Nasser and Park: Development, state building, and elite consolidation

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The American University in Cairo

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

Nasser and Park: Development, State Building, and Elite Consolidation

A Thesis Submitted by

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Under the supervision of Dr. Ibrahim Elnur

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science
Chapter 4 Historical Overview of Korea

4.1 Colonial and Post-Independence Korea
   4.1.1 From hermit kingdom to empire to colony
   4.1.2 The colonial period
   4.1.3 Liberation and War
   4.1.4 The Rhee administration

4.2 Korea under Park Chung-hee
   4.2.1 Military as guardian of the nation
   4.2.2 The military-political-business alliance and the Five-Year Plans
   4.2.3 The Saemaeul Undong (New Community Movement)
   4.2.4 Park’s “state populism”

PART III

Chapter 5 Analysis

5.1 Comparing and contrasting Egyptian and Korean experiences under and after colonialism
   5.1.1 Similarities
   5.1.2 Differences
      5.1.2.1 Education
      5.1.2.2 Capitalist socioeconomic structures

5.2 Testing the Hypothesis
   5.2.1 Elite consolidation
      5.2.1.1 In Egypt during the Nasser era
      5.2.1.2 In Korea during the Park era

5.3 Migdal and strong societies and weak states

5.4 Corruption?

5.5 Process Tracing
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Possible Future Research

The relationship between development & state building and elite consolidation

Nationalism

Present-day Elites

References
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Abstract

This thesis examines the relationship between elites and development and state building. It looks at how elite consolidation does or does not affect development and state building. It does this in the context of the cases of Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser and Korea under Park Chunghee. The thesis initially puts forward the argument that Korea’s advantages from the colonial era set the basis for later development and state building, and paved the way for elite consolidation into the 1960s. However, the thesis ultimately finds that while Korea may have had some advantages from the colonial era that helped in development and state building, this was but one factor of the ability of elites to consolidate well. It ultimately argues that the ability of elites to effectively consolidate is connected to the efficiency of the bureaucracy and exogenous catastrophic circumstances, which are in turn connected to the success of development and state building processes.
PART I

Chapter 1 Research Design

1.1 Introduction

“...[A] nation full of confidence and zeal, throughout the history of mankind, never bows to adversities, but displays the wisdom of overcoming and making use of them as a foothold for national development and progress.” – Park Chung-hee

“This Assembly which stems from the will of the masses must always stay with them...It has grown out of the will for drastic change and it must attain the broad objectives of change, the objectives of unbounded sufficiency and justice, of unrestricted social and political democracy, of a society with equal opportunities for all and no class difference and of new vistas in which the Arab individual can do honour to life and life can do honour to the Arab individual” – Gamal Abdel Nasser

Oftentimes in developing nations, development and state building are top priorities. Grand projects of national development and state building are undertaken and said to be for the betterment and security of the nation and the people. In the quoted speeches above, Park addressed a rally of farmers and fishermen and emphasized national development and progress. Nasser addressed the newly formed National Assembly of the United Arab Republic, calling on equal opportunities and no class differences for the Arab individual, values often considered results of development. Through these speeches, it can be seen how much emphasis they put on development, for a better situation for the nation, and for the individual citizen.

Projects of national development and state building are especially important in relatively newly formed states. After independence, elites in these usually unstable countries are faced with the tasks of development and state building, all while needing


to consolidate their own power and ruling coalitions. These processes are seen in many regions of the world, but with vastly different results. Two specific cases are particularly interesting.

Gamal Abdal Nasser, after leading a “revolution” or “coup” in 1952, officially started leading Egypt from 1956 and led until his assassination in 1970. The time of his rule and the consequent events had an effect on the trajectory of Egypt, which had a role in creating the Egypt of today: somewhat unstable, arguably authoritarian, and economically stagnant. On the other hand, Park Chung-hee led South Korea (from hereon “Korea,” except where there may be confusion) from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. Although starting with similar policies as Nasser, and in many ways in a worse situation initially than Nasser’s Egypt, Park’s policies resulted in a different trajectory, which had a role in creating the Korea of today: quite stable, fairly democratic, and industrialized.

Thus, while at one point in the 1950s and ’60s some thought these two nations were comparable in many ways, they are no longer thought of as so today. This thesis will compare these two nations that at one point were thought to be comparable.

The table below demonstrates the contrasting trajectories of both nations according to economic indicators, as it shows how economically these two nations were on similar footing in the 1960s, but the gap widened with time. As the gap started to widen in the 1970s, what happened in the time leading up to the 1970s, when Egypt and Korea were in fairly similar economic situations, becomes important to examine.
Table 11.1. Population, Total GDP, and GDP per Capita in Egypt and South Korea, 1960–1998 (current prices)

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<td>South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total GDP (US$ billion)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (US$)</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>5,921</td>
<td>6,842</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>42.1</td>
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<td>62.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total GDP (US$ billion)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>82.7</td>
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<td>GDP per capita (US$)</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>1,304</td>
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Fig. 11.1. Total population and GDP per capita in Egypt and South Korea, 1960-1998.

Source: Rivlin 2004, 265.
Both nations came out of earlier periods of colonialism (though the nature of the colonialism they faced was different; Egypt was officially colonized for only a short time, but it was a case of subjugation similar to other cases of colonization, and thus, this thesis will call British imperialism in Egypt British colonialism), and both Nasser and Park rose to power as military strongmen in unstable and uncertain times and embarked on ambitious projects of development and state building. While there are many significant differences and potential causes of these differences, this thesis will argue that the difference is best seen in the elite power relations of both nations at the time of Park and Nasser.

This topic is still pertinent today because there are still many developing countries still undertaking similar national consolidation through national projects of economic development and state building. In many ways, this process has not ended in Egypt and South Korea either, as leaders in both nations are still putting forward their ways to make their nation “better.”

In the following thesis, sections I through IV go over the research design aspects of the project, laying out exactly what the project hopes to do. Sections V through VII include the analysis.

1.2 Definitions

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify definitions of important terms that will continuously be referred to throughout the thesis. The literature review will go into more detail on the debates in the various pertinent fields of academia on these terms, as the following terms themselves are still the topic of much debate. However, it is better to have some working definitions on a few terms that will keep on coming up.
The state: Migdal summarizes Weber’s definition of the state, perhaps the most classic and well-known definition. The modern state “is a compulsory association which organizes domination” and “is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e., considered to be legitimate) violence.” Migdal writes that the most well known and often quoted statement of Weber on the state is: “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Thus, “[f]or [Weber] states are purposeful associations with varied purposes but similar means” (Migdal 2001, 13).

However, Migdal offers his own definition of the state to allow for the role of society in a state. “The state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts” (Migdal 2001, 15-16).

This means that the state must be seen in dual terms: (1) as the powerful image of a clearly bounded, unified organization that can be spoken of in singular terms […] as if it were a single, centrally motivated actor performing in an integrated manner to rule a clearly defined territory; and (2) as the practices of a heap of loosely connected parts or fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries between them and other groupings inside and outside the official state borders and often promoting conflicting sets of rules with one another and with ‘official’ Law (Migdal 2001, 22).

This allows for examining the state both as a single actor and as an entity with numerous social forces acting within (and without) it.

Thus, state building as a term can then be seen as a general, overarching term that includes forming institutions of the central state, but also the interactions of important parts, fragments, and groupings. It is the creation of the “clearly bounded,
unified organization that can be spoken of in singular terms” as well as the place of interactions and conflict.

*Development:* The debate on development is now decades old, and can refer to many different things. Economic development is measured in many different ways, but generally refers to industrialization and modernization. There are certain issues included in development that are not strictly economic development: these include social issues, such as the rights of labor, rights of women, changes in socioeconomic structures, education, and so on, often under the term “human development.” Thus, when referring to development, this thesis uses the term as overarching and inclusively as possible, highlighting certain aspects as necessary. The idea is to not be bogged down by the ongoing debate on definitions, but to look at development in relationship to elite consolidation.

*Elites:* This term and the pertinent discussions in academia have been discussed at length in the literature review section. Putnam’s summary of where the classic elite theorists agree is probably the most pithy, useful, and (generally) uncontroversial definition. A discussion on the literature on elites is included in the literature review.

Hopefully these working definitions have cleared up possible confusion with how these terms are used going forward. Now that the question has been asked and a guess for an answer has been put forward, as well as some working definitions on a few terms have been made, it is time to discuss how to go about looking for an answer.
1.3 Research Puzzle

Still being in the shadow of colonialism meant that a class of indigenous elites had not been fully consolidated yet by the time of Nasser in Egypt and Park in Korea, though such elite consolidation was arguably necessary for the projects of development and state building. There were certainly some indigenous elites, but whether there was consolidation (creation of coalitions and consolidation of power) is key.

But then the question must be asked how did the processes of development and state building and elite consolidation affect each other in the cases of Nasser’s Egypt and Park’s Korea, if at all? That is, is it possible to say development and state building (that started before and continued into the time of Nasser and Park) paved the way for elite consolidation? Or did elite consolidation allow for greater economic development and state building (and perhaps failure to consolidate meant less development and state building)? Or is it possible at all to even suggest, much less establish, such a relationship?

During these periods, alliances (or perhaps accommodation) between military, political, and business elites were created. These processes of elite alliance and coalition building as a whole for power consolidation will be referred to as “elite consolidation” for simplicity, though it is hardly a simple process. The processes of development and state building will also be seen as one issue, though these processes are also very different. This thesis will address each of these processes in and of themselves, but for the ultimate purpose of finding some conclusion for the question, these related processes will be tied together.
This thesis will also focus on the years of the rule of Nasser and Park, though an examination of modern history of Egypt and Korea is necessary for background. Nonetheless, the emphasis is on elite processes of the specific moment, in relation to development and state building.

1.4 Hypotheses

In seeking to address the question in section 2, this thesis will forward one main hypothesis. The hypothesis states that Korea’s advantages from the colonial era set the basis for later development and state building, and paved the way for elite consolidation into the 1960s, allowing for further economic development and state building and elite consolidation, while in Egypt economic development and state building and elite consolidation were attempted all at once, with less positive results.

The hypothesis takes into consideration the contrasting situations of Egypt in the 1950s and Korea in the 1960s and the respective different colonial histories. Egypt in the 1950s had few indigenous elites, and few significant reforms. Britain had been fairly hands off, only taking what it wanted, such as cotton, and using what it needed, like the Suez Canal (Farah 2009, 28), though British influence was always there, if not always officially. However, in Korea, some agrarian and land reforms, education reforms, and infrastructural reforms had occurred, as the Japanese were building their empire. It was perhaps a more penetrating form of colonialism. This all led to the removal of the traditional landed elite (Peterson 2010, 145 and 151; Pratt 2006, 213).

This meant that, while Japan only implemented these reforms for its use and not out of any consideration for its Korean subjects, when Japan lost World War II and left the Korean peninsula, all of these colonial legacies largely remained, meaning
Korea had an advantage that Egypt did not, forming a stronger foundation for further development and state building, and paving the way for elite consolidation. While the advantages mentioned above are both tangible and intangible, there will be a focus on the intangible, as development and state building processes are more than just that which is seen.

In Korea, among the several processes that began in colonial times that can be included in development and state building, perhaps processes in regards to education and creation of capitalist socioeconomic structures (that is, replacement of social classes based on feudalism with socioeconomic classes based on capitalism), in particular, legacies from the colonial era, played major roles in elite consolidation. However, testing and analysis will be conducted in later sections on this hypothesis.

It is worth noting here that colonialism is a sensitive subject and that this thesis is not suggesting that somehow British colonialism ruined Egypt while Japanese colonialism paved the way for Korea to be East Asia’s Cinderella. These are extreme and untrue claims. Ultimately, as is typical of colonialism and imperialism, both Britain and Japan used Egypt and Korea respectively for their own benefit, with little concern for Egyptian and Korean subjects. This thesis merely hopes to make some suggestions about the nature of elite coalitions in Egypt and Korea in the respective time periods (the rule of Nasser and Park, respectively) and how they were created or consolidated, and how the colonial period had an influence on these nations during the respective time periods.

1.5 Methodology

In seeking to address the question in section I, subsection B and prove the hypothesis in section I, subsection C, this thesis is a comparative historical case study
of the two cases, focusing on elite relations, namely, Korea under Park Chung-hee (1960-1979) and Egypt under Gamal Abdal Nasser (1954-1970). Thus, while there may be a need for a small amount of quantitative research when potentially looking at economic numbers for the respective periods, this thesis is a qualitative thesis.

When looking at tracing historical processes, there is a question about the gap between tracing the historical processes and being able to gain explanatory power from this tracing. To try to help lessen the gap, I will refer to the method of “process tracing.” Several resources are available on this method, with a couple mentioned below.

James Mahoney, in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, describes process tracing as “the effort to infer causality through the identification of causal mechanisms” (Mahoney 2003, 363). Process tracing is used to help avoid mistaking a spurious correlation for a causal association. The problem of spuriousness arises when two correlated variables appear to be causally related but in fact are the product of another variable (Mahoney 2003, 363).

Process tracing can help the analyst distinguish between […] two possibilities by showing whether causal mechanisms link the variables together. Thus, if hypothesized causal mechanisms can be identified between the second and third variables through process tracing, the analyst has a basis for believing that the sequence is a causal path; that is, the second variable has a real causal effect on the third variable. Alternatively, if causal mechanisms cannot be identified between the second and third variables, the analyst has grounds for believing that the sequence may be a spurious correlation; that is, the second and third variables are correlated only because of the presence of the first antecedent variable (Mahoney 2003, 364).
Another resource on process tracing is *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*, edited by Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, perhaps the most definitive book on this method to date.

Contemporary political science has converged on the view that [several research puzzles], and many more on the scholarly and policy agendas, demand answers that combine social and institutional structure and context with individual agency and decision-making. This view, together with recent developments in the philosophy of science, has led to an increasing emphasis on causal explanation via reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Part I, Ch. 1, para. 2).

They go on to argue that “techniques falling under the label of process tracing are particularly well suited for measuring and testing hypothesized causal mechanisms” (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Part I, Ch. 1, para. 3). They also argue that, “process tracing – or the use of evidence from within a case to make inferences about causal explanations of that case – has in fact been around for thousands of years” (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Part I, Ch. 1, para. 6).

There is a caveat as “the seemingly intuitive nature of process tracing obscures that its unsystemic use is fraught with potential inferential errors; it is thus important to utilize rigorous methodological safeguards to reduce such risks” (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Part I, Ch. 1, para. 7).

Bennett and Checkel thus define process tracing as “the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest” (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Part I, Ch. 1, para. 12). It is a “key technique for capturing causal mechanisms in action. It is not simply glorified historiography, nor does it proceed by the logic of frequentist statistics” (Bennett & Checkel 2015, Part I, Ch. 1, para. 25).
For an example of process tracing, Mahoney uses Collier and Collier’s work from 1991 where they “identify mechanisms linking different types of labor incorporation periods with different types of party systems” (Mahoney 2003, 365).

In their analysis of Colombia and Uruguay, Collier and Collier systematically identify the processes and events through which the incorporation pattern of “electoral mobilization by a traditional party” led to the party system outcome of “electoral stability and social conflict.” These processes included a period in which the party that oversaw incorporation briefly maintained power, the gradual emergence of conservative opposition, a period of intense political polarization, a military coup, and, finally, the creation of a party system marked by stable electoral politics and social conflict. Each of these events acts as a mechanism linking labor incorporation with a particular party system outcome. The ability of the authors to show how these and other processes connected explanatory and outcome variables is crucial to the success of their argument (Mahoney 2003, 365).

Schimmelfenig gives a few examples of scholars who have used process tracing explicitly and implicitly in studies on the European Union, as scholars find it useful because it “cuts across theoretical positions” (Schimmelfenig 2015 in Bennett & Checkel Part II, Ch. 4, para. 8).

Andrew Moravcsiks’ Choice for Europe ‘is a series of structured narratives’ of the EU’s grand bargains designed to test observable ‘process-level’ implications of competing theories of preference formation, bargaining, and institutional choice […] Paul Pierson illustrates his historical-institutionalist, process-level explanation of the ‘path to European integration’ with a case study of European social policy […] Craig Parsons traces the process of how a specific set of ideas on the construction of European regional organization prevailed over its competitors in the French political elite and was subsequently institutionalized […] Adrienne Heritier […] examines institutional development in the EU on the basis of process implications of several theories of institutional change (Schimmelfenig 2015 in Bennett and Checkel, Part II, Ch. 4, para. 8).

Schimmelfenig’s short list shows how process tracing as a methodological tool is widely used on a diverse range of topics or subtopics within a topic, precisely because theoretical positions do not matter in its use; it is a methodological tool.
Through process tracing causal factors can be eliminated and proven, and thus support potential explanations. And so, I hope to be able to overcome the gap between tracing historical processes and gaining explanatory power through process tracing. However, as stated above, the goal of the thesis is not necessarily to try to prove without a doubt that there is a relationship, but to try to suggest connections that can possibly be further investigated in the future. Also, process tracing is just a methodological tool to try to overcome this gap. It may be that there still is a gap, but the hope is to try to lessen the gap as much as possible.

1.6 Academic Relevance and Case Selection

At this point there may be still a question as to what relevance this project will have on academia, and why these particular cases. While much has been written about development and certain development projects on a national scale and much has been written about authoritarian regimes, as well as much has been written about state building under authoritarianism, not as much has been written about how development and state building affect elite consolidation and visa versa in authoritarian settings. Furthermore, not much work has been done comparing nations between the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and East Asia, even though there are a certain amount of similarities between different cases in the regions and many interesting studies can be conducted.

The literature in regards to East Asia is growing, though only recently has the focus gone beyond the developmental states. The literature to “deparochialize” (borrowing Aidi’s term) the Middle East is also growing, trying to move beyond
arguments of cultural, political, and economic exceptionalism (Aidi 2009, 11). This thesis aims to contribute to this literature.

For a while the “developmental state” was a trendy idea in political science, with cases such as Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore the main go-to cases in the literature on this model of state-led development. Peter Evans’s *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* and Atul Kohli’s *State-Directed Development* are perhaps among the better-known works on this topic. This thesis will acknowledge such literature, and to a certain extent, start on the assumption that state building and development processes are related and connected.

However, where this thesis hopes to break new ground in is in regards to the role and consolidation of elites in such processes of state building and development in authoritarian settings, and how colonial history affects or does not affect this process of elite consolidation. It hopes to be able to examine and trace various processes that happened at the same time, parallel to each other. Thus, this thesis will hopefully be able to make some suggestions in regards to these elite political processes that occur parallel to state building and development processes.

While it is true that the geopolitical regions Egypt and Korea are in are vastly different, there are similarities. The MENA region has been under Ottoman and western subordination and exploitation in modern times. The East Asian region was originally under Chinese, then Japanese, and then western subordination and exploitation in modern times.

Of course, the differences in the nature of these various forms of subordination (which can probably be summed up generally as different forms of imperialism)
cannot be ignored. In particular, British colonialism had a great effect on Egypt, and Japanese colonialism on Korea. The approaches of colonialism, although similarly abusive, were quite different as the British approach was perhaps more indirect, as they were careful not to call it colonialism, while the Japanese approach perhaps more direct. This thesis hopes to suggest that these differences affected the modern state when the modern state was created and/or consolidated later on.

Specifically in the MENA, many of the cases of authoritarian elite legitimation through development and state building occurred in newly independent former colonies that were newly formed republics, and as such, elites had to find ways to hold the nation together to strengthen their power and position in that society. Egypt is a case in point. By the time of the 1952 Free Officer’s Revolution, through which Nasser would eventually come to power, the nation had been unstable for decades, all in a quasi-post-colonial, nominally independent era, as Britain still had great influence (Farah 2009, 69-70). The power of the new elites and the consolidation of their coalition depended on the stability of the newly formed nation, and stability depended on development and state building.

In Egypt, Nasser came up with his own populism, deciding to “build his power base on a philosophical imperative: the need to win a sweeping mandate from the people. This bottom-up approach aimed to translate the desires and wants of the people into state policies and national socio-economic strategies.” This, of course, meant land reform and the creation of a public sector (through nationalization). Thus, the old elite was dismantled, and a new elite consolidated (Osman 2010, 47), or at least, that was the goal.
Park Chung-hee’s South Korea was actually not that much different. When the administration of the first post-colonial, post-independence president, Syngman Rhee, ended in his removal, the government that replaced Rhee was seen as just as corrupt and incompetent, unable to handle economic, social, and political crises. Park and his officers took advantage of the power vacuum and stepped in (Y. Han 2011, 41), and with it, the new elites began to consolidate power and begin national projects of development and state building. Han calls this “state populism,” “a strange amalgam of egalitarian ethos, an ideal of social welfare and developmentalist dictatorship” (S. Han 2004, 87). Sorensen and Kim write that Park himself called it “administrative democracy” or “Koreanized democracy,” an economy first, anti-Communist policy as a prerequisite for “restoring” democracy and “National Reconstruction” (Sorensen and Kim 2011, 5).

Thus, while one cannot deny or ignore the fact that Egypt and Korea have vastly different historical and geopolitical contexts. But one also cannot ignore the potential in comparative study.

Also, the effect of outside actors in the process of elite consolidation cannot be underestimated. Egypt had an enemy in Israel; (South) Korea in North Korea. And this was all occurring in the global geopolitical situation of the Cold War. One cannot forget what was happening in the respective regions of these nations or what was happening globally. How exactly friends and foes affected the state building, development, and elite consolidation processes in these nations will be seen in following sections.
Focusing on the regimes of Nasser and Park in the respective time periods is important because immediately after World War II many considered Egypt and Korea to be comparable. However, that is no longer a popular idea today. The differences in trajectories started during the Nasser and Park regimes. So, while this thesis will touch on other time periods of these two nations (especially the colonial periods), it will focus on the period of Nasser for Egypt and Park for Korea.

Hopefully some novel ideas and conclusions will come about from this unique pairing of case studies, and this study will add to the academic discussion, even if in some small way.

Chapter 2 Theoretical Background

2.1 Literature Review

More than anything else, it is important to examine what exactly is meant by certain terms that have been used so far (beyond the set of preliminary definitions), such as elites, development and state building. It is best to examine an overview of the literature. Most of the literature takes development (usually economic) and state building together. Thus, this preliminary examination of the literature is divided into two parts: an overview of elite politics and an overview of development & state building, especially in relation to elite politics.

2.1.1 Elite politics

To start, an examination of some literature on elites more generally is necessary. Many have written on the topic over the years.

In *Elites and Society*, T.B. Bottomore writes that the term elite “did not become widely used in social and political writing until late in the nineteenth century
in Europe, or until the 1930s in Britain and America, when it was diffused through the sociological theories of elites, notably in the writings of Vilfredo Pareto” (Bottomore 1966, 9) and Gaetano Mosca (Bottomore 1966, 9). He writes that Pareto and Mosca have a conceptual scheme with common notions:

in every society there is, and must be, a minority which rules over the rest of society; this minority – the ‘political class’ or ‘governing elite’ [...] undergoes changes in its membership over a period of time, ordinarily by the recruitment of new individual members from the lower strata of society, sometimes by the incorporation of new social groups, and occasionally by the complete replacement of the established elite by a ‘counter-elite,’ as occurs in revolutions (Bottomore 1966, 12).

Bottomore also discusses elites in developing nations. Among some specific types of elites in such nations are “leaders of nationalist movements,” i.e. political elites. In such nations “the impetus for economic development came originally from the struggles for political independence” (Bottomore 1966, 103).

These nationalist leaders have power derived from leadership of a political party based upon nationalist sentiment. After independence is gained, “the need to consolidate a nation out of related but still separate tribal or linguistic groups, and the economic need to plan on a national scale the industrial development of the country” are among the problems facing such nations leading to nationalism (Bottomore 1966, 103-4).

Another group Bottomore mentions are military elites. Bottomore writes that in developing nations, where political institutions are still being made and political authority unsettled, “those who control the ultimate power of direct physical coercion have the opportunity to play an important part in deciding the future of the nation” (Bottomore 1966, 105).
As Bottomore mentioned both Mosca and Pareto, it is necessary to examine more specifically what they wrote. Mosca writes, “In all societies […] two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (Mosca 1939, 50). It is a constant fact or tendency found in all “political organisms,” one that is “so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye” (Mosca 1939, 50). The ruled class is “directed and controlled by the [ruling class], in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the [ruling class], in appearance at least, with material means of subsistence and with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism” Mosca 1939, 50).

Furthermore, “in choosing its supreme leaders a political class is in a sense the prisoner of the ideas and principles which it has adopted in regard to leadership. Those ideas and principles result from its whole history and from the level of intellectual maturity that it has attained. It cannot, therefore, change them from one day to the next” (Mosca 1939, 430).

In the case of Pareto, as Bottomore explained, his definition of elites is similar: “the strongest, the most energetic, and most capable – for good as well as evil” (Pareto 1979, 36). However, in his book The Rise and Fall of Elites, Pareto’s focus is on the rise and fall of elites, that is, where one group of elites ascends, another declines.

The new elite which seeks to supersede the old one, or merely to share its power and honors, does not admit to such an intention frankly and openly. Instead it assumes the leadership of all the oppressed, declares that it will pursue not its own good but the good of the man; and it goes to battle, not for the rights of a restricted class, but for the rights of almost the entire citizenry. Of course, once victory is won, it subjugates the erstwhile allies, or, at best, offers them some formal concessions (Pareto 1979, 36).
Pareto writes that, “It is an illusion to believe that it is the people who stand at
the head of the dominant class today. Those who stand there […] are part of a new
and future elite which leans upon the people” (Pareto 1979, 72). He also writes that
“There is never, to be exact, one elite stratum, there are only various strata which
together constitute the elite” (Pareto 1979, 78).

In an Introduction to Pareto’s *The Rise and Fall of the Elites*, Zetterberg sums
up Pareto’s view of the elite, writing “A dominant group, in Pareto’s opinion,
survives only if it provides opportunities for the best persons of other origins to join in
its privileges and rewards, and it if does not hesitate to use force to defend these
privileges and rewards. Pareto’s irony attacks the elite that becomes humanitarian,
tenderhearted rather than tough-minded” (Zetterberg 1979, 2).

For Pareto,

events and decisions among the elites have more consequences for the history
of a society than events and decisions among its great masses. The very fact
that critics of his viewpoint treat the masses either as breeding places for
revolutions, that is for new elites, or as factors contributing inertia or stability
to society, proves to Pareto that the study of historical change very largely
revolves around the study of elites (Zetterberg 1979, 4).

In *The Power Elite*, C. Wright Mills writes what is dubbed the “power elite,”
in the context of America. These are “men whose positions enable them to transcend
the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make
decisions having major consequences […] they are in command of the major
hierarchies and organizations of modern society” (Mills 1956, 3-4). Immediately
below the power elite are professional politicians of mid-level power, and mingling
with them are celebrities (Mills 1956, 4).
The “hierarchies of state and corporation and army constitute the means of power” (Mills 1956, 5). This “triangle of power is the source of the interlocking directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the present” (Mills 1956, 8).

“The people of the higher circles may also be conceived as members of a top social stratum, as a set of groups whose members know one another, see one another socially and at business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account […] the inner circle of ‘the upper social classes’” (Mills 1956, 11).

Mills clarifies on a caveat that while the power elite may have decision-making power, this does not mean they always are the history makers, or that they never are either. The definition of the power elite “cannot properly contain dogma concerning the degree and kind of power that ruling groups everywhere have” (Mills 1956, 20). While Mills writes in the context of America, his discussion is general enough to fit in the context of any nation.

According to Mills, the power elite in America “is composed of political, economic, and military men, but this instituted elite is frequently in some tension: it comes together only on certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions of crisis” (Mills 1956, 276). They are not merely doing their duty, but “[t]hey are the ones who determine their duty, as well as the duties of those beneath them” (Mills 1956, 286).

Mills also acknowledges that the power elite is not a club of permanent membership, but there is “a good deal of shifting about” (Mills 1956, 287). The unity of the power elite “rests upon the corresponding developments and the coincidence of interests among economic, political, and military organizations. It also rests on the
similarity of origin and outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies” (Mills 1956, 292).

Robert Putnam gives a summary of general principles (drawn from other scholars, including many of the those already mentioned) of elites that helps to bring everything that has been discussed so far together and essentially gives a working definition of sorts:

1. Political power, like other social goods, is distributed unequally.
2. Essentially, people fall into only two groups: those who have ‘significant’ political power and those who have none.
3. The elite is internally homogeneous, unified, and self-conscious.
4. The elite is largely self-perpetuating and is drawn from a very exclusive segment of society.
5. The elite is essentially autonomous (Putnam 1976, 3-4).

Putnam does write later that “the classical elite theorists […] treated the unity of the ruling elite as axiomatic” but Putnam suggests “the elite may be only an aggregate of powerful individuals, a statistical artifact whose members need have no more in common than their unusual involvement and influence in politics” (Putnam 1976, 107).

Putnam also summarizes the major theories in regards to why elites change, or elite transformation. Many classical elite theorists claimed that the key to historical change lay in the “metamorphoses of the political elite” (Putnam 1976, 166).

Putnam summarizes that Pareto’s theory of “elite circulation” was based on the idea that “elites tend to dissipate their talents, while at the same time a few forceful and talented individuals appear among the nonelite” and if these newcomers are not allowed into the elite, they may cause a revolution (Putnam 1976, 167). Marx based his theory of elite change on patterns of socioeconomic power, and Mosca similarly based his theory on the rise of new social forces (Putnam 1976, 168-69).
Putnam labels C. Wright Mills’s theory as one based on “social needs,” of a task the elite need to perform. “Why this elite? Because this task. Why this task? Because this elite” (Putnam 1976, 169). Schumpeter is also given this label, as Schumpeter argued the position of the class depends on the significance of its function and the ability of the class to perform the function (Putnam 1976, 170).

2.1.2 Elites and state building & development

Typically in the literature, development means economic development, and state building processes are usually considered hand-in-hand with development. That being said, many scholars realize there are caveats to such assumptions.

In State-Directed Development, Atul Kohli justifies such assumptions by arguing, “industrial growth is a key determinant of any country’s overall economic growth, and economic growth remains a core element of any understanding of development” (Kohli 2004, 2-3). In regards to the relationship between the role of the state and development, Kohli argues that, “a central concern with the economic role of the state in development really does not require any justification. It is more than an idiosyncratic assertion to hold that states are important economic actors in developing countries and thus worthy of serious scholarly interest – even if rates of economic growth reflect a host of other factors” (Kohli 2004, 3).

Kohli goes on to give his main argument for his book. He argues that, “the way state power is organized and used has decisively influenced rates and patterns of industrialization in the global periphery. A core analytical task involves identifying different patterns of state authority and then tracing the impact of those variations on economic outcomes and probing the origins of the varying state types.
Admittedly, in a way, what this thesis will attempt to accomplish is similar to what Kohli has attempted to explain in his book. State capacity and development are related. However, this thesis will not focus on this particular relationship, but will instead focus on the consolidation and role of elites during these processes.

The developmental state model by Peter Evans, described in his book, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, is a well-known model when discussing the story of many so-called “newly-industrialized countries.”

Evans argues development is no longer just local, but “…defined by the relation between local productive capacity and a changing global array of sectors” (Evans 1995, 8). Thus, “…countries that fill the most rewarding and dynamic sectoral niches are ‘developed’” (Evans 1995, 8), while countries in niches considered less rewarding are not (Evans 1995, 8). Thus, in developmental policy, countries must use what comparative advantage they have as best as they can.

States “with transformative aspirations” (Evans 1995, 10) are looking for ways to participate in the most rewarding and dynamic sectors and not the less rewarding ones (Evans 1995, 10). Such states “…are not just hoping to generate domestic sectors with higher profit rates. They are also hoping to generate the occupational and social structures associated with ‘high-technology industry.’ They are hoping to generate a multidimensional conspiracy in favor of development” (Evans 1995, 10).

Evans thus argues that in such a developmental climate, “State involvement is a given. The appropriate question is not ‘how much’ but ‘what kind’” (Evans 1995, 10). He goes on to say that states are not generic and thus, “Different kinds of state structures create different capacities for action” (Evans 1995, 11). He names two
types of states in particular: predatory states and developmental states (Evans 1995, 12). Predatory states “…extract at the expense of society, undercutting development even in the narrow sense of capital accumulation” (Evans 1995, 12) while developmental states “…[preside] over industrial transformation [and also] can be argued to [play] a role in making it happen (Evans 1995, 12).

Thus, developmental states have internal organization that Evans argues approximate a Weberian bureaucracy. There is highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards which create commitment and corporate coherence (Evans 1995, 12). Such corporate coherence “…gives apparatuses a certain kind of ‘autonomy’” (Evans 1995, 12) though they are not insulated from society as Weber suggested, but, according to Evans, “they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies” (Evans 1995, 12). Only when there is such embeddedness and autonomy is a state developmental (Evans 1995, 12).

A few other scholars take a deeper examination of the relationship between elites and development. A few are mentioned below.

Vivek Chibber’s work, Locked in Place, compares the Indian experience with the South Korean experience. Chibber writes that,

[t]he debate on the developmental state has thus come to a conclusion […] that much of the interesting variation in outcomes […] depends on the state’s having the capacity to fulfill the tasks assigned to it. State capacity itself has been decomposed into two broad dimensions: an intrinsic component, namely, the state’s cohesiveness as a strategic actor, which can formulate and implement policy in a coherent fashion; and an extrinsic component, which is the state’s ability to extract performance from private firms… (Chibber 2003, 7).
Chibber says it thus becomes important to examine the “question of the installation of the state,” that is, the lack of success of putting a developmental state in place (Chibber 2003, 8). Chibber also argues that, “the critical conflicts for building state capacity occur not within the state but between the state and societal actors, particularly the capitalist class” (Chibber 2003, 9).

Thus, it was the success in striking an alliance of sorts with its domestic business class that gave the Korean political elite the space to build the institutions they had proposed” however, “having the autonomy to put the institutions in place was not sufficient for success; for this, the facts internal to the state, on which much of the literature has focused, were of great importance […] however […] the antecedent autonomy garnered by the alliance with business was necessary for the state-level processes to be effective (Chibber 2003, 9-10).

What Chibber calls the state-business alliance this thesis calls elite consolidation, recognizing that political and business elites were not the only actors and that it is a process.

Chibber writes that the prevailing literature says that “industrial policy [in Korea] was successful because of the unique power the state had to override the proclivities of its own capitalist class, and it was this power that set Korea apart from other developing states,” however, Chibber argues that while power over individual firms, or even groups of firms, was exercised in tremendous success, there is no reason to believe that the state’s power over the entire capitalist class was any more developed in Korea than in other state. This is not to deny that the state wielded considerable power over domestic business; but all capitalist states have such power to varying degrees (Chibber 2003, 52).

One of the reasons this was possible in Korea was because “[t]he absence of large inequalities in income distribution meant that the South Korean government did not have to deal with vested interests of the wealthy and powerful in agriculture or industry. Policymakers were therefore insulated from pressures to follow the special
interests of particular sectors and were able to plan and implement policies designed to maximize the growth of the economy as a whole […] Authorities were not under pressure to redistribute income” (Rivlin 2004, 266).

In contrast, in Egypt the state operated under what was termed “Arab socialism,” a “welfare-oriented strategy in which private and public ownership of assets coexist” (El-Ghonemy 2004, 255), with an emphasis on “elimination of exploitation” which “should be taken to mean rapid poverty reduction, quick gains from employment expansion, and efficient bureaucracy” (El-Ghonemy 2004, 256). Thus, land reform and creation of the public sector (nationalization) were among the first actions. This meant that “[n]ot only were the exponents of the ancien régime ousted from power but the result was a process of restratification […] The former landowning elites (and foreign residents) were politically and economically neutralized, or they left Egypt altogether, and new opportunities were created for army officers” (Kupferschmidt 2004, 164). Thus, the old landed and business elites were removed altogether as the elite coalition was consolidated with political and military elites taking the lead and essentially becoming the new business elites.

David Waldner, in State Building and Late Development, takes the concepts of development and state building and does a comparative study of Syria, Turkey, Korea, and Taiwan, comparing the actions of elites in these four countries. He writes:

[s]tate building through popular-sector incorporation addressed the immediate needs of the newly incumbent elites. Under these circumstances, Syrian and Turkish elites shaped state finances, development strategy, and key institutions to secure their rule. The political arrangements they crafted promised economic bounty but could not deliver on this promise. In Korea and Taiwan, on the other hand, elites who were relatively secure in their incumbency had the luxury of creating state institutions and policies that were more conducive to long-term economic development (Waldner 1999, 4).
Waldner approaches his study with a combination of coalition theory and collective action theory, leading to two potential trajectories:

The first is where “[i]ntense inter-elite conflict (1) results in the construction of broad, cross-class coalitions; (2) these coalitions are a sufficient condition for the formation of precocious Keynesian states; and (3) this type of state can resolve Gerschenkronian collective dilemmas only at the expense of exacerbating Kaldorian collective dilemmas…” (Waldner 1999, 8). He argues this is the trajectory of Syria and Turkey.

The second potential trajectory, which Waldner says is the case of Korea and Taiwan, is where

(1) the dynamics of inter-elite conflict differed markedly from the Syrian and Turkish cases; (2) Korean and Taiwanese elites chose different coalition strategies; (3) these different coalition strategies permitted the construction of developmental states; and (4) these states had starkly superior capacities to solve collective dilemmas, producing a different developmental trajectory (Waldner 1999, 8).

Nadia Farah conducts a similar study to Waldner, but for Egypt, over nearly two centuries during the modern period of Egypt. She writes that any state, developing or developed, developmental or rentier, is

the site of a complex interplay of power relations […] In many instances, emerging social groups resort to violence to restructure existing power relations to weaken or even eliminate the power of hegemonic groups, whose

3. States with pre-industrial economies where there was “[t]he exchange of material benefits for political loyalty acting as a form of stimulus” (Waldner 1999, 6).

4. Gerschenkronian collective dilemmas are “those that impede capital accumulation and investment in new industrial production” the resolution of which leads to new investment, the expansion of industrial production and extensive growth and Kaldorian collective dilemmas are “those that obstruct efforts to enhance the economic performance of existing industrial enterprises” the resolution of which result in intensive growth (Waldner 1999, 7).
interests […] have become an obstacle to further growth and development. During such periods, the state’s autonomy increases, and its ability to change economic policy and strategies is enhanced (Farah 2009, 18).

In the case of Egypt, Farah argues that, “The withdrawal of the state from the economy and the inability of the Egyptian government to play the role of a developmental state are the main reasons for the lackluster performance of Egypt’s economy” (Farah 2009, 19). This is seen by tracing the power relations in the different periods of the modern Egyptian state and the effect those relations had on development policy and, ultimately, actual development.

2.1.3 Migdal & strong societies and weak states

It is also a good idea to go further into Joel Migdal’s theory on state-society relations as it will be useful later on in the study.

His book Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World came about from a paradox

The first concerns the incredible change in the political landscape of even the most remote villages in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the last generation […] But a close look at the performance of these agencies reveals that often they operate on principles radically different from those conceive by their founders and creators in the capital city. The second paradox seems even more bizarre. Another close look at accounts of the political behavior of top state leaders revealed, strange as it may seem, that many have persistently and consciously undermined their own state agencies – the very tools by which they could increase their capabilities and effect their policy agendas (Migdal 1988, xv).

Migdal defines strong states as “those with high capabilities” to “achieve the kinds of changes in society that their leaders have sought through state planning, policies, and actions” (Migdal 1988, 4-5). “Social control” is “the currency over which organizations in an environment of conflict battle one another” (Migdal 1988, 32), and in measured in three indicators, compliance, participation, and legitimation (Migdal 1988, 32-33). He argues that, “the capacity of states […] especially the
ability to implement social policies and to mobilized the public, relates to the
structure of society. The ineffectiveness of state leaders who have faced impenetrable
barriers to states predominance has stemmed from the nature of the societies they
have confronted […] through their various social organizations” (Migdal 1988, 33).

Thus, the paradox facing state leaders “forces them […] to engage in a risk
analysis: they must weigh their need for effectiveness and security against the risks to
their own political survival through creating agencies that can turn out to be […]
power centers” (Migdal 1988, 211).

Migdal thus “posits that the emergence of a strong, capable state can occur
only with a tremendous concentration of social control. And such a redistribution of
social control cannot occur without exogenous factors first creating catastrophic
conditions that rapidly and deeply undermine existing strategies of survival, the bases
of social control” (Migdal 1988, 262).

He argues that the sufficient conditions for creating strong states are: “world
historical timing” where there is a situation where “exogenous political forces favored
concentrated social control; “military threat”; “the basis for an independent
bureaucracy” that is “sufficiently independent of existing bases of social control and
skillful enough to execute the grand designs of state leaders”; and “skillful leadership”

This review is meant to be an overview of the literature to better position this
thesis in the broader literature and discussion. It is definitely not exhaustive, but
nonetheless tries to touch the diverse literature on the pertinent topics, namely elites
and the relationship between elites and state building and development.
2.2 Conceptual Framework

This thesis will examine the relationship between elites and development and state building. It is looking at how elite actions, namely, consolidation, does or does not affect development and state building (taken as one broad concept for simplicity for right now). Thus, this thesis is similar to Chibber, Waldner, and Farah above.

Whereas Mosca, Pareto, Putnam and others just look at elite politics, and Evans and Kohli among others focus on development and state building (they do mention elites and state authority, but elite actions are not central to their examination), this thesis aims to examine the effects of elite consolidation in a post-colonial setting on national, state-directed projects for development and state building. Thus, it is unique in that it is placing itself in two specific, comparable background contexts and time periods. Unlike Chibber and Waldner, there is a greater historical component. Unlike Farah, there is the comparison aspect with two cases from very different geopolitical regions.

Finally, Migdal gives an examination of the state and its relationship with society. His study of Nasser and his dilemma of needing state institutions for development, but those very institutions becoming a potential threat, will be examined in a later section.
PART II

Chapter 3 Historical Overview of Egypt

Up until this point the goal was to set up the research project, going over design aspects and situating the research in the broader literature. The following sections will go into the analysis. The historical overview comes first to situate the analysis in historical context. It is hardly an exhaustive history. Many others before have already done this. This section is here to give an overview, highlighting certain important events or series of important events in the modern histories of these two nations, for some background before going into further analysis.

3.1 Colonialism in Egypt

Throughout the modern history of Egypt, it has been under some kind of influence from an outside power. This section will focus on a fairly recent and influential outside influence, that of British colonialism, with some context, for historical background leading into the Nasser era.

3.1.1 The British “protectorate”

The construction of the Suez Canal and subsequent debt incurred by Egypt gave France and Britain enough of an excuse to step in, in the name of protecting access to the canal and handling Egypt’s finances. It was around this time, in 1882, that a group of soldiers under the leadership of Colonel Ahmad al-Urabi rebelled against the Egyptian monarchy, dismayed at the burden of debt owed to British and French banks (Cook 2012, 12). While France was reluctant to face Urabi, Britain shelled Alexandria with warships and landed troops, subduing Urabi’s forces (Cook 2012, 12).
To assuage the French, the British promised a speedy evacuation of Egypt (Tignor 2012, 174). Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer (hereafter just Cromer) was chosen as consul general in 1883. Although the British government had promised “a quick reform of the Egyptian government and a speedy evacuation of British troops from the country” (Tignor 2012, 175), Cromer believed that “he and British advisers alone could enact desperately needed reforms in Egypt [and that] the British presence in Egypt must go on for some time” (Tignor 2012, 175). He stayed as consul general from 1883-1907 (Tignor 2012, 175).

However, Cromer faced a difficult task, as “the British occupation was supposed to be a temporary one […] Nor did Cromer become a colonial governor.” It was a “veiled protectorate” (Tignor 2012, 176). The British did insist on having full control over the Finance and Public Works Ministries (Tignor 2012, 176). Cromer was able to increase the country’s revenues, make improvements to the irrigation network, and constructed a dam at Aswan (between 1898-1902) (Tignor 2012, 176-177). After initially having Egypt pull out of Sudan, the Egyptian army under British officers retook Sudan, making Sudan officially under dual control, though in reality control was heavily weighed towards Britain (Tignor 2012, 177).

With WWI, resentment towards the British spread from the educated elites to include other parts of the population (Tignor 2012, 181). In response to this resentment, the British established military rule and a state of emergency. As the Ottoman Empire was against the British in the war, all formal ties with the Ottoman Empire were broken and a British protectorate formally established (Tignor 2012, 181). Egypt soon became fully engaged in the war, with some 400,000 British troops
stationed there, leading to trouble between them and the population (Tignor 2012, 181).

3.1.2 Nominal independence

By the end of the war, the population was full of resentment. Saad Zaghlul said he would lead a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference with Egyptian demands (Tignor 2012, 182; Cook 2012, 20). Of course, the British did not accept, instead arresting Zaghlul. This led to protests and widespread violence. Even after Zaghlul was released and he and his delegation were allowed to go to Paris, the violence did not stop (Tignor 2012, 183).

Eventually, Lord Allenby, who had been sent specifically to restore order, proclaimed Egypt’s political independence in 1922 and the end of protectorate rule. The Egyptian ruler would thus become king. However, four limitations to independence were claimed: “protection of foreigners and control over operations of the Suez Canal, over Sudan, and over Egyptian foreign policy” and also a military presence would remain (Tignor 2012, 183; Cook 2012, 23).

A new constitution was written in 1923, and the Wafd Party (Zaghlul’s party) participated in elections in 1924, winning the elections leading to Zaghlul becoming prime minister (Tignor 2012, 183). This 1919 revolution not only led to political changes, but also economic and social changes as well. In 1920, Bank Misr, a purely Egyptian bank, was created with the funds of wealthy individuals. Industrialization and economic diversification were promoted (Tignor 2012, 2185). Cairo and Alexandria grew exponentially with urbanization (Tignor 2012, 186).
3.1.3 Lingering British influence

The interwar period was characterized by a three-way struggle between the palace, the British Embassy, and the Wafd (Tignor 2012, 188). While the Wafd continued to win elections, it had to deal with the palace and the British. The king had the power to remove governments as he liked, thus often a party in favor of the king would form a government. The British would intimidate politicians through their army (Tignor 2012, 188). In 1936, the Wafd were able to sign a peace treaty with the British. The four powers given to the British were continued, but British troops would be limited to 10,000, away from population centers, in the Suez Canal zone; and Egypt would obtain membership in the League of Nations (Tignor 2012, 188). However, many nationalists were dissatisfied with the treaty (Tignor 2012, 189).

With the start of World War II, war came to Egypt as the German army headed for Egyptian population centers in 1942. Many allied troops were soon stationed in Egypt (Tignor 2012, 190). The British had the king install a pro-British Wafd government, who caved to British demands (Cook 2012, 30). The British were able to stop the Germans. The Wafd only gained condemnation for their collaboration. “No group was more offended by this abdication of authority to the British than the young officer corps of the Egyptian army, who held a grudge against the king for succumbing to British demands and against the Wafd for allowing themselves to be used by their occupiers. The stage was being set for the military coup d’etat of 1952 (Tignor 2012, 190).

Before the coup, there was a general sense of chaos. There were many political assassinations. The parliament continued to be unable to do anything. The
large British military presence (often more than 10,000) continued. At one point, British forces attacked a unit of Egyptian police. This led to rioting against foreign establishments. However, the British troops did not act. “Obviously the fact that British troops allowed foreign citizens to be killed and foreign property to be destroyed revealed to many that the days of the British Empire in the Middle East were numbered” (Tignor 2012, 190-91).

3.1.4 The Free Officers

On July 22, 1952, a group of young Egyptian military officers seized power. They struck late at night, taking control of radio networks and military bases. They moved quickly, knowing that the king and his supporters were acting to stop them. “Over Radio Cairo, Anwar al-Sadat, one of the Free Officers, announced the coup and asserted that the military was seizing power to transform Egyptian society” vowing to rule for the people (Tignor 2012, 192). Within days the king was exiled to Europe, though the Free Officers only did away with the monarchy completely six months later, as the initial goal was reform and not regime change (Cook 2012, 39-40).

In August a land reform law was passed, one of the first major reforms, limiting individual holdings to 200 acres (or fedans) and family holdings to 300 acres, thus taking land from the “hyperwealthy landowners” who had been the rulers, to the peasants in abject poverty (Tignor 2012, 192). This was significant, as “less than one-half percent of total landowners held approximately 35 percent of all cultivable land, while the vast majority of the remaining landowners controlled five fedans [acres] or less each” (Cook 2012, 45). The officers promised open education, social mobility, and economic improvement (Tignor 2012, 192).
The Free Officers were mostly young men in their thirties, holding the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel, native-born, from the Egyptian military school, different from and at odds with older, senior officers (Tignor 2012, 192-93). They had made the Free Officers Group as a secret organization in 1949, “diagnosing Egypt’s weaknesses and seeking solutions to its manifold problems” (Tignor 2012, 193). For many of these young officers, the failed Arab campaign against Israel in 1948 was a turning point. They were embarrassed by the military defeat in 1948, blaming the politicians (Tignor 2012, 193-94).

Critical of the democratic rule of the 1930s, they were reluctant to allow elections, outlawing political parties (Cook 2012, 49), instead creating the Liberation Rally (Cook 2012, 49-50). While Gamal Abdel Nasser was the “guiding figure from the outset” (Tignor 2012, 194), at first he stayed behind the scenes. Instead, General Muhammad Naguib was a senior officer who became the figurehead, as they believed the population would be skeptical of being ruled by young, inexperienced men.

However, this eventually led to a showdown between Naguib and Nasser in 1954, with Nasser prevailing and becoming “supreme leader of the military government” (Tignor 2012, 194). From that point on, although the officers continued to meet in the Revolutionary Command Council, Nasser was the “unquestioned leader” (Tignor 2012, 194).

Cook argues that the authoritarian political order created by the Free Officers came to be because “[t]he Officers’ distinct lack of a guiding ideology combined with the unintended consequences of their intervention and the hard realities of Egyptian politics produced something quite different from the reform the Free Officers claimed they wanted” (Cook 2012, 40).
3.2 Egypt under Gamal Abdal Nasser

3.2.1 Pan-Arabism

Nasser was a “brilliant orator” giving his message through his various speeches, “that Egypt had suffered grievously at the hands of the British for nearly a century, that Western capitalism robbed Egypt of its wealth and dignity, and that the pathway toward power in the Middle East and toward a solution of the vexing Arab-Israeli problem was through an Egyptian-led pan-Arab unity” (Tignor 2012, 195). His message was projected throughout the Arab world, creating enemies but also winning the hearts and minds of Arab progressives (Tignor 2012, 195).

As Nasser’s message blamed the British and the west for causing Egypt problems, the evacuation of British troops was an important issue. Negotiations with the British on evacuation of British troops were arduous, as,

the British were determined to hold on to their magnificent and huge base in the Suez Canal zone, which they regarded as an essential element in deterring Soviet expansionism into the Middle East […] But no Egyptian could tolerate the presence of large British forces in their country […] Finally, in 1954, the two sides reached an accord. All British uniformed troops would depart by early 1956. The British would retain a small staff of nonuniformed officers to oversee maintenance of the base, which the British could reoccupy in the event of an attack in the area (Tignor 195).

3.2.2 Nasser’s projects

The military officers had a lack of expertise in economic matters. However, “[t]hey believed that a combination of central planning and creative entrepreneurial energies could transform the Egyptian economy overnight [thus] they wanted their government to be active in the economic arena, to set high, but attainable economic growth rate targets, to limit the power of foreign capital, and to be energetic in redistributing wealth from the superrich to those most in need” (Tignor 2012, 196).
A new High Dam in Aswan would be the “foundation block of Egypt’s new diversified economy” (Tignor 2012, 196). There were numerous advantages to this dam: cheap electricity could be generated; a regular distribution of Nile waters could be ensured, meaning perennial irrigation and new areas could be cultivated; and prevention of the flooding of the Nile would mean the Nile would not longer wreak havoc on Egyptian agriculture (Tignor 2012, 196).

However, Egypt would not be able to finance the dam on its own. And with its construction, a big lake would be created behind the dam, meaning the resettlement of many Nubian villagers. Antiquities, such as Abu Simbel, would be submerged. More downstream, “no part of the country would any longer receive the renewing supply of silt that the Nile flood brought from the Ethiopian highlands” meaning a large amount of fertilizer would become necessary for farming. The Nile waters would no longer “sweep through the delta” meaning the Mediterranean Sea “would steadily push into the interior of Egypt and render the lands in the lower delta less fertile” (Tignor 2012, 196-97). However, the decision was made to go ahead with the plan, and the government began to look for sources of funding and technical assistance (Tignor 2012, 197).

As Egypt was negotiating with Britain, America, and the World Bank in these matters, Egypt purchased arms from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet bloc country, as the west refused to sell arms. Nasser was concerned with the preparedness of the military. This led to the British, Americans, and World Bank withdrawing support for the dam (Tignor 197-98).

Then on July 26, 1956, as Nasser was giving a speech in Alexandria, “Egyptian technicians and military men moved into the Suez Canal zone and took
control of the Suez Canal Company [...] Nasser announced that the Suez Canal Company would be nationalized, “paying off its shareholders at the share price on the day of nationalization, and would use its assets to finance the High Dam” (Tignor 2012, 198).

On October 29, “perhaps as many as 45,000 Israeli soldiers poured across Sinai in an attack against Egypt. France and Britain said [...] that they had to intervene in order to separate the warring antagonists. In fact, the French and British had worked out these arrangements months in advance. They began landing roughly 80,000 troops at Port Said and along the canal zone on November 5” (Tignor 2012, 199). Nasser decided to fight no matter how outnumbered his forces.

Eventually, American President Eisenhower called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egypt and the Soviets threatened to bomb London and Paris if Britain and France did not withdraw (Tignor 2012, 200). When America withdrew financial support for the British pound, Britain withdrew, and France and Israel followed. Nasser had secured a huge international political victory, nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and fending off an invasion. “His reputation among the Arab peoples soared” (Tignor 2012, 200).

Unfortunately, later years did not see Nasser have similar success. Syria and Egypt, with Yemen as junior partner (Ferris 2013, 30), formed the United Arab Republic in 1958. It lasted only three years (Tignor 2012, 202). “Egypt’s republicanism, vague socialism, drift toward Moscow, and bid to lead the Arab masses” (Cook 2012, 75) was regarded as a threat to the Arab monarchies, thus leading to the idea’s unpopularity with other nations. The UAR experiment ended
when the Syrian military seized control of Damascus and unilaterally seceded from the UAR (Ferris 2013, 24).

The union had been the symbol of the climax of Nasser’s influence. The end of the union was a blow to the Arab revolutionary movement (Ferris 2013, 24). Nasser reacted “with resolve to export Egypt’s revolution to his Arab rivals and determination to deepen the revolution in Egypt itself. In the immediate aftermath of the *infisal* [secession], the Egyptian leadership rededicated itself to shoring up revolution at home. Further nationalizations, expropriations, and arrests of ‘reactionaries’ followed within weeks” (Ferris 2013, 27).

In 1962, an attempted coup in Yemen led to civil war (Ferris 2013, 27). Though some have the view that the Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni civil war was in reaction to the secession, Ferris points out that, “Yemen lay at the heart of plans formulated in 1953 by Egyptian intelligence to spread revolution throughout the Arab world” (Ferris 2013, 29). Although still formally federated to Egypt even after Syria left the union, when the Yemeni leader called out Nasser in a poem, the Egyptian government formally ended the union (Ferris 2013, 29-30).

The decision was made to send troops “in such vast numbers that resistance to the republic would become unthinkable, and any military context would be decided rapidly and decisively” (Ferris 2013, 44). However, “[f]ar from deterring Yemen’s neighbors, Egypt’s military intervention reinforced the fears of Nasser’s regional foes, drove them together, and cemented their determination to oppose him, thereby fueling the very escalation the show of force was meant to avert” (Ferris 2013, 44). Egypt would be stuck in Yemen from 1962-67.
Right after, the 1967 War broke out and was a huge failure for the Arab nations. Tensions erupted on the Syrian-Israeli border (Tignor 2012, 202). Nasser decided to remilitarize the Sinai (which had been demilitarized after 1956). However, the question is why? Ferris writes that, “Nasser could have reacted to the threat of an Israeli assault on Syria – or even to an actual attack – by doing nothing, which is precisely what Israeli intelligence expected him to do” (Ferris 201, 236).

Ferris argues that the Egyptian president was seizing the opportunity Soviet intelligence [gained as Egypt was drifting towards the Soviets] afforded in order to implicate the Kremlin in a gambit that had little to do with Syrian security or Soviet intentions […] By forcing the Soviets to assume responsibility for the alleged consequences of their candor, Nasser hoped to trap one superpower in a web of commitment to a high-stakes maneuver directed primarily against the other (Ferris 2013, 237).

Weeks later, the Israelis sent planes against the amassing Egyptian army and air force in Sinai, fearing Egypt and Syria might launch an attack. Egypt lost an estimated 20,000 soldiers who were retreating. Syria and Jordan joined, only to lose territory. By the time of the ceasefire, six days after the first shots had been fired, Israel had taken the Old City of Jerusalem and West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Sinai from Egypt (Tignor 2012, 202).

There was enough popular support for Nasser to stay on as president as he had given the people “Egypt ruled by Egyptians” (Cook 2012, 92), but many military leaders, including the head of the military, Amir, were sacked (Cook 2012, 100). In 1970 Nasser passed away from heart failure (Tignor 2012, 203).
3.3.3 The socialist, populist state

Many foreign firms that entered Egyptian hands after 1956 were not run efficiently. “Many inexperienced and frankly incompetent military officers occupied important seats on the boards of these firms” (Tignor 2012, 201). That is, the military became not only the political elite, but also the new economic elite. Thus, the military, political, and economic elites became more and more one and the same.

Nasser’s expansion of the education system led to a promise for a guaranteed position in the government bureaucracy to all graduates of Egyptian universities, bloating further the already bloated bureaucracy (Tignor 2012, 201). Graduates soon became placed in public sector firms, thus bloating industries, commercial establishments, and financial institutions (Tignor 2012, 201). “As a result the companies produced commodities and rendered services that were either too expensive for the ordinary Egyptian to purchase or were sold at prices below cost because the government made up for losses. These became a drag on the Egyptian economy by the late 1960s” (Tignor 2012, 201).

However, Nasser and company “embraced the Soviet model of economic expansion, drafting ambiguous five-year plans and opening a host of new government-run industries that were expected to be the engine of economic progress” (Tignor 2012, 201). However, the reality was that by being committed to internal economic change and cutting off economic ties with the western world, the Egyptian government “ran huge budgetary deficits and found itself unable to provide the essentials of life for most of its inhabitants” (Tignor 2012, 201).
One success was that the Aswan High Dam was eventually built with Soviet assistance, becoming an “unquestioned economic achievement of the Nasser years” (Tignor 2012, 201-02). However, this was not enough to balance the failures.

Osman, summing up the Nasser years, argues that what Nasser hoped to see come to be from the beginning was the creation “out of disparate Arab countries a semi-unified ‘nation’ that, he envisaged, would emerge, in one or two generations, as a global power” (Osman 2017). This project resonated until 1967.

“Large groups of Arabs, especially the first generations ever to be educated in the West, felt the ‘nation’ was on the verge of discarding centuries of regress and subordination; that the ‘people’ would now reap the fruits of the past century’s modernization; and that a new dawn after centuries of darkness awaited the Arab nation” (Osman 2017).

For Egypt, it meant Egypt went from being merely a place Arabs came to “learn, work, and holiday” to “the custodian of the ideals of modern Arab nationalism” (Osman 2017). This custodianship gave legitimacy to “Egypt’s political leadership in the Arab World” (Osman 2017). However, the 1967 War crushed this dream. While Egypt was able to regain the land it lost six years later, the real blow was in the humiliation (Osman 2017). The image of Nasser as the hero crumbled (Osman 2017). “The blow to Nasserist Arab nationalism took from Egypt a lot of its claim to leadership” (Osman 2017). Nasser knew this himself. According to Osman, “Christ became mortal” (Osman 2017).

Osman goes on to argue that the 2011 uprising was about the frustrations of young Egyptians about the gap between “the nation’s historic image as a powerful leader in the region, and the reality of a country consumed by its colossal social and
economic problems” (Osman 2017). This dichotomy between the country’s “nostalgia for that historic role and its current absorption with its challenges continues to torment the society” (Osman 2017). Even today, “Egypt’s old view of itself as the leader of the Arabs refuses to go into the shadows of historical memory” (Osman 2017), showing just what kind of legacy Nasser and Nasserist Arabism left on Egypt.

This brief overview of Egyptian history from the beginning of British influence through the Nasser years shows how colonialism influenced Nasser and the Free Officers and their desire for development and state building. British colonial influence created many inequalities, which continued into the time of nominal independence, eventually leading to instability. This allowed the Free Officers to come to power, and the Free Officers’ goal was to create an “Egypt for Egyptians,” reversing decades of British influence and royal rule, trying to overcome inequalities through development and state building, under the banner of Egyptian-led Pan-Arabism. Unfortunately, the government was largely incapable of reaching such goals. Nasser largely relied on his personal charisma and popularity, and ultimately the Nasserist model did not last. Further examination into why the model did not last will be conducted in following sections.

**Chapter 4 Historical Overview of Korea**

**4.1 Colonial and Post-Independence Korea**

Colonialism entered Korea through the gradual taking of sovereignty by Japan over a few decades. Although many changes to Korean society occurred under Japanese colonialism, some reforms started before colonialism during the time of the late Joseon Dynasty (the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
4.1.1 From hermit kingdom to empire to colony

In the early nineteenth century, “the world outside of East Asia was of little concern for [Koreans]” (Seth 2010, 9). But western imperialism began to intrude little by little. In two separate occasions in 1832 and 1845, British ships appeared and inquired about trade. The Koreans explained they did not trade with outsiders. In 1846 three French ships gave a letter to be sent to the king. In 1854, two Russian vessels clashed with Koreans (Seth 2010, 9). At the same time, the Opium Wars were going on in China, and Japan was forced to open to trade by the United States (U.S.) in 1854 (Seth 2010, 9-10).

With the ascension of the Taewongun (the Prince Regent) in 1864, a program of reform was started. The Taewongun wanted to strengthen the monarchy and the central state. He “rebuilt the main royal palace and restored royal tombs, instituted a new currency, and carried out measures to increase the state’s tax revenue” (Seth 2010, 10).

In August 1866, an armed American merchant ship, the General Sherman, sailed up towards Pyongyang seeking to open trade. The crew ignored orders to leave. When it was stuck in a receding tide, it was burned and the crew killed (Seth 2010, 11; Peterson 2010, 119).

In such a xenophobic atmosphere, due to a belief that Catholicism “was a dangerous Western doctrine that would undermine the political and social order” (Seth 2010, 10), persecutions against Catholics increased. This led to the French responding in 1866 by sending seven ships and 600 men. The French demanded those responsible for the murder of Catholic missionaries be punished, while the
Taewongun responded by mobilizing forces. Eventually the French were driven back and then left. This would only be the beginning of many foreign incursions.

By now word of the General Sherman had reached America and a punitive expedition of five ships and 1,200 men was sent. The Koreans did not talk, instead resisting to the end. Eventually the expedition withdrew, not authorized for further action. These events led the Taewongun to conclude that westerners could be defeated and kept away (Seth 2010, 12; Peterson 2010, 120). He felt he had won wars, though to the French and Americans there had never been any war (Peterson 2010, 123).

Meiji Japan tried to open relations with Korea. When it announced the imperial restoration of Japan, the Koreans did not accept, as they never recognized the Japanese emperor as an emperor, on par with the Chinese emperor. Also, the westernization of Japan just reinforced the idea that the Japanese were semi-barbarians (Seth 2010, 12).

In May 1875, the Japanese sent the warship Unyo and other ships to Korea. As the Unyo began to survey the coast, it eventually entered the prohibited area off Kanghwa Island, where the punitive expeditions of the French and Americans had landed. The Koreans fired, the Japanese returned fire and destroyed the Korean guns. The Japanese then overran a small fort. The Japanese dispatched more ships with the excuse of protecting Japanese residents (Seth 2010, 12-13)

The Japanese demanded negotiations. By now the King Kojong had taken personal control. He decided to sign the Treaty of Kanghwa, which recognized the government in Tokyo, and agreed to open three ports to Japan for twenty months.

Korea and Japan were indicated as equal sovereign states, not as a Chinese tributary
state (which Korea was officially), thus introducing the concept of a system of equal and sovereign states to Koreans. Japan was allowed to survey Korean waters, Japanese could reside in treaty ports, and Japanese had the right to extraterritoriality. Additional economic privileges were given later (Seth 2010, 13). Thus, Korean isolation was ended, and gradual Japanese penetration began.

From 1876 onwards, Korea had to balance western powers (Britain, France, the U.S., Russia) and East Asian neighbors China and Japan. King Kojong slowly began reforms. He established the Office for Management of State Affairs (Tongni Kimu Amun), which was in charge of foreign affairs, international trade, foreign language instruction, military affairs, and weapons manufacturing (Seth 2010, 15). Kojong also created a force of eighty cadets under a Japanese army lieutenant to learn modern warfare. Missions to Japan and China were sent to learn modern institutions and technologies (Seth 2010, 15). However, none of the measures accomplished very much (Seth 2010, 15-16).

A rebellion in 1882 by unpaid soldiers who attacked the Japanese legation led to China stationing troops around Seoul and Japan stationing troops at its embassy (Seth 2010, 16). China began to push for a certain amount of control in Korea. Korea was opened to Chinese trade. China advised the king to create a Foreign Office and a Home Office (Seth 2010, 16-17).

In 1884, a group of young reformers made a coup attempt, known as the Kapsin Chongbyon (Political Disturbance of the Year Kapsin). Fires and explosions were set off around the palace, the royal family removed to another palace under the
protection of the Japanese legation, and six leaders and leaders of military units in Seoul were killed (Seth 2010, 18).

Then the organizers of the coup proclaimed a new government, calling for fourteen reforms. They called for the abolition of class distinctions, tax reform, punishment of avaricious and evil officials, the permanent cancellation of debts, a modern police system, a unified modern military, placement of all financial affairs under the Ministry of Finance, and giving full responsibility to the State Council to formulate all laws and regulations (Seth 2010, 18).

The coup was eventually crushed by China, in a clash with Japanese troops. This led to China and Japan agreeing to withdraw troops from Korea, no longer send military instructors, and notify the other party if it was necessary to send troops to Korea. From 1885 to 1894, China wanted to keep Korea from falling into the hands of another power and thus exercised much influence. Reforms at this time were very little (Seth 2010, 19 and 21). At the same time, Russia began to take greater interest, and Japan became more and more concerned with China and Russia’s role in Korea (Seth 2010, 22).

In 1892, a peasant rebellion, the Tonghak Rebellion, led to both China and Japan once again sending troops. The Japanese occupied the Kyongbok palace where the king was, and forced political change by having the king create a new government. Japan then attacked Chinese forces. Japan routed China in what became the Sino-Japanese War, and in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China surrendered all claims to Korea as suzerain, ceded Taiwan and Liaodong to Japan, and agreed to pay a war indemnity (Seth 2010, 25).
Reformers under Japanese sponsorship enacted sweeping reforms from 1894-1896, known as the *Kabo* Reforms. A new cabinet and prime minister were created, moving much of the king’s power to these institutions. There was separation of judicial, military, and civil affairs. Slavery was abolished, social distinctions eliminated, equality of law enacted (opening all positions to those of talent, not social background), child marriage abolished, a Western calendar used, and a western-style education system created (Seth 2010, 26-27). These Japan-influenced reforms were the beginning of reforms that would continue into the colonial era.

The lease of the Liaodong Peninsula by China to Japan also meant the handing over of Port Arthur, a potential naval base. Russia also wanted Port Arthur. It, with Germany and France, issued a demand to cancel the lease, to which Japan complied (Seth 2010, 27-28). Japan then sought to eliminate the Korean Queen, a rallying figure for pro-Russian, anti-Japanese officials. Japan had the Queen killed. Once this became known, it led to a wave of anti-Japanese sentiment. With the collapse of Japanese influence, the *Kabo* reformers “were unable to maintain themselves in power” (Seth 2010, 28).

Kojong soon placed himself under Russian protection, ignoring the *Kabo* cabinet (Seth 2010, 29). Japan and Russia eventually came to an agreement on how to advise the king and how many troops each would keep in Korea (Seth 2010, 29).

In 1904 Russia and Japan became embroiled in the Russo-Japanese War, starting with an attack on Port Arthur by Japan (Peterson 2010, 137). Japan emerged victorious. Thus it had eliminated competitors. Japan established a protectorate over Korea in 1905, signed by the Korean Foreign Minister, but not the acting Korean
Prime Minister (Seth 2010, 33). In 1910, a treaty of annexation was signed (Seth 2010, 35). Thus, the colonial period started.

4.1.2 The colonial period

Seth claims that Korea was unique as it was colonized by a neighboring nation, not a distant foreign power. It also had a greater coherence as a cultural and historical unit and a longer history of political stability than almost all other nineteenth century states. “It had clearly defined borders, and a distinctive ethnic culture and language not shared by any other peoples. It was a state that was an ethnic group, or an ethnic group that was a state. And it had many centuries of autonomy” (Seth 2010, 39-40).

Seth also argues that Korea had many attributes that made the transition to a modern nation easier: long tradition of bureaucratic government, fairly high literacy rate, common shared set of values and customs giving the country a sense of unity and purpose, and a tradition of borrowing from abroad (Seth 2010, 40). Koreans were quick to respond to the opening of their nation from isolation. “Indeed, the speed with which Koreans began appreciating the strength of Western nations and the value of Western learning is more comparable with Japan” (Seth 2010, 40).

But at the same time many factors hindered it from responding to the imperial threat: modest commercial development, social gap between elites and commoners, traditional disdain for military, and “the stubborn sense of Confucian righteousness among many of the governing class” (Seth 2010, 40).

According to Peterson, thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule in Korea can be divided into three phases: the Military Period (or Dark Age; 1910-19), the Cultural Policy Period (1919-31), and the Assimilation Period (1931-45). Harsh military rule
but also some modernization and new ideas and products characterized the first period. The second period was “remarkably open” and censorship and suppression subtle. By this point, most Koreans, to varying degrees, accepted Japan’s “Asian Greater Co-prosperity Sphere” and “Asia for the Asians.” Cultural creativity flourished, and there was development and prosperity with the booming world economy of the 1920s. The third period was marked by war, bringing hardship to the colony. Life for Japanese became hard, and even harder for the colonized, the second-class citizens (Peterson 2010, 141-42).

Oftentimes the term “annexation” is used to describe Japanese colonialism in Korea. However, Koreans were never Japanese citizens with the same rights, and never had representation. “Japan took control of Korea, retained control with the help of a large military and civilian police force, and ruled it through a series of governor-generals appointed in Japan (Peterson 2010, 142). Thus, colonial or imperial rule are the appropriate terms.

Japanese colonial rule in Korea was top-down centralized, with power concentrated in the hands of the governor-general (Seth 2010, 43). As the colonial rule apparatus became vast, colonial rule became more and more intrusive (Seth 2010, 44). One of the first major tasks of the colonial administration was to conduct an accurate land survey. Tokyo regarded Korea as an important supplier of food. Whereas the Korean state taxed production, the colonial government taxed land (Seth 2010, 44). With the new legal procedure from the land survey, many poor Koreans lost land or the customary use of land, as they did not have the documentation to show ownership. Members of the old nobility were able to take advantage and increase
their land. However, the government became the largest landowner, taking possession of lands by the Korean state and royal household (Seth 2010, 45).

On March 1, 1919, representatives from various independence movement groups gathered and signed a declaration of independence (Seth 2010, 47). The declaration was read to gathered crowds, leading to demonstrations throughout the country. An estimated 500,000 to 1 million people participated in the demonstrations that continued throughout the spring (Seth 2010, 47-48; Peterson 2010, 154). Leaders of this March First Movement tried to keep demonstrations peaceful. Of course, Japanese authorities reacted by attempting to suppress these demonstrations, often violently (Seth 2010, 48). Christians were especially targeted, being heavily represented in the movement (Seth 2010, 48).

The March First Movement is considered by some as the “birth of modern Korean nationalism;” by others, the transformation of a small movement of scattered intellectuals to a mass movement (Seth 2010, 48). It is around this time that Koreans began seeing their land as a nation that had lost its independence (Seth 2010, 48). The March First Movement led to some calling for a change in the harsh military rule of Korea, and some liberties were granted (Seth 2010, 48). The more liberal policies of Japan in the 1920s further facilitated an “intellectual ferment” (Seth 2010, 51). There was an explosion of creativity, arguably establishing the intellectual foundation of the later two Koreas (Seth 2010, 50-51).

Meanwhile, Korea’s economy grew under colonial rule, “although the extent to which the colonial period laid the foundations for its economic transformation after 1945 is controversial” and the record is complex and ambiguous (Seth 2010, 58). In
general, Koreans tend to view the era as one of “Japanese exploitation and patriotic Korean resistance” (Peterson 2010, 144).

Japan did build infrastructure and an industrial base as well as modernize agriculture. However, “it did so in ways that often minimized the benefits for Korea and created structural problems. And at the end of colonial rule Korea still remained mostly rural, with the majority of Koreans very poor, arguably, in some ways more impoverished than at the start of colonial rule” (Seth 2010, 59). This is because “Japan made Korea efficient to make it more useful to Japan” (Peterson 2010, 145), but only to the extent that Japan benefitted.

Socially Korea changed greatly at this time. Intellectuals embraced modernity, from liberal democracy to socialism to Japanese modernity. Educational development in society shows this embracing of change and new ideas (Seth 2010, 61). With the more liberal cultural policy of the 1920s, education was expanded. Expansion occurred gradually, however, leading to a flourishing of unlicensed schools (Seth 2010, 62).

With the start of wartime in 1931, the colonial experience changed profoundly. Many were dislocated due to wartime mobilization. Also, this was the period when Japan tried to forcibly assimilate the Korean people, to make them become Japanese (Seth 2010, 70). The Great Depression led to Japan shifting away from liberal policies to more militarist ones, coinciding with a tightening of control over Korea. Korea began to be mobilized for the benefit of the empire as a link between Japan and the recently acquired Manchuria; “Japan would colonize Manchuria from Korea” (Seth 2010, 71; Peterson 2010, 169). As war grew larger and more serious, more and more
mobilization occurred, including so-called “comfort women,” women forced to become sex slaves to Japanese troops (Seth 2010, 73). Of course, this was only one way Koreans were victimized by colonial rule.

Japan also tried to force assimilation. A Name Order made Koreans adopt Japanese names. All Koreans were forced to register at Shinto shrines. Korean language newspapers were closed. Korean was eventually banned at schools. However, while Koreans were forced to become Japanese, at the same time they were still inferior subjects (Seth 2010, 74; Peterson 2010, 170). Assimilation ultimately failed, as Japanese and Koreans did not mix socially. Instead, a collective sense of Korean national identity only grew (Seth 2010, 75).

There is much debate over how much Japan and its colonial rule laid a foundation for the independent Korea(s). “Some Japanese scholars argue that Korean historiography treats Japan too harshly and that their countrymen did good things in Korea that should be recognized. Koreans respond that even the so-called good things were done for Japan’s advantage not Korea’s” (Peterson 2010, 173). It is not the place of this thesis to attempt to make a judgment on this. However, it is true that during the period of colonial rule Korea began to embrace economic development and modernization, though their introduction was more often than not for Japanese aims and benefit. Peterson argues that, “Like other modern colonizers, but more intensively than most, the Japanese built things for their own purposes that would be useful when they left” (Peterson 2010, 174).
4.1.3 Liberation and war

With the end of WWII and Japanese surrender (and exit from Korea), Korea was occupied by the USSR and the US along the arbitrary line of the thirty-eighth parallel (Seth 2010, 84). Eventually, the occupation became a trusteeship (Seth 2010, 91). By early 1946, “the outlines of separate occupational zones with their own administrations had already appeared. This was an unintended outcome of the military occupation. No Korean wanted or foresaw such a development. Nor does it appear to have been the initial intention of either the USSR or the United States to create two separate states” (Seth 2010, 91).

What became the Republic of Korea (commonly known as South Korea) was a sorry state in the beginning. Electricity production had come from the north, but North Korea soon cut it off.

It had been an economy geared toward supplying Japan with its needs. Japan, however, was no longer importing Korean products. The South had been the rice basket, but there were no external markets for its production […] With its Japanese suppliers and markets gone, the Japanese technicians repatriated, erratic power supplies, and the confusion that followed the government takeover of Japanese enterprises, the meager industrial base was in shambles” (Seth 2010, 95). The new president, Syngman Rhee, was autocratic in style, relying on the bureaucracy, the police, and the military (Seth 2010, 96).

It was in this context that the Korean War occurred. It was a horrible war that one estimate says led to 750,000 military and 800,000 civilian deaths (Seth 2010, 109). In South Korea, the war expedited land reform. It also enhanced the power of the South Korean state as American aid arrived, giving the Rhee government access to foreign currency, giving it an economic prop (Seth 2010, 110). Anticommunism gave a purpose and raison d’etre for South Korea. A large military force was created.
Large amounts of American aid kept South Korea afloat and insured linkage with the west (Seth 2010, 110).

Ultimately, the division was solidified by the war, though the war was started to get rid of the division in the first place. The two separate systems were consolidated (Seth 2010, 111).

4.1.4 The Rhee administration

Whereas to this point the thesis has traced the (more or less) singular narrative of one nation, Korea, this is the place in the history where the timeline divides into two separate histories, that of North Korea and South Korea. This thesis focuses on South Korea. However, one should not forget that the North Korea remained in the picture in many different ways.

The Rhee administration officially started with the proclamation of the Republic of Korea in 1948, through the Korean War, and lasted until 1960. Before the war, Rhee was more concerned with consolidating power than anything else. As mentioned before, post-independence, South Korea was already in a sorry state, and the war only made things worse. As Seth points out, “…for most outsiders, South Korea’s prospects for the future looked grim. Overcrowded, possessing modest resources, artificially severed in half and cut off from the more industrial and developed North, riddled with official corruption and political instability, few countries must have seemed a less promising candidate for an economic takeoff” (Seth 2010, 149).

Rhee “followed an import substitution industrialization policy typical of many postcolonial states after World War II” (Seth 2010, 157). However, he refused to
establish trade or diplomatic relations with Japan, the former enemy, despite U.S. advice. However, he did not have much of an alternative, and thus Korea relied largely on U.S. aid (Seth 2010, 158).

In 1953, after the war, South Korea was still mostly rural and agricultural. Traditional values and loyalties based on family, clan, and locality were strong (Seth 2010, 150). But, land reform that took place during the war meant the countryside was now made up of small family farms instead of dominated by the nobility (Seth 2010, 150). The war had also accelerated urbanization. Refugees had fled to the city and stayed there. Those in the cities were more open to new ideas, meaning a volatile urban population (Seth 2010, 150).

Rhee dominated politics. He and his Liberal Party used “bribery, intimidation, manipulation, and thuggery to maintain themselves in power” (Seth 2010, 150). In 1954, an amendment was pushed through the National Assembly to allow Rhee to run for a third term, which he won in 1956 (Seth 2010, 150). Gradually, his support from the urban population declined. A merger of opposition groups created the Democratic Party, leading to the basic two-party system (based more around a leading figure than ideology) that would continue into the future (Seth 2010, 151).

A growing urban population, growing disgusted with corruption, and disappointment with the slow pace of economic recovery and growth only made Rhee’s hold on power more and more tenuous” (Seth 2010, 151). Vote rigging in the 1960 elections led to massive demonstrations led by students. The military refused to fire on demonstrators. Rhee, under pressure from the U.S., resigned and went into exile in Hawaii (Seth 2010, 152; Peterson 2010, 214).
Then from 1960-61, there was a brief experiment with a more democratic government (Seth 2010, 153). The new government, made of mostly elites, could not appease the demands of labor, student, and other dissident groups (Seth 2010, 153). Discontent continued to increase. Conservatives became nervous that the instability would be an invitation for the North to invade again (Seth 2010, 154).

Park Chung-hee was a major general respected and trusted by junior officers, and was frustrated by how promotion and advancement in the ranks was blocked by superiors who monopolized higher ranks (Seth 2010, 155). On May 16, 1961, some 1,600 troops took over major government buildings as the government fled. Military rule was declared and martial law imposed. A Military Revolutionary Committee was formed to take over power (Seth 2010, 155; Peterson 2010, 216).

Eventually, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) was created, taking control of the government and dissolving the National Assembly (Seth 2010, 155). The coup plotters chose Park as their leader. The military began ruling the country with efficiency and purpose. The new military government began to consolidate power by purging political and military leaders and creating the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) (Seth 2010, 156), which became an important tool of repression for Park (Peterson 2010, 217).

All of this was done in the assertion that corruption was being cleaned up for national security as “North Korea could read the political and social chaos in South Korea as an opportunity to step in, so the military would stabilize the situation temporarily” (Peterson 2010, 216), thus, playing on the fears of conservatives.
4.2 Korea under Park Chung-hee

4.2.1 The military as guardian of the nation

By the time the Park Chung-hee government came to power, South Korea was in an embarrassing situation. It was falling behind North Korea, Japan was booming, and the American soldiers based there were well fed (while South Koreans were impoverished). The military, like the economy, was totally dependent on the U.S. (Seth 2010, 160). The main goal of the new military government led by Park was to free the nation from its dependency and lift it out of poverty, and thus, come out of the weakness, humiliation, and limitation of sovereignty that was symbolized in its dependence on the U.S. (Seth 2010, 160). Thus, the economic policy of Korea changed from one of import substitution industrialization to more and more export-based.

Thus, the military, as the rulers, would ensure the economic and national security of the nation, and free the nation from its embarrassing dependency. It would be the guardian of the nation. In fact, in this manner, Park was not that much different from his northern counterpart, Kim Il-sung, who also sought a nation economically strong enough to support a large military and free from outside powers (Seth 2010, 160).

4.2.2 The military-political-business alliance and the Five-Year Plans

Park thus supported a “state-directed, planned program of economic development” (Seth 2010, 160). This is what has been called in the literature at different times a “developmental state” or other similar terms. One of the first steps was to create the military-political-business alliance. At this point, the military
already dominated politics, having purged members of the old guard. The government also “detained and fined fifty-one of the leading business figures” (Seth 2010, 160). However, eventually the military leaders realized “they needed the skills of the entrepreneurs to promote economic growth” (Seth 2010, 161). Thus they were released after signing an agreement stating “‘I will donate all my property to the government if it requires it for national reconstruction’” (Seth 2010, 161). Thirteen of these business leaders were chosen to form the Promotional Committee for Economic Reconstruction (Seth 2010, 161).

One of the first steps undertaken by the military government was the issuing of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan. The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established, staffed by young talented technocrats who would work on the details of the Plan. The head of the Board was made a deputy prime minister. This first plan nationalized commercial banks and gave the state control over credit, thus money could be lent out to businesses according to the economic plan (Seth 2010, 161). A goal was set of 7.1 percent economic growth rate for 1962-1966 by developing light industries for export. The goal was exceeded, as growth averaged 8.9 percent. The Second Five-Year Plan, 1967-1971, placed greater emphasis on basic infrastructure, including transportation and electric power (Seth 2010, 161).

Although Park had wanted to limit outside influence, he was still reliant on the U.S., which forced him to restore civilian rule in 1963. Park was elected president, ruling under an authoritarian system where his party maintained a majority in the National Assembly (Seth 2010, 162).
In 1972, Park once again declared martial law, wrote a new constitution that gave him nearly dictatorial power, and pushed for heavy industrial development. The Third Five-Year Plan, 1972-1976, called for investment to be channeled into heavy and chemical industries (Seth 2010, 164). “A desire to be able to eventually supply most of its own military equipment and to be economically autonomous was a major incentive for this push” (Seth 2010, 164). There was also a desire to match North Korea and also compete with Japan (Seth 2010, 164).

Such economic policies by the state also led to the creation of the chaebols, the huge family-owned conglomerates (Seth 2010, 165). Banks poured credit into a few companies to develop industries targeted for development. Chaebols were given “exemptions from import duties on capital goods and offered special rates for utilities and the state-owned rail system” (Seth 2010, 165). In turn, chaebol leaders “found it necessary to work closely with the government and contribute generously to government political campaign coffers and to pet projects favored [by the regime]” (Seth 2010, 165). While this may seem similar to what occurred in other nations, a key difference is in efficiency. Chaebols had to be efficient. Government support was given only if they produced results, met economic targets, and were able to compete in domestic and foreign marketplaces (Seth 2010, 166).

4.2.3 The Saemaeul Undong (New Community Movement)

In the winter of 1971-72, Park launched the Saemaeul Undong, or New Community Movement (NCM), partly to shore up his rural support, partly to transform the lagging development of the countryside (Seth 2010, 168). The rural areas had not benefitted much from the economic boom of 1961-1971. The NCM was
launched “to mobilize rural communities for the purpose of carrying out modernization efforts” (Seth 2010, 168). By promoting modernization, traditional customs considered wasteful or backward were discouraged.

However, many benefits were seen as well. Village committees were created to carry out their own improvement schemes. Women were encouraged to be involved. Price support was given to farm crops, especially rice (Seth 2010, 168). This led to eventual higher income for farmers and therefore lower rural poverty. At the same time, the countryside was infrastructurally transformed. There was electrification; telephones and televisions introduced; fertilizers, mechanized equipment, and a demand for agricultural products from urban areas made farming more lucrative (Seth 2010, 169). This led to further rapid urbanization as well.

Thus, the NCM was loved for what it did and hated for the heavy-handed manner in which it was done, like many of Park’s programs (Peterson 2010, 221).

4.2.4 Park’s “state populism”

It is useful to examine deeper Park’s governing style. As mentioned above, it has been given different labels, among them “administrative democracy,” “Koreanized democracy,” or “state populism.” The task of labeling a political system is always a difficult one. Collier and Levitsky’s “Democracy with Adjectives” describes just this: “Specifically, [researchers] seek to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching that arises when the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which […] it is not appropriate. The result has been a proliferation of alternative conceptual forms, including a surprising number of subtypes involving democracy ‘with adjectives’” (Collier and Levitsky, 431).
Of course, the above terms are yet again new subtypes, though Sorensen and Kim credit some to Park himself. Moller and Skaaning, and Sartori also weigh into the trouble that is classification in the social sciences (Moller and Skaaning, 2010; Sartori, 1991). This thesis does not aim to try to classify Park’s administration or to decide on what a suitable term would be. However, an examination is necessary as the analysis goes forward.

Kim writes that Park was a nationalist rather than a democrat. He has been defined as an authoritarian leader. He could even be depicted as a dictator, as many people from a liberal democratic viewpoint have done. Accusing him of being a non-democratic politician is easy, and it is easier to condemn his measures to oppress individual human rights […] Nevertheless, what should be further considered is whether liberal democracy should be the only basis or the supreme criterion for evaluating political leadership” (Kim 2011, 102-103).

While his governance was not of the principle of “government by the people,” according to Kim, it was in a sense “government for the people” (Kim 2011, 103), as he endeavored and succeeded in attaining freedoms such as “freedom from poverty,” “freedom from disease,” and “freedom from illiteracy” (Kim 2011, 103). What Park called “Korean democracy” or “indigenous democracy” was a “basic democracy” or “guided democracy” often found in the early stage of third world modernization (Kim 2011, 103). Kim argues that “evaluations of Park’s political ideology and leadership should be based on whether or not his arrangement of the hierarchy of national goals, which regarded economic development as a prime goal, was proper in view of the actual situation of the Republic of Korea at that particular time” (Kim 2011, 103).

Han chooses to not use the “democracy” epithet at all, choosing to use the term “state populism” to describe Park’s anti-elitism and populism (Han 2004, 70). In a footnote, Han says she calls it thus because “Park felt sympathy toward the poor
farmers. His compassion contained populist elements, but instead of ‘populism’ I call it ‘state populism,’ because the word ‘minjung’ (mass) in the 1970s and 1980s exclusively indicated the anti-Park, pro-democratization forces” (Han 2004, 70). It was “fomented and practiced as a means of national mobilization. Economic equality and egalitarianism […] pervaded every measure taken to arouse and sustain the NCM” (Han 2004, 80). It helped change social mobility, and was an important element in the “moral topography of the Park regime” (Han 2004, 83). It was “a strange amalgam of egalitarian ethos, an ideal of social welfare and developmentalist dictatorship” (Han 2004, 87). It was a “far cry from democracy, because it never cherished proper decision-making procedures, let alone representational politics” (Han 2004, 88).

The forced opening of Korea in the nineteenth century led to some reforms in the face of the foreign threat, however, this was not enough to stop foreign penetration. Eventually, Japan colonized Korea, making some reforms but largely exploiting the country in many different ways. This exploited nation soon became split in two, and war followed. The Rhee administration only made the situation worse, mostly worrying about holding onto power than about development and state building. This led to further instability, thus, the military stepped in, and Park tried to make a strong, independent nation through this development and state building policies, and was quite successful. Further examination into this success will be conducted in following sections.

This historical overview has gone through some 150-200 years of modern Egyptian and Korean history over merely a few pages. It certainly could have been longer and more detailed, but as the purpose is to provide some background and
context, the current overview is appropriate. The historical overview started with the beginning of modernization of both nations, into periods of colonialism, independence, instability, war, and authoritarianism. There is so much more that can be said, but for the purpose of this thesis, this is enough to give context for further analysis. Now, it is useful to compare and contrast the histories of both nations, especially the different experiences under colonialism.
PART III
Chapter 5 Analysis

5.1 Comparing and contrasting Egyptian and Korean experiences under and after colonialism

It is perhaps a bit awkward to try to neatly categorize some aspects of Egyptian and Korean colonial experiences as similar to each other and others as different. Such categories only go so far. Once again, this goes back to the brief discussion on the difficulty of classification in the social sciences. How different is different? How similar is similar? However, it is of analytical benefit to compare and contrast and go over some of these similarities and differences, which I feel are similar enough and different enough. It is especially of analytical benefit to examine those similarities and differences that seem to have had far-reaching effects into the second half of the twentieth century and beyond.

5.1.1 Similarities

There are several similar aspects when examining the modern history of Egypt and Korea (later South Korea), some significant enough to briefly point out. To start, efforts of modernization and reform began before the colonial period and not with the colonial period, contrary to what some may believe. In Egypt, from the period of Muhammad Ali (in the early nineteenth century) gradual modernization efforts continued until Nasser’s time. In Korea, limited reforms began with the Taewongun’s efforts to centralize the state, the attempts of the Kapsin and Kabo reformers, and under Kojong himself as he attempted to balance relations with the different foreign powers present in Korea at the time.
Thus, this shows that it was not only colonialism that began the modernization of both nations. Native efforts had already been ongoing, and even the modernization efforts of Britain and Japan were limited to those that benefitted themselves in some way.

In the post-WWII era, both countries were very much involved in the Cold War and the global geopolitics of the era. Egypt tried to play the superpowers off of each other, and Korea was hugely affected by one of the few times the Cold War became “hot.” This created an enemy for South Korea in North Korea, allowing for leaders to legitimize actions in the name of national security. This is how Rhee held onto power, and how Park came to power and initiated his development and state building plans.

Egypt had an enemy in Israel, and humiliating defeats in 1948 and 1967 certainly did not make things better. In much the same way as Korea, many actions were legitimized in the context of national security, and Nasser claimed Egyptian leadership of the Arab world would be the only way to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although emphasized less these days, North Korea and Israel are still the go-to enemies when discussing national security by South Koreans and Egyptians today.

In both cases, the military stepped in during times of confusion and chaos, in the name of national security and guarding the nation. The military leaders promised security, stability, and prosperity, though they did not give much voice. However, this was not too concerning for both Nasser and Park, as both consolidated bases of support through populism and personal charisma, though Park was also able to further develop support by producing results early on. Nasser’s economic success was
somewhat more limited, but he had great charisma as the leader of pan-Arab nationalism.

And, both Nasser and Park focused on development and state building. Economic development, and development in general, was undertaken through the creation of elite alliances and large projects, and state building through the creation and reform of state structures, such as the bureaucracy. However, as suggested before and discussed further below, the results were quite different.

5.1.2 Differences

The examination of differences can start with the more obvious ones. Each country had a different regional and geopolitical context. Egypt was a formal protectorate for a short period of time, while Korea was “annexed” and for longer. Egypt was imperially influenced mostly by the west, Korea from a neighbor. And so on. Many of these differences were already seen in the Historical Overview section above.

 “[T]he British occupation was supposed to be a temporary one […] Nor did Cromer become a colonial governor.” It was a “veiled protectorate” (Tignor 2012, 176), and Cromer believed that “he and British advisers alone could enact desperately needed reforms in Egypt [and that] the British presence in Egypt must go on for some time” (Tignor 2012, 175). Cromer also did not promote democratic governance. Instead the British ruled autocratically (Tignor 2012, 178).

Seth writes that Korea was in many ways […] a typical victim of the imperialist powers of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Yet certain aspects were distinctive […] Korea was an object of competing imperial rivalries. Unlike
most societies in the non-Western world, it was colonized by a neighboring nation, not a distant foreign power. Korea, itself, differed from most colonies. It possessed a greater coherence as a cultural and historical unit and a longer history of political stability than almost all other nineteenth-century states. It had clearly defined borders, and a distinctive ethnic culture and language not shared by any other peoples. It was a state that was an ethnic group, or an ethnic group that was a state. And it had many centuries of autonomy. China was theoretically its suzerain, but for all practical purposes Korea had been an independent state with little outside interference […] Few other states had such stability, such a long period of self-government, such a homogeneous ethnicity and culture (Seth 2010, 39-40).

Peterson argues that, “Like other modern colonizers, but more intensively than most, the Japanese built things for their own purposes that would be useful when they left” (Peterson 2010, 174).

There are two major differences that appear to be worth highlighting. One is that of how educational reforms occurred during the colonial era (and later) in both nations. Another is that of the changes in socioeconomic structures, often from what resembled feudal structures to more capitalist ones.

However, once again it is worth noting (and probably worth noting many times more, if possible) that while reforms in education and socioeconomic class structure are two important areas where there are differences between the two cases and these reforms saw the most change in colonial times, this is not to say that the British and the Japanese are to thank for these reforms. Hardly. In fact, as is typical with colonialism, the British and Japanese wanted the best for their citizens and enough change in the system for Egyptians and Koreans to make them good subjects. However, at the same time, many significant reforms did occur under colonial rule that had effects in the future.
As mentioned above, the British did not care much for education in Egypt during its imperial influence there. Cromer regarded educated “natives” as “potential critics of British rule” (Tignor 2012, 178). Thus, in 1903 “Cromer revealed that the state had expended less than 1 percent of its revenues on education. Even as late as 1913, the Ministry of Public Instruction received a mere 3 percent of the Egyptian budget, compared to 16 percent to the Ministry of Public Works and 26 percent for tribute to the Ottoman Empire and debt repayment” (Tignor 2012, 178).

Thus, when some Egyptian intellectuals approached Cromer in 1906 with plans for an Egyptian university, Cromer did not approve, believing “Egypt was far from ready for university training” (Tignor 2012, 178). He did concede some more funds for primary and secondary education. Eventually, the intellectuals opened their own private university, which became Cairo University (Tignor 2012, 178). Tertiary education would soon include Alexandria and Ain Shams Universities, though in 1952 there were fewer than 50,000 students, generally from the elite class (Cupito and Langsten 2010, 184).

While Cromer was reluctant to expand the educational system much, an educational system was nonetheless created. A very small elite was trained in English or French language schools to staff the bureaucracy while elementary education in Arabic was provided for the masses (Langohr 2005, 166). In 1905, the Ministry of Education “inspected over 2,500 schools and supervised the education of approximately 76,000 students; by 1960 the number of students had doubled” (Langohr 2005, 166). In 1922, responsibility for education was devolved to the
Egyptians. The system continued to greatly expand, as spending on education reached 11 percent of the budget in 1953, and most private schools became a part of the national education system as well (Langohr 2005, 167).

Nonetheless, the system remained elitist. “It was generally ‘assumed that, by making more facilities available, there would be a marked change in the social composition of student bodies,’ disproportionately benefiting children from poor families” (Capito and Langsten 2010, 185). Thus, with the 1952 Revolution, the Free Officers set out to reverse educational elitism, assuming that “egalitarian reforms and the expansion of the number of higher education places would be sufficient to promote greater inclusiveness in higher education enrollment” (Capito and Langsten 2010, 185). Some reforms included: “guaranteed admission to higher education for all qualified secondary school graduates”; “a national examination system to level admission criteria”; “elimination of higher education fees”; and “a guarantee that all graduates of higher education would be given positions in the civil service” (Capito and Langsten 2010, 184).

It was perhaps a somewhat knee-jerk reaction to eliminate the elitist policies of the first half of the twentieth century. It was not an efficient or effective system. Capito and Langsten write that, “in 2005, higher education attendance continued to the favor the wealthy. Young people from the wealthiest 20% of families occupied more than 40% of university places” (Capito and Langsten 2010, 194), thus, ultimately the reforms were limitedly successful at best.

Even before the colonial period, with western missionary-sponsored innovations that began in 1884, “the educational system [in Korea] had started to open to a nonelite public” though only some of these schools survived the Japanese
Beginning in 1908, the Japanese administration began to take control of educational policy, first placing private schools under the same control as the public school system (Peterson 2010, 151).

With the end of isolation, Koreans were quick to respond to the opening of their nation from isolation. “Indeed, the speed with which Koreans began appreciating the strength of Western nations and the value of Western learning is more comparable with Japan” (Seth 2010, 40).

Many Korean nationalists, namely cultural nationalists, began to see education as key to gradual development, spiritually and culturally, in order to be ready for independence (Seth 2010, 53).

Socially Korea changed greatly during colonialism. Intellectuals embraced modernity, from liberal democracy to socialism to Japanese modernity. Educational development in society shows this embracing of change and new ideas. In the last two decades of the Chosun Period (the last kingdom of Korea), “hundreds of schools were established by Koreans and by foreign missionaries, while the state was beginning to create a national system of public education” (Seth 2010, 61).

Initially the colonial administration sought to use education for Japanese aims, while maintaining a separate, parallel system of schools for Japanese (Peterson 2010, 151). The Japanese-created system limited education for Koreans, with the expressed goal of making Koreans loyal subjects of Japan (Seth 2010, 61-62).

With the more liberal cultural policy of the 1920s, education was expanded, but gradually, leading to a flourishing of unlicensed schools (Seth 2010, 62). Thus, with the little investment by the Japanese authorities, many who were able to took
matters into their own hands and began seeking not only higher education, but also secondary education in Japan (Seth 2010, 63).

Colonialism and the removal of the nobility meant a new middle class emerged based largely on education, and “access to education would be a central concern to all those who aspired to or sought to maintain this status” (Seth 2010, 65).

Thus, it is perhaps possible to suggest (cautiously) the differences in experience when it came to education reform had an effect on the trajectories of both nations. In Korea, education had been considered a matter of status before the colonial era, it continued to be so in colonial Korea, and education became more and more nonelitist (though still limited, and only certain elites were able to go to Japan for further education). When the gradual expansion of the educational system did not satisfy Koreans, many took matters into their own hands, creating unlicensed schools. Education became matters of nationalism and status, as a new middle class emerged. And while Rhee was more concerned with creating a power base, surrounding himself with people who favored him, no matter their merits, Park was different.

Evans’s well-known argument says that part of the success seen under Park was due to bureaucratic recruitment being “meritocratic recruitment via elite universities [creating] the potential for constructing batsu-like solidary interpersonal networks within the bureaucracy” (Evans 1995, 51). This was possible because of a “deep, thoroughly elaborated, bureaucratic tradition” and “some powerful additional basis of cohesion in the upper ranks of the state” which allowed for the transformation of the state’s relationship with capital (Evans 1995, 52-53).

Thus, not only did education come to be connected with nationalism and personal societal status, it became an important factor in Park’s creation of an
efficient, meritocratic, bureaucratic state. I would argue that a culture was created; a culture of working hard for one’s self, posterity, and the nation, that did not remain in the bureaucracy, but extended into other areas of society.

However, in Egypt, it appears that with the exception of basic primary education, education was continuously mostly the privilege of the elites during the colonial era. Thus, this led to the largely knee-jerk reforms of the Free Officers, which became the standard to how the Egyptian education system operated. Of course, this led to the bloating of the bureaucracy and public sector as mentioned before, leading to inefficiency, which became a drag on the country’s development goals.

5.1.2.2 Capitalist socioeconomic structures

Another factor that appears to have had a lasting effect on both Egyptian and South Korean society is the change in socioeconomic structures from those that could be considered largely feudal to more modern, capitalist structures. This and the above difference in education are only separated for the sake of analytical benefit; in reality, all of the processes going on in society during the turbulent times of pre-, during, and post-colonialism affected each other. Education could affect social status, and social status could affect what kind of education was possible, and so on.

In the case of Egypt, an early push for modernization started early in the nineteenth century with the rule of Muhammad Ali. Muhammad Ali nationalized all agricultural land. Consequently, peasants were obliged to sell their products to the state commodity board at low prices. The state then resold these products internally as exports at higher prices, and used the profits to build industry. Not just agriculture, but all industry was state-owned (Farah 2009, 26).
After Muhammad Ali, during the time of his successor Ismail, Egypt reintegrated into the international economic system and was forced to rely on exports of primary agricultural products, especially cotton (Farah 2009, 27). “But the most important step undertaken by Ismail to generate revenues was the sale of land to Egyptians, which led to the growth and entrenchment of an Egyptian landowning elite” (Farah 2009, 28). After the Urabi Revolt, which was encouraged by the Egyptian landowning elite, and its failure (Farah 2009, 28), “…the landowning elite was dealt a severe blow in its attempts to secure independence from both the Ottomans and the khedive [ruler] or at least to share power with the khedive” (Farah 2009, 28).

However, from the 1920s into the 1950s, “[f]ollowing Egypt’s achievement of nominal independence from Britain in 1922, big landowners and industrialists came to dominate parliament” (Farah 2009, 29). They passed laws to impose minimum land tax; establish an agricultural bank to support landowners in crisis; restrict foreign ownership of land; and put pressure on the government to sell state lands at minimal prices (Farah 2009, 29). “At the same time, the members of the landowning elite increased their investments in the emerging industries with state support by obtaining tariff protection in 1930” (Farah 2009, 29).

And “[w]hile many intellectuals, politicians, and even some landowners advocated land reform and a state-led industrialization drive from 1916 to 1952,” (Farah 2009, 30) such policies could not be implemented for several reasons. “First, the political system was dominated by powerful members of the landed elite […] Second, the presence of British troops in Egypt […] would have thwarted any efforts at controlling free trade […] Third, the state had no autonomy, relative or otherwise…” (Farah 2009, 30).
Thus, from the period of 1916 to 1952, as summarized by Farah,

The dominant power relations that existed from 1916 to 1952, while leading to some industrialization […] prevented further industrialization and development for several reasons. For one thing, the state was subsumed under the power of the landowning and industrial elites […] Second, the members of the industrial elite came from the ranks of the landowning elite […] A conflict between the landowning and industrial elites in this case was unthinkable, and weakened the ability of the members of the industrial elite to pursue their own interests independently from those of the large landowners. Third, the presence of British troops in the country prevented the Egyptian elites, and the state for that matter, from effectively pursuing a policy of protecting infant industries from cheap manufactured imports (Farah 2009, 30-31).

The 1952 land reform limited individual holdings to 200 acres and family holdings to 300 acres (Tignor 2012, 192). It was the Officers’ push away from a feudal system where the wealthy landowning elite dominated the state towards a more socialist system.

With such a leveling of the social pyramid, the hope was to open the path towards the stated goals of education, social mobility, and economic development. In the examination of education above, the Officers were unfortunately not too successful. Economic development was also limited, as the Five-Year Plans were not too coherent or effective. And in such a society, not capitalist but not socialist, if these two significant paths towards social mobility were not very successful, then social mobility was also more limited than what the Officers originally aspired for.

The push for reforms started in Korea with the beginning of western intrusions. The organizers of the Kapsin Chongbyon coup proclaimed a new government with fourteen reforms, many of them social. They called for the abolition of class distinctions, tax reform, punishment of avaricious and evil officials, the permanent cancellation of debts, a modern police system, a unified modern military, placement
of all financial affairs under the Ministry of Finance, and giving full responsibility to
the State Council to formulate all laws and regulations (Seth 2010, 18). They were
unsuccessful as the coup was eventually crushed.

The Kabo Reforms changed how the government was run, with the separation
of judicial, military, and civil affairs, but social reforms were also instituted. To recap:
Slavery was abolished, social distinctions eliminated, equality of law enacted, child
marriage abolished, a Western calendar used, and a western-style education system
created (Seth 2010, 26-27).

When the Japanese took over, they also undertook land reform. As mentioned
above, this was because Tokyo regarded Korea as an important supplier of food (Seth
2010, 44). With the new legal procedure from the land survey, many poor Koreans
lost land or the customary use of land. Members of the old nobility were able to take
advantage and increase their land. However, ultimately the land reform was mainly to
benefit the colonial government, which became the largest landowner (Seth 2010, 45).

During the Korean War, the Rhee administration undertook significant land
reform. American occupation authorities conducted a partial land reform when
Japanese holdings were redistributed (Seth 2010, 159). While Rhee’s conservative
supporters were largely landowners and not enthusiastic about land reform, North
Korean propaganda was making peasants restless, and the U.S. applied pressure,
making the National Assembly act to pass a reform act in 1949 that was not carried
out until during the Korean War.

Property holdings were limited to 7.5 acres and those receiving redistributed
land had to pay 150 percent of the annual value of the land over a ten-year period.
This effectively ended tenancy and peasant unrest, and the domination of the countryside by the landowning elite as well (Seth 2010, 159). This meant the countryside was now made up of small family farms instead of dominated by the nobility (Seth 2010, 150). This led to a social transformation where peasants became small entrepreneurial farmers and the landowning class directed their capital and energy to business and education (Seth 2010, 159).

The economic and developmental success of the Park era led to the acceleration of urbanization so that by 1980 only about a third of people were farmers (Seth 2010, 169), a huge transformation for a nation that was still largely feudal at the time of independence.

The different experiences under and after imperialism for Egypt and Korea played important roles in the developmental experiences of the 1960s and ‘70s. Specifically, the roles of education and the creation of capitalist (or quasi-capitalist) socioeconomic structures were highlighted as appearing to have larger roles than other factors.

This is not to say Japan was more benevolent than Britain was on these issues. Reforms made by Japan during its colonial rule of Korea were more far and deeper reaching, affecting Koreans in many ways through education reforms and socioeconomic reforms. However, ultimately everything was for Japanese interest and goals, for the Japanese empire, so that Japan could get what it wanted from Korea and Koreans.

With this preliminary analysis of a historical overview and some comparing and contrasting, it is finally time to test the main hypothesis introduced above.
5.2 Testing the Hypothesis

5.2.1 Elite consolidation

5.2.1.2 In Egypt during the Nasser era

The Free Officers did not come to power with the consent of any large part of the Egyptian population. It was a forceful coup, and the public acquiesced. This meant the Free Officers were not “indebted” to labor or any other social group, and they had considerably more leeway in forging a coalition and consolidating their regime” (Aidi 2009, 46).

With Nasser as the new leader after the 1952 Revolution, the Free Officers tried to restrict participation of actors in the ancien régime. The political activity of such actors was restricted by the depoliticization of the public by the abolishment parties, parliament, the monarchy, the courts, and so on (Aidi 2009, 46).

Actors of the ancien régime were restricted economically by the land reform. “[T]he Nasserist regime eliminated the economic base of the power of the landed elites and reduced the unequal distribution of agricultural land” (Farah 2009, 32) and “…aiming at building a new social coalition to support its policies, implemented several measures to decrease the high income-inequalities before 1952” (Farah 2009, 35).

In place of the old elites eliminated by the regime, “The emergence of a large public sector led to the creation of a new class to manage it: a bureaucratic elite […] The bureaucratic elite, by manipulating public sector assets, succeeded in amassing large fortunes through bribery and corruption” (Farah 2009, 36).
Nasser’s social coalition “…was formed of the middle class […], the workers, and the peasants. A faction of the business elite, engaged mainly in construction and internal trade, joined the social alliance supporting the regime” (Farah 2009, 36).

The new rural middle class, those to whom the ceiling of owning 200 fedans did not pertain, soon emerged as the new privileged group with connections to the state (Aidi 2009, 47). This rural middle class was not mobilized, but accommodated. It would come to “man the rural bureaucracy, control the peasantry, and insure the flow of capital from rural areas to urban industrial projects” (Aidi 2009, 47).

Nasser had the support of labor because he granted many of the demands of labor at the time. The biggest demand was job security (Aidi 2009, 49). Thus, labor “provided the foot soldiers” during the Nasser-Naguib conflict. But “the power struggle between Nasser and Naguib did not involve conflict over the economic borders of the state, so the former did not require labor’s sustained, mobilized support to initiate his development strategy; the mere control and acquiescence of the working class would suffice” (Aidi 2009, 53).

Elite consolidation, beginning with the 1952 Revolution, arguably centered on Nasser. Early on, Nasser was able to remove Naguib and consolidate his power. Another incident had to do with Nasser’s commander of the armed forces. Abd al-Hakim Amir was Nasser’s deputy charged with controlling the armed forces. Although the Suez Crisis of 1956 showed that Egypt’s military was incompetent, Amir continued on the job after 1956 (Ferris 2013, 35). Amir created networks of loyalty and patronage in the military, consolidating his power base (Ferris 2013, 36).
Eventually, Nasser saw this as trouble and reorganized the government, restructuring the executive branch to establish a Presidential Council on top of the cabinet. “The idea was to place all members of the ruling group on an equal footing in purely supervisory roles, while lesser figures took on ministerial responsibilities” (Ferris 2013, 39). The idea was to “strip [Nasser’s] colleagues of their executive authority while pretending to bestow upon them the power of the presidency (Ferris 2013, 39). Amir got the message and eventually resigned and disappeared. However, it meant that “[a] majority of the senior civilian leaders stood aligned with the president against the general commander of the armed forces, in turn supported by a powerful faction of the military” (Ferris 2013, 40).

Amir would enter the picture again, and he and Nasser compromised by giving Amir the ability to present military appointments, promotions, transfers, and dismissal above the brigade level. This power was supposed to be the Presidential Council’s prerogative, and thus Nasser had “doomed the young institution to irrelevance within weeks of its establishment.” Ferris points out that this was common for many institutions under Nasser (Ferris 2013, 52-53). Thus, once Amir no longer seemed like a threat, he was allowed to stay on, while Nasser no longer cared about the institution of the Presidential Council, as it no longer had the original purpose he created it for. More and more, Nasser relied on elite consolidation around the figure of his person, not institutions.

This arrangement went on for five years until the 1967 War, leading to the “calcified command of the Egyptian armed forces” for a “crucial half-decade.” It was only with the 1967 War that Amir was arrested (Ferris 2013, 53).
Nasser was able to create such a charismatic persona because of the fact that he was a symbol of pan-Arab nationalism, claiming how it was the pathway toward power in the Middle East and toward a solution of the Arab-Israeli problem (Tignor 2012, 195) and winning fans along the way. These arrangements where Nasser was the center of consolidation were possible because the military, political, and economic elites became more and more one and the same.

While support was provided by labor during the intra-elite power struggle in 1954 (the conflict between Nasser and Naguib), “Nasser did not attempt to cultivate the electoral support of labor. Instead, after destroying the power base of large landowners, Nasser sought to control labor and the peasantry using the state bureaucracy. Nasser forged electoral links with the smaller landed elites who, along with the military and the state bureaucracy, formed the base of his support” (Aidi 2009, 38).

Such an alliance was further made possible because the Egyptian labor movement was depoliticized, instead attached to the state bureaucracy as “the Free Officers’ goal was the control and ‘preemptive demobilization’ of labor” (Aidi 2009, 17). Such mobilization or demobilization determines the configuration of the ruling coalition (Aidi 2009, 25). Nasser and the Free Officers came to power by a coup and did not need the support of labor and the peasantry. Thus, Egyptian labor was organized under the hierarchical Egyptian Trade Union Federation. This hierarchy and “the state’s co-optation of top leadership have had a profound influence in the state’s ability to control the working class” (Aidi 2009, 25). Nasser also did not use the party, but “the state and public sector to control labor and large sections of the populace” (Aidi 2009, 27).
This, along with the bloating of the bureaucracy, led to inefficiency. As previously active political institutions had been dismantled or demobilized, the role of the bureaucracy became important. “The Free Officers, who were fully cognizant of the inefficiency and corruption of the civil service, had wooed bureaucrats upon assuming power, because of the new regime’s need for support and the lack of alternative allies. Bureaucrats, in turn, welcomed the Free Officers’ reliance on the administration and supported the RCC’s plan to expand” (Aidi 2009, 57).

A coalition of “military officers, bureaucrats, and populist sectors” drove the expansion of the bureaucracy (Aidi 2009, 58). “[T]he bureaucracy and new public sector became the Egyptian state’s instrument of control, the sole target of societal demands and the main channel for participation” (Aidi 2009, 58). Competition for rents and patronage became intense, resulting in “the formation of clientelistic networks that crisscrossed the state and that would render the bureaucracy incoherent and inefficient” (Aidi 2009, 58).

Further inefficiency was created by the “ambiguous five-year pans and opening of a host of new government-run industries that were expected to be the engine of economic progress” (Tignor 2012, 201) as the military government tried to (kind of) follow the Soviet Union. The only “unquestioned economic achievement of the Nasser years” (Tignor 2012, 201-02) was the Aswan High Dam, but even this project was not without its issues.

Ultimately, Nasser’s coalition included “the military, the urban and rural populist sectors, the rural middle class, and the bureaucrats to counter the oligarchy and foreign and domestic capital” though the partnership with the private sector failed, leading to the nationalization of private capital (Aidi 2009, 59).
Thus, while the new elites (the military) were able to effectively consolidate their power to include political and economic power, ultimately it was their inability to run the state efficiently that led to future changes post-Nasser. Although after Nasser there was not the same level of restructuring of the state as seen with the 1952 Revolution, Sadat initiated many changes after seeing how the situation was going for Egypt.

For Nasser, “state autonomy did not mean administrative reform and bureaucratic autonomy, but it meant the RCC’s independence from coalitional constraints; this type of autonomy deprived the regime of organized, mobilizable support” (Aidi 2009, 60). The Egyptian state “[lacked] the capacity to extract itself from postrevolutionary commitments.” Ultimately, this “produced an incoherent and isolated state” (Aidi 2009, 60).

Of course, it is unfortunate how things turned out as “[t]he Officers’ distinct lack of a guiding ideology combined with the unintended consequences of their intervention and the hard realities of Egyptian politics produced something quite different from the reform the Free Officers claimed they wanted” (Cook 2012, 40).

5.2.1.2 In Korea during the Park era

One of the first steps Park took was to create the military-political-business alliance. As mentioned above, the military purged members of the old guard. The government also “detained and fined fifty-one of the leading business figures” (Seth 2010, 160). However, eventually the military leaders realized “they needed the skills of the entrepreneurs to promote economic growth” (Seth 2010, 161). Thus they were released after swearing allegiance to the government (Seth 2010, 161).
A further strengthening of the alliance was seen in how the economic policies by the state led to the creation of the *chaebols* (Seth 2010, 165). *Chaebols* were given “exemptions from import duties on capital goods and offered special rates for utilities and the state-owned rail system” (Seth 2010, 165). In turn, *chaebol* leaders “found it necessary to work closely with the government and contribute generously to government political campaign coffers and to pet projects favored [by the regime]” (Seth 2010, 165). Thus, there was a give and take built into the alliance.

Another way elite consolidation occurred in Korea during the Park era was through populism, often surrounding the figure of Park himself. State populism was “fomented and practiced as a means of national mobilization. Economic equality and egalitarianism […] pervaded every measure taken to arouse and sustain the NCM” (Han 2004, 80). It helped change social mobility, and was an important element in the “moral topography of the Park regime” (Han 2004, 83).

Park was able to create a persona for himself because the claimed main goal of the new military government led by Park was to free the nation from its dependency and lift it out of poverty, and thus, come out of the weakness, humiliation, and limitation of sovereignty that was symbolized in its dependence on the U.S (Seth 2010, 160), especially in the face of an enemy in the North. The military was the guardian of the nation, and Park was the leader of the military. Thus, using the rhetoric of nationalism and national security as well as the goal of freedom from poverty, Park was able to consolidate the elites around him, rally the masses, reach even the rural areas, and create high economic growth and development, all efficiently.
In comparison to Aidi’s examination of Egypt, Park was able to create an autonomous state that could mobilize the supporting coalition, as it was not independent of coalitional commitments, and the state could allow the bureaucracy to be autonomous and efficient. In some ways, this is once again a nod to Evans’s argument.

5.3 Strong societies and weak states

Joel Migdal writes that in the post-WWII era, new political leaders in Asia and Africa “came to believe in their states’ potential to mold their societies through virtuous planning and meticulously laid out policies” (Migdal 1988, 4). He argues that “the failure of states to have people even in the most remote villages behave as state leaders want ultimately affects the very coherence and character of the states themselves” (Migdal 1988, 5).

Examining Nasserist Egypt, Migdal concludes what is evident from the overview above: “the post-1952 Egyptian state in the end failed to concentrate the social control it sought. It failed to achieve predominance by eliminating other social organizations applying conflicting rules of the game” (Migdal 1988, 183). Agrarian reform was one of the first ways that Nasser sought to concentrate social control. “Nasser was out to break the biggest, richest landowners, who concentrated much of the social control in Egypt in their hands […] five days after [the new state executive] issued the law, they retired high-ranking civil servants and about 450 army officers. The battle for social control began” (Migdal 1988, 185). However, this agrarian land reform was ultimately incomplete. The lower classes only benefitted a limited degree
and actual redistribution was only modest (Migdal 1988, 186). Migdal continues to examine why this was.

Nasser needed to find muscle to transform Egyptian society. Thus, he first relied heavily on the military as a “stopgap solution” and “elaborated the state agencies and related institutions that would deliver the new strategies of survival” (Migdal 1988, 187). Thus, he had army officers “who enjoyed his personal confidence” fill important state roles with significant autonomy in leading agencies (Migdal 1988, 187-88). However, Nasser also learned that the military by itself could not “build new strategies of survival to challenges old bases of social control” (Migdal 1988, 189). “Nasser needed a set of institutions he could count on to replace all the opponents of the state in the environment of conflict. Only effective agencies, not individual army officers with unbounded loyalty, could guarantee staying power to manipulate rewards, sanctions, and symbols effectively” (Migdal 1988, 190).

However, “[t]he supreme irony was that the very agencies created to achieve state predominance in Egypt perpetuated an environment of conflict and fragmentation of social control” (Migdal 1988, 193). The state could not overcome the fragmentation of social control because “[t]he new rules of the game in rural social life were not those of the state. The rich and middle peasants used their sinecures in the new state institutions and the ASU for their own purposes, subverting the designs of the state leadership” (Migdal 1988, 197). While Nasser initially tried to get rid of the competing rules of the game using the ASU (Migdal 1988, 199), however, he stopped this because “the creation of a strong channel for mobilization, such as the ASU, in the absence of many other state channels with significant
independent mobilizational capacities, posed serious threats to him” (Migdal 1988, 200).

Thus, he “tried to make the ASU an instrument that could promote his increasingly radical goals […] At the same time he knew that if the ASU became such an instrument it could be turned against him” (Migdal 1988, 201). His solution to this dilemma? He began to balance the military and the ASU. However, with the embarrassing military defeat in 1967, the military was no longer an effective counterweight. Thus, in the matter of rural social stability, as he did not want to use the ASU and the middle and rich peasants assured such stability, “he announced his willingness to accommodate local strongmen and their fragmentation of social control in exchange for social stability in the countryside.

Thus, from this analysis, it can be posited that while education and class were very important, when it came to elite consolidation and development and state building in Korea and Egypt, an efficient bureaucracy and catastrophic exogenous forces were even more important (and thus, the original hypothesis, though not completely wrong, is not fully correct either). Thus, it appears Korea was able to better effectively manage and gain social control through better use of the bureaucracy, leadership, and the fact that the exogenous situation allowed for the state to overcome the fragmentation of social control. Where Nasser used his power of appointment to balance his need for industrial production and fear of power centers, Park reversed the appointment heavy bureaucracy of his predecessor, using merit-based systems and effectively co-opting the existing business elite. There were also effective exogenous catastrophic forces at play in a recent brutal civil war (in the context of a global Cold War) and subsequent chaos and poverty, with North Korea a
constant imminent threat. While Egypt had Israel as an enemy, it was not necessarily worried about the state of its existence, unlike South Korea, where not only the government had to legitimize itself, but the existence of the state itself had to be legitimized.

5.4 Corruption?

Some may consider the various methods used by both Park and Nasser forms of corruption. While it is difficult to have a full discussion on this issue, it is still worth noting and having a brief discussion on the issue.

Though the definitions of corruption are many and slightly different depending on context, the following definition has many of the aspects common to most definitions: “[c]orruption is an act in which the power of public office if used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game” (Aidt 2003, F632).

There must be at least three conditions:

1. Discretionary power: the relevant public official must possess the authority to design or administer regulations and policies in a discretionary manner.
2. Economic rents: the discretionary power must allow extraction of (existing) rents or creations of rents that can be extracted.
3. Weak institutions: the incentive embodied in political, administrative, and legal institutions must be such that officials are left with an incentive to exploit their discretionary power to extract or create rents (Aidt 2003, F633).

Aidt continues by discussing “four analytic approaches to corruption” (Aidt 2003, F633):

1. Efficient corruption: corruption arises to facilitate beneficial trade between agents that would not otherwise have been possible. It promotes allocative efficiency by allowing agents in the private sector to correct pre-existing government failures.
2. Corruption with a benevolent principal: corruption arises when a benevolent principal delegates decision making power to a non-benevolent agent. The level of corruption depends on the costs and benefits of designing optimal institutions.
3. Corruption with a non-benevolent principal: corruption arises because non-benevolent government officials introduce inefficient policies in order to extract rents from the private sector. The level of corruption depends on the incentives embodied in existing institutions.

4. Self-reinforcing corruption: the reward to corruption depends on the incidence of corruption due to strategic complementarity. The level of corruption depends, for given institutions, on history (Aidt 2003, F633).

While it would be difficult to say that Egypt or Korea had any one of the above approaches to corruption, perhaps it can be argued that Korea had efficient corruption as there was beneficial trade between private and public sector agents that may not have been possible otherwise. This was done in the context of the military-political-business elite alliance mentioned above. Whereas just action by the military, or political elites, or business elites may have led to failures, there was allocative efficiency through the alliance.

Perhaps in Egypt, where there was no such alliance, rather competition between different institutions, there was corruption with a non-benevolent principal, as although Nasser meant well and wanted to make radical changes, ultimately he came to focus on his political survival while everyone else already was.

However, Aidt makes a good point when he writes, that even efficient corruption “is based on second-best reasoning: given a set of unavoidable distortions created by various government procedures of policies, corruption can promote allocative efficiency by allowing agents to circumvent these procedures of policies; yet the first-best policy would be to remove the distortions themselves” (Aidt 2003, F634). While certainly a good point, there is also the fact that, to a certain extent, such distortions are inevitable in developing nations and nations undergoing state consolidation as certain government policies are likely to lead to potential failure with trial and error. In this case, efficient corruption as second-best is better than fourth-
best, and perhaps efficient corruption can be seen as being included in the overall bureaucratic efficiency and elite consolidation/alliance-making that was one factor that helped Korea as it was developing and consolidating its state (and overcoming fragmented social control).

5.5 Process tracing

At this point, it is useful to look at process tracing again to see if some kind of relationship beyond simple conjecture or correlation can be made between the processes of development and state building, and the process of elite consolidation.

Bennett and Checkel give ten “best practices” in process tracing to make conclusions better. They are given below:

1. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations
2. Be equally tough on alternative explanations
3. Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources
4. Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations
5. Make a justifiable decision on when to start
6. Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision on when to stop
7. Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and feasible
8. Be open to inductive insights
9. Use deduction to ask “if my explanation is true, what will be the specific process leading to the outcome?”
10. Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is conclusive (Bennett and Checkel 2015, Table 1.1).

In examining this thesis with these ten best practices, I have tried my best to follow these best practices. I have cast the net wide, starting with the colonial/imperial period of both cases for ample background, considering alternative explanations as relevant. To try to avoid bias, I used multiple sources as possible. From the beginning, the research design allowed for the limiting of the time period
and what topics were pertinent as evidence. The research design also allowed for two specific cases from the beginning of the study.

Thus, ultimately a conclusion was reached, although ultimately somewhat different from the initial hypothesis. This will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Chapter 6 Conclusions and Possible Future Research

The relationship between development & state building elite consolidation

This thesis cautiously puts forward the conclusion that Gamal Abdel Nasser was able to create a charismatic persona because he was a symbol of pan-Arab nationalism, claiming it was the pathway toward power in the Middle East and toward a solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In Nasser’s Egypt, the military, political, and economic elites became more and more one and the same. Thus, while the new elites (the military) were able to effectively consolidate their power to include political and economic power, ultimately it was their inability to run the state efficiently that led to little success in development and state building, and to further future changes during the Sadat and Mubarak era.

Park Chung-hee was able to create a persona for himself because the claimed the main goal of the new military government was to free the nation from its dependency and lift it out of poverty, and thus, come out of the weakness, humiliation, and limitation of sovereignty that was symbolized in its dependence on the U.S. The military was the guardian of the nation, and Park was the leader of the military. Thus, using the rhetoric of nationalism and national security as well as the goal of freedom from poverty, Park was able to consolidate the elites around him, rally the masses, reach even the rural areas, and create high economic growth and development, all
efficiently due to the efficient bureaucracy. Thus, the ability of the elites to consolidate affected the efficiency of the bureaucracy, and ultimately the success of the development and state building processes.

Thus, this would suggest that how well elite consolidation happens might affect the efficiency of the bureaucracy and other state institutions, ultimately affecting the ability of the nation to development and build the state effectively.

When considering the main hypothesis put forward earlier, Korea’s advantages from the colonial era set the basis for later development and state building, and paved the way for elite consolidation into the 1960s, allowing for further economic development and state building and elite consolidation, while in Egypt economic development and state building and elite consolidation were attempted all at once, with less positive results, it can be seen that it is only somewhat true.

While Korea did have certain advantages from the colonial era, and it was true that Egypt had a longer way to go with consolidating state and nation, it appears that bureaucratic efficiency depending on the strength of elite consolidation was more significant in affecting the processes of development and state building. That is, Korea may have had some (mostly non-physical) advantages from the colonial era that helped in development and state building in a general sense, however this was but one factor of the ability of elites to consolidate well. It appears the ability of elites to effectively consolidate is connected to the efficiency of the bureaucracy, which is in turn connected to the success of development and state building processes.

Perhaps another aiding factor in the ability of Korea to become a strong state with an efficient bureaucracy and strong social control is the redistribution of social
control that occurred due to exogenous catastrophic circumstances, namely assimilative colonialism that led to division by a brutal war (thus, not directly because of colonialism, but an unforeseen result of colonialism), followed by further chaos into the 1960s. Thus the combined factors of efficient bureaucracy (with effective elite consolidation) and exogenous catastrophic circumstances allowed Korea to develop and build its state more effectively.

Nationalism

A topic that was not a topic of focus but nonetheless appeared often during the study is that of nationalism. The effects of nationalism and nationalists on the histories of both countries cannot be emphasized enough. For the sake of analytical simplicity this study did not focus on the topic, but further research may try to incorporate nationalism in some way.

Globally, nationalism came into prominence as both countries began to modernize in the nineteenth century, so that by the time of imperial influence the Korean and Egyptian nationalist movements were very active and important actors in society. This coincided with a general rise to prominence of nationalist movements around the world. Nasser and Park used nationalism in various ways, but perhaps most importantly in terms of using it as a rhetorical tool for the legitimacy of their government and their own legitimacy. Nasser’s pan-Arabism and Park’s emphasis on eventual independence from the west show exactly this. While these ideas by themselves were seen to be beneficial to the country as a whole, they helped to legitimate Nasser, Park and their military governments (and in extension, elites).

Interestingly, the end of the Nasser and Park eras also coincided with a general decline in the prominence of nationalism with globalization. This trend of the decline
of nationalism and rise of globalization in prominence has seen a faltering in recent years (e.g. Brexit, populism, religious fundamentalism), however it is probably safe to say globalization is a phenomena here to stay.

Nonetheless, while this is not the place to try to contribute to the debate on nationalism and what a nation is exactly (whether it is “imagined” a la Anderson and Hobsbaum or it is primitive and natural a la Smith and Durkheim), this study does agree with the argument that the idea of the nation and the ideology of nationalism can have great effects on a country, as evidenced in the case of Egypt and (South) Korea over the past century and a half or so.

*Present-day elites*

It appears that while in both the cases of Nasser and Park there was elite consolidation around several symbols (Nasser and Park themselves; nationalism; national security; and so on), how the government was administered played a large role in how things turned out. Further research in time periods after Nasser and Park, into the present day, would be interesting. Even a cursive examination sees interesting phenomena.

Egypt is unfortunately a case of several experiments in development and state building that ultimately ended in failure. Early modernization efforts that started before the influence of western powers did not last, especially once western powers stepped in. The British were only concerned about what they could get of their own benefit from the country. The monarchy was largely ineffective in doing anything. The Free Officers and Nasser, while perhaps meaning well, were only able to vaguely create a state modeled on the Soviet Union and socialism and populism, but not completely.
Aidi argues that, “the fact that benefits were paternalistically extended to labor without mobilization implies that crucial organizational ties with which the state (or party) can control labor were not formed” (Aidi 2009, 31). And in the years since Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak’s policies have only made things more complicated and messy. It is the effects of such a history that the Egyptian people were actually protesting in 2011. However, such a long history of failure does not change overnight, and once again we see the familiar rhetoric of stability and national security first.

Korea is a case of a country taking the path from feudal colony to modern state in a fairly short period of time. Post-independence, on the way to becoming a modern state, the state was largely concerned with national security (i.e. during the Rhee administration). Then it became a “developmental state,” to borrow the usual parlance (during the Park administration into the 1990s). Eventually, the South Korean state became a democratic state, and is perhaps on the way to a welfare state.

Thus, the recent South Korean political scandal of 2016-17, that saw the eventual impeachment and removal of a sitting president, shows that the modern South Korean state has matured, and, though the junior Park tried to emulate her father, the methods that the senior Park administration used no longer work. One reason the younger Park as removed was because of bribery due to the arrangements she had with the chaebols, not too different from the political-business alliances of her father.

The scandal showed just how much the South Korean population has changed. No longer is economic development and national security enough. The dissatisfaction specifically targeted the younger Park’s illicit political and business dealings. Thus,
the old arrangement of elites no longer works, and this shows once again just how

dynamic elite consolidation, removal, and reconsolidation are.
References


