affected the people’s life. The first example is the character of Ali El-Badry as portrayed by Osama Anwar Okasha, the Egyptian screenwriter, in one of the most important Egyptian drama series Layaly El-Helmiy’a. During Nasser’s era, Ali was a young man full of enthusiasm and activism. After Infitah Ali’s character has witnessed a dramatic change. His inner conflict between his principals and the new era’s parameters was resolved as Ali became just a businessman, who is in a fierce pursuit of just the profit accumulation. He has reached a conclusion that those principles, he once stood for, are outdated and he has to adapt to the new world. Another example is the movie Ded El-Hokoma, which tells the story of Moustafa, an ill-mannered lawyer, who used to con his client. A wake up call came to him after his son was injured in a bus accident. He took the case with a determination that

\textsuperscript{122} Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/infitah
the government has to be sued. In his last plea, he admitted his corruption as part of his
loyalty to the era. He then tells his story from Nasser to Infitah; from speaking the
language of principals and national values to realizing the law of the 1970s according to
which he has traded in everything: law, honor, and everything else.

4.1. The Origins of the Welfare State of Egypt

Many students of contemporary Egypt use the term of welfare state to describe the
defining theme of the country's post 1952 political economy, which extended through
Nasser’s era i.e.: the 1950s and the 1960s. However, many scholars believe that the
rise of the welfare state in Egypt was not planned by the Free Officer. It is believed that
the Free Officer did not have a specific ideological bias. Hence, the emergence of the
welfare state in the 1960s and the 1970s was the result of trial and error. As a matter of
fact, it was not the immediate strategy of the Free Officer just after they seized power.
On the contrary, the first Nasserite attempt was pursuing a “guided capitalist” model
over the period from 1954 to 1960. The friction between the capitalists and the Free
Officers' government made it impossible for one side to trust the other, and then the
"guided capitalism" model has failed to start the surge of nationalization which started by
the National Bank of Egypt and Bank Misr on February 11, 1960. This step was followed
by several steps along this path, nationalizing all banks and insurance companies, 50
heavy industrial and shipping companies, as well as 83 companies in light processing and
public works which became 50 percent state-owned. Also the state acquired a 10 to 50
percent interest in 147 medium-sized firms. In conclusion, the Free Officers did not
came to power with neither an aim for how their government should look like, nor a plan
to attain that aim. Their only strategy was how to prolong their reign in the most basic
form. Hence, in their socioeconomic endeavors they were trying to search for social
allies, a social group which acts as the social bearing of the government. After failing to

125 Ismail, S. (2006). Political life in Cairo’s new quarters: Encountering the everyday state (N - New ed.) University of
find this in the capitalists, Nasser's government decided to rework the social composition of the country to "create a modern middle class".128

4.1.2. The Creation of the Modern Egyptian Middle Class

The creation of this modern middle class was the outcome of a hybrid strategy. Firstly, the nationalization which made the government the primary employer for the population. Secondly, a large network of social services was employed. Public services like healthcare, food supplies, education and housing were subsidized. Education was free for all, and jobs for all universities graduate was guaranteed. In other words, the government was committed to the social reproduction of the population129. Thirdly, there was the founding of the ideological body which mobilizes the beneficiaries of Nasser's economic policies but on an ideological basis. This was the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) for which the preparation started in late 1961.130

This socioeconomic rationale of the welfare state is what shaped the spaces of everyday life of the population, especially the population of the rising middle class. It is noteworthy that the modern Egyptian middle class was Nasser's creation. They were either proletarized agrarian class or workers of the new nationalized factories. This process of proletarization, has created a surge of immigration from the agrarian areas to the cities, especially the city of Cairo. Therefore, Nasser had to create new spaces to include this surge of immigrants within the city. Hence, it is important to look at the housing policies of Nasser's government to understand how this class was positioned within the city of Cairo, and how their public space was shaped.

Before Nasser, there was no clear housing policies since housing was the responsibility of the private sector. Hence, The housing policies of Nasser was focused on incorporating this rising middle class within the city by assigning direct investment to affordable housing for low and middle-income classes as a tool to promote the new class which acts

as the social bearing of the Free Officers government.\textsuperscript{131} More than 32,000 homes were built by the state from 1952 to 1960 at a cost of 24 million Egyptian pounds.\textsuperscript{132} The following figure highlights the government spending in the housing sector from 1952 to 1964.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Project</th>
<th>Cost in LE</th>
<th>Number of Buildings</th>
<th>Number of Dwelling Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ain al-Sirah</td>
<td>79,367</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izbat Haridi</td>
<td>159,306</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Darassah</td>
<td>71,043</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Zawiyah al Hamra</td>
<td>839,890</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>2,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Amiriyah</td>
<td>495,951</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halwan</td>
<td>1,210,267</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramlat Bulaq</td>
<td>438,216</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jisr al-Bahr al-A’zam</td>
<td>20,174</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Tur’ah al-Bulaqiyah</td>
<td>26,766</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izbat Wahbi</td>
<td>29,717</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Assan</td>
<td>182,660</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qalali</td>
<td>25,369</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Amiriyah</td>
<td>121,895</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maydan al-Matariyah</td>
<td>40,578</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shari al-Shihab bil Matariyah</td>
<td>77,796</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadi al-Sabiryah</td>
<td>301,544</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shari al-Khalij bil Matariyah</td>
<td>241,132</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Sharabiyyah</td>
<td>439,601</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Tariq al-Muwazi</td>
<td>547,194</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharb al-Yasar</td>
<td>79,800</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Abajiyah</td>
<td>410,603</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,838,869</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>14,542</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these dwelling units, 28% are one-room apartments; 54% are two-room apartments; and only 18% are three-room apartments, even though the assumed average size of occupant families is six, in empirical studies, has been found to be closer to seven.

Source: Abu-Lughod, 231

As we can see, all the neighborhoods subject to government spending were either neighborhoods at the outskirts of the city, like Helwan, Al-Mataria, Zawiya Hamra, or neighborhoods adjacent to older, and more urbanized neighborhood like Ramlet Bulaq adjacent to Zamalek. As we can see, the development was constructed in the suburbs of the city to incorporate the proletarized peasants moving from rural areas to Cairo. It is

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid: 68
also to offer the new generations, born in the heart of the city, a space to move to. For example, both my parents moved from Shubra Masr and Bab El-Saha'reyya - two old popular quarters of Cairo - to Zawya Hamra in the late 1950s.

4.1.3. The Public Space of the Popular Quarters under the Welfare State

This affordable houses used to be called Masaken Sha'biyya (Popular Housing). It is important to see how those popular housing were designed in order to complement the rationale of the welfare state shaping the everyday of the population. The buildings were five to six floors height maximum. There were public gardens which was taken care of by government officials. There were also sports arenas in the streets were youth used to play football among other sports like weight lifting and boxing. The government used to organize football championships for neighborhoods in Ramadan. My father used to represent Waili and plays against teams from Amiriyah, Sharabeyya, etc. There was also a public library close to the neighborhood reachable by walk or public transportation. In that sense, the government was committed to the social reproduction of the population as mentioned above. The population were thankful for Nasser's government which provided them this quality life which includes, education, healthcare, food supplies, and proper housing with proper public spaces for leisure.

I would like to close this section by explaining how the different components of the welfare state rationale contributed in shaping the everyday of the people from the popular quarters. The fact that the government used to take care of the basic needs of the population made them not worrying about earning money. They were enjoying the free education up to the free universities, knowing that their jobs are secured in the public sector. The spaces of production were limited in a large part to the nationalized factories, public hospitals, and government institutions of bureaucracy. The spaces of exchange were also concentrated like national shops for food supplies, Downtown for clothing, Manasra for furniture, etc. Hence, unlike the neoliberal rationale, there was

not much of intertwining between spaces of production and exchange and the spaces of
the everyday. The interaction between the state and the population was organized as
such, with no much of neither state nor market intervention in the everyday. In the
following section, I will show how this rationale was replaced by the neoliberal one after
Sadat's open door policy and how this shift affected the spaces of the everyday of the
population.

4.2. The Shift to Neoliberalism

4.2.1. From Open Door to Neoliberalism

As stated above, the Free Officers did not have a specific ideological belief. In that sense,
they were pursuing politics in an opportunist manner. This explain how the vice president
of Nasser, Anwar Sadat, toppled his predecessors welfare rationale in favor of liberalizing
the economy. It is noteworthy that Sadat's shift to open door policy was not an arbitrary
decision. There was a social context which provided the pretext for the emergence of
that decision. The six years, followed the defeat of 1967 and until the victory of 1973,
caused economic hardship to the country. Most of the public funding were directed
towards rebuilding the military, which affected all other aspects of economy. Overall
growth levels had dropped to 3% in 1973, while unemployment stood above 10% of the
civilian labor force. A solution to rising unemployment was the expansion of the public
sector and the army that absorbed a high portion of the educated unemployed
population. Sadat's government have managed to keep the subsidies, in order not to
break the social contract of Nasser, which should ignite an uncontrollable social conflict.
However, the high level of inflation caused Sadat to borrow money to secure the
subsidies, which led to a dramatic rise in the external debt of Egypt. All these factors
served as the socioeconomic pretext of the Open Door policy announced in 1974. It is
noteworthy that Sadat's liberalization of the economy was never complete as it was faced
by a considerable social resistance, which reached its peak in January 1977 when he
announced the removal of some of the food subsidies. That decision lead to mass

demonstrations in Cairo, which spread social unrest for few days and could not be controlled before the army took over the streets. As an effect of these "food riots", as they were coined later, Sadat's government rolled the decision to lift subsidies back. However, as I will explain later, Sadat's 1977 plan was implemented but gradually and without official announcement.

After Sadat has been assassinated, Mubarak - who was the vice president of Sadat - came to power in 1981. He inherited a country with an assassinated leader and a deep economic crisis. Egypt's debt rose from $2 billion in the late 1960s to $21 billion by 1981. The way, Mubarak dealt with this situation was that he activated Sadat's 1977 plan but in a span of more than two decades instead of one night, to avoid the recall of the social upheaval. He started by supporting the private sector while keeping an eye on the welfare of the citizens, and this is why supporting the private sector in the 1980s did not mean to abolish the public sector. It was not until the early 1990s when Mubarak started the privatization project. The first step of this project was law 203, in June 1991 which determined 314 public sector companies to be privatized. As of June 2002, 190 out of 314 were privatized.

4.2.2. Social Fabric of Neoliberal Egypt

As a matter of fact, the liberalization policies of Sadat and Mubarak have not sprung of just the economic necessity. They were one of the tools, which was used by Sadat in his war against Nasser's legacy. By liberalizing the economy, he shifted the orientation to the United States instead of Nasser's orientation towards the Soviet Union. Thus, Sadat managed to replace the old beneficiaries of Nasser, who were the fetus of the modern social class, with a new social group, which was consisted mainly of businessmen. However, the cost of making the new social class of the businessmen were paid by the majority of the population who used to enjoy government spending on the public

137 http://www1.aucgypt.edu/src/wsite1/Pdfs/Privatization%20in%20Egypt%20Quarterly%20Review.pdf : 8.
services. The retreat of the government from providing the public services was accompanied by increase in the number of the poor people dependant on the government spending. Moreover, this retreat was not replaced by private sector, which is more concerned with profit making. Hence, the life conditions of the majority of the population have deteriorated. On the other hand, corruption and lack of transparency caused a small group of the population to get richer. In a nutshell, we can say that liberalization of the Egyptian economy has failed to create an organized capitalist class. On the contrary, it resulted in the poor pay the expenses of the rich getting richer.

On another hand, Sadat's war against Nasserite trenches was not limited to the political economy. It also had an ideological component. As discussed earlier, Sadat opened the spaces for the Islamist activism to counter the leftist and the nationalist activism. Sadat also has explicitly expressed his ideological orientation towards islamization of the government. In a public speech he announced Egypt as the state of science and faith (Dawlat E'lm wal E'eman) and he announced himself as a Muslim president leading an Islamic country (Ra'ees Moslem le Dawla Islamiyya). He even ratified the Egyptian constitution in 1971, and stated in its second article, which still present, Islam as the religion of the state, Arabic as the official language, and sharia as a principle source of legislation. All those steps from Sadat's government allowed the Islamists to rise from their underground trenches and to organize themselves in public organizations.

Opening spaces for Islamism was not only to counter the hegemony of the leftists and nationalists. Islamic activism was thought of as filling the gap left by the retreat of the state from providing public services, which was not filled by the private sector for obvious reasons. Hence, Islamic charity and development organizations occupied this area, to represent 34% of all charity-oriented associations in Egypt by 1990. Most of these charity organizations were operating in the poor neighborhoods which were

139 http://sadat.bibalex.org/Search/NewSearchResults.aspx?TabName=&Title=%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%B1
140 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iFDdlB0zzuw&feature=youtu.be
provided heavily with the government social assistance programs. Gami’yya Shari’yya is one of the oldest and biggest charity Islamic organizations which operates on a national scale. It has one of its main premises in Cairo in Al-Mataria, and one of the most popular hospitals in Al-Mataria is Nour Mohammadi hospital, owned by Gami’yya Shari’yya. It is noteworthy that some branches of Gami’yya Shari’yya used to be dominated by board members who used to be active members in the National Democratic Party. Through the rest of this section, I will examine how the liberalization of the economy shaped the public space of the popular quarters.

**4.2.3. The Public Space of Cairo's Popular Quarters under Neoliberalism**

In our discussion of the public space of Cairo's popular quarters under Nasser, we have shed lights on how the welfare rationale shaped those public spaces. It is noteworthy that we have reached a point that 60% of Cairo's inhabitants are occupying informal housing, which are built on former agrarian land without government permit. This phenomenon has to be explained through the dramatic increase in delegation of housing by the private sector starting from the mid 1970s. The private sector rationale caused a huge inflation in the prices of the housing market which made it inaccessible to low-income citizens. Hence, the solution for the poor was to resort to informal housing.

The popular quarters, which were the sites of the popular housing, became the sites which have the majority of the informal housings. It is important to understand how the spaces of the popular quarters have been shaped by the neoliberal eras. Firstly, instead of having five to six floor buildings, we have know buildings up to fifteen floors, built on a former agrarian land without permit. The public gardens of Masaken Sha'beyya were destroyed, either by the fact that the government stopped taking care of them, or because they were taken over by people using them for commercial spaces, like parking spaces, kiosks or small shops. Hence, people living in popular quarters losing reasons to

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143 Ibid: 190
144 Malterr-Barthes, C. (2016). Housing Cairo: From small-scale informal housing construction to semi-professional speculative urban schemes. ETH, Zurich: 1
be thankful for the government. They have became independent in their way of life, and the only space of interaction with the government was the police, as we will explain later.

In conclusion, we can compare the everyday of the popular quarters' inhabitants under the welfare state rationale, and under the neoliberal rationale. The retreat of the government from providing the basic needs of the population, made them always worrying about making living. People were also proposed with opportunities to prosper financially. Those opportunities were mechanisms of discipline, since they were leading to people commodifying their time, and hence subscribe their lives to the logic of the market. Although, free education is still there and subsidies are still partially there, there is a huge decline in the quality of services provided by government: food, education, or healthcare. Jobs for university graduates are not secured anymore. Young people have to be ready to take any job available in the market regardless of whether or not this job matches his/her qualification. Hence, the spaces of production and exchange are not bound by time or space. For example, a small agrarian land in front of the building where we live as destroyed and turned into a parking lot which serves all day. In our small alley which is approximately 3 meter wide and about 90 meter tall has 8 shops: a carpenter, a tailor, a grocery shop, an electrician. On the other hand, exchange has stopped being specialized and concentrated in certain places. For example, you do not have to go to downtown to buy clothes, there are several shops which offers the same goods offered in downtown. Hence, unlike the neoliberal rationale, there was not much of intertwining between spaces of production and exchange and the spaces of the everyday. As we can see, everyday life under neoliberalism is different from the everyday of the population under welfare state. This difference is reflected in the disciplining techniques which will be discussed through the rest of this chapter.

4.3. Neoliberal Subject Formation from Welfare to Neoliberal State

Through the previous sections, I have explored the development of the Egyptian society through the shift from welfare state rationale to the neoliberal one. However, in order for us to achieve the aim of this chapter, the development of the Egyptian society has to be complemented with an examination of the development of the disciplining techniques.
Hence, the rest of this chapter will be dedicated to explore how the techniques of disciplining the population have evolved in accordance with the transformation of the government rationale i.e.: from welfare state to the neoliberal state. By doing so, we will be able to have the proper introduction of the role of the local police station in the popular quarter, which will be the topic examined through the following chapter.

4.3.1. Nasser, the Pastor

We can argue that the most important ideological success of Nasser's discourse was the construction of the concept of the people Al-Sha'ab. This construction was examined by the Egyptian historian Sherif Yunis through his book The Calling of the People (2012). In that book Yunis argued that the hegemonic concept of the people during Nasser's era was, in fact, constructed to legitimize the rule of the Free Officers' government in the name of the people.

In fact, the concept of the people was also a disciplining mechanism according to which citizens are classified whether they are part of the people or enemies of the people. Looking at critiques of Nasser's era, which came in forms of novels or movies, gives us an idea about how the term "enemies of the people" or "enemies of the nation" was used. For example the movie We are the People from the Bus (E'hna betoo' El-O'tobees) produced in 1979 telling the story of two commoners, who were mistakenly detained while riding a bus. The movies examined the randomness of the political detention and cruelty of the torture in Nasser's prison. What feeds into our discussion from this movie is Sergeant Abdul-A'ty conception about the detainees. He referred to them as the evil guys, enemies of the people and enemies of the nation. The finale of the movie was the radio broadcasting the news about 1967 defeat and Sergeant Abdul-A'ty wondering in tears:"All the evil guys are in jail now, why are not we victorious".

The construction of the concept of the people in Nasser's era is a byproduct of the welfare state rationale. Hence, it is important to examine the disciplining mechanisms of the welfare state, which starts with a government taking care of its population. The concept of "care" in this context brings in Foucault's notion of "pastoral power" to the
discussion, since it is believed to be where the roots of the care of the welfare of the individuals are. This pastoral power is characterized by four themes:

The fundamental nature of the relation of the God-Shepherd to the flock; the constitution of the flock by the shepherd's activity of gathering them together and guiding them so that the flock becomes a 'multiplicity in movement'; the salvation of each and all by means of the shepherd's individualized kindness, his 'beneficence'; and, finally, the shepherd's duty to be devoted without rest and to know the flock as a whole and in detail and to be ready to sacrifice himself for his flock.

If we look closely, we will find all the themes of the pastoral power are applicable in the case of Nasser. Nasser was the shepherd, who gathered the flock of the Egyptian modern class. He was perceived as the father figure of the nation; kids and young people at his times were looking at him as their father, and older generations were looking at him as a prophet. For example, the famous Lebanese poet Nizar Qabbani wrote a lament after Nasser's death saying: "we killed you, last prophet". The good life, the middle class had at Nasser's era was perceived as the product of his own kindness. People from this generation refer to themselves as those who got their education in Nasser's schools, enjoyed the healthcare in his hospitals, and lived the good life in his housing.

This rationale, of the pastoral power, created the self-disciplined citizen. For the majority of the population, a life outside the boundaries of the state was unthinkable. People who thought otherwise were perceived as enemies of the nation and were subject to the oppression of the police.

4.3.2. Neoliberal Policing

147 Ibid: 91
Unlike the police of the welfare rationale, the police of neoliberal governmentality was not limited to discipline whoever thinks of making a life outside the flock. The police played a greater role disciplining the people and intervening in their everyday, especially in popular quarters.

The increase in the role of the police under neoliberal rationale has to be seen in light of dismantling the flock of the welfare state. Under Sadat and Mubarak, people were less dependent on the services provided by the state. The retreat of the state from taking care of the welfare of the citizen resulted in the binding force of the population to evaporate. Population has, then, learned to dependent on themselves. Hence, the state has moved to the background. It is not anymore the primary source of meaning for the people. However, this did not lead to dismantle the population, since the act of governing is not only limited to buying the consent of the people.

As Samer Soliman noted, The preservation of power is the ultimate aim of any government. This is accomplished through controlling the minds and bodies of the population, and promoting the economic development to enrich the legitimacy of the government. In other word, through oppression and consent. Accordingly he categorized public expenditures as follows: "(1) political control expenditures, which include outlays for the security apparatus, for ideological control (the media, culture, religious affairs), and for social expenses that serve to promote legitimacy and political stability (food subsidies, for instance), and (2) economic development expenditures, which cover education, infrastructure, research, promoting exports, and so on."148

In the neoliberal era, the economic development expenditures were not effective to promote the legitimacy of the government. As discussed above, many aspects of social assistance have been delegated to private sector and to Islamic charity organizations, like Gami‘yya Shari‘yya. However, they were supervised formally and informally by the security apparatus. On the other hand, the clashes with the Islamic militancy in the 1990s

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served as the pretext to enlarge the budget of the ministry of interior to be at the top of the list of government agencies whose share of state budget increased in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{149}

Regardless of all the efforts exerted by the government to preserve its power, it has to be complemented with informal techniques. Although, these informal techniques of policing will be the topic of the next chapter I would like to close this chapter by recalling a story, mentioned in the introduction, to explain how the informal connections which links the police with the existent power structure have become central in governing the spaces of the popular quarters.

In early March 2011, there was an attempt to enact reconciliation between the state and the people of Al-Mataria. This attempt was in a form of a public conference where representatives of the state meet with the people and explain the facts to them. This conference took place in one of the halls attached to one of the most popular mosques managed by Gami’yya Shari’yya. The representatives of the state on the panel where a retired police general who was acting as the chief of the neighborhood, a sheikh from Gami’yya Shari’yya who used to live in Al-Mataria and was respected by the people of the neighborhood, and Kamel Salah Abou Eida, the chief of one of the biggest families in the neighborhood. Although this conference has failed since people kept chanting asking for vengeance for the martyrs of the revolution, this gives us an idea about the governing body of the neighborhood.

4.4. Conclusion

The development of the neoliberal policing of the spaces of the new popular quarters has to be examined within the development of the Egyptian state from welfare to state to neoliberalism. This political economic development entails a development in the state society relations. Hence, a development in the mechanisms of policing the public space and disciplining the people.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid: 63
The welfare state of Nasser entailed a model of a caretaker state. After failing to establish a guided capitalist model, Nasser has decided that the social bearings of his government should be a modern middle class. The beginning of the 1960s has witnessed a huge surge in nationalization, so that the government should acquire enough resources to provide the socioeconomic conditions of creating the modern Egyptian middle class. Nasser's government offered food subsidies, healthcare, free education through all stages, and secured jobs in the government sector for all university graduates. Cheap housing was part of Nasser's plan which was manifested in establishing the popular housing *Masaken Sha'beyya* for the poor. These housing projects were established by the government in the popular quarters to offer proper housing for the emerging middle class in Cairo. This rationale entailed the discipline technique of Nasser's governmentality to resemble the pastoral power. The population were dependent on Nasser's government in their everyday, and thought of no possible life outside the borders of the state. Their relation to Nasser resembled the relation of the flock to the shepherd. Hence, the conductive conduct of the government created the self-disciplined subject.

Sadat and Mubarak's responses to the fiscal crises of the late 1960s and the 1980s respectively took a different direction. Sadat applied the open door policy to liberalize the economy and relief the state from the economic burden of the welfare model. This turn was intensified by Mubarak's neoliberalization. The retreat of the government and the rise of the wealthy individuals, who also were known as the fat cats, entailed a transformation in the social fabrics of the Egyptian society. The middle class of Nasser were dispossessed of their benefits they used to enjoy during the 1960s. The retreat of the government forced the middle class to depend on the state less. Hence, the informal labor market has spiked which entailed another informal ways of life. Since the popular quarters were the spaces of Nasser's middle class, they became the spaces of informality under Sadat and Mubarak. Hence, the model of the flock has been dismantled and replaced by an atomized society whose members though less of the state as the source of meaning. This transformation necessitated a turn to informal techniques of policing resembling the informal ways of life, especially in the popular quarters. These informal techniques will be explained in detail in the next chapter through examining the development of the social dynamics of Al-Mataria and how the police station has interfered with it to create the hybrid governmentality.
Chapter 5: Governmentality of Al-Mataria

Through the previous chapters, this thesis tried to examine the themes of space and neoliberalism as the main themes of this study. Throughout the previous chapters, those themes were studied against the backdrop of governmentality as the conceptual lens of the study. It is fair then to proceed from the general discussion of the themes to a more specific stage, where we examine how those themes interact together in the space of the popular quarter of Al-Mataria. Examining this relationality is an examination of an instance of the state society relations in the popular quarters of Cairo. Hence, I would like to start this chapter with a historic background about state society relations in Egypt.

5.1. Characteristics of State Society Relations in Egypt

Politics from above has always been the main characteristic of the Egyptian politics since the foundation of the modern Egyptian state by Mohamed Ali Pasha (1769 - 1849). For example, as Khaled Fahmy explained, the Pasha's main project of building a modern Egyptian army was the backbone of the making of the modern Egyptian state. "It triggered the need to found more and more institutions which together radically transformed the face of Egyptian society". It was the raison d'être of the modern Egyptian state. Many factories were founded to produce commodities for the use of the army, which was their most important market. Most of the schools were opened to graduate officers for the army. Likewise, the earliest modern hospitals to be built in Egypt were essentially military hospitals that were constructed near camps with high troops concentration. Moreover, the army, since it was a conscript army, changed the lives of thousands of Egyptians who were dragged into its service and radically changed
the lives of their families who were often left behind trying to do their best after losing an important, if not the primary, bread winner.\textsuperscript{150}

Another important aspect of the Egyptian politics from above is the arbitrariness. Even when the rule of law has been said to be the governing concept of the state it has never been able to create a rupture with the arbitrary forms of exercise of power; it rather incorporated this arbitrariness, reshaped it and was reshaped by it.\textsuperscript{151} This composite nature of state society relations in Egypt (arbitrariness of the politics from above) will help us to understand how the spaces of the popular quarters in Cairo are governed and policed, which will be the focus of this chapter.

5.1.1. The Threat of the Popular Quarters

The popular quarters of Cairo have always posed a challenge to the logic of the modern government. Firstly, they were spaces interrupting the project of modernity. As places on the outskirts of the capital, they were the most immediate destination of the immigration from the rural parts next to the capital. The increasing numbers of rural immigrants made these areas demographically challenging to the government’s policies and plans, even though the demolitions’ plans.\textsuperscript{152} Secondly, their ‘communal’ self-planning was not in accordance with the project of modernity. As spaces consists of adjacent buildings, narrow streets and alleys, and places are only accessible for Tuktuk drivers, these neighborhoods failed to provide the modern state of Egypt with a vantage point from which the government can accomplish full surveillance over the citizen. Thirdly, the popular quarters of Cairo were the spaces with a majority of unsalaried workers who suffer the most under neoliberalism.\textsuperscript{153} They specifically suffered from the rolling back of government from providing services and social security. Hence, the population of these neighborhoods resorted to depend more on communal and informal social security networks to substitute for the government absence. This type of social

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{150} Fahmy, Khaled. (2002). All the pasha’s men: Mehmed Ali, his army, and the making of modern Egypt: American University in Cairo Press: 12.
\item\textsuperscript{153} Ibid: 207
\end{itemize}
dynamics took place beyond the capacity of the state to regulate it formally, which resulted - at one instance - in the case of Imbaba.

Because of all the previous reasons, popular quarters and their inhabitants were perceived as threatening to the stability of the nation especially after being the spaces where Islamic militancy flourished. In this chapter, I will explore how the neoliberal government dealt with this challenge posed by the popular quarter of Al-Mataria. In other words, I will examine the policing techniques of the neoliberal government of Egypt to control the public space of Al-Mataria. Before moving any further, I would like to make an important remark. Acknowledging that the popular quarters posing a challenge to the government, does not entail an assumption that popular quarters are natural spaces of resistance to the modern government. As a study descending from the Foucauldian conception of power, it acknowledges the productive aspect of power. The study also perceives the social reality as the product of the struggle between views from above and practices from below. Hence, what I will try to examine through the rest of the chapter is how the pre-modern are incorporated in the broader scheme of governmentality which ensures the reproduction of the relations of production. On the other hand, the pre-modern social dynamics of the popular quarters have to be perceived not as a rupture with the logic of the modern government. On the contrary, the lens of governmentality enables us to unveil the continuities which connect pre-modern techniques of exercise of power and the logic of modern government. The continuity which connects the pastoral power with the welfare state is a good example of this phenomena. Hence, the pre-modern social dynamics of the popular quarters has to be analyzed through the logic of the government. This analysis equips us with the comprehensive understanding which allows us to unpack how these pre-modern social dynamics are incorporated within and manipulated by the logic of government. Through this chapter I will examine how the techniques of the modern government are interwoven in the grid of the pre-modern social dynamics of Al-Mataria, through the informal techniques of policing the public space of the neighborhood.
5.2 From the City to the Street

The city is the main form of public space in our modern world. However, the modern city is a hybrid form of space, which includes spaces of public and private institutions and streets. What concerns us specifically in this thesis is the space of the street, which requires a specific attention in examining the neoliberal city. As mentioned in previous chapters the logic of neoliberal production and exchange challenges the limitations of time and spaces. Hence, there is a noticeable rise in using the street as a space of production and exchange, especially in the popular quarters which are the spaces of informality. Public gardens are used as parking lots to generate profit, sidewalks are occupied by street vendors and coffee shops. As Asef Bayat noted, the neoliberal city is "the city inside-out, where a massive number of inhabitants become compelled by the poverty and dispossession to operate, subsist, socialize and simply live a life in the public spaces". In the case of Cairo, this phenomenon is not limited to the popular quarters. However, the government resist it in other quarters while investing in it in the popular quarters. For example, in the last year, the police has raided the coffee shops in Heliopolis, which used to occupy the sidewalks, several times while coffee shops in Al-Mataria are left intact, while occupying more sidewalk spaces. This does not mean that the inhabitants of Al-Mataria are resisting the government by occupying the streets. The thing is, the informality of occupying the sidewalks in Heliopolis stands out in an urbanized neighborhood like Heliopolis, while the informality of occupying the sidewalks of Al-Mataria is normalized. The normalization of this informality is orchestrated by the local police station of Al-Mataria through connecting the formal techniques of policing with the informal power structure of the neighborhood as we will see in the rest of the chapter.

5.3. The Power Networks of Al-Mataria

5.3.1 The Panopticon as a Social Dynamic

The panopticon, as explained by Foucault in Discipline and Punish,\textsuperscript{155} is the structure facilitates the main task of the government as conducting the conduct of the population. The panopticon offers the government the proper point of view to overlook its population and keep track of the individuals. However, the panopticon should not be only limited to the structure. Rather, it has to be understood as social dynamics. As a matter of fact, enacting the task of the panopticon has been the back drop of planning the modern city in accordance with the values of modernity. As Foucault puts it:

The panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of its properties, was destined to spread throughout the whole social body; its vocation was to become a generalised function. The plague-stricken town provided an exceptional disciplinary model: perfect, but absolutely violent; to the disease that brought death; life inside it was reduced to its simplest expression; it was, against the power of death, the meticulous exercise of the right of the sword. The panopticon, on the other hand, has a role in amplification; although it arranges power, although it is intended to make it more economic and more effective, it does not do so for power itself, nor for the immediate salvation of a threatened society: its aim is to strengthen the social forces – to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of public morality, to increase and multiply.\textsuperscript{156}

However, the randomness of Al-Mataria has blocked the access of the government to the point of view from which it can overlook the society and keep track of the individuals. Hence, the panopticon was dismantled and took the form of fluid social dynamics to overcome the challenge posed by the haphazardous emergence of the neighborhood of Al-Mataria . The panopticon has to have the agility to move through the space responding to every alert. On the other hand, the police institution does not have the capacity to deploy personnel in uniform to cover all the space of the maze of Al-Mataria . Therefore, the task of surveillance is being delegated to certain members of

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid: 207-208
society. It is noteworthy that this process of liquefying the panopticon into a social
process is different from the formation of networks of baltagya (thugs) by the police.
Although the job description of baltgeya included disciplining the population in the
public space, by performing the dirty business of terrorizing members of the public, they
were recruited as a task force. For example, they were recruited to break up
demonstrations, intimidate voters and other tasks. On the other hand, the task of the
panopticon neither have a time frame nor a target group. The panopticon is there to
overlook the social dynamics of the space and to discipline the people the people
existing in this space as long as this existence lasts. Hence, the social body upon which
the social dynamics of the panopticon relies on should be more organic, and here comes
the importance of the traditional social structure of the popular quarters.

In order to unpack the dynamics of the process of panopticon I will start by the scene
described in the closing of the last chapter. A Sheikh from Gami’yya Shari’yy was joined
by a police officer, and a representative of one of the biggest clans of the neighborhood,
to achieve the reconciliation between the people of Al-Mataria and the state. In that
sense, the They were gathered not in their personal capacities, but for the sake of what
they represent. For the composition of what they individually represent forms the
actuality of the state as they interact with the population of the neighborhood.

5.3.2 The Role of the Police Station of Al-Mataria

In the following sections I will examine the power networks of the neighborhood. These
networks consist of both formal and informal components. The formal component is
manifested by the police station and the informal components is represented by the
clans and families who used to exercise power over the spaces of the popular
quarters. The most significant characteristic of the Egyptian state is the weakness of the
institutions, including the security institutions. So, the logic of competition and the

enterprise society is not institutionalized. Rather it is generalized within the society and takes different formal and informal forms. More specifically, if we limit our scope to Al-Mataria, which is the place under study, we can find two different forms of competition-based positioning realms. The first one is the formal one within which people acquire social status and prestige through education. The second realm is the informal one within which people acquire their social status through their access to the underground world of outlaws. The dynamics between these two realms are clearly manifested in the public space. It is easy to tell from how someone is dressed and how he talks and interacts whether he is the one who is interested in education as the source of social prestige, or the one who is connected with the underground world.

On the other hand, the role of the government – which is exemplified in the police station – was limited to developing a mechanism of disciplining the outlaws who belong to big families, since these families are in actual control of the public space. This mechanism implies for example that the police station allows them to perform their illegal activities, which are mainly drug dealing and informal construction, and in return the big families hand over some of the insignificant individuals to the police officers in order for the police station to fulfill its mandate on paper. In that sense, the local police station and the traditional power structure of the neighborhood exchange their roles. The latter has become part of the ruling, and the former has become part of the criminal networks. This intertwining was not hidden by the absence of the police personnel from the public space. It was apparent and dominant that the most intense presence of the Egyptian government was in the public space, not as an author of its institutional reconstitution but as part of its dynamics, and hence we can understand why the people of Al-Mataria did not rush to Tahrir square asking for reform. Instead; they chose to encounter the immediate manifestation of the state in their everyday lives, i.e.: burning down the police station.

5.3.3. The Urban Clans of Al-Mataria
Shelagh Weir provides a minimalist definition of the tribe as a territorial polity whose members share a common blood based allegiance which is potentially or actually subordinate to some sort of a state.\textsuperscript{159} The combination of territoriality, blood based allegiance, and politicization is what differentiates tribes from other social groups like religious or ethnic groups which are not necessarily territorial or politicized, political parties which are not territorial and state institutions whose members do not share blood based allegiances. It is noteworthy that the logic of tribalism undermines the logic of modernity at two levels. Firstly, the individuality of the members of the tribe is shadowed by the allegiance to the tribe. Secondly, the blood based allegiance makes the subordination of the individuals to the modern state a subject of negotiation. On the other hand, the territoriality of tribalism undermines the logic of neoliberal government regarding the public space, since the tribes develop their internal mechanisms controlling their territory outside the scope of the government. In order for the tribe to impose its logic in a way which poses a challenge to the government it has to exercise power. In this section I will examine how the clans of Al-Mataria has emerged, how they managed to exercise power over the territories of the neighborhood and how they have been co-opted by the government to be a tool of the neoliberal governmentality instead of resisting it.

Although Al-Mataria as a social space is one of the new popular quarters of Cairo, it has existed as a space a long time ago. The city of Iunu or On, which is the ancient Egyptian name for the city known as "the city of sun" during the Greek period, was situated on the northeastern borders of the city of Cairo below the hill of El-hesn (Tal Hisn), which is part of the neighborhood of Al-Mataria.\textsuperscript{160} The granite obelisk erected by King Senwosri the First, of the twelfth dynasty (1971 BCE—1926 BCE) is still at its ancient position in the area of the Obelisk (Mesalah).\textsuperscript{161} During the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, well cultivated land has occupied most of the space of the neighborhood. Therefore, it was full of palaces used by Muhamad Ali Pasha's family as rest houses. One of those palaces, is the palace of Prince Youssef Kamal, who lived between late nineteenth and early twentieth century. He gave away the palace to princess Shwikar,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[160] http://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/1204?lang=en-us
\item[161] http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/NUM_ORC/OBELISK_Gr_b3EXivrcos_diminutiv.html
\end{footnotes}
who in turn gave it to her son, the Prince Waheed El-Deen Selim after finishing his studies in Paris in 1939. The palace is still in its place, in front of Al-Mataria metro station, and was transformed to the museum of the prince Waheed El-Deen Selim, after being nationalized after the 1952 coup.

After the nationalization surge of 1952, the properties of Muhammed Ali Pasha family became state owned properties. The agrarian lands were given to the farmers, and people who used to work for the royal family either as an effect of the land reforms or after the royal family members flee the country after 1952 leaving their properties without heirs. Many of the new owners of the royal family properties sought to grow wealth by demolishing these properties and erect tall residential buildings. This was the case also with the agrarian lands which was destroyed and transformed into residential buildings. This was one of the dynamics according to which the new clans of Al-Mataria emerged and acquired capital and power. For example, the clan of Gizawy, who used to work for one of the Pashas and was given a piece of land, and built his first residential six-story building. His children and grandchildren, from the 1960s till now, expanded the real estate activity of the family. Abrag Gizaweya (The towers of Gizawy family members), which is the name used to describe the 10 to 12 story buildings owned by Gizawy family members has spread all over the neighborhood.

Another dynamic, according to which the clan of Al-Mataria emerged, was through the immigration from the rural governorates surrounding the city of Cairo. It is noteworthy that big established clans in the rural rarely immigrate from their places to the capital. Whoever immigrates from his original space to the capital is someone who is searching for an opportunity to prosper. Al-Mataria has offered this opportunity for many of the people from the rural governorate next to Cairo, mainly Qalubiyya. The reason why Al-Mataria was the perfect place is that the neighborhood was full of deserted agrarian land, away from the center of the capital which makes it away government supervision. Hence, it was a place suitable for informal money generating activities like destroying agrarian lands and erecting tall buildings instead. This was the case for clans like Abo-Eida, El-Omda, El-Taweel, and others.

162 http://elbadil.com/2012/10/21/66693/
5.3.4. Between the Local Police Station of Al-Mataria and the Big Clans

As we can see, all big clans of Al-Mataria work in the field of construction. However, their economic activities is not limited to that. With the construction, comes dealing in antiquities. As mentioned above, Al-Mataria was an ancient neighborhood. Therefore, it is believed to be floating over a sea of pharaonic antiquities. For example, in last October, an Egyptian German mission has discovered a royal compartment which goes back to the thirties dynasty of the Pharaohs in Al-Mataria, which suggests that there are temples for King Ramsis the second under the neighborhood of Al-Mataria and Ain-Shams.\textsuperscript{163} However, the weak presence of the government in the neighborhood makes the sites of the old monuments deserted lands which are transformed into sites of garbage and a safe haven for drug dealing and other criminal activities. It is worth noting that finding pharaonic antiquities in Al-Mataria and Ain-Shams does not require specialized intervention from experts. As a matter of fact, in our childhood, when we used to play football in the streets and mark the goal by stones from the street, we used to look closely at those stones for they might be antiquities. We could not find any, but others whose economic activities entailed digging found so many, since there is a high possibility to find antiquities just by digging deep enough to lay the foundation of a ten-story building. Since, the big clans who used to work in the real estate, did so informally and most of the buildings they erected were built without permit, their activities were not supervised by the government. Hence, they managed to collect many antiquities from the buildings they established around the area of Mesalah.

However, the heavy activity of construction cannot be accomplished completely outside the supervision of the government, especially if this construction takes place in Mesalah, which is less than 1 kilometer away from the local police station of Al-Mataria.

Therefore, there was a police presence amid these activities. However, the nature of the

\textsuperscript{163} http://alwafd.org/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/917310-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A2%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%A3%D8%AB%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9
presence of the local police station in the activities of construction and dealing in antiquities, has been exposed after 2011 uprising by people who used to work in these activities for the big clans. After storming the local police station of Al-Mataria, people thought that they got rid of power networks which connected the local police station with the economic activities of the big clans of the neighborhood. Hence, people started to tell stories exposing these networks. Regarding the activities of construction, the involvement of the local police station was twofold. Firstly, whenever one of the big clans start the work of digging the police station used to send a sub-officer (Ameen Shorta) to sit in a location where he has a vantage point over the site - or in the exact words of the people who told the story "the sub-officer constable used to hit on the head of the site (a'la ras el-hafr)" to supervise the extraction of the antiquities. By the end of the working day, the police constable used to go back to the chief of the police station with a record of every piece of antiquity they found during the day. The chief of the police station and other high ranked police officers in the police station force whoever found those antiquities to share a percentage with them. This percentage varies depending on the power of the clan whose construction is the subject of negotiation. The stronger the clan is, the less the percentage of the local police station is. In return, the police station turns the blind eye to the whole activity which is legally criminalized. The second component of the local police station involvement in the activities of construction of the big clans, was that the chief of the police station was entitled to be given away an apartment in any building he requires, either for free or for 10% of its actual price. In return, he would turn the blind eye to the construction without permit. Whoever refused to get in these relations were denied constructing and they were subject to the law enforcement. I remember that engineer who is our neighbor, who owns a two-story building, which was built during the 1970s officially and after issuing a permit. In 2004, he thought that he would build a third story for his growing. The fact that this engineer is not a member of one of the big families who are connected with the police station in ways mentioned above, led to demolishing this third floor just after finishing the concrete skeleton.

The relations of exchange examined above were among the big families and the high ranked police officers. There are other relations of exchange among the sub-officers and the apprentices of the big clans who are not family members but work for them. These
relations took place in the field of managing the internal transportation network of Al-Mataria. These relations were partially examined in the first chapter of this thesis, where we examined the mediation of the civil society in the form of recruiting someone to ensure the surveillance over those who work in the field of transportation. What I would like to add here is that the microbuses operating within the maze of Al-Mataria were operating without permits and most of them were owned by sub-officers. The sub-officers were also involved in the small-scale drug dealing. One sub-officer was identified as the one who was responsible for distributing hashish over small hashish dealers. He used to do so at a coffee shop in the area between Al-Mataria and Ain-Shams.

Beside the monthly bribes (Shahreyya) paid by the big clans to the local police station, the previous relations of exchange were benefiting the police personnel in their personal capacities. There was another relation in which the local police station is involved as an institution with the big families. This relation was established through the big families accuse some of their apprentices with small crimes like small theft and small scale drug dealing. They submitted them for the local police station on a monthly basis, so that the police station will keep the appearance of enforcing the law in the neighborhood. On the other hand, the big families used to take care of the families of their apprentices while they were in jail. A story has been told to me from one of its first witnesses in that regard. The story goes as follows: There was this guy in Al-Mataria, who was famous for violence. Part of his activities was doing some of the dirty business for the big families of the neighborhood. In fact, he was registered as a dangerous criminal with record of offence against the person, and therefore he was a constant visitor to the police station of Al-Mataria. However, a couple of years ago, he quit, and decided that he will just take care of his wife and his children. After not visiting the police station for few months, the chief of the police station called for him. He told him, are you upset with anything? has anyone did you any harm? The chief of the police station assumed that as long as this guy is not practicing violence for few months, so he must be threatened by someone who is more violent than him. When the guy responded that nobody can do me any harm, I quit (Ana tobt ya Pasha), the chief responded: "So, how can this police station survive if you quit?!". This type of relations was presented in the movie The Land of Fear (Ard El-Khouf), in the neighborhood of Batneya which was famous for drug
dealing. The chief of the drug dealing in the neighborhood Mo'allem Hodhod promised the wife of one of his apprentices, who was recently arrested, that he will take care of her and her daughters.

5.4. Power Networks in the Public Space of Al-Mataria

5.4.1. Disciplining the Public Space

This hybrid network of governmentality used to exercise power mainly over the public space within the streets of the neighborhood. The big families and their apprentices were the only people allowed to be active in the streets of the neighborhood. For example, all the coffee shops which occupy the streets of the neighborhood are either occupied by members of the families or by their apprentices. On the other hand, the police station and the big families were the only entities allowed to block streets and set up checkpoints. Police checkpoints were set up for security reasons or for organizing the traffic. In the case of the big families, they used to block streets to set up wedding or mourning ceremonies for the family members. Sometimes, the preparation for the wedding ceremony takes three or four days, during which main streets can be blocked completely. Checkpoints were set up by the family members and their apprentices during the wedding ceremony to control the inflow of the people crossing the street where the wedding ceremony takes place.

On another hand, the big families were delegated to resolve any disputes happening in the public space. For example, a new clothes shop has opened underneath the apartment of one of my friends in 2010. It was owned by one of the apprentices of Mimi El-Omda who was the parliament member representing Al-Mataria at that time. One day, they were playing loud music and my friend went down asking them to lower the music a bit. They insulted him and when he insulted them they beat him up and chased him all the way to the police station. When he entered the police station they stopped. However, when he tried to report to the police the police officers refused to file the report for him. They asked him to go to Hajj Mimi instead, for he is the only one who will be able to settle this. He did go to Hajj Mimi, who in turn called for his apprentices and
slapped him in front of my friend. He told my friend that they should call it even otherwise, he will not be responsible for any harm will be done to him by any of his apprentices. Another repeated case is the case of dispossession. As we mentioned above, in this chapter, many of the proprietors in Al-Mataria were people who used to work for the Pashas and inherited their properties after the flee the country after 1952. Not all of the new proprietors managed to transform the small villas into tall buildings. Some of the population were satisfied with living in a small two-story villa surrounded by a small garden. However, the expansion of the informal housing sometimes necessitated the removal of those small villas. Hence, people used to live in these small villas were approached by the big clans to leave their building and be compensated. In case of refusal they used to be terrorized. Some of the thugs are hired by the big families to do specifically the task of dispossession by terrorizing.

This formal/informal network of power relations was sealed by co-opting members of the big families within the National Democratic Party (NDP). Some of them used to run for the parliamentary elections representing the NDP and some of them managed to win seats like Mimi El-Omda in 2010. It is noteworthy that even after 2011, representatives of those families ran for seats in the parliament either as independent or after being co-opted by some of the emerging parties like Free Egyptians party.

5.4.2. The Public Space of January 28th

The aforementioned dynamics of governmentality was not a water tight network of power relations. On the contrary, it was a contradictory social dynamic. The main contradiction of this network of governmentality was a contradiction inherent in the desperate attempt to rationalize the informality within the rationality of the government. In other words, enacting the modern governmentality through pre-modern structures of power. More specifically, from one side, the informal presence of the population of the streets in the everyday, performing their informal economic activities of production and exchange through which they were asserting their "right to city".164

From the other side, the government endeavor to use this informality against the people, by interrupting the informal silent resistance through the informal techniques of government. This contradiction was the source of the tension among different segments of the population. The common people of the neighborhood thought of themselves as subject to potential violence on an everyday basis. Every day the passerby of the neighborhood may be stopped by a thug and being robbed knowing that he cannot go to the police station for they will do nothing to give him his right back or even arrest the criminal even though he is known for the officers in most cases. Constant privatization of the public space, like the case of my friend and the clothes shop, and even dispossession of private properties were also unanswered by the police. On the contrary, these illegal practices were done under the supervision of the police station in many cases. On the other hand, there was the friction between the Apprentices of the big clans and the members of those clans. The apprentices thought of themselves as doing the dirty business without being properly compensated. For example, three years ago, there was a huge fight lasted for five days between Kamel Abou-Eida and one of the thugs, whose name is Hussein. Abou-Eida has hired Hussein to perform one of the tasks of the dispossession. However, after doing the job, Hussein asked for a better compensation, and after being denied the compensation he asked for, a huge gun-fire fight erupted between Hussein and his men and the men of Abou-Eida family. Two of Hussein's men were killed and some of Abou-Eida family members were badly injured.

These tensions gathered to create the pretext for January 28th. What was missing was the ignition, which was provided by the days of clashes between the protestors and the police forces (25th -27th) January, 2011. On Friday, January 28th, 2011, after the Friday prayers, people started to march, chanting "the people demands the downfall of the regime". They were not organized, but they were driven by the sentiment of solidarity with their fellow citizens who were fighting the police for the previous couple of days. Their instinct lead them to march to Al-Mataria square. They were in few hundred when they reached the square. After about two hours of clashes with the security forces deployed in the square, they started to get tired. Only then, they were joined by another few hundred to reach few thousands. They outnumbered the police forces and they forced the central security forces to either run away or seek refuge in the mosque of the square. Security forces personnel in the mosque remained under siege until the evening.
After accomplishing the victory in the square, a group of the protestors decided to storm the police station which is 300 meters away from the square. Some of the protestors, who are known faces as apprentices of the big families seized an armored vehicle from the central security forces and drove it to the police station. They stormed the door using the vehicle and started to raid the police station. Police officers started to shoot the people rubber bullets and live ammunition to defend the police station. However, they could not stand for too long. The location of the police station of Al-Mataria is hard to protect in times like these since it is surrounded by residential buildings taller than the police station. Hence, demonstrators enjoyed vantage point in this battle. It took them one hour to win the battle of the police station. Then they stripped the police officers of their uniforms and guns and allowed them to run away and then freed all the detainees in the police station who were mainly registered criminals and parolees.

By the afternoon, everything was in the hands of the demonstrators. The neighborhood of Al-Mataria has been a neighborhood with no police presence. In the following day, people started to form the popular committees to defend the public and the private spaces in the face of the potential danger expected in the absence of the police. The registered criminals, who are the people with the most valuable expertise, took over the task of moving in rotation between different parts of the neighborhood to spot any coming danger. For few days, the contradiction of the informal governmentality was resolved. The logic of government was suspended. The only prevailing logic was the logic of the people. Not only police personnel were the one ceased to exist in the public space during this period, also the big clans suddenly disappeared. Only Mimi El-Omda was spotted in the first days of February in Al-Mataria square going with his people to Moustafa Mahmoud square joining the pro Mubarak protests.

5.5. Conclusion
Through this chapter I have examined the dynamics of interweaving the pre-modern power structure with the modern one, informing the neoliberal governmentality in Al-Mataria. I have started the chapters by explaining the importance of the street as the site of government in neoliberal city. Then I have discussed how the informality of the urban space of Al-Mataria and other popular quarters leads to the absence of a point of view for the government to control the space. This necessitated the liquefying of the panopticon into a social process of integration between formal and informal techniques of government.

Afterwards, I have moved to examine the most important form of pre-modern structure in the neighborhood of Al-Mataria: the structure of the clans. I have started this endeavor by explaining the historical context within which those clans emerged. Then, I have moved the discussion to their illegal economic activities which led them to prevail over the social dynamics of the neighborhood. In examining the socioeconomics of the clans of Al-Mataria, I have investigated the forms of involvement of the local police station within this pre-modern power structure. This involvement evolved into the delegation of the tasks of the police to those clans. This is how the task of liquefying the panopticon into dynamic social relations was completed. Hence, the establishment of the network of governmentality which harnesses the interweaving of the informal and formal techniques of government and exercise of power.

I have closed the chapter by exposing the contradiction of rationalizing the informality. As we have seen, this inherent contradiction causes this type of hybrid governmentality to fail to sustain its self-disciplined subjects. Social tension will always be hard to contain between the different social groups which are part of the experience of this hybrid governmentality. I have then, explained how this social tension manifested in Al-Mataria and how it was erupted by telling the story of January, 28th, 2011 and the following days of the popular committees which replaced both the police station and the big clans. As a final word, I would like to say that these days may be thought of as instances of liminality as explained by Victor Turner. However, those days cannot be limited to their temporality. They posed a serious challenge to the logic of government and exposed its inherent contradictions. For example, the local police station of Al-

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Mataria was able to return back to its original place just after more than five years from January, 2011. Also that clash between Hussein and Abou-Eida was never to be thought of before 2011. This chapter then suggests that the contradictions of the neoliberal governmentality in the popular quarters cannot be fully restored back. It will always be challenged at different scales on a daily basis.
Chapter 6: Conclusion (Beyond Explosion)

Although the guiding question of this thesis regards a singular moment that transpired on January 28th, the focus of the analysis extends beyond the boundaries of a particular instance of contentious politics. This study’s main purpose is to escape the hype of the moment, by trying to situate it within the broader social dynamics which made it possible. However, this endeavor would not have been possible unless we use a theoretical framework which allows us to look at the two subjectivities contributing to the moment – the police and the people – differently. We needed to look at these subjectivities not as two separate entities, but as positions produced within a comprehensive process of subject formation. Hence, this thesis was an attempt to prove that the process of neoliberal subject formation is the most adequate framework to contextualize the moment of January 28th in the popular quarters of Cairo. It is true, however, that there are other possible explanations for the moment within the discipline of political science. It is also true that this thesis did not try to engage with those other explanations. Therefore, I would like to dedicate the following section by engaging with one of the other possible explanations, which is the contentious politics.

6.2. Brief Introduction to the Contentious Politics Approach

According to Sidney Tarrow, contentious politics refers to “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when: (1) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (2) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants or objects of claims.” These features are all relevant to the moment under investigation in this project. Hence, the relevance of engaging with the contentious politics as a possible approach.

As Tarrow further suggests, contentious politics is generally the area of study that is interested in analyzing the political conflict in which government plays an important role, either as an actor of this conflict or the target of it. The political conflict as such takes different forms; war, civil war or the political struggles in against government in the form of social movement, or revolution. Although these

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forms of contention seem different in intensity and expected outcomes, they share similarities in nature. They all stem from contentious interactions among different actors in the public against the backdrop of political claims, and they all start by transformations in the structure of political opportunities/threats. Hence, the contentious politics as a framework helps us examine this shared nature of the different forms of contention.167

6.2.1. The Collective Behavior Approach

Generally speaking the American studies of contention have been occupied by Neil Smelser’s work on the collective behavior until the late 1960s. In his work Theory of Collective Behavior, Smelser attempts to make sense of seemingly irrational collective political behavior such as public craze, panic, riots. His main assumption is that however spontaneous and irrational those forms of public behaviors may seem, they share some regularities which make them adequate subject of empirical investigation.168 He defined the collective behavior as "mobilization on the basis of belief which redefines social action".169 This definition which is based on the general collective belief is the backdrop against which Smelser examines the different forms of collective behaviors. In other words, his approach rests heavily on understanding the forms of contention as a collective response to shared public grievances.

The collective behavior approach implied a direct causal connection between the shared grievances and the public mobilization. However, in most of the contentious episodes this direct link does not exist. Moreover, just few shared grievances actually develop into mobilization. By limiting the focus of his approach to the shared grievances, He made the shared grievances the sole contributor to developing an “irrational” moment of public mobilization. He fails, then, to explain the intergroup relations which contribute in the developing the moment of contention, as well as, the shared grievances in the first place. This failure to include this interrelationality within Smelser’s approach makes it one sided and incomplete.

6.2.2. Structural Approaches

167 ibid
169 Ibid: 8
There are two major structural approaches. The first one comes from Marxist orthodox understanding of how the social reality is composed. For the orthodox Marxists, the society is composed of two layers; the substructure and the superstructure. The substructure is where the relations of production take place between the means of production and the classes. The superstructure is everything else including culture, religion, social relations ... etc. Generally speaking, the substructure is the economy while the superstructure is the politics in the broader sense. The relation between both structure, for orthodox Marxism, is a one-way mechanical relation; every change happens in the economy necessitates a similar change in the politics and not vice versa. Hence, the episode of political contention happens only as a direct result of change within the economy.

The orthodox Marxists are not equipped with the necessary methodological arsenal to examine most of the episodes of contention which are not directly rooted in the economy. This reductionism creates a void in the explanation which is filled through the second approach within structuralism which shifts the focus to the political by focusing on the structure of political opportunity and political threat.

Broadly defined, the political opportunity structure are features of the regime according to which people interact with the government. A transformation in this structure creates a transformation of the interaction between the people and the government which may result in a cycle of contention. Those transformation as described by Ryan and Deborah Cragun, building on Tarrow and Tilly's work can be:

- Increasing political pluralism where the regime includes new actors to the process
- Decline in repression
- Division within elites

All these examples happened in the last few years of Mubarak. Starting with 2005, we have witnessed the first Egyptian presidential elections which followed by the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in the parliament. The repression did not witness any decline but it was more exposed by the emerging human rights movement at that time. Also the division within elites was predominant in the National Democratic Party (NDP) with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and Ahmed Ezz as the new elite and their conflict with the old guards of the party. This conflict which resulted in the Army supporting the people's movement in January 2011.

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6.2.3. Political Process Approach

The political process approach was complimented by the study of mechanisms, and institutions, and repertoire of contention in the work of Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam. Their critique of the the study of contention was that it has been always occupied with being immersed in the moment of the social explosion. It has then been occupied with following the path of a single actor at a time, which reduced the study of contention to being descriptive.\textsuperscript{171} What Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam offered in their book "Dynamics of Contention" was a shift from following one actor and being blinded by the instance of the movement towards analyzing the mechanisms and the processes.\textsuperscript{172} They did not promise to grasp an episode of contention in its entirety, rather they suggested that social movements and episodes of contentions should be understood as a social phenomena situated within a wider social context.

Following this line of thought, Tarrow argued that contentious politics emerges out of how the people respond to changes in the structure of the political opportunity and threat. If people used repertoire of actions and acted collectively based on a dense social network and according to legitimate action-oriented cultural frames they emerge as a social movement. If this contention spread across the entire society it becomes a cycle of contention. If this cycle is organized around multiple sovereignties, the outcome is a revolution.\textsuperscript{173}

6.2.4 Contending with the Contentious Politics Approaches

Although contentious politics is a possible explanation for the moment under study, it lacks the sufficient explanatory capacity. Contentious politics approaches as we have seen speak of people getting together, out of shared grievances or aspirations, or responding together to transformation within the political opportunity or threat. People get together, move together and contest the government. This approach presupposes a dichotomy between the people and the state/the authority. In that sense, the only difference between the theory of contentious politics and other classical theories studying political

\textsuperscript{172} Ibid: 305
conflicts is tactical. For example, contentious politics theory includes cultural elements, which used to be neglected in the classical approaches, in studying the social movement. On the other hand the contentious politics approach shares the same ontology with more classical approaches, which perceives power as an authored practice. For these classical approaches, the state is the author of power. It practices its power over the populations through different institutions. This understanding of power creates the dichotomy between those who are powerful and those who are powerless. Hence, it is impossible to build a comprehensive understanding of the social dynamics on this understanding of power.

Governmentality, on the contrary, suggests an alternative ontology according to which the state is just a set of processes and techniques, and power is authorless power dynamics. Moreover, the contentious politics approach presumes that there is a starting point to the people’s movement, which is the change in political opportunities and threats; while this study perceives the movement of the people as part of social dynamics which take different forms in different moments rather than a path which has a starting point and specific phases of development. Hence, contentious politics approach is not the suitable approach for this study.

6.3. The productive nature of power

I believe the most important contribution of Foucault to the concept of power is that asserting to its productive nature. By asserting on the fact that power is not only repressive, but also productive, he gave us the context according to which we can understand the social dynamics more comprehensively. However, this productive nature is not essential to power. Its development has a specific history. Foucault explains this historical development in his analysis of the development of the disciplinary mechanisms. Disciplinary power was a process within the project of modernity which was developed as a reformation of punitive power. Foucault argues that the power was concentrated in the sovereignty of the King, who became the embodiment of the power. Punitive power was targeting, then, whoever is transgressing the boundaries of the king’s sovereignty. This punitive power of the king has been taken over by the disciplinary power of the government, which rendered itself invisible as it infiltrates the


175 Discipline and punish
everyday life of the people. This was enacted by the discourse which posited the government as a representation of the society.\textsuperscript{176}

As a representation for the society, the government exercises power for the society, not over society. In the process of creating the self-disciplined subject, the government invests in the welfare of the population. At this point we can see the productive nature of power as the modern government seeks to exercise a normalizing form of power which target the bodies of the population.\textsuperscript{177} This contribution of the understanding of power, allows us to perceive the subjectivity of the parties contributed to the moment of January 28\textsuperscript{th} as interrelated product of the process of neoliberal subject formation. Hence, we have a context within which we can understand this interrelation as existing and being performed on the same plane.

6.4. Heroes or Criminals

Following Foucault’s explanation of the productive nature of power, we can contextualize the moment of January 28\textsuperscript{th} not far from its social context. By this contextualization, this thesis aims at escaping the demystification of the moment. By demystification, I mean those two extreme approaches to the moment which try to explain the moment as in and of itself, denying its rootedness in the dynamics of a broader social context. One of those approaches perceives the moment of January 28\textsuperscript{th} as the essential moment of resistance. For this approach, the moment of 28\textsuperscript{th} was a heroic act which marks the truth of a revolution. On the other side of the spectrum, the other approach goes to the other extreme by criminalize the moment. Some says that those involved in the moment were criminals. Others say that it was an organized movement orchestrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, or even the state, depending on the political animosity of the speaker. However, this thesis tries neither to underestimate nor to vindicate the moment. On the contrary, this thesis acknowledges all the discourses of the moment as contributing elements to the process of neoliberal subject formation.

Pursuing this endeavor, my main assumption was that the neoliberal logic of government in contemporary Egypt created a government, which combined informal with formal techniques of policing

\textsuperscript{176} Discipline and Punish
provided the pretext for the instance of January 28th. This combination served as the network of power structure governing the public space of the neighborhood. This combined form of practicing power creating a combined form of a so called resistance. Hence, at the moment of contention, people were mobilized through the same logic; occupying the streets of the neighborhood, unveiling the inherent contradiction of the neoliberal governmentality.

That being said, the motives of the actors of the moments, whether heroes or criminals, are irrelevant. This thesis was an attempt to prove that the moment of January 28th, is an instance within the structure of the state-society relations in Egypt. This way, we do not only escape the mystification of the moment, but we also escape judging the success or the failure of the moment, as it has become contextualized within broader social dynamics. The prolongation of those social dynamics is a prolongation of the potential for another moment of contention. In another word, the inevitability of the moment of January 28th is linked to the prolongation of the neoliberal logic of government, which combines both formal and informal techniques of government in the popular quarters of Cairo. Hence, it is irrelevant to judge the results of the inevitable.
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