

American University in Cairo

AUC Knowledge Fountain

Archived Theses and Dissertations

6-1-1987

An historical study of Hajj administration in Northern Nigeria, 1954-1966

Yakubu Ahmed Danfuloti

The American University in Cairo AUC

Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds



Part of the [Arabic Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

APA Citation

Danfuloti, Y. (1987). *An historical study of Hajj administration in Northern Nigeria, 1954-1966* [Thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain.

https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/706

MLA Citation

Danfuloti, Yakubu Ahmed. *An historical study of Hajj administration in Northern Nigeria, 1954-1966*. 1987. American University in Cairo, Thesis. *AUC Knowledge Fountain*.

https://fount.aucegypt.edu/retro_etds/706

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Archived Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact fountadmin@aucegypt.edu.

**AN HISTORICAL STUDY
OF HAJJ ADMINISTRATION
IN NORTHERN NIGERIA:
1954-1966**

**YAKUBU AHMED
DANFULOTI**

1987

**LIBRARY
USE
ONLY**

Thesis
1987/213

THIS THESIS FOR THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE

By


YAKUBU AHMED DANFULOTI


HAS BEEN APPROVED


Mid. East. Hist.

713


79.


Dr. KENNETH M. CUNO
CHAIRMAN, THESIS COMMITTEE


Dr. MARSDEN JONES
READER, THESIS COMMITTEE


Dr. HUDA LUTFI
READER, THESIS COMMITTEE

14 April 1987
DATE


CHAIRMAN, CENTER FOR ARABIC STUDIES

713

AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF HAJJ ADMINISTRATION
IN NORTHERN NIGERIA : 1954-1966

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE CENTER FOR ARABIC STUDIES,
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO,
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
FOR THE AWARD OF THE
MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE
IN MIDDLE EASTERN HISTORY
MARCH, 1987

By

YAKUBU AHMED DANFULOTI

Thesis
1987/713

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGES</u>
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	1 - 4
<u>CHAPTER ONE</u> : AN HISTORICAL OVER-VIEW OF Islam IN NORTHERN NIGERIA	5 - 17
<u>CHAPTER TWO</u> : BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HAJJ ADMINISTRATION FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE COLONIAL PERIOD	18 - 35
<u>CHAPTER THREE</u> : HAJJ ADMINISTRATION IN THE LAST DAYS OF COLONIAL RULE: 1954 - 59	36 - 48
<u>CHAPTER FOUR</u> : POLITICS AND THE HAJJ IN NORTHERN NIGERIA : AN ANALYSIS	49 - 65
<u>CHAPTER FIVE</u> : DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HAJJ ADMINISTRATION: 1960-1966	66 - 75
<u>CONCLUSION</u>	76 - 77
<u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u>	78 - 80

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am very grateful to the American University in Cairo for the African Fellowship that enabled me to study in Egypt. The same to the University of Sokoto, Nigeria, which footed my maintenance bills throughout the course.

I am also very grateful to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Kenneth M. Cuno who not only provided Academic guidance but also was most helpful in attending to the bureaucratic demands on me, with despatch.

My sincere gratitude also to Mr. Joseph Tawo Ayambem and family, of the Embassy of Nigeria in Cairo, for the generous hospitality they accorded me. Indeed 'The Ayambem Fellowship' was very key in providing the conducive atmosphere for the final draft of this study.

Lawal Yunusa and family also deserve mention for providing me the Academic haven in Jos while writing this study.

To Tijjani Mohamed Lamin, Zanna Laisu Imam and all friends in Cairo and Nigeria who directly or indirectly helped in making this work a reality, I am grateful. To Madam Lucy Alf Shukr, for the excellent typing.

Lastly, I assume full responsibility for all errors in this work, whether factual or interpretative.

Y.A. DANFULOTI

Introduction

Islam has a long history in Northern Nigeria. While there is much literature on Islamic political institutions in Nigeria (Such as the 19th Century Jihad, the Sokoto Caliphate, and the Emirates) there is to date, little historical research on other facets of Nigerian Islam such as Marriage, the observance of Muslim festivals, the Zakat, Education and the Hajj. Little attention has been paid to their historical development.

This thesis is a contribution to this neglected theme of Muslim history in Northern Nigeria. It is also a pioneer study devoted entirely to the formal administration of the Hajj in Nigeria. Its basic focus is, to explore the relationship of the Hajj, to the politics of Northern Nigeria, from 1954 to 1966. More so because the Northern Regional Leader at this time (his today's parallel is Sadiq el Mahdi of the Sudan), Ahmadu Bello, was a direct descendant of the 19th Century Jihad Leader, Usman Danfodio.

Hajj is one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam. The Muslim is required to perform the Hajj once in a lifetime, to Mecca and Medina if he/she has the means. Other conditions that have to be met before a Muslim embarks on the Hajj include: physical fitness, mental health and safety of the routes to and from the Hajj. The intending pilgrim should have sufficient funds to cover his journey and maintenance to and from Hajj, and he should also ensure he has left behind sufficient funds to take care of his family and dependents, if any. The pilgrim must also clear all debts before departure, in addition to making a "will" (Wasiyyat) in respect of property and other important issues. The pilgrim should be an adult and if female, must be accompanied.

The Hajj is observed annually in the month of Zul Hijja. The pilgrims must wear Ihram, (a sort of pilgrim uniform - for males, it consists of two pieces of

plain white cloth, and for females their usual clothing, but they must be fresh at the beginning of Ihram), throughout the performance of the Hajj rites. These rites consist of tawaf (the circumnabulation around the Kaaba seven times), Al-Safa and Al-Marwah, Arafat (without the rite of standing (Wuquf) at Arafat on the ninth of Zul hijja, a Hajj is not valid). Other rituals are Muzdalifa, the Jamrat (the rites of stoning the satan) and Sacrifice of Animals at Muna.¹

Nigeria, as a political entity, was the handiwork of British Colonialism as a result of the Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 'Protectorates' in 1914. By the 1950s, when the 'Sons of the Soil' started participating (with the British) in running the country, Nigeria was a federation of three regions, namely the Northern, Western and Eastern regions. The federal Centre was at Lagos. It had a British style parliamentary system of government with a Premier heading each Region, and a Prime Minister, as the head of the Federal Government.

Nigeria became independent in 1960 with the same federal structure. The regions were replaced with twelve states in 1967. The States increased to Nineteen in 1976. Today Nigeria has 19 States, and the Federal Government, based in Lagos (Movement to the New Federal Capital, Abuja, has started) as basic administrative units.

This study is primarily concerned with only a part of Nigeria, the North. Most Nigerian Muslims live in the North, though there are many in the West. The period chosen for study is from 1954 to 1966, which coincides, with the tenure of office of the first and the last Nigerian premier of the Northern Region (the region is today made up of ten States under Governors).

The thesis consists of five chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter is an historical overview of Islam in Northern Nigeria. The second chapter briefly

traces the history of Hajj in the pre-colonial North, including the routes followed, and its Organisation. The Hajj under Colonial Rule is then discussed. Chapters three to five present the results of the research on the Hajj. Chapter three examines the different aspects of Hajj administration from 1954 to 1959. Chapter four is an analysis of the politics of Northern Nigeria Vis-a-Vis^{the} Hajj, from 1954 to 1966. Chapter five discusses the developments in Hajj Administration from 1960-1966.

The conclusion summarizes the salient-points of the study. One basic conclusion reached was that when Nigerians started participating in the formal Hajj Administration in 1954, they had to develop this administration almost from scratch. Another conclusion is that Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of Northern Nigeria from 1954-1966, although actively involved in Hajj administration, did not exploit the Hajj for partisan political purposes.

This study has its limitations. The suggestions of others who would point out such limitation would assist me in pursuing further research on this topic.

Sources

The objectives of the thesis were achieved by a close examination of the primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are basically archival materials to be found at the National Archives, in Kaduna, Nigeria, and one or two government publications. I also consulted the editions of the Newspaper of the period (1954-1966). The publications that have proved valuable are specified in the footnotes of chapters two to five. A full listing of the primary and secondary sources will be found in the bibliography.

Footnote

1. For details on the Hajj see:

Hussain S. A. A Guide to Hajj (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1977).

Kamal Ahmed The Sacred Journey (New York: Sloan & Pearce, 1961).

Wen Sinck A. J. et al "Hadjdj". The Encyclopedia of Islam, pp. 196-201.

Whid?

Holy Quran - Surahs.

Verses

Al-Baqara : 197, 198-199, 203

Al-Nur : 41.

Al-Imran : 96-97.

H. A. S. JONSON, THE FUJANI EMIRATE OF SOKOTO,
(London: Oxford University press, 1971)



□: Capital of Eastern
Wingate, Caliphate

① Capital of Westermung
of the Caliphate, Gwandu
Emirate.

- Capital of Emirates

Shaded areas: not part
of the Caliphate.

CHAPTER ONE

An Historical Overview of Islam in Northern Nigeria

The history of Islam in Northern Nigeria goes back as early as the Eighth Century A. D.

The major part of Dar al-Islam in the Central Biladal Sudan before the 19th Century Jihad, was Hausaland and Borno. By the 9th Century A.D. Islam had a firm foothold in the state of Kanem.¹ At the same time there was a significant number of Muslims in the towns and cities of Hausaland and Borno.

The first known official acceptance of Islam in today's Northern Nigeria was that of Mai Hume Ibn Abduljalil, of Kanem's Sayfawa dynasty in C 1096. Prior to this date, many Muslim Scholars, most of whom doubled as traders, were active in the propagation of Islam. Through the trade routes these Muslim Scholars reached Hausaland and Borno, some with the sole objective of spreading Islam. Examples of such scholars were Muhammad Ibn Mani in the 11th Century and Adam Ibn Ibrahim in Kanem's Capital in the 15th Century.² There was also Muhammad al Maghili who was Hausaland in the 16th Century. It was Muhammad al-Maghili that wrote a treatise (at the request of Muhammad Rumfa of Kano) on the Islamic obligations and duties of rulers and the ruled.³ Another agent of the spread of Islam was the Al-Murabitun movement, led by Abdallah Ibn Yasin, in the 12th Century.

With the passage of time numerous mosques and Centers of Islamic learning sprang up in Birnin Gazargamu, Kano and Katsina, attracting Muslim Scholars from far and near.

By 1242 the rulers of Kanem had already established a Madrasa in Cairo, known as Ibn Rashid. Ibn Rashid was established to enhance the learning and Scholarship of the Muslims in Kanem in particular and central Bilad Sudan in general

in addition to providing comfort to pilgrims on transit. The Madrasa was sponsored by the rulers and scholars of Kanem.

Undoubtedly Kanem (now Borno) was the earliest part of what is today Northern Nigeria to embrace Islam. This might be due to its proximity to the Source of Islam. By the 11th century the ruler of Kanem, Mai Hume Ibn Abduljalil, performed the Hajj. Thereafter many later Kanem rulers followed suit and performed the Hajj to show that Kanem was firmly in the Islamic Camp.⁴

In the Hausa States, the Muslim Scholars took active part in the administration. They served as qadis, administrators, official advisers and so on. Al-maghili's book on the Islamic obligations and duties of the rulers and the ruled was widely used in the Hausa states.

The central event in the 19th century Islamic History of Northern Nigeria was the Jihad led by Usman Dan Fodio.⁵ According to the Mujahideen, the Hausa rulers of their time were accommodating the Hausa religion; (for example Bori dance "being possessed by Spirits" by Bori priests, to pray for a bumper harvest or victory over the enemy in war,) even though they were Muslim rulers. The Hausa rulers were also accused by the Mujahideen, of levying unislamic taxes, and allowing the giving of bribes to high officials. They also criticized the corrupt judiciary and the compulsory conscription of Muslims into the army. To the Mujahideen, the yardstick for measuring a country, was the religion of its leaders. The Hausa leaders were syncretists and thus, Hausaland was a land of Kufr (Unbelief), and therefore ripe for a jihad to purify Islam of the pollution it suffered in their hands.⁶

The principal objective of Usman Danfodio's jihad, according to the Mujahideen, was to establish an Ideal Islamic state which was to ensure proper adherence

to Islam by the faithful. The Jihad was not targeted at non-muslims but at the purification of Islam. By the time of the Jihad, large parts of Hausaland were long Islamised. The Jihad was also the last resort of the mujahideen to purge Islam of its Unislamic practices symbolised in the Hausa governments. The Mujahideen had tried to effect a new social order through preaching and dialogue with the authorities since 1774. All these had failed. By 1804 the leaders and their followers took up arms.

Within a short time the Mujahideen succeeded in overthrowing the Syncretist Hausa government and in replacing it with the Islamic system of the Caliphate in 1807. Usman Danfodio, was the first Amir al Muminin, although the practical administration was carried out by his son, Muhammad Bello.

The Jihad coincided with the high expectations of Muslims in Hausaland of the coming of the Mahdi. In Muslim eschatology, a Mahdi appears every century of the Islamic calendar. The Mahdi is the guide, who would sweep clean, with the broom of justice, all societal injustices. Prior to the Jihad, the people of Hausaland had experienced a series of ecological sufferings in the forms of droughts.⁷ These sufferings were attributed by the muslims to their being lax in their practice of Islam. Danfodio started preaching for Islamic reform against this background. Many Muslims thought that the Jihad leader, Usman Danfodio the Mujaddadi, was the expected Mahdi and flocked to him accordingly. He was reputed to have possessed the Wird of Qadriyya which made his prayers highly efficacious and full of baraka. The Mahdi belief was thus one of the prominent reasons for the success of the Jihad.

The Jihad resulted in a greater political centralisation. The Caliphate covered about 75% of Northern Nigeria. (See map at the beginning of this chapter). The

Jihad ushered in the Caliphate with its Headquarters at Sokoto, hence the Sokoto Caliphate, under MUhammad Bello as the Amir al-Muminin. The Amir al-Muminin administered Sokoto and its environs. Under the caliphate there were the Emirates (many of whom roughly correspond to the former Hausa states), under the Emirs who individually waged the Jihads in their localities after being blessed with Dan fodio's flags. The Emirates had a number of districts under them. The first Emirates included Gwandu, Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and so on. There was a devolution of authority. The functions of the early Amir al-Muminin and the Emirs were derived from the Quran and the Shariah, and they were guided by the same in the performance of their duties.

The above broad outline of the caliphate was largely used for the purposes of, and by, the British Colonial administration, after the latter had physically conquered most of Northern Nigeria by 1904. It is also broadly the basis of local government administration, in present day Northern Nigeria.

Islam Under Colonial Rule

By 1903, the British had succeeded in killing Attahiru, then Amir al Muminin. Attahiru had earlier been defeated in the Battlefield in Sokoto.⁸ He did not give up and resorted to the Hijra eastwards: following the British occupation, Attahiru had declared that Hausaland was now under infidel rule, and thus urged all Muslims to join him on the migration eastwards or to Mecca to meet the expected Mahdi. The migration led by Attahiru eastwards was thus a form of resistance to alien Christian rule. He attracted large numbers of followers and the British vowed to put an end to his flight, which was a direct threat to their total control of the recently conquered Northern Nigeria.

By late June 1903 the Superior British Forces had succeeded in killing the fugitive Caliph, in the Battle of Burmi. The year 1903 thus, marked the formal end of the Sokoto Caliphate. Earlier, other emirates of the Caliphate had been conquered by the British. The British promised the new Caliph and the Emirs that they would respect and would not interfere with Islam. A look at some Islamic institutions under British Colonial rule, however, suggests that the British did not keep their promise.

Under British rule the concepts of the Caliphate the Emirate were distorted.⁹ The British High Commissioner assumed the functions of the 'Caliph' which included the appointment and deposition of Emirs. The Caliph himself was demoted to the rank of 'Sultan'. The appointment and deposition of Emirs by the British were frequent. Any non-conforming Emir was removed. Hitherto the Caliph could only depose an Emir that deviated from Islamic norms. The British also created new emirates, such as Biu, Fika, Yawuri, Abuja, Bedde and so on. There was even a non-Muslim, Kitoro Gani, who was made the Emir of Bussa by the British. The British also introduced a classification of Emirs into first, second and third classes. It should be noted that the British decided to administer their Northern Nigerian territories via the traditional institutions they met, not out of love for those institutions, but because it was administratively less costly and more convenient, to achieve their main colonial objectives via such institutions.

In the early days of colonial rule, the British had used Ajami (Hausa writing in Arabic Script) for the purposes of administration, but this was later abandoned out of fear that it would aid the spread of Islam.

While Christians could have unhindered access to outside assistance (through the various missionary societies) under Colonial rule, this privilege was not extended to Muslims. The British closely monitored and supervised Muslims contact with the outside Islamic World, so as to prevent the infiltration of ideas incompatible with Colonial objectives. To this end, Azhar studies were discouraged and Arabic Literature Critical of European Imperialism was censored. Azhar graduates were refused jobs and Egyptians, especially during the Nasser era, were barred from Northern Nigeria.

The British did not only discourage Islamic Education but also denied a western education to the majority Muslim inhabitants of Northern Nigeria.¹⁰ This was the genesis of the disparity in Western education between Northern and Southern Nigeria, to the advantage of the latter. This disparity has always been a threat to Nigeria's stability as a Nation.

It should be noted that Western education is a prerequisite to effective participation in running post-Colonial Nigeria: The official language is English, and the administration, commerce, bureaucracy, and so on, are also copies of the Western models. The Muslim North was thus heavily under represented in the running of Nigeria at the Federal level because of its small number of Western educated people.

This state of affairs was brought about by the Muslim antagonism to Western education, the genesis of which could be traced to the British Colonial administration. In Southern Nigeria, the Christians Missionaries provided Western education as an ancillary to their conversion activities. In the North, on the other hand, the Christian Missionaries were restricted to the non-Muslim areas.

The British Colonial administration did not want to antagonize the Muslim emirs further and hence the prohibition of Christian Missions in Muslim areas. All the same, the restrictions was not total, and some Missions insisted on converting the hardly convertible Muslims. Governor Lugard of Northern Nigeria allowed his friend Dr. Walter Miller, of the Church Missionary Society, to establish a school at Zaria, on the condition that Dr. Walter Miller would provide secular education to Muslims. Miller did no keep his word. He instead resorted to open conversion of his Muslim pupils to christianity. This act sowed Muslim distrust and suspicion toward Western education.

The alarmed Muslim parents equated Western education with conversion to christianity, and promptly withdrew their children from Miller's School. Miller's secular education programme also included a class for the Ulama (Mallams in Hausa). The Mallams as the Intellectual elite, the alpha and Omega of Islamic Studies, were and are still highly revered, and their influence over the people overwhelming. To bundle this group in Miller's class, implied that the Western education Miller represented, was superior to what they owed their prestige in society to.

The Christian Missions could not provide secular education to Muslims because their raison d'etre was winning souls for Christ: (in the Western region, the Muslims had to take christian names to be admitted). The Colonial administration Schools were the only alternative.

Yet the Colonial administration only established a few schools, whose admission was exclusively for the sons of chiefs and the Cream of Society, who were groomed to be loyal leaders to the British. The early British decision to impose school fees, (which also meant enrollment would be restricted to the well-off families) was also a reason for the distrust and suspicion of Muslims toward Western education.

The Muslims were familiar with the Quranic School System from time immemorial. They did not see any immediate benefits of the new Western education. In the South, the products of Missionary Schools could be employed as teachers, preachers, catechists, and clerks and hence its immediate attraction. The Muslims felt they could gain nothing, and did not understand why, they should pay school fees for a system of education that sought to de-Islamise their wards. I have dwelt at length on this issue because many Nigerians, ignorant of the historical facts, attribute the backwardness in Western education of Muslim Northern Nigeria compared with Southern Nigeria, simply to Islam - especially its supposed aversion to 'Change' and 'Modernity'.

Neither in the Judicial realm - was British respect for the Shariah total: The Shariah was tolerated so long as its provisions were in consonance with the British conception of 'natural justice', which was, of course, un-Islamic. To this end canonical punishments like Amputation for theft - and stoning for adultery were replaced with prison terms. To satisfy their conscience, the Muslim Qadis resorted to delivering two verdicts - one, at home in accordance with the Shariah, and the other in the court in accordance with the British yardstick. In a pamphlet prepared for the British Colonial officers, P.H.G. Scott.¹¹ reported how, the Emir of Katsina always transferred culpable homicide cases to the supreme Court, because the emir knew that his verdict would be overruled.

By and large the British kept their pledge of non-interference and respect for Islam, only in regard to Islamic Institutions (for example the traditional Islamic Schools) that were not repugnant to their political and economic designs.

Islam Today

The Impact of Islam is quite profound among the Muslims of Northern Nigeria. For instance, the major Muslim groups (Kanuri and Hausa) trace their origins to

the East. There are many classical Arabic words that have become part and parcel of the Hausa and Kanuri Languages. The Indigenous Cultures of the varied Muslim groups are also primarily Islamic.

Although Western 'Secular' courts are in use in Nigeria, the Islamic Personal Law of marriage, inheritance and so on, is still observed by Muslims.

The most highly organised formal Muslim association in Northern Nigeria is the Jamaat Nasr al-Islam (Society for Islam's Victory), established in the 1960's. This society has its headquarters in Kaduna. It is very active in building Schools and Mosques, and in the propagation of Islam.

Muslim - Christian relations have generally been cordial. At least there has never been a major confrontation between groups, that could be specifically attributed to religion. However, the elite at times exploit religious differences for selfish ends. For instance, during the Second Republic (1979-83), many states established Christian Pilgrims Boards, and suddenly pilgrimage to Jerusalem and Rome became a cardinal point of Christianity. The argument for this was that the federal government should equally oversee both Islamic and Christian pilgrimages. In 1978, the Muslim elite unsuccessfully sought the establishment of, a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal.

Recently, there was an unnecessary controversy over Nigeria's full membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference (O.I.C), largely fuelled by a section of the Nigerian press. The argument against the membership largely revolved round the questionable claim that membership, would make Nigeria an 'Islamic State'. The critics of membership conveniently forget that, Nigeria belongs to the Commonwealth, which is always headed by a British Monarch, who doubled as head of the Church of England.¹³ And what of Nigeria's diplomatic relations with the Vatican? The

Nigerian State also observes the Gregorian Calendar, and Saturday and Sunday as Sabbath. Religious differences in Nigeria are only exploited by the elite (especially those in the Newspaper houses).

In the 1980's there have been outbreaks of religious disturbances in Muslim areas of Kano, Maiduguri, Kaduna, Jimeta and Gombe. These disturbances were usually called Maitatsine (named after the leader, literally, the owner or one, who possesses a curse) riots. They mostly involved Muslims and not non-Muslims. The riots were unfortunately bloody, and many lives were lost.

The riots were caused by some Muslim preachers and their followers, whom many Muslims consider as heretics and non-Muslims. The activities of the rioters are mostly obscure, but it is generally believed that they consider their leader, Muhammad Marwa Maitatsine, a Cameroonian, as a prophet. It was the provocative preachings of members of the group that usually resulted in troubles.

Officially, the riots were caused by foreigners from the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger, Mali, Ghana, hence the 1983 expulsion of "illegal aliens". The Marxists believe, it was a class struggle between, the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. The political parties of the period, blamed the riots on the activities of each other's political thugs (it should be noted that similar riots had occurred in Jimeta and Gombe after the deposition of the civilian regime on 31st December 1983). There is yet to be a logical study of the defunct movement for obvious reasons.

Presently there is a proliferation of Muslim associations like the Izalatul al-Bid'a Wa Iqamat al-Sunna (after the title of one of Dan Fodio's Works), Jund Allah, Fityan al-Islam and others. However, there is as yet no study of this phenomenon. What is certain is that, the 'resurgence' of Islam is conspicuous in many parts of

Northern Nigeria. Many Muslim ladies have now taken to the Hijab, the long Jallabiya and long beards are now worn by many of the youth, and there is renewed interest also in Islamic education for both sexes, which had led to the establishment of more schools. Finally, Student Muslim Organizations have been very active in the University Campuses.

To what extent outside influences, like the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, Muslim brotherhood of Egypt, and the activities of Libya and Saudi Arabia - and to what extent internal conditions in Nigeria - like the increasing materialism in the society were responsible, would make an interesting and invaluable study.

There is a lot of enthusiasm for Hajj. Muslims from all social groups aspire to perform it, hence Nigeria has always been among the 'top twenty' of the countries that go on the annual Hajj, to Mecca and Medina. The prestigious titles of Alhaj and Alhaja are usually conferred on those that have made it to Hajj. Those that have not yet made it to Hajj, always pray "to be invited" (it is generally believed that even if you have the funds for the Hajj, Allah has to "invite you" before you go). In the next chapters, we shall discuss the early history of the Hajj and specifically the bureaucratic dimensions, and politics in the making of an Alhaji or Alhajiya.

Notes

1. For details see M. Nur Alkali, "Some Contributions to the Study of the pilgrimage tradition in Nigeria" History Department Seminar, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria, Wednesday 27th, July, 1983.
2. Ibid.
3. For details see J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., History of West Africa, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University, 1971). Chapters 5, 6 and 14.
4. Ibid. Nur Alkali.
5. For details on the background and different aspects of the Jihad, See Last M., The Sokoto Caliphate (London: 1967).
 Johnston, H.A.S., The Fulani Empire of Sokoto (London: 1967).
 Hiskett M., The Sword of Truth The Life and Times of the Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, New York: 1973.
 "Material relating to the state of Learning Among the Fulani before their Jihad", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 19, 3, 1957.
 Usman Y.B., ed., Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate, (Zaria: 1977).
 The three principal Mujahideen were Usman Dan Fodio, Abdulahi Fodio (Usman's younger brother), Muhammad Bello (Usman's eldest son) were also muslim scholars who wrote a number of books. For example Usman Dan Fodio wrote Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan and Bayan Wujub al-Hijra ala Ibad etc. Abdullah wrote Tazyin al Waraqat and Muhammad Bello Infaq al Maisur etc. Also See Crowder Michael, The Story of Nigeria (London: Faber and Faber, 1973) pp. 90-104.
 A.D.H. Bivar, "The Wathiqat ahl al-Sudan: A manifesto of the Fulani Jihad" Journal of African History, IV, 2, 1961.
 H.F.C. Smith, "A neglected theme of West African History: the Islamic Revolutions of the 19th Century", Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, II, 4, 1963 pp. 435-48.
 D.M. Last and M.A. Al-Hajj "Attempts of defining a Muslim in 19th Century Hausaland and Bornu" Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, III, 2, 1965.
 M.G. Smith, "The Jihad of Shehu Dan Fodio - some Problems" in I.M. Lewis ed., Islam in Tropical Africa (Indiana, 1966).
6. The three frontline Mujahideen were Intellectual giants in their own right. Most of the picture of the Un-Islamic pre-Jihad Hausaland in the literature was taken from their works in Arabic, Hausa and Fulfulde languages. There is as yet no Independent thorough research on the state of Islam in pre-Jihad Hausaland to Corroborate the picture. Such a research is important especially when we remember that the Mujahideen were not only intellectuals, but were later to become leaders of a large polity.

7. For details see J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder, eds., History of the West Africa, Vol. 1.
8. For details on the British Conquest of Nigeria, see Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria, (London: 1978).
R.A. Adeleye, Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria (Longman; 1971).
J.E. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria (Oxford, 1960).
H.F. Bäckwell, The Occupation of Hausaland 1900-1904 (London, 1969).
Northern Nigeria, Colonial Reports (1903).
9. For Islamic Institutions Under Colonial rule, the most comprehensive treatment was Saad Abubakar's "Northern Provinces Under Colonial Rule" in Obaro Ikime ed., Ground Work of Nigerian History (Ibadan: Hienemann, 1980) pp. 455-75.
See also a handbook prepared for British Colonial officers in Northern Nigeria - P.H.G. Scott, A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria, (Nigeria: Government Printer, 1953).
Isa A. Baba, "Islam in Adamawa in the 19th and 20th Centuries". M.A. Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, April 1976.
10. For details see:
A.B. Fafunwa, History of Education in Nigeria (London: 1970).
F. Lugard, Political Memoranda 1913-1918 (London, 1970).
M.M. Tukur, "British Colonial Social Policy in the Emirates" paper presented at a History postgraduate Seminar, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria 1977.
Y.A. Danfuloti, "The Development of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) As an Instrument of National Unity". B.A. (History) Dissertation, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria, 1983 - Chapter 2.
11. See note 9 above.
12. The O.I.C. comprises many countries whose majority population is non-Muslim. Non-Muslim leaders like Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Amin Jemayel of Lebanon etc. were among those who attended the 1987 O.I.C. Summit in Kuwait.
13. Africa Events, Vol. 2 No. 10, October 1986, pp. 12-17.

CHAPTER TWO

Brief Historical Background of Hajj Administration from the Earliest Times to the Colonial Period

Early History:

The Hajj is one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam, and thus the histories of Islam and the Hajj in Northern Nigeria are inseparable. As early as 1108 AD Mai Hume Ibn Abduljalil of Kanem led a large pilgrimage Caravan, and died in Egypt on the return journey¹. His son and successor to the throne of Kanem, Mai Dunoma Humeni, went on the pilgrimage at least twice.²

The rulers of the Islamic State of Kanem took their responsibility for the Hajj and its smooth conduct seriously, both at the personal and official levels. At the personal level it is known that at least twenty rulers of Kanem (and some of them more than once) performed the Hajj during their tenure. By 1242 Kanem officialdom had a Madrasa-cum-hostel in Cairo called Ibn Rashiq, for scholarship and learning, and especially for Kanem pilgrims.³

Big Hajj caravans were also an annual affair in Hausaland. The Hausa cities of Kano and Katsina were located along one of the principal routes to the pilgrimage- and Mali and Songhai pilgrims had to pass through these cities on their way to the Hijaz. Unlike the rulers of Kanem, it is not clear how many Hausa rulers performed the Hajj personally.⁴ However, the ulama in Hausaland took active part in the pilgrimage, the most prominent of whom was Muhammad al-Kashnawi (from Katsina) in 1730. Al-Kashnawi was said to have been in the Hijaz and Cairo for eleven years and authored a book on Astronomy, Al-Durr al-Manzum.⁵

The Hausa rulers of Kano and Katsina must have taken active interest in the Hajj traffic too. These two cities, apart from their strategic location along the pilgrimage routes, were also centres of International Commerce and Islamic learning. The existence of quarters for pilgrims in transit in some parts of Hausaland,

implied that there was a sort of Hajj Organisation.

The best example of formal Hajj Organisation in pre-Colonial Northern Nigeria was that of Kanem. In Kanem, and later Borno, the Hajj was a state matter. A study has shown that the performance of the Hajj was the principal objective of a Kanem ruler on assumption of office:

"This would further confirm his status as the custodian of the Islamic State and enhance his prestige among his followers."⁶

The rulers therefore, took overwhelming interest in the Hajj Organisation.

The Organisation encompassed many things, including arrangements for the bodyguards and soldiers that would guarantee the security of the Hajj caravans. The wealthy provided transport (Camels, donkeys and so on) and foodstuffs, while the Ulama prayed for a safe and trouble-free pilgrimage. Pilgrims that intended to join the State Hajj caravan had to gather at the Headquarters of Kanem, Birni Ngazargamu, and later Borno, Kukawa. The State Hajj caravan consisted of the ruler, or his representative, his advisers, the ulama and all the intending pilgrims at any given time.

At the apex of Hajj administration (Organisation) was the ruler, who would automatically assume the office of Amir al-Hajj if he was going to Hajj that year, and who delegated the office to others if otherwise. He also selected other officials who would perform varied roles.

These officials included envoys and ulama, usually very familiar to the various states that the pilgrims had to traverse. They usually left a month or so ahead of the main caravan (the State caravan). These officials obtained pledges of 'Safe Conduct', and made the necessary arrangements for the following main caravan. The functions of the envoys and the ulama were vital in allaying the

fears of rulers of the States to be traversed, who might be apprehensive of such a large, armed body of soldiers escorting the kings on the pilgrimage

As mentioned above, the State caravan was the king's party. It also consisted of well armed bodyguards and guides (known as the Madugu in Hausa, Dagirawa and Fuguma in Kanuri). The guides were experts in the techniques of route identification. These techniques included following the stars at night, the sand dunes, and so on. The fluctuating weather conditions and the direction of the wind could alert the guides, for example, of a possible heavy thunderstorm ahead.

Another component of the State caravan was the mass of the king's people and neighbouring peoples. This group followed the State pilgrim caravan for reason of maximum safety in the course of the long journey.⁸ In the late 16th Century Mai Idris Alooma persuaded the Ottoman Sultan, Murad III, to enact legislation for the protection of Borno pilgrims and traders.⁹

After reviewing what obtained in Kanem at the official level as regards Hajj Organisation, one cannot but disagree with al-Naqar's assertion (as rather too sweeping) that:

" - - - absence of a pilgrimage 'policy' is a noticeable feature of - - - early period in pilgrimage history".¹⁰

Hajj Routes

Climatic conditions, security, and distance were the determinants of pilgrimage route preference at any given time. The pilgrims from Borno and Hausaland (Northern Nigeria) used three principal routes.¹¹

First, there was the Jallaba route, which was also known as the forty days route. Apart from being the nearest and direct, this route was popular among

pilgrims for they enjoyed the safety and security provided by the host States of Bagirmi, Wadai and Darfur. This route was mostly patronized by those whose sole objective was to make the Hajj and return home. The pilgrims travelled on foot. Donkeys and Camels were only for the rich pilgrims. The Jallaba route joined the Chad basin region with the Nile via the States of Bagirmi, Waday and Darfur, and the Oases of Salima and Kharja, to Asyut in upper Egypt. The invasion of Borno by Rabiḥ in 1893 interrupted the flow of traffic. However, up to 1960's the route was still used.¹²

There was also the central route which joined Kanem with the Kavar Oases and the Fezzan, and then turned eastwards to Egypt and Arabia. This route was particularly patronized by traders whose pilgrimage to Mecca, was an adjunct of their business activities. It was utilized all through the nineteenth Century.

The 'Sudan Route' was also a traders' route. It linked Hausaland and Borno with Agadez, Ghat, and Ghadames, linking up with the Central route at Fezzan. It was largely patronized by Hausa traders, Daagirawa and Tuaregs, to whom the pilgrimage was a second priority after Commerce. By and large the Jallaba or Eastern, Central and Sudan routes were patronized solely by pilgrims and trader-pilgrims respectively.

19th Century

One principal historical event in the nineteenth century in our area of study was the Jihad of Usman Danfodio. The Jihad resulted in the dissolution of the Hausa States and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate with its dependent emirates. It is not our intention to go over the motives of the Jihad, as it has been done eloquently elsewhere.¹³ Our purpose is to examine how the Hajj was administered in the Caliphate, whose raison d'être was Islam. We have already seen

the various official efforts made by especially Kanem, later Borno, and the Hausa States (predecessor of the Sokoto Caliphate) towards the smooth conduct of the Hajj.

The rulers of the Sokoto Caliphate did not take an active interest in the Hajj compared with the rulers of pre-nineteenth century Borno. The Jihad triumvirate - Usman Danfodio, Abdullah Fodio and Muhammad Bello did not perform the Hajj. Abdullah Fodio and Modibbo Adama made abortive attempts at performing the Hajj. According to one study, none of those at the helm of Sokoto Caliphate affairs performed the Hajj from its establishment in 1804 to the British invasion and conquest in 1903.

The only recorded instance of the appointment of an Amir al Hajj in Sokoto Caliphate, was in 1813, when one Ali b. Nuh was appointed. But even such gestures might not have been the practice. Perhaps the common practice was the selection as an Amir al Hajj, of a veteran pilgrim, to look after other pilgrims.¹⁴

Official indifference to the Hajj in Sokoto can be seen in the inability of the rulers to perform the Hajj themselves and the absence of a formal State apparatus to oversee the Hajj. On the other hand, the Hajj was not relegated to the background as an intellectual issue.

Muhammad Bello, the first Amir al Muminin of the Sokoto Caliphate, authored Tanbih al-raqid Lima Ya' Tawir al-Hajj min al-Mafasid. According to this book, the Hajj should only be undertaken if security along the routes and water availability could be guaranteed. Moreover funds for the Hajj expenses must be pure.¹⁵

The Tanbih has been likened to the Caliphate's Hajj policy whose effects included an absence of reorganisation of the Hajj by the Caliphate, which provided the excuse for non-performance of the Hajj by subsequent Sokoto rulers.¹⁶ The

Sokoto rulers might have refrained from making the Hajj to avoid pandemonium (which might accompany their departure) due to the strong Mahdist beliefs prevalent amongst their people. Al-Naqar discerned:

" - - - Two major factors in which a pilgrimage element can be clearly discerned during the nineteenth Century and which were responsible for the movement of considerable numbers of West African peoples eastwards under the general impulse of Hijra. These were first, the belief in the near appearance of the Mahdi, and second, the European Occupation of West Africa."¹⁷

There is no evidence to suggest that official Sokoto indifference in respect to Hajj Organisation affected the morale of pilgrims in the nineteenth Century. Embarking on the Hajj is a personal decision in most cases, and the enthusiasm of the people for Islam, especially reactivated by the Jihad, might have possibly encouraged many Muslims to seek for channels which undoubtedly existed in the fulfilment of the Hajj obligation. There were also traders, who might have been encouraged by the favourable trade climate (a byproduct of the Jihad¹⁸), and tried to seek trade and other Commercial opportunities on the Hajj routes. There were possibly others who had to make the Hajj for both religious and economic reasons. Perhaps official Sokoto indifference was not an obstacle at all to individuals in the performance of the Hajj in the nineteenth Century.

Aspects of Hajj Under Colonial Rule:

Many features of Colonial rule adversely affected the conduct of Hajj. Colonial rule introduced rigid frontiers with concomitant claims to sovereignty on Muslim lands by individual European powers. Travel papers and currency exchange regulations were also introduced. Hitherto, the Universalism of Islam (the concept of Dar al-Islam) had allowed Muslims from Hausaland and Borno to traverse the territories of Chad and Sudan on their way to the Holy Lands without such impediments.

It is hard to differentiate between British Colonial policies towards other aspects of Islam, and their attitude towards the Hajj.¹⁹ However, since our brief focuses specifically on the Hajj, an attempt shall be made to decipher these attitudes despite the fragmentary nature of the evidence at our disposal.

Colonial attitudes to the Hajj appear to have been informed by many and varied factors, (both external and internal) at different points in time of the Colonial epoch.

On the external front, the British encounter with the Mahdi of Sudan appear to have made them see a potentially 'Subversive' (to their Imperialist designs) in every pilgrim. The British did not take kindly to contacts between the Muslims in Northern Nigeria and the larger Muslim World, for fear of their contracting Pan-Islamic ideas which threatened British imperial hegemony.²⁰ British intelligence kept 'Surveillance' on Nigerian pilgrims.

In the 1950's, the British press portrayed the Hajj in a very bad light: it linked the Hajj traffic and the Hajj itself with the slave trade (that favourite theme of, and, British official justification for Colonial rule). Mustafa Danbatta, a doyen of the Northern journalists, wrote a rejoinder in The Nigerian Citizen.²¹ Thus, the British press appears to have contributed to the insensitivity of the Colonial administration towards the Hajj. 11X

Also in the 1950's, Nigerian al Azhar graduates and Egyptians were not even employed in the North.²² This appears to have been a result of the Suez crisis; Nasser's foreign policy of "Three Circles", one of which connected Egypt to Africa; and Nasser's non-alignment. Perhaps the Colonial authorities thought that the Azhar graduates might contract these ideas while in Cairo and might try to advocate them now that they were in Nigeria. The British would not tolerate any threat to the Empire or a section of it. 7

The requirements of the International Colonial Order (such as travel papers and currency regulations) must also be taken into consideration. The world-views of the non-Muslim Colonialists and the Colonized Muslims were opposed: For instance, the non-Muslim Colonialists could not understand the significance of the Hajj in the lives of Muslims, which makes the latter undergo all 'Suffering' and 'hardship' to accomplish it. As regards the French whose 'territory' in Chad had to be crossed by land pilgrims, John works in his study has observed that " - - - the pilgrimage ran counter to the early French policy of containment ---."23

Internally, the British had to be sceptical of the Hajj for politico-economic reasons. Politically, the toughest resistance to the British by the Muslims in what became Northern Nigeria was led by Attahiru I, at the Battle of Burmi in 1903. This resistance was associated with the Hajj. As mentioned above Attahiru I had urged all Muslims to follow him eastwards to Mecca (and many did) because British occupation had invalidated the Islamic identity of the Sokoto Caliphate.

Economically, the permanent traffic to and from the Hajj implied less taxes and manpower for forced labour (a Colonial substitute for 'Slavery') for the achievement of Colonial objectives. From 1913 to 1918, about 20,061 Northern Nigerians left for the Hajj. The Colonial authorities were naturally alarmed at this" --- possible eventual drainage of Muslim population of Nigeria."24

However, the Hijra eastwards as a response to alien Christian occupation had its limits. The Muslims from the North who migrated eastwards found to their chagrin on arrival in the Sudan that Imperialism was already there. They thus settled near Sennar and named the settlement after their leader, Mai Wurno, who was also one of the sons of Attahiru I of the Battle of Burmi fame. Some of these pilgrims never returned to Nigeria and were later to be considered persona non grata, by the Saudi Arabian and the Sudan governments, and a source of worry to the Nigerian government.

Colonial rule is divided into two phases in this study. The first phase could be called typical Colonial rule, and was characterised by an absence of Nigerian participation at the decision-making level- that is, roughly from 1903 to 1954. In the late Colonial phase, from 1954 to 1960, Nigerians formulated Hajj policies, but with Colonial guidance. The Independence era, 1960-66, was marked by the complete execution of Hajj by Nigerians for Nigerians. This study is particularly concerned with the period between 1954 and 1966.

The First Phase of Colonial Rule:

Under this phase Hajj affairs were handled by the information division of the Civil Secretary's Office, (Secretary, Northern Provinces Kaduna), which was headed by the Regional Public Relations Officer. Correspondence in respect to the Hajj was sent to the Provinces, through their (the provinces) Residents. The Residents appear to have passed the information to the pilgrims through the local leaders.

The emphasis of the administration centred on the new international requirements of travel, such as Immigration Control, Passports, Collection of Saudi Arabian and the Sudan dues and deposits, monetary regulations, and the observation of health regulations by pilgrims. By 1948, Maiduguri and Kano were the two designated Yellow Fever inoculation centres, and government Medical Officers could issue International Certificate of Vaccination.²⁵ Indeed, up to 1958, the emphasis was on the above.²⁶

It is important to note, however, that most pilgrims ignored the official channels and requirements.²⁷ It is difficult to say why the pilgrims were indifferent to official Colonial channels and requirements. Perhaps this was an expression of resistance by the people to Colonial rule. The Muslims might have felt that the Colonial Authority, as non-Muslim, had no business regulating a fundamental Islamic tenet.

Colonial measures like possession of Passports or Travel Certificates, deposits, and payments to the French, might have also appeared to them suspect, and expensive to meet. As the pilgrims had to make their own transportation arrangements throughout, they might have wondered about the benefits of the "new order".

The pilgrims of West African origin, most of whom were 'Nigerians', were usually referred to as Takruni in the Arab Countries.²⁸ From time immemorial these had worked their way to the Holy Land. They had to settle along the routes to farm or engage in other trades that would bring them some funds for the next station. Most times they did so voluntarily, but at times they were forced by the exigencies of the moment to settle. For instance, the French Colonial authorities in Chad wasted no time in tapping the potential revenue source of pilgrims-thus a 10 Franc fee for crossing french 'territory' was levied on each pilgrim.

By 1924, the French had effected stiff immigration laws which not only required possession of a Passport and visa, but also increased from 10 to 100 Francs the levy charged for crossing their 'territory'. As a result: "many Pilgrims had to stay and earn money for their papers, and passage"²⁹

This implied that the pilgrims' funds had already been tampered with, and by the time they arrived at the Holy Land, the pilgrims were mostly poor and destitute. Perhaps out of compassion for their penury and the distance covered to reach Makka, the authorities in the Hijaz decided to charge them half the amount for Saudi Arabian dues, pilgrim taxes, and fees. These concessions were called, Takruni privileges by the sources. In 1947 the Authorities in Saudi Arabia decided to withdraw the Takruni privileges. The withdrawal, according to the sources, was the Saudi's formula to limit the number of Pilgrims to manageable proportions:

"The total of those making the pilgrimage has risen from under 40,000 in 1944 to over 105,000 in 1948... There is genuine concern by the Saudi Arabian authorities as to their ability to cope with ever increasing numbers"³⁰

In neither the French nor the Saudi Arabian cases did the Colonial authorities in Northern Nigeria protest on behalf of the pilgrims. In fact, the withdrawal of the Takruni privileges served the interests of the Colonial authorities. Earlier on we mentioned the British vow to stop the Attahiru followers from their Hijra eastwards. On that occasion the British had used force. The withdrawal of the Takruni privileges thus implied force was no longer necessary, to stop the mass migration eastwards to the Hajj

It should be noted also that the first two years between 1944 and 1948, which according to the sources, experienced heavy pilgrim traffic, also coincided with the final years of the Second World War. Thousands of Nigerians fought for the British in far away lands and also in the neighbouring Cameroons. The Muslims might have been using the Hajj as a means to avoid conscription to fight for the British cause in the Second World War. Thus, to the extent that the withdrawal of the privileges reduced the pilgrim traffic, it implied that the British had unlimited potential manpower for conscription. In as much as most of the pilgrims were tax paying subjects, the measure would undoubtedly curb the 'Brawn drain', which meant a fatter purse for the Colonial administration.

At any rate, subsequent to the withdrawal of the Takruni privileges, in 1950 the deposit for a passport skyrocketed from £15 to £60. "The high cost of the passport is bound to be DETERRENT (capitals, mine)".³¹ The pilgrims also had to pay the full Saudi Arabian dues of £37.2s.6d and Sudan charges of £12.5s.6d (these were supposed to take care of rail and steamer fares, and deposits refundable on the return journey for the subsistence of pilgrims.)

Fifteen shillings of the Sudan charges went to the coffers of the Colonial government (we should note that the government in the Sudan in 1950 was also the British Colonial government for all intents and purposes). For purposes of the above payments, a ten year old was considered an adult and had to pay the full rates, while those from five to nine years paid half the rates.³²

It is clear from the above that the Colonial authorities were insensitive towards the Hajj and benefitted economically as a result of the Saudi withdrawal of the Takruni privileges.

As mentioned earlier, many pilgrims ignored official channels and requisites. They did not get away with it though, for once they reached the French Colony of Chad, they had to stop and "earn money for their papers and passage." For purposes of convenience, we shall refer to this group, as 'private' pilgrims.

When the passport was £15 only five percent of an estimated 4 to 6,000 pilgrims took it.³³ Let us refer to this percent as 'official' pilgrims. The 'private' pilgrims could proceed to the French Colony of Chad and work for papers, they could then proceed to the Sudan where they could pay the authorities there and receive papers to Saudi Arabia. Perhaps it was cheaper and more convenient for them, than paying all the dues before leaving home. Even those who went through the official channels found that their welfare was completely disregarded. An 'official' pilgrim who went by road, in 1954, described the welfare arrangements as deplorable:

"... Nobody seemed to like the chopbox containing a cupful of half cooked rice, three smelling guavas, a roll and a piece of meat. These odds and ends were to last a passenger from Kano to Jeddah, a journey of about 16 hours."³⁴

He went on to compare his compatriots who were served nothing during stop overs El-fashir and Khartoum, with those from the French territory, who were served hot meals and cold drinks. "... in full view of their hungry and angry counterparts".³⁵

As regards the accomodations at Jeddah:

" There is no privacy. It is always crowded, filthy and full of flies. Most of our prisoners in Nigeria have far better accomodation."³⁶

True, the conduct of the Hajj to its end especially transportation (at this time most pilgrims travelled in lorries, hence the term, 'Land pilgrims'), was not the business of the Colonial authorities. It was a private arrangement between the pilgrim and the Pilgrim Agents. But the authorities should have taken more interest in the pilgrims' welfare since they had collected huge sums from 'official pilgrims', for the various purposes mentioned above.

Even after Nigerians started assuming positions of responsibility for the Hajj in the late 1950's, key British Colonial servants continued to offer advice in consonance with British interests. In one instance, Abdallah Metteden submitted a report in 1956 on the conditions of the pilgrims that used the land routes. According to this report, these pilgrims encountered minor difficulties in Chad; however, the moment they set foot in Geneina (Sudan) their major problems began. These ranged from the extortions of Sudan drivers to Quarantine Officials.³⁷

Metteden's proposal that in future, the land pilgrims should be accompanied by "One of our people", to report on their condition and make recommendations, was enthusiastically accepted by the Premier in 1956. However, there were many comments by the British civil servants which not only showed how they thought but also might have been aimed at blocking such a simple official move.³⁸

Many reasons for the uselessness of the proposal were given in the comments of the British civil servants. One was that the trip was uncalled for, since the pilgrimage was INTENDED to involve hardship and; "... that the sufferer gains merit thereby: a thing which seems all wrong to the western mind...".³⁹

Another reason was that the Sudan government could make amends by mere representations (by correspondence), from the Northern Regional Government, through the British Embassy in Khartoum.⁴⁰ The Nigerian Pilgrim Office in Khartoum was attached to the British Embassy there, and was headed by Mr. J. N. Lawrence, a Briton, in 1956.

The most likely reason why the British civil servants wanted to block Metteden's proposal emerged later between September and October 1956. This became clear after J.N. Lawrence, Nigerian Pilgrims Officer in Khartoum in 1956 "back pedalled". Lawrence was Metteden's Superior (Metteden was the Assistant Nigerian pilgrims Officer), and had earlier fully endorsed Metteden's proposal. In fact it was Lawrence that officially passed the proposal to Nigeria.

The reason for this change of view seems to be related to the Suez crisis. It should be recalled that as a result of the Suez crisis, Anglo-Egyptian relations were at their worst.⁴¹ As a result of this crisis, British officials became extremely reluctant to initiate any changes in Colonial administration. According to R.E. Greswell, the British Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Local Government, which also supervised Hajj affairs:

"... Unless an invitation came from the Sudan government (which is most unlikely), we could not possibly send an officer through on the land route. If the premier raises the matter I will explain to him the very tricky situation in which the Sudanese government is placed, viz-a-viz relations with Egypt and accusations against British 'Spies'."⁴²

It is clear from the above that the Colonialists were indifferent to the welfare of pilgrims. It was against this background that the Nigerian leaders began to disregard and distrust British heads and hands (advice and personnel)

especially in respect of Hajj. For instance, the Premier disregarded Greswell's advice and the result was the "Stafford Report".⁴³ The Premier also recommended the sack of Mr. Lawrence from the Nigerian Pilgrim Office in Khartoum against the advice of the British Ambassador in Khartoum.⁴⁴ The Premier mentioned this official neglect and indifference in his autobiography.⁴⁵

From 1954, the 'Sons of the Soil' became active in the day to day affairs of the Northern Regional Government. Did 1954 signal the dawn of a new era for Hajj administration? Did the new rulers evolve a Hajj policy and a Hajj bureaucracy to implement such a policy? Was Hajj exploited for individual political purposes by the man at the helm of affairs, Ahmadu Bello, either for legitimacy or to enhance the fortunes of the ruling, Northern peoples Congress (N.P.C.)?

The conduct of international relations (of which many aspects of Hajj in the twentieth Century were a part), was the sole prerogative of the Federal Government with its seat in Lagos. What was the nature of the relationship between the Federal and Northern Regional Governments in respect of the Hajj? This study would attempt to provide answers to these and other questions.

Notes

1. Dr. M. Nur Alkali, "Some Contributions to the Study of the Pilgrimage Tradition in Nigeria", History Departmental Seminar, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria, Wednesday 27th July, 1983.
2. Mai Dunoma's pilgrimage C1098-1150 was the first to be recorded from West Africa. See Umar al-Naqar, The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa (Khartoum; 1972) p. 27.
3. Alkali, Op. Cit., p. 3. According to al-Naqar Ibn Rashid was the first West African foundation (Waqf) in the Middle East. See al-Naqar, Op. Cit., p. 29.
4. Alkali, Op. Cit., p. 4.
5. Al-Naqar, Op. Cit., p. 36.
6. Alkali, Op. Cit., p. 6.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. Ibid.
9. M.A. Al-Hajj, "Some Diplomatic Correspondence of the Seifawa Mais of Borno With Egypt, Turkey and Morocco" in Bala Usman and Nur Alkali eds., Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno. (Zaria: 1983). p. 167.
10. Al-Naqar, Op. Cit., p. 37.
11. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
12. Alkali, Op. Cit., p. 6.
13. For Jihad Literature, See notes 3, 5, and 6 in Chapter One.
14. Al-Naqar, Op. Cit., pp. 54-55, 64, 67.
15. Ibid., p. 55. Bello's Charge Against the Charity of "Unjust rulers who Contributed to the Hajj Caravan provides an insight into the official involvement of the Pre-Jihad rulers with Hajj.
16. Ibid., p. 60. According to al-Naqar only the present Sokoto ruler, Abubakar III, had performed the Hajj since the establishment of the Caliphate. See also Ibid., pp. 78-79.
17. Ibid., p. 83. The fear of Sokoto rulers seems to have been justified later. When the British conquered Sokoto, Attahiru I fled eastwards with a large number of followers (Hajj as protest against European Imperialism). The alarmed British had to pursue and kill him - but that did not stop the migration eastwards. By 1918 the Borno Resident, Richmond Palmer, "Speculated on the eventual drainage of a large percentage of Muslim population of Northern Nigeria". H.R. Palmer, "Reports on a journey from Maiduguri, Nigeria to Jedda in Arabia" 1919, N.N.A. Ibadan no 63. Quoted in al-Naqar, p.90.

18. For details See Y.B. Usman, ed., Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate (Zaria: 1977).
19. For a discussion of British attitudes toward other aspects of Islam See Chapter One above.
20. P.H.G. Scott, A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria (Nigeria: Government Printer, 1953), p.5.
21. The Nigerian Citizen, Wednesday, June 3, 1959, p. 5.
22. For details, See Isa Alkali Baba, "Islam in Adamawa in the 19th and 20th Centuries", Unpublished. MA Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, April, 1976.
23. John A. Works, Pilgrims in a Strange Land: Hausa Communities in Chad. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976) p. 138.
24. Nigeria, National Archives, Ibadan.
H.R. Palmer, "Reports on a Journey from Maiduguri, Nigeria to Jeddah in Arabia", 1919, p. 25. Quoted in al-Naqar, Op. Cit., p. 90.
25. PRE/40, Vol. 1, p. 1.
26. PM 18/S.9 Vol. II, "Stafford Report" p. 1.
27. PRE/40, Vol. I, "Pilgrimage to Mecca" p. 42, by 1942 only about 5% cared to take the £15 passport out of an estimated 4,000-6,000 pilgrims annually.
28. Umar al-Naqar, "Takruni: History of a Name", Journal of African History X, 3, (1969) pp. 365-374.
29. John Works, Op. Cit., p. 113.
30. PRE/40 Vol. 1, p. 41.
31. Ibid., p. 42.
32. Ibid., p. 45.
33. Ibid., p. 42. The Price of the passport rose from £5.25.6d in 1925 to £15 in 1945. By 1950 it was £40, the reason: "Since the War Controls have everywhere been stringent, particularly in Money and Medical matters and it has been decided that the passport must cater for these" PM 57, p. 32. This was in consonance with British policy not to subsidize the Colonial administration.
34. The Nigerian Citizen, Aug. 12, 1954, p. 5.
35. Ibid.,
36. Ibid., There was also no rest room at Kano Airport (ASI/217, "Pilgrims Reports" p. 124.
37. PM 18/S.9, 2 Vols. "Stafford Report". pp 2-3.

38. PM 18/S.9, pp. 5-9.
39. Ibid., p. 5.
40. Ibid., p. 7-8.
41. For details on the Suez Crisis See:
J. Georges Picot, The Real Suez Crisis. (New York: 1978).
Terence Robertson, Crisis (New York: 1965)
Kenneth Love, Suez The Twice Fought War (New York: 1969).
Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: 1967).
Robert Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography. (London: 1971) etc.
42. PM 18/S.9, p. 9.
43. Ibid., Vol. 2, "Stafford Report" pp. 1-19.
44. PM 18/S.7, "Pilgrim Affairs: Nigerian Mission to Saudi Arabia and Sudan 1958" p. 46.
45. Ahmadu Bello referred to his 1955 visit to Saudi Arabia a "quite essential":
"... The real object was to see for ourselves the conditions for the pilgrimage in Arabia... We felt that it was important for us as Muslims, to investigate for ourselves ... as it was six years since the last of these visits...". MY LIFE (London: 1962), pp. 171-172.

CHAPTER THREE

Hajj Administration in The Last Days of Colonial Rule : 1954-59

Ahmadu Bello was the Regional Premier from 1954 to 1966. Although this study is not an autobiography¹, it will not be out of place to briefly glance at this leader's profile, especially since his tenure (1954 to 1966) is the historical period of this study.

Ahmadu Bello was a direct descendant of Usman Danfodio, the leader of the 19th Century Jihad in Northern Nigeria. Ahmadu Bello also traced his genealogy to the Prophet Muhammad. He was the first Northerner to assume the Premiership of a British implanted secular parliamentary system of government in Northern Nigeria in 1954.

Though running a 'secular Modern' government, Ahmadu Bello consistently tried to promote the cause of Islam during his tenure. (To some extent this was inevitable: most of the people in the Northern region are Muslims, and a politician must have the interests of his electorate at heart). He set up a council of eminent ulama to advise him on Islamic issues. He promoted Arabic and Hausa literacy, and set up a committee for the publication of Jihad Manuscripts. He also established Jamaat Nasr al-Islam (The Society for Islam's Victory).

In 1963 he launched Islamic Conversion Campaigns in non-Muslim areas of the North.² He performed the Hajj no less than nine times in his life time. His international Islamic credentials would be discussed later.

It was this personality who was the leader of the Northern Regional Government six years before the exit of Colonial rule, and six years after the commencement of Nigeria's political independence.

The year 1954 was indeed a landmark: formal Hajj administration was transferred from the office of the Regional Public Relations Officer to the Ministry For Local Government and Community Development, whose Minister was the Premier himself.³ The government also sponsored its Minister of works, Isa Kaita, to Hajj, in order to submit a comprehensive report on the Hajj to the Northern Premier and the Prime Minister of the Federation.⁴ This report might have been the basis for the formulation of future Hajj policies. Although I have not seen Isa Kaita's official report, a press interview he gave on arrival from the Hajj in 1954 seems to suggest dissatisfaction with the official welfare arrangements.⁵

The Premier's first pilgrimage was in 1955. According to him, his performance of the Hajj, among other things, was an opportunity for a personal assesment of Hajj conditions. This assesment, he thought, was long overdue, since the last time any official concern was shown was in 1949.⁶

In 1955, the Hajj administration left the Ministry For Local Government for the Premier's Office.⁷ The Assistant Secretary IV in the Premier's Office was specially assigned to attend to Hajj issues.

On the Premier's return from the Hajj in 1955 he approved the appointments of three Pilgrim Representatives. These appointments were to become an annual affair.⁸ The Pilgrim Representatives were to assist air pilgrims at Kano airport. Their other functions included maintaining.

"... general supervision over the welfare of pilgrims ... explain ... all regulations governing immigration, passports, health and pilgrimage charges."⁹

These Representatives were drawn from the different provinces of the Region. They worked directly under the Pilgrim Liaison Officer, who was in turn attached to the Kano Provincial Office. The pilgrim Liaison Officer submitted an annual situational report on the Hajj to the Premier's Office, via the Kano Provincial Office.

The creation and functions of the office of the Pilgrim Liaison Officer and his aides, the Pilgrim Representatives, could be regarded as an innovation in Hajj administration. There was no reference to the existence of such Offices, or anything similar, in the sources before 1955.

Another innovation was the Sending of Annual Medical Mission to the Hajj. The Mission was usually headed by a Medical Doctor, who was assisted by a number of Para-Medical Staff. The new era also ushered in the office of the Senior Superintendent of Public Enlightenment in each Province.¹⁰ The sources did not specify his duties but from the title it appears he was responsible for providing all the information required by intending pilgrims like the existing Hajj fare including dues, inoculation, the departure time and so on. It was also in 1955 that a new Hajj camp was built at Jeddah for Nigerian pilgrims arriving by sea.¹¹

On the international level, the Northern Regional Government had to establish the posts of Pilgrims and Assistant Pilgrims Officers in 1955. These were to be attached to the United Kingdom's Trade Commissioner's office in Khartoum. These appointments had become necessary in view of the Sudan government's declared intention, that from 1956, it (Sudan government) would no longer tolerate the Nigerian pilgrims' habit of entering the Sudan without papers, and that the paid Sudanese documentation enjoyed by Nigerian pilgrims in order to perform the Hajj or enter Saudi Arabia, would be stopped henceforth.

A Travel Certificate was devised to take care of the first Sudanese demand (non entry for undocumented Nigerians). The functions of the Pilgrims Officer and his assistant were in consonance with the second demand. These functions included documenting in the Sudan all Nigerian pilgrims on their way to Mecca, providing Nigerians with Pilgrims Passports, and collecting the usual Sudan government fees of £4 from the Nigerian pilgrims for onward transmission to the Sudan Authorities.¹²

The Nigerian Pilgrim Officers in the Sudan had to be both Arabic and Hausa speaking. If an expatriate, the concerned Pilgrim Officer had to be conversant with the Northern region. These became established qualifications for posting pilgrim Officers to Khartoum.¹³

A Publicity Campaign was also launched to enlighten and educate pilgrims on the desirability of possessing a Travelling Certificate before entering the Sudan from 1956.

A Pilgrims Centre was also established in Maiduguri which was the last Nigerian port of call for pilgrims taking the land routes. The Maiduguri office, on the border with Chad, was to provide the necessary papers to those pilgrims who did not obtain them from their Provinces before departure.¹⁴

The Federal prerogatives for Passports and International relations (in as far as they concerned the Hajj) were at this time delegated to the Regional Civil Secretary's Office.¹⁵ That explains the Regional Government's quick action in respect to the Sudan government's above demands, which were to be effective within a short time.

The Nigerian Pilgrims Office in Khartoum, which was also the potential Nigerian Diplomatic Mission there was opened in 1956 under Mr. J.N. Lawrence and Ahmed Metteden, as Pilgrims and Assistant Pilgrims Officers respectively.¹⁶ A similar office was established in Jeddah in 1956 and it was headed by Ahmad Marafa Danbaba, a fluent Arabic Speaker from Sokoto Province.¹⁷

The Federal Government Annual Welfare team to the Hajj, which started in 1955, usually worked under the auspices of the Pilgrim Officers in Jeddah. It was the Pilgrim Officer's duty to assign members of the welfare team to the various pilgrimage sites.

The Jeddah Pilgrim Officer also prepared a "Pilgrim Guide", which discussed religious, social and monetary issues as they affected pilgrims, while in Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ Like its counterpart in the Sudan, the Nigerian Pilgrims Office in Jeddah was also attached to the British Embassy.

To understand developments between 1956 to 1957, we must briefly review the role of the Pilgrim Agents. The pilgrim Agents were an important segment of the Hajj administration. The main agents were based in Kano and Maiduguri, which were also the last points of departure by pilgrims using the air and the land transports respectively.

The pilgrim who intended to travel overland had the option of either engaging the services of an agent, or making his/her own private transport arrangements at each stage of the journey. This latter group was in the majority. The pilgrim who intended to go via an agency, would pay the agents in Kano or Maiduguri, the fare plus the official charges. Later, the main agents were to establish sub-agent in the provinces. The agents or their representatives would then organise the transport at each of the six stages of the land journey, from Nigeria to El-Obeid, in the Sudan, a distance of 1,835 miles.¹⁹ The stages, routes and the distances of the land journey were as follows:

<u>Stage(s)</u>	<u>Routes</u>	<u>Distance</u> ²⁰	
1.	Kano - Maiduguri	367	Miles
2.	Maiduguri - Gamboru	84	"
3.	Gamboru - Fort Lamy	64	"
4.	Fort Lamy - Abeche	497	"
5.	Abeche - Geneina	132	"
6.	Geneina - El Fasher - El Obeid	<u>791</u>	"
	T O T A L	1,832	"

It was also the duty of the agents to process, on behalf of the pilgrims, the travel documents through the various Immigration Control posts along the routes in the French Colony of Chad and the Sudan. In addition, they secured accomodation for their clients, especially while in the holy land. They were also responsible for the overall welfare of the pilgrims under their care.²¹

From 1947 to 1955 Haruna Kassim, based in Kano, was the only Pilgrims Agent organizing both overland and air transport for pilgrims. By 1956 Mahmoud Dantata's West African Pilgrimage Association (WAPA), became the Second Agent.²² Agencies that came later included Northern Hujjaj Travel, and Mecca and Medina Travelling Agency, and Murul Hujjaj.

The pilgrims that chose to go via the WAPA in 1957 experienced untold sufferings and hardship. Essentially, the WAPA could not fulfill its obligations to its pilgrims. These included its inability to transport some pilgrims back, and also the failure to pay pilgrims while in Saudi Arabia, the various sums of money they deposited to it (WAPA). These deposits were for the purposes of their sustenance while on the Hajj.²³ The stories of the ordeal of WAPA's 1957 pilgrims spread like wildfire.

As a result of the 1957 fiasco, the Regional Government assumed additional responsibilities. The most important being the repatriation of stranded pilgrims to Nigeria. Henceforth, the repatriation of pilgrims from both the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, became an annual affair. The repatriation policy was also an important example of the government's subsidy.²⁴

The issue of stranded pilgrims was resolved by cooperation between the Federal and the Northern Regional Governments. The Federal Government took care of transporting the stranded pilgrims to Nigeria by: "... using the empty positioning flights of the outward pilgrimages ... at a reasonable cost..."²⁵

The Northern Government fed them, checked their health, and provided them subsistence and travelling allowances to their various destinations. The Northern Government spent about 15,000 sterling shillings, on the stranded WAPA pilgrims in 1957.²⁶

Other effects of the 1957 pilgrimage operations failure were the increase of the Pilgrims Representatives in Kano, from three to five,²⁷ and the need to regulate the activities of Pilgrims Agents by law.²⁸

In 1958, the Regional Government promulgated a law to regulate the activities of agents. The law was called, "Control of Travel Agencies Law, No. 4, 1958". It was to ensure that only reliable and self supporting people were granted licenses.

The law created the Northern Regional Travel Agency Licensing Board, which was attached to the Premier's Office. The day to day administration of the Board was carried out by its Secretary, who was usually a top civil servant. The Premier appointed the Chairman and members of the Board, who were drawn from the various parts of the Region.²⁹

The Board was empowered to receive, process and approve applications for licenses "... by person, company, association or body of persons"³⁰ who would like to participate in the Pilgrims' traffic."³¹

The Board meeting was held every three months, to consider applications for new licenses and the renewal of licenses.³² It also deliberated on the issues raised by the various Hajj reports.³³

The year 1958 seemed to be full of events. It was in that year also, that the Government sponsored the formation of a company, to be based in Kano, under Haruna Kassim. The company to be known as Alharamaini Limited, was to oversee both overland and air Hajj traffic. The Government bought 100 ordinary shares at £1 (£1 was equivalent to £1 sterling), and took up debentures worth £45,000. It also appointed its representatives on the Company's Board of Directors.³⁴

The Company was to facilitate the pilgrims' journey, and to ensure their health and safety. To this end, an Assistant Divisional Officer in the person of Mr. B.C.J. Stafford, was asked by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, on 27th March, 1958, to follow the overland route up to Port-Sudan and Suakin. Stafford's trip was a sort of feasibility study to:

" ... Investigate the conditions under which the pilgrims travelled and to report on the conditions which would affect the establishment of a proposed Government Sponsored Agency, Alharamaini Limited." ³⁵

The ' Stafford Report ', did not immediately recommend the overland route for the operations of the Company. However, it fully endorsed the air route. ³⁶

The Premier led, as Chairman, a goodwill mission to the Sudan and Saudi Arabia in 1958, at the request of the Federal Government. Other members of the Mission were Muhammad Sanusi (The Emir of Kano), and D.S. Adegbenro, the Western Region's Minister for Local Government. The 1957 Pilgrims Officer in Jeddah Abubakar Mahmud Gumi and Ado Sanusi acted as Secretaries to the Mission. ³⁷

Prior to the Mission's departure, a working paper had already been prepared and presented to it, by a special envoy to the Sudan and Saudi Arabia in the person of Muhammad Ngileruma, and the Nigerian Pilgrim Officers of Khartoum and Jeddah. The working paper served as a guide and basis for Negotiations by the mission, with the officials of the Sudan and Saudi Arabia. ³⁸

The Mission was particularly urgent. Colonial Nigeria's formal relations with Saudi Arabia were under the auspices of the British Embassy there. This formal link was severed when Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Britain over the 1956 Suez Affair. From 1956, it was Pakistan which represented Nigeria's interests. ³⁹ But the Pakistani Embassy did not live up to the expectations of the Nigerian Pilgrims Office in Jeddah. ⁴⁰ The Mission was thus set up to:

"... Visit the Sudan and Saudi Arabia with a view to establishing personal contacts and procuring the goodwill of influential persons connected with the pilgrimage in those two countries."⁴¹

In the Sudan, the mission discussed and succeeded in obtaining the resolving the following issues, which made the passage of Nigerian pilgrims difficult: 1) opening the closed French and the Sudan Frontiers for Nigeria's overland pilgrims; 2) the issue of Nigerian pilgrims who spent years in the Sudan and Saudi Arabia working their way to or from Mecca, and the Saudi threat to deport about 20,000 of these in 1957; 3) the posting and the status of Nigerian Agents, to El-Obeid and other places, to look after Nigerian pilgrims, as requested by the Sudan.

In Saudi Arabia, the Mission persuaded the Saudi officials not to carry out their threat of rejecting Nigerian Travel Certificates for the 1958 pilgrimage and subsequent pilgrimages. The Saudis had hitherto said they would only allow in pilgrims with International Passports. Nigeria was not independent at the time, and Nigerian pilgrims could not use their British Passports, since Britain had no formal relations with Saudi Arabia as of 1958.

The Mission also discussed the Mutawwif issue,⁴² that achille's heel of Nigerian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia. The Mutawwif, usually based in Mecca, had a Wakil in Jeddah, and a Muzawwir in Medina, as his agents. It is the Mutawwif's duty to act as a guide for the foreign pilgrims, right from their arrival to departure, and throughout the Hajj rites. It is also his responsibility to ensure the welfare of the pilgrims entrusted to him. In return, the pilgrims paid a fee, called the Mutawwif fee. As of 1958, Nigerian pilgrims paid £7.8s each, as the Mutawwif fee.⁴³

About 15,000 Nigerian pilgrims were attached to one Mutawwif, Bukar Sharraf. According to the sources, Bukar Sharraf's Services were inefficient, and his agents

also levied all sorts of unofficial financial demands on the pilgrims. His agents also lost twenty Nigerian Travel Certificates. The Mission was thus to urge the Saudi authorities to allow three or four persons of Nigerian descent to act as Mutawwifs for the Nigerian pilgrims, since "There are Mutawwifs from practically every Muslim nationality".⁴⁴

Upon return, the Mission submitted its report and recommendations to the Federal Prime Minister.⁴⁵ The Mission was symbolic of the cooperation between the Federal and Regional Governments on Hajj affairs. By 1958 Nigeria had evolved a permanent formal Hajj administrative machinery abroad, both in the Sudan and in Saudi Arabia.⁴⁶

The year 1959 was not only the eve of Nigerian Independence, but also featured a general election. The election ushered in the various governments which assumed power at the both the Federal and Regional levels, at Independence. The relation of these events of 1959 to the Hajj will be fully discussed in the next Chapter.

Notes

1. The review here is only centred on Ahmadu Bello's religious claims and activities. For his Autobiography See:
Ahmadu Bello, My Life (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962)
John N. Paden, Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto (Zaria: Huda Huda, 1986).
2. For an Analysis of the Campaigns for Conversion to Islam See Isa Alkali B., "Islam in Adamawa in the 19th and 20th Centuries" Unpublished MA Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, April 1976.
3. PRE/40, Vol. I, "Pilgrimage To Mecca", p. 69.
4. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 280. The number of 'Official' pilgrims at this time was put at between 3-400, p. 28.
5. The Nigerian Citizen, August 12, 1954, p. 5.
6. Ahmadu Bello, Op. Cit., pp. 171-172.
7. PRE/40, Vol. 1, p. 79, AS I/210 "Pilgrims Representatives in Kano", p. 46.
8. PRE/40, Vol. 1, p. 117.
9. Ibid.,
10. Ibid.,
11. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 284.
12. PM 57 "Pilgrim Passport Instructions", p. 71.
13. PM 18/S.10 "Pilgrims Passports and Travel Arrangements: Policy and Instructions", p. 69.
14. PM 57, p.105, also PM 18/S.10, pp. 26-30.
15. PM 18/S.10, p. 30.
16. PM/57, p. 105, PM 18/S.10, p. 141. See Chapter two above for the role played by J.N. Lawrence as regards the Metteden proposal.
17. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 122.
18. M01/137 "Control of Pilgrims" , p. 165.
19. PM 18/S.9, Vol. II, "Pilgrim Affairs: Stafford Report", pp. 1-3.
20. Ibid.,
21. ASI/360 "Pilgrimage Arrangements 1961", p. 158.
22. ASI/217 "Pilgrims Reports", p.123.

23. ASI/210 "Pilgrims Representatives in Kano" pp. 35-36. Also see the Appendix, pp. 40-45 for the list of pilgrims who were WAPA victims.
24. WAPA's 1957 failure was the catalyst for the Regional government's repatriation policy, however it was not the sole reason responsible for the pilgrims being stranded. Other reasons are Nationalist Xenophobia (especially in the Sudan) which pressured the governments to force stranded 'professional' pilgrims out (Some had been in the Sudan since the 1900's), inadequate finance probably due to extortions by Mutawwifs or ill-planned spending spree. etc.
25. The Nigerin Citizen, Sat. June 27, 1959.
26. The Nigerian Citizen, June 14, 1958. ASI/217, p. 124.
27. ASI/217, p. 1.
28. PM 18/S.7 "Pilgrim Affairs: Nigerian Mission to Saudi Arabia and Sudan, 1958," p. 38.
29. AS I/360, pp. 235-237, The Nigerian Citizen, May 27, 1959.
30. The Composition of the 1960 Board was as follows:

Alhaji Bello Makaman Kano,	Chairman
Alhaji Muhammadu Bello Magajin Rafi	Member
" Shehu Bida	"
" Alin Iliya Jos	"
" Ahmadu Gwadabe	"
" Bakari Yola	"
" Muazu Funtua	"
Mallam Muhammadu Sani Maigamo Wambai	"
Alhaji Aisami Maiduguri	"

See AS I/360 "Pilgrimage Arrangement, 1961", p. 237.
31. AS I/219, Vol. I, "Applications for and Issuance of Pilgrim Agency Licenses" pp. 579-580. For details on the information needed of the applicant and criteria for approval, see AS I/360, pp. 235-236.
32. For the full list of the agents and sub-agents, See AS I/219 , Vol. 1, pp. 684-686.
33. AS I/360, pp. 2-3.
34. AS I/217, p. 40.
35. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 285.
36. PM 18/S.9, Vol. II, "Pilgrims Affairs: Stafford Report", p. 1.
37. Ibid., p.17.
38. PM 18/S.7 "Nigerian Mission to Saudi Arabia and Sudan, 1958", p. 36.
39. Ibid., pp. 17-20.
40. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 286.

41. PM 18/S.7, p. 41.
42. Ibid., p.1.
43. Ibid., pp. 28-29. For the role of Mutawwif in the Hajj, see, R. Paret, "Mutawwif," The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. III, pp. 786-787.
44. PM 18/S.7, p. 43.
45. Ibid., p. 4.
46. Ibid., pp. 28-47.

CHAPTER FOUR

Politics and The Hajj in Northern Nigeria: An Analysis.

The principal thesis of this study is to establish the relationship, if any, between the Hajj and Politics in Northern Nigeria. In particular, the Premier had shown a keen interest in Hajj affairs since his assumption of office. Was this keen interest for political purposes, since he was a politician with a large Muslim constituency, or just out of sheer determination to promote Islam by virtue of his membership to the Mujahideen's family?

In this analysis we shall consider a number of issues which became prominent features of Hajj administration during our period of study. One of these important features was the large annual delegations to the Hajj led by the Premier also known as the "Very Important personalities (V.I.P.) flight." Another was the appointment of officials for the Hajj administration. Other issues to be discussed are: The Regional - Federal Government relationship vis-a-vis the Hajj, the Premier's international Islamic stature, and lastly, comments from rival political parties in Nigeria. It is important to note that the Premier's party, the Northern Peoples Congress, of which he was the President, did not only form the Government of the Northern Region, but also was the main party (in coalition with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens. NCNC) that controlled the Federal Government. The Action Group (A.G.) was the main opposition party at the Federal level and also formed the Government of the Western Region.

A. The Annual Hajj Delegation or 'The V.I.P.'s Flight'.

The Premier performed the pilgrimage no less than nine times during his lifetime. One major characteristic of his annual Hajj was the large delegation that usually accompanied him. The composition of such flights included Ministers, Emirs and Chiefs, Parliamentarians, top administrators, and civil servants. The

composition of the delegations reads like a list of "Who is Who" in the Northern Region, hence the label, 'the V.I.P. flight'. This flight was usually the last to leave, for the Hajj, but the first to return.

In 1959 the Premier led a delegation of forty-four, out of which thirty were first-timers to the Hajj.¹ It was also in the same year that the Premier declared his intention to perform the Hajj annually.² The V.I.P. flight was thus an annual affair from 1959 to 1965.

By 1963 the Premier had also started performing annually, in addition to the Hajj, the lesser Hajj or Umra, with a delegation of sixty-five people. For the Hajj of the same year he led two hundred people.³

In 1964, he led eighty-three people to the lesser Hajj. Among his delegation for the 1964 Hajj, was the present spiritual leader of the Muslims in Nigeria, Abubakar III, the Sultan of Sokoto. The 1964 Hajj was Sultan Abubakar's first.⁴ According to al-Naqar, Abubakar is the only Sultan of Sokoto known to have gone on the pilgrimage.⁵

Perhaps the Premier intended, by leading to the Hajj eminent peoples from the different parts of the region, to utilize a common religion to cement the different groups into one, so that the cooperation of such peoples would be forthcoming in the development of the Region. This would be in consonance with the ruling party's motto of, "One North, One People".⁶

In regard to his annual performance of the Hajj, the Premier had the following to say, in a broadcast to the people of Northern Region on the eve of his departure for the 1964 Hajj:

"... It affords me the opportunities to discharge a religious obligation, the pilgrimage gives me rest, peace of mind and some relief from my heavy responsibilities... The rest of the mind which is the rest of the body and a regeneration of the faculty which enables us to face our work with renewed energy."⁷

Whatever the case, the large annual delegations to the Hajj created the impression, among the people, of the Premier as a generous Muslim leader, who personally sponsored large numbers of people to the Hajj annually. A recent study also has such an impression.⁸ The implications of such an image is interesting for our analysis.

The Premier started receiving requests for free sponsorship to the Hajj from all parts of Nigeria. These requests were both from the high and low, party supporters and so on. Such letters were directly addressed to the Premier. It is important to mention, in passing, that in Northern Nigeria, it is a common practice for the well-to-do and influential persons to sponsor people for the Hajj.

In 1963 and 1964, the Premier received respectively 91 and 33 such letters of request for sponsorship.⁹ All these requests were turned down, including those from party supporters and a prominent local leader. The Premier could have made political capital at least by granting the requests of party supporters and local leaders, but he did not. For example, a party supporter who claimed to be " ... a prominent NPC supporter" ¹⁰ even enclosed his membership card to back up his case. This party supporter had his membership card returned with a "... regret that your request cannot be met with".¹¹

A local leader in Pankshin Division (in present Plateau State) argued in his request that there was not a single Alhaji in his division. He thus wanted the Premier to give him the opportunity of being the first Alhaji, by sponsoring him. The Premier could have sponsored him, and in turn, the chief would have ensured that Premier would get the votes of his village during elections.

The Premier did not do that. Instead he told his Private Secretary to reply to the chief, that if he (the chief) wanted to be the first Alhaji in his division, he should send to the Premier's Office "... a deposit of £125 (pound sterling) ... being the estimated fare for return ticket to Medina."¹² This payment was part of

the condition that had to be fulfilled by all members that accompanied the Premier on the 'V.I.P. Flight'. Even accompanying press men had to be sponsored by their employers.¹³ For the bulk of the applicants for sponsorship or a free trip, a proforma form was devised for the reply. The reply read simply: "... Pilgrimage is not obligatory if one has no means".¹⁴ Clearly, the Premier did not entertain such requests because, if he did so, he would expose himself to attacks from the opposition that he was using public funds for political ends. The Premier similarly declined twice to sponsor candidates to Malaysia to participate in an International Quranic Competition, because each trip would have cost the government £1,000.¹⁵

But who sponsored the large delegations to the Hajj, that the Premier annually led? All members of the delegation had to pay for their passage, merely sharing the same plane with the Premier. There was a procedure for this. Advertisements were usually inserted in the papers and Radio, asking people who would like to join the 'V.I.P. flight' to submit their names.¹⁶ In addition, the person must pay the rate of £125 for the return ticket, or whatever fare that obtained.¹⁷

It is thus clear from the above that, the Premier's large annual Hajj delegation was not for the purposes of political patronage. Surely, the annual V.I.P. Hajj and Umra must have impressed the North's Muslim constituency. Perhaps the annual V.I.P. Hajj also gave the Northern Muslims a sense of belonging to the larger Muslim World. The composition of the delegation suggests that, the members were people whose callings (as Ministers, Parliamentarians, Emirs and Chiefs) did not warrant long absence. Hence they had to join the 'V.I.P. flight', because it would afford them the advantage of being away from their duties for two weeks only.

B. The Appointment of Hajj Officials

The Hajj officials appointed to serve in Khartoum and Jeddah had to meet certain requirements. These requirements were a knowledge of Arabic and previous experience. In addition, expatriates had to be conversant with Northern Nigeria,

There is no evidence to interpret such appointments as either favouritism or political patronage by the ruling, Northern peoples Congress, (N.P.C.) The opposition party in the Northern Regional Assembly, the "Northern Elements Progressive Union" (N.E.P.U.), could have made the above hypothetical charge, but there is no evidence that it did. Besides, the bulk of internal Hajj administration was conducted in Kano, the N.E.P.U.'s main home base.

The four main pilgrims Agencies were: Haruna Kassim's "Hajj air of West Africa", Baba Danbappa's "Northern Hujjaj Travel", Inuwa Tangaza's "Mecca and Medina Travelling Agency", and "Nurul Hujjaj Travelling Agency". We are not concerned with the unhealthy rivalries that characterised the inter-agency relationship. Suffice it to say, the multiplication of the agencies from one in 1955, to four in 1966, was a manifestation of these rivalries. Intra-agency disagreements were usually solved by the disgruntled group breaking away to form its own agency.²⁵ All the subsequent agencies formed after 1956 were established by the old partners of the first main agent, Haruna Kassim.

Haruna Kassim had more political clout than any of the other agents. He was a member of the Northern Regional Assembly, representing the Kano waje (outside) Constituency. Haruna Kassim used his political connections to further his business interests. The Regional Government came to prefer his services, and he was always the main agent for the V.I.P. flight. When the Alharamaini Company Limited was formed, largely with the funds of the government, Haruna Kassim was in the forefront of running it. Although he delayed repaying the £10,000 loan granted him by the regional government to run the Alharamaini, I have not come across any evidence in the sources, that suggests that the loan was "Controversial."²⁶

Haruna Kassim was not the only agent that benefitted from the government's assistance in running the Hajj business. The Mecca and Medina Travelling Agency also did. There was the interesting story that, in appreciation of the Regional

Government's help, the Mecca and Medina Agency offered two seats (return ticket to the Hajj for two persons) to the Premier. The Premier asked his Principal Private Secretary to "Thank them for me ask them to offer the two seats to Miskeens".²⁷

Haruna Kassim was, of course, a political friend of the Premier. They belonged to the same party and were both members of the House of Assembly. But, that was all. The fact that the Regional Government patronised Haruna Kassim had more to do with his long experience in the Hajj business. He was in the Hajj business way back in 1947, before partisan politics and the formation of the House of Assembly. His long experience on the job and continuity might have been the reasons for the government's patronage.²⁸

Haruna Kassim was also in the good graces of the top civil servants in charge of the Hajj administration. They always sent good reports of his conduct of the Hajj business to the Premier, hence the Premier had "... nothing against him".²⁹ Political motive could hardly be proved as the reason for the Premier's patronage of Haruna Kassim. In fact, had the government blindly accepted Kassim's incessant complaints against rival agents, without verifying such complaints, the other main agencies would have had their licenses revoked.³⁰

C. Relationship With The Federal Government

We have already touched above on the various aspects of cooperation between the Regional and Federal Governments as it concerned Hajj administration, especially in the area of repatriation of stranded pilgrims.

Ideally, the Federal and the Northern Regional Governments dealt, respectively, with the external and internal aspects of Hajj administration. In practice, the Regional Government took active part in the external Hajj administration as well, in coordination with the Federal Government. For instance, the Regional Government usually selected and paid the Pilgrim Representatives sent to Jeddah and Khartoum.³¹

and especially had to have a working knowledge of the Hausa language, which was spoken by most of the pilgrims.¹⁸ These appointments were usually made by the Premier, on the recommendations of Assistant Secretary I and the Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Premier's Office.¹⁹

Certain close associates of the Premier were very active in the Hajj administration. Some of these were: Abubakar M. Gumi who served as Pilgrims Officer in Jeddah in 1957 and who performed all the subsequent Hajj with the Premier; Ahmad Marafa, the 1956 Pilgrim Officer in Jeddah, and the Premier's son-in-law; and Ahmadu Waziri, the Nigerian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1963, who was the Premier's College classmate.²⁰

The above close associates of the Premier met the stated qualifications of speaking fluent Arabic and previous experience of the Hajj. Abubakar Gumi, for instance, was the translator between the Premier and the non-English speaking King Saud of Saudi Arabia.²¹ Abubakar Gumi has also translated the Quran into Hausa.

Perhaps the involvement of close associates also implied the importance attached to the Hajj by the Premier.²² Besides, it is a common practice among leaders world-wide, to entrust important jobs to close associates and classmates. We shall see below that, it was only the report of such a close associate, in the person of Ibrahim Dasuki, that persuaded the Premier to officially sanction the stoppage of the overland journey.

The local Pilgrim Representatives did not need to be conversant with Arabic, since they were based in Nigeria. All the same to ensure that all parts of the Region took part in the Hajj administration, the pilgrim Liaison Officers and Representatives were chosen from the various Provinces and Native Authorities, on a rotationary basis. Whenever the turn of a particular Native Authority came up to nominate Pilgrim Representatives, the concerned Native Authority would be notified to "Supply the men"²³. In fact, even people outside government, (Such as Islamic Scholars), were invited to participate in the relevant aspect of the Hajj administration.²⁴

The Civil Secretary's Office in the Northern Region handled liaison with the Federal Government in respect to external affairs.³² Although the Federal Government footed the medical expenses bill, the Northern Government usually recommended the composition (of the Northern representatives) of the medical team.³³ We are here concerned with, only an aspect, viz the Hajj, of Inter-governmental relationship, as it affected internal Nigerian politics.

Since 1956 there had been persistent campaigns by the Nigerian Pilgrims Office in Khartoum to discourage the pilgrims from using the overland routes. The "Stafford Report" of 1958 made the strongest official case against the overland routes. The 'Stafford Report' argued that overland pilgrims encountered untold hardships and suffering, which in turn made them liabilities to the transit countries which in turn adversely affected Nigeria's image in such countries as the Sudan and Saudi Arabia. The report recommended that the overland routes be abandoned in favour of short trips, afforded by air travel. The Premier read the report and even "Congratulated Mr. Stafford for the excellent work he was sponsored to do".³⁴ However, he did not immediately take action.

Meanwhile, the Federal Government had read the report too. The image-conscious Federal Government was disturbed, especially with the part of the report that dealt with Nigeria's image, particularly in the Sudan. Hence-forth it started to seek ways to stop the overland pilgrimage, in order to redeem Nigeria's 'dented image' and to improve relations with the Sudan and Saudi Arabia.³⁵ The Federal Government had to contact the Northern Regional Government, as regards the strategies to be followed, to outlaw the overland pilgrimage. This was because most if not all of such pilgrims were of Northern origin.

"... Publicising conditions laid by our religion for going on pilgrimage. They can restrict our people."³⁹

The Federal Government employed the Premier's strategy when imposing the 1962 restrictions (to be discussed below). And it paid off. On that occasion the Federal Government recruited Islamic Scholars from all parts of the North as publicity agents. The Scholars gave a series of talks over the Radio in the different languages, "... With seasoned arguments from the texts."⁴⁰

The Scholars' talks covered the hurdles faced on the road by the overland pilgrims, the undesirability and the dangers of leaving without being in sound financial health, and so on. The strategy worked. According to the sources, 2,999 pilgrims went for the Hajj by air, as against 417 by land, in 1962.⁴¹ It should be noted that the Premier only agreed to formally discourage the overland pilgrimage in 1962, following a report by a close associate, Ibrahim Dasuki, then the Pilgrim Officer in Khartoum.⁴²

D. Political Opposition Comments In Relation To the Hajj

Premier Ahmadu Bello was well known in international Islamic circles. He held an honorary Doctorate from Al-Azhar, and was the Deputy President of the World Muslim League. (The Precursor of the current, Organisation of Islamic Conference. O.I.C.).⁴³ He visited all the Islamic holy places in the Middle East. He was a personal friend of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The Premier's annual delegation was always greatly honoured by the Saudi authorities while on the Hajj: "His name (Ahmadu Bello) has become almost a visa for all Nigerian pilgrims"⁴⁴

Earlier on we mentioned that the Action Group (A.G.) was both the opposition party at the Federal level and controlled the Western Regional Government. The A.G. sought to exploit the Northern Premier's Annual Hajj and his International

Accordingly, the Federal Government sent one Mr. Varvill to Kaduna, then capital of the Northern region, to officially discuss the implication of the 'Stafford Report', on the 13th of October, 1958. The Federal Government wanted its regional counterpart, via Media campaigns and legislation, to limit the number of the overland pilgrims to only those who were physically and financially fit.

The Federal Government made it clear that it did not want the Northern public to know that the proposed restrictions were its own initiative:

" ... It was imperative, on political grounds, that the initiative should come from the North in the first instance".³⁶

Clearly, the Federal Government wanted to, "eat its cake and have it ."

The measure to restrict the overland Hajj by law was not only new in Hajj history, but would also be interpreted by the Muslims in the North as anti-Islamic. Besides, the mode of transport the 'Stafford Report' recommended was air travel, which could only be afforded by the rich. The Federal government knew this, hence its desire to distance itself from the proposal. The Federal Government even dangled a carrot; an immediate financial aid to enhance Hajj administration if the Regional Government made the Federal proposal its own.³⁷

The Regional Government flatly rejected the political suicide implied in the proposal. The Premier also rejected restricting the number of pilgrims by law, writing in response to the Federal request:

" I much regret to say that I cannot support introducing such a motion from the opposition. I cannot ask members of my party to sponsor it also. If the Federal Government feel they can do so, let them do it and bear the blame."³⁸

The Premier's counter-proposal later adopted by the Federal Government, was a media campaign via the wireless and the papers. His solution was:

Islamic stature to its political advantage. There is a large concentration of non-Muslims, mainly in Benue and Plateau Provinces of the Northern Region. The A.G.'s objective might have been to frighten away the non-Muslims in the Northern Region from the N.P.C. to its (A.G.'s) fold by branding the former as mainly a Muslim outfit for Muslims. The Premier's annual Hajj, and his relations with the Islamic World, especially the Middle East, provided the A.G. with the political ammunition to put into effect its design.

This began in 1956 when Premier Ahmadu Bello visited Egypt in a private capacity on his way to the Hajj. He had an audience with President Nasser, and the latter invited the Premier to return officially.⁴⁵ While the Premier was away, political controversy raged over the Cairo visit.

The Action Group charged that the N.P.C. wanted to establish an Islamic State in the Northern Region and, by extension, the whole country, since it controlled the Federal Government. The N.P.C. had also joined the Arab bloc. It was accused of having an alliance with Egypt's Islamic Congress, and the Premier was also accused of having officially invited President Nasser to the Northern Region. The N.P.C. denied all the charges and re-affirmed its policy of religious freedom for all.⁴⁶

The Action Group re-opened the controversy in 1958 and on the eve of the 1959 Federal Elections. On this occasion, the Premier was accused of entering into an agreement with President Nasser, so that the N.P.C. would be heavily funded by Egypt.⁴⁷ The Premier categorically denies the accusations:

"... Whatever ill-propaganda might be spread by anybody anywhere... Will not stop the Muslims from every corner of the globe from performing their annual religious rite ... Such criticism acts only as incentive to all Muslims including those of the West (The Western region had an A.G. Government) ... It has never been the practice of Muslims to comment on Christians who go on pilgrimage to Rome or elsewhere..."⁴⁸

He further said that the Action Group clearly hated Islam and Muslims despite its big Muslim constituency. The Northern region, he said:

"... has never at any time entered or sought to enter into negotiations or any other relations with President Nasser or the United Arab Republic. I should further like to inform the Action Group and its supporters that Islamic brotherhood is stronger than that of blood and therefore wherever Muslims are in the World, they are our religious brothers."⁴⁹

It was in 1959 that the Premier formally announced that henceforth he would perform the Hajj annually.⁵⁰ The timing was politically important, as 1959 was an election year. However, it is difficult to prove that the pronouncement was to enhance his party's electoral fortunes at the polls. Moreover, the pronouncement was contained in the English print media, whose readership at that time must have been very limited.

It was also in 1959 that the Premier met King Saud of Saudi Arabia who gave him a gift of many books for the Northern Regional Library. To pre-empt the Opposition Action Group's comment on the gift, the government owned press issued an editorial entitled, "No strings". The editorial argued that the books on Saudi Arabia are invaluable, and since a lot of Muslims go to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, they should know the country very well. As for those who would read politics into the gesture:

"... the CITIZEN wants to remind all those who, for sinister motives or ignorance, wrongly interpret this gesture as any thing more than religious ties... They are living in a fool's paradise. We assure them there are no strings attached to this friendship. It is purely religious".⁵¹

It should be recalled that, as a result of the Suez crisis in 1956, Anglo-Egyptian relations were very cold. The A.G. was undoubtedly aware of this, and perhaps wanted to play Britain, Nigeria's Colonial power, against the Northern region

by portraying the latter as "a bad guy", that is, not close or loyal enough to the British Commonwealth. This hypothesis seems plausible, since the A.G. was not happy with the backing Britain gave to the Northern Region over the issues of Ilorin and Lagos. The A.G. had wanted the Ilorin Emirate to be excised out of the Northern Region, and merged to the Western Region, on the grounds that the Emirate comprised mainly the Yoruba, the main ethnic group in Western Region. It wanted Lagos too for the same reasons.⁵²

Nasser's stature in the world was then also in the ascendancy. His 'Three Circles' foreign policy included Africa, of which Nigeria was the most populous nation. Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the Action Group, was also the official opposition leader at the Federal level. Thus, he hoped one day to form the Federal Government. Nigeria's leadership, by any individual, at least because of its big population in Africa, would also imply the Continental leadership. To that extent, Nasser's stature might have conflicted with Awolowo's aspiration. Whatever the case, Awolowo's dislike for Nasser is a matter for the record.⁵³

Perhaps the N.P.C.'s motto of "One North, One People, irrespective of Religion and Tribe", had anticipated a criticism similar to the A.G.'s, that it was a Muslim outfit only.

Ironically, it was Samuel Akintola, the non-Muslim Premier of the Western Region, and an A.G. member, that sponsored Muslims of the Western Region to the Hajj, in order to insure his party's success at the polls.⁵⁴

Notes

1. The Nigerian Citizen, May 27, 1959. For the Composition of the flight, See, The Nigerian Citizen, May 30, 1959.
2. The Nigerian Citizen, Sat. June 27, 1959 "No strings", p. 8, for the 1960 V.I.P. flight See, The Nigerian Citizen, Wed. May 25, 1960. For the 1961, See The Nigerian Citizen, Wed. May 17, 1961.
3. The Nigerian Citizen, Sat. February 9, 1963, Ibid., April 27, 1963.
4. The Nigerian Citizen, Wed. April 15, 1964. According to the paper "Religious History is being made this year, as the Sultan of Sokoto, Spiritual leader of some 25 Million Muslims in Northern Nigeria ... left on Monday for ... holy pilgrimage for the first time..."
5. Al-Naqar Umar, The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa (Khartoum: 1972) pp. 78-9. Al-Naqar gave the wrong date of 1963 - it was in 1964 that the Sultan of Sokoto first performed the Hajj. 1963 was the first time he set foot in Saudi Arabia when he went for the Umrah - See The Nigerian Citizen, Sat. February 9, 1963 for the Umrah and Ibid., April 15, 1964 for the Sultan's first Hajj.
6. The full motto of the then ruling NPC, was "One North, one people irrespective of Religion and Tribe".
7. The Nigerian Citizen, Wed. April 15, 1964.
8. John Paden, Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto. (Zaria: 1986) p. 281.
9. PRE/240 2Vols. "Matters Affecting pilgrims". These files contain basically such requests.
10. Ibid., pp. 160-61.
11. Ibid., see also the request of, and the reply to, Epe Organizing Secretary of the NPC pp. 238-9, p. 248.
12. Ibid., p. 267-8.
13. Ibid., page 87.
14. Ibid., page 49.
15. ASI/201 "Pilgrims and Islamic Affairs: Policy and Instructions", pp. 1-2.
16. The Nigerian Citizen, Wednesday, January 22, 1974.
17. PRE/240, Vol. II, pp. 275, 283 etc.
18. PM 18, Vol. II, "Pilgrim Affairs", p. 98.
19. Ibid., p. 299.

20. AS I/217, p. 240J. . Also See John Paden, Ahmadu Bello... pp 33, p.324.
21. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 281.
22. Ibid., page 287.
23. PM 18, Vol. II, pp. 298-9, AS I/360 "Pilgrimage Arrangements, 1961", pp. 9-11, 15.
24. PM 18, Vol. II, p. 304.
25. AS I/217, pp. 123-139. A deeper probe into these rivalries is important. The reasons given in the sources are vague - besides the author of the report was the West African Manager of Sabena World Airlines, who was certainly not neutral in the disputes.
26. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 281. According to the source, Haruna Kassim, asked for a £15,000 loan for the construction of a pilgrims centre in Kano. This prompted an official query as to whether Haruna Kassim, intended to rely on the regional government loans for running Alharamaini. See PM 18, Vol. II, "Pilgrims Affairs", p. 299.
27. PRE 240, Vol. II, pp. 290-291.
28. AS I/202 "Pilgrimage Publicity", p. 2. AS I/360 "Pilgrimage Arrangements, 1961", pp. 10-12.
29. AS IV/174 "Pilgrimage Arrangements 1962" page 16.
30. AS I/219, Vol. 1, page 628, AS I/360, page 5 etc.
31. PM 18, Vol. II, page 299.
32. PM 18/S.10, pp. 30, 159.
33. PM 18, Vol. II, page 299.
34. PM 18/S.9, Vol. II, "Stafford Report" pp. 1-20.
35. Phillips was right when he said:-

"... The pilgrimage presented a potential for strained relations." Claude S. Phillips Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy. (Illinois: North Western University Press, 1964). page 130. But Phillips and Nolutshungu, author of "Islam and Nigerian Foreign Policy: Tradition and Social Criticism" in Addeed Dawisha ed., Islam in Foreign Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp. 129-43, were wrong in opining rather sweepingly, that Islam did not play any role in Foreign policy, for the following reasons:(1) The first embassies of Nigeria abroad in the Sudan and Saudi Arabia were for the sole purposes of the Hajj - is it not significant that the first foreign policy move of the government was to up-grade the already existing Nigerian Pilgrim Offices in Khartoum and Jeddah into diplomatic missions.

- (2) The Image-Conscious Federal Government contributed towards the repatriation of stranded pilgrims in order to, among other things, enhance Nigeria's image in both the Sudan and Saudi Arabia.
- (3) In 1963, the Federal Government appointed Nuhu Bamalli, as Minister of Hajj Affairs.
- (4) Saudi Arabia (Contrary to Phillip's view), is "the most important Muslim country" to the Nigerian Muslims.
- (5) Although the bulk of the foreign policy bureaucracy was non-Muslim, it is inconceivable that the interests of the largest religious group (43% according to the 1963 census), in the country could be ignored.
- (6) If Nigeria's relations with the Muslim states was "only incidentally based on religion"? On what basis is Nigeria's relations with the Vatican or even the West?
- (7) The existence of the Nigerian Pilgrims Board as an arm of the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs attests to the role (admittedly minor, but all the same "role") of Islam in Foreign policy.
- (8) The Nigerian State cannot play, as the authors implied, the role of a 'Secular' state to the full: for instance it controls the flow of foreign exchange and pilgrims require foreign exchange in form of the U.S. dollars or the British pounds sterling or others for travel - the Government thus had to participate in the Hajj administration to limit the amount to be carried out, since it would never allow unhindered access to foreign exchange.
- (9) Nolutshungu's sources were mostly secondary sources, which are prevalently marxist in interpretation. His essay also contains a gross inaccuracy, the group that started the 1980's riots, known as the Maitatsine (See chapter one above) and not as he claims 'Yan Izala (followers of the Izalatul Bidia movement). He also relied heavily on the newspapers, a thorough understanding of Nigerian History is essential, before one relies on the Nigerian papers as a source. The papers tend to project the interests of the sections where ^{their} proprietors or journalists come from. Importantly, most papers are published in the South, which is also mainly non-Muslim in Nigeria. This implies, they do not understand Muslim issues and Islam, to warrant a reliable coverage.

36. PM 18/S.9 , Vol. II, page 22.
37. Ibid., page 23.
38. Ibid., pp. 25 - 32.
39. Ibid.
40. MO1/137 "Control of Pilgrims" pp. 29-32.
41. Ibid., p. 80.
42. John Paden, Op. Cit., p. 532.

43. Ibid., p. 480.
44. AS I/217, p. 56.
45. Ahmadu Bello, My Life, (London: 1962) pp. 192-193. The Regional Government was at pains to reaffirm "its policy is and always has been to bring the Northern Region into fullest and close membership of the British Commonwealth".
46. John Paden, Op. Cit., pp. 284-285.
47. Ibid.,
48. The Nigerian Citizen, September 13, 1958, page 1.
49. Ibid.,
50. The Nigerian Citizen, Editorial "No Strings" Sat. June 27, 1959, page 8.
51. Ibid.
52. For details see Obaro Ikime, ed., Groundwork of Nigerian History (Ibadan: 1980) etc.
53. Obafemi Awolowo, Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 312.
54. AS I/217 "Pilgrims Reports", p. 39.

CHAPTER FIVE

Developments in the Hajj Administration, 1960-1966.

In addition to making the repatriation of stranded pilgrims an official policy, the regional government decided to spend £5,000 in 1960 for the purpose of filming the overland pilgrimage, the film to be shown later to the public. The objective was to show the people the conditions on the overland routes, and how the journey was undertaken.¹ It would then be up to the intending pilgrims to make their individual decisions, whether to go by road or by air.

Throughout the first five years after 1960, the meetings and discussion on the pilgrimage arrangements were held at Kano. These were usually held under the Northern Minister without Portfolio for the Hajj, who was also the Emir of Kano, and Mr. R.E. Greswell, the Kano Senior Resident, who was the Permanent Secretary for Pilgrim Affairs. It is not clear when these appointments were made, but the first reference to the offices of Minister without Portfolio for Hajj affairs, and his Permanent Secretary was in 1961.² By the 1960's, air travel for the purposes of the Hajj had become widely used. Perhaps Kano was chosen as the seat of Hajj administration because it had the only international airport in the Northern Region, which is also Nigeria's gateway to Saudi Arabia and the Middle East.

Premier Ahmadu Bello made good use of his Saudi personal contacts to enhance Hajj administration. For instance, in 1961, his Mutawwif, Abdullah Kamil, who was also an employee of the Saudi Foreign Office, wrote to warn the Premier in advance (So that the Northern Government would not be taken unawares), of a proposed Saudi demand for a deposit of 1,300 Riyals each, from both overland and air pilgrims, with effect from 1962.³

The Premier immediately wrote a strongly argued and persuasive letter to the Saudi Arabian authorities, on behalf of not only potential Nigerian pilgrims but also

all West African pilgrims. He urged them to drop the demands for the deposit, which was supposed to be used in case of need for deportation.

The letter, addressed to Crown Prince Faisal, argued that the proposed deposit was, indeed, a very heavy burden on the Nigerian pilgrims known as the Takruni.⁴ The Takrunis were very poor and they had just become independent of intense Colonial exploitation, which had sucked them and other Africans dry. The implied discriminatory nature of the deposit demand was also pointed out, because it excluded the Egyptians, Iraqis, North Africans, the Sudanese, Indians, Pakistanis and others.

He also noted that the Nigerians who were resident in Saudi Arabia, most of whom undertook the journey on foot during Colonialism, were there to fulfil a religious obligation. They were escapees from the fire of colonialism and wanted to be near the holy places. His compatriots had never been thieves and they were peace-loving.

The Premier further reviewed the regional government's efforts over the years to curb the incidence of stranded pilgrims, as well as measures taken to repatriate Nigerians who via the Hajj settled in Saudi Arabia.⁵

He finally urged the Saudis to rescind their decision, which if followed would bar the peasants and poor of Nigeria from the Hajj. The measure would also give material for the propaganda purposes of European Imperialism and Zionism.⁶ The Premier's strong plea was only granted in regard to air pilgrims, as we shall see below.

Earlier in 1961, the Premier had set up a commission on "The Holy Pilgrimage to Mecca". The commission was to consider and report to him the religious aspects of the pilgrimage. The commission was headed by Northern Region's then Grand Qadi, Sheikh Awad Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese, and six others.⁷ The commission's brief

was basically to apply the Islamic conditions on the Hajj, to the physically unfit (Examples: the crippled, lame, and pregnant women), and the materially sick (those with insufficient funds).⁸ It should be recalled that this was the Federal Government's proposal the Premier declined to pursue in 1958. By setting up the commission, the Premier might have wanted to be sure of a sound religious basis, before officially sanctioning the discouragement of the overland routes. It should also be recalled that a year after this commission was set up, that is 1962, the overland routes were officially discouraged though not by the force of law.

By 1962, the Federal Government had started playing a more active part in Hajj administration. It appointed in 1962 a Resident Nigerian Minister for Pilgrim Affairs, Nuhu Bamalli, to be based in Jeddah.⁹ It was the first reference to such an office.

We have already noted above that the Federal Government had recruited Islamic scholars as publicity agents, with the sole objective of obtaining a religious sanction in making the overland Hajj unattractive. The Federal Government introduced further measures in 1962, partly to satisfy the Saudi demand for deposits and partly to further discourage the overland Hajj.

It was in 1962, in response to pressures from the Sudan and Saudi Arabia, that a Nigerian Pilgrim Passport replaced Travel Certificates.¹⁰ Thus, from 1962, any overland pilgrim would need a Passport. To qualify for the Passport, the Federal Government levied different deposits on such pilgrims, totalling £286.11s. These would cover the expenses of food, repatriation guarantees, and the Saudi and Sudan Government dues, including the Special Saudi deposit of £100 (1,300 Riyals).¹¹

The Federal Government clearly wanted to discourage overland and favour air pilgrimage. An air pilgrim would be eligible for a Passport if he had a return ticket which cost only £95 (Kano - Jeddah-Kano).¹² The Regional Government was

at pains to indicate that the restrictions on land pilgrimage were not its own making. With a large Muslim constituency the government could not afford the label, 'Anti-Muslim'.

The Federal Government's combined efforts of using Islamic Scholars as publicity agents, and large deposits of £286.11s. before qualifying for the over-land Pilgrim Passport, seemed to have yielded results as shown above in chapter four.¹³

The year 1962 seemed to be the dawn of the Hajj by air. In addition to the pilgrim passport, another innovation in 1962 was fixing firm dates for Hajj flights.¹⁴ Hitherto, most air pilgrims would arrive at Kano with no idea of when to leave.

The first batch of 1963 air pilgrims were seen off at Kano Airport by the Emir of Kano, Muhammad Inuwa, his councillors and the Kano provincial Secretary. The Kano Emir prayed and wished the pilgrims a trouble-free pilgrimage.¹⁵ In Saudi Arabia itself, the pilgrims' ability to identify their camps was made simple by hoisting Nigerian National Flags. Hitherto, there had been many cases of Nigerian pilgrims missing their camps.

We have already discussed above the Federal Government policy of appointing annual Hajj welfare team, which comprised representatives from both the Northern and Western Regions. The Hajj team also included the Federal Government representatives. The Hajj team was supposed to work together, under the overall supervision of the Pilgrim Officer in Jeddah, who usually assigned them to the various Hajj sites. It is not clear what brought about the disagreement between the representatives of the Federal and the Northern Governments on the one hand, and those of the Western Region on the other. The Federal and Northern delegates complained bitterly of the lack of cooperation of their Western Regional counterparts in the discharge of the

duties of the team. In a report written by the Federal and Northern representatives without the participation of the Western Regional representatives, they accused the Western representatives of carrying Nigerian politics to the Hajj. In addition to behaving as if the Western Region was not part of Nigeria. I have not seen the report of the delegates of the Western Region on the 1963 Hajj, if they have written any.¹⁶

Earlier we saw that four main Pilgrim Agencies were registered at different times. By the instrumentality of the Travel Agency Board, it was decided that no more than two main pilgrim agencies should operate at the same time in any given Hajj season. By 1964, perhaps because it was felt the number of pilgrims justified more than two agencies, three were allowed to participate in the Hajj operation for the first time. These were A.H. Kassim, Northern Hujjaj and the Mecca and Medina Agencies.¹⁷

It was also in 1964 that a permanent air agreement as regards the operation of Hajj flights was reached between Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. The agreement guaranteed the Saudi Arabian Airlines either up to 50% participation in the Hajj traffic, or £5 royalty per each air pilgrim.¹⁸

The 1964 Hajj operation by air, experienced two main setbacks which were later amicably solved. The first was the reluctance of the Northern Hujaj Travel Agency to share the same airline (Britich Caledonian) with the Mecca and Medina Travel Agency. The second was the refusal of the airlines (British Caledonian and Sabena) that conveyed the Nigerian pilgrims to Saudi Arabia to honour the agreement reached between Nigeria and Saudi Arabian Airlines mentioned above. They did not pay the royalties to the Saudi Arabian Airlines. This problem was later resolved when the Saudi Arabian Airlines agreed that it could come to Nigeria in 1965 and fly as many pilgrims as it could get.¹⁹

The 1965 Hajj operations by air, is described in the sources as "... terribly disorganised ...".²⁰ First, the Saudi planes did not arrive on schedule. When they did, they could only convey 1,300 out of an estimated 13,000 Nigerian pilgrims. It was also alleged that the Nigerian pilgrims that did not go with the Saudi Airline were 'punished' by the Mutawwifs. They had to pay £1.2S.6d on arrival at Jeddah, before being allowed into or out of Mecca and Medina. At least, this was the Mutawwifs' stated reason for collecting the levy, and it is not clear whether they were acting on their own or on the orders of the Saudi authorities.²¹

Other problems included ignorance on the part of the agents or inadequate information on the numbers of passengers each agent was responsible for, the number of airliners taking part and the flight schedules, in addition to the inter-agency rivalry. These problems were blamed mostly on the agents, who:

" ... had not a sufficiently efficient and disciplined organisation to handle the immense business which the movement had developed into".²²

Also in 1965 an incident occurred which was related to the Arab-Israeli question. At issue was the International Health Certificate used by the Nigerian pilgrims. Apparently, the Nigerian Health Officials did not do their homework well before issuing the certificates. The Health Certificates were wrongly stamped with pre-independent Nigeria's Coat of Arms, which had the United Kingdom's Coat of Arms and a Star of David. At independence it ceased to be Nigeria's Coat of Arms. The Health Certificates were all seized by the Saudis and never returned. To the Saudis, the star of David was objectionable, because it had a striking resemblance to the Israeli Coat of Arms. They made it clear that they accepted it from colonial Nigeria, but were not ready to honour it from an independent Nigeria.²³

As will be shown below, 1965 was also a watershed in Hajj administration. It also paved the way for the eventual take over of the whole Hajj administration by the Federal Government later. We mentioned above that the 1965 Hajj was beset with

problems. Both the Federal and Northern Regional Governments learnt of the problems through the reports of the various officials and Hajj teams. One report which would have consequences for the future of Hajj administration, was that written by Hamzat Ahmadu. Hamzat Ahmadu, at that time, was the Head of Treaties and Consular Division in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was until recently the Permanent Secretary, of the same ministry. In 1965 he accompanied Nuhu Bamalli, The Minister for Hajj affairs, to the Hajj. He wrote a meticulous report on the 1965 Hajj.²⁴

The Ahmadu report recommended the setting up of the Nigerian Pilgrims Board. This Board would be on the model of what obtained in India, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Sudan. The Board would consist of representatives of the Ministries of External, Internal Affairs, Finance, Aviation, and representatives of the Regional Governments. The Board would be a Federal Government controlled parastatal.²⁵

The Pilgrims Board would plan, to the last detail, the Nigerian pilgrims movement to and from Saudi Arabia.²⁶ The suggestion to establish the Nigerian pilgrims Board marked the prelude to the current government's full involvement in all aspects of Hajj administration.²⁷

Today there is a Nigerian Pilgrims Board at the Federal level. It coordinates the varied aspects of the Hajj administration with the different States' Pilgrim Welfare Agencies, which are also part of the State Governments. Both the Federal and the State Pilgrim Boards are usually headed by a Secretary, as the Chief Executive.

The Premier of Northern Region, Ahmadu Bello, and the Federal Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, were among those slain in the first bloody military coup after independence in 1966. (According to a recent study, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia allegedly ordered prayers to be said in all Saudi Mosques, in memory of Premier Ahmadu Bello).²⁷ The new Military Government in the North had to dispell the rumours prevalent there to the effect that, following Premier Ahmadu Bello's death, there would be no Hajj in 1966.²⁸

Despite the change of government there were many continuities: Hajj administration remained in the former Premier's Office, now renamed the Military Governor's Office. The annual Federal and Regional Hajj welfare teams were sent, and the convening in Kano of the annual meeting for Hajj arrangements also continued.

But the 1966 pilgrimage was far from being problem-free for an inexperienced Military Regime. The agents blamed the new government for the difficulties (Similar to those of 1965 discussed above) and vice-versa.

It was in 1966 that the suggestion that the government should take full control of all aspects of Hajj administration was first made. It was also the first time that the conduct and performance of individual agents were comprehensively analysed in the Pilgrims Reports.²⁹ The full scale involvement of the Federal Government, via the Nigerian Pilgrims Board, in Hajj administration, continues in present day Nigeria.

Notes

1. The Nigerian Citizen, Wednesday, May 25, 1960, page 6.
2. AS IV/152 "Pilgrim Representatives in Kano", page 33.
3. PRE/240, Vol. 1, "Matters Affecting the Pilgrims", pp. 3-4.
4. In Nigeria, this word means a non-Arabic speaking pilgrim - it also implies poor pilgrim. It is generally used in a derogatory sense, See The Nigerian Citizen, May 16, 1964, p. 3. It is difficult to accept Naqar's view that the word is not derogatory, in Nigerian usage it is. It is implied in the Premier's usage of the term. See Naqar's article, "Takruni: History of a Name", Journal of African History, X, 3(1969), pp. 365-374.
5. PRE/240, Vol. 1, pp. 5-9.
6. Ibid., page 7.
7. PM 18/S.13, Vol. 1.
8. Ibid.,
9. The Nigerian Citizen, Saturday, May 1962.
10. M01/137, pp. 14-16.
11. Ibid., p. 15.
12. AS I/202, "Pilgrimage Publicity", p. 1.
13. M01/137, p. 80.
14. AS IV/174 "Pilgrimage Arrangements, 1962", page 4.
15. ASI/217, p. 8.
16. Ibid., pp. 1, 7.
17. Ibid., p. 20. I plan to write a paper after a thorough research on the role of the Agencies in the pilgrim administration.
18. Ibid., page 47.
19. Ibid., page 18.
20. Ibid., p. 48.
21. Ibid., p. 18.
22. Ibid., p. 65.
23. Ibid., p. 47.

24. Ibid., pp. 46-63.
25. Ibid., p. 56.
26. Ibid.,
27. John Paden, Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto (Zaria: 1986), p. 282.
28. New Nigerian, Wednesday, February 9, 1966.
29. AS I/217, pp. 105-20.

CONCLUSION

In Africa's Colonial Historiography, the impression usually given is that the departing Colonial Authorities left behind 'Modern' institutions, and the leaders that "Stepped into their shoes" only continued where they had left. In other words, the Colonial Authorities had left clear blue-prints for all conceivable things. In so far as the formal Hajj administration in Northern Nigeria is concerned, the above impression, strictly speaking, is untenable.

Perhaps the only legacy of formal Hajj administration under typical Colonial rule (1903-1954), that survived by 1954 was the involvement of agents and subagents in the payment and arrangement for transportation, and accomodation while on the Hajj. The similarity ended there.

The Colonialists left no other blue-prints and the leaders literally started from scratch. One could safely say it was a complete 'Revolution' in formal Hajj administration, especially as regards the welfare of pilgrims, public enlightenment and officiating, and so on. For instance, the sending of an annual Hajj medical mission was an innovation which started in 1954.

By 1954 the Northern leaders had started to make representations to the Sudan and Saudi Arabia in cases of policies that were inimical to their compatriots, in the discharge of their Hajj obligation. Hajj policies were evolved. These included the annual appointment of pilgrim Liaison Officers, the regulating of Pilgrims Agents via the Travelling Agency Board, there was also the policy of annual repatriation of stranded pilgrims, who in some cases were victims of the new ideology, nationalism. The administration was coordinated by the Premier's office.

The Premier also utilised the personal friendship he cultivated with the Saudis over the years, to ensure better deals for his compatriot pilgrims. Indeed, Premier Ahmadu Bello was very active in the Hajj administration.

Premier Ahmadu Bello belonged to the Mujahideen family of Usman Danfodio, which established the Sokoto Caliphate following the Nineteenth Century Jihad. Thus, he was of a family that is primarily associated with Islam. His great great grandfather, Muhammad Bello, led the Sokoto Caliphate and wrote numerous books as his contribution to Islam. Attahiru, his other ancestor, served the cause of Islam by resisting and dying at the hands of the British at the Battle of Burmi. The deeds of Ahmadu Bello's ancestors are all in the annals of history. It is against this context we can explain Ahmadu Bello's active involvement in Hajj administration.

Ahmadu Bello held an elective office, and was therefore a politician. However, this does not mean his active role in Hajj administration was for political purposes. In his autobiography he seemed to imply that by virtue of his Danfodio ancestry, he was a man with a religious mission. Perhaps, then, he too wanted to leave in the annals of history, like his ancestors, his own form of contribution to Islam. Hence, his active involvement in Hajj affairs.

Perhaps, one major criticism of this thesis would be its total dependence on written sources. This is to some extent inevitable by virtue of the nature of the topic. All the same it is noted and will be rectified in future researches, especially on the Social and spiritual significance of the Hajj to the Nigerian Muslims.

What motives, spiritual or mundane, outweigh the others when deciding on the Hajj by an individual? What prayers were emphasized during the Hajj? Is it worldly concern like wealth, power, promotion and so on or because the Hajj is a spiritual asset in the life-hereafter? Why do the rich and influential in the society sponsor others to the Hajj? What social classes perform the Hajj more than the others, and why. Do Hajis feel spiritually superior to others who have not yet made it?. To answer most of the above questions effectively in a research, I need, among other things, to become an Alhaji myself.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

PRIMARY SOURCES

Archival Materials. Nigeria: National Archives, Kaduna. (N.A.K.).

<u>N.A.K.</u>	<u>PREMIER'S OFFICE</u>	<u>FILE NUMBER</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
"	"	ASI/217	Pilgrims Reports
"	"	PRE/240, 2 Vols.	Matters Affecting Pilgrims
"	"	ASI/360	Pilgrimage Arrangements 1961
"	"	AS IV/174	" " 1962
"	"	MOI/137	Control of Pilgrims
"	"	ASI/201	Pilgrims Affairs: Policy & Instructions
"	"	ASI/202	Pilgrimage Publicity
"	"	ASI/232 Vol. 1	Trade by Nigerian Pilgrims in Saudi Arabia 1964
"	"	ASI/219 Vol. 1	Applications for and Issue of Pilgrim Agency Licenses
"	"	ASI/210	Pilgrims Representatives in Kano
"	"	AS IV/152	Pilgrims Liaison Officers in Kano
"	"	AS IV/141	Nigerian Pilgrims Office in Khartoum
"	"	PM 18/S.9, 2 Vols.	Pilgrims Affairs: Stafford Report
"	"	PM 18/S.6	Pilgrims Arrangements for 1958
"	"	PM 18, Vol. 11	Pilgrims Affairs
"	"	ASI/209	Pilgrims Currency Regulations
"	"	PM 18/S.10	Pilgrims Passports and Travel Arrangements: Policy & Instructions
"	"	PM 57	Pilgrims Passport Instructions
"	"	PM 18/S.7	Pilgrims Affairs: Nigerian Mission to Saudi Arabia & Sudan 1958
"	"	PRE/40, Vol. 1.	Pilgrimage to Mecca

Government Publications

P.H.G. Scott, A Survey of Islam in Northern Nigeria (Nigeria: Government printer, 1953).

Nigeria, The Pilgrim Passport For Overland Travel: Instructions (Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation, 1954).

Newspapers

The Nigerian Citizen, issues from 1954 to 1965.

New Nigerian, 1966 issues.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Abubakar, S. "Northern Provinces Under Colonial Rule" in Obaro Ikime, eds., Groundwork of Nigerian History (Ibadan: Hienemann, 1980).
- Ahmad, K. The Sacred Journey (New York: Sloan & Pearce, 1961).
- Ajayi J.F.A. Crowder M., eds., History of West Africa, 2 Vols. (New York: 1971).
- Alkali, M.N. "Some Contribution to the Study of the Pilgrimage Tradition in Nigeria", History Departmental Seminar, University of Maiduguri, Nigeria, Wednesday 27h July, 1983.
- _____, Usman Y.B., eds. Studies in the History of Pre-Colonial Borno (Zaria: 1983).
- Al-Naqar, U. The Pilgrimage Tradition in West Africa (Khartoum: 1972).
- _____. "Takruni: History of a Name", Journal of African History X, 3, (1969).
- Awolowo, O. Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
- Baba, I.A. "Islam in Adamawa in the 19th and 20th Centuries" Unpublished MA Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, April 1976.
- Backwell, H.F. The Occupation of Hausaland 1900 - 1914 (London: 1969).
- Bakori, G.I. "The Hadj As a COMMUNITAS and an Integrative Process: A Case Study of Nigerian Pilgrims". Unpublished B.Sc. Soc. Sc. (Sociology) Thesis, Ahmadu Bello University, Samaru - Zaria, June 1977.
- Barth, Heinrich. Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa, 3 Vols. (London: 1965).
- Bello, S.A.A. My Life: The Autobiography of Sir Ahmadu Bello Sardauna of Sokoto (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962).
- Burton, R.F. A Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina 3 Vols. (London: 1874).
- Dawisha A., ed. Islam in Foreign Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- Fafunwa, A.B. History of Education in Nigeria (London 1970).
- Last D.M., Al-Hajj M.A. "Attempts at Defining a Muslim in 19th Century Hausaland and Bornu" Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria III, 2, 1965.
- Lavers, J.E. "The Adventures of a Kano Pilgrim, 1892-1893" Kano Studies 1, (1968).
- Lovejoy, P.E. "Long-Distance Trade and Islam: The Case of the 19th Century Hausa Kola Trade" Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 5, 1971.
- Martin, B.G. "Kanem, Bornu and the Fezzan: Notes on the Political History of a Trade Route" Journal of African History 10, 1969.

Paden, J.N. Religion & Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1973).

_____. Ahmadu Bello: Sardauna of Sokoto (Zaria: Huda Huda Press, 1986).

Paret, R. "Mutawwif", The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. III, New Edition.

Phillips, C.S. Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Illinois: North-Western University Press, 1964).

Trimingham, J.S. The Influence of Islam Upon Africa (New York: Praeger, 1968).

Tukur, M.M. "British Colonial Social Policy in the Emirates" History Post-graduate Seminar, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 1977.

Usman Y.B., ed. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate (Zaria: 1977).

Weinsinck A.J., et al, "Hadjdj" The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition.

Works, J.A. Pilgrims in a Strange Land: Hausa Communities in Chad, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

AMERICAN UNIV. IN CAIRO LIBRARY
3 8534 01141 8096

