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The American University in Cairo  
**CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE PRACTICES IN EGYPT:  
CASE STUDIES: INNOVATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION**

A Thesis Submitted by

**Rana Gaber**

To Department of Political Science

December, 2016

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

The degree of Master of Arts

Has been approved by

Dr. Ibrahim Elnur

Thesis Committee Advisor  \_\_\_\_\_

Dr. Nadine Sika

Thesis Committee Reader  \_\_\_\_\_

Dr. Marie Duboc

Thesis Committee Reader  \_\_\_\_\_

 \_\_\_\_\_

Department Chair

 11/01/2017

Date

 \_\_\_\_\_

Dean

 2-2-2017

Date

The American University in Cairo  
School of Humanities and Social Sciences

**CIVIL SOCIETY AND STATE PRACTICES IN EGYPT**

**CASE STUDIES: INNOVATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION**

A Thesis Submitted to  
The Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Arts/Science

By Rana Gaber

Under the supervision of Dr. Ibrahim El Nur

December/2016

## *DEDICATION*

*To my Grandfather, Mourad El Kharadly, may his soul rest in peace; he has always been my inspiration to explore the surrounding social, economic, and political phenomena and to bring the change we imagine to the reality we live in.*

*To all the unjustly arrested, prosecuted, and jailed in Egypt I dedicate this thesis.*

## *ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS*

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## ABSTRACT

In this study, I explore the different factors enabling civil society in influencing state practices. And how this is reflected in the social and economic development of the state. I am mainly focusing on Egypt, specifically going through a comparative analysis of the different development strategies from Nasser till Al Sisy. In addition, drawing a comparison between Innovation and Civic Education as two case studies. The framework through which the dynamic state society relations are explored is Michael Mann's "Sources of Social Power" and Joel S. Migdal's "Strong Societies and Weak States". The different factors I identified were; political change, the purpose of the local civil society actors, as well as international support. The influence of these factors on state practices from recognition of civil society, support to civil society, and policy change. And thus, identifying the social and economic development of the state.

## **Acronyms**

ASRT	Academy of Scientific Research and Technology
CE	Civic Education
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EU	European Union
EYF	Egyptian Youth Federation
HDI	Human Development index
ITIDA	Information Technology Industry Development Agency
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MoSR	Ministry of Scientific Research
MoSS	Ministry of Social Solidarity
MoY	Ministry of Youth and Sports
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NACE	Network of Arab Civic Education
NECE	Networking for European Citizenship Education”
NM	Nahdet Al Mahrousa
RDI	Research development and Innovation Program
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TIEC	Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USA	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
YIA	Young Innovators Awards

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## **Chapter one**

### **Introduction**

During the past five years Egypt has been making it to the headlines in the different news agencies, either as a case where democracy is finally arriving or a case of a persistent authoritarian regime. The role of Civil Society has been highlighted in this phase either as the opposition agent bringing about democracy or the one failing in this process. While these statements might hold some truth in them, they are in a way falling short in explaining what the Civil Society means and what role did the Civil Society have and how it shaped and was shaped by its dynamic relation between the society and the State.

Civil society in general, and not only in Egypt, is a contested concept with different understanding, yet for the purpose of the study I will be looking at Civil Society as Sheila Carapico defined it as “an associational space situated between government and households, and also between the public state sector and the commercial economy.” She then adds that civil society does not aim at taking over the state but rather it is a metaphorical space for civil discourse and volunteerism, it is not driven by profit either (Carapico, 2013: 99). With this understanding of what civil society means, this imaginary public square of activism has always been a space where the state and the society are interacting. Looking closer at how the state and the society are interacting within the sphere of the civil society helps in understanding the different factors that enable the civil society to influence the state practices. Thus, it can contribute to the understanding of the development both the states and the societies are going through together.

Egypt is no different than the rest of the world, the civil society remains a space between the society and the state where dynamic interaction takes place. Different

stakeholders emerge and interact together within the civil society, shaping a dynamic interaction between the state and the society determining the social and economic development. Development is a wide concept and encompasses different fields be it political, economic, or social. For the purpose of the study the focus would be on two fields, one, mainly having economic value, and has been growing exponentially within Egypt; namely the field of innovation. Another has both political and social value, and has always been important on the agenda of development; civic education. By examining the dynamic interaction between the state and the society within the two fields of study, one would be aiming to understand:

*What are the factors that enable the Civil Society to influence the state practices in Egypt?*

My main argument is: Purpose of local civil society actors, Political change, and International support are the main factors enabling civil society to influence the state practices. This influence could be used as an indicator in studying the economic and social development in Egypt.

Influence will be tackled within the sub-hypothesis, yet first I will outline some definitions I will be using throughout the course of the study:

By *Local civil society actors* I mean formal and informal groups and organizations- that could also be viewed as registered under the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) or unregistered- that operate within the country. What distinguishes these actors from the international actors is the scope of their work; they are local in the sense that their scope does not cover other countries.

By *State Practices* I mean the everyday activities the state engages in with the society from policies, ministerial decrees, statements by state officials, activities, events, meetings...etc.

*The Influence* that I will be trying to track is the change in recognition of the state to the local actors, the support that is offered by the state to the local actors it can be either financial or technical support; it might also take the form of partnership agreements, and finally the change in the policies of the state.

The time frame of the study would be mainly tracing the change within the period that followed the issuance of the civil society law in 2002 and until the year 2015<sup>1</sup>.

The research question brings about some sub questions that further elaborate on the issue.

- How does the purpose of local civil society actors influence state practices?
- What are the implications of the uprising in 2011 on the processes of influencing the state practices by the local civil society actors?
- How do International Actors impact the ability of the local civil society actors to influence state practices?

In an attempt to answer the questions, three hypotheses have been drawn:

1. The more economic the purpose of local civil society actors is, the more successful they are in influencing State Practices.
2. The period that followed the uprising in 2011 witnessed more influence on the State Practices by the local civil society actors.

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<sup>1</sup> As explained later in the Methodology, the different case studies selected have different starting and ending dates within the timeframe specified above.

3. The more consistent the agenda of the Local civil society actors with the international organizations operating within the country, the more successful they are in influencing state practices.

### **Methodology**

This study has a comparative angle to it. Comparative analysis would be drawn between state society relations within the fields of innovation and civic education. In the course of the study I will depend on content analysis of the different policies, in-depth interviews within the frame of the case studies, and questionnaires I also developed within the case studies to capture the understanding of the different stakeholders to the fields of development and the main concepts within the fields. I will also depend on participant observation, to document the reflections gathered from attending different events within the frame of the two case studies during 2015 and 2016. Lastly, I will draw on my personal experience within the field of development specifically within the field of civic education working in since 2011 in a Non Governmental Organization (NGO), as a project coordinator, a project manager, and finally as a director of programs.

Below is a thorough explanation of the different components of the methodology; namely: *case studies, questionnaires, in depth interviews, participant observation, and personal experience.*

*Case Studies:* Through the course of this research the focus would be on two main fields existing within the development agenda in Egypt where both the state and the society are interacting. The two fields, as mentioned before, are Innovation and Civic Education. The two case studies were selected for multiple reasons. First, within the two

fields both local and state actors are present and there is a high intensity of interaction between them. Second, there has been a significant increase in the number of organizations working in the two fields within the period following the uprising in 2011. Third, both fields hold different purposes, while the innovation field is assumed to make more significant change and more encouragement from the state, the civic education field is regarded as a contested field and the state is slow in responding to the growth that exists within this field. Fourth, the difference in the level of influence within the two fields. Within the field of the innovation, policy change can be traced to a certain extent where the state –across the past few years- showed signs of change in its recognition, support, and policies. While on the other hand the different attempts of change in the field of the civic education have not witnessed significant influence on state practices on the three levels whether recognition, support, or policies.

*Brief about the case studies:* Innovation is defined with the Oslo Manual as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations.” (OECD, 2005). Which translates into innovation finding its way as a defining factor to the level of development of the state. Innovation is also closely related to entrepreneurship, Research and Development, as well as the use of Information Technology. An example of how innovation as a field within the development world has emerged and gained momentum is the formation of the “Innovation Union: A Europe 2020 initiative” by the European Commission. Innovation Union is “the European Union strategy to create an innovation-friendly environment that makes it easier for great ideas to be turned into products and services that will bring our

economy growth and jobs” (EC, 2015). In addition to the Presence of an Innovation Strategy for the OECD<sup>2</sup>.

In Egypt as a field it has been gaining more attention since the beginning of the 2000s with the rise of NGOs working on innovation through social entrepreneurship. The state picked up this trend; an example would be the Ministry of Scientific research adopting an innovation strategy in 2006, also the establishment of “Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Centre” (TIEC) in 2010 the first governmental incubator of technology related startups. Within the Egyptian 2030 Sustainable Development strategy “Innovation” has been mentioned several times within the goals of the strategy.

Choosing the case studies within the field depended mainly on several criteria that relate to the hypotheses, one of which is the presence of interaction between the state and the civil society actors. Another is the intention of the civil society to influence the state practices from recognition, support and policy.

Depending on the above mentioned criteria two cases are selected. One about a program within a NGO aiming to influence the recognition and support of the state. Another is of a NGO aiming to influence the policy level.

The first case is; Young Innovators Awards (YIA); a program under the umbrella of Nahdet Al Mahrousa (NM), an Egyptian NGO operating since 2004. YIA is one of the earliest attempts to offer technical and financial support to the young innovators from different public universities from natural sciences backgrounds. (NM, 2008)

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<sup>2</sup> For more information on the OECD innovation strategy visit the official website: <http://www.oecd.org/site/innovationstrategy/defininginnovation.htm>

The other example is ECASTI, a registered NGO under the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MoSS) in 2013. Mainly acting as a think tank for science, technology, and innovation policies, strategies, and laws.

The second field to be addressed is Civic Education. Unlike innovation, civic education has political and social purposes. Though the innovation field might be considered gaining attention recently, civic education is not. It has been on the agenda of several local organizations, governmental institutions as well as international organization from a long time. On the local level the establishment of the Youth Association for Population and Development (YAPD) in 1995 would be an example, on the level of the government the Ministry of Youth and Sports (MoYS) established a unit inside the ministry for civic education in the early 2000s. Finally on the international organizations level different examples can be mentioned here from UN Habitat, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as well as the German aid organization known as GIZ. Within this case study, I would be looking at the Egyptian Youth Federation (EYF) as a local organization working on civic education since its establishment in 2006, mainly focusing on the influence EYF was trying to make on the recognition, support, and policy levels. What I will be attempting to do is looking at these interactions, analyzing them, and identifying the instances of influence in the state practices in recognition, support, or policies towards the organization itself as well as towards the field in general.

*Questionnaires:* These questionnaires were targeting gaining a deeper insight to the understanding of the two concepts, development because of the difficulty attached to defining the concept, and innovation because of the recent attention this field has been gaining. The questionnaires mainly target the perception of the different stakeholders

working within development. Specifically, two questionnaires were developed. The questions of the two questionnaires are found in annex 1. Each questionnaire had 21 respondents.

*In-depth interviews:* The fieldwork will be mainly done through in-depth interviews with the stakeholders involved in the two case studies presented. For each case study interviews will be conducted. The stakeholders Identified so far: State officials working in the field of the cases, Local Organization active from the early 2000s, Local organization active after the 2011, an informal group working in the same field, an international actor working in the field, and finally a company/social enterprise.

*Participant observation:* During 2015 and 2016, there were several events relating to the innovation field as well as civic education; reflecting on these events and writing the insights these events gave me would be added to the study. I have attended as well as facilitated different national, regional, and international events within the two fields. An example would be the events I attended within the innovation field in 2016: “Innovation Cluster Initiative (iCi) Workshop”, organized by TIEC/ Information Technology Industry Development Agency (ITIDA) on the 22nd of June 2016. “Rise um Berlin” organized by Rise up, a startup working on entrepreneurship, on 13th of July 2016. In Berlin, Germany. “Support for Coworking spaces and founding startups in Alexandria”, and event organized by the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) on the 18th of July 2016, in the bibliotheca Alexandrina, Alexandria, Egypt. “Technovation 2016”, organized in the American University in Cairo, on 1st and 2nd of December 2016. Cairo, Egypt. “Social Startup Carnival “ organized different NGOs and funded by Research development and Innovation Program (RDI) on the 26th of November 2016. Cairo, Egypt.

*Personal experience:* I will also draw on my personal experience. My personal experience could be summarized in my 9 years work experience within youth development. Namely working with three different NGOs. The Most relevant one is my 7 years work experience within EYF, leading the civic education component within the NGO as well as directing the programs of the NGO. I will highlight my experience in two aspects. The first, depending mainly on my network within the field of civil society to map the different organizations working in the field. In addition, this network would help me to reaching out to the relevant stakeholders for conducting the interviews. Second, my observations as a participant myself in a number of projects, programs, conferences, and events focusing on Civil Society State relations nationally, regionally, and internationally.

The study would be organized in six chapters; chapter one just concluded the research question, the main argument, as well as the methodology this study would follow. Chapter two includes the literature review and theoretical framework this study would use. Chapter three would outline the development strategies and the evolution of state society relations from Nasser to the present date would be elaborated on. Chapters four and five would be examining in depth the two fields, innovation and civic education, and their case studies in Egypt respectively. Chapter six would be the concluding remarks on the overall study.

Moving to chapter two where how the present and the past literature address the research question and paving the way to theoretical lens through which this study would be looking at the question.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

This chapter mainly explores how the research question was addressed by different scholars then identifying the theoretical framework of this study.

#### **Literature Review**

Here I will be dividing the literature review into two subtopics, namely: how development has been perceived whether social or economic, in addition to approaches to exploring the role of Civil Society as a transition agent or catalyst for social and economic development. Then I will outline the theoretical framework of the study.

##### *Development as a field of study:*

Development can be looked at as a concept, a process, and a discipline. It is complex in nature, and there has been an ongoing debate around it ever since the discipline started spreading in the aftermath World War II. Below I would mainly explore the evolution in defining the concept, and explore the challenges that are associated with it.

After World War II, development started to gain attention as a result of multiple reasons. First, The realization that the worldwide spread of markets has not automatically brought the benefits promised by nineteenth –century economic theory. Second, The emergence of socialism as a viable development alternative. Third, Pressure for economic development exerted by the newly independent countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. (Wilber & Jameson, 1981)

Linguistically, the word development is defined, according to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, as “the act, process or result of developing: the state of

being developed: a gradual unfolding by which something is developed: gradual advance or growth through progressive changes.” (Webster, 2015). Within this definition, movement from a state/place could be detected as an underlying characteristic of development. Not only movement, yet movement in a certain direction. This direction is what is called advancement or progress. The process of movement within a certain path has the time element attached to it. Which reflects that development must be dealt in a historical context. The historical experience will condition the stage in which a country finds itself and the degree to which its development has unfolded.

As much as there is no one definition that can describe what development is as a process and field of study. It was attached to the concept of progress in the classical writers, Marx, as well as the neoclassical school of development thinking. During the evolution of the concept it was seen as equivalent to modernization. Yet, as much as the term was associated with modernization in the past it soon enough broke away from the term and established itself as a separate concept, because of the problematic nature of tying the term to the concept of modernization. This problematic nature is lying in predetermined path modernization draws for all the states. Which proved unlikely to happen, as the developing countries remained underdeveloped.

Development was also equated with liberalization. Yet, liberalization is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end, it is a process that is related to the distribution of power within a national context, it changes the relations within the society, and reorganize it in a way that affects the power dynamics and the distribution of power within the national context.

If the concept is not equated with either modernization, below were some characteristics of development as put by Tschirgi. For him, “Development remains as an elusive subject, because there is still debate on what it is and what is the best practices for it. There is no ultimate development goal but some recommended development strategies. There are three main actors that affect and are affected by the development objectives, they are: social structures (for social mobility), national state (for political organization and participation) and economies (for production and distribution). Although scientists will always find methodological flaws and be ethnocentrically biased, history is progressive in nature (Tschirgi, 1996)

He then continues to talk about how development is multifaceted and interdependent. How it also involves choice and thus morals. In addition, he stresses on the importance within which development occurs, it does not occur in vacuum, both the national and the global contexts have great impact on it. This impact of the context could take different forms most importantly environmental or cultural. He stresses on the uneven nature of development that differs from one society to another, because for him, it is a social rather than an individual phenomena. (Ibid, 1996)

Though modernization and liberalization are not synonyms to development, they have been used as indicators to the development process of different countries as well as basis on which different underdeveloped countries create their own sustainable development strategies.

Looking at development not as merely economic has been growing within the recent literature, adding a social aspect to measuring the development of a country took place with the introduction of the Human Development Index. This Index, though it can

be problematic in some aspects, rests on bringing human at the heart of development. The Human Developed Index was developed based on the realization that human should be the real end of development, and that the development process should be centralized around humans.

The main purpose of the Human Development Index (HDI) is conducting an assessment of the development of the country without solely focusing on economic growth; it puts people and their capabilities at the center and using it as the ultimate criteria. HDI is designed to reflect average achievements in three basic aspects of human development – leading a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and enjoying a decent standard of living, and having a decent standard of living. Where life expectancy reflects health, knowledge reflects education, and decent standard of living is reflected by the GNI (PPP\$).

Development as a concept and as a discipline has been facing a number of challenges that sometimes questioned the value in its existence. There are many challenges facing development. First, the idea of exploitation, or in other terms the idea that for something to develop something else needs to un-develop. The dependency theorists in their different explanations of why the underdeveloped world is not flourishing as expected explained this more thoroughly. They started to shed light on the exploitative nature of the relation between the developed world and the underdeveloped world. They were highlighting that the developed countries are developed because they depended in their development on the underdeveloped world; in other terms as Andre Gunder Frank puts it, the developed world were never underdeveloped they were

undeveloped, and that the past of the developed does not resemble the present of the underdeveloped by any means.

Second, the hierarchical nature of development. Where there is always an underlying assumption that the people/ organizations would help other communities/countries develop assuming they know the right formula and the right processes, and assuming that knowledge exists outside the underdeveloped and is present within the developed. This underlying assumption have to be contested, since the past decades have witnessed some major development projects such as the structural adjustment programs proved to do wrong more than right, to harm more than to help, and final to contribute to the underdevelopment more than the development.

A third challenge is the relative weight of Non-state actors. A large number of non-state actors are involved from international organizations, national organizations, local organizations, local communities, and the individuals themselves. The multiple players involved in the process might have conflicting goals that might make the process complicated.

Finally, the discipline itself was a concept invented in the developed world, and exported to the underdeveloped world, defining development in their terms and putting meaning in it with little attention to what it actually means to the underdeveloped world. Accordingly, new concepts are evolving from globalization and integration into the world system, which are gradually replacing development.

Before moving on to understanding the different approaches to defining the role of civil society, it is fair to conclude this part stressing on the complex nature of development. Movement and progress lies at the heart of development. Though there is no one definition of development it should be looked at in a more comprehensive way, because it is multifaceted and interdependent. There is a difference in the perception of the different players of development to the goal of development yet there is an agreement that it works with change and progress. Lastly, as the concept developed humans were becoming more and more at the heart of the process. Understanding the dynamic nature of interaction between the different stakeholders within the field within the historical context would be an indicator to the type of social and economic development the state is reaching.

*Approaches to exploring the role of the civil society:*

The role of the civil society in the Arab world has been gaining some attention especially in the aftermath of the uprisings in 2011. The role of the Civil Society and its influence was approached differently. One approach was mainly looking at the Civil Society from a transition perspective, another from a developmental perspective. Outlined below are the two approaches and their arguments.

The first approach attempts to track the role of the civil society as a tool of “democratization” or “authoritarian resilience”. Which means that in some cases the Civil Society is looked at as a replacement to the opposition parties, like what Langohr argues in the article “Too much Civil Society, Too Little Politics”. The argument is basically revolving around looking at NGOs, specifically the ones working with advocacy, as agents that are replacing the opposition parties, and thus performing the role of the

opposition within the regime. Following this definition of the Civil Society and its role, the final conclusion would be that there is only so little it can do and it cannot be the agent of “Transition” towards democracy. As Langohr puts it “Groups seeking to challenge authoritarian rule require widespread popular support, and nongovernmental organizations, which are typically single issue groups with small local constituencies dependent entirely on foreign largesse, are ill equipped to lead the charge”. (Langohr, 2004: 200)

Narrowing down the role of the Civil Society as only opposition in the Arab World raised the questions of why is it failing to bring about this “transition”. This is evident in several writings, an example would be what Niklas Plaetzer tackled in his article “Civil Society as Domestication: Egyptian and Tunisian Uprisings Beyond Liberal Transitology”, where he highlights why civil society as an analytical lens failed to explain transition and failed in its role to bring about transition. In his article he argues that civil society holds as a weak framework in explaining why transition did not happen within the Arab Spring countries. (Plaetzer, 2014: 262)

When trying to answer the question of why civil society is failing to make the transition to democracy, Francesco Cavatorta and Azzam Alanzana in their article, “Show me the money! Opposition, western funding, and civil society in Jordan and Lebanon” start with summarizing the debate present in the literature. The three explanations they found in the literature is: First, they talk about the “uncivil” nature of the Civil Society in the Arab world. Second, they explain the weakness and fragmentation of the Civil Society. Lastly, they mention the different strategies that the regimes employ to control the civil society within the Arab world from “co-option” to “repression”. After the

summary they write their argument that the Civil Society in the Arab world is not weak, it is strong because of its ability to survive the different types of control mechanisms by the regimes. They add that the problem with civil society in the Arab world is that it is divided into two camps the liberal camp and the Islamists, and this division is the core of the problem. They also argue that the foreign funding is playing an active role in reinforcing this division. They summarize the problem in a sentence stating that what the Arab countries have is a “strong Civil Society that is unable to unite”. (Cavatora & Alananza, 2010: 89)

The challenge with this approach is that when it decides to look at the civil society, it looks at it as a coherent actor, without recognizing the diversity present within the civil society. In addition, this approach assumes a role for the civil society framing it as an opposition to the current regime/s and does not verify this role set forward by the different actors within civil society. Furthermore, it looks at civil society as a passive player where it gets influenced by the state strategies as well as foreign funding with little attention given to how it perceives itself and its role. The diversity present within it, as well as the different strategies that the civil society actors employ to influence social change are simply overlooked.

Another approach to looking at the civil society starts at what Eva Bellin mentions in some of her writings. She brings about an interesting aspect, concerning the role of the Civil Society in bringing about “transformation” on the polity level rather than regime change or transition. (Bellin, 1994: 509).

This opinion is relevant because it considers the other side of the debate regarding how to look at Civil Society. Here Maha Abdelrahman wrote an article outlining the conflictual and reactionary nature of the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). What she offers is a different account of the Egyptian case, where she explores “ how the state is no longer the prime authoritarian force in repressing civil society organization. Instead, civil society has become an arena for political conflict and its organizations have been seized by representatives of contending political programs that often resort to violence and repression to suppress other groups within civil society.” (Abdelrahman, 2002: 21). She also defines civil society more broadly; as “more than the sum of its organizations: it is the environment in which these organizations develop and interact. Civil society organizations are the product as well as the components of the society as a whole and their formation an ongoing process that is born out of continuing changes in domestic social forces, the state, and the complex in which the two interact. “ (Ibid: 34). What she offers in her article is a recommendation on “*how a more critical version of civil society could be used as a conceptual framework for analyzing social and political transformation*” (Ibid: 34)

This understanding Maha Abdelrahman offers is approaching civil society within a bigger context, the state society relations and how they influence the sphere of the civil society as well. Looking at civil society from this perspective would be looking at it as a space existing between the state and the society, and that the state is not the only powerful actor in opposition to civil society, on the contrary it is within the civil society that exists the interaction between the state and other actors. This approach is not new, it has its roots within the literature of different scholars studying state society relations and specifically focusing on social control. An important attempt was made by Migdal in his book

“Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World”. In this book he tries to breakaway from the assumption that the core is the one having more influence on the periphery and that whatever happens in the periphery does not affect the core. He explores different examples where the periphery shaped the core and as he went on in the book he was trying to look at the state as less of unitary actor. The different cases he explored were of relevance. (Migdal, 1988). Migdal continues to write in his later work about the state society approach and further develops the “State-in- Society” approach, where he attempts to decenter state authority while simultaneously retaining the normative idea of the state as a core unit of analysis. (White, 2013: 2).

The importance of the State Society approach lies in widening the lens through which civil society is viewed; looking at the civil society as a space where the state and the society are interacting together. This gives the study specific areas to look at, viewing the civil society as a public square where both the society and the state are engaged in continuous interaction that would define where the state is in terms of its social and economic development. Additionally, it gives attention to the diversity of interactions taking place between the state and the society. Focusing on the state society relations within the civil society as a space existing within the development field will offer a breakaway from the dichotomy of democratization or authoritarian resilience to understanding how development happen.

Based on the gaps existing in the above-mentioned literature on development and civil society, I would be exploring the everyday changes that take place in the practices of the state rather than institutional changes. Which means, looking at the “everyday”

development of state authority into multiple scripts, narratives, and political activities. (White, 2013: 2). This is an attempt to understanding how development happens and how does the Civil Society influence the state practices. Relying mainly in my theoretical framework on two approaches, the state society approach, and the sources of social power.

### **Theoretical Framework**

What I am trying to explore is the state society relations within the space of civil society and how its influence on state practices can explain where the state is in terms of economic and social development. This perspective would be focusing more on tracing the changes that happen within the state society relations which impact societal change within the sphere of the civil society. Here, civil society represents one of the many spaces/spheres where the state and the society interact, yet it has at its core the economic and social development. The theoretical framework depends mainly on Michael Mann and Joel S. Migdal. Mann's "the sources of social power", in addition to Migdal "Strong societies and weak states".

My research question is trying to capture the different factors that enable civil society in influencing state practices. The theoretical framework I use is one that is divided between two, one that feeds into the identification of the factors and another for the identification of state practices. First I will be using both Mann and Migdal for approaching the factors, and Migdal in approaching the state practices. It is useful to note that in my study I attempt to apply their theoretical approaches within a specific space within the state society relations represented in the civil society, it is important to note that their approach examines as wider scope, yet for the purpose of this study I would be

focusing more on applying their theoretical approach within the space of civil society in Egypt in the two development fields specified in chapter one.

Both Mann and Migdal are relevant because both of them follow a historical narrative approach to the case studies they use. Also, how they approach the state is very important. While Mann looks at it as one source of social power, Migdal approaches it as a non-unitary actor. What they both offer is an understanding of how societies and states interact together to shape the development process be it economic or social (in terms of social control). As explained below, Mann's understanding of social power and how the networks of power are formulated is at the heart of the importance of his approach. And, Migdal's fragmented social control, as explained below lies at the heart of the importance of his approach.

Also both Mann and Migdal capture the moments of political change highlighting their influence on the progress and on state society relations. International actors also are integrated within both theoretical approaches. Thus, by looking through their theoretical approaches, factors I tackle within my main argument from the purpose of civil society actors, international support, as well as political change would be considered and hold explanatory power to the economic and social development of the state.

*First: The social forces of social power by Michael Mann:*

"Sources of social power" is an integral part of the theoretical framework because of multiple reasons. Most importantly, how Mann looks at the state not as the heart of any change or development, but rather as one of the major types of power networks. While he is focusing on the European example, he is carefully examining the historical narrative.

Mann defines power as "the ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one's environment" (Mann, 1986: 6). While highlighting social power as Weber puts it "

the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Ibid, 6). Mann here looks at forms of power as not a human need, but rather organizational means to fulfill other drives. In other words, he sees power not as an original human goal but rather it is a powerful means to other goals. Power in this way is not a resource, because resources in this sense are the media through which power is exercised. As mentioned above he looks through a socio-spatial and organizational level of analysis. This level of analysis addresses the central problems concerning organization, control, and communication. This is built on the assumption that societies are much messier than our theories of them. He stresses that the four sources of social power offer alternative organizational means of social control. He adds that power development has a discontinuous nature; new organizational techniques to control people and territories are always developed.

He stresses on the sources of change and development, geographical ones and social ones, as emanating from within as well as outside the social and territorial space of the given society. Which resonates greatly with the role of International actors to be explored. In addition, Mann mentions that each power network tends to make its own unique and distinctive contribution to the society's reorganization in different period. This last argument is also very relevant to the non-unitary path towards development this study is focusing on.

Mann rejects the reference to society as a unitary actor, and he looks at it in a more loose way; a "society" comprised of "a loose confederation of stratified allies" (Mann, 1986; 14). Mann believes, "we can arrive at a better definition: A society is a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment" (Ibid 1986:13). "Societies are constituted of

multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power" (Ibid 1986:1). The relevance of Mann's theory is that he follows a socio-spatial and organizational level of analysis, which resonates with how civil society is defined within this study. Mann believes that it is the different power relations that make change happen. Also, as Tim Jacoby summarized social change for Mann: "Change is thus simultaneously driven forward by the goal-seeking behavior of individuals and mitigated by structural constraint." (Jacoby, 2004). In this sense, Mann is integrating individual action into structural change. In His words: "*A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships. These are (1) overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions, levels, or factors of a single social totality. (2) They are also organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals. Their primacy comes not from the strength of human desires for ideological, economic, military, or political satisfaction but from the particular organizational means each possesses to attain human goals, whatever these may be.*" (Ibid, 1986: 1).

Mann also outlines the importance of the local actors on states; he captures how the actors' relations to the state define which type of state is emerging, he also explains how international influence is important to shaping the power network. He highlights the role of international events and actors entering the states paying little attention to its boundaries and how this influences the social and economic development of the state.

Understanding where do the four sources of power lie and how they interact together within the space of the civil society forming different power networks would contribute to understanding how local civil society actors and the international ones

enable the civil society to influence the state practices and thus defining the social and economic development of the state.

What ties Mann to Migdal and makes the two theoretical approaches complement each other is the pursuit of the different actors of social control. They both highlight fluctuation of the role of the state within different time frames from having a small role and then the evolution in the role of the state. Where Mann examines how the different sources of social power interact together to form different power networks, Migdal attempts to understand how social fragmentation within developing countries has been of a persistent nature.

*Second: Strong societies and weak states by Joel S. Migdal:*


The relevance of Migdal's approach is that he examines the dynamic relation between the state and the society in pursuit of social control. In this sense, Migdal's approach is complementing Mann's sources of social power, in which he is talking about the state as the political power, and then Migdal opens this network and starts exploring the nature of this power and its relation to society.

In his theory, Migdal explains through "Strong Societies and Weak States", the dynamic nature between the states and the societies within the developing countries, where the interaction between both exists within an environment of conflict. In his book, he used Egypt under Nasser as a case study applying the theory to it, the theory held reasonable explanatory power, and thus could be applied to the current environment of conflict existing within Egypt.

He starts his book "strong societies and weak states" by rejecting the dependency theory, and modernization as well. He recognizes that the state is not the only player within the network of the social. And that there are many actors seeking control over

society or what is referred to as social control. What is interesting in his argument is that he mentions that what makes an actor strong does not necessarily mean the other actor is weak; in other words strength or weakness of the states does not necessarily indicate the strength or the weakness of the society. He stresses on the importance on understanding the influence of the different actors over the society. This struggle over social control is best explained in the below diagram extracted from his book.

*Figure 1: Strong societies and weak state by Joel S. Migdal*



*Source: Joel S. Migdal, "Strong societies and weak state"*

On one hand this figure explains Migdal’s model of relations between weak third world states and their societies where fragmented social becomes an inevitable and persistent result whatever road the state takes. The states use different strategies to influence the networks of power relations with the rest of the actors to exercise social control, which results in fragmented social control. This figure also recognizes the influence of the international context on the state society relations. He is talking about fragmentation of social control in the sense that people’s behavior does not get captured in the legislations and policies of the state. Although the state institutions penetrate the society and is found everywhere, yet there is always a disparity between the policies and

legislations and the consequences. This leads the states to adopt different politics of survival that accommodate social stability and thus leading them back to the fragmented social control.

In this sense both Mann and Migdal recognize the importance of the different networks of power that get created between the different actors within the society, these networks of power are not exclusive to the state, it includes other actors, and these networks in their pursuit of social control are what determines the social and economic development of the state.

Later on in 2001, Migdal developed an approach that complements his theoretical approach. Migdal's "State in Society" approach; where he looks at the processes that determine how societies and states create and maintain distinct ways of structuring day-to-day life. In this approach he defines the state as "A field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) *the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory*, and (2) *the actual practices of its multiple parts*" (Migdal 2001a, 15-16). This definition—structured around the "practices" and the "image" of the state—showcases the core analytical and methodological propositions that run through and define the state-in-society scholarship. This Definition of the state is the one I will be mainly using throughout the study. The state-in-society approach is the relevant to my research question because it frames the state within the day-to-day life, and thus, I focus on capturing the influence on state practices from recognition, support, and policy change.


Accordingly, within the understanding that development of any society happens through the interaction of what Mann outlines as the sources of social power, then

identifying the interaction between the state and the society as outlined by Migdal in “strong societies and weak states” with the understanding of the state as put forward by Migdal in the “state-in-society” approach is the focus of the rest of this study.

It is worth mentioning that both Mann and Migdal recognize that human characteristics are the source of everything, and they are the sources of power. It is very difficult to capture change and development without focusing on human beings as a source of power, and human behavior is not captured in legislations and policies.

In conclusion, I will be using Mann’s and Migdal’s theoretical approaches as explained within the below figure:

*Figure 2: Outline of the theoretical framework:*



The figure above explains the research question, the main argument, as well as the sub-hypothesis. Where the different factors influencing the state practices from purpose, international actors, and political change are derived from both Michael Mann and Joel S. Migdal theoretical approaches. This means that both Mann’s and Migdal’s approaches contribute to identifying local civil society actors’ purpose, international actors, and

political change as factors that interact together and influence on state society relations over social control. This interaction then according to Mann forms a unique network of power that determines the social and economic development of the state. While Migdal's state-in-society approach contributes to looking at state practices as the media identifying the influence that took place by the different factors.

The next Chapter would be mainly exploring briefly the historical context for state society interaction reflecting on the economic and social development from Nasser (1952) till the present date. Followed by two chapters comparing the influence of the previously mentioned factors on the state practices.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Historical Context: State Society relations and Development in Egypt**

This chapter mainly aims at exploring the state society relations and development in Egypt since 1952 until the present date. Exploring these aspects would take into consideration the different phases that Egypt went through under the different Presidents since Nasser and until Al Sisy. First, the chapter will explore the meaning of development in general, then it's understanding within the Egyptian context, this happens through a questionnaire exploring the perception of development by different civil society actors. Second, exploring the historical context From Nasser to Al Sisy.

The Egyptian development strategy hasn't been a consistent effort by the state. It has been changing dramatically over the years. This change had to do with the change in the regime that accompanies the change of the president. This change could be traced from Nasser with his socialist agenda, with Sadat and his "infitah" policies and the structural adjustment programs entering Egypt, then with Mubarak with the 2000s drive of integration within the world system on all levels, Moving then through the period of political instability and change starting from the uprising in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood rule under the former president Mohamed Morsi, till finally reaching the election of president Al Sisy.

### **Development in Egypt: definition, meaning, and perspectives**

Moving to exploring the different perceptions of development by people working in the field within the Egyptian context, I developed a questionnaire (see the questions in Annex 1) and addressed it to different stakeholders working within the development field, 21 respondents were recorded.

The questionnaire included people working in non-governmental organizations, associations, initiatives or groups, as well as social enterprises. I have received 21 answers. Twenty-one respondents to such a broad concept is not a concrete indicator of how the people within the field view development, but it could still give insights about how development is perceived with some of the people working with the concept. The different answers can be summarized as follows:

The main idea that all the answers included was the presence of movement from one condition to another. This movement –in some answers referred to as change- is lying at the core of all the definitions mentioned. However there were also variations within the definitions used, some were focusing on the individual as the main focus of the development process (which is the majority) while others were focusing more on the community, while one definition only was talking about the state level. Two of the twenty three respondents were very critical to the concept, mentioning that though they would describe themselves as working in the development field only -for lack of other terms - they would not define the development process in a “positive” way (in their own terms).

Some key concepts that were present within the different definitions were:

1. *Sustainability*: this term appeared in different definitions mentioned and it is attached to the type of impact the development has on the different communities. One of the respondents defined development as only sustainability.

2. *Providing services*: some respondents referred to providing services directly to the local communities as an integral part of the development process.

3. *Empowerment*: this term was the term most frequently appearing in the different answers, and it was referring to empowerment with skills mainly, and empowerment to the marginalized individuals and communities. Most of the respondents who mentioned empowerment didn't tie it to a goal, yet some others tied the empowerment process with the goal of reaching something else, from solving community problems, to integration within the employment market.

4. *Reform*: also appeared frequently within the answers of the respondents mainly referring to political, economic, and social reforms being the purpose of the development process.

What was interesting in one of the answers is that development was seen as a space of resistance to the corruption and injustice present within the state.

What was also striking was the focus on the individual more than the community and very little focus on the impact on the state. In addition, social change and reform was the one most frequently appearing while economic reform or development was mentioned only once in the 21 respondents.

The understanding provided above acts as a framework through which I will look at development within the rest of this study from the historical context presented below to the empirical evidence from the case studies.

### **Egypt under Nasser: State Society relations, civil society, and development**

Egypt under Nasser was a unique case because both the society and state were shaped and reshaped several times. As much as it is difficult to track, which had more influence over the other; both the state and society evolved within a context of conflict. Different

scholars explored this phase, yet, Migdal in his book “strong societies and weak states” offered an account of what happened and how can it be interpreted.

The strategy Nasser followed mainly focused on four pillars. First, Industrialization as the way to achieve modernization and improve the standard of living. Second, Agriculture should be modernized to increase productivity. Third, any opposition groups against the national targets or reforms were to be contained. Fourth, supporting small cultivators should be supported. (Harik , 1984: 43)

As Migdal views it, Nasser together with the new leadership of the state had the intent of changing the structuring of the society. This change in the structure is channeled through “an extensive agrarian reform, attacking the very property rights that bolstered some of Egypt’s most dominant social Organizations”. (Migdal, 1988:182)

Here Migdal challenges the dependency theory, and makes the point that although Egypt with its bureaucracy and homogeneity might be viewed as a place that has very rare instances when the periphery influences the core, the Egyptian State under Nasser was not successful in creating a strong and predominant state.

Evidence to that could be found in the different policies that were implemented by Nasser during his period of ruling Egypt. Below is a summary of the different policies implemented and how it affected the state society relations:

What Nasser started with was addressing the inequality that existed within the Egyptian society regarding landownership. He introduced agrarian reforms. Through

these reforms there was a redistribution of land and social structures prevailing changed with it. The transformation within the society was evident. Yet, the question that remained unanswered was whether these changes could result into the strong, predominate state Nasser aspired for or not.

The challenges were not only in the redistribution of land, the challenge was in the rest of the policies implemented by Nasser in grounding his rule. Some of these challenging policies and decisions was reorganizing of political parties as well as arresting some of the key figures. Later on more challenging policies were implemented to create the social control Nasser aspires to have overseen by the strong predominate state. The highlights of the agrarian reforms could be summarized in: “ (a) the new tenancy in regulations, which lowered rents and afforded legal protection tenants, (b) the destruction of the big landowners as a powerful class in the Egyptian society, and (c) the gains in productivity on those fields included in the reforms”. (Ibid, 186)

For Nasser to build the predominate and strong state to exercise social control, he depended on two policies: “relying mainly on the military, while elaborating the state agencies that would deliver the new strategies to take place of the old social organizations. “ (Ibid, 187)

For implementing the previously mentioned policies, Nasser had to first make sure that his reliance on the army is to be trusted, and thus he appointed some of the free officers in the different governmental institutions. He also let go of some of the officers from the army itself. On the other hand, he arrested politicians, and created a system where he is relying mainly on the ministries and a political party under his control. This

party would act as the agent of mobilizing the people who were not mobilized enough behind the agrarian reforms. By creating this system, Nasser believed this is the only safety measure for the survival of the revolution.

Replacing the landowners, who maintained social stability, Nasser created and made effective some institutions to maintain social control of the state. These institutions were: the agricultural cooperatives, the local councils, and the committees of twenty. Then came the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962 as the single political party with the committees of twenty acting like its executive level. (Ibid, 192)

These institutional changes were believed to have changed the face of the villages in Egypt, it brought an end to a social order that was kept by the landowners, and replaced it by a social structure that was thought at this time to be organized and sustained by the state institutions. It was believed that the farmers were on daily basis facing the state and not some landowner. However, as much as it is tempting to think that this is because of the strength of the Egyptian state, the impact these institutions have is worth exploring. Migdal refers to this aspect by emphasizing that the very same institutions that were created to bring about state predominance, “perpetuated an environment of conflict and fragmentation of social control” (Ibid, 193)

He attributes the failure of the state to impose its predominance to the social elements that were playing the rules of the institutions for their own gains. In the case of the agrarian reforms, Migdal identifies these social elements as the middle and rich peasants who dominated the institutions the state created to predominate the social structure. This unpredicted influence of the middle and rich peasants on the state

institutions affected the desired social control of the state, and attributed to its failure. Nasser found himself in a position having to curb this influence of the middle and rich peasants, and then the fight did not last for long. Because soon enough, Nasser realized that the two institutions he trusted with keeping the social control needs to be balanced as well. Any of these institutions gaining more power than it would only mean less social control as well as less predominance of the state and Nasser's power. He feared the creation of "power centers" within the context of conflict and fragmentation. Soon enough after going after the middle and rich peasants with the committee of liquidation of feudalism, Nasser stopped and again relied on the very same middle and rich peasants for social peace. This reach out for the middle and rich peasants for social peace only meant taking away from the power of the ASU, which Nasser started to criticize publicly. In addition, by 1967, especially after the defeat of the army, Nasser starting decreasing the influence of the army as well.

Nasser's development strategy thus can be summarized in his attempts to create a centralized system of planning where the state is the strong actor leading the process with a top down approach. The agrarian reforms mentioned above as an example of state society relations during Nasser's era also represent one of the pillars of his development strategy. Nationalization was also another pillar, where he was intending the curb international influence within Egypt. Nationalization as well was directed towards the banks so that restructuring of the financial resources management is shifted to the control of the state. Industrialization represented the final pillar of Nasser's development strategy.

As for the civil society, laws to regulate the civil society were not changed except after 3 years of the revolution. The law then changed and a new law was issued 284 for the year 1956. This law was particularly important because gave way to dissolve all the

NGOs and then re-establish with new structures under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Eight years later, another law was issued in 1964 to grant the state the full hegemony over civil society. Here it can be observed that there was a phase out of the role of the NGOs and incremental state control over civil society as a space. (Hassan, 2012:)

Finally, Nasser attempted to create a strong state with centralized power to lead the development strategy. This strategy with all its consequences paved the way to Sadat's strategies that differed completely because of he took power in a war situation.

Here if we apply Mann's theory, we would look at an example of strong economic power represented by the landowners, being challenged by the newly emerging political power, this newly emerging political power represented in the state is strongly relying on the military power, and imposing its ideological power. And thus, at this phase of the development in Egypt, the military technology was the one force relating to the forming of social life and to the mode of economic production. The competition existing within the bi-polar international system also influenced the maneuvering space Nasser's state had in its attempts to increase and widen the scope of the state control.

### **Egypt under Sadat: State Society relations, civil society, and development**

Moving on to Sadat's era, his presidency could be divided into two phases the state-led growth strategy then the opening up phase. Sadat came to power within a problematic context; the aid from the United States of America (USA) already stopped in 1965, indicators of an approaching military confrontation with Israel, and the failure in the creation of the strong centralized state Nasser was after. Until the year 1974, not much

change within the development strategy took place. The main change that happened was in the restructuring of the public sector. From 1975 and until the end of his rule, Sadat's development strategy changed drastically. The change in strategy came as a result of decrease in aid given to Egypt, decrease in investment rates, and the increase in the budget deficit. His new strategy was called "Infitah" meaning "opening up"; which meant opening up to the international society. This new strategy aimed at increasing the foreign investment, decrease the state spending on the military, and decrease the deficit within the budget. It was characterized by the increased role of the private sector. Reassessing the legal framework to limit the nationalization and to give more benefits for the private sector to encourage investment. In addition to the free trade zones, an evident example here is Port-Said governorate. Receiving loans from the international organizations as well as other states, most importantly the United States of America (USA) after signing the 1979 peace treaty, was one of the main features of this phase. The different policies applied resulted in an increased inflation, and a decreasing growth rate. The deficit in the budget also increased.

If we look closely at what both strategies of Nasser and Sadat, it could be seen that, as Shechter put it in his article "The Cultural Economy of Development in Egypt: Economic Nationalism ": Egypt was in a complicated situation under Sadat because of the "infitah" policies, because of the emergence of a hidden economy emerging alongside the official one acting on the unsolved economic problems. (Shechter, 2008: 573)

When it comes to civil society, Sadat's era contained both the continuation of the restricted policies of Nasser followed by opening up because of the aid coming in. Thus, the debate around foreign funding started to emerge. The role of NGOs was restored as

developmental and not only charitable and the influence of international NGOs started to grow. (Hassan, 2012:)

Here the strength or the weakness of the state could be contested, yet what cannot be contested would be the dynamic nature that existed between the different power networks. During the first phase of Sadat's rule the same pattern of interaction as the one dominated in Nasser's era prevailed; Strong ties between political and military power, imposing ideological power, at the expense of the economic power networks, that started to collaborate with the state. The outstanding characteristic here would be the increasing role of the international actors, whether aid organizations, or countries. This affected greatly the power networks as explained above.

#### **Egypt under Mubarak: State Society relations, civil society, and development**

Mubarak inherited the legacy of both the rise of Islamist groups as well as the aid; Sadat left this legacy after his assassination. The impact of both affected the development strategy and the state society relations greatly during the Mubarak era. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustment program that began in the 1980s started to gain more momentum in the 1990s. Unemployment was rising as the privatization of the state owned enterprises was increasing, "by 1999 it is said that one third of the state owned enterprises were partly or entirely privatized. Unemployment was rising between 10% and 22%" (Langohr, 2004: 187). And the standard of living was falling; the percentage of the population living on or under the poverty line was also increasing.

As the state was trying to consolidate its power, create what looks like democratic procedures, while trying to control both opposition and civil society. Trade unions and professional syndicates were no exception; different attempts of control reached them as

well. While the Muslim Brotherhood's influence started increasing with civil society, the state's attempts to control it increased. (Langohr, 2004: 187)

As for civil society under Mubarak's rule, the first few years did not witness much of a change. Yet, international pressure increased to issue another law to regulate civil society, this law of the year 1999 was issued, yet it was found unconstitutional. As a replacement the law 84 of the year 2002 was issued. (Hassan, 2012: ) This law is still enacted until the present date in November 2016. In principle, the law was less restrictive than the previous ones, yet with thorough analysis it becomes clear that it has a restrictive nature and it give the state power and control over civil society. Some of the restrictions are the clauses relating to banning NGOs from working in anything political, or anything that is threatening national unity. This ambiguity in defining the terms gave the state more control over civil society and over the activities of the different NGOs. The role of international organizations started to increase during Mubarak's era, and there was this common perception within the international community, especially the organizations operating in Egypt, that CSOs are agents of change. Having a major role in alleviating poverty and working on different societal problems as well as a catalyst for democratic transition. An example to this is the focus of the UNDP on the role of CSOs as agents of change in their Human Development Report (HDR) of 2008.

Looking at the interaction here between the different power networks, the state during Mubarak's era was monopolizing the judicial power and expanding it to legislating, it was also coordinating the activities of powerful civil society actors, which led to diffused economic power. While the state, also referred to the political power, was still in reliance on the military yet in a decreasing manner than the previous presidents.

This imbalance within the economic and military power led to an ambiguity on the ideological power, and thus economic and social development at this stage signified that change would be taking place to reorganize the networks of overlapping powers differently.

### **Egypt Post the uprising of 2011: State Society relations, civil society, and development**

The period that followed the mass demonstrations taking place from the 25th of January 2011 and until Mubarak stepped down was characterized by instability and the absence of clear priorities within the development field especially that this period was called the transition period led by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

With the first presidential elections within the transition phase the different candidates developed their programs within which they integrated their developmental priorities. The former president Mohamed Morsi was one of the candidates who developed within his program not only the development priorities but also the priorities within the first 100 days of his rule. Morsi was elected as the president in June 2012. The period of his rule was characterized by a high wave of societal activism in monitoring the performance of the presidency. An example to this activism is Morse Meter<sup>3</sup>, the website developed two social activists right after the elections, as an attempt to monitor the performance of the president and the progress he is making regarding the 100 days program he announced. As indicated by one of them, “the state back then represented in presidency initiated contact with us, and offered to send us more information so that we can updated the website. Our answer was no, because we do not want exclusive

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<sup>3</sup> For more information on the website visit: <http://morsimeter.com/en>

information, we want them to publish it so the public can hold them accountable”.  
(Anonymous, 2nd December 2015)

With the period of instability continuing and with the demonstrations taking place on the 30th of June 2013, and with the Army taking control again until the next presidential elections which brought about Al Sisy as the president in May 2014.

Al Sisy development agenda was not clear from the beginning until Egypt 2030 vision started.

Egypt 2030 was introduced to the Egyptians together with the world in International Economic Forum in Sharm El Shiekh in March 2015. After the launch of the strategy in the International Economic Forum, an official launch took place and President Al Sisy attended and gave a speech in February 2016. Going about the vision would be through exploring two aspects, the first is the content, and the second is the process.

*The content of the strategy:*

The government under this strategy commits itself to working on the three fields: Economic development, Competitiveness of markets, and Human Capital. In this sense the state is influenced greatly by the international standards of development. Specifically the influence of the Sustainable Development Goals “SDGs”. The strategy aims at achieving higher growth rates, increasing investment, reducing unemployment, increasing exports; it also addresses local energy sources to maximize them. It also focuses on health and education. The strategy talks about university, as well as the health system, it talks about the effectiveness of the administrative system of the state, it

also mentions the cuts in government spending. It adds section to talk about the reforms in the telecommunication and information technology sector. It puts women empowerment and gender equality as a priority. Though the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were put as clear as possible, methods through which these will be measured as well the mechanism through which these KPIs will be achieved was not made clear and concise.

As mentioned above, the strategy seems to be very much affected by the international agenda for development, the terms and concepts used are terms and concepts that are derived from the different indexes used to measure the development process of the different states, and easily detected resemblance would be the Human Development index (HDI) as well as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The timing of the presentation as well makes it more probable that this strategy is one made for international consumption, which leaves us with very minimal prediction on how will the strategy be implemented on the local level and to what extent is it adaptable to the local needs.

*The process:*

Throughout the in depth interviews conducted, especially the ones focusing on the innovation field, I was told that key figures from CSOs or startups were invited. In addition, to the key figures within each of the fields the strategy is addressing. “The Ministry of Planning (MoP) hired a consultancy to facilitate the process of developing the vision. The process included sessions with the key actors within the fields where the Ministry presents the indicators developed under each field, opens to receive feedback on

them, then finally develop the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the indicators.” (Anonymous, 14 June 2016). An example to how inclusive the process was came from one of the interviews; “I had a suggestion to integrate an indicator within the strategy, and based on the inclusion of this indicator I was able to later on work with a governmental entity who is adopting the strategy”. (Ibid, 2016)

Some interviewees view this process as participatory and to an extent inclusive. The vision, as vague as it is, still gives a sense of direction to the development of Egypt if adopted by all the different state institutions. It is also seen as a limiting factor to mismanagement of resources.

The process of the launch however was challenging, since the soft launch in the International Economic Forum was the one addressing the international society, yet within the launch on the national side, on the 24th of February 2016, where the president addressed the population with a speech, not mentioning at all the strategy or its role within the development process. The focus became more on the accomplishments of the presidency, in addition the role of the citizen in supporting the state. Even the banner behind the president did not include the logo of the vision but rather the banner had “Youth Year” on it, which is based on the presidency announcing 2016 as the “Youth Year”.

As for civil society during this phase, this period witnessed different forms of organizing within the space of civil society. First of all, the rise of different movements whether political or social gave rise to different forms of resistance to the control of the state to the NGOs. Not only political and social movements, new forms of organizing

started appearing since 2011. These new forms took different forms from what was called community based initiatives and informal groups and initiatives, from their name they were not following the legal framework of the state while working daily within the society. Other form included co-working spaces, startups, and social enterprises registered as companies yet working within the social field.

Different attempts to issue a new law regulating civil society and NGOs, yet until the moment nothing passed. Yet, it is worth mentioning that there is a draft being discussed these days, November 2016, that is much more restrictive than any previous law. It mentions criminal charges reaching jail for 5 years, in addition to fines, as well as restrictions not only on foreign funding but also on the national one. And finally, it brings the role of the Ministry of Interior officially as part of a committee approving the different funds. The danger of this law, if it passes, it threatens the survival of the NGO sector.

Wrapping up the post Mubarak era is challenging, since there were fluctuating networks of power, that kept on reorganizing themselves yielding different social and economic development that changes very rapidly. Yet, if an account could be given to the current situation, it would be that the reliance of the political power over the military power is restored to the beginning of the age of Nasser, in addition to ambiguity surrounding the economic and ideological powers.

In conclusion of this chapter, throughout the different phases led by the different presidents and forces, the social and economic development of the state varied greatly. Yet, the common factor was the different, successful and failed, attempts to widen the

scope of control of the state represented in the political power allied with the military power. Each President, as well as the dominant ideological power has articulated this differently within the different phases. Economic power however have been leading to societal influence on how the different policies are implemented and thus influencing the outcome, which eventually ends up quite different than the one imagined by the state. The dilemma was always state-led growth versus opening up. The role of external pressure and international forces was very evident during the different eras. Relating to the current social and economic development of Egypt, it is very difficult to tell what type of reorganization is taking place. Because of the different indicators pointing at contradicting directions. Some point at the increasing role and power of the political and military powers. Another is pointing out to the role of the economic power. This is significant if we look at Egypt 2030 vision, yet it is too soon to tell whether this will yield to the balance between the state and the society or not, simply because the different state entities do not have one stance towards it. In addition, there are no indicators that the state is intending to mainstream this strategy. Yet, it is fair to acknowledge the difference in terms of the process through which this strategy was development, its future remains ambiguous though. Civil society remained throughout the different phases of the different presidents as a space of contested control between the state and the society, always being affected by the presence of pressure from the international community, this happened during Sadat's era as well as Mubarak's.

The next two chapters would be going in depth with two fields to continue examining the different factors enabling the civil society to influence state practices, as well as attempting to understand the social and economic development of Egypt within the current state. Within the chapters, I will mainly explore the different definitions and

understandings of the different stakeholders, mapping them, as well as exploring the dynamics between the state and the society within each context.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Innovation for Development in Egypt**

This field of innovation has been gaining attention in Egypt during the early 2000s, yet with the technological advancement happening in the world, more and more focus of the international community on the concept of innovation gave momentum to its rise in Egypt as well. Since 2011 and on, more focus on innovation and entrepreneurship was starting as per mentioned in all the interviews. Only two organizations from the 11 interviewed were operating in Egypt within the field before 2011. The two organizations go back to 2003 and 2005, while the rest came around the year 2013. Despite the different political changes that are taking place in Egypt since 2011 this field was one of the few fields within development that were flourishing. Exploring why this happened in addition to understanding the role of international actors and the economic purpose around which the organizations within this field are clustered is the purpose of this chapter. In addition to understanding the influence all of this have on the state practices and thus on the social and economic development of the state.

Since this field is a young field in Egypt, not a lot of literature is available within this field. In my analysis I depended mainly on reports produced by the major stakeholders within the field. Yet, most importantly I depended on primary I data collected through: in depth interviews with 11 governmental, NGOs, Startups, Investors, and other relevant stakeholders within the field. I also developed a questionnaire that outlines the understanding of innovation and disseminated the questionnaire among 21 stakeholders working within the field.

This chapter will outline first the understanding of the term, map the different stakeholders and their influence, explore the influence of international actors, and then finally look in depth in two case studies.

### **Understanding Innovation in Egypt**


The term has been used in different ways in Egypt. I observed that the term itself was referred to in different ways while I was conducting the interviews. This realization led me to design the questionnaire to reach to other stakeholders within the field and understand how they view this field and type of value they see in it. In Annex 3 are the demographics of the respondents of the questionnaire, and in Annex 1 there are the questions of the questionnaire.

The highlights of the answers were: 61% of the respondents chose the Oslo manual third edition definition as the definition closest to their work. According to this definition innovation is seen as “ the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations.” (OECD, 2005). This in itself is an indicator of the focus of the different respondents on the economic aspect of the concept as the international exposure of the different respondents to the questionnaire. According to this definition there are different types of innovation: product innovation, process innovation, marketing innovation, and organizational innovation.

Though the respondents mainly focused on the economic purpose or value of innovation when asked within the questionnaire about what type of value does a

program/project/initiative have to hold to be considered innovative, the answers came as follows: Economical 71.4%, Societal 76.2%, Political 33.3%, Technological 52.4%, Scientific 38.1%, Environmental 52.4%, Other 19%.

*Figure (3): percentage of innovation values*



*Source: Data analyzed from the questionnaire*

Looking at these percentages might give an indicator to what the different stakeholders focus on when they work in their day-to-day activities within the field. Most of the respondents then are more focused on the societal and economic value. The political value gained the lowest percentage with 33%. This indicates the value the respondents see for their work within the innovation field as societal and economic. The societal value of innovation was articulated clearly in an interview with a NGO acting as an incubator for innovative startup within the field of scientific research under the condition that they have “social impact, this social impact could be whatever, an example is employing staff members from a certain underprivileged area.” (Anonymous, 27th June 2016)

This resonates with what I observed in different events I attended, organized by some state agencies as well as by NGOs the invitees and participants are a variety of people working within innovation from the economic aspect or the societal aspect. An

example of an event organized by a governmental agency would be the event organized by ASRT, on the 18th of July 2016, where the list of speakers included 12 speakers, from both civil society and private sector, only 2 of which were speaking about social innovation. While the rest were talking more about the economic value of innovation within different fields whether technology, industry, or investment.

Looking closer at the societal value this field might encompass, all 21 respondents mentioned that innovation is important to development, justifying their answer with either the economic need as someone mentions, “ With such current progressive economies you either innovate or die. The complexity in social and economic context requires innovative solutions, projects and initiative to create a sound impact.” (Anonymous, September 2016) Others link it through highlighting the importance of sustainability; “Innovation allows us to design development projects that are sustainable, scalable and that achieve better results. Innovative approaches include all stakeholders in the problem-solving, incorporate new technologies and follow best practices, clearly define success criteria and monitoring and valuation mechanisms that record and ensure success”. (Ibid) Some others relate it to the complexity of the social problems the society is witnessing and the need for the society to move in a creative way; “To solve complicated problems in the society, we need unusual, new innovative solutions.” “It allows for a flexible system that facilitates creation for prosperity”, and “It is very important to discover new territories of development and how the development endeavors can serve the communities in a more sustainable way”. (Ibid) Bringing different examples of countries that were able to break away from the low middle-income trap to the high income through innovation also highlighted the link between innovation and development. While others highlighted the importance of the socio-economic value of innovation for the society.

What was also striking in the respondents' answers is the linkage they make between innovation and entrepreneurship and also economic prosperity. Which reaches sometimes the level of equating innovation with entrepreneurship in a way that diffuses the meaning of innovation from its essence. This was an evident trend in the interviews I conducted with investors focusing on innovative startups (anonymous, 21 June 2016), as well as the interviews I conducted with some startups (direct beneficiaries of NGOs, incubators, and investors within the field), which could not define what innovation is yet they articulated its importance for entrepreneurship (anonymous, 1st July 2016).

The mix up between innovation and startups is not found in academia. Also, I was able to trace the difference between the two fields from the interviews I conducted with Academics within the field of innovation, and with founding members of companies specialized only in innovation. Their perception of it is that: Innovation can exist within any field as long as it offers a new way/method/process/idea of doing things or a significantly improved way. And this divides innovation as a field into two aspects: innovation management, research and development, and finally academia. In one interview a founder of a company working on innovation defined for me innovation as “an adaptation of technology more or less” (anonymous, 14th June 2016). They also made the distinction between innovation and invention; the economic value is relevant here. There is a distinction that could be used to differentiate between the two as expressed by one of the interviewees, there are two types of entrepreneurs the ones for necessity and the ones for opportunity (Ibid). The ones for opportunity are the ones relevant to the innovation field. However, when it comes to the questionnaire more than 50% of the respondents have seen that entrepreneurs are not by default innovators. And

they justified this with different views on who entrepreneurs are and what they do, one of which was: “Entrepreneurs can just be cash cows investing in businesses that generate money without innovation but all this reflects on the industry in which they operate on the long run, because on the short run it's getting bills paid.”

Economic value of innovation lies within different spheres. The state identifies the economic value of innovation on several levels. In addition to the catching up with the international trend that values knowledge based and innovation based economies that are highlighted in several reports on the international level as well as the regional level as the key to increasing production, competition, and creating more jobs. An important report that highlights the influence the transformation process will have on Arab economies is the World Bank report “Transforming Arab Economies: Traveling the Knowledge and Innovation Road” in 2013. Apart from catching up with the international trend, there is the investment element attached to it, a state that promotes innovation specially within the entrepreneurship field is a state that is attractive from investors within the field from incubators as well as venture capital. The third reason outlined is also job creation, especially in developing countries where unemployment is on the rise; accordingly moving the responsibility of creating jobs to the university graduates a shift to them having the responsibility of creating this opportunity through innovation and entrepreneurship. From the different interviews with different youth entrepreneurs they do not see the job of the government to create jobs for the unemployed, yet it’s the job of the government to create a context around which the unemployed can create their own opportunities (Anonymus, 21<sup>st</sup> May 2015). This is an interesting shift in the understanding of the role of the state, shaped by the rising trend promoting innovation and entrepreneurship in Egypt. From the government side, the different interviews tackled

the increasing production more as the economic value they put forward. Job creation is the one reason that dominated the two interviews conducted with two different international organizations funding innovation and entrepreneurship in Egypt.

The understanding of innovation within the Egyptian case is quite similar between governmental and non-governmental organizations. The economic purpose and value of the field is believed to be the driving force behind the growing importance of the field. Though more respondents and interviewees were coming from civil society as well private sector, there were some respondents from different governmental organizations sharing similar understanding of the economic value. In addition to the increasing number of events and conferences organized by the government to promote innovation, an example is “innovation in government” organized on the 11th and 12th of October 2015 by the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and organized by T20<sup>4</sup>.

### **Mapping of different stakeholders within innovation**

The respondents of the questionnaire outlined the different stakeholders within the Egyptian innovation field as: “Incubators, private sector, startups, NGOs, Academia, research institute, government, International donors.” which resonates with the international understanding of the important stakeholders or as mentioned in the ESCWA report as “system actors” within the innovation field as: these are research performing organizations, local authorities, industry, business and civil societies. (Radwan, 2015: 6)

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<sup>4</sup> (An association of approximately 700 Egyptian alumni of global business schools such as Harvard, Stanford, Oxford, London Business School, INSEAD and many others), or those who are currently working or have worked at one of the 4 leading consulting firms McKinsey, Bain, BCG and Strategy.

The different mapped categories exist as governmental organizations, as NGOs, or as Companies and startups. Below is a brief explanation of the different categories existing.

*Governmental organizations within the innovation field:*

Different Ministries involved:

The Ministry of Higher Education, The Ministry of Trade and Industry, The Ministry of Scientific Research, The Ministry of Communication, and the Ministry of Investment.

Funding governmental organizations:

1. “Science Technology and development fund, established in 2007.
2. Research, Development, and Innovation Program (RDI), established after the EU-Egypt science and technology agreement of 2005.
3. The Academy of Scientific Research, and Technology (ASRT)
4. Industrial Modernization Center (IMC), within the ministry of trade and industry.
5. The Information Industry Development Agency (ITIDA), within the ministry of communication. “ (Radwan, 2015: 15)
6. Technology Innovation and Entrepreneurship Center (TIEC), founded in 2010.

Figure (3) below is extracted from a report for ESCWA by Amr Radwan, October 2015. It is explaining the different roles the government is playing within the innovation field. In addition to their structure. The figure maps the different roles the governmental organizations perform. From policymaking, developing strategies, road maps and

foresight, moving on the organizational roles played by the government, and the evaluation.

Figure (4): STI main components



Figure 3: Graphical Presentation of STI main components (by function)

Source: Data derived/interpreted from ASRT evaluation and monitoring study 2015

(source: ESCWA report, Radwan, October 2015)

The first look at this figure might give the impression that the state is having a high degree of controlling the innovation field. Yet, when I conducted the fieldwork, especially when attending events organized by the government, it was obvious that the government is relying greatly on civil society as well as private sector in most of the roles it performs. Examples to this were evident for me while attending, as an example, an event organized by the ASRT on the 18th of July in Alexandria, where the president of

the Academy in his opening speech after outlining the role of the academy, started highlighting the importance of collaboration between civil society and the state within the field. Also, throughout the event the different state officials giving speeches were stressing on the challenge the government has with reaching out to the right beneficiaries, which is something civil society is good at. In this sense, the event was mainly attended by civil society organizations (local and international) as well as private sector. This resonates with what Migdal talk about from the state's creation of different institutions does not necessarily mean they have control over the society. This highlights the importance of exploring the other existing players within the field. Before doing so, it is important to highlight that when the government started a project on mapping the different stakeholders within the field, they reached out to a startup working in the field to be the implementing partner. Here I am talking about the partnership between TIEC and Innovety in Cairo Innovates<sup>5</sup>. Below is a brief mapping of other relevant actors:

*Other actors within the system include:*

1. Incubators, There exists incubator in the private sector such as Flat6lab, within universities such as: venture lab within the American University in Cairo, as well within civil society such as GESR and Nahdet Al Mahroussa (NM).
2. Venture Capital and investors an example is Cairo Angels.
3. Innovation Enablers: These include startups and companies such as Yomken.com as well CSOs such as ECASTI

*International actors:*

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<sup>5</sup>Egypt Innovate is the online innovation hub for Egypt, where innovators and entrepreneurs get inspired, educated and connected. We will take you on a journey of inspirational and educational content, practical tools and templates, access to networks from the innovation hubs and spaces around the globe, for more information visit: <http://egyptinnovate.com/en/intro>

As the funds from international actors increasing with regards to innovation, as the term is becoming frequently used whether it is defined properly or not.

When I asked about the wave of funds directed towards innovation and entrepreneurship one interviewee saw it as “a way to neutralize the youth politically, and move away from the revolutionary and radical change” (anonymous, June 2016) This argument though it might hold some truth to it, other interviewees countered that argument mentioning that the international actors have been in the field for a long time and have been in partnership with the Egyptian government to work on the innovation system since 2005. An example on that is EU-Egyptian Scientific Research agreement in 2005. In addition to the bilateral agreements Egypt has with the different countries that includes the implementation of joint activities relating to the field of innovation even before 2011. Though one cannot deny the increasing funding opportunities directed to the field since 2013, especially the funds by the USAID in the form of the SEED program in 2016. During these past few years the Egyptian cooperation worldwide has increased regarding the innovation field, according to the ESCWA report, the following map shows the areas of cooperation Egypt has worldwide:

Figure (5): Egypt’s International Cooperation Capacity within STI



Figure 7: Egypt International Cooperation Capacity 2009–2015  
Source: Scival, data retrieved on September 2015

Source (Radwan, 2015: 22)

What the figure above reveals is the wide network Egypt has with the international community within the innovation field. These partnerships cover reforms to the legal structure, promoting funding opportunities, supporting of civil society and/or startups within the field.

In an interview I had with a staff member of an international organization partnering with the Ministry of Trade and manufacturing, s/he highlights that the purpose of working in this field mainly is “promoting business innovation for startups as a

stepping stone to creating more jobs. The rationale behind partnering with the government is sustainability.” (Anonymous, September 2016). S/he adds that the international actors working within the field of innovation as well as other fields have periodic meetings to discuss their progress and how to collaborate.

After finishing my 11 in depth interviews within this field and attending more than 7 events organized by the state and civil society, I observed that two clusters are shaped in Egypt within the field of innovation. One cluster around the Ministry of Communication and another around the ministry of Trade and Industry together with the Ministry of Scientific Research. Each of these clusters includes: IGOs, INGOs, NGOs, individuals categorized as experts, incubators, startups, and companies. The two clusters are not mutually exclusive; a certain level of coordination takes place because some of the stakeholders exist in the two clusters. This classification was also mentioned in two important interviews one with a former government employee, and one with a founder of a company who managed to work with both clusters. Also in one of the events organized by ASRT, one of the employees highlighted his frustration in his different failed attempts to work with the Ministry of Communication though they are doing the same thing as TIEC (anonymous, July 2016). However, this level of cooperation is kept at a low level, this was evident in several events attended, where exchange of information on the services the government offers was not clear to the members of the other cluster.

It is important to note here the ties existing between the network working within the field from state actors, civil society, as well as private sector. It is what the different interviewees called “the ecosystem”. This network or ecosystem works as the medium for transfer of knowledge and creating a new cluster of economic power dynamics that could

shape the type of the economic development of Egypt as knowledge based economy (as put in a clause within the Egyptian constitution and in Egypt 2030 vision).

The sustainability of this network and the pattern of interaction it creates is something worth exploring to understand if it is -according to Mann's theory- creating a pattern or is it coincidence.

### **Sustainability of innovation**

Innovation is viewed in most of the interviews I conducted as a trend that will last longer than the rest of the trends that started within the development field. For some, it is because of the economic impact it has (discussed above), it becomes more sustainable. Others look at it from a support perspective, and they view this trend as supported by the government since the establishment of TIEC.

Another view for why this trend is there to stay for longer, is the opinion of one of the investors within the tech startups who mentions that “this field is different, especially the innovation within entrepreneurship. Because this is not free money, the money that is invested within this sector is "accountable" money; meaning that the investors pay great attention to how to make sure their money will either come back, or flourish. Which is a major different between innovation and other fields within development.” (Anonymous, 14 June 2016)

On the other hand the only interviewee who viewed innovation as any other trend and would fade away was with the employee of the international organization. Yet, there

was an agreement that for this field to be sustainable it has to overcome certain challenges that are inherent within the field, below are some of these challenges.

A challenge that appeared in all the interviews I conducted even in the ones with the governmental employees was the legal framework. A pressing challenge mentioned in several interviews is “the absence of laws that protect the startups general and more specifically in case of bankruptcy.” (Anonymous, 14 June 2016). Also relevant to the legal framework are the absence of unified strategy that gathers all the ministries and governmental entities together, but rather the presence of an innovation strategy here and there without the existence of structure channels of cooperation between the different entities. (Anonymous, September 2016)

Different organizations, whether private companies or NGOs, expressed in the interviews that their role is not necessarily the role they would like to actually do, instead they are offering the different services that are supposed to be offered by the government. Some others identify their role as like one of the interviewees saw his role as “facilitator between the government and the society. And sometimes between the academia, the civil society, the industry, and the government. (Anonymous 14 June 2016)

“The absence of an educational system supporting innovation” (Anonymous, September 2016) as expressed by one of the interviewees, the ministry of higher education has a very important role in revisiting the university curriculum to integrate innovation and creativity, yet this does not happen. In addition to the importance of supporting the university professors in their innovative attempts and patents.

The rigidity existing within the governmental entities working in the field was expressed in three interviews. Two of which were working in governmental organizations, a ministry and a research center, and they both had to leave because they could not adapt to the limiting internal policies and bureaucracy. They both saw value of working with the government and on influencing the government yet, from outside the government, either from the civil society or from the private sector. The third example on the other hand expressed that “I loss of momentum to influence the decision making process and started adapting to the slow and limited pace of the governmental organization, which is not something I like, I want my startup spirit back” (anonymous, 20 June 2016)

“Change that takes place with the government is incremental change, and not radical or big change. It has to be incremental so that the trust building process is not disrupted.” (Anonymous, September 2016). This was a challenge was also highlighted in several interviews.

The sustainability aspect depends greatly on how this network of power relations decides to reorganize and address them, According to Mann. Also, if the political power, the state, decides to widen its scope of control, this network might lose its dynamics as it is right now, and different forms might occur that might signify fragmented social control of the state, according to Migdal.

Exploring the influence the interaction within this network is examined through two case studies. Mainly to track the influence civil society has on state practices in terms of recognition, support, and policy.

## **First Case Study**

### **Young Innovators Awards (YIA)**

This case stands out as one of the earliest attempts to work on innovation with direct beneficiaries within the Egyptian context. This program has been operating since 2004 under the umbrella of Nahdet Al Mahrousa (NM), the first incubator of early stage social enterprise founded in Egypt as an NGO in 2003.

NM as an organization represents also an example of how different local actors organize when they see a pressing need, and creates their own relevant structure. It started in 2003 when the founder of NM had an idea of creating a platform to support social development ideas.

As defined on their official website: The program mainly aims at improving the research and development in Egypt. They do so through financial and technical support of innovators either by supporting their graduation projects (the ones from natural sciences faculties within public universities), or supporting the prototypes to be turned into products. The program worked in 19 Egyptian public universities, 87 faculties of natural sciences. The program partnered with a large number of businesses as well as governmental organizations. The program worked with more than 3800 young innovators. “Since inception in 2004, 670 graduation projects and 24 prototype awards were distributed.” (YIA, 2016)

The content of their program includes two sections. The first is mainly about “awards of excellence in undergraduate research”, where they hold competitions for the graduation projects of students within natural sciences faculties in national universities. Whoever wins the competition is awarded a financial award to pursue their project. The

second is the “prototype design awards and commercialization” which moves beyond the graduation projects to awarding prototypes to be turned into products. The financial support here is more than the one for the graduation project awards. The program has within its mandate capacity development component as well as networking component to raise the capacities of the young innovators as well as connect them to the relevant key actors within their field of interest that could help them further develop and turn their projects into startups. Different success stories could be traced to YIA, one of the examples could be “Integreight”<sup>6</sup> which was awarded in one of the years and moved to the next level of being incubated, then went through the whole entrepreneurial cycle and now is a well established company in the field of Information and communications technology (ICT).

Within the framework of this program, YIA has partnered with different governmental, international, and private organizations within the field. The governmental organizations cooperating with the program as put forward by the founder of the program, in my interview with him on 21st of June 2016, are: “National Research Center, the Academy for Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT), the Ministry of Scientific Research, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Cooperating with the government for the program was either with the governmental entities that have the budget to contribute with, or technical support. The different partnerships with the different governmental entities resulted in both negative and positive impact on the program and the beneficiaries.” He continued to explain further what he meant, an example of a successful cooperation was the partnership with ASRT, in which ASRT financially supported different startups or prototypes, yet this support was always facing legal challenges of

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<sup>6</sup> Integreight is a company in the ICT industry, concerned with proposing innovative solutions for end users using technology.

whether they should have equity within the startup or not, and how to ensure that the money they invest in the different projects are not wasting the public money. The different staff within the governmental organizations might have ambition to develop different projects yet, this ambition does not come to reality because of the legal units within these entities outlining the impossibility of such acts under the current laws governing the ecosystem. This legal dilemma sometimes was sometimes solved through the partnership of these governmental organizations with local NGOs that can the different projects avoiding the waste of public money challenge. (Anonymous, 21 June 2016)

Cairo Innovates is an example of the outcome of the long-standing partnership between YIA under the umbrella of NM and ASRT. Cairo innovates mainly takes place November of every year as an exhibition inviting all the relevant stakeholders nationally, regionally, and internationally to promote the culture of invention and innovation (ASRT, 2016). YIA and ASRT partnered for this event for two consecutive years, yet this year, 2016, ASRT implemented the exhibition on its own with the sponsorship of different CSOs most importantly Masr AlKhier.

Basically as outlined by one of the founders of the program and one of the employees working on the program, the influence can be summarized in being the ability of the different governmental partners to change some of their internal policies to accommodate the needs of the program. Another is the involvement of some governmental officials from public universities and ministries in the evaluation of the different projects of the students. Another example is the participation of the Minister of Scientific Research to the yearly exhibition YIA implemented in Partnership with ASRT.

They were thus not only recognized by the state as a partner in signing different Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), they were also supported technically by university professors and financially by funding some aspects of the program.

The two interviewees traced this influence to several reasons, first, Inclusiveness of different partners and reaching out to them by the staff members of YIA. The program partnered with 19 public universities, several ministries, as well as several semi-governmental organizations. This widens the areas of cooperation as well as builds trust with the government within different areas of collaboration.

Second, The duration of the partnership is also a factor, the program operated for more than 10 years. Through which the program was partnering with different governmental entities that contributed to acquiring flexibility, trust, as well as mutual learning within the partnership. The longer the partnership is the more likely the different partners develop realistic expectations from each other.

Third, How focused and clear the objective of the program makes the partnership more solid and guided by the objective. This has to be accompanied by acknowledgement of change that happens within the framework of the partnership over the years, and looking at it with guidance for more shaping the future partnerships.

Last, The presence of a critical mass from civil society, investors, incubators, entrepreneurs, and innovators influences the government when it comes to recognizing the field, its needs, as well as the different actor in addition to having to respond to these needs in the form of support because of the presence of this critical mass.

In conclusion to this case study, political change has minor impact on the program, the economic nature of the program made the partnership with the state easier and recognition and trust building was not lengthy, soon enough the state offered both technical and financial support. The international actors here are having indirect impact on the program through working on innovation together with the government without being involved directly with the program.

The next case study mainly explores the change in policy within innovation driven by civil society, represented by ECASTI.

### **Second Case Study**

#### **The Egyptian Center for Advancement of Science, Technology, and Innovation (ECASTI)**

The Egyptian Center for the Advancement of Science, Technology and Innovation (ECASTI)<sup>7</sup> is a start-up non-governmental foundation aiming to enhance the framework of Science and Innovation in Egypt and monitor the country's performance in this field. (ECASTI, 2014)

How they define shows how they try to capture the essence of the entrepreneurial context by defining themselves as a “start-up” while also stressing on their nature as a foundation. In an interview with two of the staff members on 27th of June 2016, they mentioned that they do not interact directly with the innovators. What they work mainly with is enhancing the ecosystem of innovation in Egypt. (Anonymous, June 2016)

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<sup>7</sup> Registered under the MoSS: number 9312 for the year 2013

They view their work within this critical phase in Egypt's history essential to integrate Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) into national development policies and the economic reform agenda, using the efforts of all actors and stakeholders to build Egypt's renaissance. For them, government cannot be expected to take the full responsibility for the scientific research and Innovation System; rather, the private sector and civil society organizations have a key role to play in driving STI in Egypt.

In this context, the role of ECASTI becomes particularly important. As they mention in their mission, mainly they are founded to “consolidate and increase the importance of STI and its outcomes in Egyptian society in order to achieve sustainable socio-economic development that is commensurate with the aspirations of this nation.”

What they try to influence is always the policy level. An example worth mentioning here is the influence ECASTI had on the Egyptian Constitution. The basic clauses ECASTI wanted to integrate were derived from the Ministry of Scientific Research Strategy that was developed in 2006. First they had several attempts to lobby the committee that drafted the 2013 constitution under the rule of the former president Mohamed Morsi. Yet, their attempts were not successful and they could not integrate the clauses they wanted within the constitution. As put by the staff responsible for the lobbying, the committee invited them to give a presentation, they seemed to have understood what have been said, recognized its importance, yet when the constitution was drafted the clauses were not added. However, after the overthrow of the former President Mohamed Morsi, a process of drafting a new constitution started with a new constitutional committee. ECASTI was more successful this time in lobbying for: the importance of scientific research for national sovereignty, the importance of knowledge

economy, the idea of dedicating 1% of the GNP of Egypt to scientific research, as well as adding the importance of working with the Egyptians living abroad for the scientific research cause.

The clause within the current constitution that was put forward by ECASTI read as follows: Article 23 of the 2014 constitution:

“The State shall ensure freedom of scientific research and encourage scientific research institutions as a mean to achieve national sovereignty and build a knowledge economy. The State shall sponsor researchers and inventors and allocate a percentage of government spending to scientific research equivalent to at least 1% of the Gross National Product (GNP), which shall gradually increase to comply with international standards. The State shall ensure effective means of contribution by private and non-governmental sectors and the participation of Egyptian expatriates in the progress of scientific research.” (Egyptian Constitution, 2014)

These were not the only clauses they actually lobbied for, as mentioned by the staff, there were clauses relating to the education system they were not able to pass. ECASTI idea was to make the education for free for the primary phase only, yet the following educational stages would be free for the talented, gifted, high achievers. This is because they see the system of education currently used in Egypt is a burden on the economy and it affects the quality of the education system.

A second example is a comparative study between the different scientific research laws existing within different countries all over the world ECASTI worked on. Based on this comparative study, they developed the different pillars on which the law in Egypt

could be drafted. As a final step ECASTI proposed this draft in 2016 to the Ministry of Scientific research, however, by the time it was proposed, the Ministry itself had their proposal.

The last example here is working on a strategy for scientific research and technology and innovation in Egypt. This strategy was part of the efforts done by the former Minister of Scientific research Dr. Sherief Hammad, who formed a small group in the form of a committee to review the structure of the different governmental organizations working on scientific research, technology, and innovation in Egypt. In other words to clear divides between the different governmental organizations working within this field, most importantly, the Ministry of Scientific Research (MoSR), the Academy for Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT), and the Science and Technology Fund in Egypt (STDF). The output of the work of this committee was mainly the scientific research, technology and innovation strategy for MoSR. Here the staff stressed on the idea that they were the only representative of the Civil Society present within the committee. Working on this strategy was problematic. ECASTI were the only representative of the civil society and they were taking the lead in the research for the strategies within different countries with similar context to the Egyptian one. ECASTI shared their work internally with their own Scientific Council, to take their input and feedback into consideration. The challenge here was that the document was shared by on the members of the council publicly. This incident reached the Prime Minister at the time, which then reached the Minister of Scientific research, which considered as a challenge and stopped the cooperation with ECASTI. Some major measures were taken by the Minister, most importantly banning ECASTI staff from entering the Ministry. Yet, as soon as there was a change in the cabinet, the Minister of Scientific Research also

changed, and when the strategy came out from the Ministry, the role of ECASTI was mentioned, which is considered as a formal recognition of the role of the NGO. Though the relations with the Ministry are not as strong as they were before, the relations are not completely cut, the ban from entering the Ministry ended.

The staff members traced back the success in influencing the policy level to several reasons. First, Depending on the already existing network and connections. This was evident in the influence on the constitution, which can be traced back to the personal connections ECASTI had with the committer of 50 who drafted the current constitution. These personal connections allowed the organization to lobby on a solid base of trust.

Second, a very important reason is the impact of international actors. A very evident example on this is the clause ECASTI managed to include in the constitution was a clause derived from the innovation strategy of the MoSR developed within the framework of the Partnership with the European Union (EU) in 2006. Also, the idea of establishing an organization like ECASTI came to existence because of a similar structure existing within the white house, advocating the policies of scientific research. The Chief Knowledge Officer within Misr Elkhier NGO was inspired by this role, and since Misr Elkhier is more focused on charity and development the idea was establish ECASTI as a spin off Misr Elkhier to assume the advocacy role within the scientific research field. Funding is another influence by the international actors, the availability of the funding opportunities influence greatly the type of activities the organization implements. The pool of funding defines the objectives and leaves smaller room for the organizations for maneuvering and working directly on their strategic objectives. Being worried about their survival sometime drifts away the attention of the organization from its mission. Also,

collaboration can be incited by international organizations as well. In the case of ECASTI one can draw on their project regarding the social innovation clusters, this project is funded by the EU, and within the call for applications a condition was to apply as a consortium, which led ECASTI to partner with several local NGOs such as AYB, Nahdet Al Mahroussa, and GESR of Misr El khier, as well as international organizations such as ASHOKA as well as the state represented in the RDI.

The influence could also be disrupted by several factors, the staff summarized these factors as: First, “Policy change is a matter that involves the high level employees within the ministries and governmental organizations. Accordingly, it is sometimes affected by bottom down decisions. Influence could only be traced if it was backed up by the key stakeholders within the government, and with one decision the influence on the smaller level could be cancelled.” (Anonymous, 27 June 2016)

Second, The creation of parallel governmental structures to the civil society ones that would seem as an alternative to cooperating with the civil society. In the case of innovation, the creation of The Egyptian Science, Technology and Innovation Observatory (ESTIO) which was established in February 2014, only a few months after the establishment of ECASTI in October 2013. ESTIO is affiliated to the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, the Ministry of Scientific Research. ESTIO and ECASTI are not cooperating together in any of their activities.

In conclusion to this case, cooperation, recognition, support and thus influence on the policy level is a highly personalized manner; meaning that it depends highly on the Minister as a person and whether s/he is open for change or not rather than on the staff of

the ministry or the strategy guiding the ministry. Influence on the policy level is important to see tangible changes within the state. International actors influence the survival of civil society in terms of funding as well as on the content level.

What this chapter offered is, first, an account of the current stance of social and economic development within innovation, second, understanding the influence of different factors on the field, third, identifying some changes within state practices in recognition, support, policy.

In conclusion, after reviewing the field as a whole and going in depth with the two case studies, the role of the state is very evident within this field. The different state entities, though not acting in unison, are proactive and reach out to the civil society to work on the concept and create common understanding of how to move forward. Their power, for the time being, is also shared with other actors from civil society, private sector, and international actors. Creating a network of economic relations that is complicated a balance is present in it between the state as the political power and the rest. Until this moment, there is no involvement of military or ideological power within this network, which is contributing, to its survival. Along the different political changes and turmoil taking place, this field has been growing exponentially independent from the political context. Yet, the political context had a great influence on the field on two levels; the first is the interest of youth in the field after the uprising in 2011, the second is any change within the policy level is always subject to the political will of the state and is not left to the day to day staff, which is considered as a challenge in personalizing the matter in the hands of different ministers one after the other without consistency in

strategy. International actors are one of the different stakeholders driving this network of relations and not the only driving force.

After exploring the innovation field the next chapter would be exploring the civic education field in depth in a similar way.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Civic Education in Egypt**

Civic Education is not a newly emerging field; it has been integrated within the education system formally and informally since Nasser and even before this period. This field, unlike the innovation field, had educational, social and political purposes. This Chapter would follow the same structure of the innovation chapter in understanding the concept, mapping different stakeholders in Egypt, reflecting on the sustainability of the field, and finally ending with a case study. This structure is to analyze the social and economic development taking place in this field, as well as trying to explore the influence of political change, international actors, and the purpose of local civil society actors. As well as reflecting on the influence of civil society on state practices.

In this chapter I would be outlining my experience in working within the field, both formally and informally. Formerly, I worked from 7 years in a local NGO called the Egyptian Youth Federation (EYF), I was heading the civic education program there, responsible for the partnership with the Ministry of Youth and sports (MoY), and finally responsible for the strategic planning of the NGO. On another level, I also worked within this field in developing different training manuals with different international organizations, and I was part of different regional and international networks working on Civic Education, most importantly the “Networking for European Citizenship Education” (NECE) since 2012. And finally my experience in working on a research project mapping citizenship education in Egypt by the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI), and EYF.

## **Understanding Civic Education in Egypt**

Throughout working within the field of Civic education for the past 9 years, I observed that both the terms Citizenship education and Civic education are used interchangeably. Not only Civic and Citizenship education, sometimes it is called “political” education, as in the German case. Yet, within the Egyptian context, both governmental as well as non-governmental actors refer to both, civic education and citizenship education, as synonyms. Below are some important findings regarding how Civic education or Citizenship education (CE) is defined and their historical development within the Egyptian context.

First, how CE was defined within the education system: CE can be traced back to 1922 after Egypt’s independence. In this era courses in civics education were developed with the purpose to promote Egyptian nationalism, highlighting that Egypt remained an independent state, and paying little attention to the colonial history but rather focusing on how Egypt survived it as an independent entity (El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolka, 2009).

After Nasser came to power, the priority was to increase educational institutions’ capacities to accommodate more students; this came at the expense of improving curricula and led to “an environment that discouraged students’ participation, questioning and independent thought” (Baraka, 2008, pp. 6-7). CE was then included in social studies, Arabic language and religion, and not as a stand-alone subject (Baraka, 2008). Furthermore, the history textbooks focused on Arab nationality and students studied the history of all Arab nations (El-Nagar & Krugly-Smolka, 2009). After the war in 1973, the values of peace and dialogue were stressed, highlighting the role that dialogue played in accomplishing Camp David Peace Agreement (Baraka, 2008).

During Mubarak's era, history and geography were renamed to social studies and included more information on civics including human rights and the meaning of democracy (Baraka, 2008). With the new millennium, more attention was directed at CE to be utilized to confront growing threats of extremism and globalization (Baraka, 2008,). Another supporting factor to CE's growing prominence was pressure from international donor agencies on Egypt that required "quality learning that included interactive and democratic teaching styles" (Baraka, 2008, p. 6).

During the period that followed the 2011 uprising, political changes were increasing; the regimes changed one after the other in a short period of time. "This led to three different curriculums from 2011 to 2014; one was issued for the academic year 2011/2012 under the ruling of the Supreme Council of the Army Forces (SCAF), the second was issued for academic year 2012/2013 under the ruling of former president Mohammad Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood Group and the first civilian president for Egypt, the third was issued for academic year 2013/2014 under the ruling of interim president Adly Mansour, who came into power for a transitional period after the events of June 30th, 2013 ". (Ali et al., 2015: 11).

Second, CE as defined outside the education system. This mainly exploring what CE meant for different CSOs. "CSOs in Egypt work now within the framework of developing: "well rounded, responsible citizens who know their legal rights and duties, and apply this knowledge to evaluate government policies and practices. Moreover, nurturing students to become citizens who work for the common good has a positive impact on their communities and societies" (Faour & Muasher, 2011, p. 12). Some CSOs

focused their programs on some concepts they define as important for CE, mainly: “citizenship, democracy, human rights, tolerance, and political participation” (Corbel & Pollock, 2012, p. 13). “ (Aly et al, 2015: 3)

The understanding of CE used by CSOs conveys the political purpose behind working within the field for them. And thus has been affected greatly by the political changes within Egypt, and to what extent the state is widening or shrinking its control and power.

### **Mapping of different stakeholders within Civic Education**

In the Egyptian context, there are two ministries that are mainly concerned with civic education, the Ministry of Education (MoE) that is mainly concerned with the schooling system and the Ministry of Youth (MoY) specifically under the Civic Education unit. In 2005 a unit for CE was established within the MoY in partnership with UNICEF, which focuses mainly on CE projects. Since then, this CE unit has developed several partnerships with other International agencies to implement different programs in different parts of the country.

As for civil society, CSOs have operated carefully within the field of CE, especially during Mubarak’s era, where organizations working on issues related to human rights and citizenship were not supported (Youniss & Barber et al., 2013).

“According to the “Citizens in the Making” report conducted by Gerhart Center 2012, only 14% of the civic education programs carried out by the NGOs do not target youth, while the rest focuses on youth solely. This trend can be explained by the focus of the Ministry of Youth (MoY) on CE for youth as well as the rising wave of youth

activism from 2011. Most programs carried out by the CSOs are centralized in the capital and big cities; Cairo, Alexandria and Minya, and the rest are neglected especially in Upper Egypt, Sinai and the Red Sea provinces (Corbel & Pollock, 2012). CSOs working in the field of Civic Education and Engagement are mainly International Donors and Agencies, Research Centers, Social Enterprises and registered and non-registered Youth Organizations and Student Activities.

Along with the public sector and civil society organizations, there are other important and contributing stakeholders for the spread of civic education values and content; such as the media, political parties, private sector, and religious institutions as well as donors. Media is considered “powerful because it is widely accessible to all irrespective of their level of education and sophistication” (El-Mikawy, 2013, p. 33). “(Ali et al, 2015: 5)

### **Sustainability of Civic Education**

Unlike the innovation field, this field is greatly affected by the state. Since it has, as outlined above, political purpose and value the political changes on the state level affected the field greatly, in terms of what is allowed to be taught and who is allowed to be responsible for it. The intervention of the political power then together with the military and ideological powers sometimes hindered a network of power relations to emerge within this field. Instead, no particular patterns were developed, yet only random developments within the field that do not follow a certain pattern.

## **Case study**

### **The Egyptian Youth Federation (EYF)**

In exploring this case, I mainly depend on primary sources because of the lack of published material on EYF. The primary sources I depend on are mainly: in depth interview with a staff member on 26th of August 2016, my personal experience as the director of programs of EYF for 7 years, annual reports and strategic plans of EYF, and finally, my personal experience in working closely with MoY on different projects.

The Egyptian Youth Federation is a non-governmental umbrella organization for youth led and youth serving NGOs. Currently EYF has 17 members from different governorates, namely Cairo, Giza, Alexandria, Minya, North Sinai, and Damietta. Since its establishment, EYF has been aiming at empowering youth organizations so they can empower youth better serve and engage with their communities. This happens through networking as well as capacity development programs.

EYF has been registered within the Ministry of Social Solidarity for the year 2006. As stated in the law, EYF is the only Youth Federation that can exist in Egypt.

The purpose of EYF is mainly to: develop the Capacity of its member organizations as a stepping-stone towards accomplishing their youth targeted objectives.

The above-mentioned purpose was developed into three objectives:

1. Strengthening the effectiveness of EYF as an umbrella organization representing the Egyptian Youth organizations.
2. Creating a suitable environment for supporting youth work.
3. Developing the capacity of Youth organizations.

EYF started working within CE since its establishment in 2006 through different

programs. The approach towards CE evolved further after the uprising in January 2011. This was stemming from the interest of young people in community activism as well as the interest of the international organizations to work further with the Egyptian youth after the images from the demonstrations in Tahrir Square were shared.

Since EYF is an umbrella organization, it derives its strength from the strength of its member organizations. It also designs its strategy from the strategies of its member organizations, and during the phase from 2011 and 2013 there was a rising trend within the member organizations to work with CE of youth. Consequently, EYF adopted that trend, during this period, the network with the governmental and the non-governmental sectors widened. EYF was keen on establishing links with the ministries involved within this field. Below is a more thorough explanation of this period.

The influence of the 2011 uprising on EYF could be traced in three dimensions. The first is in the rise in the collaborative spirit of its member organizations. The second is mainly on the programming level. The third is regarding its relation to the different governmental organizations.

Regarding the rise of the collaborative spirit of its member organizations; EYF suffered from a period of stagnation right before the uprising in 2011. During this stagnation period, the member organizations were losing interest in the different activities conducted by the organization. It was difficult to mobilize the member organizations and more difficult to mobilize the non-members to join. The member organizations were 10, and a maximum of 3 organizations were active. As 2011 uprising started, the collaborative spirit was on the rise. The different member organizations were coming back together to figure out how can they best use this already established umbrella

organization. Several meetings started taking place in the second half of 2011 to bring back the role of EYF as an advocacy network for youth issues, and mainly the civic education and engagement of youth. The member organizations agreed to give the lead back to NM and mobilize the different youth organizations. This happened through several awareness sessions held as well as field visits to different governorates such as Alexandria, North Sinai, Damietta, and Ismailia.

Regarding the influence on the programming level; EYF started paying attention to its role as an advocacy network catering for the needs of the youth in Egypt. This was manifested in the different attempts of EYF to integrate participatory approaches in developing a Youth Policy. A participatory Youth Policy came as a priority of both the board of directors as well as the staff of EYF during 2011; this was mainly derived from the fact that the previous 2005 youth policy was not participatory. Dr. Safy El Din Kharboush, the chairperson of the National Council for Youth, introduced the draft national youth policy of 2005. And even this non-participatory national youth policy was not activated. EYF tried to integrate the youth policy component within all the projects it was implementing since the second half of 2011 and until 2016. Where in 2011, in cooperation with the UNICEF, EYF was able to conduct a 2 days event in cooperation with the Ministry of Youth gathering 30 youth from different governorates using participatory and engaging methods to get their inputs around how a youth policy should look like. In addition to partnering with the Swedish Youth Council in 2013 in a three-year project with the main aim of developing a participatory National Youth Policy built on the successful examples from the Arab world, mainly the Lebanese example.

Lastly, the relations of EYF with the governmental organizations were influenced greatly by the changes that took place within the government after the uprisings in 2011. Two examples could be mentioned here, one is regarding MoY, known before as the National Council for Youth. EYF engaged in a lengthy trust building process with the National Council for Youth since the appointment of one of the prominent Civil Society figure as the vice chairperson. Since the vice-chairperson was from the same network as the chairperson of EYF, EYF chairperson and staff were invited for consultation several times within MoY. These visits to the ministry for meetings with different staff members from different departments led to widening the network of EYF within the ministry and thus building trust with the staff of the ministry that lasted even after the vice president left his post. EYF, though unsuccessful in influencing the development of a participatory youth policy, kept close relations with MoY and implemented several activities with the ministry from 2012 and until 2016. These activities were mainly revolving around integrating Dialogue within the different ministry activities with youth. The main success was the establishment of a partnership agreement with the CE unit within the Ministry, this partnership was mainly built on both EYF and MoY contributing to integrate new and innovative methods to civic education, developing the capacities of the facilitators working with the civic education unit of the ministry, and finally working directly in engaging the young people within the different venues owned by the ministry in dialogue with the administration.

How this partnership developed and the influence it had can be summarized in the following points, as mentioned by one of EYF staff members in her/his interview with me:

1. The lengthy trust building process with the staff of the ministry starts with having a good network within the ministry. A personal contact represented here in the vice-chairperson of the national youth council in 2012 was the gateway to the partnership.

2. The trust building process is essential and lengthy. It involves the exchange of different documents, attending several meetings, in addition to working closely with the staff of the ministry.

3. The level to which this trust is granted to the NGO was highly dependent on the personal connections the staff of EYF had with international organizations that were funding the ministry. In this case it was UNICEF, where as an organization it has been in partnership with the ministry for a long time. In addition, UNICEF was the main organization supporting the establishment of the Civic education unit within the ministry. Supporting the civic education unit was not only financial support; it was also technical support developing the capacity of the staff working within the unit. This somehow made the unit having a unique position within the ministry.

The outcome of this partnership could be summarized in the following:

1. Both EYF and the Civic Education unit were approached by another international organization to build on the existing partnership to start the implementation of a new project within Youth centers within the marginalized and poor areas in Egypt. With the main purpose of opening new spaces for civic education and political participation. This project was implemented in two phases reaching out to more than 20 youth centers and generating more than 30 community based initiatives organized by the youth within the centers. These initiatives were then taken by the youth the youth centers administration as well as the governmental staff working on the municipal level to exchange ideas on how to implement the initiatives together.

2. Training of the facilitators of the civic education unit within the ministry by specialized trainers from the field of civic education present within the network of youth organizations of EYF.

3. Different training manuals that were used by the civic education unit of the ministry after the partnership with EYF ended.

4. Observed change in how the meetings between the ministry staff and EYF staff, where more equality was established. In addition, the meetings were done in a more participatory manner.

5. Technical support of the ministry to EYF was offered, where a mutual agreement of EYF providing the content and the ministry providing all the logistical support for the different workshops conducted.

6. The MoY taking the lead in developing different dialogue projects. One of which was launched in 2016 as a national dialogue platform implemented in the majority of the Youth Centers around Egypt.

However this period of intensive cooperation that lasted for almost two years, leaving a long-term impact on both EYF and MoY, ended. The different causes I observed for the gradual withdrawal of MoY from the partnership could be summarized in:

1. Starting from 2013 and Following the presidential elections of Al Sisy in 2014, there has been a period where the different Ministries were freezing any agreements they have with international as well as national organizations. This affected the pool of funds both EYF and MoY were dependent on for implementation of their joint activities. Though some of MoY explicitly mentioned that they would like to proceed

with the activities, it was very difficult to get the approvals of the senior staff members within the ministry.

2. CE has always been a sensitive issue, and with the rise of political and social unrest since 2013, the different ministries started exercising self-censorship until the political boundaries are set by the newly established political system.

3. The Presidency announced 2016 as the year of youth, and thus started in developing the presidential leadership program that for some seemed like a parallel structure to what MoY has been doing for years. Though links with the Presidential Leadership Program were made, especially regarding the inclusive dialogue component the presidency expressed their will of implementing, the approval of the presidency was never granted, and thus EYF was not able to work with the youth within the leadership program.

Though EYF was not able to influence the process of policy change regarding the participatory youth policy. Small and slow progress took place before the whole process was interrupted because it was not a priority within the Ministry of Youth's strategy.

Though some success could be traced in the partnership with the ministry of youth. EYF failed to establish any type of partnership with the Ministry of Education, where several meetings were conducted but they did not contribute to build the trust needed to establish the partnership and thus it failed before it started. On another level, a partnership that started yet did not evolve in a full-fledged partnership was with the Addiction Treatment and Abuse Fund. This partnership started with minor activities and both organizations were not able to scale it up, because neither organizations were able to put the resources that could contribute to the success of the up scaling process.

*Influence of international organizations on EYF:*

The influence of the international organizations on EYF is evident in the different phases the organization went through. The idea of actually founding the organization came in 2004 in an event organized by Goethe institute Cairo bringing together different Civil Society organizations working within the field of development. 10 organizations from different governorate, namely Cairo, Minya, North Sinai, and Alexandria, came together, under the leadership of Nahdet Al Mahrousa<sup>8</sup>, to realize the importance of collaborative work and coming together to advocate for youth issues within the development field.

Another influence would be the number of projects EYF was implementing that were mainly funded by the different international organizations. That in itself might not be regarded as international influence, yet the fact that EYF, mainly during the first few years of its establishment was responding to the calls for proposals by the international donors. These calls for proposals were very specific in terms of the field as well as in terms of the objectives of the call. This was the case with UNICEF, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and GIZ.

Where with UNICEF, the project was mainly aimed at influencing the NGOs working with youth in order to develop their capacities to integrate adolescents within the board of directors of the different NGOs. This project was mainly influenced by the UNICEF strategy, simply because working with adolescents was not part of the target group of EYF before this project, and through this project EYF integrated this age bracket to the target group. The project succeeded in building the capacity of EYF on so many

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<sup>8</sup> An NGO working on social innovation and entrepreneurship since 2004.

levels. Most importantly, developing a strategic plan for the organization, widen its network of different NGOs through awareness sessions and field visits to different governorates. The main challenge the project faced was drifting away from its main aim of integrating adolescents within the boards of the different NGOs, simply because the NGOs were reluctant to do so because they target an older age bracket and the NGO law does not allow adolescents to be within the board of directors of the NGOs, it specifically sets 21 as the legal age of being a member of the board of directors of any NGO.

Regarding the German organizations from the GIZ and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, this happened through an integrated German expert within EYF. This expert was part of the CIM program; this program mainly aims at placing experts within the developing countries in different organizations. “The Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) is jointly run by GIZ and the International Placement Services (ZAV) of the German Federal Employment Agency.” (CIM, 2016). This integrated expert influenced the types of programs as well as the management of the organization greatly. When it comes to the type of programs, he was mainly on contact with the German organizations operating in Egypt. Since he joined EYF in 2010, the organization implemented different projects with GIZ (from the employment unit to the women’s rights unit), implemented different events with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung before it was shut down in Egypt, and applied with it to a major project in the European Commission in 2011. In terms of management, the integrated expert managed to raise the capacity of the staff working within the organization by providing them with technical support, as well as widening their network through inviting them to the events run by the German organizations.

EYF was more reactionary within applying for the different projects; another example on this would be the Ambassadors for Dialogue project funded with the Danish Youth Council. Where the Danish Youth Council was the one reaching out to EYF to partner in a project that works on bridging the gap between the Danish Youth and the Youth from different Arab countries.

A final example that can be referred to here, is the membership of EYF within a Network for Arab and European Civic Education (NACE). This network was established due to the increased interest of the different European organizations working within the field, which gather together every year in conference called “Networking for European Citizenship Education” (NECE), in the Arab Spring. This interest led inviting different stakeholders from the Arab Spring countries to the NECE Conference in Cordoba, December 2012. From that year on, a core group was established to exchange best practices across the Atlantic. The outcome of this group was a comparative analysis of CE across different European as well as Arab titled “Citizenship in the Making between Europe and North Africa”, through writing country profiles for CE<sup>9</sup>. This study led EYF and DEDI (both members of the core team) to expand it to the previously mentioned mapping of CE in Egypt. Another outcome that could be traced would be the current attempt to create the Network for Arab Civic Education (NACE), an advocacy network for the Arab Civic Education stakeholders. NACE is still within the founding phase, it is very difficult to predict where will it actually head, yet it is following the footsteps of NECE, and highly influenced by it.

The case of EYF mainly stresses on how within this field the political power, the state, is the one controlling the field. And civil society in this sense is more reactionary to

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<sup>9</sup> Can be found on the NECE website on:  
<http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/netzwerke/nece/205936/country-profiles>

the political changes happening. International actors have more influence on both the state and civil society than local actors having on the state. A defined and clear political purpose is always a challenge working in a politically changing context such as the Egyptian one.

In conclusion, through the dynamic interaction between the international, national, and local organizations within a field as sensitive as CE only led to fluctuating periods of increased cooperation, shaping and reshaping of the different policies of all the stakeholders. Political power, military power, and ideological powers are the ones dominating this field, with a major role for the state in controlling and coordinating the activities of powerful groups within civil society. This pattern was broken at different instances of political change, this was evident in 2011.

Personal networks had a vital role to play within the civil society state relations. The knowledge, where does it lie and how is it transferred between the different actors also played a major role in determining the level of cooperation.

International actors play a major role within this field, yet unlike the field of innovation, In CE International actors are operating within the scope identified to them by the state.

In the following chapter, I will outline the final conclusions derived from the study with its different components.

## **Chapter six**

### **Conclusion**

Within this study I was exploring the different factors that are enabling civil society to influence state practices in Egypt. In attempting to answer this question I put forward this argument: purpose of local civil society actors, Political change, and International support are the main factors enabling civil society to influence the state practices. This influence could be used as an indicator in studying the economic and social development in Egypt. I then divided this argument into three sub-hypotheses and attempted to measure them:

1. The more economic the purpose of local civil society actors is, the more successful they are in influencing State Practices.
2. The period that followed the uprising in 2011 witnessed more influence on the State Practices by the local civil society actors.
3. The more consistent the agenda of the Local civil society actors with the international organizations operating within the country, the more successful they are in influencing state practices.

The chapters were organized in a way to tackle the three different hypotheses against the influence of the local actors on state practices in terms of recognition, support, and policy change. While also reflecting on the social and economic development of Egypt within the fields of study. The theoretical approach used was mainly dependent on Mann and Migdal (as explained earlier). Below I will be tackling the findings under each sub-hypothesis, move to the final argument and evaluation the relevance of both the methodology and the theoretical framework, then list the different gaps in the analysis, and end with recommendations for future research.

*First, the three sub-hypotheses:*

1. *The more economic the purpose of local civil society actors is, the more successful they are in influencing State Practices.*

Generally, the more political the purpose of civil society actors whether international or local the more difficult it is for them to cooperate with the state and not only to influence them. This could be found in the different historical phases from Nasser to Al Sisy, thus the more economic the purpose of the different civil society actors the more space they are allowed to interact with the state and thus means more possibility in influencing state practices. This is not an indicator of how strong the state is; it is an indicator of the intention of the state to widen its scope of control, whether is it successful or not is another issue to tackle. The legislative restrictions discussed in chapter 3 are evidence to this. In addition to the recently passed restrictive law from the Parliament in December 2016, shrinking the space allowed for civil society to operate.

How far the purpose affects the influence on state practices is tracked within the different case studies. Evidence from the case studies suggest that, within the innovation field a stronger and possibly sustainable network is created between the different stakeholder including the state organizations allowing civil society to influence state practices and be recognized as critical mass advocating for change on the policy level, which might accepted or not. This critical mass operating within the space of civil society is also supported technically and financially by different state entities. This is unlike the case with CE, where the state exercises its political power over CSOs and from now to then shrinks their scope of influence.

2. *The period that followed the uprising in 2011 witnessed more influence on the State Practices by the local civil society actors.*

Moments of political change, generally, offer space for civil society actors to influence the state. This was evident within the comparison of the historical context. Where the first few years of any change in the regime from Nasser till Al Sisy, always the years where influence on the recognition and support levels is very high, yet the state remains reluctant to being influenced on the policy level during this phase. Accordingly, 2011 was no exception.

By looking at the two fields, innovation and CE, the different case studies highlighted that 2011 brought changes to the society itself where new forms of organizing started to spread and were recognized by the state. In addition, the inability of the state to catch up with the changes happening within the civil society, and thus giving space for more flow of information and manpower from the civil society to the state institutions. This flow of personnel to state institutions during this period, created a network between civil society and state. This network existing to date, changed if not on the policy level as in the innovation field, impacts the day-to-day communication between the state and civil society.

3. *The more consistent the agenda of the Local civil society actors with the international organizations operating within the country, the more successful they are in influencing state practices.*

In general, social and economic development in Egypt has been affected greatly by international factors. Here I mean, not only the role of international organizations, but also international events. From the colonial history, to aid, to the different wars taking place in the region, from the different wars Egypt participated in. The historical chapter

could only capture the part of it relating to the impact of aid, and at certain cases the impact of international pressure.

However, this hypothesis was mainly tested in the two fields of innovation and CE. Where the role of the international actors took different forms from supporting in enlarging the space of the civil society, to supporting in ecosystem within which civil society is operating (evident in the innovation case). And also supporting the state itself within the two fields, in this sense International actors sometime are holding the role of the mediator between the civil society and the state as the case was in the trust building process between CSOs and state entities in the field of CE. The more consistent the local civil society actors were with the international organizations the more likely they are able to influence the state practices, unless they have political purposes and then the political power of the state would prevail.

Though the different sub-hypotheses were tested, there are some limitations of the study that must be mentioned. The first is the limited ability of the to use the findings as a concrete indicator to the social and economic development of Egypt at this point. This is due to the complexity inherent in the development context in Egypt nowadays. This complexity and fast changes within the political sphere contribute to the first set of challenges in reaching a generalization. Another limitation relates to theoretical framework, as much the approaches used give a solid framework to look through, this framework is very wide, trying to take all the different factors that contribute to the historical narrative of the state to be taken into consideration, also criticizing the different generalizations reached by other scholars. This wide scope of analysis makes it very difficult sometimes to gather all the meaningful data and analyze them thoroughly. In addition, the study requires more time, fieldwork, and case studies so that one can reach a

definitive indicator. In short, the relevance of the theoretical framework is also its main challenge. Another limitation relates to the fieldwork and the data collection within this time in Egypt. Where working with such a sensitive topic such as state society relations did not make it easy for me to get approval from the different stakeholders to conduct interviews with them, especially the ones in the government. Confidentiality had to be guaranteed, and accordingly some of the gathered information could not be shared and thus used within the framework of analysis.

Moving on from the limitations and the gaps to the recommendations to future research. The first recommendation would be widening the timeframe so that the historical narrative could be more elaborative and is not disrupted. Including more case studies from different fields would either strengthen the observed patterns or point them out as coincidence and highlights other patterns to be examined. Include the how the different factors relate to each other and how they also relate to other factors that are not mentioned. Including different methodologies such as network analysis of the people working within the different fields, to convey the relations that exist and how they influence the state practices, this network analysis should take into consideration the different propositions and jobs individuals within the network acquired over a selected time period to be able to track down the different relations existing within the networks and how the influence is created. Also a comparative analysis between Egypt and other developing countries could be helpful in reaching more generalizations.

**Annexes:**

*Annex 1: Questionnaires*

*Annex (1. A) Development Questionnaire:*

1. Are you working in the development field:

Yes

No

2. If yes, what type of organization:

NGO/ Association

Initiative

CSR of a Company

Another

3. How do you define Development?

4. In your work do you think that the development agenda is dictated to you by the state?

Yes

No

5. In your work do you think that the development agenda is dictated to you by the Donor Organization?

6. In your work you have the freedom to set your own agenda and strategies?

Yes

No

7. DO you have any examples in which your work affected the development strategy of the state and/ or the donor?

*Annex (1.b): Innovation Questionnaire:*

1. I work within the field of innovation:

Yes.

No.

2. Age Bracket:

Less than 18

From 18 to 21

From 22 to 25

From 26 to 29

From 30 to 34

More than 34

3. I Define myself within the field as:

Entrepreneur.

Content creator.

Trainer.

Researcher.

Lecturer/ Professor

Employee.

Investor.

4. Sector:

Gov.

NGO.

Not for Profit un registered Initiative

Start up

Other, For Profit Entity, Specify

Other,

5. Working/interested in the field since for:

Before 1990s

1990s

Early 2000s

Since 2009- 2010

Since 2011- 2012

After 2013- Now

6. Do you think Innovation is important for Development:

Yes/ No

Please justify your answer:

7. Are entrepreneurs by default innovators?

Yes

No

Please justify your answer

8. How do you see the link between innovation and entrepreneurship?

9. How do you see the link between Innovation and Technology?

10. How do you see the link between Innovation and Scientific Research?

11. Which of the below mentioned Definitions is closest to your understanding of innovation:

“The process of translating an idea or invention into a good or service that creates value or for which customers will pay.” Business Dictionary

“An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations.” Based on “Oslo Manual”, 3. rd. edition, 2005

Other, please mention the one you may use the most.

12. What type of value does a program/project/initiative have to hold to be considered innovative?

(you can choose more than 1, please prioritize)

Economic

Societal

Political

Technological

Scientific

Environmental

Other, specify

13. What Economic value does Innovation hold, If any:

14. What Social value does Innovation hold, If any:

15. What Political value does Innovation hold, If any:

16. What Technological value does Innovation hold, If any:

17. What Scientific value does Innovation hold, If any:

18. What do you know about open innovation?

19. Which of these Projects/programs/organizations/ Initiative/ Company would you consider Innovative:

( you can choose more than 1)

YIA: <https://www.facebook.com/yiaprogram/?fref=nf>

Eventtus: <https://www.facebook.com/EventtusApp/?fref=ts>

RiseUp: <https://www.facebook.com/riseupsummit/>

AlshaneK

Ya

Balady

AYB:

<https://www.facebook.com/AlashaneKYaBaladyNGO/?fref=ts>

GESR: <https://www.facebook.com/GESR.Egypt/?fref=ts>

Yomken. com <https://www.facebook.com/Yomkencom/?fref=ts>

Egypt innovate: <https://www.facebook.com/EgyptInnovate/>

Presidential leadership Program: <https://www.facebook.com/plpegypt/>

Cairo Runners: <https://www.facebook.com/CairoRunners/?fref=ts>

Morsi Meter: <https://www.facebook.com/MorsiMeter/>

Ambassadors for Dialogue: <https://www.facebook.com/ambassadorsfordialogue/>

Messaha,

The district,

Other, specify

20. What is still needed to enhance the Innovation Ecosystem?


*Annex 2: in-depth interviews questions:*

1. Introduce yourself, your organization, and your role?
2. If addressed to civil Society:
3. If addressed to governmental official: Does your work involve working with the government? In what way?
4. For civil society actors:
  - How would you define your role as civil society?
  - What is the objective of your organization/ project?
  - Does your work involve working with the government? in what way?
  - How would you describe your relations with the government?
  - From your experience: Have you seen any change in the behavior of the government towards civil society in the past few years? what sparked this change?
    - From your experience: Have you see any change in the support of the government to the civil society during the past few years? what sparked this change?
    - From your experience: have you seen any change in the governments' policies within your field? what sparked this change?
    - Would you consider your work/interaction with the government influencing it and/ or influenced by it in any way? how?
1. For governmental officials:
  - Does your work involve working with the civil society? in what way?
  - How would you describe your relations with the civil society?
  - What do you think is the role of the civil society? what role are they playing now in Egypt?
    - From your experience: Have you seen any change in the behaviour of the civil society towards the government in the past few years? what sparked this change?

- Would you consider your work/interaction with the civil society influencing it and/ or influenced by it in any way? how?
2. For International Organizations:
- How would you define your role as civil society?
  - What is the objective of your organization/ project?
  - How do you see your role as a international organization within the local context in Egypt?
  - How would you describe your relations with the local civil society actors?
  - Does your work involve working with the government? in what way?
  - How would you describe your relations with the government?
  - From your experience: Have you seen any change in the behavior of the government towards civil society in the past few years? what sparked this change?
  - From your experience: Have you see any change in the support of the government to the civil society during the past few years? what sparked this change?
  - From your experience: have you seen any change in the governments' policies within your field? what sparked this change?
  - Would you consider your work/interaction with the government influencing it and/ or influenced by it in any way? how?


*Annex 3: Demographics of the respondents of the innovation questionnaire:*

**I work within the field of innovation:**




Yes	18	85.7%
No	3	14.3%

**Age Bracket:**




Less than 18	0	0%
From 18 to 21	1	4.8%
From 22 to 25	5	23.8%
From 26 to 29	5	23.8%
From 30 to 34	4	19%
More than 34	6	28.6%

**I Define myself within the field as:**




Entrepreneur	5	23.8%
Content creator	4	19%
Mentor	1	4.8%
Trainer	3	14.3%
Researcher	2	9.5%
Lecturer/ Professor	1	4.8%
Employee	5	23.8%
Investor	0	0%

**Sector**



Governmental	0	0%
Non Governmental Organization	7	33.3%
Not for Profit unregistered Initiative	2	9.5%
Unregistered business	1	4.8%
Start up	6	28.6%
Accelerator	1	4.8%
Other, For Profit Entity	4	19%
Other	0	0%

**Working/interested in the field since**



Before 1990s	2	9.5%
1990s	1	4.8%
Early 2000s	3	14.3%
Since 2009- 2010	4	19%
Since 2011- 2012	2	9.5%
After 2013- Now	9	42.9%
Other	0	0%

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