United we stand..divided we fall: Political opposition fragmentation post-Mubarak

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United we Stand...Divided we Fall

Political Opposition Fragmentation Post-Mubarak

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By

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This Work Is Dedicated To

To those who went to streets in 2011 calling for ‘Bread…Freedom…Liberty’ and from whom I learnt the significance of unity…To those who sacrificed their lives starting from Khaled Said and Sayed Belal henceforth…To those who lost their eyes or any of their organs such as Ahmed Harara….To those who lost their freedom such as Alaa’ Abd El-Fattah, Ismail El-Iskandriani, Shawkan, Doma, etc. and from whom I learnt the meaning of sacrifice…To anyone dreamt or called for a just and democratic political system where everyone is equally represented and has a voice.
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Abstract

This thesis examines the causal factors behind the persistence of opposition fragmentation after the toppling of Mubarak and the collapse of the regime’s throbbing heart, the security apparatus. This is due to the importance of opposition unification not only in the toppling of autocrats but also in the success of any transition towards democracy. More urgency is brought to the puzzle due to the specific nature of the transitional period that was more in favor of different political forces compared to previous periods. This argues that three causal factors were behind the re-fragmentation of the opposition post-Mubarak: the continuation of regime manipulation by the SCAF, the failure of cooperation between youth movements and political parties, and the polarization between Islamists and Secularists.
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Chapter One

In early 2011, the fall of Ben Ali’s regime spelled tremendous change not only for Tunisia, but for the Middle East as a whole. Following the Tunisian uprising, uprisings took place in different countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Despite the various paths these uprisings took, their unexpected occurrence raised scholars’ expectations who thought that the “third wave of democratization” had finally knocked at the door of the Middle East\(^1\). Unfortunately these expectations were unfounded. Some authoritarian regimes succeeded to resist the wave of change (i.e. Syria and Bahrain), while the uprisings in other countries have either led to the failure of the state itself (i.e. Libya and Yemen), or to another form of authoritarian regime (i.e. Egypt). Of the six Arab Spring cases, only Tunisia seems to hold some potential of completing a democratic transition.

These different outcomes revived the scholarly debate about the factors that influence authoritarian regime stability in time of crises and hence their prospects of survival or breakdown. It has been argued by most transitologists that divisions within the ruling elite are a “prior condition for political liberalization”\(^2\). However, the democratization trend that swept Latin America, South and East European countries in the 1970-1980s proved to scholars that opposition can play a role in overthrowing regimes. Hence, scholars started to focus on opposition under authoritarianism. Among those scholars is Przeworski who says: “imagine that the authoritarian regime suffers a loss of legitimacy but no alternative regime is accessible, that

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is, no coherent alternative is politically organized. What would happen? Nothing much.”

Accordingly, he argues that a regime will not collapse “until an alternative is organized in such a way as to present a real choice for isolated individuals”. For this reason, Cavatorta and Haugbølle argued that autocrats tend to fuel ideological and personal conflicts between opposition forces to keep them divided and thus, to maintain their stability. Besides, autocrats use other tactics such as repression, co-optation, etc. to ensure the absence of any alternative. Despite that, Lust argued that “when political circumstances change, opposition elites are more likely to put aside personal conflicts, recognizing that while mutual cooperation may succeed, independent actions surely will not”. The unification of opposition forces is not only crucial with regard to the toppling of authoritarian incumbents, but also with regard to the success of a transition towards democracy. According to Przeworski, anti-authoritarian forces must unite to bring down the regime but they must compete against each other under democracy. However, if they divide too early, the result will be another form of authoritarianism. While if they did not divide at all, the new regime will be a mirror image of the old one: neither representative nor competitive.

Based on these considerations, I examine the fragmentation of the Egyptian opposition after Mubarak. When the opportunity arose in 2011, the opposition disregarded their differences and got united in opposition to Mubarak. After his fall, however, cleavages started to re-emerge and gradually led to their re-fragmentation. This observation is counterintuitive because

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5 Ibid, pp. 426
7 Ibid, pp. 88-89.
“transitions in the Arab world took place at a time when political actors are due to rebuild political systems” after years of de-politicization. Some scholars such as Lust and Albrecht, among others, would argue that opposition re-fragmentation is due to regime strategies that attempted to divide the opposition. In other words, as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)–which is perceived as a major component of the former regime–was in charge of transition, which cannot be considered a neutral force, the regime was likely to adopt the same strategies as Mubarak to keep the opposition fragmented and consolidate its power. Even if this is partially true, transitions are “very specific moments” because they lead to a “major watershed in political life that opens up various trails and to a moment of great uncertainty” that is different from the authoritarian context. Hence, whatever the military’s institutional weight, the huge political void left by the collapse of Mubarak’s regime cannot be entirely filled by the military. As a result, opposition fragmentation cannot be explained entirely by regime strategies, requiring a look at opposition deficiencies as well.

Based on what was mentioned previously, this paper will try to solve this puzzle by answering the following question:

In the light of the space that was open in 2011 for the opposition to organize, what are the causal factors that contributed to the persistence of fragmentation among the opposition?

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8 Philippe Droz-Vincent, “Prospects for democratic control of the armed forces: Comparative insights and lessons for the Arab world in transition”, Armed forces and society 40, no. 4 (2013), 704
12 Ibid, pp. 704.
**Literature review:**

As I am interested in studying the causal factors that impeded the Egyptian opposition from unification despite the relative absence of regime repression after Mubarak and the increasing opportunity for cooperation at that time, it is necessary not only to look at what was written on Egyptian opposition fragmentation after the uprising but also at opposition fragmentation in the larger context. Thus, this literature review will be divided into two sections: the first will revolve around scholars’ attempts to study opposition fragmentation while the second will be concerned with how scholars studied the Egyptian opposition after the uprising. Further, scholars concerned with the first issue can be divided into two groups: one that tries to answer the question of ‘when does opposition unite?’ and another group that is concerned with answering the question of ‘why does opposition fail to unite?’

- **Section One: Opposition fragmentation under authoritarianism:**

  a) *When does opposition unite under authoritarianism?*

  By the early 1990s, most one-party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (ME) had witnessed a liberalizing trend by initiating legislative elections and opening the space for civil society. Accordingly, it was logical that many scholars would focus on pre-electoral alliances as a manifestation of opposition unification. For instance, Posusney argues that radical Islamists are not the only threat faced by authoritarian regimes in the ME but also secularists and moderate Islamists can challenge these regimes through elections. Accordingly, she found that most Arab elites “preferred winner takes all voting which proved beneficial for regimes pluralizing from a single-party situation.” Nevertheless, Posusney argued that the fragmented opposition may unite within the presence of a hegemonic ruling party and may either adopt a

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14 Ibid, pp. 37.
participation or exit strategy\textsuperscript{ii} to “diminish the regime’s hegemony over the electoral system”\textsuperscript{15}. Unlike Posusney, Kraetzschmar studied electoral alliances by examining the reasons behind the failure of the United National Front for Change (UNFC) in Egypt in 2005 within the context of other successful experiences that took place in Egyptian legislative elections of 1984 and 1987. He argues that the failure of the UNFC was due to its own deficiencies such as the timing of its formation, the absence of interparty cooperation between its candidates, and the exclusion of a potent rival, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)\textsuperscript{16}. He suggests that for any future alliance to be effective, three conditions must be fulfilled: leadership commitment to the project, preparedness of the campaign and MB inclusion\textsuperscript{17}. Similarly, van de Walle studied the “circumstances that influence the degree of opposition cohesion in electoral autocracies and its relation with electoral outcomes” by focusing on Sub-Saharan Africa\textsuperscript{18}. He claims that opposition cohesion is not a cause for transition but is a consequence of the increasing probability of opposition victory in elections\textsuperscript{19}.

Other scholars tended to focus on opposition alliances that were forged in contexts that may include electoral processes but are not limited to them. Clark is among those scholars who studied the factors that influence the success or failure of cross-ideological alliances by examining three successful alliances and one failed coalition\textsuperscript{iii} that were forged in Jordan between 2003 and 2006\textsuperscript{20}. She found that cross-ideological alliances are initiated under external

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, pp. 37.
\textsuperscript{16} Hendrik Kraetzschmar, “Opposition Alliances under Electoral Authoritarianism: The United National Front for Change in Egypt’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections”, in Holger Albrecht (Ed.), 
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, pp. 112.
\textsuperscript{18} Nicolas Van De Walle, “Tipping Games: When do opposition parties coalesce?” in Andreas Schedler (Ed.), 
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of unfree competition, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 78.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, pp. 78.
\textsuperscript{20} Janine A. Clark, “Threats, Structures, and Resources: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Jordan”, 
Comparative Politics 43, no. 1 (2010), 101. \url{http://www.jstor.org/stable/25741389}
threats not in the context of political opportunities\textsuperscript{21}. These external threats may include regime policies that directly influence the political arena an actor is working in\textsuperscript{22}. Similar to Clark, Ryan focused on Jordan but instead on the evolution of reform alliances from leftist parties and Islamist movements starting from 1989 to grass root alliances, youth movements and social media activism after Arab uprisings\textsuperscript{23}. The successful attempts by the opposition to form reform alliances that expanded from 1989 till now is due to two reasons: first, opposition found it much easier to cooperate on foreign issues than domestic ones but such cooperation has paved the way for cooperation on domestic issues later on\textsuperscript{24}. The second reason is their ability to coalesce different societal segments such as Jordanians and Palestinians as well as different political and social forces that include youth movements, grass root alliances, etc. This shows why alliances that exclude important political or social forces were never sustained in Egypt or elsewhere.

Finally, as Lust was writing the concluding chapter for ‘the dynamics of opposition cooperation in the Arab World: contentious politics in times of change’\textsuperscript{25}, she noted that scholars did not reach to a single reason behind opposition unification, but that it rather depended on the context\textsuperscript{iv}. Thus, more research is required to understand the reasons behind these different outcomes and when alliances succeed or fail. Further, she criticized the dichotomy of ‘successful’ and ‘failed’ cooperation common in the literature because the formation of alliances is a dynamic process and thus, the impact of opposition efforts over long periods must be considered\textsuperscript{26}. Last but not least, Lust argued that opposition has cooperated to topple

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, pp. 101.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, pp. 115.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. Pp. 378.
\textsuperscript{25} Hendrik Jan Kraetzschmar (Ed.), “The dynamics of opposition cooperation in the Arab World: Contentious politics in times of change”, (New York/London: Routledge, 2013)
\textsuperscript{26} Ellen Lust-Okar, “Opposition Cooperation and Uprisings in the Arab World”, \textit{British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38}, no. 3 (2011): 432.
authoritarian regimes in 2011 but most importantly, “what should we expect of opposition alliances when the dust begins to settle?” Although she kept the question open, she argued that two variables may influence opposition behavior. First, the youth has a more active political role after the uprisings which will not only lead to the establishment of new movements and parties but will also force old elites to restructure their organizations to include new entrants. Second, the fall of autocrats may undermine the regime’s constraints on opposition coordination but at the same time, the nature of the transition period “raises the stakes, making it difficult for the opposition to coordinate” as the Egyptian case clearly illustrates.

b. Why do opposition fail to unite?

Trying to answer this question, we can find that scholars can be divided into two schools of thought: the first argues that regime strategies are responsible for keeping the opposition fragmented; thus they tend to adopt a top-down approach. The second group argues that opposition fragmentation is due to the deficiencies of the opposition itself, thus adopting a bottom-up approach.

Top-down approach:

There are many mechanics through which authoritarian regimes can maintain opposition fragmentation other than repression. Albrecht argues that regime repression and co-optation has maintained such fragmentation so that opposition will not be able to challenge the regime. As political parties are only utilized to give the impression of a multi-party system, the electoral system does not function as an arena for political struggle but as arena for clientelist co-optation and recruitment into the political realm. In other words, political parties are given access to

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27 Ibid, pp. 433.
28 Ibid, pp. 433.
29 Holger Albrecht, “How opposition can support authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt”, Democratization 12, no. 3 (2005), 384
state resources along with other privileges in exchange for their loyalty to the regime. In that sense, Albrecht categorized the opposition in authoritarian regimes into three groups: loyal, tolerated, and anti-system opposition. The loyal opposition are those that accept the legal framework established by authoritarian regimes and hence, they only criticize the rules and procedures that will restrict their activities such as electoral rules\(^{30}\). By that they indirectly maintain regime stability.

Unlike Albrecht, Lust is arguing that scholars failed to explain the reasons that would make political opponents unwilling to challenge the regime even if they are capable of doing so especially during times of regime crisis\(^{31}\). She explained how incumbents use ‘structures of contestation’ (SoCs) to manipulate the opposition. Some incumbents may allow some groups to participate in the formal political system while excluding others, creating by that a “divided structure of contestation,” whilst other incumbents may choose to include all opposition groups in the system, creating a “unified structure of contestation”\(^{32}\). Lust found that in ‘unified SoC’, when the regime gets weaker and the economic crisis continues, the moderate and radical groups are more likely to neglect their ideological affiliations and collaborate to challenge the regime\(^{33}\). While in divided SoCs that were established in Morocco under King Hassan II and in Egypt under Mubarak, moderates will exploit the economic crisis to call for demands but as the crisis continues, they are no longer willing to challenge the regime because if they mobilized the public and failed to control them, or if the radical opponents joined their demonstrations, they will be harshly repressed by the regime\(^{34}\).

\(^{30}\) Holger Albrecht, “Raging against the machine: Political opposition under authoritarianism in Egypt “, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2013), 9-10.
\(^{32}\) Ibid, pp. 1-2
\(^{33}\) Ibid, pp. 96 & 125.
\(^{34}\) Ibid, pp. 126 & 151.
Other scholars such as Brown have focused on how autocrats use elections to maintain the weakness and fragmentation of opposition. Historically, they used elections to signal new ideological directions and to construct and maintain patronage networks, but with the rise of semi-authoritarian regimes, they realized that elections can be used as mechanisms to regulate their relation with the opposition. Accordingly, he argues that elections can be used to govern opposition in three ways; first, elections can be a mechanism to monitor opposition and it allows regimes to differentiate between threatening and taming opposition. Second, elections can be used to co-opt opposition where some opposition groups are given access to state resources in exchange for their support to the regime. Finally, elections can be a mechanism to divide the opposition.

**Bottom-up approach:**

Scholars who adopt this approach argue that the deficiencies of the opposition are as important as regime strategies in maintaining opposition fragmentation. Among these is Cavatorta who attempted to explain why the MENA region deviates from the expected behavior of alliance-building common in transitology literature. Studying the cross-ideological conflict between the Moroccan Islamists and secularists, he argues that the problem is not in the absence of such alliances but in their ad hoc nature as opposition manage to form alliances to exert pressure on the regime on a specific issue but these attempts never developed wide-range programs of change and thus, they become ineffective vis-à-vis the regime. According to him, the main reason for this phenomenon is the ideological differences between Islamists and

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36 Ibid, pp. 22.
37 Ibid, pp. 22.
38 Francesco Cavatorta, “Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail: Opposition Politics in Morocco”. *Democratization 16*, no. 1 (2009), 140-141, [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802575882](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802575882).
secularists. Most importantly, what makes the opposition in the MENA more fragmented than their counterparts in other transitional countries is the conflicting belief systems of the two spectrums and the major role of religion in politics\(^{39}\).

Just as Cavatorta, Shehata questioned the common wisdom in the literature that attributes authoritarian resilience to cohesion of ruling elite and regimes’ strategies of co-optation and repression by asking “why democratic mobilization has remained weak even during moments of regime crisis/breakdown?\(^{40}\) She argues that “while divisions within the ruling coalition might be a necessary pre-condition” for regime breakdown, transition will never take place if the opposition remained fragmented even in times of regime crisis\(^{41}\). Accordingly, she examined how ideological polarization, mobilizational asymmetries and unfavorable political opportunity structures have impeded the formation of sustainable alliances between Islamists and secularists in Egypt even in time of regime crisis (1980s and 2000-2005) where their alliances proved to be temporal and unable to challenge the regime\(^{42}\). With regard to ideological polarization, it seems that she agrees with most transitologists that prior consensus by different opposition actors over decisive issues is required for a transition to succeed. As Cavatorta, Shehata argues that cooperation between Islamists and secularist will be difficult to achieve when ideological polarization is combined with mobilizational asymmetries between moderates and radicals\(^{43}\). Hence, moderates will favor the authoritarian status quo rather than being ruled by radicals who will win in fair and free elections. Lastly, with regard to political opportunity structure, she referred to the selective inclusion/exclusion strategy adopted by authoritarian regimes to divide

\(^{39}\) Ibid, pp. 142
\(^{40}\) Shehata, *Islamists and non-Islamists in the Egyptian opposition: Patterns of conflict and cooperation*, 2-3
\(^{41}\) Ibid, pp. 3
\(^{42}\) Ibid, pp. 4
\(^{43}\) Ibid, pp. 22
the opposition and hence to create different incentive structures that inhibit the cooperation between the included and excluded forces.\textsuperscript{44}

Moving to the context of the Arab uprisings, Haugbølle and Cavatorta argue that the absence of opposition political parties at the helm of the 2011 uprising in Tunisia is due to the frequent failures of such parties to coordinate during Ben Ali’s reign to challenge his rule.\textsuperscript{45} Thus, they opened the way to informal groups such as social media activists to take the lead. According to them, Ben Ali’s tactics of co-optation and repression only proved effective in curbing any efforts of cross-party coordination due to three factors related to the opposition itself: ideological rivalries within the opposition, personal rivalries, and opposition inability to unify their position vis-à-vis the regime.\textsuperscript{46} Even after Ben Ali’s withdrawal, the most challenging factor to the success of transition is the divisions among opposition and the legacy of coordination failures which may prevent them from uniting behind a joint program of institutional renewal.\textsuperscript{47}

- **Second section: Egyptian opposition after Mubarak:**

  After looking on the literature of opposition fragmentation, in this section I will briefly go over what was written on opposition fragmentation after Mubarak’s withdrawal to find out the theoretical and empirical gaps this study will try to fill.

  To begin with, Mazen Hassan focused on studying the transformation of parties from restricted multi-party system to a fragile fragmented party system after 2011. As in other transitional countries, Egypt witnessed a high proliferation of new political parties that reached


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, 42 & 56-57.
around 70 parties\(^48\). Hassan, as other scholars, is questioning if this phenomenon will increase the prospects of democratic transition or will be one of the challenges facing transition\(^49\). He put the spotlight on ten main problems that keep political parties weak and fragmented. One of these problems is the weakness of institutional structures of most parties which refers to the hegemonic role of the party leader and his exclusion of other members, non-democratic mechanism of decision-making, etc. enhancing by that party weakness and in extreme cases, leading to internal splits\(^50\). With the exception of a few parties, such as Justice and Liberty, Justice, El-Masreen El-Ahrar, etc., there is an overlap between the names and programs of most parties which makes it difficult to differentiate between them\(^51\). This raises a question that I will try to answer: why did parties fail to coordinate and form alliances despite the absence of acute ideological differences between them? In this sense, Hassan argues that the absence of real coalition between parties is one of the main problems of political parties.

Unlike Hassan who adopted an institutional perspective by focusing only on political parties, other scholars tried to understand the fragmentation of opposition and obstacles facing transition by looking at the interaction between all political forces including parties or by focusing on the deficiencies of a single actor. For instance, Mai Mogib has divided political forces in the transition period into four: the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), Islamists, secularists, and the youth. She argues that each actor enjoyed some sort of legitimacy but since no actor enjoyed full legitimacy, each found it necessary to build a coalition with

\(^{48}\) Yosri El-Azabawi & Mazen Hassan. “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising: From restricted plurality to party fragmentation”, *Strategic Papers*, no. 234(2012), 16

\(^{49}\) Ibid, 30.

\(^{50}\) Ibid, 28-36.

\(^{51}\) Ibid, 30-31
another actor while excluding others enhancing by that polarization between actors\textsuperscript{52}. And with the exception of youth, the position of all other actors was not constant throughout the period\textsuperscript{53}. Further, the fragmentation of political forces whether in the sense of internal splits or divisions among opposition was the main factor that enhanced the weakness of these actors.

Another contribution was made by Abd El-Fatah Mady who tried to explain the reasons behind the failure of democratic transition in Egypt and the escalation of violence since 2011 till now. His analysis can be summarized into three factors: the SCAF’s attitude during the transition period, the attitude of MB after reaching power, and the attitude of other political forces prior and after Morsi’s assumption of power. After Mubarak’s fall, most political parties assumed that it is time for political competition and campaigning for their programs instead of coming together to set the new rules of the game\textsuperscript{54}. As a result, zero-sum game became the logic of most forces where each is trying to totally exclude its opponent\textsuperscript{55}. Another problem is that political forces did not resort to dialogue to reach a compromise over general rules, but instead they resorted to electoral campaigning and demonstrations which enhanced polarization and brought elite conflicts into the streets\textsuperscript{56}. The second factor refers to the SCAF’s view of the period and its role. On one hand, the SCAF viewed itself as the guardian of the state and the uprising and thus claimed the supreme authority to take decisions\textsuperscript{57}. Most importantly, the attitude of parties strengthened this perception because they used to view the SCAF as a mediator between opposing actors in the aftermath of the uprising. Further, secular parties viewed the SCAF as a


\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, 88-89.

\textsuperscript{54} Abd El-Fattah Mady, “\textit{Violence and Democratic Transition in Egypt\textquotedblright}, (Cairo: Egypt, Dar El-Bashir for Knowledge and Sciences, 2015), 58-59.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 59.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, 59-60 & 69-70.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 61-62.
protector against Islamists which is why they called for the military to intervene to overthrow Morsi\(^{58}\). In addition, the SCAF did not manage this period as a post-uprising ary one that requires the establishment of new rules and institutions and applying transitional justice\(^{59}\). Hence, the SCAF tried to limit the repercussions of the uprising to the change of the ruler while adopting nominal changes under the pressure of mass demonstrations\(^{60}\). The last factor is the attitude of the MB, especially after assuming power. In the aftermath of the uprising, the MB adopted a reformist not a revolutionary program which brought its view closer to the SCAF than to that of the revolutionary forces, enhancing by that the mistrust between the MB and other opposition forces\(^{61}\).

Lastly, Shehata tried to analyze the evolution of youth movements since early 2000s until they took the lead of demonstrations in 2011. Moreover, she drew a map of the protest movements that paved the way to 2011 uprisings, including the Popular Campaign for the support of El-Baradei, April 6, We are all Khaled Said, etc. She then explained the alliances that were formed during the uprising such as the 25 January Revolution Youth Coalition and their role in the aftermath of Mubarak’s withdrawal. Most importantly, she focuses on the characteristics of these movements which would help us understand why these movements disintegrated after Mubarak. For example, being internally diverse and inclusive of all ideological orientations helped these movements in overthrowing Mubarak but they soon disintegrated after his fall because active members of these movements dropped out to establish

\(^{58}\) Ibid, 61-62 & 70.
\(^{59}\) Ibid, 60-61.
\(^{60}\) Ibid, 60-61 & 65.
\(^{61}\) Ibid, 66.
their own parties\textsuperscript{62}. Moreover, the polarization between Islamists and Secularists over the sequence of transition and between liberals and leftists over social and economic policies have further weakened the leverage of youth and has enabled the SCAF to successfully play off the different groups against one-another\textsuperscript{63}.

By going over the literature on the Egyptian opposition after Mubarak’s fall, we can find some issues that were overlooked by the literature and hence, further research is required. On one hand, most of the literature written on this period is descriptive in nature with some few exceptions that tried to analyze the nature of interactions between different political forces and the reasons behind the attitude of each. However, they almost completely neglected the shifts in views and positions of actors from one instance to another since 2011 till now and hence, they did not study any significant events beyond elections. Similarly, when looking at opposition alliances, most scholars paid attention to pre-electoral alliances neglecting by that all alliances that were forged to call for specific demands as the call for parliamentary elections in 2011. In other words, scholars focused mainly on alliances between formal institutions such as parties while neglecting alliances either between parties and informal groups such as youth movements, or between youth movements. Moreover, scholars who focused on youth movements tend to focus on their role during the uprising or in the early days after Mubarak but they neglected their role hereafter. Finally, when studying Islamists, more attention was paid to the MB rather than Salafis or MB youth despite their significant role in the post-Mubarak era.

\textsuperscript{62} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and the 25 January revolution”, In Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (Eds.), \textit{Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and beyond.} (Cairo/New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 118 & 121.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, pp. 122.
Theoretical Framework:

Despite some similarities between the 2011 Arab uprisings and the democratization trend that swept Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1970-190s, there is a critical difference between the two trends with respect to the role of the military in transition. In some Latin American countries such as Brazil, the “military was trying to extricate itself from power” while in Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, “its neutrality was necessary for the transition to proceed further and enfeeble communist regimes”\(^ {64} \). Within the context of the Arab uprisings, the military decided to back the revolts in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia and to repress the demonstrations in Syria and Bahrain while in the case of Yemen and Libya, it was split into factions\(^ {65} \). This phenomenon urged scholars as Albrecht, Ohl, Barany and Koehler to ask why the military took different positions in all these cases and how this would influence the path of transition in case of regime breakdown.

In Egypt Mubarak was forced to hand over power however, since the military had been a major component of the political apparatus of the former regime, it was far from being a neutral body to run the transitional period (Fitra Intiqaliya)\(^ {66} \). Taking this into consideration along with the SCAF’s frequent emphasis on its willingness to turn power over, it is expected that it would prefer minimal reforms while keeping the fundamental rules of the regime untouched\(^ {67} \). If this is the case then it is important to examine the relationship between the SCAF and different political forces throughout the transition period as well as the political impacts of the decrees issued by the SCAF especially the ones related to the party system and elections in order to test the validity

\(^ {66} \) Said, Atef. Op.Cit. Pp. 397. (Note: The ‘transitional period’ refers to the term used in the Egyptian political discussion in reference to this period but not as a scientific classification for the events)
\(^ {67} \) Ibid, pp. 705-706.
of the assumption –mentioned before- that opposition fragmentation is a result of regime manipulation and hence, to find the elements of continuity with Mubarak’s regime.

Even if we assumed that regime manipulation was still a factor after Mubarak, the political void left by the collapse of his regime cannot be entirely filled by the military as mentioned before which leaves a space for the opposition to maneuver particularly when the SCAF was facing a legitimacy crisis. The SCAF derived its legitimacy from its support to the uprising and it presented itself as a protector of the uprising in all public statements\(^68\). Then by the ratification of the constitutional amendments that took place in March 2011, the SCAF has ensured its constitutional legitimacy\(^69\). However, it started to lose this legitimacy when it started to repress demonstrations which it perceived as a challenge to its rule\(^70\). Based on Shehata’s argument, this period can be regarded as a time of regime crisis. This lends more urgency to the question of why the opposition failed to organize and unite to put an end to the military rule. For all these reasons, it is pivotal to look at the other side of the coin and examine the deficiencies of the opposition that inhibited it from unification.

Based on the above considerations, I argue that there are three alternative hypotheses which could explain the failure of the opposition to unite and whose validity I will test in this thesis:

1. Since the military was in charge of the transitional process, opposition fragmentation can be explained by continued regime manipulation.

\(^69\) Mogib, “Transitional regime environment”, 94.
2. The failure of political parties to form alliances with youth movements has enhanced the fragmentation of opposition and weakened them vis-à-vis remnants of authoritarian regime.

3. The polarization of ideological differences and personal conflicts between Islamists and Secularists with the absence of sustained dialogue and mobilization asymmetry between the two has prevented them from reaching a compromise over the rules of the new political order.

✧ Conceptual Framework:

1) What is meant by ‘Opposition’?

The term ‘opposition’ is a dependent concept which is tied to the concept of ‘government/authority/rule’\(^71\). Government can be understood as: a ‘process’ where it is “required to be ballistic and aggregative”, an ‘authority’ since it is professional and representative of its citizens, and an ‘output’ where it is a problem-solving and responsive to citizens’ demands\(^72\). In contrast, opposition is supposed to provide an alternation to the government with its various aspects in front of people\(^73\). Any political system is indeed composed of two complementary units: the government and the opposition. Further, opposition is dependent on the government in the sense that its character is tied to that of the government\(^74\). In liberal political systems, for instance, institutions and social cleavages have a major impact on the character of opposition\(^75\). If social cleavages are sharp, opposition is more likely to be represented in “communal groups or in parties being mere epiphenomena” whilst, opposition can

\(^{71}\) Jean Blondel, “Political Opposition in the Contemporary World”, Government and Opposition 32, no. 4 (1997), 463.


\(^{73}\) Ibid

\(^{74}\) Blondel, “Political Opposition in the Contemporary World”.

\(^{75}\) Ibid, 486.
be exclusive to parties or can be a mixture of parties and social movements where the impact of social cleavages is minimal. On the other hand, the forms of opposition vary on the extent of autocrats’ tolerance. Some authoritarian regimes are brutal while others may allow some groups to participate in the political life and exclude others. Accordingly, tolerated opposition are given some space to perform whilst, real opposition are forced to function from underground.

However, this is not to overlook the variations in types and strength of the opposition. The strength of the opposition refers to the competitiveness of the opposition which is partly influenced by its cohesiveness. However, this point will be discussed below in details. Further, the categorization of the opposition depends on the variance between the goals of the opposition and that of the government. As stated by Blondel, some actors may disagree with the government over minor issues or over general policy matters while remain ‘pro-system’. In contrast, other actors may oppose the regime or the structure of the political system as a whole and hence, are regarded as ‘anti-system’. With relevance to Egypt under Mubarak, Albrecht argued that opposition can be divided under authoritarianism into: loyal, tolerated, and anti-system opposition. Loyal opposition include parties such as: El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, El-Nasri, etc. that have implicitly accepted the legal framework established by the regime while their dissent was directed toward specific policies. While tolerated opposition are the protest movements as Kefaya and the network of human rights activists who emerged from within the society and independently from the state. Mubarak’s regime has provided some space for these groups to

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76 Ibid, 478.
77 Ibid, 486.
78 Ibid, 486.
79 Ibid, 468.
80 Ibid, 469-470.
81 Ibid.
82 Albrecht, “Raging against the machine”, 9-10.
83 Ibid, 10.
maneuver although, they were challenging the regime on its repressive mechanisms. Lastly, Islamists composed of MB and small groups with either moderate or militia agenda were regarded as ‘anti-system opposition’. This is not due to the ideological difference between them and the regime but because they were representing an alternate project to organize the society and were enjoying a wide social support specifically, in the case of the MB. Based on Albrecht’s classification, the term ‘opposition’ used in this paper refer to the forces who got united during the 18 days of 2011 uprising in opposition to Mubarak then re-fragmented after his toppling. To be specific, ‘anti-Mubarak’ opposition were mainly composed of the tolerated opposition and MB as part of the anti-system opposition and to a lesser extent, the loyal opposition whose participation remained minimal during the 18 days.

2) **What is meant by ‘Opposition Fragmentation’?**

Most of the literature overlooked the definition of ‘fragmentation’ while focusing more on its manifestations and its various impacts which range between performance of ruling incumbents or governments, prospects of regime change, effectiveness of political parties especially opposition, probabilities of civil war onset, etc. Nonetheless, authors like Gandhi and Reuter unintentionally explained ‘fragmentation’ by explaining its antithesis, cooperation. By which, they argued that coordination between opposition parties may take place in different forms during elections such as joint electoral lists, joint statements, and pre-electoral alliances. They argued that coordination refers only to cooperation between political actors but does not necessarily mean cohesion (i.e. ideological proximity), especially in developing countries where

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84 Ibid, 10.
85 Ibid, 10-11.
86 Ibid, 10-11.
88 Ibid, pp. 3.
ideological differences are not genuine among political actors\textsuperscript{89}. Similarly, Ko Maeda argues that high a level of opposition fragmentation implies a lack of coordination between them, while a unified opposition would have a more general stance aiming at a wide range of citizens\textsuperscript{90}. In other words, a fragmented opposition will be unable to present itself as “coherent and visible alternative to the regime” whilst a unified opposition will attract citizens who are unsatisfied with the current regime\textsuperscript{91}. Consequently, Ko Maeda emphasizes that a large number of opposition parties may allow the incumbent to lose some votes in favor of the opposition however, an “anti-incumbent swing” (i.e. regime change) will not take place unless the opposition is united\textsuperscript{92}. In another context, Ko Maeda has pointed to the manifestations of opposition fragmentation or unification. When the opposition is moving towards unification, multiple parties will merge together and larger parties will get larger whilst smaller ones will either get smaller or totally disappear\textsuperscript{93}. On the other hand, if the opposition is becoming more fragmented, we are likely to see that the size of opposition parties become more balanced, an existing party splits, or a new party enters into the electoral competition\textsuperscript{94}.

From the above, we can realize that there are different degrees of fragmentation which differentiates one political system from another. Accordingly, authors like Anderson and Bengtsson attempted to measure fragmentation by using the “effective number of parties (ENP) in the legislature” which implies “available alternatives” if the ENP is large\textsuperscript{95}. In other words, they focused on the degree of party fragmentation in the whole legislature rather than the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, pp. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid, pp. 423.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, pp. 423.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, pp. 765
\end{flushleft}
fragmentation of opposition only. However, Ko Maeda criticizes their attempt because a large ENP value does not necessarily mean the availability of alternatives as it measures the number of parties in the whole legislature including both ruling and opposition parties. Instead, he initiates a new variable called “effective number of opposition parties (ENOP) which applies Laakso and Taagepera’s method of calculating the effective number of parties to the number of seats of all opposition parties.” Hence, the larger this value, the more parties of similar size exist; if there is only one opposition party, the ENOP will be equal to one. Nonetheless, this does not imply the preference of one variable over another, they are just different concepts: the ENP concentrates on the number and size of all parties to capture the fragmentation of the party system while the ENOP focuses on the number and size of opposition parties to measure the fragmentation of the opposition. And since opposition is a subset of the whole party system, it is more likely that the degree of their fragmentation is correlated with the degree of overall party system fragmentation in most countries. For instance, in a country with two parties, the number of opposition parties should be one and so on. Otherwise, the determinants of opposition fragmentation are most likely different than that of party system fragmentation which would require more investigation.

From the above, we can conclude that scholars focused on fragmentation of either the whole party system or opposition parties. However, they totally neglected the fragmentation of informal groups such as social movements that can play the same role as the formal opposition. Conversely, scholars who attempted to study the reasons behind the eruption of civil wars
focused on such type of fragmentation since it is crucial to the understanding of civil wars. As defined by Cunningham, opposition movements are a “set of non-state actors that are engaged in dissent” related to the government or territory under dispute\textsuperscript{102}. Accordingly, a fragmented opposition comprises of multiple organizations or factions that are operating at the same time to pursue the same goals on behalf of the same population\textsuperscript{103}. This definition then excludes multiple oppositions who are pursuing different goals or representing different populations, even if they are operating at the same time and on the same territory as others\textsuperscript{104}.

Similarly, Bakke et al. focused on “intra-movement dynamics” or interaction between organizations that are mobilized around a collective identity to achieve specific goals\textsuperscript{105}. This also includes “movements composed of organizations that are mobilizing on the basis of ethnic, tribal, clan, linguistic or national identities”\textsuperscript{106}. But unlike most of the literature that tended to define fragmentation by its antithesis (i.e. cohesion, coordination or cooperation) or by explaining one of its aspects, Bakke along with others introduced a multidimensional concept of fragmentation. They argue that three dimensions can differentiate between cohesive or fragmented movements: the number of organizations in a movement, the degree of institutionalization across these organizations, and the distribution of power among them\textsuperscript{107}. The first dimension refers not only to the number of organizations operating under the broader movement but also to their adherence to the collective goals of the movement even if these organizations have their own leadership and organizational structure\textsuperscript{108}. The second dimension

\textsuperscript{102} Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Actor fragmentation and civil war bargaining: How internal divisions generate civil conflict”, \textit{American Journal of Political Science} 57, no. 3 (2013), 662.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, pp. 662.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid, pp. 662.
\textsuperscript{105} Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham et al. “A plague of initials: Fragmentation, cohesion, and infighting in civil wars”, \textit{Perspectives on politics} 10, no. 2 (2012), 266.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, pp. 266.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, pp. 266.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid, pp. 268.
which is ‘institutions’ is fundamental in differentiating between cohesive or fragmented movements. Institutions refer to the formal and informal rules that coordinate between the organizations functioning under the broader movement. Thus, for a movement to be cohesive, it must be strongly institutionalized which entails a broad membership and effective monitoring mechanisms to constrain its members’ autonomy. Fragmented movements are composed only of a “narrow sub-set of organizations in the movement and lack rules and mechanisms to monitor and constrain their members”. Hence, it is more likely to find a high degree of cooperation between organizations in highly institutionalized movements than in weakly institutionalized ones. The third and final dimension is the ‘distribution of power’ among organizations within a movement. Thus, a movement will be fragmented if the power is divided across multiple organizations, while power will be concentrated in one organization in cohesive movements. This is due to the fact that prospects of division are less likely since weak organizations will not have the abilities to influence other organizations or even the larger dispute.

Based on the three dimensions mentioned above, Bakke et al. have introduced a “three-dimensional concept of fragmentation” (in the appendix) where the first points to highly fragmented movements whilst, the second refers to ultimate cohesive ones. By that they argue that fragmentation is a “concept that changes over time due to frequent shift in the degree and type of fragmentation” due to changes in the political spectrum.

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109 Ibid, pp. 269.
110 Ibid, pp. 269.
111 Ibid, pp. 269.
112 Ibid, pp. 269-270.
113 Ibid, pp. 270.
114 Ibid, pp. 270.
Research design:

   - Why am I focusing on Egypt on this time period:
     At the time of writing this paper, Egypt stands at a crossroads. It is neither progressing towards democracy as is Tunisia, nor has it reached the stage of a failed state such as Libya, Syria and Yemen. Authoritarianism is still resilient in Egypt. And despite the fact that much of the literature of authoritarian resilience has focused on the strategies adopted by Mubarak to fragment the opposition, Mubarak’s fall has not changed Egypt’s fate. Thus, it is crucial to understand this phenomenon at the time when the political environment was in favor of different political forces compared to previous periods. In other words, the political space was relatively open since Mubarak stepped down on 11th February 2011 until Morsi’s overthrow by the military on June 30, 2013, at least compared to Mubarak era and post-Morsi period. Hence, there was still a space for opposition to maneuver, express their views freely, and work on ground but they failed to organize themselves and remained fragmented.

   - Why am I not comparing Egypt with other Arab spring cases?
     With regard to the topic under study, Egypt can be perceived as a unique case compared to other Arab spring countries because of several reasons. On one hand, Tunisia is unlike Egypt in many aspects which include: the major political role played by Tunisian Labor Union (UGTT), the small Tunisian military that has been out of politics for ages, the rate of literacy, etc. which made the circumstances in Tunisia more favorable for democratic transition than in Egypt. Also, unlike other Arab countries where boundaries are in dispute as the case of Yemen or where their societies are extremely divided based on sectarian or ideological affiliations as in the case of Libya and Syria, Egypt’s boundaries are stable for centuries and its society is to a great extent
homogeneous. For these reasons, it is illogical to compare Egypt with other Arab Spring countries at least with regard to the topic under study.

2. Variable operationalization:

As indicated above, the dependent variable of this study is the persistence of fragmentation. In order to uncover the causal factors behind this phenomenon I have chosen the most important factors that are more likely to influence my dependent variable. These factors can be divided into two categories;

1) Regime strategies that include manipulation and divide-and-rule

2) Deficiencies of the opposition which refers to three main problems:
   (a) Misperception by all opposition forces toward the transitional period
   (b) Conflict between Islamists and secularists
   (c) Tension between political parties and youth movements

   Further, as I am interested in understanding the factors that led to the persistence of fragmentation, I will be looking on two types of fragmentation: 1. Non-cooperation between Islamists and secularists and 2. Non-cooperation between political parties and youth movements

   Thus, I am not focusing on the individual problems of each actor as much as I am focusing on the inter-relational problems between them. However, individual problems as internal splits will be taken into consideration when necessary.

3. Measurement of indicators:

As mentioned in the previous section, my independent variables can be divided into two categories:

1) Manipulation and divide-and-rule strategies used by SCAF:
To study the political impact of SCAF strategies on opposition fragmentation, I will focus on the following:

1. SCAF strategy during transition with specific attention to the political impacts of El-Bashri’s constitutional committee and March Referendum
2. The influence of the legal framework of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections on opposition unification or fragmentation
3. The attitude of SCAF and political actors toward the protests against military rule.

These will be studied by using secondary resources from newspapers and books in order to examine if SCAF adopted a divide-and-rule strategy or not.

2) Deficiencies of the opposition:

(a) Cooperation between Islamist and secularist parties:

To examine if such form of cooperation did exist or was totally absent, I will mainly focus on the following:

1. Pre-electoral alliances formed before 2011 parliamentary and Shoura elections
2. The debate over writing the constitution and how Islamists and Secularists dealt with their disputes with regard to the first and second constitutional committees.
3. Why polarization between Islamists and Secularists reached its peak under Morsi?

These will be studied by using secondary resources from newspapers and books in order to examine the changing nature of these alliances and how it influenced opposition fragmentation.

(b) Cooperation between political parties and social movements:

To examine if such form of cooperation did exist or was totally absent, I will mainly focus on the following:

1. Cross-ideological alliances formed post-uprising and their relation with political parties
2. Ideological alliances formed post-uprising and their relation with political parties

3. How political parties responded to the demands raised by youth movements and the protests they called for post-uprising

These will be studied by using secondary resources from newspapers and books in order to examine the nature of relation between these alliances and political parties and to what extent, it influenced opposition fragmentation.

**Chapter Two**

*Man on horseback*: *The relation between SCAF and political opposition post-Mubarak*

Democratization and authoritarian regime durability were not the only themes that were brought to the forefront due to the Arab Spring but most importantly, civil-military relations under dictatorships moved to the top research list of many scholars. This is due to the fact that the military has always been a major political actor, especially in Egypt and Syria prior to the uprising. Hence it is unsurprising that its position toward the mass demonstrations was a decisive factor with regard to regime survival or breakdown. The military’s importance also lies in the fact that “it is the most consequential actor in post-authoritarian transitions and the success or failure of these processes to a large extent hinges on its political behavior”\(^{118}\). This is most apparent in cases where the military was in charge of transition as the case of Egypt where Mubarak was forced to hand over power to the military. Consequently, it is intuitive that SCAF’s behavior will have great implications on the path of transition\(^{119}\). To be more specific, some scholars such as Lust and Albrecht, among others would argue that the re-fragmentation of

\(^{117}\) The term returns back to Samuel Finer’s book titled as *“The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics”*, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2002).


opposition is due to regime strategies that attempt to divide the opposition. As SCAF was a major component of Mubarak’s regime, it is less likely to be a neutral force and would probably adopt the same strategies as Mubarak to keep the opposition fragmented. Accordingly, this chapter will test the validity of this assumption: Since the military was in charge of the transitional process, opposition fragmentation can be explained by continued regime manipulation.

The chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will examine the military’s position under Mubarak, how it reacted to 2011 uprising, and why it defected from Mubarak. The second section will focus on SCAF’s role at critical stages during the transitional period and how it dealt with different political actors in an attempt to test the validity of my assumption.

Section One

The military under Mubarak: Most privileged or main victim?

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,” that is how Kandil characterized Mubarak’s era, reflecting by that a debate between two camps: the first to whom Kandil and Albrecht belong, argue that the military’s prerogatives declined under Mubarak compared to his predecessors while the second camp to whom Sayigh and Bou Nassif belong, argue that the military’s privileges were vast under Mubarak. In the following lines, I will briefly present the different dimensions of this debate followed by how the military responded to the 2011 uprising. I conclude by discussing why the military turned against Mubarak and sided with the protestors.

The military’s position under Mubarak:

According to Bou Nassif, what Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have in common is that they promoted the interests of the military elite to ensure the military’s loyalty. However, they all differed in the mechanism. When Mubarak came to power, the military was tamed after the purges that extended from the 1950s till the 1970s which enabled him to adopt a less complex control system than that of his predecessors. Rather than following Nasser’s ideational ties with the military or Sadat’s reshuffling mechanism, Mubarak depended on material privileges. Those privileges can be presented in the form of officers’ appointment to civilian positions and expansion of military’s economy.

1. Officers’ appointments:

After 1991, Mubarak’s control system depended on the promise of “a loyalty allowance” that senior officers would receive upon retirement in the form of post-retirement careers that would offer them opportunities to generate extra income or accumulate their assets. To get promoted, middle-rank officers must tolerate their low wages during service and must show their loyalty and political abstention. Officers who fulfill these conditions are more likely to get promoted to the rank of general before retirement since Mubarak did not appoint any officer to a governorship beyond this rank. In addition, he institutionalized placement patterns “with certain positions within the military leading to specific posts in the bureaucratic

126 Ibid, 511.
128 Ibid, 5
129 Ibid, 5
130 Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak”, 517-518
apparatus”\textsuperscript{131}. To be specific, 4 of the 7 commanders of the Republican Guard and 11 of the 21 commanders of the Second and Third Field Army under Mubarak were appointed governors while the last three commanders of the navy have occupied leadership positions in the Suez Canal or the National Navigation Company\textsuperscript{132}. In total, 63 out of 156 governors during Mubarak’s reign have a military background while almost 2,000 have occupied positions as deputy governors, heads of cities, etc.\textsuperscript{133}

Furthermore, Mubarak specified a certain percentage of the total budget since 1991 for “disaster management, emergency response, and other security-related activities”\textsuperscript{134}. However, he assigned a portion of it to officers at the rank of marshal, lieutenant general, and general in the form of cash installments known as loyalty allowance which may be later distributed among some major and brigadier generals\textsuperscript{135}. Besides, senior officers who are involved in the arms trade receive commissions to favor some companies over others\textsuperscript{136}.

Despite those privileges, Albrecht argues that the “path dependent career patterns” implied that Mubarak’s personal involvement was not strong, widening the personal gap between him and SCAF senior officers who were younger than him by 20 years with the exception of Tantawi\textsuperscript{137}. What made matters worse was the rise of Gamal Mubarak who failed to build any connections with them since he presented himself as the first civilian potential president and invited a group of business men to the political life, threatening by that military’s old interests and its position as part of the ruling elite\textsuperscript{138}.

\textsuperscript{131} Holger Albrecht, “Does Coup-proofing work? Political-military relations in authoritarian regimes amid the Arab uprisings”, *Mediterranean Politics* 20, no. 1(2015), 44
\textsuperscript{132} Bou Nassif, “Wedded to Mubarak”, 517 & 523.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 516 & 524
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid, 527
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid, 527
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, 528
\textsuperscript{137} Albrecht, “Does Coup-proofing work”, 44.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, 44-45.
2. Military’s economic empire:

Although the re-direction of the military to economic development projects was introduced by Sadat post-1973 war, the expansion and institutionalization of the military’s economy took place under Mubarak. After coming to power, Mubarak and his minister of defense, Abu Ghazala, agreed on the establishment of an economic empire over which the military would have autonomous control\(^\text{139}\). Accordingly, military bodies such as the ministry of military production, the Arab Industrial Organization (AIO), and the National Service Projects Organization (NSPO)\(^\text{140}\) were founded to run the military’s economic activities that include: construction, land reclamation, agriculture\(^\text{141}\) along with 35 factories that produce civilian goods and weapons\(^\text{142}\). Despite the rationality of these claims, Sayigh highlighted the main problem behind the expansion of the military’s economy. Whereas the military’s power under Nasser was wielded through its direct domination of the cabinet, its power under Mubarak was wielded through “indirect domination of the civil sphere to an extent that it deemed normal not only by others but also, by its members”\(^\text{143}\).

After successfully sidelining the military which was only kept as the “last resort for regime maintenance”\(^\text{144}\), Mubarak heavily depended on the police for protection and everyday control\(^\text{145}\). This is apparent in the percentage of each in the total GDP. Whereas defense expenditures have fallen from 19.5% in 1980 to 2.2% in 2010, “reaching its lowest level in Egypt’s modern history”\(^\text{146}\), the Interior Ministry expenditures rose up from 3.5% in 1988 to 6%
in 2002. According to Sayigh, “the Interior Ministry’s budget rose at three times the rate of increase of the defense budget”. Further, by the last decade of Mubarak’s era, Egypt had almost 2 million security men compared to only 460,000 in the army which means that the former size was about 1.5 times the latter. As a result, the military were not only in competition with the police, but its position was also threatened by Gamal Mubarak and his associates’ economic policy. Starting from 2004, the interests of the military collided with that of Gamal and the emerging political elite associated with him. This is due to the fact that Gamal and his men adopted a free economy model whilst the military still believed in Nasser’s etatist model. Indeed, they competed with each other in industries such as steel while the military obstructed some projects such as the privatization of banks and public companies. Mubarak’s new economic policy also hit the core of the 1952 regime which “had taken power in the name of the people and pursued social and economic policies” that favor the middle and lower-middle classes “from which military officers had originated” is now obliged to protect a regime that identified itself with “upper- and upper-middle-classes”.

**Military’s reaction to 2011 mass demonstrations:**

Although the military’s direct political influence declined under Mubarak, the army has remained an indispensable part of the regime and has benefited from the patronage system as shown. Nonetheless, the rise of Gamal Mubarak and his associates who have adopted a free economic model and the attempts made to install Gamal as a successor to his father have

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147 Kandil, “Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 195
148 Sayigh, “Above the state”, 6
149 Kandil, “Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 194
150 Sayigh, “Above the state”, 6
152 Ibid
153 Ibid
154 Kandil, “Back on Horse”, 136
“challenged the army’s role as a kingmaker”\textsuperscript{155} and have shaken the socio-economic core of 1952 regime in the long run. “The January 25 uprising took everyone by surprise including the military”\textsuperscript{156} which explains why the military was confused on how to deal with the demonstrations. Accordingly, the military’s intervention starting from 28\textsuperscript{th} January onwards is best seen as a “gradual process”\textsuperscript{157}. The withdrawal of the police after being overpowered in street battles and the torching of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP)’s headquarter left the regime barred, forcing the military to deploy its troops around government buildings on 28\textsuperscript{th} January\textsuperscript{158}. Being aware of the grievances within officers toward the regime, Mubarak tried to secure the military’s loyalty by offering Tantawi the position of Prime Minister then that of Vice President however, he rejected the two offers\textsuperscript{159}. Hence, he appointed General Ahmed Shafiq, a military figure, as Prime Minister and excluded from the new government those figures who were associated with Gamal\textsuperscript{160}. The real intentions of the military were not clear at the moment until it stated its first statement on 31\textsuperscript{st} of January where it declared that people’s demands are legitimate and that it would not use force against protestors\textsuperscript{161}. Whereas this statement reflected a kind of independence as it was issued without Mubarak’s consultation\textsuperscript{162}, the military was reluctant to overthrow Mubarak “until doing so became its only option”\textsuperscript{163}. For this reason, the military met without the president only on 10\textsuperscript{th} of February\textsuperscript{164} when it declared its first

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\textsuperscript{155} Kevin Koehler, “Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings: A Comparative Perspective on the Arab Spring”, \textit{International Political Science Review}, (2016), 10. DOI: 10.1177/0192512116639746
\textsuperscript{156} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 23
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid, 15.
\textsuperscript{159} Koehler, “Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings”, 11.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid
\textsuperscript{163} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 16.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, 15-16.
\end{flushright}
communiqué in which it “acknowledged the legitimacy of people’s demands”165 and declared that SCAF will be in “continuous session to monitor the situation”166. On the following day, “Mubarak was forced to resign and SCAF took over power”167, moving by that from a “mere passenger” to the main political actor168. From now on till the election of a president in June 2012, Egypt would be run by a “Junta regime institutionalized in SCAF” that is composed of 19 members, among which: “Sami Annan, chief of staff and SCAF’s strongman behind Tantawi; Mamdouh Shahin; and Mohsen al-Fanagry who served as the military’s unofficial liaison officers in communicating with civil society and political parties”169.

Why the military defected from Mubarak:

Whereas scholars such as: Albrecht, Kandil, and Koehler along others have introduced different explanations to military’s behavior toward 2011 uprising as will be shown, they all agreed that the military intervened at a moment of opportunity rather than disposition based on Finer’s analysis. According to Finer, the former refers to “certain situations that make the civil power abnormally dependent on the military or those that enhance military’s popularity” at the expense of the civilian incumbent while the latter refers to military’s “conscious motive and desire” to intervene170. Accordingly, the military was “forced to take a stance by the unfolding events” and at the same time, the uprising was an opportunity to retain its position as a kingmaker171 and to preserve its economic interests172 after being sidelined by the political and security apparatuses173.

165 Kandil, “Back on Horse”, 143.
166 Koehler, “Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings”, 11. The first communiqué can be viewed on this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jluqcBJsKMc (1:58-2:53)
167 Ibid
169 Ibid, 15-16.
171 Koehler, “Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings”, 5
To start with, the most prevalent argument in the literature explains the military’s behavior with the incumbent’s personal ties to the military. Comparing Egypt with Syria, Albrecht argues that both Mubarak and Bashar adopted the same coup-proofing methods such as: officer appointments, economic coup-proofing and officers’ social composition\textsuperscript{174}. Whereas Bashar adopted these strategies in a way that got the higher officers close to the “power center”, Mubarak did it in order to distance the military from himself and his ruling elite\textsuperscript{175}. In other words, Mubarak succeeded to “keep the military out of politics” while allowing them to expand their economy, “enhancing by that their autonomy vis-à-vis the political incumbent”\textsuperscript{176}. Thus if these strategies can work in times of stability, they will not work at times of crisis because the military’s economic autonomy will not encourage it to bear the costs of repressing the uprising and only the personal relationships between the incumbent and the military that would maintain regime survival\textsuperscript{177}.

Although no one can deny the importance of partimonalism in the Middle East, Koehler emphasizes that it has neither prevented “individual high-level defections in Syria” nor the fracturing of the army in Libya and Yemen\textsuperscript{178}. Accordingly, the long-term development of military politicization can best explain military’s behavior at times of endgame scenarios\textsuperscript{xii}, rather than the structural or organizational factors behind coups and the dynamics of patrimonialism\textsuperscript{179}. In cases where the military was involved in regime foundation, they are more likely to remain a dominant political actor, revealing a military-dominant pattern of political-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[\textsuperscript{172}] Said, \textit{The Paradox of Transition to Democracy under Military Rule}, 399
\item[\textsuperscript{173}] Kandil, \textit{“Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”}, 229
\item[\textsuperscript{174}] Albrecht, \textit{“Does Coup-proofing work?”}, 43-44
\item[\textsuperscript{175}] Ibid
\item[\textsuperscript{176}] Ibid, 37-38
\item[\textsuperscript{177}] Ibid, 38
\item[\textsuperscript{178}] Koehler, \textit{“Political Militaries in Popular Uprisings”}, 2.
\item[\textsuperscript{179}] Ibid, 3.
\end{footnotes}
military relations\textsuperscript{180}. Instead of relying solely on the military, authoritarian regimes may create alternative organizations, reducing the military’s direct political influence in favor of civilians\textsuperscript{181}. By time, such strategies of institutional balancing lead to competition between the military and the alternative institutions, leading to a divided pattern of political–military relations\textsuperscript{182}. This can be apparent in the case of Egypt where the modern state was established by 1952 coup led by Nasser and since then, the military developed into a politicized institution, leading to a military-dominated pattern\textsuperscript{183}. However, Sadat post-1973 followed by Mubarak have reduced military’s political influence by heavily depending on police which resulted in a divided-pattern\textsuperscript{184}. By the last decade of Mubarak’s reign, the military’s interests clashed with both: the economic interests of Gamal Mubarak and his men, and with the security forces that became the regime’s main supporter and hence, the military “was less willing to bear the costs of repressing the uprising” which they exploited to improve their position\textsuperscript{185}. As a result, militaries that face competition from rival regime institutions are more likely to defect from incumbents in the face of uprisings\textsuperscript{186}.

Lastly, Kandil argues that “the military accepted de-politicization post-1973 war as a step toward proper professionalization” after analysts blamed Egypt’s shortcomings in war to officers’ politicization\textsuperscript{187}. Nonetheless, it soon realized that authoritarianism has limited its fighting capabilities in three ways\textsuperscript{188}. First, regime corruption has produced a “dysfunctional education system that could hardly provide the military with the required manpower” while not

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid, 4.
\item Ibid, 4.
\item Ibid, 4.
\item Ibid, 10.
\item Ibid, 10.
\item Ibid, 6.
\item Ibid, 2.
\item Kandil, “Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 189.
\item Ibid
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
allowing university graduates from receiving adequate military training and thus, “the military was stuck with illiterate peasant conscripts”\textsuperscript{189}. Second, autocrats cannot tolerate popular officers who are “born in battles” and hence, they “centralized war making in the hands of trusted generals” rather than relying on “war of movement” strategy that depends on maneuvers, requiring by that “middle-ranking officers who can improvise in battle without prior orders”\textsuperscript{190}. Finally, the military were made dependent on the U.S. which was “sworn not only to preserve their key rival’s superiority” but was also “informing Israel about Egypt’s weapons portfolio and training” which made the military “exposed”\textsuperscript{191}. Accordingly, the military has suffered from “rank disequilibrium” which means “a psychological dissonance” that members of an institution suffer from once their current tasks contradict their original duties\textsuperscript{192}. In other words, “even if a few members of an institution are corrupt, the critical mass within it lean toward fulfilling”\textsuperscript{193} their main duty which is “war and combat readiness”\textsuperscript{194} rather than economic projects. As a result, high officers have defected from Mubarak because repressing the uprising may lead to the fracture of corps whom were supportive of the uprising since day one\textsuperscript{195}.

\textit{Section Two}

\textit{The role of SCAF during transition and its relation with different political actors}

At Tahrir square and other squares all over Egypt, “anger was mixed with hope” throughout the 18 days until Mubarak stepped down\textsuperscript{196}. Eighteen months later, such hope was replaced by frustration, anger, or at least precaution hope because translating people’s hopes into

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{189} Kandil, “Back on Horse”, 138.
\bibitem{190} Ibid, 138-139.
\bibitem{191} Ibid, 140-142.
\bibitem{192} Ibid, 141-142.
\bibitem{193} Ibid, 135.
\bibitem{194} Kandil, “Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 181.
\bibitem{195} Kandil, “Back on Horse”, 143.
\bibitem{196} Ibrahim Awad, “Breaking out of authoritarianism: 18 months of political transition in Egypt”, Constellations 20, no. 2 (2013): 275
\end{thebibliography}
reality is not just difficult but “is conditioned by the actors involved in the process of change and their relative power”\textsuperscript{197}. On one hand, the military found itself in the situation of “governing by default”\textsuperscript{198} where it took the center stage in politics after being sidelined for years under Mubarak. Having no prior intentions for assuming power\textsuperscript{199} along with the lack of political experience for most SCAF members with the exception of Mohsen al-Fanagry, Mukhtar al-Mullah, Mohamed al-Assar and Mamdouh Shahin\textsuperscript{200} meant that SCAF had no clear idea for managing the transition\textsuperscript{201} and had to undergo a learning process\textsuperscript{202}. What makes matter worse is that if a transition to democracy is to succeed, a general consensus among political elites on the rules of transition is required because otherwise, “spoilers would cover the landscape”\textsuperscript{203}. The same actors who succeeded to unite against Mubarak, failed to agree on the course of change or on what should be changed post-Mubarak which allowed SCAF to set the rules on its own\textsuperscript{204}. In other words, the military as an institution that historically perceives itself as a “protector of stability and the national interest” was obliged to operate in “an entirely new, unpredictable and fluid arena in which a new generation of politicized activists demands a say and in which no single player can predict what others are planning”\textsuperscript{205}. Accordingly, SCAF was keen to introduce as little change as possible\textsuperscript{206} while maintaining the main pillars of 1952 regime\textsuperscript{207} and ensuring that its interests would be preserved once it turns over power\textsuperscript{208}. Trying to balance between those contradicting intentions, SCAF strategy during transition was characterized by inconsistency,

\textsuperscript{197} Ibid
\textsuperscript{198} Albrecht, “Does Coup-proofing work?” , 49
\textsuperscript{199} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 22
\textsuperscript{200} Albrecht, “Does Coup-proofing work?”, 49
\textsuperscript{201} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 22
\textsuperscript{202} Sayigh, “Above the state”, 8
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid
\textsuperscript{205} Marina Ottaway, “The Middle East is in transition to what?”, Insight Turkey 13, no. 2 (2011): 16
\textsuperscript{206} Awad, “Breaking out of authoritarianism”, 280
\textsuperscript{207} Albrecht, “Does Coup-proofing work?”, 42
\textsuperscript{208} Ottaway, “The Middle East is in transition to what?”, 16
hesitancy and confusion, leading to transition prolongation in which each step has ended up with “opposing segments of Egyptian society driven farther apart”\textsuperscript{209}. Hence, it magnified issues of conflict rather than managing or resolving them. In the following lines, I will examine the role of SCAF at some of the pivotal stages of transition and how it dealt with different actors in an attempt to check if it “played the political forces off against each other” leading to their fragmentation or not.

\textit{El-Bashri’s constitutional committee and March referendum:}

Mubarak has not only turned over power to SCAF in violation of the 1971 constitution - which states that power is transferred to the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court in case the president stepped down permanently and there is no head for the People’s Assembly (PA) at the time\textsuperscript{210} - but also, SCAF assumed the sole right to issue decrees during transition\textsuperscript{211}. Thus, it issued its first constitutional deceleration on 13\textsuperscript{th} of February, 2011 which stated that it would run the country within a period of six month or till the election of PA and a new president, suspended the 1971 constitution and dissolved the parliament\textsuperscript{212}. Then in an attempt to “legitimize its hold on power”\textsuperscript{213}, SCAF issued a decree on 15\textsuperscript{th} of February to form a committee of eight experts that would be charged of amending nine articles of the suspended constitution to regulate the parliamentary and presidential elections\textsuperscript{214}. The committee was headed by Tareq El-Bashri, the deputy head of the Council of State and an Islamist political thinker along other experts that included Sobhi Saleh, a former MB candidate in the parliament which raised some

\textsuperscript{209} Brown, “Egypt’s failed transition”, 45-46
\textsuperscript{210} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 71
\textsuperscript{211} Ali El-Din Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework: Issuing of laws under the pressure of politics”, in Struggle for a new political system: Egypt after the uprising, Ed. Ali El-Din Helal, Mazen Hassan & Mai Mogib (Cairo: Egypt, Egyptian Lebanese Dar, 2013), 118
\textsuperscript{212} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 71
\textsuperscript{213} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 16
\textsuperscript{214} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 118-119
actor’s skepticism toward the committee’s affiliations\textsuperscript{215}. Nonetheless, El-Bashri argued that the committee was selected by the ministry of Justice and that they met with SCAF for the first time after the release of the latter’s decree\textsuperscript{216}. The amendments made by the committee have stated that the parliamentary and presidential elections will take place respectively followed by electing a constitutional committee of 100 by PA and Shoura members to write a new constitution\textsuperscript{217}. Worth mentioning, the amendments were not exclusive on the articles mentioned in SCAF deceleration but it included ten other articles such as: amending article (148) to restrict the president’s power in announcing the case of emergency\textsuperscript{xiii} and article (189) that aimed to set a time plan for writing the constitution\textsuperscript{xiv}\textsuperscript{218}.

After the committee announced its results, SCAF called for a public referendum on 19\textsuperscript{th} of March where voters were asked to vote for ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on the amendments as a whole\textsuperscript{219}. The Egyptian experience has proved the validity of the argument that successful transitions do not turn to people after few weeks of overthrowing the old regime\textsuperscript{220} as uprising ary forces “began to find themselves torn asunder due to this very first balloting”\textsuperscript{221}. SCAF, MB\textsuperscript{222}, NDP (which was not dissolved yet) and some small parties embraced the referendum\textsuperscript{223} while it was rejected by Revolution Youth Coalition, 6 April, National Association for Change and secularist parties such as: El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, El-Nasri, etc\textsuperscript{224}. In general, supporters argued that approving the amendments would ensure a speedy power transition to an elected president and

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid
\textsuperscript{216} Tareq El-Bashri, \textit{“From the Papers of 25\textsuperscript{th} January Uprising “}, 1\textsuperscript{st} edition (Cairo: Dar El-Shorouk, 2012), 49-50
\textsuperscript{217} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 77-78
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{“Elections in Egypt: The electoral framework in Egypt’s continuing transition (February 2011-September 2013)"}, \textit{International Foundation for Electoral Systems,} (Washington DC, USA: 2013), 2
\textsuperscript{220} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 76
\textsuperscript{221} Brown, “Egypt’s failed transition”, 47
\textsuperscript{222} Referendum on constitutional amendments, 1-2
\textsuperscript{223} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 123
\textsuperscript{224} \textit{“Public Referendum on Constitutional Amendments In Egypt"}, \textit{Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies,} (Doha, Qatar: 2011), http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/003466b6-5305-49fb-bac1-e992779b0d86, 2
parliament that would be charged with electing a constitutional committee\textsuperscript{225} while opponents were worried that the president or the parliament would interfere in the committee’s work since the president’s authorities were not amended and Islamists were expected to gain a majority in the parliament if elections took place that early\textsuperscript{226}. These doubts were confirmed when the amendments got approved by 77.2\% revealing the organizational capabilities of Islamists in comparison to the opposing actors who failed to achieve a majority in any governorate\textsuperscript{227}. The conflict between the two camps got intensified by the rise of a debate that became known as ‘constitution first’ or ‘elections first’ post-referendum where the MB adopted the ‘elections first’ path and argued that postponing the elections would be a betrayal to the majority who approved the amendments, whilst secularists who adopted a ‘constitution first’ position argued that this path would only be in favor of the MB who most probably would gain the majority in the coming elections\textsuperscript{228}.

On 30\textsuperscript{th} of March, the SCAF’s second constitutional declaration came as a surprise for all actors, rendering the referendum and the intense debates irrelevant. On one hand, the amendments made by El-Bashri’s committee implied that the 1971 constitution would be re-activated after including their revisions and would be regarded as the legal framework for the transition\textsuperscript{229}. This would be followed by parliamentary and presidential elections, then the election of a constitutional committee in which SCAF would have no role\textsuperscript{230}. However, the SCAF’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} deceleration replaced the 1971 Constitution and acted as an interim legal framework because otherwise the SCAF would lose its legitimacy and would be obliged to hand over power.

\textsuperscript{225} Brown, “Egypt’s failed transition”, 47  
\textsuperscript{226} Public Referendum on Constitutional Amendments In Egypt”, 2  
\textsuperscript{227} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 123  
\textsuperscript{228} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 76  
\textsuperscript{229} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 132-133  
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid, 132-133
to the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court till the presidential elections take place within 60 days according to 1971 constitution\textsuperscript{231}. On the other hand, SCAF not only borrowed selectively some articles from the 1971 constitution that were neither reviewed by the committee nor put to people in the referendum\textsuperscript{232} but also, amended article (189) after being approved in the referendum. SCAF amendments gave it the right to call the elected members of the PA and the Shoura Council for electing a constitutional committee instead of giving it to the president after the approval of the council of ministers or half of the members of the PA and the Shoura Council\textsuperscript{233}. Besides, it excluded the part of the president’s right to call people for a referendum on the new constitution and left it open without deciding who is responsible for such decision\textsuperscript{234}. The release of the deceleration in such form “revealed that the military has its own preferences…and that it is ready to take legal measures to ensure that these preferences are materialized”\textsuperscript{235}. Accordingly, most actors that had organized the January uprising went back to the streets redirecting their anger from the old regime to SCAF as we will see below\textsuperscript{236}. In contrast, the Islamists accepted the declaration and agreed to push for elections, hoping to sideline the military by the establishment of democratic institutions\textsuperscript{237}.

\textbf{The legal framework of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections:}

The process of designing a new electoral system is one of the main critical decisions to be taken during transition due to its high influence on setting the rules of the game\textsuperscript{238} as well as the

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid, 132-133
\textsuperscript{232} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 19.
\textsuperscript{233} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 134
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid
\textsuperscript{235} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 19
\textsuperscript{236} Brown, “Egypt’s failed transition”, 47
\textsuperscript{237} Ibid
\textsuperscript{238} Mazen Hassan, “Political Implications of the Egyptian Electoral System: With Appliance on People’s Assembly Elections 2011/2012” (El-Atbar Al-Siyassya L’El-Nizam El-Intkhaby El-Masri: Bel Tatbeq ala Intkhbat Majles El-Sha’a’ab 2011/2012), Friedrich Nauman Stiftung Für Die FrieHiet, \url{http://www.fnst-egypt.org/downloadable/Political-implications-of-different-electoral-systems.pdf}
potential outcomes of transition. Accordingly, studying the positives and negatives of the electoral system adopted at the first parliamentary elections after Mubarak is crucial to understand its implications on the path of transition in general and on opposition fragmentation in specific.

According to the SCAF’s second constitutional declaration, the People’s Assembly (PA) became the sole legislative body after SCAF kept the Shoura Council while canceling its restricted legislative role that it was given to after 2007 amendments to the 1971 constitution. Later, SCAF issued number of decrees of the law on the Regulation of the Exercise of Political Rights (LEPR), of PA law, and of Shoura Council Law that specified the nature of the electoral system and the technical issues associated with the electoral process.

Under Mubarak’s reign, “Egypt has been applying a majoritarian run-off electoral system where candidates used to compete in 222 two-member constituencies and had to obtain 50% of the votes to win” while, opposition demands for a more proportional system have always been met by deaf ears. The fall of Mubarak indeed brought the debate over the shape of the electoral system back to the forefront where Uprising ary forces along others have called for eliminating the Majoritarian system and “instituting a Proportional Representation (PR) system based on a single national district”. However, a PR system was opposed by the constitutional experts whom SCAF selected to help it out with issuing a new electoral law as they argued that such “system would favor party members at the expense of independents”, violating by that the

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239 Ibid, 370.
241 Ibid, 151-161.
242 Mazen Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly, Egypt 2011/12”, Electoral Studies 32 (2013), 370
“principle of equality of political opportunity enshrined in the constitutional declaration”\textsuperscript{244}. To satisfy both sides, SCAF introduced the first draft of PA law on 30\textsuperscript{th} of May, 2011 which stated that “one-third of seats be elected through a closed-list PR system” and the remaining two-third be elected using a majoritarian system with two-member constituencies\textsuperscript{245}. In June and July, several dialogues were held with political parties that resulted in changing the proportion of seats to 50:50 by July 19, 2011\textsuperscript{246}. On 25\textsuperscript{th} of September\textsuperscript{247}, SCAF however, returned back to one-third of seats to be contested by a majoritarian run-off system in 83 two-member constituencies and the remaining two-third to be contested by a PR system in 46 constituencies\textsuperscript{248}. According to such system, each voter had to cast three votes; two votes for two majoritarian candidates and one for a party list\textsuperscript{249}. Similarly, SCAF’s second declaration stated that one-third of Shoura Council seats would be appointed by the president while the two-thirds would be elected\textsuperscript{250}, out of which two-thirds would be contested in a PR system and one-third would be contested in a majoritarian system\textsuperscript{251}.

The most debatable part of this law lies in whether to allow party candidates to run on both closed party lists and majoritarian seats or not\textsuperscript{252}. Initially, the decree proposed by SCAF on 26\textsuperscript{th} September had “reserved the majoritarian seats exclusively for non-party candidates”\textsuperscript{253}. But “under popular pressure”\textsuperscript{254}, SCAF amended the decree on 8\textsuperscript{th} of October allowing party

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[244]{Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 370}
\footnotetext[245]{“Elections in Egypt: The electoral framework…”, 3}
\footnotetext[246]{Ibid}
\footnotetext[247]{Ibid}
\footnotetext[248]{Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 370}
\footnotetext[249]{Ibid}
\footnotetext[250]{El-Din Helal,“Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 128}
\footnotetext[251]{Ibid, 160}
\footnotetext[252]{Ibid, 159}
\footnotetext[253]{Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 143}
\footnotetext[254]{Ibid}
\end{footnotes}
members to contest over majoritarian seats.\textsuperscript{255} Further, SCAF has preserved the occupational quota which was inherited from Nasser henceforth, requiring 50\% of MPs be either workers or farmers.\textsuperscript{256} This means that in majoritarian districts, “if neither of the two candidates that won the majority belonged to workers/farmers category, then the candidate with the highest number of votes among the two will retain his or her seat, and the top worker/peasant candidate competing in the same constituency will gain the other seat.”\textsuperscript{257} Similarly, in PR districts, “whenever a list gains only one seat and the candidate who tops this list does not belong to peasants or workers, he/she will be replaced by the first worker/peasant candidate on the same list to ensure that the occupational quota is upheld.”\textsuperscript{258} Indeed, this reflects inequality of political opportunity between candidates who are running as workers/peasants and those who are running under the other ‘professional’ category.

Based on this electoral system, each of the PA and Shoura Council elections took place in three rounds where the former was held from 28\textsuperscript{th} of November, 2011 till 10\textsuperscript{th} of January, 2012 while the latter was held from 29\textsuperscript{th} of January, 2012 till 11\textsuperscript{th} of March, 2012.\textsuperscript{259} The reason behind “conducting the elections over three stages and stretching it to over two months,”\textsuperscript{260} is that a supra-constitutional committee composed only of judges has been charged of the whole election process\textsuperscript{261} including: “being physically present in each polling station during voting

\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{Notes}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{255} “Elections in Egypt: The electoral framework…”, 4
\item \textsuperscript{256} Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 371
\item \textsuperscript{257} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{258} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{259} Ahmed Abd Rabou, “Egyptian Parties and Elections of Egyptian Parliament 2011/2012” (El-Ahzab El-Masria we Intkabat El-Parlman El-Masri), Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, (Doha, Qatar: 2011), 2. \url{http://www.dohainstitute.org/release/e7a331ed-4f67-485b-8d72-5fde1828a653}
\item \textsuperscript{260} Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 371
\item \textsuperscript{261} El-Din Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 131
\end{itemize}
And since the number of judges can only cover one third of the polling stations at once, the elections were held on three stages\textsuperscript{263}.

Despite the fact that the whole process of elections has been administered by a judiciary committee and the success to meet the minimal international standards for a fair and free elections, no one can deny the various impacts of the electoral system selected by SCAF. To be more specific, I will examine whether the electoral system has enhanced opposition fragmentation or not by looking at: 1. SCAF promptness of making decisions, 2. Mixed vs. Parallel PR systems, 3. The relation between electoral system and party system, 4. How the way of designing districts influenced voter threshold.

Throughout the transition period, SCAF seemed to be reluctant in taking decisions unless there is popular pressure that urge it to take a final decision which is usually opaque and beyond expectations. This is apparent, for example, in deciding the proportion of seats to be contested under PR and majoritarian systems and the right of party candidates to contest over individual seats as mentioned previously. Initially, SCAF restricted party candidates from competing over individual seats then under popular pressure, it “backed down”\textsuperscript{264}. Nonetheless, this same decision led to the dissolution of the parliament by the Supreme Constitutional Court “only few days before president Morsi sworn in”, on 14\textsuperscript{th} of June, 2012 since it argued that not allowing independent candidates from competing over PR lists while permitting party candidates from competing over PR lists and individual seats have violated the equality of political opportunity\textsuperscript{265}. On the following day, SCAF issued a decree to dissolve the parliament\textsuperscript{266}. Regardless of whether this dissolution was politically and legally justified or not, the intense

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{262} Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly”, 371
\item \textsuperscript{263} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{264} M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 143.
\item \textsuperscript{265} “Elections in Egypt: The electoral framework in Egypt’s continuing transition”, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{266} Ibid
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
clashes it led to especially between SCAF and Morsi after coming to power has reflected the “institutional competition that has characterized much of Egypt’s legal reform process”\textsuperscript{267}. Further, SCAF kept on postponing political powers’ demands of issuing a political isolation law to former NDP members until it issued one that came beyond their expectations\textsuperscript{268}. The law applies on any employee, minister, MP, member of local council, or anyone who was involved in civil service and has exploited his position to attain personal interests or was charged of any type of corruption\textsuperscript{269}. However, the law insisted that the judiciary was the only body responsible for condemning those accused, who would be later banned from participating in political life for 5 years\textsuperscript{270}. What made matters worse is that the law was issued on 11\textsuperscript{th} of November, 2011, after already closing the door for candidacy\textsuperscript{271}. Hence, many NDP members have run the elections whether on individual seats or under well-known parties\textsuperscript{272}.

Although the use of a PR system is regarded as a democratic progress, the adoption of a parallel system rather than a mixed one has excluded some of the advantages that would be associated with the latter. In mixed systems, “the PR seats are used to compensate for inequalities in seat distribution for the parties”\textsuperscript{273}. In parallel systems, by contrast, “the two sets of legislators are elected independently of one another”, but unlike mixed systems, “the PR component does not compensate for any disproportionality within the majority districts”\textsuperscript{274}. Whereas it is not clear why SCAF has chosen a parallel rather than a mixed system, Faris argues that such a system was “a genuine attempt to undermine the local-level cronyism of the NDP era.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{267}Ibid
\bibitem{268}Abd Rabou, “Egyptian Parties and Elections of Egyptian Parliament 2011/2012”, 2
\bibitem{269}El-Din Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 155-156
\bibitem{270}Ibid
\bibitem{271}Abd Rabou, “Egyptian Parties and Elections of Egyptian Parliament 2011/2012”, 2
\bibitem{272}Ibid
\bibitem{273}M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 143.
\bibitem{274}Ibid, 144.
\end{thebibliography}
and to meet the demands of activists without completely forsaking the opportunity to manipulate matters in individual districts”\textsuperscript{275}.

Even if some scholars argue that the relation between the party system and the electoral system is circular, most believe that the electoral system is one of the main factors that shapes or maintains the structure of the party system\textsuperscript{276}. Indeed, Duverger’s law represents a main principle in political science, maintaining that majoritarian systems lead to two-party system while PR systems tend to produce a multi-party system\textsuperscript{277}. This is due to two reasons: the first is small parties’ inability to gain the majority in majoritarian districts, making it difficult to penetrate the party system, and the second reason is that small parties’ supporters abandon them as they believe that their potential to win is minimal and hence, they disappear from the political scene over time\textsuperscript{278}. In addition, it was frequently found that in mixed systems, parties that run more candidates in majoritarian districts are the ones who perform better on PR lists which results in the “contamination effect” where the majoritarian tier “contaminates” the PR tier\textsuperscript{279}. In parallel systems, however, there is no compensation for disproportionality so “voters will tend to vote strategically and ignore smaller parties in the majoritarian tier”\textsuperscript{280}. Accordingly, neither the majoritarian system adopted by Mubarak nor the parallel system adopted by SCAF were in favor of small parties. In addition to that, multi-party systems are not alike so some electoral systems may lead to a more fragmented system than others. Indeed, Hassan measured the degree of party fragmentation based on the effective number of parliamentary parties. Out of 32 new democracies, Egypt lies in the eleventh rank, revealing an intermediate electoral system that is

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid
\textsuperscript{276} Hassan, “Political Implications”, 18.
\textsuperscript{277} M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 145.
\textsuperscript{278} Hassan, “Political Implications”, 18.
\textsuperscript{279} M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 145.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid
neither highly fragmented nor highly concentrated\textsuperscript{281}. Majoritarian systems usually lead to a party system with high concentration however, this was eliminated by allowing only one-third of the seats to be contested over this system\textsuperscript{282}. Also, allowing two thirds of the seats to be contested through a PR system has prevented more fragmentation that was likely to occur if it was applied on all the seats\textsuperscript{283}. These findings are reflected in the election results where only 16 parties out of 40 were represented in parliament. The Democratic Coalition which included the FJP was represented by 47.2\%, while the Islamic Coalition which was formed by El-Nour was represented by 24.7\%\textsuperscript{284}. This was followed by El-Wafd, the ‘Egyptian Bloc’ coalition, and the ‘The Revolution Continues’ coalition that were represented by 7.6\%, 6.8\% and 1.4\%, respectively\textsuperscript{285}\textsuperscript{xv}.

Lastly, SCAF has ignored the demand of most of the political opposition by selecting a regional PR system with 46 districts, rather than a national PR system\textsuperscript{286}. Under this system, the legal threshold differs from one constituency to another which affects election results\textsuperscript{287}. This means that the “higher the number of seats in a constituency, the lower the number of votes required to gain a seat” and vice versa\textsuperscript{288}. For example: 10\% of the votes can be enough to gain a seat in a constituency of 10 seats while in a constituency of 4 seats, 25\% of the votes is required\textsuperscript{289}. Compared to new democracies, Egypt lies on the middle of the scale with an average of 7.2 while the average of seats per constituency were 7, 8, 6.7 seats in the three stages of

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\textsuperscript{281} Hassan, “Political Implications”, 18.
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid
\textsuperscript{285} Ibid
\textsuperscript{286} M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 143.
\textsuperscript{287} Hassan, “Political Implications”, 26.
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid
\textsuperscript{289} Ibid
\end{flushright}
elections, respectively\textsuperscript{290}. However, the problem with this system lies in the fact that the difference between thresholds of constituencies affect the party based on the geographical distribution of its supporters. If the supporters of a party are concentrated in a constituency that requires high number of votes to gain a seat while its supporters are few in one that requires less number of votes then this system work against the party and vice versa\textsuperscript{291}. In addition, as articulated by Willy Jou, “Small parties are disadvantaged by the use of regional blocs rather than a nationwide constituency as the unit of PR seat distribution”\textsuperscript{292}. This is exemplified in the Egyptian case because the low value of district magnitude, which is on average 7.2 seats in each PR constituency, made it difficult for small parties to gain a seat\textsuperscript{293}. For instance, the ‘Uprising Continues’ coalition along with other fourteen parties such as Justice, El-Gad, El-Gabha, Egyptian Socialist Democratic, etc. have failed to reach the threshold, preventing them from being represented in the Shoura Council\textsuperscript{294}.

To summarize, SCAF tended to take decisions slowly unless there was popular pressure that urged it to take a stance. Such redundancy has contaminated the path of transition in different ways. To begin with, it increased the vagueness associated with transition and confused actors who had to change their strategies constantly in short time intervals. For example: SCAF has amended the article related to the right of party candidates to contest majoritarian seats only a month prior to the elections. Moreover, SCAF members were poor explainers of their decision making process\textsuperscript{295} and their motives and hence their decisions usually did not meet expectations.

\textsuperscript{290} Ibid, 5
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid, 26
\textsuperscript{292} M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 150. Note: This quote was tackled by Faris but the original work is (Willy Jou, “Electoral Reform and Party System Development in Japan and Taiwan: A Comparative Study,” \textit{Asian Survey} 49, no. 5 (2009): 759-785).
\textsuperscript{293} Hassan, “Political Implications”, 18.
\textsuperscript{294} Mohamed El-Sanhouri, “Al-Masry Al-Youm announce with names the results of Shoura elections”, \textit{Al-Masry Al-Youm}, 25 February 2012, \url{http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/154502}
\textsuperscript{295} M. Faris, “Constituting institutions”, 144
Even though they responded to political actors’ demand to adopt a more proportional system, they adopted it in a way that limited many of the systems’ advantages. This is apparent in adopting a parallel rather than a mixed PR system and in applying regional PR blocs instead of a national PR system, both factors limiting the usefulness of PR for small parties. Putting this into consideration along with the dissolution of the ruling NDP and the absence of a majority party that could have represented uprising ary demands, Egypt was stuck with the most organized actors and the ones with the longest experience. This applied to the MB’s FJP, followed by El-Nour Salafi party. Hence, Faris argues that “no matter what electoral system is put into place, the FJP is going to serve as the core party for some time”\textsuperscript{296}. Even if this assumption is correct, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the electoral system adopted by SCAF has made this outcome inevitable, making it more difficult for small parties to penetrate the party system. In a best case scenario, SCAF was attempting to limit party fragmentation -which they perceived as equivalent to multi-partism- and which they regarded as a threat to national unity. In a worst case scenario, the electoral system adopted was in favor of more organized actors compared to small parties, allowing Islamists to gain a majority in both the PA and Shoura Council which has increased the tension and conflict between them and other actors.

\section*{Protests against military rule:}

The military succeeded to maintain a positive reputation among Egyptians because it successfully portrayed itself as the victorious force in the 1973 war with Israel and its indirect role during Mubarak’s reign kept it away from popular criticism\textsuperscript{297}. This image was assured when the military abandoned Mubarak and sided with people. However, its reluctance to achieve

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{296} Ibid, 145.  \\
\textsuperscript{297} Albrecht & Bishara, “Back on Horseback”, 18
\end{flushleft}
the uprising’s demands along with its opaque and inconsistent strategy during transition as shown above, has gradually caused the military’s credibility to decrease. Indeed, it turned from being a guardian of the uprising to a counter-uprising agent, replacing the slogan of ‘the people and the army are one hand’ raised after overthrowing Mubarak by ‘down with military rule’ in the last quarter of 2011. Soon after the March referendum and the release of SCAF’s second deceleration, protestors realized that SCAF would not take any reforms seriously except under pressure so they went back to streets almost every Friday. As shown in the previous chapter, the protests that took place starting from April until September have focused on hastening Mubarak’s trial and reforming the security apparatus, along other demands that aimed to rectify the track of transition. This led to increasing tensions between the SCAF and uprising forces. But starting from Masspero massacre on 9th of October, 2011, this tension turned to a violent clash between the two that escalated gradually till it reached a turning point by the Council of ministers demonstrations on 16th of December, 2011.

The Masspero incident was triggered by sectarian tensions. In a town at Aswan governorate, Muslim residents smashed part of an old church and set it on fire in order to protest the governor’s decision to re-build the ramshackle church. This urged a group of Christians to protest in front of the High Court on 4th of October, 2011 then to organize a sit-in by the state

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300 Said, The Paradox of Transition to Democracy under Military Rule, 426.
302 Nadia Abu El-A’nin, “Revealing the Third Party in Masspero Massacre”, Masr al-Arabia, 9 October 2013, http://www.masralarabia.com/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA/114377-%D9%86%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88
broadcasting headquarters, known as Masspero, until the government would respond to their demands of re-building the church\textsuperscript{303} and prosecuting perpetrators\textsuperscript{304}. Unfortunately, the military police attempted to break the sit-in resulting in 75 casualties, among which one was harshly beaten by the forces which raised Christians’ anger and urged them to organize a march to Masspero on 9\textsuperscript{th} of October\textsuperscript{305}. After the police failed to disperse the demonstrators\textsuperscript{306} by shooting in the air and using electric sticks against them, the protestors threw stones on the troops and set fire to one of the tanks, provoking the military police officers to use tear gas and bullets against them\textsuperscript{307}. Things get worse when some civilians with weapons joined the military troops and the clashes between the two extended till evening resulting in arresting some\textsuperscript{308} and in around 200 casualties and 23 martyrs, out of which 14 were smashed under armors and 9 were shot\textsuperscript{309}. The importance of this massacre lies in the fact that it was the first time for military police to violently repress a protest post-Mubarak, challenging the military’s positive image among the public.

With the rise of the debate over ‘constitution first vs. elections first’\textsuperscript{310} and the fear of some actors of the domination of a single actor in the coming parliamentary elections\textsuperscript{311}, the idea of issuing ‘supra-constitutional principles’ arose where all actors would agree on the main

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid
\textsuperscript{305} Abu El-A’nin, “Revealing the Third Party in Masspero Massacre”
\textsuperscript{306} Amina Abd El-A’al & Sara Rashed, “Details Published for the First Time on Masspero Massacre”, al-Mesryoon, 11 October, 2014, https://almesryoon.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA/572909-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%85%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B0%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88
\textsuperscript{307} Abu El-A’nin, “Revealing the Third Party in Masspero Massacre”
\textsuperscript{308} “Masspero Event: The State Prompt Sectarian Violence…”
\textsuperscript{309} Abu El-A’nin, “Revealing the Third Party in Masspero Massacre”
\textsuperscript{310} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 84
\textsuperscript{311} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 164
principles that the constitutional committee could not exceed\textsuperscript{312}. Indeed, the ‘Democratic Coalition for Egypt’ that included the FJP and El-Wafd, along with other parties, released a proposal of supra-constitutional principles in late June \textsuperscript{313}. This was followed by ten other proposals that were published\textsuperscript{314} such as: the Al-Azhar document, the El-Baradei document for human rights, etc\textsuperscript{315}. In an attempt to reach consensus among political actors, El-Fangary announced a communiqué on 12\textsuperscript{th} of July that called actors to meet for discussion\textsuperscript{316}. A round of discussions from 8\textsuperscript{th} to 25\textsuperscript{th} of August took place with 34 parties and a number of syndicates and movements, resulting in the release of a document named after Ali El-Selmi, deputy prime minister in November\textsuperscript{317}. As was the case with SCAF’s 2\textsuperscript{nd} declaration, political actors were surprised by some articles in the final draft that they had not discussed before such as the requirements upon which a constitutional committee would be elected\textsuperscript{318} and the intention to release such a document in a declaration in order to be binding for all actors\textsuperscript{319}. What made matters worse is article nine and ten\textsuperscript{xvi} which were criticized by most actors due to the

\textsuperscript{312} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 83-84
\textsuperscript{313} Samir Behairy, “Document of Democratic Coalition for Egypt”, \textit{El-Wafd}, 7 July 2011, http://alwafd.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A/67996-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%AC%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1
\textsuperscript{315} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 165-166
\textsuperscript{316} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 84
\textsuperscript{317} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 165-166
\textsuperscript{318} Ramy Nawar, “Publishes the Full Text of El-Selmi’s Document before Presenting it to SCAF…”, \textit{Al-Youm} 7, 16 November 2011, http://www.youm7.com/story/2011/11/16/%D9%86%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B5-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%80-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%84%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%B6%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89/53327
overwhelming rights it gave to the military. Accordingly, Islamists, especially the MB who had abstained from participating in previous demonstrations, called for the ‘One Demand or Transition of Power’ protest on 18th of November to oppose El-Selmi’s document. The Uprising Youth Coalition, 6 April, Kefaya, El-Tayyar El-Masry, El-Gabha, and founders of ‘Second Anger Friday’ FB page joined the Islamists on this day, while the National Association for Change and secularist parties such as El-Wafd and El-Tagammu abstained. The massive participation on this day and the coherence of the demands raised by Islamists and youth alliances returned the image of Tahrir Square during the 18 days. However, a dramatic shift took place by the end of the day. As suggested by the MB, most forces withdrew at the end of the day in order not to impede the parliamentary elections that were scheduled to take place in the coming week. Some revolutionary forces, however, along with the families of the uprising’s martyrs decided to continue a sit-in until the SCAF would respond to their demands. On the following day, security forces used violence to break up the sit-in, forcing protestors to flee to side streets such as Mohamed Mahmoud. After the military police succeeded to occupy Tahrir Square and its exits, many protestors went to Tahrir to support their companions, forcing the police to retreat to Mohamed Mahmoud. The police later attacked Tahrir and used tear gas, rubber bullets and cartouches against protestors, leaving around 1700 casualties and 10 martyrs. The excessive violence used against protestors raised their anger and encouraged others to join, resulting in six days of street war between military police and protestors that

Ibid
Ibid
Al-Sherif, “Position of revolutionary forces towards Mohamed Mahmoud events and its memorial”
Sadaka & Ta’lab, “Boycotted Parties Describe the Million as Kandahar Friday and Accuse Islamists for Seeking to Take over Power”
El-Kholi, “Mohamed Mahmoud: Memorial of resistance, blood and betrayal”.
Rabei El- Sa’adani, “7 days created the myth of Mohamed Mahmoud”
Ibid
became known as the battle of ‘Mohamed Mahmoud’\textsuperscript{328}, leaving around 50 martyrs and hundreds of wounded, where 60 lost their eyes along with 383 detainees\textsuperscript{329}. On 22\textsuperscript{nd} of November, Tantawi announced his acceptance of prime minister Sharaf’s resignation and asserted that the parliamentary elections would be held on time while the presidential elections would take place maximum by June 2012\textsuperscript{330} in response to the ‘National Salvation’ demonstration that was organized by 38 parties and movements\textsuperscript{331} including 6 April, the Sabahi presidential campaign\textsuperscript{332}, El-Gabha El-Salafia\textsuperscript{333}, El-Tahalouf El-Eshtraki\textsuperscript{334}, etc. with the absence of the MB that declared its abstention in order not to give a chance to those who were attempting to lure protestors to violence\textsuperscript{335}. Nonetheless, Tantawi’s speech came beyond most actors’ expectations and seemed irrelevant after the revival of clashes. Accordingly, the ‘Rescue Egypt’ initiative that included the Egyptian Social Democratic party, the Socialist Popular Coalition, the Egyptian Communists, El-Tagammu El-Watani El-Taqadomi El-Wahdawi, and Justice Parties along with the National Association for Change, the Egyptian Association for

\textsuperscript{328} Mahmoud Fayed, “Mohamed Mahmoud, memorial of MB betrayal to the uprising”.

\textsuperscript{329} Mohamed El-Kholi, “Mohamed Mahmoud: Memorial of resistance, blood and betrayal”.

\textsuperscript{330} Nibal El-Bora’ai, “Critical Moments in Egypt’s History between the Past and Present (Lahazat Fareqa fe Tarekh Masr bein El-Mady wel Hader)”, (Cairo: Dar Al-Ahram, 2012), 414-415. To see Tantawi’s speech: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2p99n3_%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B7%D9%86%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A_news


Social Participation, etc. called for a ‘Last Opportunity’ protest on 25th of November. 6 April, the Revolution Youth Coalition, El-Tayyar El-Masry, Kefaya, the Union of Youth Rebels, etc. declared their participation as well. As had been the case with the ‘National Salvation’ protests, the MB announced that it would not participate so as to pacify the situation and let the transition of power go through elections as planned. Along with the demands raised earlier, actors called on the SCAF to hand over power to a national salvation government that would have all the powers to run the transition period until the parliamentary and presidential elections, to reform the Interior Ministry, to prosecute those involved with shooting protestors, etc. The selection of Kamal El-Ganzouri, “a Mubarak-era prime minister”, as the new prime minister raised the anger of some forces who decided to sit-in in front of the Council of Minister’s headquarter, leading to a new massacre as we will see. Mohamed Mahmoud was critical with respect to the relation between SCAF and political forces from two aspects. First, the support of Islamists, particularly the MB, to the ‘One Demand’ protest on 18th of November was the “first public break with SCAF” since they abstained from participating in previous demonstrations and kept themselves away from criticizing its performance since Mubarak’s overthrow. However, the MB’s abstention from participating in the events later can be seen as an attempt to show their mobilization power without triggering SCAF’s anger at the time of parliamentary elections that they were certain to win. Second, the events have challenged SCAF’s rule after protestors explicitly raised slogans such as: “Down with the Field Marshal,” “the People will

336 “Political Actors and Parties Call for Last Opportunity next Friday”, Middle East Panorama, 23 November 2011, http://mepanorama.net/12870
338 El-Bora’ai, “Critical Moments in Egypt’s History between the Past and Present”, 418.
339 Sha’aban & Fathy, “With Pictures….El-Tahrir is getting ready for Last Opportunity”.
340 El-Amrani, “Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State”.
342 El-Amrani, “Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State”.
prosecute Tantawi,” etc. for the first time, forcing SCAF to hasten the transition of power. Indeed, the military turned from being a guardian to a counter-revolutionary actor, revealing a critical break between them and some political forces, specifically revolutionary forces.

Over the next two weeks, protestors continued their sit-in in front of the Prime Minister’s office to protest the appointment of El-Ganzouri and to pressure SCAF to respond to the other demands raised earlier. On 16th of December, a protestor falsely “kicked a football into the gardens of Parliament and climbed over the gate to fetch it. After being detained by military police for several hours, he was returned to the protesters bruised and beaten” which raised their anger. Indeed, protestors on one side and uniformed soldiers and men in civilian cloth on the other side kept on throwing rocks at each other, leading to a round of clashes between the two for five days. SCAF issued a communiqué claiming that protestors have attacked a soldier who was securing the Parliament, raising the anger of his companions who intervened to break the sit-it while El-Ganzouri argued that there were anonymous actors who were intentionally preventing the security situation from improving. However, some videos have revealed that some soldiers and men with civil clothes were throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails upon the protestors’ heads from the roofs of nearby buildings, along with using snipers to shoot on protestors, resulting in 18 martyrs and 1917 casualties over the five days. What mostly triggered people’s anger is the

343 Ibid
344 Ibid
346 El-Amrani, “Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State”.
347 Abdallah El-Shafe‘i. “Council of Ministers events from the Beginning till the Sentence of Life”. Dotmsr. 4 February 2015. http://www.dotmsr.com/details/%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%A%7%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1.%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A%8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%A8%D8%AF
scene of brutally stomping a women and stripping her cloth. Under the title of “Egypt’s Freewomen...Rad El-Sharaf”, 16 parties and alliances which included El-Wasat, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Tayyar El-Masry, Egyptian Democratic, Uprising Youth Coalition, Union of Youth Rebels, 6 April, National Association for Change, etc. protested the brutality of military officers against protestors and the shame of assaulting women under the slogan of ‘Egyptian women are red line’. They called for resignation of El-Ganzouri, the prosecution of those who killed protestors, setting political detainees free, and hastening the transition of power. As had been the case with Mohamed Mahmoud, Islamists, including the MB, El-Gama’a El-Islamiyah, El-Asalah boycotted the protest, with the MB arguing that it did not want to escalate the situation and that the only way to pacify it was to prosecute those involved in the shooting of protestors and to accelerate the democratic transition of power to civilian bodies. While El-Nour Party declared that it would symbolically participate in a march from Al-Azhar to Tahrir under the slogan of “Free Egyptian Women,” but would not partake in a protest against SCAF under the slogan of “Rad El-Sharaf”. Accordingly, this event resembled a breaking point between the military and uprising ary forces where the military became impatient toward frequent criticisms of its performance especially when they challenged its rule and it “moved from praising the uprising ary youth as heroes to labeling them as destructive agents”. While Egyptians were

348 Badr, “4 Years after Council of Ministers Event”.
351 Ibid
353 “National Association for Change Participates in Friday of ‘Egypt’s Free Women’ and MB rejects”.
354 “Egypt: Rally Protests in Rad El-Sharaf Friday”.
astonished by the brutal behavior of military soldiers which did not differ from that of police, hitting to the core of the military’s legitimacy and credibility especially after assaulting women. Not only this, the events intensified the mistrust between the uprising ary forces and Islamists who turned their back to their companions once they achieved a tremendous victory in PA elections despite the fact that their companions’ demands were related to women’s rights.

**Conclusion**

This chapter started by the military’s position under Mubarak who adopted a less complex control system than his predecessors. After the military had already been tamed, Mubarak depended on material privileges to secure its loyalty. Hence, he offered officers post-retirement positions in the bureaucracy which allowed them to generate more income and he institutionalized their economic empire which preserved the military’s economic autonomy vis-à-vis the regime. Taking everyone by surprise, the military intervened gradually in the 2011 mass demonstrations and was reluctant to topple Mubarak until this became the only option. Trying to explain the military’s behavior, Albrecht argued that Mubarak and his son failed to build personal connections with the military which did not encourage it to bear the costs of repressing the uprising especially if we took into consideration its economic independence. While Kandil claimed that officers were suffering from rank disequilibrium under Mubarak and hence, were supportive of the uprising forcing SCAF to defect from Mubarak in order to maintain military’s coherence. Further, Koehler argued that militaries which face competition from rival regime institutions as resembled in Gamal’s economic policy and police hegemony will defect from incumbents in the face of uprisings. Whereas it is difficult to point to a single reason behind military’s intervention, no one can deny that it was an opportunity for the military to return its role as a king maker and to preserve its interests.

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356 El-Amrani, “Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State”.
Trying to balance between those interests and those of different political actors in a new volatile environment along with “military’s own characteristics that prefers stability, tends toward secrecy and is hostile to dissent”\textsuperscript{357}; SCAF’s strategy was inconsistent which further contaminated the path of transition as shown in section two. Based on Lust’s theoretical framework that examined the dynamics of government-opposition relations through Structures of Contestation (SoC) established by incumbents, SCAF adopted a divided SoC\textsuperscript{xvii} as Mubarak even if it seems the opposite (i.e. unified SoC)\textsuperscript{xviii}. Being forced to govern in an open environment where each actor demands a say, SCAF had no other option but to “manage such political expansion except by including moderate groups”\textsuperscript{358}. Worth mentioning, radicals are those actors who prefer policies far from the status quo while moderates are the ones who seek less reform\textsuperscript{359}. Indeed, SCAF’s interests coincided more with that of Islamists than that of uprising ary forces since the latter sought uprising ary demands that would challenge the authoritarian pillars of the 1952 regime, while the former were known for their reformist discourse and preferred to preserve the state especially given that they were likely to win political power. Taking this into consideration, along with Islamists’ strong organization and mobilization capabilities, the SCAF made sure to gain them as allies against the revolutionary forces\textsuperscript{360}. But unlike Mubarak who allowed some political parties -whom Albrecht referred to as a loyal opposition- to join the formal political sphere while excluding the MB who was only allowed to perform underground\textsuperscript{361}, SCAF was aware –intentionally or accidentally- that “incumbents can determine

\textsuperscript{357} Abd Rabou, “Civil-military relations in the Middle East”, 101.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid, 73.
\textsuperscript{360} Abd Rabou, “Civil-military relations in the Middle East”, 101.
\textsuperscript{361} Lust. “Structuring Conflict in the Arab World”, 67.
which opposition groups exist or disappear and can influence their incentives to unite or split by
the rules they make and the institutions they establish”

In less than a month after Mubarak, Egyptians found themselves in front of ballot boxes
to vote on the amendments that were made by a constitutional committee appointed by SCAF.
The composition of the committee which lacked representation of different political spectrums
with the exception of Islamists and the very first balloting have “opened the first rift between the
revolutionary forces, who demanded a new constitution and the Islamists, who supported
SCAF’s gradual approach of amending the 1971 constitution”

The release of the SCAF’s declaration two weeks after the referendum opened the door for an intensive debate between
Islamists who adopted an ‘election first’ path and uprising ary forces along with secularists who
adopted a ‘constitution first’ approach. The declaration came as a surprise for all because it did
not only adopt the elections first path as advocated by the Islamists, but also secured the SCAF’s
role in writing the coming constitution. Further, the SCAF adopted a parallel rather than a mixed
PR system as well as regional PR blocs instead of a national PR system in 2011/2012
parliamentary elections, making it difficult for post-uprising ary small parties to penetrate the
party system while making the victory of Islamists inevitable if we take into consideration the
capabilities of both. Hence, the election results have escalated conflict between Islamists and
uprising ary forces instead of encouraging cooperation within parliament. Moving to the last part
of section two, SCAF described the revolutionary youth as heroes and has grudgingly accepted
the frequent protests until it lost its patience and “reacted defensively once protestors’ demands
challenged its status” when they called for power transmission at the Mohamed Mahmoud and
Council of Ministers events. In addition, the MB’s abstention from joining other forces in

362 Ibid, 34-35.
363 Abd Rabou, “Civil-military relations in the Middle East”, 101-102
364 Sayigh, “Above the state”, 8.
protests against the SCAF with very few exceptions cannot solely be explained by its incentives, but also by examining the nature of an actor’s relation with the incumbent. As Lust argued, moderate opposition in divided SoC will be less willing to mobilize because “they prefer to maintain the status quo to either losing the privileges they have achieved if they exploited discontent to cause serious regime instability”\(^\text{365}\). Accordingly, the MB may have feared that if they allied with other forces against the SCAF, they would lose the privileges they had achieved in the parliament and were likely to obtain if they won the presidency, in addition to their influence on writing the coming constitution. Not to mention that if they challenged the military with other forces, they feared to be the main victims if we took into consideration the historical conflict between them and former regimes especially under Nasser. As a result, my assumption seems valid where SCAF has used rules and institutions that widened the gap between Islamists and uprising ary forces and impeded them from cooperation. At the same time, its divided SoC has influenced the MB’s strategy in a way that intensified the historical mistrust between them and other forces.

\textit{Chapter Three}

\textit{Youth movements and alliances and their relation with political parties}

\textit{prior and after 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising}

The Arab Spring has astonished the world not only due to its success in toppling longstanding dictators such as Ben Ali and Mubarak, but also due to the rise of new agents whose role was pivotal in changing the path of events. In the Egyptian case, for instance, the youth took the initiative by calling for protests and taking the risk of going to the streets, encouraging others to follow. And despite attempts made by traditional political forces, youth movements and alliances refused any type of negotiation with the regime until Mubarak would

\(^{365}\) Lust. “\textit{Structuring Conflict in the Arab World}”, 5.
step down, which contributed to his overthrow. Some scholars were astounded by this experience and hence they dealt with youth as if they were new political actors that entered the political scene. Accordingly, they focused on the role played by the youth during the days of protest while they left questions open for what role youth could play during the transition period. Conversely, other scholars argued that this new generation did not get politicized during the days of protest but that there were many precedents in the 2000s that provided this generation with an opportunity for politicization and for gaining some political space, paving by that the way to the uprising.

Despite the major role played by youth prior to the 25th January uprising and after, this did not change Egypt’s fate. The unification of the opposition during the 18 days did not last for long and the anti-Mubarak coalition re-fragmented soon after the toppling of Mubarak. Accordingly, this chapter will test the validity of one of the causal factors that I argue was behind the failure of the opposition to unite and organize itself especially in a political context that was in their favor compared to previous periods:

*The failure of political parties to form alliances with youth movements has enhanced the fragmentation of opposition and weakened them vis-à-vis remnants of the authoritarian regime*

This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will focus on youth movements that were formed prior to the uprising. The second section will be concerned with post-uprising youth alliances and movements whether those formed during the 18 days of protest or after the toppling of Mubarak and their relation with political parties post-Mubarak onwards.
Section One

Youth movements prior to the 25th January uprising

Due to Mubarak’s de-politicization policies in the 1990s, all forms of political activism seemed to be entirely absent. However, the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 broke the silence and led to the rise of social movements that swept the political spectrum. As El-Mahdi and Shehata along with others articulated, the 2000s can be divided into different phases: protest movements such as the Popular Committee to Support the Intifada that emerged from 2000 until 2003 were concerned with regional issues such as the Palestinian Intifada, the American invasion of Iraq, etc.; prodemocracy movements such as Kefaya and Youth for Change that were active from 2004 until the 2005 parliamentary elections; labor strikes that started in Mahalla in 2006 and the rise of 6th April movement; youth movements or mass media groups such as the Popular Campaign to support El-Baradei and We are All Khaled Said that proved effective since 2009 until the uprising. Despite these precedents, some authors were surprised by the uprising and would refer to it as a ‘sudden’ occasion. On the other hand, Albrecht and El-Mahdi along with others argue that all these movements helped in politicizing a new generation and in creating the fertile conditions for the uprising. Accordingly, this section will elaborate how these movements paved the way to the uprising and played a role in calling for protests.

1. The Egyptian movement for change/Kefaya movement:

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367 Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising”, Strategic Papers 218 (2011)
370 Ibid, 53-54.
Although, the Egyptian Movement for Change (EMC), or Kefaya (Enough), was only formed in September 2004, it had been in the making since the mid-1990s. This is due to the fact that its founders were involved in the 1970s student movement that swept Egyptian universities. But unlike older generations, they realized that “the ideologically based mistrust and animosity among Egypt’s older generation of political elites only serves to strengthen the ruling party’s ability to maintain its monopoly of power.” Accordingly, they organized informal national dialogues throughout the 1990s in an attempt to build bridges between political actors from different spectrums. Such efforts ended up with a document by twenty-three activist that would represent the foundation for their mutual political action. The document was then open for signatures by public figures until it reached three hundred and Kefaya was announced by September 2005. Taking into consideration the political background of its founders, it is unsurprising that Kefaya’s founders came from the far left to the far right to include Nasserists (El-Karama), Marxist-Socialists (The Revolutionary Socialist Organization), liberals (Al-Ghad), Islamists (Al-Wasat and the Egyptian Islamic Labor) and some independent figures as George Ishaq, Bahaa’ Taher, Alaa’ El-Aswani, Abdul Mone’m Abul-Fotoh, Hamdeen Sabahy, etc.

Worth mentioning, the movement was not a coalition of political parties due to two main reasons: first, public figures joined Kefaya on an individual basis independent of their parties; second, all parties mentioned above were not yet legalized with the exception of Al-Ghad.

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372 Ibid, 179
373 Ibid, 182-183
374 Ibid, 185
375 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 56
377 El-Banna, Divided they Win?, 68
378 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 56
A few months after its first demonstration, Kefaya attracted young people for whom the movement was an alternative opposition channel to the mistrusted parties. Not only this, Kefaya represented a new phenomenon in Egyptian politics. According to Albrecht, Kefaya reflected a change in the red lines set by Mubarak since its demonstrations were not repressed by security despite their strong presence. El-Mahdi also argues that it was “the first time in fifty years that political liberalization” rather than economic or regional issues “would be the sole cause for mobilization.” In this regard, many critics argue what makes Kefaya demands different from those raised by other political actors. However, as Shorbagy emphasized it would be over-simplistic if we said that Kefaya was just targeting Mubarak because it rejected the rules of the game as a whole. In other words, Kefaya did not wait to take the government’s permission to go to streets, but instead created a new political space for itself away from the political parties that it considered as part of the regime, bypassing by that the legal framework that was set by the regime to maintain its monopoly over power.

Unfortunately, Kefaya started to fade away by 2006 due to several reasons, one of which is that the very characteristics that made Kefaya a unique phenomenon are the ones that threatened its sustainability. Although it was a cross-ideological movement, its “lack of programmatic coherence and common interest” among its ideologically diversified members made it difficult to keep them together “beyond the very term that united them.” Most importantly, depending on protests was important in the early stages of Kefaya, but maintaining it for an extended period of time has limited the movement’s ability to establish new forms of

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379 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 55
380 Holger Albrecht, Raging Against the Machine, 73-74
381 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 56
382 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 55
383 Shorbagy, The Egyptian Movement for Change-Kefaya, 190
384 Ibid
385 Ibid, 81-82
activism beyond the stage of breaking taboos. Further, the lack of organizational form created a conflict over decision-making especially between old and new generations, resulting in the emergence of dissent sub-movements such as Youth for Change.

**Youth for Change:**

Youth for change was established in February 2005 by a group of youth activists who were mainly students, unemployed graduates, and young professionals. Although, it “elected its own coordination committee and organized separate activities”; it still operated under Kefaya and assisted in organizing its events. Nonetheless, what differentiated Youth for Change from Kefaya was that the former ensured to include youth demands that were neglected by Kefaya such as restoring democracy inside universities, guaranteeing equality of opportunity, and access to education, health care, housing and employment. Besides, what made the movement different from any former movement was that it was the first time that people organized themselves on an age basis rather than class, ideology, or geographic location as the only criteria for joining the movement was to be under thirty. Youth for Change did not only resemble the emergence of generational politics but also represented a new era where internet played a major role in building connections between activists since it depended on blogging to spread its latest news. Unfortunately, this unique experience did not last for an extended period. After the 2005 parliamentary elections, the conflict between Kefaya and Youth for Change escalated due to their

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386 Shorbagy, The Egyptian Movement for Change-Kefaya, 191-192
387 Albrecht, Raging Against the Machine, 81-82
388 Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising”, 15
389 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 57
391 El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 57
392 Ibid
conflicting views toward the regime and the former’s willingness to interfere in the latter’s affairs, leading to the latter’s disintegration.\footnote{Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising ”, 2011, 17}

2. 6 April movement:

After the 2005 parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s regime adopted restrictive laws in an attempt to close the public space in front of opponents. Instead, the new generation of activists succeeded to bypass those restrictions by regrouping in social media\footnote{Albrecht, Raging Against the Machine, 82-83} and adopting a cross-ideological discourse that allowed ideologically diversified activists to work together.\footnote{Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising ”, 2012, 105}

In December 2006, the workers at the biggest weaving and spinning factory in Egypt in El-Mahalla city declared a strike to protest not receiving the bonus payment promised by Nazif’s government.\footnote{Rabab El-Mahdi, “Against marginalization: Workers, Youth, and Class in the 25 January Uprising ”, in Marginality Exclusion Egypt Middle East, ed. Ray Bush and Habib Ayeb (London, GBR: Zed Books, 2012), 140} This was followed by a wave of labor protests and strikes in other industries that swept Egypt till 2009.\footnote{Ibid}

On 23\textsuperscript{rd} of March 2008, Al-Ghad party activist, Israa Abd El-Fattah established a FB group in coordination with Ahmed Maher\footnote{Ibid} in order not only to support the El-Mahalla labor strike that was expected to take place on 6\textsuperscript{th} of April but also to call for a general strike all over Egypt.\footnote{Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising ”, 2011, 20} Besides Israa and Maher, the other twenty founders were associated with the Popular Movement for Supporting the Palestinian Intifada, Youth for Change, Al-Ghad and Labor Parties.
along with some independent youth\textsuperscript{399}. On 28\textsuperscript{th} of June, they declared the establishment of 6 April Movement and re-named the FB group formed earlier by Israa\textsuperscript{400}.

Introducing itself as an exclusive youth movement, 6 April had around 2000 active members in twelve governorates by 2009, according to Maher\textsuperscript{401}. After the expansion of its social base, 6 April broadened its goals so they no longer focused exclusively on labor strikes nor were they only focusing on Mubarak. Rather they sought to change the regime as a whole (i.e. rules of the game)\textsuperscript{402}. To achieve this goal, 6 April found it necessary to raise people’s awareness of the Mubarak regime’s corruption. In its annual ‘Minority Conference’ which took place in parallel to the NDP annual conference, 6 April addressed “the NDP reports with real numbers and facts that scrutinize[d] the deteriorating socio-economic conditions”\textsuperscript{403}. Besides, it arranged protests on 6\textsuperscript{th} of April of each year, initiated the ‘Your voice is your demand’ campaign, and joined a number of events with other movements\textsuperscript{404}. But unlike previous movements, 6 April depended heavily on social media to mobilize people\textsuperscript{405}.

Despite its initial success, conflicts started to emerge between its members leading to the movement’s first division in 2009. First, disputes arose over the movements’ priorities. While a group of Pan-Arabists argued that it should focus on Arab causes, other activists maintained that the priority was to topple the regime and to adopt dramatic changes in the economy, health and education\textsuperscript{406}. Second, contention escalated when 6 April received an invitation from the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{399} Ibid, 19-20
\textsuperscript{400} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising \textquotedblright, 2011, 20
\textsuperscript{401} Ibid
\textsuperscript{402} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising \textquotedblright, 2012, 21
\textsuperscript{403} El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 72
\textsuperscript{404} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising \textquotedblright, 2012, 115
\textsuperscript{405} El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 57
\textsuperscript{406} El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 72-73
\end{flushright}
Department of State\textsuperscript{407} to participate in the Freedom House conference\textsuperscript{408}. Since its foundation, 6 April had refused any foreign intervention and hence its members voted for rejecting the invitation. However, two of its members insisted on accepting it\textsuperscript{409}. The Pan-Arab group declared a new movement called ‘You will not Pass’ to prevent these members from traveling to USA and to reject Obama’s visit to Cairo. Maher tried to maintain 6 April cohesiveness by dismissing them and declaring that this movement was not related to the mother one.

After 2009 the movement succeeded to reconstruct itself and expand its support base by forming student groups in twelve governorates by January 2010 to train them on “means of non-violent peaceful change, campaigning and mobilization, organizing protest, marshes, demonstrations and strikes”\textsuperscript{410}. In the same year, 6 April successfully associated itself with the Presidential Campaign of El-Baradei where it used its FB page to collect signatures on El-Baradei’s call ‘Together We Will Change’ and to announce the campaign’s events\textsuperscript{411}.

Unfortunately, the uprising catalyzed the internal disputes between 6 April members leading to its split into 6 April movement headed by Maher and the Democratic Front headed by Tarek El-Kholi\textsuperscript{412}. Prior to the uprising, some members were dissatisfied by the way the movement was operated\textsuperscript{xxiii} and they argued that institutionalizing the movement was the only solution. Post-Mubarak, the dissenting members renewed their call for institutionalism along with holding new elections, deciding on new procedures for membership, and rules of labor division\textsuperscript{413}. The political office emphasized that 6 April became one of the most influential actors

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{407} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising ”, 2011, 25
\bibitem{408} El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 72
\bibitem{409} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising ”, 2011, 25
\bibitem{410} El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 73
\bibitem{411} Ibid, 74.
\bibitem{413} Ibid, 86-87
\end{thebibliography}
on the political arena and hence, any internal changes in the movement’s structure might lead to its destabilization\textsuperscript{414}. Besides that, the office favored postponing the acceptance of new members because it did not have time to filter the applicants -to exclude members who may be working with security or intelligence apparatuses- while responding to the changing environment post-uprising \textsuperscript{415}.

3. \textit{Popular Campaign to Support El-Baradei/National Association for Change:}

With the 2011 presidential elections approaching, activists seeking change started to suggest some names that could have been an alternative to Mubarak such as El-Baradei. Thus, in December 2009, El-Baradei announced that he was willing to run for elections if the constitution was amended to ensure fair and free elections. His call was met by about 45 FB groups to support him but the most important one was that established by Abd El-Rahman Youssef\textsuperscript{xxiv}. This group attracted around 250,000 participants in the subsequent months and became later the official group for Baradei’s presidential campaign.

After his arrival in February 2010, El-Baradei met around 30 activists including Abu El-Ghar, El-Aswani, Ishaq, etc. along with leaders of El-Ghad, El-Gabhah, El-Karama, El-Wasat parties and the MB to announce the foundation of the ‘National Association for Change’. After its foundation, El-Baradei met with FB activists along with 6 April, Calling for my Rights and 9 March movements. All these meetings resulted in a ‘statement for change’ that included demands to ensure fair and free elections asking citizens to approve and sign. The National Association, with the support of the Popular Campaign and 6 April, organized a number of

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{414} Ibid, 87  
\textsuperscript{415} Ibid, 87-88}
events to introduce El-Baradei to the public and to convince them to sign the statement. Prior to the uprising, the number of signatures reached 800,000\(^\text{416}\).

4. ‘We are All Khaled Said’ Facebook Group:

By 2010, political activism had become clearly anti-regime whether in terms of how groups identified themselves or in the demands they raised\(^\text{417}\). Yet, the rise of ‘We are All Khaled Said,’ a group that never identified itself as political, represented a major challenge to the regime\(^\text{418}\). According to El-Mahdi, its focus on quality of life issues rather than ideology, geography, or class, hit the core of the regime\(^\text{419}\).

Although the brutal murdering of Khaled Said by police officers was not the first incident of police brutality against civilians, it was the snowball that galvanized public dissent against Mubarak’s police state. Torturing Said to death because he posted videos on FB that scrutinized the illegal practices of a police officer was unacceptable to the youth\(^\text{420}\). Accordingly, two anonymous activists, Wael Ghoneim and Abdel Rahman Mansour\(^\text{421}\) -who would only be known post-uprising and who were members of the El-Baradei campaign\(^\text{422}\)- founded a FB group called ‘We are All Khaled Said’ on July 10th, 2010\(^\text{423}\). Although they never identified themselves as a political group, their attempt to mobilize mainstream support around Said’s case and later to scrutinize police practices was “in every sense political”\(^\text{424}\). Under the hashtag ‘He could have been your brother’\(^\text{425}\), the page succeeded to attract around 300,000 followers in a few months,

\(^{416}\) Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\(^\text{th}\) January uprising ”, 2012,116
\(^{417}\) El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 63
\(^{418}\) Ibid, 63-64
\(^{419}\) Ibid, 64
\(^{420}\) Ibid
\(^{421}\) Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\(^\text{th}\) January uprising ”, 2011, 30
\(^{422}\) El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 64
\(^{423}\) El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 75
\(^{424}\) El-Mahdi, Egypt: A Decade of Ruptures, 64
\(^{425}\) El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 76
becoming by that the largest FB page. The group “held several demonstrations and campaigns to protest against human rights violations and to call for punishing Said’s culprits”.

The fraudulent 2010 parliamentary elections, the church bombing in Alexandria on Christmas night, and the torture of Sayyed Belal to death by police officers, urged the page founders to call for protests on 25th January 2011, national police day. The call was attended by 27,000 on ‘We are all Khaled Said’ only, but in collaboration with other pages as that of 6 April’s ‘My name is Khaled Said’, the call reached a half million on FB. The pages set five demands for 25th January: “raising minimum wages, improving health and education services, abolishing the emergency law, firing Minister of Interior Habib el-Adly, and placing two term limit on the presidency”. These were the initial demands raised by protestors; however, the success of the Tunisian uprising along other factors encouraged them to call for Mubarak to step down.

Section Two

Post-uprising Youth Alliances and their relation with political parties

If it is easy to count and identify the social movements that existed before 25th January uprising, it is almost impossible to do the same in the post-uprising period. The success of protestors’ sit-in at Tahrir Square for continuous 18 days broke all the red lines set by Mubarak and allowed protestors to conquer the public space that was once restricted. Further, the political void left by toppling Mubarak and the protestors’ high expectations and enthusiasm led to the establishment of around 135 youth alliances during the 18 days and post-Mubarak that were all

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426 Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising”, 2011, 29
427 Ibid, 29-30
428 El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 83
429 Ibid
claiming to be representative of the rebels. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify all these alliances and hence, I will mainly focus on the most prominent ones. These alliances can be categorized into two categories: cross-ideological reform alliances and ideological reform alliances. The reason behind choosing this dichotomy (cross-ideological vs. ideological) is that most youth alliances are almost identical with respect to their names and demands. Thus, what differentiates them from one another is the political background of their founders. While the term ‘reform alliances’ is introduced by Kraetzschmar as one type of joint opposition actions that were prevalent in the Middle East. Reform alliances “seek to tackle a whole range of policy areas usually packaged in a common program of reform demands towards the authoritarian incumbent” while single-issue alliances are often “time-bound to a specific event or policy”.

Accordingly, post-uprising youth alliances are close to reform alliances in the sense that they do not restrict themselves to political demands but also raise economic, social and constitutional demands. Besides, they were not bounded to a specific event as the uprising rather they were politically active at least in the first phase of the transition period since they were seeking a radical change of the regime.

1. Cross-ideological reform alliances:

At Tahrir and other squares, Egyptians from far right to far left succeeded to unite against Mubarak. Even after his resignation, they succeeded in sustaining their unity for a short period of time in the form of cross-ideological alliances which they formed during the 18 days onwards. These alliances included the Revolution Youth Coalition, the Union of Youth Rebels, the Council of Revolution Trustees, the Front for Supporting the Revolution, and the Organizational

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Committee of 25\textsuperscript{th} January Masses. In the following lines, I will compare these alliances with respect to the time of their foundation, their purpose, and the political background of their founders.

Although the Revolution Youth Coalition or Coalition of 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolution (I’tlaf Shabab El-Thawra) was officially founded on 6\textsuperscript{th} of February, 2011, it was established two weeks prior to 25\textsuperscript{th} January by political actors who called for and participated in the uprising\textsuperscript{432}. Indeed, it is not surprising that it would be the major youth coalition post-uprising, since it included nationalist, socialist, Islamist, and liberal youth\textsuperscript{433}. The idea of the coalition arose when some actors such as the MB, Al-Wafd, El-Tagammu and those who formed the committee of Wise Men\textsuperscript{xxvii} agreed to enter into negotiations with the newly appointed vice president, Omar Soleiman\textsuperscript{434}. Accordingly, the founders thought of the importance of uniting the rebels under one entity and unifying their demands specifically, their insistence on not negotiating with the regime until Mubarak would step down\textsuperscript{435}. Post-Mubarak, their focus shifted to observing the achievement of uprising ary goals and exerting pressure on incumbents to achieve the goals that weren’t achieved yet\textsuperscript{436}.

On 30\textsuperscript{th} of January, the Union of Youth Rebels (Ethad Shabab El-Thawra) was founded by a group of independents and youth from different political parties. What makes it different

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{432} El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30th June”. \textsuperscript{433} Omar Samir Khalaf, “Political participation for youth after the uprising “, Arab Forum for Alternatives, 25\textsuperscript{th} May, 2013, pp. 5 \textsuperscript{http://afaegypt.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=347:%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9&Itemid=282#.V3qVjP197IU} \textsuperscript{434} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising “, 2012, 120. \textsuperscript{435} El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30th June”. \textsuperscript{436} Ahmed Fathy, Mohamed El-Fiky & Ahmed Eiwas, “The uprising that produced 6 alliances in 18 days”, Ikwan Wikipedia, 21 June, 2016, http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%89-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%AA-6-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7 \textsuperscript{83}}
from the former coalition is that the majority of its members belonged to the nationalist and leftist spectrums. Nonetheless, their goals were almost identical in that they sought to maintain the uprising’s gains and to follow the achievement of its demands. Two days after toppling Mubarak, the Front for Supporting the Revolution (Gabhat Da’am El-Thawra) was founded to unite all political actors who supported the uprising but what differentiated it from the other groups was that it regarded itself as a mediator between political actors and incumbents. Beside these alliances, some had more logistical than a political nature. At Tahrir, there were three main powers who tried to inspire and influence the protestors through their broadcasts: one for Uprising Youth, other for the MB, and another for Free Egypt Coalition. In an attempt to coordinate between them, the Organizational Committee for 25th January Masses (El-Lagna El-Tansyqia L’Jamaher El-Thawra) was established by the five main alliances founded during the 18 days and later expanded to include other alliances and independents. The organizational committee played a vital role during the transition in planning for the subsequent demonstrations, coordinating between the alliances to unite their actions and demands, and organizing for these demonstrations logistically. Another coalition known as the Council of Revolution Trustees (Majles Omna’a El-Thawra) was formed during the 18 days but it became more prominent post-purging Friday on 25th February, when it declared that it would not participate in this demonstration because it argued that Egyptians must give a chance to Sharaf government and the SCAF to achieve uprising’s demands.

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437 Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising”, 2011
438 Ahmed Fathy, Mohamed El-Fiky & Ahmed Eiwas, “The uprising that produced 6 alliances in 18 days”.
439 El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30th June”.
440 Heba Sa’ed, “Formed after 11th February and its meetings were held in secrecy…Organizational Committee, how internal disputes occurred?”, Al-Ahram, http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Al-Ahram-Files/News/131369.aspx
441 Ibid
443 Heba Sa’ed, “Formed after 11th February and its meetings were held in secrecy…”
As we will see in the next section, youth alliances are not only identical with regard to their founding purpose, but also with regard to the demands they raised. Worth mentioning, Revolution Youth Coalition is the only coalition that succeeded to attach itself to the uprising’s demands and to be the most representative of the political discourse adopted by youth rebels till its dissolution in July 2012\(^{444}\).

With respect to the alliances’ founders and their backgrounds, all alliances were a combination of independent youth, public figures, parties and social movements but what might differentiate these alliances from each other is who is the hegemonic party. Accordingly, the previously mentioned alliances can be divided into three categories: youth-hegemonic alliances, public figures-hegemonic alliances and mixed alliances.

Among the five alliances, ‘Revolution Youth Coalition’ is the only one that represents youth-hegemonic alliances. It succeeded to keep a distance from political parties even if it included youth from El-Ghad, El-Tagammu, El-Gabha, El-Karama, and El-Wafd\(^{445}\). It also included youth from the MB, Freedom and Justice Movement, 6 April, Popular Campaign to Support El-Baradei, Together We Will Change, and National Association for Change. For such reason, it succeeded to gain people’s support\(^{446}\). Its executive office included ten youth who would represent the coalition and be responsible for coordinating with parties. These members were Islam Lotfy and Mohamed El-Qasas (MB), Mostafa Shawki and Khaled El-Sayed (Justice and Development), Amr Ezz and Tarek El-Kholi (6 April), Zyad El-Elaimy and Bassem Kamel (Popular Campaign), Khaled Talimah (El-Tagammu), Hossam Mo’nis (El-Wafd), Amr Salah

\(^{444}\) Omar Samir Khalaf, “Political participation for youth after the uprising “, pp. 5
\(^{445}\) Ibid
\(^{446}\) Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising “, 2011
and Ahmed Abd Rabou (El-Gabha), Nasr Abd El-Hamid (National Association for change)\textsuperscript{447} along with, some independents as Abd El-Rahman Faris and Sally Tomah\textsuperscript{448}.

In contrast, public figures-hegemonic alliances such as the ‘Front for Supporting the Revolution’ and the ‘Council of Revolution Trustees’ included members who belonged to older generations. The former was composed of figures such as Abou El-Fotouh, El-Baradei, El-Baltagi, Ayman Nour, George Ishaq, Hamdeen Sabahy, etc\textsuperscript{449}. Whilst, the latter’s board of trustees had a good representation of MB as it included El-Baltagi, Sobhi Saleh, Khaled Oda and Safwat Hegzay in addition to eighteen members from different political backgrounds such as El-Aswani, Belal Fadl, etc\textsuperscript{450}. Besides, the front was composed of National Association for Change, Popular Parliament, and Egyptian Association for 25\textsuperscript{th} January rebels\textsuperscript{451} along with youth figures as: El-Elaimy, Shady El-Gazali, Maher, Islam Lotfy, Sally Tomah, Abd El-Rahman Faris, etc.\textsuperscript{452}.

On the other hand, the council’s board of trustees was composed of thousands youth who have been members of the administrative councils at Tahrir Square while its executive office was headed by 3 youth: Ahmed Naguib, Sayed Abou El-Ala, and Hamza Abou A’isha\textsuperscript{453}.

Lastly, mixed alliances such as the ‘Union of Youth Rebels’ and the ‘Organizational Committee of 25\textsuperscript{th} January masses’ were composed of both political parties and social movements. The former has included parties who mostly belong to the leftist and nationalist spectrum as El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, El-Arabi El-Nasri, El-Gabha, Reform and Development,

\textsuperscript{447} Uprising Youth Coalition official page on Facebook  https://www.facebook.com/Uprising.coalition/info/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item\&tab=page_info
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid
\textsuperscript{450} Mohamed Ismail & Aya Nabil, “Launch of Council of uprising trustees with the participation of MB”
\textsuperscript{451} El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30\textsuperscript{th} June”.
\textsuperscript{452} Naglaa Shawki, “Politicians and activists establish a front to support the Egyptian uprising “
Egyptian Communist, El-Ghad, El-Islah, New Leftist, and Masr parties⁴⁵⁴. Some movements also joined the union such as the Free Front, Revolution of Egyptian Youth, Renaissance of Egyptian Youth, 9 March, 11 February, Youth for Change, People’s Crowds, and Raheel⁴⁵⁵. While the organizational committee was initially formed by the five main alliances at Tahrir Square: Union of youth rebels, Free Egypt coalition, Coalition of Egypt’s rebels, Revolution of Youth Coalition, and Coalition of uprising trustees⁴⁵⁶. Then it expanded to include other alliances and movements as MB, Independent academics, Council of revolution trustees, Union of youth of faculty staff at public universities, 25th January youth movement, Voice of revolution coalition, Association of protecting national unity, and Free Egypt’s Copts⁴⁵⁷.

If it is reasonable that Kefaya, 6 April, National Association for Change, etc. have represented an alternative opposition channel to the mistrusted parties for youth prior to the uprising, it is surprising that they organized themselves under informal entities as cross-ideological alliances rather than political parties post-uprising. In other words, the legacy of mistrust between youth and parties resulted in the phenomenon of cross-ideological youth alliances that reached its peak during the 18 days of protest and the very few months after Mubarak until it faded away by 2012, when polarization between different actors swept political life. As shown, mixed alliances have opened the door for traditional parties and for pre-uprising movements who regarded these alliances as a good opportunity to re-participate in the political life and re-gain people’s trust. Instead of reforming their organizations to attract the new generation of activists, parties preferred to join the already established youth alliances, reflecting

⁴⁵⁴ Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising “, 2011
⁴⁵⁵ Ibid
⁴⁵⁶ “Organizational committee of uprising masses hold a conference tomorrow to call for stability Friday to support the government and SCAF…Uprising coalition defects”, Al-Ahram http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Al-Mashhad-Al-Syiassy/News/90917.aspx
⁴⁵⁷ Heba Sa’ed, “Formed after 11th February and its meetings were held in secrecy…”
by that the validity of my assumption. Further, the inclusion of parties have threatened the sustainability of these alliances because they are more likely to defect once an opportunity emerges especially that their different political backgrounds and their contradicting interests would make them not committed to the alliances’ purposes. In contrast, ‘Uprising Youth Coalition’ maintained its sustainability since it neither disintegrated nor disappeared as other youth alliances but it dissolved itself once the SCAF transferred power to the elected president. This is due to the fact that it succeeded to keep itself away from traditional parties and older generation, making it an exclusive youth coalition. Accordingly, my assumption seems valid in the sense that parties failed to reform their organizations to include youth activists on one hand and they enhanced opposition fragmentation on the other hand when they joined youth alliances while not being committed to their goals.

Nonetheless, my assumption has overlooked the reason behind the failure of youth alliances to unite under one entity, given that their goal and demands are almost identical. Looking at the membership of these alliances can provide us with a partial answer. As shown previously, the National Association for Change was present in three alliances at a time: the Revolution Youth Coalition, the Front for Supporting the Revolution, and the Organizational Committee of Revolution Masses. Also, parties such as El-Ghad, El-Tagammu, El-Wafd, and El-Gabha were represented in the Revolution Youth Coalition and the Union of Youth Rebels. Further, youth figures such as Islam Lotfy, Khaled El-Sayed, Amr Ezz, Zyad El-Elaimy, Amr Salah, Nasr Abd El-Hamid, Sally Tomah and Abd El-Rahman Faris were members in the Revolution Youth Coalition and the Front of Supporting the Revolution. Such overlap in the membership of the alliances has led to the rise of conflict among and between these alliances, weakening them vis-à-vis traditional actors such as the SCAF and the MB and hence preventing
them from achieving their main goal which was to pressure for and follow up the achievement of any goals.

2. **Ideological reform alliances:**

   a) **MB Youth:**

   After Mubarak stepped down, Egyptian society witnessed a kind of generational conflict with the rise of a new generation of youth who sought to change the status quo in a way that differed from older generations. Such conflict did not only rise between youth activists and older political figures, but also emerged within political entities themselves. Even if it is a very well organized movement, MB was not an exception and the opening space accompanied by the uprising gave a chance to all dissatisfied members -mostly youth- to call for institutional reform. Adding to that, the frustrating performance of the MB post-uprising gave an additional incentive for those members to complain and then defect when they realized that their reform demands hit a dead end. It is worth mentioning that MB youth are neither an independent entity of the MB nor a homogenous generational unit. Rather, they are a diversified category with respect to their religious thoughts, their commitment and views toward the MB, and their relation with other actors such as liberals and leftists.

   Unlike older generations, the MB youth showed more flexibility with liberal, leftist and national youth. Since the early 2000, the MB youth created their blogs and participated in different forms of youth activism starting from Kefaya, 6 April, We are All Khaled Said, National Association for Change, etc. Hence, it is unsurprising that the MB youth has

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460 Ibid
participated since day one in the uprising and were one of the groups that joined the first youth coalition, Revolution Youth Coalition\textsuperscript{462}. This was their stance despite the fact that the MB officially announced its participation only on 28\textsuperscript{th} January\textsuperscript{463} as leaders were not yet convinced that these demonstrations would lead to real change and hence, they agreed to negotiate with Omar Soleiman\textsuperscript{464}. Nonetheless, the MB youth who participated in the uprising cannot be regarded as one homogenous category. Instead, they can be divided into three spectrums: the left wing which is composed of mostly youth who later joined Abou El-Fottouh’s presidential campaign such as Mohamed El-Gabha, Mohamed El-Shahawy, Mohamed Heikel\textsuperscript{xxviii}; the centrist group which is composed of Islam Lotfy, Mohamed El-Qasas, Ahmed El-Nazari, etc.; and the right wing which includes Hassan Ezz El-Din, Mostafa El-Wahsh, Hossam Badawi, etc.\textsuperscript{xxix\textsuperscript{465}}. According to El-Azabawy, the left wing is considered the most significant group out of MB youth as they joined other youth since day one of the demonstrations\textsuperscript{466}. The center group participated starting from 24\textsuperscript{th} January while the right wing joined only by 28\textsuperscript{th} January\textsuperscript{467}.

Since they were both struggling against Mubarak, the conflict between MB and its youth did not come to the surface except after Mubarak stepped down and specifically when the MB announced on 21\textsuperscript{st} of February that it would establish its own party which would be later known as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The creation of the party itself was a natural political development for the MB post-uprising but many MB youth were against FJP simply because there was no independence between the party and the movement\textsuperscript{468}. Despite various assurances made by the MB leadership, the selection of the party leadership by the MB Shoura Council

\textsuperscript{462} Ibid
\textsuperscript{463} Doha Samir, “Muslim Brothers in Egypt”, 82
\textsuperscript{464} Ibid, 116
\textsuperscript{465} El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30\textsuperscript{th} June”.
\textsuperscript{466} Dina Hosni, “The Potential Rise of an Islamist Youth within 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolts”, 75
\textsuperscript{467} Ibid, 75
\textsuperscript{468} Dina Hosni, “The Potential Rise of an Islamist Youth within 25\textsuperscript{th} January Revolts”, 79.
instead of the party’s founders was just one indicator of the dependency of the two which increased the frustration of the MB youth along with old figures such as Abou El-Fotouh and El-Zafarani\(^{469}\). Adding to that, all attempts made by the MB youth to convince their leaders of reforming the method of party leadership selection or reforming the movement was met with deaf ears\(^{470}\). After losing hope of any kind of reform within the MB, some youth, such as Moa’az Abdul Karim, Mohamed El-Qasas, Islam Lotfy, Moas’ab El-Gammal, Mohamed Abbas and others announced the establishment of Al-Tayyar Al-Masry Party in May 2011 which they perceived as a different political project that sought to overcome ideological polarization by resembling the mainstream of Egyptian society\(^{471}\). Its founders also insisted to include youth from different political spectrums as Abd El-Rahman Faris (Kefaya) and Asmaa Mahfouz (6 April)\(^{472}\). Few days after firing Abou El-Fottouh who announced that he would run for the presidency despite the MB leadership’s decision of not nominating any of its members\(^{473}\), the Guidance office fired all members who joined Al-Tayyar Al-Masry on 14\(^{th}\) July, 2011 and declared that it would not allow any of its members to join any party other than FJP\(^{474}\).

2) **Union of Socialist Youth/ Ethad El-Shabab El-Eshtraki:**

According to Ahmed Belal, founder of the Union of Socialist Youth and a member of El-Tagammu, the idea of the union was present during the uprising but it was only founded on 16\(^{th}\) March, 2011 after the security break-up of Tahrir on 9\(^{th}\) March\(^{475}\). In its founding statement, the union asserted that the unification of Socialist youth is a necessity to confront the remnants of

\(^{469}\) Ibid, 80.

\(^{470}\) Ibid, 81-82 & 85-86

\(^{471}\) Doha Samir, “Muslim Brothers in Egypt”, 107-108.


\(^{474}\) Doha Samir, “Muslim Brothers in Egypt”, 107.

Mubarak’s regime who were struggling to not change the regime after Mubarak’s overthrow and to confront any political actors, especially Islamists, who were trying to influence the public through media, money, etc.\footnote{476 Union of Socialist Youth official page on Facebook \url{https://www.facebook.com/egy.socialist.youth/info/?entry_point=page_nav_about_item&tab=page_info}}.

Despite the uprising phase Egypt was passing through, the leftists were getting more fragmented than before due to the elitist character of their parties and the inflexibility of their leaders. Those leaders were not only acting paternalistically vis-à-vis youth within their parties and prohibiting them from reaching leadership roles, but were also engaging them into their personal conflicts with other parties\footnote{477 Ibid}. Hence, the coalition was an attempt to unite all Socialist youth away from the control of their party leaders and the restrictions set by traditional organizations such as parties\footnote{478 Ibid}. The coalition had almost 1200 members, some of which belonged to El-Nasri, El-Tagammu, El-Karama and Egyptian Communist Parties\footnote{479 El-Azabawy, “The youth from 25th January to 30th June”.}

3) Salafyo Costa:

Salafyo Costa is a social movement that was founded by a group of Salafis after the March referendum in an attempt to end the polarization and skepticism between Islamists and Secularists\footnote{480 Salafyo Costa, a history of policies against the trend”, Gate of Islamist movements, 17 April 2014, \url{http://www.islamist-movements.com/2464}} and to break up the typical image of the Salafis in Egyptian society\footnote{481 Sara Mahana, “Salafyo Costa to improve Salafi’s image…an interview by Arab news with Mohamed Tolba”, Al-Arab News, 23 November 2014, \url{http://www.al3rabnews.com/news-156254.html}}. In other words, its founders attempted to establish a movement that would include ideologically diversified members to create a suitable environment to get to know the ‘other’ and to respect differences. For this reason, the movement has set a quota for Christians (25%) and Salafis.
The inclusion of Christians, liberals, socialists and even communists was not the only reason that differentiated the movement from other Islamist movements, but also their inclusion of women and their political positions which were mostly against those of Islamists. In addition, Salafyo Costa adopted a different discourse than the typical Salafi one as it accepted different manifestations of modernity as its name indicates and believed in the modern state that is based on citizenship while limiting the role of the religion to the individual’s personal life. Based on this, it is not surprising that its founder, Salama, was El-Nour party’s (Salafi) media representative before he resigned on 18th of August, 2011 to work with El-Baradei, Ahmed Harrara and George Ishaq in establishing El-Dostour Party (liberal).

Although ideological reform alliances are different from each other in many aspects, they are all regarded as a kind of resistance by youth in opposition to their mother organizations. They were attempts by such youth to reject their leaders’ paternalism and the restrictions imposed by traditional organizations such as the MB, parties, and Salafi movements which hindered any type of cooperation with their political opponents. In other words, those youth realized that their mother organizations insisted on engaging them in their ideological and personal conflicts with their opponents while the prospects of cooperation between youth from different political spectrums proved to be high after they succeeded to cooperate together starting from early 2000s onwards. Accordingly, the foundation of their own organizations is just an indicator for the failure of leaders to co-opt youth within their organizations and to reform such organizations in

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482 “Salafyo Costa, a history of policies against the trend”.
483 Ibid
485 Mahmoud El-Gala’a, “One year after his death…Yosri Salama, the founder of Salafyo Costa”, Arab news network, 24 March 2014, http://www.moheet.com/2014/03/24/2034443/%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%88.html#.V41Twfl97IU
order to cope with their high expectations and the demands of the exceptional period in Egypt’s history. In addition, it proves that youth has more flexibility to deal and cooperate with their opponents than older generations. Based on this, my assumption which links the fragmentation of opposition to the failure of parties to co-opt youth seems valid.

As shown, organizing themselves under cross-ideological alliances rather than parties and forming their own organizations as represented in ideological alliances strengthened the plausibility of my assumption to a great extent. Thus, I will further test my assumption’s validity by looking at the demands raised by youth alliances in the different demonstrations that took place post-Mubarak and how parties responded to their demands. Due to the large number of these demonstrations which took place almost every Friday during 2011, after which their rate declined in 2012 and 2013 although they never completely stopped, I will focus only on some of the most significant demonstrations that reflect the nature of relation between youth alliances and parties.

Two months after the toppling of Mubarak, uprising activists became skeptical of the SCAF’s real intentions as Mubarak’s family and his ruling elite had not been accused yet of any political or criminal wrongdoing, the SCAF’s 2nd constitutional declaration had contradicted the March Referendum, and a government draft intended to prohibit factional strikes. Indeed, uprising ary groups went back to the streets on the 1st of April protesting under the title of ‘Rescuing the Revolution’ and on the 8th of April under the title of ‘Purging and Judgment’. The demands raised in the two demonstrations were almost the same: fast and just trials to Mubarak, 

486 Mahmoud Goma’a, “Call for ‘Rescuing of Uprising ’ Demonstrations in Egypt”, Al-Jazeera, 20 March , 2011, http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2011/3/30/%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B0-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1
Zakaria Azmy\textsuperscript{xxxii}, Fathy Sorour and Safwat El-Sherif\textsuperscript{xxxiii}; effective and fast procedures to return embezzled public money from abroad; sending those responsible for repressing protestors during the 18 days to trial; dissolution of the NDP and the local councils; firing of Yehia El-Gamal and Abd El-Magid Mahmoud\textsuperscript{xxxiii}; reformation of police; sending civilian detainees to civil, not military courts; and engaging all political actors in drafting the laws for parliamentary and presidential elections, etc.\textsuperscript{489}. Despite the homogeneity of demands, the ‘Organizational Committee of 25\textsuperscript{th} January Masses’ which included the MB and the Council of Revolution Trustees participated only at ‘Purging and Judgment’\textsuperscript{490}. According to the MB youth, they informed their leaders of the necessity of joining other forces in the ‘Rescuing the Revolution’ protest, especially after the SCAF had been given enough time to respond to activists’ demands\textsuperscript{491}. The MB refused to participate, claiming the short notice of its youth however, they insisted on participation as members of Revolution Youth Coalition\textsuperscript{492}. Others argued that the MB only participated in the second protest after the success of the first\textsuperscript{493} but the MB claimed that it participated as being a part of the Organizational Committee which called for this protest along others\textsuperscript{494}. Nonetheless, the MB refused the sit-in adopted by some actors claiming that the Organizational Committee did not agree on this issue\textsuperscript{495}. It is worth mentioning that the ‘Uprising

\begin{itemize}
\item 487 Ibid
\item 488 Islam Sa’ad, “Purging and Judgment Friday calls SCAF to fasten Mubarak and his family trial”, \textit{BBC}, 8 April, 2011, \url{http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/04/110408_cairo_demonstrations.shtml}
\item 489 Noura Fakhry, “Youth Coalition calls for Purging Friday 8 April”, \textit{Youm 7}, 4 April, 2011, \url{http://www.youm7.com/story/2011/4/4/384026/}
\item 490 Amr Abd El-Rahman, “Organizational Committee of Uprising Masses calls Egyptians to participate at Regime Purging Friday”, \textit{Misr El-Gedida}, 6 July 2011, \url{http://www.masress.com/misrelgdida/68621}
\item 491 Hany El-Wazeri, “El-Watan publishes MB Youth document on MB non-participation on 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising ” \textit{Al-Watan News}, 24 January 2013, \url{http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/118898}
\item 492 Ibid
\item 493 Jazeh Naguib, “Video for Abou El-Fotouh calling for participation in Purging and Judgment Friday at Tahrir and other squares all over Egypt”, \textit{El-Badil}, 6 April 2011, \url{http://www.masress.com/elbadil29000}
\item 494 Hany El-Wazeri, “MB: Purging Friday, a message to Mubarak and his regime remnants...we did not ask our supporters to sit-in”, \textit{Al-Masry Al-Youm }, \url{http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=293170}
\item 495 Ibid
\end{itemize}
Youth Coalition’ which includes the MB Youth, 6 April, National Association for Change along others have called for the two protests while Kefaya, Hashd and El-Eshtrakeen El-Thawreen have participated only in the first.

These two Fridays were followed by another protest that widened the gap between secularists and youth alliances on one hand and Islamists, specifically the MB, on the other hand. It took place on 27th of May under the title of ‘Second Anger Friday’ by Uprising Youth Coalition, Union of Youth Rebels, 6 April, Popular Campaign to Support El-Baradei, Kefaya, Popular Coalition, National Association for Change, MB Youth, El-Jihad El-Islami Youth along with liberal and leftist parties such as: El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Gabha, El-Karama, El-Nasri, Socialist Egyptian Democrat, Masr El-Horrrya, and El-Tagammu. The ‘Organizational Committee of 25th January Masses’ which included the MB gave its participants the right to decide what each perceives appropriate for its organization. The demands they raised included a stop of military trials to civilians, the hastening of trials for Mubarak and his ruling elite, firing of El-Gamal and ministers belonging to the former regime, determining the roles of National Security, drafting a law to ban former regime elite from participation in political life for a certain period, etc. Most importantly, the protestors sought to amend the road map set by the SCAF after the March Referendum where 6 April and most liberal parties called for electing a

500 Ashraf Azouz, Ahmed Sa’ed et al., “Tens of thousands participate in Second Anger Friday…”
502 Ashraf Azouz, Ahmed Sa’ed et al., “Tens of thousands participate in Second Anger Friday…”
constitutional committee before parliamentary elections. According to Hamzawi, liberal parties were calling for postponing the parliamentary elections for few months due to security circumstances and to give more time for public debate over ‘practicing of political rights’ and ‘political parties’ laws. Further, Shadi El-Ghazali Harb, a member of Revolution Youth, said that the coalition would suggest an initiative for electing a constitutional committee followed by presidential and parliamentary elections respectively. Since the MB and other Islamists as El-Gama’a El-Islamiyah were calling for approving the March referendum, it is unsurprising that they rejected this call. According to the March referendum and the SCAF’s 2nd constitutional declaration, the writing of a new constitution would take place after the parliamentary elections. However, secular parties and youth alliances were against this road map as shown because it would only be in favor of the MB. Indeed, the MB did not only oppose ‘Second Anger Friday’ but also, they regarded it as a ‘revolution against the public or its majority’, seeking to drive a wedge between the military and the people. According to Sobhy Saleh, a member of the MB and of the constitutional committee that had been appointed by the SCAF, the MB still supported the uprising’s demands but it was neither against the SCAF nor against the Sharaf government and hence would not participate in a protest that would raise a conflict with them. MB non-participation did not only raise conflict with other actors but also with its youth, especially with those who were part of Revolution Youth Coalition where they agreed after ‘rescuing the

505 Ibid
506 Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 76.
507 Mohamed Hassan Shaba’an, “Egypt’s MB oppose Second Anger Friday…”
508 “MB decide not to go to Tahrir Square on Second Anger Friday”, Al-Arabiya, 25 May 2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/05/25/150421.html
revolution’ protest that the MB would not declare its non-participation in any demonstration while giving the right to its members who are part of other alliances to participate as members of these alliances. Although the MB youth tried to convince their leaders of the necessity of MB participation after they successfully convinced other actors to stick to common demands and neglect the controversial ones, they were surprised by the MB decision not to participate and its insistence on issuing a statement despite their previous agreement. What made matter worse is that the Secretary General of the MB declared on 28th May that the MB does not have any representatives at Revolution Youth Coalition.

After several events, ‘One Demand or Transition of Power’ demonstration on 18th of November 2011 resembled a breaking point between youth alliances and Islamists, especially the MB. After many incidents that raised people’s skepticism towards the SCAF, the issuing of ‘Supra-Constitutional Principles’ by PM deputy, Ali El-Selmi with its ninth and tenth controversial articles that would give the military exceptional powers in the new constitution, resembled a snowball. Indeed, it gave an incentive for political forces to unite to oppose El-Selmi’s statement and to call on the SCAF to transfer power to an elected president no later than in April 2012. Although the Islamists including the MB, El-Gabha El-Salafya, Hazmoun,

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509 Hany El-Wazeri, “El-Watan publishes MB Youth document on MB non-participation on 25th January uprising”.
510 Ibid.
511 Doha Samir, “Muslim Brothers in Egypt”, 83.
513 Mahmoud Fayed, “Mohamed Mahmoud, memorial of MB betrayal to the uprising”, Al-Wafd, 16 November 2013, http://alwafd.org/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%80%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/573739-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9
514 Nariman Abd El-Karim, Mahmoud Goda et al., “Tahrir Millions toppled Mubarak…”
El-Nour, El-Asalah, Coalition of Egypt’s Islamist Youth⁵¹⁶, El-Wasa‘⁵¹⁷, etc. heavily participated on this day, the participation of ideological diversified forces have returned us back to the 18 days of the uprising when all actors were unified against Mubarak. Revolution Youth Coalition, 6 April, Kefaya, El-Tayyar El-Masry, El-Gabha, and founders of ‘Second Anger Friday’ FB page called for the protest and joined Islamists on this day⁵¹⁸. This was the first time that youth alliances agreed with the Islamists on the same demands with a prevalent absence for secular parties as El-Wafd, El-Tagammu, Egyptian Citizen, and Popular Coalition that rejected the demonstration and claimed that it was just a show of power by Islamists⁵¹⁹. As much as the ‘One demand’ protest was an occasion for unifying political forces, it became a reason for driving a wedge between youth alliances and Islamists, specifically the MB. This is because the MB has convinced most political forces to withdraw in order not to impede the parliamentary elections that would take place in the coming week, while uprising ary forces and families of uprising’s martyrs decided to stage a sit-in until the SCAF would respond to their demands⁵²⁰. Due to

⁵¹⁶Mohamed Ismail, Mohamed Hagag et al., “Political movements and actors prepare for 18th November million”, Youm 7, 16 November 2011, http://www.youm7.com/story/2011/11/16/%D9%82%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%9D%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D9%86%D9%88%D9%81%D9%85%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%B0%D8%B1/534037

⁵¹⁷Nayera Al-Sherif, “Position of uprising ary forces towards Mohamed Mahmoud events and its memorial”, Masrawy, 21 November 2014, http://www.masrawy.com/News/News_Various/details/2014/11/21/393555-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A7

⁵¹⁸Ibid

⁵¹⁹Hossam Sadaka & Ebtsam Ta’lab, “Boycotted parties describe the million as Kandahar Friday and accuse Islamists for seeking to take over power”, Al-Masry Al-Youm, 19 November 2011 http://today.almasryalyoum.com/article2.aspx?ArticleID=317928

⁵²⁰Mohamed El-Kholi, “Mohamed Mahmoud: Memorial of resistance, blood and betrayal”, Tahrir News, 18 November 2015, http://www.tahrirnews.com/posts/338817/%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89+%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%
security forces’ attempt to break up the sit-in by using violence, many joined their companions which resulted in six days of street war between the military police and protestors that became known as ‘Mohamed Mahmoud’. The escalation of events urged most political forces to call for the ‘National Salvation’ protest on 22nd November to call for replacing the Sharaf government with a national salvation government that would run the transition instead of the SCAF. On the 23rd of November, Field Marshal Tantawi gave a speech to announce his acceptance of Sharaf’s resignation and to insist on SCAF’s commitment to the running of parliamentary elections in its time while the presidential elections would take place before June 2012. However, Tantawi’s speech did not meet protestors’ expectations so they continued their sit-in and political forces called for the ‘Last Opportunity’ protest on 25th November to call SCAF to hand over power to a national salvation government that would have all the powers to run the transition period till the parliamentary and presidential elections. As mentioned, ‘Mohamed Mahmoud events’ drove a wedge between secularists and youth alliances on one hand and Islamists, especially MB, on the other hand. This is because El-Tayyar El-Masry, Uprising Youth Coalition (which both include MB Youth), 6 April, Kefaya, El-Tagammu, El Wasat, El-Gabha, Hazmoun heavily participated in the events while other secularist forces such as El-Baradei, Sabahi’s presidential campaign, etc. participated only in the two

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522 Mahmoud Fayed, “Mohamed Mahmoud, memorial of MB betrayal to the uprising”.
523 Mahmoud Fayed, “Mohamed Mahmoud, memorial of MB betrayal to the uprising”.
524 Ibid
526 Rabei El- Sa’adani, “7 days created the myth of Mohamed Mahmoud”.
527 Rabei El- Sa’adani, “7 days created the myth of Mohamed Mahmoud”.

protests. After its withdrawal post-one demand protest, the MB abstained from participating in the events and from joining most forces in the two demonstrations. Not only this, the MB focused on the parliamentary elections in its statements, which was perceived by protestors as a type of opportunism and non-commitment to the uprising and its martyrs. Prior to the ‘National Salvation’ protest, the MB announced that it would not participate in the protest because it believed that such violent events were planned by the Ministry of Interior and Mubarak regime remnants in order to spread chaos and to impede the elections. Also, Mohamed Bad‘i, the MB General Guide, said in a TV show that there were attempts to lure protestors to violence and to put the MB at the forefront against military and police. Nonetheless, many MB and Salafi Youth opposed their leaders and joined their companions as Asmaa El-Baltagi and Asmaa Abd El-Aziz. Besides some figures, mostly from the central spectrum of the MB and Salafis such as

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529 Mohamed Ismail, “The story of MB and Mohamed Mahmoud in 3 years…”, Youm 7, 19 November 2015, http://www.youm7.com/story/2015/11/19/%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%81%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB/245058

530 Mohamed Rashad El-Madhoun, “MB sold/betrayed us in Mohamed Mahmoud: The most famous quote in 3 years”, Masr Al-Arabia, 19 November 2014, http://www.masralarabia.com/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7%20415889-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AB%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%86%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%81%D9%89-%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AB/245058

531 “In the third memorial of Mohamed Mahmoud…MB: We were wrong due to misleading information and rebels: their apology are not accepted”, Official Page for Abo El-Fotouh, 2 November 2014, http://www.abolfotoh.net/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%20%D9%88%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9/3532
El-Baltagi\textsuperscript{532}, Hegazy, Abou Ismail, El-Ansari, etc. joined protestors despite their organization’s decision\textsuperscript{533}.

As youth took the lead on 25\textsuperscript{th} of January, their post-revolution alliances were the main organizers for most demonstrations that took place during the transitional period. The participation of secularist parties remained at its minimal level while Islamists, especially the MB, abstained from participation in such protests with few exceptions. Hence, youth demands – which were general demands not exclusive to youth- were either met by opposition or abstention from political parties in most cases, widening the gap between them and youth alliances. This reflects the validity of my assumption especially if we look at how the MB specifically responded to its opponents and its youth in Al-Tayyar or Revolution Youth once their demands clashed.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The first section of the chapter focused mainly on the new forms of political activism as represented in Kefaya, Youth for Change, 6 April, National Association for Change, and We Are All Khaled Said. The importance of these movements lay in their attempt not only to break the silence and bypass regime restrictions to create their own public space but also to cross the red-lines by explicitly attacking Mubarak and his family. Most importantly, they refused to identify themselves with ideology and they functioned outside traditional organizations such as parties and labor unions which were manipulated by the regime and mistrusted by the public. Indeed, they created new techniques such as blogging, social networking, and street protesting, attracting by that many youth without clear ideological affiliations. Although such movements failed to

\textsuperscript{532} Ibid
\textsuperscript{533} This is a blog that took a picture of all tweets by protestors, activists, and public figures on the events https://ashrfsaber66.wordpress.com/tag/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%8A/
achieve any of their grand objectives, they “reflected what Oberschall conceives as precondition of successful protest movements: developing a network of pre-existing associational ties and a segmented society”\textsuperscript{534}. This means that “6 April founders experienced political activism through Kefaya, blogging and parties as Work, Front, Ghad and MB; while Khaled Said administrators were active in the El-Baradei presidential campaign that mobilized various activists from the National Movement of Change”\textsuperscript{535}. Indeed, it is unsurprisingly that this new generation of activists would be the co-founders of post-revolution youth alliances. In other words, it is like a cumulative network of activists that has the flexibility and capacity to operate in different ways once the suitable environment exist. This leads us to the second section that focused on post-Mubarak youth alliances and their relation with political parties. As shown, they were divided into cross-ideological and ideological reform alliances. Surprisingly, youth preferred to organize themselves in cross-ideological alliances rather than parties even if the restrictions imposed by Mubarak were gone. Instead, some parties found it an opportunity to re-participate in politics and re-gain people’s trust by joining these alliances. Hence, parties failed to reform their organizations to attract the new activists which prove my assumption. Further, the inclusion of parties has influenced these alliances’ sustainability because their non-commitment to the alliances’ purposes encouraged them to defect once a better opportunity emerged, enhancing by that opposition fragmentation. Ideological alliances resemble movements of the 2000s in that they “adopted a consensual approach by focusing on what unites Egyptians not on what divides them”\textsuperscript{536}. Indeed, they bypassed the restrictions imposed by their mother organizations and avoided the paternity of their leaders who tried to engage them in their ideological and personal conflicts by forming their own organizations. In other words, the failure of the MB, Leftist

\textsuperscript{534} El-Banaa, Divided they Win?, 128
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid
\textsuperscript{536} Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\textsuperscript{th} January uprising ”, 2011, 117-118
parties, and Salafi movements to reform their organizations to meet the expectations of their youth, urged them to withdraw and form their own organizations: Al-Tayyar Al-Masry, Union of Socialist Youth, and Salafyo Costa respectively. Accordingly, my assumption seems valid in the sense that parties or movements such as the MB failed to co-opt its youth and their reform demands hit a dead block which urged them to withdraw and form their own organizations.

Lastly, youth demands which were raised in the post-Mubarak demonstrations they called for were met by abstention or opposition from the side of parties which further support my assumption. As shown, Islamists, especially the MB, abstained from participation in most protests with few exceptions. Secularist parties were also absent in those demonstrations and they only participated in those that raised demands related to their interests. As we will see in a coming chapter, Islamists called for some demonstrations such as the ‘Coming Together’ protests on the 22nd of July 2011, but they were boycotted by youth alliances and secularist parties due to their focus on controversial issues. These controversial demands were not the only reason behind the clash between Islamists and youth alliances in particular but also the reformist discourse and pragmatic behavior they adopted. On one hand, the reformist discourse adopted by the MB was beyond the expectations of their youth which urged them to oppose their leaders and join their companions in some protests such as Mohamed Mahmoud. On the other hand, the MB’s pragmatic behavior was perceived by youth as a kind of opportunism and betrayal of the uprising. Accordingly, the MB did not only fail to include and meet the expectations of youth from other political spectrums but also its own youth whom opposition to the movements’ internal rules and behavior either faced deaf ears or firing.

Nonetheless, my assumption overlooked the fact that opposition fragmentation was not only due to the failure of parties to ally with youth alliances. Those alliances also have their own
problems that further weakened them vis-à-vis traditional forces. As with the movements of the 2000s, their lack of institutionalization made youth alliances non-existent beyond the event. In other words, they were active during liberalization phases and were successful in organizing protests, but for them to maintain sustainability, institutionalization was inevitable. In addition, the cross-ideological nature of prior and post youth alliances was highly important in unifying them against Mubarak before his toppling or SCAF post-uprising but the “lack of programmatic coherence and common interest” among its ideologically diverse members makes it difficult to keep them together “beyond the very term that united them”\textsuperscript{537}.

\textbf{Chapter Four}

\textit{The impact of the conflict between Islamists and Secularists on opposition fragmentation}

Mubarak inherited a restricted multi-party system that was initiated by Sadat in the second half of the 1970s after he broke up the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the former single party, into three platforms: Hizb al-Ahrar (right), Tagammu (left), and Masr El-Arabi El-Eshtraki (center)\textsuperscript{538}. These platforms were later transformed into political parties followed by the establishment of the National Democratic Party (NDP) which would be the ruling party from then on\textsuperscript{539}. In the first decade of his reign, Mubarak kept the legal and political restrictions on political parties and the parties just mentioned, along with the Socialist Labor Party, the new Wafd Party and Arab Democratic Nasserist Party were the only loyal opposition parties\textsuperscript{540}. But since 2004, the regime decided to take a more liberal stance. The Political Parties Committee (PPC) legalized two new parties in less than a month: the Free Social Constitutional Party

\textsuperscript{537} Holger Albrecht, \textit{Raging Against the Machine}, 81-82

\textsuperscript{538} El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising”, 15.

\textsuperscript{539} Albrecht, “\textit{Raging against the Machine}”, 38.

\textsuperscript{540} Ibid, 40.
(FSCP) and the Hizb al-Ghad (Tomorrow Party) led by Ayman Nour\textsuperscript{541}. By the end of Mubarak’s era, there were 24 official parties in the political arena\textsuperscript{542}. Nonetheless, all these parties were either politically marginalized or virtually defunct\textsuperscript{543}. This is because parties were not initially created by social pressure but by an initiative from incumbents who intended to use them as an image for a multi-party system while in reality the party system was dominated by the NDP\textsuperscript{544}. Hence, they were referred to as ‘loyal opposition’ by Albrecht because they are only supposed to oppose specific policies or procedures while accepting the legal framework set by the regime\textsuperscript{545}. Not to mention that they were prohibited to confront the incumbents or the regime in order to have access to clientelist regime arrangements. As argued by Lust, elections in liberal autocracies reflect a process of competitive clientelism where incumbents gave elites an opportunity to have access to state resources, which in turn prevents the opposition from exerting pressure on the regime to democratize\textsuperscript{546}.

On the other end of the political spectrum were the Islamists which can be divided into “three forms of movement organizations” under Mubarak: the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) which was a moderate movement based on strong popular backing, a number of clandestine groups and would-be parties that have been loosely associated with the MB, and radical groups that have engaged in militant activities between the mid-1970s and 1997\textsuperscript{547}. Nonetheless, the MB was perceived by incumbents as well as secular forces as the most dangerous threat due to their wide social base\textsuperscript{548}. Accordingly, they were regarded as ‘anti-system opposition’ not on an ideological

\textsuperscript{541} Ibid, 54.
\textsuperscript{542} El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising”, 15.
\textsuperscript{543} Albrecht, “Raging against the Machine”, 45-46.
\textsuperscript{544} Ibid, 41 & 58.
\textsuperscript{545} Ibid, 8-11.
\textsuperscript{547} Albrecht, “Raging against the Machine”, 97.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid, 108.
basis but due to the fact that their alternative project and their popular support challenged the core of Mubarak’s regime\textsuperscript{549}. However, Mubarak adopted a two-sided strategy with Islamists where the radical Jihad and Jama’a Islamiya were put under heavy-handed pressure through the security apparatus while the MB was given some opportunity to become a player in the political institutions\textsuperscript{550}. To be specific, the MB were not allowed to create their own party but were only allowed to act informally through running as independents in parliamentary elections\textsuperscript{551}. Furthermore, any liaison between MB and other political forces was under suspicion by the security forces since 1980s\textsuperscript{552}. Over time, an implicit agreement developed that the MB were not allowed to have a dialogue with official opposition forces including parties and NGOs\textsuperscript{553}. At the same time, parties did not dare to contact the MB in order not to raise the regime’s anger. As we will see, this environment of skepticism and mistrust may have made it difficult for both to coordinate with each other after Mubarak’s fall.

Based on Lust’s theoretical framework that examined the dynamics of government-opposition relations, Mubarak adopted a divided structure of contestation by allowing secular parties to act in the formal sphere while only allowing MB to perform from underground. Accordingly, this chapter will attempt to examine one of the factors that may have led to opposition fragmentation after Mubarak by looking at the nature of relation between Islamists and Secularists based on this assumption: \textit{The polarization of ideological differences between Islamists and Secularists, with the absence of sustained dialogue and the presence of mobilization asymmetry between the two prevented them from reaching a compromise over rules of a new political order.}

\textsuperscript{549} Ibid, 8-11.  
\textsuperscript{550} Ibid, 108.  
\textsuperscript{551} Ibid, 108.  
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid, 110-111.  
\textsuperscript{553} Ibid, 110-111.
The chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will focus on the political landscape post-uprising. The second section will focus on some significant stages during the transitional period to examine how Islamists and other actors (who can be referred to as secularists despite the differences among them) managed their differences and whether this increased the tension between them leading to opposition fragmentation or not.

Section One

The Political Landscape after the Uprising

Although political parties neither played a role in calling for 25th January 2011 uprising nor had an apparent presence during the 18 days revealing the extent of their isolation from the public, many became interested in political parties post-Mubarak and were motivated to join the emerging parties after years of reluctance\(^{554}\). Indeed, it is unsurprising that the transition period has witnessed an explosion in the number of parties which reached over 70 parties\(^{555}\) especially after issuing a new law for political parties by SCAF on 29th of March, 2011\(^{556}\). Unlike the PPC that was composed of the president of the Shoura Council, the Ministers of Interior, Justice, and State for People’s Assembly and Shoura Affairs, three judges, and a number of public figures appointed by Mubarak, the new law stipulated that the committee would be exclusively composed of judges which ensured the separation between the executive and legislative authorities\(^{557}\). Besides, the law allowed the formation of parties by notifying the committee as long as it succeeded to get the official signature of 5,000 founders who must be from at least ten


\(^{555}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising”, 16.

\(^{556}\) Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 149.

\(^{557}\) Ibid, 149-151.
The committee was then obliged to investigate the party’s request within 15 days and to hand it over to the Supreme Administrative Court in case of rejection, while the party became automatically legal if it did not hear back from the committee after a month. Thus, the Parties law along with other political factors have led to the establishment of many new parties that can be divided into five categories based on their ideology:

1) **Islamic Parties:** After Mubarak, many formal and informal Islamist movements declared their intention to establish their own parties. Most importantly, the MB was the first to announce this intention and it later formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Defectors from the MB also established their own parties that included: El-Tayyar El-Masry, Masr El-Qawia, El-Reyada, etc. Furthermore, Salafi movements that had boycotted politics prior to the uprising and had opposed many of the principles of the democratic system, changed their mind post-uprising and established around 11 parties such as: El-Nour, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia (El-Gama’ah El-Islamiyah), El-Asalah, El-Islah wel Nahda, etc.

2) **Christian Parties:** There were only 5 parties: El-Ommah El-Masria, Abna’a Masr, El-Ithad El-Masry, and Shabab El-Thawra. However, those parties did not even attract Christians which resulted in their weakness and low popularity in contrast to Islamic parties.

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558 Yosri El-Azabawi, (Challenges of Democratic Transition in Egypt throughout the Transitional Period, Conference in Cooperation between Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, FRIDE and UNDEF, Samiramis Hotel, Cairo, Egypt, 26-27 July 2011), 6. [http://www.arabsi.org/attachments/article/2521/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8%20%D9%84%20%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9.pdf](http://www.arabsi.org/attachments/article/2521/%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8%20%D9%84%20%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9.pdf)


560 El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising ”, 16.

561 Ibid


563 El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising ”, 16.

564 Ibid, 17.

565 Ibid, 17.
3) **Liberal Parties:** In response to the establishment of the FJP, a well-known businessman, Naguib Sawiris, established a liberal party known as El-Masryen El-Ahrar which would be one of the most prominent liberal parties\(^{566}\). Other parties were later founded such as: El-Dostour (El-Barade’i), Masr El-Horia, El-Mostaqabel El-Gedid, etc\(^{567}\). In contrast to critique by Islamists, El-Ahrar along others were calling for a civilian state that will not be antagonist to religion which is part of the Egyptian identity and culture and cannot be isolated from\(^{568}\).

4) **Leftist Parties:** They included El-Tahalouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki, Communists, El-Eshtraki El-Masri, etc\(^{569}\). They criticized other actors for neglecting the socio-economic demands of the uprising and called for an increasing role for the state in the health and social insurance, for minimum and maximum wages, and for restoring the public companies that were privatized\(^{570}\).

5) **Mixed Parties:** These were parties that combined liberalism and socialism such as: Social Democratic (El-Democratie El-Igtame’i), El-Salam El-Igtame’i, El-Tahrir El-Masry, El-Haq El-Masry, Justice (El-A’dl), etc\(^{571}\). The Social Democratic Party, for example, included reformist left and liberals adopting free market economy which makes it closer to leftist democratic parties in Europe\(^{572}\). While, Thwar El-Tahrir party has adopted liberalism on the political and economic front and socialism on the social side\(^{573}\).

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**Section Two**

*The Relation between Islamists and Secularists Post-Mubarak*

❖ **First: Pre-electoral alliances in 2011/2012 parliamentary elections:**

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\(^{566}\) Ezz El-Arab, “Map of political parties in Egypt after the Revolution”.

\(^{567}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 17.

\(^{568}\) Ibid.

\(^{569}\) Ibid, 18.

\(^{570}\) Ibid.

\(^{571}\) Ibid.

\(^{572}\) El-Azabawi, Challenges of Democratic Transition in Egypt throughout the Transitional Period, 9.

\(^{573}\) Ibid.
The People’s Assembly elections which took place in three rounds from 28th of November, 2011 till 19th of January, 2012 were considered the first elections post-Mubarak and the first test for all political parties especially the new ones. Not only this, these elections were important since the People’s Assembly and Shoura members would be responsible for choosing the committee mandated to write the constitution. Around 40 parties and 10,600 candidate ran for these elections in an environment characterized by more competitiveness compared to Mubarak’s era.

On 16th of March, 2011 the MB held a conference titled “Together we will start building Egypt” that was attended by El-Wafd, El-Ghad, El-Tagammu, El-Nasri, El-A’mal, El-Ahrar, El-Dostouri El-Hor Parties along with the National Association for Change, Uprising Youth Coalition, El-Eshtrakyen El-Thawreen, etc. In an attempt to build consensus, the MB initiated the formation of a democratic coalition between different political actors through which they would agree on the main principles for a democratic system. At the end of the conference, Wahid Abd El-Magid was selected to gather the ideas suggested by the participants in a document that would be amended frequently based on the meetings that would take place between political actors. Then he was later chosen as the coalition’s general coordinator upon

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574 El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the revolution”, 19.
576 Hammam Sarhan, “Egypt…Obstacles in the Way of Democratic Coalition”, Swiss Info., 27 June 2011, http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1---%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82--%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A--/30538450
579 Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”.
580 Ibid.
a suggestion from El-Wafd party\textsuperscript{581}. The meetings extended for more than four months\textsuperscript{582} and attracted many old and new parties that reached more than 30 parties\textsuperscript{583}. On 21\textsuperscript{st} of June, 2011 the coalition delivered its first proclamation which stated that the participants agreed on releasing a consensual document over the principles of a democratic system and a draft of the electoral law that would ensure the representation of all actors in the coming parliament\textsuperscript{584}. The proclamation was signed by 17 parties, including the FJP, El-Wafd, El-Ghad, El-Karama, El-Tagammu, El-A’dl, El-Nour, etc\textsuperscript{585}. On 29\textsuperscript{th} of June, the electoral law proposal was handed to the SCAF and Council of Ministers while on 7\textsuperscript{th} of July, El-Wafd held a conference to declare that the consensual document was now open for signatures by parties\textsuperscript{586}. The conference was attended by the FJP, El-Karama, Ghad El-Thawra, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia, El-Asalah, etc. while parties such as El-Wasat, El-A’dl, Masr El-Horrya, etc. refused to join the coalition despite their participation in previous meetings and debates\textsuperscript{587}. After the release of the document, other parties joined such as Masr El-Hadetha, El-Sha’ab El-Democratie, etc\textsuperscript{588}. As usual, El-Tagammu on 7\textsuperscript{th} of August followed by El-Nour on 2\textsuperscript{nd} of September defected from the coalition\textsuperscript{589}. With the approach of the parliamentary elections, the coalition thought of running the elections as one party list especially that the coalition represent different ideologies\textsuperscript{590}. However, this decision deviated the coalition from its original purpose which was to achieve national consensus and turned to a pre-

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{583} Wahid Abd El-Magid, “MB without the Democratic Coalition…There is a difference”, \textit{Al-Ahram}, 15 April 2012, http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/899/2012/05/15/4/149368.aspx
\textsuperscript{584} Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”.
\textsuperscript{585} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{587} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{588} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{589} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{590} Abd El-Magid, “Democratic Coalition in Parliamentary Elections”.

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electoral alliance that increased polarization instead. On 5th of October, the largest secular party in the coalition, El-Wafd Party, declared its withdrawal which represented a crack in the coalition leading to a cascade of defections. El-Wafd decided to run the elections independently because its view of the proportion of its candidates on the lists contradicted that of the MB that violated its original promise of running only on 30% of the seats. This was followed by the defection of El-Ahabi El-Nasri, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia, El-Wasat along others as an objection of the proportion of their representation on the lists and the insistence of the MB to run over 40-45% of the seats. According to Abd El-Magid, the coalition had two options in order to deal with the high number of candidates that each party wanted to add to the lists compared to the required number set by the law. The first option was to convince parties to decrease the proportion of their representation to give space for other parties to be represented while the second option was to increase the capacity of the lists by innovative solutions such as having two lists in one constituency. Since these two options were inapplicable from the parties’ perspective, some found that the only way out was to defect. As a result, by the closure of the door to candidacy in October, the FJP became the hegemonic party in the coalition, along with other nine small liberal and leftist parties such as El-Ghad El-Gedid, El-Karama, El-Ahrar, El-Hadara, Egyptian Arab Socialist, El-A’mal, etc.

591 Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”.
593 Abd El-Magid, “…Democratic Coalition….The journey of rise and disintegration”.
594 “Egyptian Revolution Parliament Elections (2)”.
595 Abd El-Magid, “Democratic Coalition in Parliamentary Elections”.
597 Abd El-Magid, “Democratic Coalition in Parliamentary Elections”.
598 Ibid.
599 Ibid.
600 Yosri El-Azabawi & Mazen Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19.
The parties which had defected from the Democratic Coalition either formed another pre-electoral alliance or ran in the elections independently. Besides the Democratic Coalition dominated by the FJP, the Islamic Coalition was founded on 29th of July, 2011 by El-Nour Party after it withdrew from the Democratic Coalition. It was compromised of the Salafist El-Asalah Party and El-Bana’a wel Tanmia Party of the Gama’a El-Islamiyah, a former militant group\(^{601}\). Although El-Asalah and El-Bana’a wel Tanmia asserted that they were not antagonistic to other alliances\(^ {602}\), they were actually the main competitors to the MB despite the fact that they became allies after they both won the elections.

On the other hand, the main secular alliance, the Egyptian Bloc was founded on 25th of August\(^ {603}\), 2011 by 16 liberal and leftist parties such as El-Masryen El-Ahrar, El-Democratie El-Igtaame’i El-Masry, El-Tagammu, El-Gabha, El-Tahrir (Islamist), Awareness, and Egyptian Communist party, etc\(^ {604}\). However, disputes over the share of each party on the lists\(^ {605}\) and the inclusion of some former NDP members to the lists led to the withdrawal of some parties such as El-Tahlouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki, Masr El-Horrya, El-Eshtraki El-Masry, El-Gabha, etc\(^ {606}\). By the time of the elections, the bloc was composed only of three parties: El-Masryen El-Ahrar, El-Democratie El-Igtaame’i El-Masry, and El-Tagammu where the first shared by 45%, the second by 40% and the last by 15%\(^ {607}\).

The last main pre-electoral alliance was ‘The Revolution Continues,’ established in October 2011\(^ {608}\) by an initiative from Uprising Youth Coalition and Al-Tayyar El-Masry then it

\(^ {601}\) Hassan, “Elections of the People’s Assembly, Egypt 2011/12”, 371
\(^ {602}\) “Egyptian Revolution Parliament Elections (2)”.
\(^ {603}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19
\(^ {604}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19.
\(^ {605}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19
\(^ {606}\) “Egyptian Revolution Parliament Elections (2)”.
\(^ {607}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19
\(^ {608}\) El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 19.
later expanded to include the Populist Socialist Coalition, Masr El-Horrya, Equality and Development, and Egyptian Socialist parties. The alliance run for 33 constituencies with 300 candidates on party-lists and 50 as individual candidates; out of which, 47 were women and 100 under the age of 40. This shows that this alliance had a good representation of the two marginalized sectors: youth and women compared to other alliances. Not only that, this alliance was different from the previous alliances in two aspects: first, it was considered the only non-partisan coalition that represented the revolution youth and second, its founding purpose was to confront the polarization between Islamists and Secularists and hence, one of the criteria it set for approving a candidate on their lists is not to advocate polarization.

Aside from these four pre-electoral alliances, other parties decided to run the elections individually. With the exception of El-Wasat, El-A’dl, El-Gabha and El-Wafd, all other parties suffered from a lack of popularity and would depend mostly on personal relations to gain votes over individual seats. This raises a reasonable question of what are the reasons that prevented these parties from joining any of the above alliances and more specifically, why El-Wasat and El-A’dl Parties did not unite with Al-Tayyar Al-Masry, for example, if they were ideologically identical. According to Doha Samir, Al-Tayyar called for a dialogue between El-A’dl, Revolution Youth Coalition, El-Wasat, and El-Nahda along others to prepare for one strong electoral coalition. However, the dialogue failed and most parties refused to join. El-Wasat argued that it would not join because the coalition included one liberal Party (Masr El-Horrya)

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610 Ahmed Abd Rabou, “Political parties and People’s Assembly elections of 2011/2012”, 4.
611 “Exclusive Interview with candidates of revolution continues coalition”, YouTube video.
613 “Uprising Youth in the second round of elections”, YouTube video, posted by ONtv, December 11, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MOxJphrruil
614 Ibid, 5.
615 Doha Samir, “Muslim Brothers in Egypt”, 109.
and another Leftist Party (Populist Socialist coalition) whilst, El-A’dl “justified its refusal by its strategy to nominate only young revolutionary politicians, not other parties’ calibers”\textsuperscript{616}. On the other hand, Islam Lotfy, a candidate of ‘Uprising Continues’ and a representative of Al-Tayyar said that after the results of the first round, there were attempts for coordination between the coalition and Egyptian Bloc however, it did not work\textsuperscript{617}. This is because the former insisted on not joining any alliance unless it was committed to the criteria it set for its candidates which was not to advocate polarization, be part of Mubarak’s regime, or be responsible for any type of corruption during Mubarak’s era\textsuperscript{618}. And since the Bloc included former members of the NDP, ‘Revolution Continues’ refused to ally with it in order not to violate their principles and not to put their image at risk\textsuperscript{619}. Besides, such alliance would enhance the idea of an Islamic vs. Secular pre-electoral alliance which they totally rejected and which was the reason behind their foundation\textsuperscript{620}.

Out of the 40 parties that ran in the parliamentary elections, only 16 were represented in parliament. However, none of these parties succeeded to achieve the simple majority\textsuperscript{621}. The FJP was the one with the highest proportion as it succeeded to gain 45% of the seats while the Democratic Coalition was represented by 47.2% in total\textsuperscript{622}. El-Nour party came in the second rank, represented by 21.5%, whilst the Islamic Coalition was represented by 24.7%\textsuperscript{623}. El-Wafd party which ran in the elections individually came in the third rank, representing 7.6\%\textsuperscript{624}. Out of

\textsuperscript{616} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{617} “Revolution Youth in the second round of elections”, YouTube video.
\textsuperscript{618} Ibid
\textsuperscript{619} Ibid
\textsuperscript{620} Ibid
\textsuperscript{621} Yosri El-Azabawi & Mazen Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the Revolution”, 20.
\textsuperscript{623} Ibid
\textsuperscript{624} Ibid
the four pre-electoral alliances, the ‘Egyptian Bloc’ was represented by 6.8% whilst, the ‘Revolution Continues’ coalition gained 1.4% of the seats which is equal to seven seats only.\footnote{Ibid}

Moving to the Shoura Council elections which started with its two rounds on 29\textsuperscript{th} of January and ended on 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February of 2012\footnote{“Timing of Shoura Council election”, \textit{Egypt window}, 16 January 2012, \url{http://old.egyptwindow.net/news_Details.aspx?News_ID=16509}}, the representation of parties and pre-electoral alliances at the Shoura Council does not differ much from their representation at the People’s Assembly. Unlike the People’s Assembly, the FJP achieved majority in the Shoura where it gained 58.3\% of the seats\footnote{Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and Returning back to Square One”, 304.}. Similarly, El-Nour and El-Wafd came in the second and third ranks respectively where the former is represented by 25\% and the latter is represented by 7.8\%.\footnote{Ibid} By that, FJP and El-Nour parties are represented by 83.3\% combined. While the ‘Egyptian Bloc’ was only represented by 4.4\%.\footnote{Ibid} Unfortunately, ‘Revolution Continues’ along with other fourteen parties such as El-A’dl, El-Gad, El-Gabha, El-Democratie El-Igtame’i, etc. failed to gain any seats\footnote{Mohamed El-Sanhouri, “Al-Masry Al-Youm announce with names the results of Shoura elections”, \textit{Al-Masry Al-Youm}, 25 February 2012, \url{http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/154502}}. This is because they failed to reach the voter threshold which is 0.5\% (≈ 32,233 votes)\footnote{Ibid}.

From the above, we can realize that political parties had the intention to reach consensus over the main principles for the potential democratic system and they succeeded to release a common document after four months of talks. However, disputes arose once they started to discuss the details by the closure of the parliamentary elections leading to their re-fragmentation. Among other factors, the withdrawal of many parties from the original democratic coalition was

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotetext[625]{Ibid}
\footnotetext[627]{Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and Returning back to Square One”, 304.}
\footnotetext[628]{Ibid}
\footnotetext[629]{Ibid}
\footnotetext[631]{Ibid}
\end{thebibliography}
due to the fact that the MB broke its original promises and other parties’ inflexibility with regard to their representation on the lists. Comparing the pre-electoral alliances of 2011/2012 elections with the general characteristics of pre-electoral alliances in the Arab region since 1980s based on Kraetzschmar’s study, they share in common the fleeting character where they even failed to survive in their original composition beyond this election. Further, they tended to be limited in their numerical composition which proved valid in the Egyptian case such as the Egyptian Bloc which is composed only of three parties. Whereas most pre-electoral alliances across the region straddled the ideological division, the pre-electoral alliances formed post-uprising were implicitly formed on ideological bases. As shown, we had two Islamist alliances and one secular alliance while the only alliance that attempted to confront polarization (i.e. Revolution Continues) failed to achieve significant representation in the parliament.

✦ Second: The debate over writing the constitution:

1. First constitutional committee:

As shown in a previous chapter, the ad hoc constitutional committee appointed by the SCAF to amend the 1971 constitution instead of writing a new one raised the debate of ‘constitution first or elections first’ between Islamists and Secularists. Then the SCAF’s second constitutional deceleration just made matters worse with its controversial and vague article (60) which stated that the two houses of the parliament would jointly choose a constitutional committee of 100 who would write a new constitution within 6 months which would “go before the electorate for an up or down, simple-majority vote”. Even if no one

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632 Kraetzschmar, Mapping Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World, 295.
633 Ibid
634 Ibid
635 Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 79.
realized that such procedures would be in favor of Islamists due to their electoral abilities\textsuperscript{637}, the electoral system adopted by the SCAF made an Islamist victory nearly inevitable as explained earlier which further intensified the tension between them and secularists. As argued by Brown, this path may work well if there is deep consensus among political actors but it hardly produces consensus on its own or even give incentives to reach it\textsuperscript{638}. Accordingly, the process of writing the constitution turned from being a matter of agreement where different societal segments would have a voice to a matter of conflict that was based on the “logic of the majority vs. the minority”\textsuperscript{639}.

According to Abd El-Magid, the first joint meeting between the People’s Assembly and the Shoura on 3\textsuperscript{rd} of March was supposed to clarify the vagueness of article (60) by setting objective criteria for selecting the constitutional committee\textsuperscript{640}. Unfortunately, the debate between deputies were misdirected toward discussing the proportion of their representation in the constitutional committee\textsuperscript{641}. The recommendations have ranged between 70\% as suggested by El-Bana’a wel Tanmia to 6\% as recommended by El-Tahalouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki\textsuperscript{642}. While other parties argued that the percentage of deputies inside the committee should be as following: El-Waf\d (20-25\%), El-Masri El-Democratie (25\%), El-Islah wel Tanmia (20-40\%), FJP (40\%), El-Hor\dya and El-Salam El-Democratie (50\%), and El-Nour (60\%)\textsuperscript{643}. Consequently, they failed to resolve the obscurity of article (60) by agreeing on electing 50\% of the constitutional committee from the parliament, 25\% from representatives of civil society and state

\textsuperscript{637} Ibid, 55.
\textsuperscript{638} Ibid, 55.
\textsuperscript{639} Mogib, “Transitional regime environment: In search for a road map”, 81.
\textsuperscript{641} Ibid
\textsuperscript{642} Ibid
\textsuperscript{643} Ibid
organizations, and 25% of public figures without determining specific criteria for these members. On the day of selecting the committee, 24th of March, secular parties were surprised by a list of 100 with a majority of Islamists that was prepared solely by the FJP and El-Nour without consulting other parties. In an attempt to solve the dispute that arose, Ahmed Sa’ed (Head of El-Masryeen El-Ahrar) and Zeyad Baha’a El-Din (El-Masri El-Democratie) along with others tried to postpone the elections to give more time for other parties to consult over candidates who reached two thousand but their attempts failed. Accordingly, the elections resulted in a committee composed of 25 belonging to the FJP, 11 from El-Nour, and 10 from other parties (3 of El-Wafd, 2 of El-Democratie El-Igtame’I, 1 from each El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Wasat, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia, El-Karama, and El-Islah wel Tanmiah) and 4 independents. If we put into consideration that 25 of the members from outside the parliament had Islamic affiliations then Islamists reserved for themselves 65% of the committee. Accordingly, 25 members resigned from the assembly, including representatives of El-Wafd, El-Masri El-Democratie, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Tahalouf El-Sha’abi El-Eshtraki, and El-Karama along with deputies and public figures such as Amr Hamzawy, Ahmed Hararra, Rabab El-Mahdi, Margret Azer, Ahmed El-Nagar, etc. Besides, the resignation of representatives of El-Azhar, the Orthodox Church, lawyers syndicate, labor union along other syndicates and state organizations hit the legitimacy of the committee to the core. At the same time, some turned to

\[644\] Ibid
\[645\] Ibid
\[646\] Ibid
\[647\] Ibid
\[649\] Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle on the Constitutional Committee (1-2)”.
\[650\] Ibid
\[651\] Awad, “Breaking out of authoritarianism”, 286.
\[653\] Ibid
the Supreme Administrative Court in order to suspend the committee\textsuperscript{654}. After failing to postpone the committee’s first meeting, Abd El-Magid tried to convince its members of holding the committee’s work and negotiate with defectors because otherwise, the committee would lose its legitimacy\textsuperscript{655}. Thus, a mediation committee headed by Sa’ad El-Katatni was formed which included Wahid Abd El-Magid, Nadia Mostafa, Mo’ataz Abd El-Fattah, Farouk Goweida, Tala’at Mazrzug, Maged Shabeta, and Nader Bakar\textsuperscript{656}. On 29\textsuperscript{th} of March, the meeting between the SCAF and the heads of parties ended up with emphasizing the necessity of using El-Azhar’s supra-constitutional principles as a guideline and suggesting the replacement of Islamic members with others from various spectrums but without specifying their number\textsuperscript{657}. Another meeting was held on 1\textsuperscript{st} of April between representatives of the mediation committee and the defectors where they agreed on re-electing the committee especially after it proved logistically difficult to replace some members with others\textsuperscript{658}. The new committee would be elected on the same criteria but the representation of each actor would be decided beforehand\textsuperscript{659}. However, this suggestion was refused by the FJP and El-Nour Parties and hence, Abd El-Magid suggested to gather the suggestions of all defectors in an attempt to reach a compromise\textsuperscript{660}. Nonetheless, those attempts were put to an end after the Administrative Court disbanded the constitutional committee due to its illegality as deputies have selected themselves for membership in the committee\textsuperscript{661}.

\textit{2. The second constitutional committee:}

\textsuperscript{654} Brown, “Egypt’s failed transition”, 48.
\textsuperscript{655} Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle on the Constitutional Committee (1-2)”.
\textsuperscript{656} Ibid
\textsuperscript{657} Ibid
\textsuperscript{658} Ibid
\textsuperscript{659} Ibid
\textsuperscript{660} Ibid
\textsuperscript{661} Awad, “Breaking out of authoritarianism”, 286.
Although the decision of the Administrative Court found a way out of the stalemate between Islamists and Secularists by re-electing a new constitutional committee, it raised the expectations of political parties, opening the door for new debates and clashes. The attempts that were made earlier to mediate between the two spectrums continued and it took mediators such as Wahid Abd El-Magid, Hatem Azam (El-Hadara), Mohamed El-Baltagi (FJP), Ahmed Sa’ed (El-Masryeen El-Ahrar), and El-Sayed Khalifa (El-Nour) around ten days to arrange a joint meeting between political forces. For two months and a half, 10 meetings took place between parties’ deputies and 18 meetings between Islamic and Secular parties in an attempt to reach a compromise over standards for electing the new constitutional committee. In the following lines, I will focus on some of the more significant meetings that led to the establishment of the committee at the end.

Upon a suggestion from Abd El-Magid, a meeting was held on 17th of April, 2012 between El-Badawi (El-Wafd), Mady (El-Wasat), El-Sawy (El-Hadara), and Samy (El-Karama) at El-Wafd headquarter since they usually play a vital role in mediating between opposing parties. They suggested to divide the seats of the assembly among parties, syndicates, representatives of workers and peasants, judicial organizations, executive organizations, lawyers, and public figures. On the following day, they held a meeting with parties’ deputies who did not attend El-Wafd meeting and informed them with their recommendations. They agreed that each would return back to their party to agree on the main points then all Islamic and Secular

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664 Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.

665 Ibid

666 Fathi, “Behind the Scenes of Sofitel Agreement that led to the Birth of the Stumble Constitutional Committee”.

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parties would meet starting from 22\textsuperscript{nd} of April in a hotel away from the media to reach an agreement\textsuperscript{667}.

For continuous six days at Sofitel Hotel, Abd El-Magid and Azzam moderated the discussion between Islamic and Secular parties in an environment of mistrust\textsuperscript{668}. The meetings were attended by the FJP, El-Nour, El-Wafd, El-Masri El-Democratie, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, El-Wasat, Ghad El-Thawra, El-Bana’a wel Tanmia\textsuperscript{669} and El-Karama along with Abd El-Galil Mostafa from the National Association for Change and Sameh Ashour, head of lawyers syndicate\textsuperscript{670}. Besides Abd El-Magid and Azzam, the participation of Sayed El-Badawi, Ayman Nour and Fouad Badrawi was significant in creating bonds between mistrustful political opponents\textsuperscript{671}. Based on the suggestions at the El-Wafd meeting, they agreed on dividing the seats among different organizations and sectors and discussed the initial proportion of each while they disagreed over the parties’ proportion and the parties that should be represented\textsuperscript{672}. Nonetheless, the main problem that the Sofitel talks could not reach an agreement over was the threshold for approving an article of the constitution\textsuperscript{673}. El-Ahrar and El-Democratie insisted on 67\% of the votes to approve an article while FJP and El-Nour asserted on 50\% + 1\textsuperscript{674}. As a way out, Ayman Nour suggested gradation in the voting process where the priority will be for agreement then a vote by 67\% will take place\textsuperscript{675}. If this threshold was not reached, they would negotiate over the disputed article and then a vote would take place by less than 60\%\textsuperscript{676}. However, FJP and El-Nour called for reducing the threshold in the second level by less than 60\% while El-Ahrar and El-

\textsuperscript{667}Ibid
\textsuperscript{668}Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.
\textsuperscript{669}Fathi, “Behind the Scenes of Sofitel Agreement that led to the Birth of the Stumble Constitutional Committee”.
\textsuperscript{670}Ibid
\textsuperscript{671}Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.
\textsuperscript{672}Ibid
\textsuperscript{673}Fathi, “Behind the Scenes of Sofitel Agreement that led to the Birth of the Stumble Constitutional Committee”.
\textsuperscript{674}Ibid
\textsuperscript{675}Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.
\textsuperscript{676}Ibid
Democracy insisted either on obliging Islamists to have 50 seats only in the committee or voting by 67% which Islamists feared to be an imitation to the Lebanese experiment of ‘the stumble third’\(^{677}\). The Sofitel talks were followed by a meeting with the SCAF on 28\(^{th}\) of April where parties finally reached an agreement over the threshold on constitutional articles\(^{678}\). As suggested by Nour, they agreed to vote by 67% if agreement was not reached from the outset but if this threshold was not reached, they would vote by 57% after discussing the disputed article within 24 hours\(^{679}\). As FJP and El-Nour showed flexibility in accepting 57% in the second level, El-Ahrar and El-Democrat accepted to lower their expectations\(^{680}\).

For a month and a half, parties’ attention was diverted towards the protestors’ clashes with military in the area of Abassiya followed by rumors about SCAF’s intention to release a complementary constitutional deceleration to set the criteria for electing the assembly which urged them to discuss its contents in order not to let SCAF set the rules unilaterally -as was the case with 30\(^{th}\) March deceleration-\(^{681}\). However, they were surprised by the closeness of the presidential elections\(^{682}\) then by SCAF’s announcement that it would release a deceleration if they did not reach an agreement within 48 hours\(^{683}\). Hence, a meeting took place at El-Wafd headquarter on 6\(^{th}\) of June between 9 parties which included the FJP, El-Nour, Egyptian Bloc

\(^{677}\) Ibid
\(^{679}\) Ibid
\(^{680}\) Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.
\(^{681}\) Fathi, “Behind the Scenes of Sofitel Agreement that led to the Birth of the Stumble Constitutional Committee”.
\(^{682}\) Ibid
\(^{683}\) “Egypt: SCAF Calls the Parliament to elect the constitutional committee”, Arabic RT, 7\(^{th}\) June 2012, https://arabic.rt.com/news/586989-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1...-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%86-%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B1
parties along others\textsuperscript{684}. They agreed on all criteria for electing the committee including the allotment of 39 seats to parties\textsuperscript{685}. Nonetheless, they failed to reach a compromise over the allocation of Islamic and Secular parties where Egyptian Bloc parties insisted on dividing the seats equally between Islamists and Secularists arguing that this would not intensify the ideological polarization since this is already a fact while the FJP and El-Nour asserted on having 53\% of the seats\textsuperscript{686}. On the following day, the SCAF met with parties where they succeeded to reach an agreement over dividing the seats equally between Islamic and Secular parties due to El-Bana’a wel Tanmia initiative that relinquished its allocation in the Islamic bloc but instead would choose two candidates from other parties that would represent it\textsuperscript{687}. Despite this, the non-documentation of meeting results and the non-allocation of state organization seats (19 seats) in relation to parties’ seats led to a new clash between actors\textsuperscript{688}. FJP, El-Nour, El-Wafd and Ghad El-Thawra argued that they were part of the 50 seats allocated for Islamists while others argued that they were not part of any bloc. This dispute was left unresolved because SCAF called the parliament to elect the constitutional committee on 12\textsuperscript{th} of June\textsuperscript{689}.

With a voter turnout of 84.8\%, the deputies of the People’s Assembly and Shoura Council elected the 100 member committee which included: 33 parties’ representatives, 29 public figures and revolutionary youth, 9 law professors, 7 representatives of syndicates, 6 from judicial organizations, 5 representatives of El-Azhar, 4 representatives of the three churches, 4 representatives of labor and peasants, 3 representatives of the military, the police, and the

\textsuperscript{684} Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.  
\textsuperscript{685} Hala Gamal, “Sa’ed: The Formation of the Constitutional Committee Reached a Deadlock”, El-Gomaa, \url{http://www.elgomaa.com/article.php?id=35992}  
\textsuperscript{686} Abd El-Magid, “The Whole Story of the Battle of the Constitutional Committee (2-2)”.  
\textsuperscript{687} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{688} Ibid  
\textsuperscript{689} Ibid
government. But as had been the case with the first constitutional committee, Islamic parties broke the previous commitments including 50-50% and prepared a list that gained the majority of seats. As an objection, 60 deputies withdrew from the joint meeting of the two houses of the parliament and they included representatives of El-Wafd, El-Democratie El-Igtama’ei, El-Ahrar, El-Talahalouf, El-Tagammu, El-Karama, Masr El-Arabi, El-A’dl, Masr El-Hadetha, El-Salam El-Democratie, El-Ithad El-Masri along with 13 public figures such as Amr Hamzawi, Mostafa El-Gendy, Amr El-Shobaki, Mohamed Abu Hamid, etc. This was followed by the retirement of Abd El-Galil Mostafa from the National Association for Change, the law professor Gaber Nassar and the Christian thinker Samir Morqous along with the representative of the Supreme Constitutional Court who wanted to stay away from the conflict between political actors. Despite all the negotiations made, the defectors argued, they had returned back to square one and the composition of the second committee did not differ much from that of the first. Instead of forming a representative committee of all societal sectors, it was formed on the basis of partisan interests where Islamists insisted on securing the majority of seats. As mentioned earlier, the non-documentation of meeting results with the SCAF in June led Islamists

692 “Publishing the Names of the Constitutional Committee that will be Responsible for Writing Egypt’s New Constitution”.
697 “News Report: Election of Members of the Constitutional Committee….”
to argue that the 50% of the seats had been allocated to FJP and El-Nour, while defectors argued that if they included public figures and parties with Islamic inclinations as El-Wasat along with institutions as El-Azhar then Islamists’ proportion would exceed 50%698.

Only two days after electing the committee, the Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved the parliament as shown earlier, threatening the continuity of the constitutional assembly699. In an attempt to deal with a constitutional problem that might arise, the SCAF issued its third constitutional deceleration (complementary deceleration) which stated that if any cause prevented the current constitutional assembly from writing the constitution, the SCAF would form a new representative assembly for all societal sectors which would write the constitution within 3 months and then put it to a referendum700. Not only that, the SCAF reserved the legislative powers for itself until the election of a new parliament along with other articles that gave it exceptional powers701. This resulted in a duality of power between the SCAF who had the real power and Morsi who came to power by the end of June with restricted powers, leading to the first breakdown between the military and the MB since Mubarak’s fallxxxvii. Matters got worse when many turned to the administrative court to suspend the second constitutional assembly arguing that it overlooked the court’s former decision by electing deputies of the Shoura Council in the committee arguing that they are only representatives of their parties702. As a pre-emptive action, Morsi approved decree no. 79 set by the parliament prior to its dissolution and used for selecting the assembly to close the door in front of the court to impeach the

698 Marina Ottaway, “Egypt: Does the Death of the Constitutional Committee will be announced?”, Carnegie Center for the Middle East, 13 June 2012, http://carnegie-mec.org/2012/06/13/ar-pub-48563
700 Ibid
assembly’s legitimacy\textsuperscript{703}. Nonetheless, the administrative court referred law no. 79 to the Supreme Constitutional Court on 23\textsuperscript{rd} of October, 2012 to study its constitutionality\textsuperscript{704} since it argues that the law was approved after the assembly’s formation by a month and did not include clear standards for electing the committee which implies that the reason behind it was to prevent it from disbanding the assembly\textsuperscript{705}.

The destiny of the second constitutional committee was not only threatened by the judiciary but also by the continuous withdrawal of its members till it witnessed a group defection in November. It started with the defection of the representatives of the three churches, journalists’ syndicate, and actors’ syndicate\textsuperscript{706} then followed by the withdrawal of 13 secular figures such as Ahmed Maher\textsuperscript{707}, Amr Moussa, Wahid Abd El-Magid\textsuperscript{708}, etc. on 14\textsuperscript{th} of November who declared their intention to write a parallel constitution\textsuperscript{709}. In total, the number of defectors reached 26 members which represents 25\% of the committee\textsuperscript{710}. Churches argued that the constitution sought to establish a religious state and that the framing committee was not representative of all societal sectors\textsuperscript{711}. Similarly, Abd El-Magid and Moussa argued that they were surprised by the disparity between the issues they agreed on during the sessions and the drafts written by the 5-member framing committee which was not representative of all societal sectors and unfortunately, their requests to include 2 of the defectors to the committee were

\textsuperscript{704} “Important Stages in the Way of the Constitutional Assembly”
\textsuperscript{705} “The Battle of the Constitution in Egypt between the Majority and the Faction”
\textsuperscript{706} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 177.
\textsuperscript{707} Ali & Abd El-Zaher et al. “10 Parties, Wafidis and 13 Public Figures…”
\textsuperscript{708} “Important Stages in the Way of the Constitutional Assembly”
\textsuperscript{709} “The Battle of the Constitution in Egypt between the Majority and the Faction”
\textsuperscript{710} Ali & Abd El-Zaher et al. “10 Parties, Wafidis and 13 Public Figures…”
\textsuperscript{711} “Politicians Withdraw from the Constitutional Committee for Writing the Egyptian Constitution”, \textit{Al-Rai}, 27\textsuperscript{th} November 2016, http://alrai.com/article/551975.html
refused\textsuperscript{712}. Besides, there was insistence on not widely discussing the constitutions’ articles and on rapidly finishing the constitution because the committee’s continuity was threatened by the judiciary and it was obliged to finish its task before 12\textsuperscript{th} of December as set by SCAF second deceleration\textsuperscript{713}. Hence, the timing of the secularists’ withdrawal was not only crucial but also further undermined the committee’s legitimacy and raised skepticism toward the way of writing the constitution and its content\textsuperscript{714}.

To conclude, the process of writing the constitution is significant since it is supposed to set the rules of the game and hence should represent all societal sectors if it is to be perceived as legitimate. Even if it is obvious that the path adopted by the SCAF, whether the ad hoc committee or the running of parliamentary elections followed by writing the constitution has made the process of reaching consensus among political actors more difficult, the behavior of Islamists and Secularists further worsened the situation. Returning back to the chapter’s main assumption, increasing polarization was not due to the absence of dialogue between Islamists and Secularists but to actors’ perception towards the constitution, the way their dialogues were run, and their commitment to the dialogues’ results. First, all political parties dealt with the constitution as if it was an electoral race rather than a matter of agreement where each must have a voice. To be specific, Islamists assumed that it is their right to dominate the constitutional assembly since they represented the majority in the parliament, while secular parties were always skeptic towards the Islamists’ intentions. Second, most dialogues were close to brainstorming and listening sessions than to negotiations because Islamists and Secularists showed inflexibility in changing their positions despite the attempts made by moderators. Lastly, the mistrust between Islamists and Secularists was intensified by the behavior of Islamists in particular where

\textsuperscript{712} Ibid
\textsuperscript{713} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 177.
\textsuperscript{714} “The Battle of the Constitution in Egypt between the Majority and the Faction”
they showed non-commitment to their promises in most cases. For example, they did not stick to the 50-50% of the seats as they agreed with other actors and prepared a list that gained the majority in the second committee despite the fact that this was one of the main reasons behind the disintegration of the first committee. Worth mentioning, secularist parties usually took the easiest solution which is either to defect or to turned to courts rather than using political solutions such as compromise.

Third: The Peak of Polarization under Morsi:

As no one expected the toppling of Mubarak, electing a president in a free election for the first time in Egypt’s modern history was astonishing for everyone whether in Egypt or abroad. Not only that, it was the first time that Egyptians witnessed such a long multi-candidate election that took place for more than 100 days since opening the door for registration on March 10th, 2012 till announcing the election results on June 24th, 2012. Officially, 23 candidates registered for the race but the Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC) later disqualified ten candidates making use of the fact that its decisions could not be appealed according to the 30th March deceleration. The excluded members included the hard line MB member Khairat El-Shater, Salafi figure Salah Abou Ismail, and Mubarak’s vice president Omar Suleiman. On May 23rd and 24th, the first round of elections took place with a run-off to be held on 16th and 17th of June. Despite the high voter turnout, the results of the first round were shocking for many since the run-off would be held between Mohamed Morsi (24.9%) and Ahmed Shafiq (23.4%). While Hamdeen Sabahy, Abou El-Fotouh and Amr Moussa came in

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716 Ibid
717 Ibid, 16-17
719 Abd Rabou, “Egypt after Elections”, 17.
the third, fourth and fifth ranks respectively. By that, people found themselves in front of the same equation as during Mubarak’s era which was to choose between either a hardliner with a military background and Mubarak’s last Prime Minister, Shafiq, or the MB candidate and former head of the FJP, Morsi. The initial response of most political forces was to boycott the second round or appeal the results. Logically speaking, state organizations, former NDP members and former regime supporters would back Shafiq while Morsi’s chances would be minimal if he was backed only by the MB members or supporters. The dissolution of the parliament by the administrative court only two days prior to the second round and its ruling that the impeachment law which was supposed to exclude Shafiq was unconstitutional raised skepticism that there might be attempts by the former regime to fight back. Hence, the political forces that formed the committee of 100 which attempted to unite all forces either behind Sabahi or Abou El-Fotouh in the first round realized that the only way to protect the uprising demands was to support the MB candidate if the movement agreed to offer them some guarantees. Accordingly, MB leader El-Baltagi invited all political forces, including revolutionary youth, to a meeting at Fairmont Hotel that continued for 15 continuous hours till they reached an agreement. Worth mentioning, political forces announced the meeting results on 22nd of June, two days before the election results in a press conference to close the

720 Ibid
721 Ibid, 15 & 17.
722 Ibid, 17.
723 Ibid, 17.
724 Mohamed El-Haddad, “With Video: Secrets Published for the First Time about Fairmont Conference”, Al-Mesryoon, 19 February 2014, https://almesryoon.com/%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86/393261-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%88%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AA
725 Ibid
door in front of any attempts to manipulate the results after the SCAF issued its complementary deceleration as shown previously and the delay in announcing the results. In other words, they were skeptic towards SCAF real intentions of transmitting power.\textsuperscript{727} At the Fairmont convention, political forces agreed to support Morsi in return for being a representative of all Egyptians and to share power with the other main three spectrums: liberal, left and national\textsuperscript{728} if he won the elections. This agreement was translated into 6 articles that included: forming a national rescue government to be headed by a national independent figure and to be representative of different spectrums, opposing the SCAF’s complementary deceleration which established military rule and deprived the president of his powers, re-forming the constitutional committee to ensure the writing of a representative constitution, etc.\textsuperscript{729}

Once he comes to power, Morsi gradually broke the commitments he and his movement made at the Fairmont agreement. First of all, it took Morsi one month and a half since his official inauguration on 30\textsuperscript{th} of June to nominate Hesham Kandil as the prime minister without any prior discussion with political forces.\textsuperscript{730} In contrast to their agreement over choosing a national public figure at Fairmont, Kandil was beyond their expectations. He had worked in the water resources and irrigation ministry since his graduation from the faculty of engineering in 1984 and was appointed minister of water resources and irrigation in the Sharaf and El-Ganzouri governments since 2011\textsuperscript{731}. Not only that, the government included 6 politicians, 3

\textsuperscript{727} Wael Kandil, “Fairmont Convention between the President and National Forces”, \textit{El-Shorouk News}, 7 July 2012, \url{http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=06072012&id=a87dcd81-d96c-42f1-afe4-d2b5db538938}

\textsuperscript{728} El-Haddad, “With Video: Secrets Published for the First Time about Fairmont Conference”.

\textsuperscript{729} Kandil, “Fairmont Convention between the President and National Forces”.


\textsuperscript{731} Mohamed Sha’aban, “Who is Hesham Kandil that Essam Al-E’ryan was surprised by Choosing him as a Prime Minister?”, \textit{El-Shabab}, 24\textsuperscript{th} July 2012, \url{http://shabab.ahram.org.eg/News/4465.aspx}
with military backgrounds, 4 businessmen, 9 technocrats, and 14 bureaucrats. Besides, the government did not represent different political spectrums as it had 9 Islamist along with 27 neutral ministers while liberals and leftists were not represented at all. Further, Morsi procrastinated with the re-formation of the constitutional assembly and declared that he would only re-form it if it could not finish the constitution on time or if there was a fundamental dispute over the constitution’s content. The aggravation of the assembly’s conflict due to the withdrawal of secularists and the closure of 2nd of December when the Supreme Constitutional Court was supposed to investigate the constitutionality of decree no. 79 as shown above, led Morsi to issue a constitutional deceleration on 21st of November that further intensified the ideological polarization instead of containing it. Most importantly, the deceleration determined that all the decisions, decrees, and declarations issued by Morsi since 30th of June could not be appealed by any institute or any means and hence he extended the work of the constitutional assembly for two months and prevented any judicial institution from dissolving the constitutional assembly or the Shoura Council.

This constitutional declaration was the snowball that widened the rift between Islamists, especially the MB, and secular forces leading to a societal division and a military coup by June 2013. In response to Morsi’s deceleration, most secular parties such as El-Wafd, Masr El-Horura, Egyptian Democratic, El-Nasri Socialist, El-Karama, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, Socialist

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733 Ibid
734 “Fairmont Scandal: An Alliance with Devil”.
737 Ibid
Popular Coalition, and El-Tagammu formed ‘National Salvation Front/Gabhat El-Inqaz’\textsuperscript{738}. It also included some public figures such as El-Baradei, Ashour, El-Badawi, Sabahy\textsuperscript{739}, Abou El-Ghar, Moussa, Hamzawy, Ishaq, etc\textsuperscript{740}. It was formed for the purpose of opposing MB attempts to have a monopoly over power\textsuperscript{741} by abolishing Morsi’s statement\textsuperscript{742}. Although Morsi later cancelled it, his insistence on keeping its effects as the appointment of a new Deputy General escalated the tension between the regime and its opponents\textsuperscript{743}. Hence, their demands expanded to include amending the constitution to be more representative of all sectors before the constitutional referendum, amending electoral laws, and nominating a neutral government to run the elections\textsuperscript{744}. Unfortunately, Morsi did not only show no intention to compromise with his opponents, but also called people for a referendum over the constitution on 1\textsuperscript{st} of December after the assembly rapidly voted on all of its articles in one session that took place on 29\textsuperscript{th} of November and extended till early morning of the next day\textsuperscript{745}. Accordingly, three youth called Mahmoud Badr, Hassan Shahin and Mahmoud Abd El-Aziz thought of establishing ‘Tamarud Movement’ on 26\textsuperscript{th} of April, 2013 that aimed to call people to withdraw confidence from Morsi.

\textsuperscript{738} Essam El-Sherbeni, Mostafa Morad & Noura Ghazal, “In details: Where did Gabhat El-Inqaz disappear?”, Al-Mesryoon, 12 May 2015. \url{http://almesryoon.com/%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA/73839-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%89-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%9F}

\textsuperscript{739} Ibid

\textsuperscript{740} Gabhat El-Inqaz official website \url{http://elgabha.org/}

\textsuperscript{741} Ibid

\textsuperscript{742} Khaled Shamt, “Gabhat El-Inqaz…Coalition of Egyptian opposition”, Al-Jazeera, 18 December 2012 \url{http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2012/12/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%86%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B0-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9}

\textsuperscript{743} Ibid

\textsuperscript{744} Gabhat El-Inqaz official website \url{http://elgabha.org/}

\textsuperscript{745} Helal, “Legislative & Constitutional framework”, 178.
and demand early presidential elections by signing a statement published by Tamarud. After only ten days of its launch, the movement gathered around two million signatures according to Badr while its goal was to gather 15 million signatures by 15th June to be able to withdraw confidence from Morsi who gained the presidency by 13 million votes. If it succeeded, the movement would submit those signatures to the Supreme Constitutional Court in order to call for early presidential elections. Tamarud then gained the support of some opposition parties and movements such as El-Dostour, the Popular Trend, El-Masryeen El-Ahrar, Kefaya, and 6th April. Later, El-Inqaz announced that it supports Tamarud and that its participant parties opened their offices for the movement. Since then, Tamarud and El-Inqaz coordinated together to gather signatures which reached around 22 million and to prepare for 30th of June.

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746 Samar Medhat, “In the third anniversary of 30th June uprising …Tamarud movement from foundation till disintegration”, Al-Wafd, 29 June 2016, http://alwafd.org/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%AD%D9%80%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA/1240447-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A9-30-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%88-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A3%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85

747 Lamia’a Rady, “Tamarud movement for toppling the president”, Sky news, 13 May 2013, http://www.skynewsarabia.com/web/article/235546/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%94%D9%8A%D8%B3

748 Hussein Emara, “Egyptian Tamarud movement: Who are they and what they want?”, France 24, 26/6/ 2013, http://www.france24.com/ar/20130626-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%94%D9%8A%D8%B3

demonstrations, the first anniversary of the first elected president post-uprising, where they called people to go down to streets to topple Morsi and call for early elections. After millions of people went to streets on 30th of June, El-Inqaz emphasized that Morsi’s regime had lost its legitimacy and that he had no alternative except to step down. Besides, it called people to sit-in at Tahrir and other squares till a peaceful power transition took place, while Tamarud called people to blockade the presidential palace on 1st of July to force Morsi to step down. On 3rd of July, the SCAF took over power and Badr along with some figures of El-Inqaz gave a speech at the SCAF conference to announce a transition road map, which raised skepticism towards the role of security in founding of Tamarud and El-Inqaz.

Whereas the presidential elections attracted the attention of many since the toppling of Mubarak, the results of the first round were extremely shocking as voters found themselves in front of the same equation as Mubarak. Hence, they had to choose between a representative of the old regime and a candidate of the traditional regime antagonist (i.e. MB). Fortunately, the MB and most political actors, including secular parties and uprising ary youth, realized that unification was required if the uprising s’ demands were to be achieved. Although the victory of Morsi would have been impossible without the backing of other political forces, the MB broke its initial promises as usual once they reached power. Instead of being a national president that would set the main pillars for a democratic system and seek to achieve social unification, Morsi took all the steps that would increase ideological polarization leading to the setback of a potential democratic transition. As explained, he did not respond to opposition demands’ towards nominating a national figure as a prime minister or re-forming the constitutional

751 Samar Medhat, “In the third anniversary of 30th June uprising …”
752 Gabhbat El-Inqaz official website http://elgabha.org/
753 Ibid
754 Samar Medhat, “In the third anniversary of 30th June uprising …”
committee to be representative of the society but what mostly raised the polarization to its peak was his November deceleration. Upon which, he gave himself exclusive powers that opponents feared it would be an intention by MB to have monopoly over power especially that their precedent actions do not exclude this allegation. Whereas El-Inqaz and Tamarud are clear indicators for the exacerbation of ideological polarization, they resorted intentionally or accidentally to the easiest way which is calling the military back rather than seeking political solutions.

**Conclusion**

The chapter has started with a glimpse over the roots of the multi-party system in Egypt and the political landscape under Mubarak where it consisted of secular parties on one side of the spectrum and Islamic movements that lie on the other front. As explained, secular parties were given some space in the formal political space by allowing them to criticize regime policies or strategies as long as they do not criticize the ruling elite or challenge regime’s core. On the other hand, double standards were used toward Islamists where radical groups as Gama’a Islamiyah were repressed harshly by the regime while MB were not allowed to act as a formal actor but at the same time, it was given some space to perform informally through its independent candidates in the parliament and its social networks in state organizations, syndicates and NGOs. Whereas there were only 24 parties by the end of Mubarak’s reign, the transition period has witnessed an explosion in the number of parties which reached over 70 parties as shown in section two. Post-uprising parties were composed of liberal, left and mixed parties that combined between liberalism and socialism along with Islamists movements that were allowed to form their own parties for the first time. In an attempt to test the validity of my assumption which returns opposition fragmentation post-uprising to the failure of Islamists and
Secularists to compromise over the rules of the new system due to ideological polarization, absence of sustained dialogue and mobilization asymmetry between the two; I have examined the pre-electoral alliances of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections and how both forces dealt with their disputes whether in the process of writing the constitution or under the rule of Morsi. As shown, a massive number of meetings were held between Islamists and secularists whether to agree on the main principles of the coming system prior to parliamentary elections or on the way of electing the constitutional assembly and voting over the constitutions’ articles. Indeed, the problem is not in the absence of sustained dialogue between the two who showed an intention to reach consensus but in the way these meetings were run and the reaction of actors to the meetings’ results. The cases used in section three illustrate that political forces can reach consensus over the main principles but once they start to discuss the details or issues related to their interests such as: parties’ representation in the constitutional assembly, disputes arose returning us back to square one. To be specific, the MB usually blames non-secularists for not accepting election results and claims that the composition of the constitutional assembly must reflect power distribution in the parliament. However, what they never understood is that majorities were for parliaments not for constitutive processes which reflects their shallow perception of democracy. Similarly, secularists usually blame Islamists for using the election results to undermine the development of a democratic system and to have monopoly over power. Although MB offered very little in the way of guarantees and usually broke its promises, secularists rarely resorted to political solutions. In most situations, they pressured to withdraw or resorted to courts as was the case with the two assemblies or they bargain with

758 Ibid
SCAF till they called for military intervention by 2013. As articulated by Brown, the problem does not lie in the political rivalries by themselves but in settling them by pressuring, nagging and bargaining with generals rather than negotiating, compromising, etc. After decades under autocrats who “mouthed democratic promises while withholding its substance” and who favored a divide-and-rule approach toward opposition creating an environment of suspicion and mistrust between actors, “each went into democratic politics with unrealistic expectations regarding what it could achieve and exaggerated suspicions of the motives of all rivals.”

Putting this into consideration along with the way SCAF run the transition and the ambiguity, suspicion, and confusion that accompanied its decisions and strategies, it successfully made use of the already mistrust between Islamists and Secularists impeding any attempts to reach national consensus especially that the rules of the game were not fair from the beginning. However, this is not to overlook the fact that the willingness of the elite to share power and compromise is more likely to occur where there is a balance of power between different segments and where no one group is able to impose its will on others. Since 15th of March referendum, it became apparent that the electoral capabilities of Islamists exceed that of secularists. Although this issue was not discussed in details in previous chapters, it is important to point out to Masoud’s explanation as one significant explanation for the excellence of Islamists over secularists. He found that the victory of Islamists in the founding elections do not return to voters’ desire to implement Shari’a or to protect the second article in the constitution but to their perception about Islamists’ economic policies where they believe that Islamic parties are more committed to redistribution and the expansion of the welfare state than leftist

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759 Ibid
760 Ibid, 55.
761 Ibid, 53.
762 Shehata, Islamists and non-Islamists in the Egyptian opposition, 22.
parties. This can be apparent in Masoud’s findings where 8.7% of recipients of Islamic healthcare services had voted for MB in 2010 parliamentary elections while 45% of them indicated their intention to vote for MB in the first post-uprising election. In contrast to the common wisdom in literature, Masoud argue that the “long-duration political and development processes have generated a social landscape rich in religious networks and poor in social networks that are based on class or occupation.” Hence, Islamists have better opportunities to reach voters and convince them with their agenda than leftists. MB members’ embeddedness in religious networks has limited influence on electoral politics under Mubarak due to voters’ reluctance and close monitoring by security over religious institutions’ activities. But post-uprising with more open environment, Islamists had a “richer fund of social ties” through faith-based institutions that “they can draw on than their secularists” in general. To conclude, my assumption seemed partially invalid in which the absence of dialogues had no impact on the failure of Islamists and Secularists to reach consensus over the rules of the new system while ideological polarization and mobilization asymmetry had played a significant role along other factors as explained.

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764 Ibid, 156.
765 Ibid, 181.
766 Ibid, 182.
767 Ibid, 158.
Conclusion

A common wisdom in the literature explains the non-competitiveness and fragmentation of opposition under Mubarak with the adoption of a divide-and-rule strategy by the regime that played the actors off against each other, making use of their ideological differences and personal conflicts. Additional factors include the problems that are associated with parties since the foundation of a multi-party system in the mid-1970s such as conflicts over leadership, lack of economic resources, democratic deficiency inside parties, etc. Once an opportunity arose in January 2011, opposition elites put their conflicts “[r]ecognizing that while mutual cooperation may succeed, independent actions surely will not” as Lust put it. Soon after the toppling of Mubarak, however, cleavages started to re-emerge leading to the re-fragmentation of the opposition. This raises the following puzzle: Why did opposition fragmentation persist despite the fact that “transitions are specific moments that results in a watershed in the political life, opening up various trails” and notwithstanding the relative decrease in regime repression after the fall of Mubarak and the collapse of the regime’s “throbbing heart”, the security apparatus? In terms of Tarrow’s definition for political opportunity structures as the “consistent dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure”, the post-Mubarak period can be regarded as the best opportunity since the re-building of a new political system requires consensus among actors. If this should be the case, it is important to understand the causal factors that led to the persistence of opposition fragmentation after Mubarak which this

768 El-Azabawi & Hassan, “Partisan map in Egypt after the uprising”, 28-36.
thesis attempted to examine. More specifically, I argued that there are three main factors that impeded opposition from unification which are continuing regime manipulation by SCAF, the failure of cooperation between youth movements and political parties, and the polarization between Islamists and Secularists.

The scholarly literature has argued that the military’s position toward mass demonstrations is decisive with respect to regime stability or breakdown. The success or failure of democratic transition also largely depend on the military’s behavior, especially if the armed forces are in charge of the transition as was the case in Egypt. Having been a major component of Mubarak’s regime, the military was unlikely to be a neutral force and there was a high probability that it would adopt the same strategies as Mubarak to keep the opposition fragmented. Accordingly, the second chapter tried to test the validity of this assumption. Whereas the military did not intend to take over power, no one can deny that it was an opportunity to return to its role as a king maker and to preserve its interests after years of depoliticization. Trying to balance between its interests and those of political actors where each requires a voice along with the “military’s own characteristics that prefers stability and tends toward secrecy”, the SCAF’s strategy during the transitional period was characterized by inconsistency, hesitancy and confusion, leading to the prolongation of the transitional period in which each step further tore political actors apart. To be more specific, I have focused on three significant stages or issues during the transitional period to examine whether the SCAF adopted the same strategies as Mubarak to divide political actors. Being aware of Islamists’ strong organizational and mobilization capabilities, the SCAF thought of taking them as allies against the uprising ary forces, especially since their interests coincided in the short run. By doing this,

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774 Abd Rabou, “Civil-military relations in the Middle East”, 101.
the SCAF sought to stabilize the situation given its preference for limited change. The Islamists, and especially the MB, are well-known for their reformist doctrine and prefer to preserve the state especially given the fact that they had a good chance to attain a position of political power. Thus, the ad hoc committee appointed by the SCAF was headed by an Islamist thinker, El-Bashri and a MB parliamentary candidate, Subhi Saleh, along with other six jurists. The lack of representation of other political forces raised other actors’ skepticism toward a deal between the SCAF and the MB. Things got worse when the committees’ amendments were approved in the March referendum after Islamists had campaigned for a yes-vote. Hence, the ad hoc committee and the very first balloting opened the first rift between Islamists and other actors, especially uprising ary forces. The lateness of the SCAF declaration that was supposed to be the interim constitution based on the referendum results opened the door for the rise of a debate between Islamists who adopted an ‘election first’ path and uprising ary forces along with secularists who argued for a ‘constitution first’ path. But then the deceleration came as a surprise for all because it adopted an ‘election first path’ as advocated by the Islamists, but at the same time the SCAF secured for itself a role in the process of writing a new constitution. Moving to the parliamentary elections which were the second issue that I examined, the SCAF, whether intentionally or accidentally, was aware that “incumbents can determine which opposition groups exist or disappear and can influence their incentives to unite or split by the rules they make and the institutions they establish”\textsuperscript{775}. Indeed, the SCAF adopted a parallel rather than a mixed PR system and regional PR blocs instead of a national PR system which made it difficult for post-uprising ary, small parties to penetrate the party system for technical reasons that were explained in the chapter while making the victory of Islamists inevitable putting their capabilities into consideration. The results of the parliamentary elections followed by the debate

\textsuperscript{775} Lust, “Structuring Conflict in the Arab World”, 77.
over writing the constitution –as will be explained below- have further escalated the mistrust between Islamists and other political forces. Lastly, I looked at the reaction of the SCAF and political parties to the demonstrations that took place against military rule. Due to its nature, the military is hostile to dissent but it tolerated frequent protests until it lost its patience once they started calling for terminating military rule. With very few exceptions, the Islamists, especially the MB, boycotted the protests that were against the SCAF. This attitude cannot be solely explained by their incentives. Based on Lust’s argument on structures of contestations, the MB may have feared that if they allied with other forces against the SCAF, they would lose the privileges they had achieved in the parliament or were likely to obtain in the battle of writing the constitution or running for the presidency. Based on all the above, my assumption seemed valid. The SCAF succeeded to play political actors off against each other by its strategy during the transitional period, by the rules it set and by influencing the incentives of actors such as the MB, thus widening the gap between them and other political actors.

The third chapter examined another causal factor behind opposition fragmentation which is the failure of political parties to form alliances with youth movements. The importance of youth movements does not only lie in the fact that youth took the lead on the streets in January 2011, but also in the significance of their foundation after the toppling of Mubarak. If it is understandable that Kefaya, 6 April, the National Association for Change, etc. represented an alternative opposition channel to the mistrusted parties for youth prior to the uprising, it is surprising that youth organized themselves under informal entities such as cross-ideological alliances, rather than political parties post-uprising. Instead of reforming their organizations to attract the new generation of activists, parties preferred to join the already established youth alliances. Not only did parties fail to include youth, but they also threatened their movements’
sustainability due to their non-commitment to the movements’ goals which urged them to withdraw once a better opportunity arose, especially before the elections. Hence, my assumption seemed valid. Besides cross-ideological alliances, another form of alliances that I referred to as ideological alliances were formed post-uprising. Similar to the movements of the 2000s, ideological alliances have “adopted a consensual approach by focusing on what unites Egyptians not on what divides them”\(^{776}\). This is because Al-Tayyar El-Masry, the Union of Socialist Youth, and Salafyo Costa were formed by defectors from the MB, leftist parties, and Salafi movements after they realized that their mother organizations insisted on engaging them in their ideological and personal conflicts with their counterparts while the prospects of cooperation between youth from different political spectrums proved to be high after they succeeded to cooperate together starting from the early 2000s onwards. Accordingly, mother organizations or movements such as the MB failed to co-opt youth within their organizations and to reform them in order to cope with their high expectations which further supports my assumption. Lastly, the demonstrations that youth movements called for throughout the transition were either met by opposition or abstention by both Islamist and Secular parties in most cases with very few exceptions which further enhanced the mistrust between them. Whereas my assumption seemed valid to a great extent, it has overlooked the fact that those alliances have their own problems that further weakened them vis-à-vis traditional forces. Just as the movements of the 2000s, their lack of institutionalization made it hard for youth alliances to maintain their activity beyond specific events. In addition, the cross-ideological nature of prior and post youth alliances was highly important in unifying them against Mubarak before his toppling or SCAF post-uprising but the “lack of programmatic

\(^{776}\) Dina Shehata, “Youth movements and 25\(^{th}\) January uprising”, 2011, 117-118
coherence and common interest” among its ideologically diverse members made it difficult to keep them together “beyond the very term that united them”777.

Lastly, the fourth chapter attempted to examine the last and third factor that explains opposition fragmentation with the failure of Islamists and Secularists to reach consensus over the rules of the new political system due to ideological polarization, absence of sustained dialogue, and mobilization asymmetry. As shown, the foundation of the multi-party system in Egypt in the mid-1970s was not created by social pressure, but rather by an initiative from Sadat who intended to use parties as an image for a multi-party system to hide a single-party system dominated by the NDP since then onwards778. Indeed, most secular parties that Albrecht described as ‘loyal opposition’ were either politically marginalized or virtually defunct779. On the other hand, the Islamist movements, especially the MB, have represented the main threat to the regime due to their wide social base and their alternative program that challenges the regime’s core. Nonetheless, Mubarak used a double-edged strategy where Jihadists were harshly repressed by the security apparatus, while the MB was given some space to maneuver. This does not mean that the MB was included in the formal political sphere which was exclusive for secular parties; instead, they were allowed to perform from underground whether by running for parliament as independent candidates or through their social networks in civil society and the syndicates. Hence, Mubarak’s adoption of a divided SoC created an environment of skepticism and mistrust between Islamists and Secularists where each was hesitant to form a liaison with the other in order not to provoke the incumbents’ anger. In an attempt to test the validity of my assumption mentioned above, I have examined the pre-electoral alliances of 2011/2012 parliamentary elections and how both forces dealt with their disputes whether in the process of writing the

777 Holger Albrecht, Raging Against the Machine, 81-82
778 Ibid, 41 & 58.
779 Albrecht, “Raging against the Machine”, 45-46.
constitution or under the rule of Morsi. In contrast to my assumption, the problem does not lie in the absence of sustained dialogue between Islamists and Secularists but in the way these dialogues were run and actors’ attitude toward the results. As shown, a massive number of meetings were held between Islamists and secularists, implying their intention to reach consensus which they usually succeeded to reach if they were discussing general issues. But disputes arose once they discussed the details such as the representation of parties in the constitutional committee or the threshold for the adoption of constitutional articles. In most cases, the Secularists withdrew from the talks, resorted to the judiciary, or negotiated with the SCAF. Hence, they usually took the easiest route instead of relying on political solutions through compromises. On the other hand, Islamists were often inflexible in changing their positions which was apparent in their insistence that the composition of the constitutional assembly must reflect the power distribution in parliament and they tended to break their promises. Moreover, the supremacy of hard-liners on both sides over moderates such as Wahid Abd El-Magid, Ayman Nour, Sayed El-Badawi, etc. made it difficult to reach a compromise between Islamists and Secularists. Another indicator for this point is that the only pre-electoral alliance in the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections that rejected ideological polarization failed to achieve significant representation in the parliament compared to the other two Islamic alliances and the secular alliance. Even if this is partially true, it is important not to neglect the fact that elites’ willingness to share power and compromise is likely to occur where there is a balance of power between different segments and where no one group is able to impose its will on others.\textsuperscript{780} Since the 15\textsuperscript{th} of March referendum, it became apparent that the electoral capabilities of Islamists exceeded that of secularists. In response, secularists blamed Islamists with their attempts to monopolize power but at the same time, the Islamists, especially the MB, usually behaved in a

\textsuperscript{780} Shehata, Islamists and non-Islamists in the Egyptian opposition, 22.
way that exacerbated such claims. As explained, Morsi broke all the promises made in the Fairmont agreement after he came to power by not nominating a national figure as prime minister, calling for a referendum over the new constitution without negotiating with opponents to ensure that it was representative of society, and releasing the November declaration that gave him extraordinary powers. Instead of being a national president who would set the main pillars for a democratic system and seek to achieve social unification, Morsi took all the steps to increase ideological polarization, leading to the setback of a potential democratic transition by the 2013 coup. Accordingly, my assumption seemed valid with respect to the impact of ideological polarization and mobilization asymmetry on impeding Islamists and Secularists from reaching a compromise over the rules of the new system while the absence of sustained dialogue proved invalid.

To conclude, this thesis attempted to examine the causal factors behind the persistence of opposition fragmentation even after the absence of the authoritarian incumbent due to the importance of opposition unification not only in the toppling of autocrats but also, in the success of democratic transition as argued by most transitologists. As mentioned, most of the literature written on the post-Mubarak period has mainly focused on the significant events during the transitional period such as elections while neglecting the nature of relation between different political actors and the shift in their positions toward each other. Hence, this thesis attempted to examine the nature of political actors’ interactions and its implications on opposition fragmentation in contexts broader than the elections. For example: the second chapter showed how and why SCAF has shifted its position toward uprising ary forces as well as MB throughout the transitional period. The fourth chapter also showed that a dialogue between Islamists and Secularists can be sustained as long as they were discussing general issues. Further, this thesis
pointed to the fact that alliances between opposition forces may not necessarily take place in formal spheres and are not exclusive to formal entities such as parties. Rather, it can take place between informal youth movements and parties such as the case of cross-ideological alliances in chapter three or can be exemplified in the informal political sphere as the case of the demonstrations mentioned in the second and third chapter that were organized by multiple actors who succeeded to unite behind some demands despite their differences. Whereas most scholars tended to focus on the role of youth during the 18 days of the uprising or in the early days after Mubarak, I tried to point to the nature of their relation with political parties and SCAF during the transition. This is because opposition behavior in the post-transition period would be influenced by the rising role of youth and the success of old elites to restructure their organizations to include these youth as argued by Lust. But as shown, her expectations were unfound as exemplified in the foundation of informal youth movements such as ideologist alliances and in the fact that youth took the lead on the streets post-Mubarak while most demonstrations were boycotted by parties. Nonetheless, this thesis has kept some questions open that would require further study. These include: who can be an alternate to the military and how can we ensure its non-interference in the process of transition putting into consideration its superior position compared to political actors, is it possible to overcome the long history of mistrust between opposing actors due to authoritarian legacy or not, how to empower soft-liners or new political elites in the post-transition period, why youth failed to formally found their own organizations post-uprising, etc.

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This is because elections can function as a forum of struggle between regime and opposition where the latter has the right to express their programs and criticize regimes’ policies and even if the legislatures have limited power, they became the focus of official media, giving the opposition an opportunity to express their views.

By adopting exit strategies that can range from election boycott to protests, sit-ins, etc., the opposition seeks to discredit the legitimacy of the regime. Whilst, by adopting participation strategies that can include electoral alliances, reform alliances or joint election-monitoring teams, the opposition aims to achieve political reforms from within regime parameters.

The three successful cases refer to the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties (HCCNOP), protests organized by the professional associations (PAs) and joint electoral lists in PA elections, whilst the failed coalition refers to the university students' attempts to create a general student union (GSU).

For instance: Cavatorta and Haugbølle found that repression and co-optation can inhibit cooperation in some cases, but can foster it in others. Kraetzschmar found that multi-issue alliances and alliances that include domestic and international actors last longer than single-issue alliances and alliances that are composed of domestic actors only. Other scholars realized that personal rivalries and distribution of power play a major role in the emergence of alliances in Morocco and Jordan, while in Tunisia, ideological differences play the most important role.

For instance, certain constituencies can be rewarded by the drawing of electoral districts and allocation of seats. In other contexts, regimes give limited concessions to certain ideological groups such as Islamists to convince them that their opponents are other opposition groups such as leftists not the regime and thus they curb any efforts of cross-ideological alliances. Further, electoral law can be designed in favor of a certain identity whether a family, tribe or sect in order to damp the basis for a common opposition program.

There is a theoretical expectation that under authoritarian constraints opposition groups, irrespective of their ideological positions and policy preferences, will pool their resources to try to pressurize the regime into reforming the political system because they all share the common objective of eliminating the authoritarian player to open up the political space. This is to be expected because it is only the removal of authoritarian constraints that will allow genuine opposition actors to put forth their visions of a new society freely. There is substantial empirical evidence from Eastern European and Latin American cases to suggest that such a theoretical assumption carries considerable validity.

That’s how Charles Dickens started his novel on the French Uprising then Kandil used the same expression to characterize Mubarak’s era as it was the best of times for Mubarak’s ruling
elite and security men whilst, it was the worst of times for the army and the people. (Kandil, “Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen”, 175)

viii The monthly salary of a lieutenant in the armed forces was, by the end of Mubarak’s rule, barely LE 2,000 (US $333). (Bou Nassif 2013, 516)

ix Similarly, “officers from the Signal Corps moved into telecommunication and information sectors and officers from the air force occupied positions in civil aviation and airports”. (Bou Nassif 2013, 519)

x According to Zeinab Abul-Magd, a historian whose articles on the Egyptian Armed Forces’ economic role have circulated widely, 40% of what the Ministry of Military Production manufactures is actually nonmilitary products. Furthermore, although the AIO is Egypt’s premier weapons manufacturer, 70% of its products are also geared toward nonmilitary merchandise. Finally, the NSPO exclusively manufactures nonmilitary equipment. (Bou Nassif 2013, 526)

xi As Hillel Frisch concluded, the ‘package deal of hereditary succession coupled by a free-market economy was too much for the military to bear’ (Albrecht 2015, 47).

xii Endgame scenarios are defined as “situations in which a non-democratic regime is challenged by mass-based, sustained, cross-sectoral anti-regime mobilization”. (Koehler 2016, 6)

xiii The case of emergency can only last for six month and cannot be extended except by a public referendum.

xiv The PA and Shoura Council are obliged to elect a constitutional committee within 6 months that will be charged to write the constitution within 6 months then people will be called for voting within 15 days after finishing the constitution final draft.

xv Despite the weak representation of youth alliances at People’s Assembly, the age of this assembly’s candidates are the youngest compared to the five parliaments held since 1995. The category of (41-50) is the highest age category where it represents 41.3% followed by the categories of (30-40) and (25-29) respectively where the former represents 13.6% of the candidates and that latter represents only 1.6% (Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and Returning back to Square One”, 314).

xvi They stated the formation of Council of Defense and National Security that will be headed by the president and will be responsible for discussing all issues that concerns the military including the discussion of its budget that will be added to the national budget as a total number while its details will be exclusive to the council. Further, any legislation concerning the military must be approved by the council before being approved by the parliament.

xvii Divided Structures of Contestation takes place when incumbents allow some groups to participate legally in the formal political system while excluding others. (Lust 2005, 1-2)

xviii Unified Structures of Contestation takes place when incumbents allow all opposition groups to participate in the formal political system. (Lust 2005, 1-2)

xix In December 2006, the workers at the Misr Textile Factory in the city of El-Mahalla in the Nile Delta started a strike that initiated the biggest wave of labor protests since the 1940s. It was quantitatively significant, with more than 1.7 million workers estimated to have participated in actions in the 2006-2009 period. It also marked a qualitative leap from earlier labor action in Egypt. Worker-leaders outside official
union committees organized the overwhelming majority of these strikes and actions…” (El-Mahdi 2014, 59)

xi An important experience in this regard was the national dialogue organized by the Committee on the Coordination among Professional Associations in 1994. The experience of the 1994 conference was by no means the last, however. One of the most productive efforts was a 1996 informal dialogue that focused on the issue of democracy. (Shorbagy 2007, 183)

xii As Wael Khalil, a member of Kefaya, articulated in his interview with Abdelrahman: “We celebrated Kefaya for its new ‘form’-horizontal, non-hierarchical, loose, and flexible- because it was everything that traditional political parties were not. The problem now, however, is that Kefaya does not exist beyond the event. In other words, Kefaya is very successful at organizing a rally or a demonstration; it attracts people, emotions rise high. However, once the event is over, there is nothing left” (Maha Abdelrahman, “In Praise of Organization: Egypt between activism and uprising ”, Development and Change 44, no. 3 (2013): 576, DOI: 10.1111/dech.12028).

xiii Former head of Al-Gad’s youth committee

xiv According to one member who became affiliated with the Democratic Front, decision making process looked like a closed box, which no one knew about except the close circle of the movement’s coordinator. Another said that “the way the movement was being run before the uprising was very individualistic and this made the movements’ loses exceed its gains”. (El-Sayed 2014, 48)

xv An Egyptian poet and political opponent to Mubarak’s regime

xvi Labeled ‘He could have been your brother’ the tragedy of Said provided psychological, political and personal motives to mobilize the sedentary critical mass against torture. Hence, the page scored 300 subscription at the first two minutes and 30,000 on the first day. By March 2011, the page contents achieved 1,300 billion hits while an average of 500,000 participants visit the page at least once every day (El-Banaa 2012, 76).

xvii The page ran numerous campaigns, e.g., a) publishing contact details of martyrs’ mothers and encourage participants to support them, b) launching a ‘Vote for Khaled Said’ campaign to nullify electoral votes of participants, c) launching the ‘Friday of Black Silence’ to mourn victims of police torture on the anniversary of the Egyptian coup d’état, d) calling upon Muslim participants to guard Christian churches on the 7th of January, 2011—to put down the regime efforts to raise sectarian conflicts, e) encouraging participants to dialogue with infiltrating police officers after publishing a list of their Facebook profiles, and f) drawing parallels the famous movie ‘V for Vandetta’ by calling upon participants to wear black outfit on the fifth of November and rounding the streets for six hours to ‘show’ grievance. (El-Banaa 2012, 80)

xviii The Committee of wise men has included Ahmed Kamal Abu El-Magd, Nagib Saweras, Amr Hamzawy and Amr Mousa and it was one of the entities that were founded after the uprising to speak on behalf of the rebels and represent their demands. (Shehata, “Youth movements and 25th January uprising ”, 2011, 34)

xix Others include: Gaafar El-Zafarani, Ahmed Osama, and Mohamed Farouq

xx Others include: Khaled Fouad, A’mar Abd El-Rahman, and Mostafa El-Wahsh

xxi For instance; its founder, Mohamed Yosri Salama, rejected the constitutional amendments at March referendum, called for sending the SCAF back to its barracks, and criticized MB performance when they reached power. In addition, the movement was always by the side of youth movements where it participated in most demonstrations as that of Mohamed Mahmoud, despite the opposition of Salafi movements to these demonstrations.

xxii Head of Presidential Office
Head of People’s Assembly and Shoura Council respectively

El-Gamal is the Prime Minister’s Deputy and Mahmoud is the Attorney General


Despite the weak representation of youth alliances at People’s Assembly, the age of this assembly’s candidates are the youngest compared to the five parliaments held since 1995. The category of (41-50) is the highest age category where it represents 41.3% followed by the category of (30-40) and (25-29) respectively where the former represents 13.6% of the candidates and that latter represents only 1.6% (Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and Returning back to Square One”, 314).

After coming to power, Morsi issued a decree that returned the dissolved parliament back. Then the Supreme Constitutional Deceleration canceled the president’s decree and asserted on its previous decision of the dissolution of the parliament. This reflected the political polarization that swept the transitional period and for the first time in history, the conflict between the presidency and the judiciary reach such level. (Mazen Hassan, “Legislature: Complete Cycle and Returning back to Square One”, 333)

Later, Morsi will issue a constitutional deceleration on 12th of August that will cancel SCAF 3rd deceleration. Upon which, the legislative powers were transferred from SCAF to Morsi. (Mai Mogib, “The executive branch: From conflict to hegemony”, 355)
Appendix (1)