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The American University in Cairo

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Framing of Political Forces in Liberal, Islamist and government newspapers in Egypt:

A content analysis

A Thesis Submitted to

Journalism & Mass Communication department

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

The degree of Master of Arts

By Noha El-Nahass

Under the supervision of Dr. Naila Hamdy

Spring 2016

## **Dedication**

I dedicate this thesis to the journalists who lost their lives while covering the political turbulences in Egypt, may their sacrifices enlighten the road and give the strength to their colleagues to continue reflecting the truth and nothing but the truth.

## AKHNOWLEDGMENTS

In the Name of Allah the merciful and compassionate, I am deeply grateful for all the blessings I have in my life including the opportunities to always learn new things and engage in new experiences.

I want to dedicate my work to my precious late mother, the greatest mother, the friend and the lovely human being, I wish she was here.

I want to thank my father, the owner of any success I achieve and any forward step I take. I also want to thank my lovely small family my husband Ayman El-Shesbokshi, who supports me in every step of my life, and to my lovely daughter Malak, who never complained I am being too busy with my thesis and work.

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## **Abstract**

Since January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, Egypt has witnessed an uneasy process of political change, one of which was the significant change in June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution, when the Egyptian army removed the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi from power, disabled the constitution and drafted along with other political forces a road map for Egypt's political future.

A content analysis was conducted to explore how the Egyptian print media framed the different involved Egyptian political forces at the national scene before June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution. The thesis examined front pages' coverage of four papers, *El-Horeya Wel-Adala*, "Freedom and Justice", *Youm7 "The Seventh day"*, *Al-Masry El Youm*, "Egyptian today", and *Al-Ahram "The Pyramids"* newspapers.

The period of the study is the crucial six months before the June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution. One composite week of news coverage was randomly selected from the six months where every day of the week was represented.

A total of 31 main political forces from both Islamist and Liberal political forces; including political parties, political movements, pressure groups and political figures, were represented in the analysis.

Two research questions were answered and the answers gave important knowledge of how the liberal, Islamist, and government newspapers framed the political forces and described the political conflict ahead 30<sup>th</sup> of June revolution.

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## **USED ABBRIVEATIONS**

**ERTU** Egyptian Radio & Television Union

**MB** Muslim Brotherhood group

**FJP** Freedom & Justice party

**CBC** Capital Broadcast Center

**IHT** The International Herald Tribune

**WSJ** The Wall Street Journal

## I. INTROUDCTION

The media has a fundamental role in shaping people's perceptions toward the world, and especially toward the issues they don't have a direct experience with, (Happer & Philo, 2013) The media shaped the public perceptions toward the national and international crises, political situations, wars, conflicts and social matters; the messages conveyed by the different media which people get exposed to all the time are shaping the world in a distorted way. (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992)

As an effect of the media's influence, some researchers assumed that the audiences believe the world is similar to what they see in the news coverage and in what the media choose to place under the light; accordingly, people tend to build their political and social views and make their related decisions according to the messages they perceive from the different media channels and types. (Potter, 2011)

The effect of media is not limited to constructing images for reality only, but rather extends to giving it a context and a meaning. (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992) Thus, creating and endorsing stereotypes serve as a tool for political conflicts, dismantle the positive image of political rivals or vice versa and frame the facts so they could serve the purpose and the interests which the media organization is affiliated with. (Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Entman, 2007)

Framing among other tools like Agenda settings and priming are considered as "tools of power" that create biased images of the reality, giving power to certain political groups and telling the people what to think about. (Entman, 2007)

Politics and media have a significant relation when it comes to the media effects approach; the political discourse presented and adopted by the media shapes the public

opinion toward the political matters, creates the desired political position, provide people with the necessary information to vote for a specific candidate/ party in the elections. (Louw, 2005) or in one sentence, formulates a certain reality toward a political group.

Political turbulences and transition in any country demand strong tools to handle the evolving political situation and substitute the old political thoughts and beliefs with the new ones. In Egypt, and after the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, the media played a very important role in shifting the public interest from the usual agenda in 2010 to a new one that could match with the immediate outcomes and aspirations of the people's movement. The corruption cases, freedoms, Human rights, the pluralism of the political field, the state of law, writing a new constitution, conducting free elections and other political demands were raised and adopted by the Egyptians, discussed as daily issues in the media and reflected mostly by the independent press (ELZahed, 2012).

As the independent media shifted their role and sided with the people's demands, the media in Egypt gained new significance and more influence over the national political process. The political opponents and competitors used the media, which was funded and endorsed by different political forces, to mobilize the people and win their hearts and minds (ELZahed, 2012)

### ***Statement of the problem***

In the time of political turbulence, political communication is getting more important in terms of shaping the people's perceptions toward a significant political situation, helping them to understand it, giving them more knowledge about the current situation and helping them to make their decisions toward any course of actions they might need to take.

The study aims at exploring how the Egyptian press, affiliated by different political ideologies and different types of ownership, contributed to the political conflict in Egypt at

that time. By studying how the different political forces from both sides were portrayed and presented to the public, the research can provide a look on the level of professional coverage and on how media was used as a tool of political power and struggle.

The study sampled four newspapers that represent the most dominant ideological political groups; one from the Islamist sphere, the partisan newspaper EL-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice”, a state-owned newspaper Al-Ahram “The Pyramids”, two from the liberal sphere Al-Masry El-Youm “Egyptian Today” and Youm7 “The Seventh Day”.

The period of the study is 6 months ahead of June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution; those months were the most politically unstable, and were full of clashes and violent events.

### ***Significance of the Study***

The importance of this study is that it explores a critical period of time and highlights the media relation to the conflict between the liberal and Islamist political forces. This study is offering a look at how the Islamist, liberal and government newspapers framed each of the political groups and how they contributed directly to the heated conflict that started months before June 30<sup>th</sup> and ended by the fall of the first elected president in Egypt after January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution.

The majority of Islamist media outlets, which were working during the conflict, were closed and taken off air either by the government or by the outlets’ owners. Thus, this study is considered a rare content analysis of the Islamist newspaper El-Horeya Wel-Adala that no longer exists and that had a great influence at the time. It is important to study how the different affiliated newspapers put their own descriptions of the current events, and how they framed the other political opponents.

## II. BACKGROUND

### 1. Historical Look at the Egyptian Media

It is important to highlight certain developments in the Egyptian media history that allowed political communication to become influential and contributed to the overall political changes that took place in Egypt since 2011. This will also contribute to the context of the study.

The Egyptian media is one of the oldest media systems in the region and the most widely understood among other Arab nations. Nevertheless, this media was tightly controlled for a long time by political dictatorships that ruled the country for more than 60 years. Every regime that took over the power throughout the modern history of Egypt and after the July 23<sup>rd</sup> military movement, widely referred to as a revolution, invested in the media and used it as a tool for political communication.

As cited in Khamis, 2011 (Boyed, 1977) stated that the situation of the media during the time of the Egyptian Iconic President *Gamal Abdel Nasser* was fully controlled, president Nasser nationalized all the existing media at that time and used the radio extensively as a tool of political influence. (Khamis, 2011)

The main task of the media that existed at his time was to inform people about the regime's views and deliver their messages to the Egyptian and regional audiences. The State media expanded to include all six publishing houses: 1)Al-Ahram "The Pyramids", 2)Rosa El-Youssef, 3)Al-Akhbar "The news", 4)Dar Al-Hilal "The Crescent", 5)Al-Akhbar "The news", 6) Al-Tahrir "The Liberation", 7) Al-Qaumiyya Lil Tawzjee "The National entity for distribution"; by law, the board of directors and the editorial boards of all these publishing houses were appointed by the government (El Issawi, 2014).

In 1960, The Egyptian National TV was established, and in 1970 the Radio and Television Union (ERTU) was founded as a governed body to control all the broadcast services in the country (El Issawi, 2014).

During President *Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat* period, a new political approach started with a pluralistic political life after the establishment of several political parties; this slight political change allowed political parties to publish their own publications. Nonetheless, in-depth, the situation of the media remained the same, which is under heavy control of the political regime. (Khamis, 2011)

In general both *Anwar El-Sadat* and *Gamal Abdel Nasser* used the media to promote their policies and to control the public perceptions of the current situations at that time; The private ownership of media was forbidden by law and the consecutive governments were the only publishers and broadcasters (Harper , 2014).

## **2. Media during Mubarak Time**

The major transformation in the Egyptian media scene was during the time of the former president *Hosni Mubarak*, who ruled the country for the longest period in modern Egyptian history and was ousted by the people in 2011 revolution. In his time, the media was granted a general shallow independency. (Khamis, 2011)

Although the independent media was granted permission to exist and to present a different type of content to the local readers and audiences, the structure level of the media system itself and the freedom of expression stayed violated and controlled by smart and indirect practices, which appeared to be supporting the independency of the media while it actually put a lot of restrictions around its work. (Khamis, 2011)



During Mubarak's time, the High Press Council, which was established earlier in 1975 and was headed by the Egyptian president himself, was the only responsible authority to grant publishing license to private newspapers (Rugh, 1987 as cited in (Youssef, 2012).

With more than 550 publications in Egypt, the Egyptian media, which appeared to be independent and self-controlled, was under a tight surveillance from the government with indirect measures; some of these measures were the publishing license that was controlled by the High Press Council as stated above, the appointment of the editors in chief of the three national newspapers in the country that was decided by the president himself and restricted the individual ownership of any independent publication. With these measures among others, the government exercised a high level of control for years over the national press (Freedom House , 2010) (Napoli & Amin, 1997) that granted a calculated margin of freedoms and opposition.

The first independent TV channel, Dream TV, was established in 2001 as an entertainment channel by the business man *Ahmed Bahgat*, who was so close to Mubarak's regime and was also the main backer and funder to Mubarak's electoral campaign at one of his terms (El Issawi, 2014). Dream TV opened as an entertainment channel in the first place that achieved a lot of success at that time and opened the door for other channels to exist.

In 2004, Al-Masry El-Youm, the first independent newspaper, was published marking a changing point for breaking the monopoly of the state over the news. Later, Al-Shorouk newspaper was launched as a new edition presenting a new type of journalism to the Egyptian readers (El Issawi, 2014). In 2001, Nile Sat company was established to launch the first Egyptian satellite channels. Later, several private media outlets were launched and Egypt had, for the first time, independent newspapers, TV stations and radio stations.

Although Mubarak granted the establishments of the first independent satellite channels, the measures that were taken to guarantee the full control were also hidden and appeared to the public as regulating rules that help to organize the media landscape. While it appeared that the private and independent ownerships of the media outlets in Egypt boosted the freedom of speech and the role of the media in the local society, the situation was completely the opposite, as the Egyptian media was granted a margin of freedom that was, yes, unprecedented but still tightly controlled and manipulated by the government.

Despite the new press experience presented by the independent newspapers, the entities failed in establishing a clear understanding of the professional values and remained governed by the board of owners who were able to shift the newspapers' interests and directions according to their rules (El Issawi, 2014).

When the 2011 protests sparked and led to the end of one of the oldest regimes in the Arab world, Hosni Mubarak, who ruled the country for almost 30 years (1981-2011), the media scene in Egypt started to change and to mobilize its efforts for new roles and grounds.

### **3. Media and January 25th revolution**

The youth revolution brought massive calls of change throughout the country that suffered from a long time of corruption, social injustice and controlled political life; it also drew massive needs and demands of pluralistic and independent media, enlarging the number of dedicated audiences and readers and putting huge responsibilities on the media professionals' shoulders to serve the people's interests and their right to know.

During the days of the protests, the state-owned media remained in a state of denial toward the protests' movements and insisted on spreading inaccurate news and framed the protestors mainly as young fools tricked by foreign agendas. The National state-owned TV

avoided in the first three days of the revolution to broadcast any footage of the protestors from Tahrir Square (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

The majority of the independent satellite television stations which were, and still, owned and controlled by businessmen who were closely tied to Mubarak's regime tried to alienate their content from the protestors' voices and chose to stand with the Egyptian president and his regime at that time. (Abdulla, 2014)

However, the success of the protestors movements during the 18 days caused a direct shift in the majority of the coverage presented by these independent outlets and other powerful media ones as well. Headlines that support the protestors and the movements found their ways quickly to the independent journalism and broadcast content to join the few independent media outlets that started to supported the revolutionaries. (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012)

As (Alexander & Aouragh, 2014) argued, these changes were a direct effect of a rebellion that took place by the journalists themselves and initiated an act of professional revolution at many media organizations. One example was *Shahira Amin*, one of the senior news anchors in Nile TV the only state owned news channel, who resigned during the 18 days of the revolution after she was pressured to speak false news (Sakr, 2013).

As the revolution was progressing, the majority of people were dedicatedly following the media to get information about what is happening and to understand and assess the situation, especially during the days where social media and internet connections were cut down by the government; this was an opportunity for different media organizations to frame the revolution events and shape the Egyptian public opinion toward the protest movements. (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

After the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian media was divided into three main categories according to the ownership and the funding. The first was the state-owned media, which is owned and controlled by the state and where the journalists and media professionals are considered by law governmental employees. The second type was the independent media, of which the majority was, and still is, owned by businessmen who were either too close to the Mubarak regime or actually part of it. The third category was the “Islamist” media, which were owned and controlled by the religious political forces that arose to take part in the political conflict.

By the first year of the revolution, a number of media outlets were added to the national Egyptian media and to the few independent media that worked before the toppling of Mubarak. In May 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood launched Misr 25 “Egypt 25” channel as their first public broadcaster; the channel attracted the former employees of Al-Jazeera channel and from the well known website at that time Islam online (Sakr, 2013).

The Muslim Brotherhood also published El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” newspaper which was owned and controlled by their political party “Freedom and Justice party”. This newspaper was named after the MB’s political party and worked as the main propaganda tool for both the party and the MB itself. Other Islamists funded newspapers were launched like Al-Masreyoon “Egyptians”, Al Fattah , and Al-Nour “The Light” that was funded by Al-Nour Salafist party (El Issawi, 2014).

As on the liberal side and later at the same year, in August, two of the most liberal currently widely seen channels were launched by the Egyptian businessman Mohamed El-Amin, launched CBC “Capital Broadcast Center” and Al-Nahar ”The morning” channels and Al-Watan “The Nation” the daily newspaper (Sakr, 2013).

Media were used as a battlefield between different political forces in the country, using these mass communication tools to mobilize the public, win the street and stir a war of words and a counter war against political rivals. In the absence of regulations that work in favor of granting freedom of media practices, the media failed to launch what researchers called “its own revolution” where it remained captivated by the power struggle. The profound political conflict between both sides pro-Islamists and pro-Liberals put the media in the wheel of political struggle and used the new rise of freedom of speech to transfer one –sided views and rumors (El Issawi, 2014).

First presence of such conflict was directly after the 2011 revolution, as the pro-Mubarak forces started to use social media effectively to re-mobilize people, especially after losing all control on the state media, while the independent media, owned and controlled by Mubarak’s men, started a unified campaign against the regime at that period. (Alexander & Aouragh, 2014)

The highest level of the direct and counter propaganda speeches was highlighted and concentrated during the one year of the ruling of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as 2012 witnessed the expansion of the Islamists media and the counter liberal ones, creating a fragmented media scene and, as a result, a fragmented and divided society.

The two sides, namely, the Islamist and the liberal media, started a war of words and accusations. Using the media content of both channels with the obvious and announced political and ideological affiliations, they were targeting each other. The independent media formulated a one-line alliance against the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing them of trying to monopolize the power and exclude the non-Islamist political forces from the political process. At the same time, Morsi himself was leading the attack on the independent media describing it as pro-Mubarak media, while some of the Islamist’s media went far in their

attack by describing the opponents of the president as non-religious or infidels (Dib & Sayed, 2013).

#### **4. Egyptian Media during Mohamed Morsi**

Although Mohamed Morsi ruled Egypt for only one year, this year was full of political unrest and violent clashes. The 2012 constitution, drafted primarily by the Islamic political forces, put major limitations on freedom of speech. The Constitution contained articles such as article 31 that forbade the insult of the individuals and article 44 that forbade the insults of the prophets (El Issawi, 2014). Both articles were criticized for being too general and open for different interpretations that can lead to freedom of expression restraints and threatening the independency of the media professionals.

On the other side, the attack on Egyptian journalists began after Morsi won the elections, as unprecedented numbers of legal complaints against journalists were being filed for insulting the president. During the first six months of his ruling, according to Media Watchdog organizations reports, more than 20 criminal court cases were filed against journalists for insulting Morsi. Anti-Muslims brotherhood rule journalists were attacked while covering protests and there was continuous crackdown on state media professionals who were known of being critical to Morsi's rule and to the Muslim Brotherhood group as a whole. (El Issawi, 2014; Harper, 2014).

According to a report released by the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, 24 legal complaints were filed against journalists and TV hosts for "insulting the president" during the first 200 days of Morsi's rule, compared to 14 cases referred to Egyptian courts for the same charge throughout the past 115 years before the revolution (Al-Alfi, 2013).

The State owned media witnessed attempts of control from the Muslim Brotherhood ruling party first by appointing *Salah Abdel Maksoud* as the Minister of Information, who was working as the head of media office of the MB general guide media and had no sufficient professional experience to hold such an important role in a complicated country like Egypt.

The fight was shifting from the previously mentioned war between the independent media and the government to become between Islamist and liberal media. The liberal media was receiving continuous verbal attacks and accusations from pro-Islamists and from officials including Morsi Himself (El Issawi, 2014).

Later the regime also allowed protesters from the Salafists movement, a religiously strict Islamist group, and supporters of Abu Ismail, a leading Salafists figure and a main backer and ally of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, to besiege the Media City in 6<sup>th</sup> of October City, located- in Giza governorate- 20 km from Cairo, banning a number of media personnel from entering the city to perform their jobs and attacking liberal journalists and anchors who were against Morsi's rule. (Harper , 2014).

On the other side, the liberal media against the Islamist government started a war of words; this battle was referred to by *Magdy EL-Gallad*, editor in chief of Al-Watan "The Nation" newspaper at that time, by saying "This is a battle we did not choose" (El Issawi, 2014).

The conflict between both Islamist and liberal media could also be seen from a perspective of supporters and opposition media. As Mohamed Morsi, was the first Islamist to rule the country and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood group that established later their political arm Freedom and Justice party (FJP), they were keen to launch and publish their own media and let other Political Islamist forces, who were in alliance with them, to establish media outlets. These Islamist media were playing a similar role to the state media

during Mubarak's era; defending the ruler and presenting his vision as the ultimate truth as well as, primarily, conveying the regime's messages. On both sides, each of political forces camps casted their tool for a political and ideological war in which the media used as a battlefield.

### **5. From January 25<sup>th</sup> to June 30<sup>th</sup>**

In January 25<sup>th</sup> January the Egyptians youth led a massive protest movement against former president Mubarak's regime, chanting with three main demands (Bread, Freedom, and Social justice). The clashes that took place between the protesters and the Egyptian police and the fall of several casualties from the protesters' side made a major shift of the demands of the people who mobilized their effort to remove old Mubarak from power.

The Protesters' demands evolved through the 18 days to insist on the toppling of Hosni Mubarak who ruled the country for more than three decades. Eighteen days of unprecedented persistence for demands and the street's loud voice led the Egyptian oldest president to step down and hand over the power to the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) ruled the country for one year and a half full of political instability and severe continuous clashes in the streets between different groups of people. With two referendums and one-parliament elections, the country seemed to be undergoing the farthest polarized political and social scenes that had ever happened.

By June 2012, the country elected the first Islamist president in Egyptian history Mohamed Morsi by a massive support from the majority of the liberal and revolutionary forces and with promises from the elected president and his Islamist supporters of inclusiveness and founding a civil state.



The Muslim Brotherhood monopoly of power and the excluding of liberal forces led to the scene of June 30<sup>th</sup> where millions of people from different backgrounds went to the streets, demanding Morsi to leave, chanting to the defense minister at that time Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to remove Morsi from power. On July 3<sup>rd</sup> Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, along with the political forces, toppled Morsi from power, disabled the constitution and supported the head of The Constitutional Court to become an interim president.

## **6. Egyptian Political Forces**

With the momentum given to the political life after the fall of Mubarak, different Islamist political forces have merged and gathered their own supporters winning elections and political campaigns, non-religious political parties have been empowered and more liberal independent political figures endorsed the political scene; hence, Egypt witnessed two years of political competition. There is a simple definition of the political forces term,

*“Parties, personalities, pressure groups that strongly influence the economic and political stability of a country through their actions and pronouncements”* (Busniess Dictionary , 2015)

This study defines the political forces as “the active political parties, civil society groups, pressure groups and other forces that had political affiliations and goals after January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution”. We can describe the main political forces identified by the study and who were active during the Morsi’s year of presidency by dividing them into main camps as following.

### **A. Islamist political forces**

The active Islamists political forces in Egypt varied very much in the way they were dealing or looking toward the political situation or the democratic process in Egypt. While the Muslim Brotherhood group was dedicated to run in all types of elections in the county

and continue to do so with their political party Freedom and Justice, other Islamists forces denounced the elections and all democratic processes, describing them as anti-Sharia “Islamic law” practices.

These forces and movements cannot be described as a homogenous group, they may agree on the greatest goal, but their means to reach the goal are different among each others and cannot be placed in one category (Saleh, 2014).

### **1. Al-Ikhwan Al Muslimun: (Muslim Brotherhood Group/ 1928-2013)**

The Muslim Brotherhood Group “*Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun*” is the largest and oldest Islamist group in Egypt (BBC, 2013). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was established in 1928 in Egypt by the hand of *Hasan Al-Banna*, an Islamic scholar and a schoolteacher (Zollner, 2009).

As described by a study made and published by their official website, the Muslim Brotherhood Group call was established for two main reasons. The first is to introduce the Islamic Sharia and make it the basic reference that controls all the civil affairs of both the state and society; and the second is the greatest goal which is unifying all the Islamic countries under the concept of Islamic Ummah, with special focus on the Arab countries, against the western imperialism (El-Hudaibi, 1997).

The movement played underground politics for almost 50 years and had wide experience in mobilizing votes from all over the country. After January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, the MB, although they refused to support the civil protest since the beginning, seized the political image by establishing their political arm and competing on the majority in all elections.

After reaching the president office, the MB faced a year of accusations of monopoly of power and excluding all liberal and non-Islamist forces from the national call. Later, in

November 2012, the MB movement mobilized their men in front of the presidential palace and attacked the liberal forces' sit-in there. The MB members were filmed torturing and physically attacking members from the protestors and seizing them right in the front of the presidential palace for hours. Attacks on Liberal figures and journalists also took place by the Muslim Brotherhood and the clashes ended up with the death of several citizens among them a well-known photojournalist, *Al-Husseini Abu Deif* who was assigned by his newspaper Al-Fagr "The Dawn" to cover the clashes (Diab, 2012) (Egypt Independent , 2012)

The clashes continued to take place from time to time between the MB members and anti-Morsi protesters till June 30<sup>th</sup>. Days before June 30<sup>th</sup>, the MB held a conventional meeting to support the Syrian anti-government militants and opened the door for Egyptian youth to travel and contribute to what they called "Jihad" (SkyNews Arabia, 2013). President Morsi, and other Islamist figures, attended the convention, during which one Islamist scholar gave a speech in front of Morsi and called the anti-Morsi protestors infidels who should be crushed (AlArabiya Net, 2013).

The MB organized a sit-in in Rabaa al-Adawiya, a square near Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque who was named after the 8<sup>th</sup> century Iraqi saint (Baroud, 2013) where hundreds of supporters from different Islamists movements participated before June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution and continued for almost one month and half after the removal of Morsi.

The sit-in, which witnessed daily hate speeches against non-Muslims and the Egyptian state and threats of terrorist attacks, was dispersed by the Egyptian police forces in a deadly clash where, according to the final report of the investigation committee, 607 of the protestors and around 8 police officers had lost their lives (Aly & Fakhry, 2014).

The movement was declared as a terrorist organization in Egypt, in 25<sup>th</sup> December 2013, after heavy attacks against the Egyptian state and its army and police forces. Although the movement keeps denying their relations to all the accusations, in a videotaped interview during Rabaa al-Adawiya Sit-in, a leading MB figure *Mohamed El Beltagy* and in responding to a question concerning the deadly attacks taking place in Sinai, an Egyptian peninsula located in the eastern side of the country, against the police and army forces, El-Beltagy said “We do not control the ground there, but all these insurgencies and attacks will stop at the same moment president Morsi returns to the presidential palace” (Alarabiya.net, 2013)

In May 2015, the movement adopted the Call of Egypt “Nedaa El Kenana” Kenana is referred to Egypt in the Islamic literature, where 40 Islamist scholars around the world signed a declaration to call for the direct fight against the Egyptian government, responding to what they described as coup d’état and military crimes; the declaration was received positively by the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Many MB members are facing imprisonment, long term court sentences or even death penalties for various accusations, including the former president Mohamed Morsi himself.

## **2. El-Horeya Wel-Adala (Freedom and Justice Party –FJP/ 2011-2014)**

The political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the party was established in 6<sup>th</sup> of June 2011, months after the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution. As stated by the political party principles declaration, the party considered the principles of Islamic Sharia as the main source of the state legislations, and although they acknowledge that non-Muslims can refer to their own religious rules concerning the family matters, they stated that non-Muslims must submit to the Islamic law in the public order and other “morality” cases.

The party also speaks about the overall morality reform that the Egyptian society needs in general and the necessity of building the Egyptian citizen from different perspectives, among which the “Spiritual” part is an important side. The principles also referred to the “Shurra” as the way to achieve the nation’s goals and point out that their ultimate objective is the Islamic law or the aims of Sharia’a “Maqasid El Shariaa” (Freedom and Justice party , 2011).

The party competed in the parliamentary elections late 2011, the first to take place after the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, and won the majority of seats; furthermore, they contributed by two consecutive candidates in the presidential race and won the president office with a slight difference against the liberal candidate General Ahmed Shafiq. In addition, the party was very active in mobilizing Islamic forces to draft the 2012 constitution and ignored all the liberal concerns, criticism and withdrawals from the constitution committee from the liberal forces.

After June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution and the ousting of their head from the president office, the FJP refused to join the National dialogue led by the Egyptian army along with other political forces and continued to protest and organize sit-ins in many spots in Egypt. An Egyptian court at the end dissolved the party in August 2014 and seized all the party assets to the state (Noueided, 2014).

### **3. Al-Dawa Al- Salafiya: (The Salafists Call. 2011-present)**

The Salafists Call is the founder of Al-Nour Salafist party and a key player in the Egyptian political scene since 2011. The Salafist’s school of thinking developed throughout long years in the Arab region, and they attribute their understanding of Islam to the ancestors or the past leading Muslim figures and their schools of thinking; they call for a literal implementation of the Islamic sharia (El-Sherif, 2015).

The Call, which was created among the current wave of *el Sahwa el Islamiyya* (Islamic Awakening), contradicts with other Islam interpretations among which is Al-Azhar, the main Islamic university and source of knowledge for millions of Muslims (El-Sherif, 2015).

The movement was legalized in April 2011, in the wake of the 25<sup>th</sup> of January revolution, and used their wide influence in the Egyptian mosques to build a strong position for the Salafists movement and parties in the Political scene. And, although their beliefs contradicts mainly with the idea of representative parliament and democratic process as it contradict with the rule of god, the Call established Al-Nour party that run for every parliamentary election since then (El-Sherif, 2015).

The Salafist Call was not in good alliance with the MB as they deeply contradict in their Islamic interpretations to what Sharia is, and also in their goals and aims. The Call promoted for June 30<sup>th</sup> extensively and backed up the army and its leader at that time the Defense Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

#### **4. Al-Nour Party: (The light party / 2011-present)**

One of the political parties that was established after the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, the party was founded on May 12 in 2011 in addition to two other Salafists political parties that followed strict Islamic Sharia law and ideology; the party was founded by Al-Daw'aa Al Salafyia (The Salafist call) (Jadaliyya, 2011).

In the 2011 parliamentary elections, Al-Nour party won 29% of the parliament seats (Coleman, 2012) and was described as the black horse of the elections. The party was always alienated from the polarization conflict in the years after the revolution, and joined the political forces in June 30<sup>th</sup> that supported the army and approved the future political road map.

In 2015, the party was described as the “Solo Political Islam survivor” as it remained the untouched Islamist party, since June 30<sup>th</sup>, which was able to engage in any public debate and running for the 2015 parliamentary elections (Tarek, 2015).

#### **5. Al-Wasat Party: (The Center Party /2011- current)**

The party was founded in 1996 but failed to receive the legal license until one week after the ousting of Mubarak. The party was always portrayed as a moderate Islamist party, until their leaders supported and joined the MB sit-ins ahead of June 30<sup>th</sup> in Cairo and in the rest of the country.

The two well-known party leaders Abou Ela Mady and Essam Sultan were arrested in July 2013 and were accused of inciting violence (Al-Arabiya net, 2013). Although the party was not banned by any court rule like the FJP, Al-Wasat Party has not joined the 2015 parliamentary elections even though its leaders were discharged from prison (Gadaliyya, 2011).

#### **6. Masr Al- Qaweya: (Strong Egypt / 2012-present)**

The party was established officially in November 2012 by the hand of the former MB resigned leading figure and former presidential candidate *Abdel Moneim Aboul Foutouh* (El Deragly, 2012). The party was not in a close alliance with the MB rule as it called for earlier presidential elections and joined June 30<sup>th</sup> massive protest. The party leader described the Islamists protests in Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square as provocative and president Morsi as a failed president and pointed out that Morsi is allowing other external forces to interfere in his work directly (ONTV, 2013).

On July 5<sup>th</sup>, two days after the ousting of president Morsi, the Interim president at that time Counselor *Adly Mansour* invited all the political forces for a meeting, including Strong

Egypt Party. The party leader attended the meeting and declared his full support to the transitional period in Egypt and supported Mohamed ElBaradei's nomination for prime minister office (Badr Eldine, 2013).

#### **7. Al-Gamaa Al- Islamiyya: (The Islamic Group/ 1970-present)**

Established in 1970 in the southern governorates of Egypt, this party had a radical ideology of change by force. What they believe in as "Jihad" was the chosen way of change for the Islamic Group until they re-structured it and made the famous revisit to all its religious beliefs and references toward violence.

In 1973, the group, in collaboration with Al-Jihad organization, killed the Egyptian president Anwar El Sadat, and responded to the killing of their head in 1983 by attacking Luxor governorate, occupying the police station, the city hall and other vital places; however, the Egyptian security forces succeed in defeating them, returning the city back, and arresting all the group leaders. Additionally, the group was responsible for the biggest attack on tourists in Luxor in 1997 that left 59 dead; later, denouncing the violence granted the group's leaders release from the Egyptian prisons and to start a normal life (Aljazeera net, 2015, Fletcher, 2008).

Leading MB figures were in the past members in the group before leaving it to join the Muslim Brotherhood Group, among those was Abdel Moneim Aboul Foutouh, the current leader of Strong Egypt Party and the former presidential candidate, Abou Ela Mady, the current leader of Al-Wast Party, and others. In 2006, several Gamaa leaders announced they left the group and joined the terrorism group Al-Qaeda, including Ayman El-Zawhry and others (Aljazeera net, 2015).

After January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, the group established their own political party El Benna Wel Tanmya "Construction and Development" and enrolled in the political process. The



group did not have a unified position toward the deposing of president Morsi as some of the well known leaders supported the revolution and the removal of the MB figure from power.

#### **8. Gabhet El Dameer (The Consciousness Front/ 2013- present but not active inside Egypt)**

A political coalition that was formulated early February 2013, according to them their main goal is to stop the polarization in the society and support the president's legitimacy (Gharib, 2013). Although the front was not declared as an Islamist movement, the majority of its members were from the MB (members) and their supporters and did not support the ousting of president Morsi later on, what portrayed the coalition as an Islamist one.

#### **9. Hazem movement (Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail Supporters/ 2012-2013)**

The Movement's name refers to Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a leading Salafist figure in the Egyptian political scene between 2011 and 2013. The movement that started during the presidential elections in 2012 presented itself as "A peaceful youth movement whose mission is to protect the revolution from retrogression" (Maged, 2012).

At later stage of the 2012 presidential election, Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismael was disqualified from the race by the Supreme Elections Committee due to his mother dual nationalities (Kirkpatrick, 2012) (Maged, 2012). Later, the movement played a strong role in supporting the MB rule.

In March 2013, Hazem movement and their leader called for a protest in front of The Media City, the headquarters of TV stations broadcast centers. The protest that started to object to the bias coverage by the Egyptian TV stations of the Islamists, ended up by violent actions from the side of Hazem movement and other Islamists protesters against the journalists who were entering the city or even covering the protest (Aboulenien, 2013; Maged, 2012).

The movement, out of accusations of violence and attacking Al-Wafd Party headquarters, had witnessed the arrest of several members before June 30<sup>th</sup> and the arrest of their leaders right after the ousting of president Morsi. Days after the June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution, Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu Ismail was arrested and accused of inciting violence (Ahram Online , 2013).

#### **10. Mohamed Morsi (The Egyptian President/ June 2012- June 2013)**

The first elected Islamist president in Egyptian history, was born in 1951 in a delta governorate in Egypt called “Al-Sharqia”, he studied engineering in Cairo University and later in USA (BBC News , 2015).

Morsi was elected in 2000 as a parliament member and acted as the main spokesperson of the MB members inside it. He was appointed as the head of Freedom and justice party in 2011. During the 2012 presidential elections, Morsi was declared as a substitute to Khairat El Shater, the leading MB figure who was discharged from the presidential race by the Egyptian authorities at the time (France24, 2012). Mohamed Morsi won the 2012 presidential race against General Ahmed Shafiq with a 51.7% from the total votes.

In 2012, he appointed Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the SCAF member, as a defense minister, and in June 2013, El-Sisi removed him from power after three days of massive protests and civil clashes around the country.

#### **11. Mohamed Badie (Muslim Brotherhood Leader / 2010- Unknown)**

Mohamed Badie Mohamed Sami was born in 1943 and joined the MB in his early life; he has a degree in veterinary medicine. In 1993 he became a member of the MB guidance bureau, the highest organizational level of the group, and in 2010 he was elected as the supreme guide “Morshed” to all MB members around the world. Badee was arrested

after days of the dispersal of Rabaa sit in and he was convicted with several sentences (Nafezat Masr , 2013).

## **12. Khairat Al-Shater**

Al-Shater is a multi-millionaire businessman and key Muslim Brotherhood leader who played a prominent role in the organization since Mubarak time. Al Shater was reported as being the second in line in the organizational chart of the MB organizations and their main financier (Feteha, 2012). Al-Shater was convicted in 2007 on charges of supplying Al-Azhar university's students with arms and provide them military training, he stayed in prison till he was released in 2011 (Al Jazeera , 2012).

Al-Shater was the main choice of the MB group in the 2012 presidential election before being disqualified by the High Committee of Elections. Al-Shater was arrested on the day of Morsi's removal.

## **13. Mohamed Saad El-katatni (Head of The Egyptian parliament in 2012. And The head of the FJP from 2012-present)**

Mohamed Saad El-Katatni was born in 1953 in Upper Egypt. El-Katatni is a leading figure in the MB organization, he joined the Group in 1981 and was elected as a member of the Guidance Bureau in 2008. (Tarek, 2012), he was elected among the MB bloc in the Egyptian parliament in 2005. After the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution 2011, El-Katatni was appointed as the head of the Egyptian parliament in 2012 and as the chairman of the Freedom and Justice party at the same year (Ikhwan web, 2012). El-Katatni was arrested days after the June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution and accused of inciting violence among other accusations. (Ahram Online , 2013)

#### **14. Hisham Qandil (Former Prime Minister/ from 2012- 20<sup>th</sup> June revolution)**

Qandil was the former irrigation minister after January 2011 revolution and was appointed as Egypt's prime minister in 2012, he was born in 1962 and received a degree in engineering in 1984 from Cairo university (Ahram online, 2012). Qandil was arrested after the toppling of Morsi (Al-Arabiya News, 2013) and released a year after with no charges (Mada Masr, 2014).

### **B. Liberal Political Forces**

#### **1. Al-Masreyyeen Al-Ahrar political party (Free Egyptians party/ 2011-present)**

Al-Masreyyeen Al-Ahrar is a liberal party that was established in 2011 by the business tycoon Naguib Sawiras. The party embraces the liberal principles of democracy and freedoms of speech (Almasreyyeen Al Ahrar, 2014)

The party formulated a political coalition the "Egyptian bloc" in 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, with the Egyptian social democratic party and Al-Tagammu party, the coalition was announced to try to defend the secular state against the MB and their allies. The coalition won all together 34 seats, from which the party had a share of 15 seats (Abdel Ghany, 2012)

#### **2. Al-Wafd party (The Delegation party/ 1919-present)**

Al-Wafd party is one of the oldest liberal parties in Egypt, it was founded 1919 by the historical political figure *Saad Zaghloul*. The party was dissolved after the 1952 military movement and was re-established in 1978 during Anwar El-Sadat time (Ahram Online and Jadaliyya, 2011)

The party competed in all the parliamentary elections, and although the historical relations between both the party and the MB had a long and old history of political conflict,

the party started to be closer to the MB organizations in 2010 elections, and followed by a political coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the elections of 2011-2012 (Jadaliyya, 2011).

### **3. Al-Tagammu party (National Progressive Unionist Party, 1976-present)**

A secular leftist political party that was established in 1976 during El-Sadat time, the party enrolled in all the parliamentary elections since its establishment. After January 25<sup>th</sup> the party stand as a strong opposition to the MB rule and to Mohamed Morsi and acted as a main pillar in June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution (AlJazeera , 2014).

### **4. Al -Tahaluf El Shabi El Ishtiraki (The Popular Socialist Alliance party/ 2011-present)**

The party was established in the aftermath of the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution from the resigned members from Al-Tagammu party. The party entered the collation of “Revolution continues” during 2011-2012 elections along with other Youth parties from the revolution camp (Aswatmasriya, 2011).

### **5. Al-Masri Al-Democrati Alektemaii party (The Egyptian Social Democratic party/ 2011- present)**

The party was established in 2011 and embraced the demand of the revolution; the party enrolled in the 2011-2012 elections and won 19 seats months after the establishment. The party joined June 30<sup>th</sup> protests and enrolled in the 2015 parliamentarian elections. (Egypt Social democrat , 2016).

### **6. Gabhet Al-Inqaz (The National Salvation front/ 2013)**

The front was established as a reaction to the “constitutional declaration” issued by Morsi in November 2012, this declaration seized him more powers above any court in Egypt

(Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012). The main coalition from liberal and non-Islamists figures which was behind the boycotting of elections, and calling for street protests and early presidential elections during Morsi's presidential year. The front had among its members the two leading figures Mohamed ElBaradei and Hamdeen Sabahi (The National Salvation Front, 2013).

### **7. Tamarod movement (Revolt movement, April 2013-Unclear)**

Tamarod was established as a rebellion movement against Mohamed Morsi's rule, gathering signatures from Egyptians all over the country and calling for early presidential elections. Tamarod was founded in Late April 2013 by the hand of members of the former Kefaya (Enough) movement that used to be active during Mubarak time and pushed for democratic changes (2004-2005) (BBC, 2013).

In 29<sup>th</sup> of June 2013, one day before the massive revolution of June 30<sup>th</sup>, the campaign announced the gathering of 22 million signatures accompanied with national ID numbers to end Mohamed Morsi's rule and to demand earlier presidential elections (Hassan, Aly, & Abdel Tawab, 2013). The campaign called Egyptian people to join June 30<sup>th</sup> protest against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood Group and was a main pillar of creating the scene of ousting Mohamed Morsi by the army in July 3<sup>rd</sup> 2013.

The campaign succeeded in creating strong presence in few months and managed to find new and creative ways to contain all the anger the Egyptians had against the current regime at that time, by relating the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution's demands with short term goals which were the toppling of the Islamist President Mohamed Morsi and calling for early presidential elections (Elyachar, 2014).

## **8. 6<sup>th</sup> of April movement (2008-present with illegal status)**

The movement was established in 2008 in the wake of the massive strike of the workers of El Mahala governorate, located in the middle of the Nile Delta northern Cairo. The movement was one of different pillars who called for January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution. 6<sup>th</sup> of April movement gained great influence over the young generation in Egypt between 2011-2013 and played a significant role in toppling Mohamed Morsi from power.

## **9. Mohamed ElBaradei**

The Former Egyptian diplomat and a Nobel Prize winner, He was appointed as the director general of the international atomic energy power from 1997 to 2009, Dr. ElBaradei returned to Egypt during Mubarak time and called for massive constitutional change and democratic transition of the power. At that time and In alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood, he managed to gather one million signatures from Egyptians to demand Mubarak to amend the constitution and allow pluralistic political life. He returned Egypt with the January 2011 revolution and declared himself ready to lead a transitional government after the removal of Mubarak.

ElBaradei was surrounded by hundreds of young protestors who looked at him as a national savior. In 2012 he launched the constitution party and in 2013 he joined June 30<sup>th</sup> collation to topple Morsi and was appointed as a vice president till he resigned after Rabaa dispersal.

## **10. Hamdeen Sabahi**

A leading political figure, a journalist, and the former chairman of “Al Karama” political party, he enrolled in the presidential election in 2012 and gained around 5 million votes. In November 2012 he joined the Salvation front along with Mohamed ElBaradei and

other figures. Sabahi joined and endorsed June 30<sup>th</sup> and supported the interim president Adely Mansour.

### 11. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi

El –Sisi is the former Egyptian defense minister and the current president of Egypt. In 2012 he was appointed as a defense minister, El-Sisi was merged as a popular figure when he removed Morsi from power after days of massive protest, dismantle the constitution and put a road map in alliances with all political parties. In 2014, El-Sisi was elected as president to Egypt.

### 7. The political coalition of June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution

June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution and the aftermath of the removal of Morsi showed two main coalitions; first, a liberal coalition led by Gabhet Al-Inqaz “The National Salvation Front” Tamarod movement “Rebel”, and liberal parties. And, second, an Islamist coalition led by the Muslim brotherhood and Hazemoun movement. However, June 30<sup>th</sup> as an revolution against president Morsi, and its demands of early elections were supported by Islamist forces as well, like Al-Nour party, branch from Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya, and others.




Figure 1: Coalition of political forces during June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution



### **III. THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK**

Mass Communication theories are the main tools through which we can study the success of the message and the mean of the communication and understand the effects of the mass communication over people's perceptions and attitude. (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

#### **1. Framing Theory**

“A media culture has emerged in which images, sounds, and spectacles help produce the fabric of everyday life, dominating leisure time, shaping political views and social behavior and providing the material out of which people forge their very identities” (Kellner, 1995).

Framing is primarily a process of selecting certain parts of the reality and deciding they are more significant in the media content to promote certain concepts and interpretations of the real world, this process can be done by relating these issues to cultural common symbols (Entman, 1993). Using frames in communication is referred to as a process of “organizing everyday reality” (Tuchman, 1978).

Framing theory refers to the norm that all issues could be perceived from different point of views, perspectives, and sides. It also refers to the method through which people will process the problem, choose to remember, and formulate their opinions toward an issue. In other wording, how people will choose to act toward the issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007b; Entman, 1993).

Framing is used to give definition to the problem and its outline, which is responsible for creating the problem, making moral judgments and suggesting solutions (Entman, 1993). Frame was defined by Gamson and Modigliani (1987) as "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987).

The frame effect depends on the combination of different factors including how strong the used frame is and its repetitive pattern, the strength of other competitors' frames and the individual motivation toward it. While under certain circumstances, the collective effect of a combination of frames may differ and be stronger from the total effects of individual frames.(Chong & Druckman, 2007a).

## **2. Frame Building**

Framing can be construed in both positive and negative terms. It can be viewed as a strategy to manipulate and deceive individuals, or it can refer more neutrally to a learning process in which people acquire common beliefs, as in the coordination of people around a social norm (Chong & Druckman, Framing Theory, 2007b).

Frames' building does not consist with narrow definitions of categories and types of coverage; generic frames can be used as wide categories to define and understand the differences in news coverage (De Vreese, 2005).

According to Entman (1993) frames emerge in four main spots in the process of communication: 1) the set of beliefs of the communicators, 2) the message, 3) the receiver's perceptions, and 4) the surrounding norms and cultures (Entman, 1993).

Communicators and media professionals usually decide consciously or unconsciously what to say to their audiences and what to omit. Their judgmental situation also comes from frames that organize their beliefs and their understanding of reality (Entman, 1993).

The communicators are influenced by the internal factors of the media outlets and how these influences affect the way of coverage (De Vreese, 2005). In other cases, the frames are identified and created by those in power and grasped by the media (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

Entman (1993) defined the four functions of the frames, first it defines the problem, diagnose causes, make moral judgment and suggest solutions. (Entman, 1993). The four mentioned functions are formulating a “Cultural logic” where each frame help to sustain the others (Entman, 2004).

The two main important frames functions are the one that offer definition of the problem and the one that suggested a solution, both functions can assess whether the media projecting the frame is supporting or opposing the public policy (Entman, 2004)

### **3. Framing as a theory of media effects**

Using framing in political communication is giving power to politicians, to certain ideas and to political affiliations. It plays a great role in the exertion of political power, and reflecting at the same time, and the frames that have consensus can dominate the media agenda and eliminate other frames from being sent to the receivers.

In any political or social debate each side advocate for their own definitions of the story, the side who wins is the side that makes the people believes their framing of the debate (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

Severin & Tankard (2001) argued that framing technique is a powerful tool of political communication, and is harder to be detected as the bias in news stories, the receivers of the media messages might be able to detect the bias in any sent messages but they can't notice it if the information is packaged and presented in certain frames (Severin & Tankard, 2001).

The Iraqi war was an example to follow in the American media, as the media coverage at that time ignored completely the negotiations between both Iraq and Kuwait and spoke about two dominant frames, war and sanctions. (Entman, 1993)

Entman (2004) Cascade model is a model attempts to describe the media effect of the framing process. The model suggests that the frames is originated from different sides, first from those in power, the media elite, and the public; but at the same time the public's reaction to the presented frame feeds back to the media and to those in power (Entman, 2004)

The frame effect depends on the combination of different factors including how strong the used frame is and its repetitive pattern, the strength of other competitors' frames, and the individual motivation toward it, and under certain circumstances, the collective effect of a combination of frames may differ from the sum of effects of individual frames (Chong & Druckman, 2007a)

People tend to formulate their opinions toward any issue or problem according to their set of beliefs which usually is stored in their minds, only certain beliefs become visible in a specific time. The framing process is more likely to work on different levels of beliefs, creating new beliefs toward an issue, make these beliefs present and accessible, and strengthen the existed beliefs while they evaluate the presented one (Chong & Druckman, Framing Theory, 2007b).

Sniderman & Theriault (2004) argue that usually people are exposed to more than one frame of the same issue and problem, this multi-frame exposure is called "Competitive frames", by receiving the different frames and views people tend to choose the alternative that is matching more with their principles and beliefs (Chong & Druckman, Framing Theory, 2007b).

It is necessary to identify how the frame can be spotted in the examined media content, the words that mark a frame does exist in the media message (Chong & Druckman, Framing Theory, 2007b)

## IV. Literature review

### 1. Framing the political situation in Egypt

Before the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, there was a general political scene that can rationalize why the political situation came that far. A comparative content analysis was conducted to study the pre-January 25<sup>th</sup> media scene to examine the front-page coverage in three newspapers, Al-Ahram, the state owned newspaper; Al-Masry El-Youm, an independent daily newspaper and Al-Wafd, the partisan newspaper of Al-Wafd Political party (Elmasry, 2012)

The study found that the three newspapers had their own similarities and their differences; For instance, the three newspapers had been mentioning the government news continuously but in different percentage. While the state-owned newspaper *Al-Ahram* portrayed Mubarak and his news positively and focused on the governmental sources, they also omitted the news of oppositions along with all the news about instability and crimes in Egypt. (Elmasry, 2012)

Meanwhile, Al-Masry El-Youm and Al-Wafd newspapers were more balanced than Al-Ahram and they both showed the positive and negative news in a balanced way. In addition, both newspapers portrayed the opposition in their coverage, while Al-Wafd portrayed more the opinion of the party, Al-Masry El-Youm quoted normal citizens who have different opinions. (Elmasry, 2012).

(Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012) conducted a content analysis to study how the Egyptian revolution in 2011 was framed in the different Egyptian media. The study looked into two main groups of media beside the social media; the first group included, as defined by the study, “Semi-Official” newspapers that are owned and controlled by the state, and the second group included the independent newspapers (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

The study looked into three categories of framing, the protestors' image, the reason behind the revolution and the third one was the solution for the crisis. The Semi official newspapers, owned and controlled by the government, used the "*Conflict*" frame to humanize the government and the current regime's image against the protestors' portrayal as misguided and under foreign influences. They also used the "Economic consequences" of the protest by stressing the fact that economy is falling apart. (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012)

In contrast, the independent media used the "human interest" to shape the protests, and called those who lost their lives during the street conflicts with the police; martyrs. Later, the Egyptian Independent media changed their political position gradually and the framing of events went differently, according to (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012); the independent Newspapers later used the "responsibility" frame where they blamed the government and held them accountable for the safety of the protestors, attacking the old regime corrupt businessman and pointing a finger toward the vicious state security and its performances (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

While the Semiofficial newspapers defined the revolution as a conspiracy, the independent newspapers described the protests as a revolution. As for the cause of the revolution the semiofficial newspapers stated that the main reason behind the protests was foreign influence; moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood and the other Salafist movements were often mentioned in conspiratorial terms, while the reason behind the revolution was injustice, poverty, oppression and dictatorship (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012).

Another study was conducted to analyze the different frames used in covering the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, the study sampled Al-Ahram "Pyramids" paper, Al-Masry Al-Youm "Egyptian Today" paper. A content analysis was conducted to analyze news stories and features in both newspapers during the 18 days of the revolution. The study showed that the

coverage in both newspapers varied along the days of the actual protest movements and before the ousting of Mubarak, the president who ruled Egypt from 1981-2011. The study argued that there was a significant role of the ownership of both newspapers in framing the revolution (Ibrahim E. , 2012).

Sara El Kamel (2013) used quantitative content analysis along with framing theory to conduct a comparative study between five newspapers in Egypt to identify the dominant used frames in their coverage. The study examined the coverage of Al-Ahram, Al-Wafd, and FJP, Al-Masry El Youm and Al-Shorouk. (ElKamel, 2013)

The study found out that the five newspapers did not agree on same definition of current political situation. Morsi's news was the primary topic on the front page of FJP, while economy news was the primary topic on the front pages of Al-Ahram. The five newspapers reflected the political division in Egypt at that time, as both Al-Ahram and FJP provide news with positive impressions, the other three newspapers portrayed the country as being at risk (ElKamel, 2013)

In 2013 (Golan, 2013) examined how the European media through their op-eds looked at the Egyptian revolution of January 25<sup>th</sup>, how they framed it, and how they chose the sources and writers who contributed to explain the situation to the western readers. The study explored the identity of writers in both newspapers' Op-Eds, choice of source and their selections of frames. (Golan, 2013)

The Study examined two main newspapers The International Herald Tribune, referred to as IHT, and the Wall Street Journal, Refers to as WSJ. By a content analysis to Op-Ed during and after the uprising, the analysis showed that both newspapers focused on the rooted cause of the uprising, the future potentials and threats and the Muslim Brotherhood as the common stated frames (Golan, 2013).

The study (Golan, 2013) found out that Op-Ed writers in both newspapers have also had their indications of the framing process, as IHT gave the majority of its Op-Eds to its writers, in addition to the American writers and Muslim Brotherhood, who contributed to the op-eds. WSJ gave more space to local writers and others from outside. IHT and WSJ both agreed to some extent on the first frame, as IHT focused extensively on the reasons behind the heated revolution and referred so much to the oppressive nature of Mubarak's regime and how citizens lacked basic freedoms, the WSJ European Edition analysis stated that the lost sense of pride, with the absence of basic human rights and the lost hopes for the young people of Egypt were behind the uprising (Golan, 2013) While the IHT columnists carefully analyzed the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the upcoming future of Egypt and deeply undermined the threat that the MB might be causing.

The WSJ was totally on the opposite side as it raised a deep concern toward the role and intention of the Muslim Brotherhood and how Egypt will look like under a theocratic rule. Op-Ed writers in both newspapers have also their indications of the framing process, as IHT give the majority of its op-eds to its writers, WSJ gives more space to Egyptian writers and outside ones (Golan, 2013)

(Grimmrt, 2012) conducted a content analysis to explore the framing of the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution in the U.S. newspapers. The study sampled 153 stories from the following newspapers "The New York Times" and "The Washington Post" and examined how sources frames the revolutionary protests at that time, the Former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and how these protests had affected both Egypt and the United States (Grimmrt, 2012).

The results showed that the views expressed by the U.S. official sources overwhelmed the coverage framing the conflict in an unbiased way, while the analysis revealed that there



was uncertainty from the U.S. foreign policy towards the conflict in Egypt and its solutions. (Grimmrt, 2012)

Along the same line, a content analysis was conducted to explore the differences in the news coverage of the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution between both news channels Aljazeera “The Peninsula” channel, and the CNN channel (Yehia, 2011). The study used the framing theory as a framework to explore the coverage.

The results showed that there were similarities and differences in how January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution was framed in both media. Aljazeera covered the revolution from the point of view of the protesters and the opposition leaders, gave the revolution an Egyptian context rather than a part of the Arab Spring as a whole, the channel also referred to the fact that the success of the revolution means that Egypt is on the direct track for true democracy. On the contrary CNN covered the revolution from the perspective of the U.S. government, raising the question of how what is happening in Cairo will affect the United States interests in the region (Yehia, 2011)

## **2. Framing June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution**

To understand how the print media dealt with the significant political transition in Egypt in June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution. The study examined the news coverage of five daily Egyptian newspapers, the state owned Al-Ahram newspaper, the Freedom and justice party paper, Al-Wafd party paper, and both the independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, and Al-Dostor (El-Abbassy, 2014)

The study examined six-month after the June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution and its results showed that there is a correlation between the type of ownership of each of these newspapers and their level of balance in covering the current events at that time. Al-Ahram, state owned

newspaper worked as a mouthpiece for the government while the Freedom and justice “El-Horeya Wel-Adala” newspaper played the opposite role as a mouthpiece for the Muslim Brotherhood group. (El-Abbassy, 2014)

Both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Al-Dostor were likely to speak critically of the MB, however, Al-Dostor newspaper and unlike Al-Masry El Youm did not side with the government of the Interim president *Adly Mansour*, while Al-Wafd had a biased coverage toward the revolution of June 30<sup>th</sup> and had the most critical coverage against the Muslim brotherhood (El-Abbassy, 2014).

### **3. Framing the Egyptian political forces**

El-Haddad (2013) conducted a content analysis to study how the Egyptian press framed the “Islamic movements” after two years from the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution. The study sampled four Egyptian newspapers Al-Ahram “The Pyramids”, Al-Masry Al-Youm “Egyptian Today”, Al-Youm AL-Sabea’, or Youm7 “The Seventh Day”, and Al-Dostor “The Constitution” papers (El-Haddad, 2013)

Five frames were identified to assess the coverage of the five newspapers of the Islamist movement in Egypt; “The politically organized” frame, the “polarization” frame, “anti-democracy” frame, “anti-revolution” frame and “Violence” frame. Although the five frames used to assess the coverage as a whole, significant differences were proved by the study in the way the Egyptian press is looking to the different Islamist groups (El-Haddad, 2013)

The results showed the the Muslim Brotherhood Group and their political arm the Freedom and Justice Party were the highest mentioned Islamist group among the studied ones, However, it was noticed by the study that both Al-Masry Al-Youm and Youm7 were mentioning all the Islamists movements under one category which opened the door to bias

generalization. (El-Haddad, 2013) “Au Ismail” supporters’ movement was the most negatively framed in all newspaper, while the “Salafi call” and its political arm “Al-Nour” party were most likely to be framed neutrally in the majority of the examined article (El-Haddad, 2013)

Halawa (2013) Conducted a framing analysis to study the image of the former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi in the US newspaper, the study sampled two daily American newspapers, the Washington Post and the New York Times. (Halawa, 2013)

The study examined the coverage of six events that took place during the first six months of Morsi’s rule to identified the employed frames. The results showed that during the six month the two newspapers, and despite being too critical to Morsi’s rule sometimes, always framed him as “Moderate Islamist leader” and never used other stereotypical words or frames (Halawa, 2013)

#### **4. Liberal and Islamist media**

As for the liberal vs. Islamist media, (Evans & Kaynak, 2015) conducted qualitative and comparative study and examined the media framing in Religious- Secular conflicts in both Turkey and Israel. The study focused on the socio-political circumstances that affected the journalists’ performance, which, by default, had an impact on how the media works. The study shows the similarities between both political situations in the two countries as, despite the obvious differences, both countries have witnessed a major rise of religious political parties in spite of their secular dominant populations (Evans & Kaynak, 2015)

The Media in both countries catered for the conflict between secular and religious political forces; although till 1990 both countries had media under the full control of the governments, the print media have long presented their interests. The study tried to explore

the framing of events in both affiliated media and to what extent their ideological affiliations have affected their role as watchdogs' media (Evans & Kaynak, 2015).

The study found that the secular mainstream media framed the religious political forces as a great danger for democracy, rather than being a result of the people's free will. On the other side, the religious media framed the secular society as immoral and that the attempts by the secular forces of stopping the passing of conservative legislations are a big defeat for the democratic process in the country. (Evans & Kaynak, 2015)

As for the watchdog role, both secular and religious media used this role to attack their opponents, show only the justice of their sides and try to protect the society from what they portrayed as wrong practices that can harm the nation. These practices led to diminishing the watchdog mission and weakening the democratic process. Another outcome was the polarization of the society; as both media refrained from reflecting the pluralism of the society, they tended to endorse the voices that reflect the same point of views (Evans & Kaynak, 2015)

Ossman (2007) conducted a study to explore the role of the thematic channels coverage of the current political affairs and studied the used frames of the news coverage. In addition to the content analysis and to identify how effective were the usages of these frames, the study surveyed a sample of politicians, academics and media figures, the study asked the surveyed sample about the most important political issues from their perspectives (Ossman, 2007).

The study showed that the most used frames were "Political crisis" followed by "conflict" frame and "competition" frame. At the same time both Nile News channels and Al-Arabiya channel, which were among the analyzed sample, showed that "conflict" frame

was the top used followed by “legal” frames, then “religious frames” and “Human interests” (Ossman, 2007).

To study the correlation between the frames used in the news coverage and the public awareness toward the handled news, a content analysis was conducted in 2006 to explore the relation between the frames used in the coverage of the American-Iraqi conflict in the Egyptian papers (state and independent) from 1990 till 2003 and the awareness level of the Egyptian public toward this conflict (Heidar, 2006).

The study sampled Al-Ahram “Pyramids” paper from the state side, and Al-Wafd “The Delegation” paper for the non state newspapers. While the study used non-probability sample in surveying the public from difference districts in Cairo. The study showed that there was a clear relation between the public opinion of the Egyptians toward the conflict and the frames used in its coverage (Heidar, 2006).

Ibrahim S. (2013) conducted a study to examine how the Muslim Brotherhood group (MB) and their political arm the Freedom and Justice Party used their own media as channel to represent their ideologies and principles. The study sampled the official newspaper of the MB and their political party FJP, El-Horeya Wel-Adala “*Freedom and Justice*” paper, Ikhwanonline Internet website, *Misr 25 “Egypt 25”* (Ibrahim S. , 2013).

The study showed that although the MB media did not focus on the religious issues as primary content, their media outlets worked as mouthpieces for the Brotherhood Group. Their media dedicated the majority of their content spaces and airing time to represent the news of the Muslim Brotherhood Group and their Political Party Freedom and Justice Party, while giving less space to discuss other news and opinions (Ibrahim S. , 2013).

## V. METHODOLOGY

This study explored the front pages' coverage of the four selected newspapers during the six months ahead of the June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution, by using a quantitative research to answer two research questions.

### 1. Content Analysis – An Overview

Content analysis is a quantitative research methodology to study the content of different types of media, the popular method can be used to assess, evaluate, and quantify the media content, to describe the communication content, compare the media message with the reality and test hypotheses. It is also a main tool to identify and assess the media image/s of certain groups or minorities (Wimmer & Dominick , 2006).

Content analysis method allows researchers to examine a wide range of text, TV interviews, newspapers and other types of media content (Macnamara, 2005).

### 2. Analysis procedures

#### Defining the universe

The study examined four newspapers; the choice was made based on an obvious rationale. The chosen newspapers were 1) El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” is the official newspaper of the Freedom and justice party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood group. 2) El-Youm7 “The Seventh Day” a daily independent and one of the highest circulated newspapers in Egypt 3) AL-Masry El-Youm “Egyptian Today” the first independent newspaper in Egypt with a liberal affiliation and also one of the highest circulated newspapers in Egypt, 4) Al-Ahram “The Pyramids” one of the oldest state-owned newspaper.

The sampling duration was six months before the June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution and the removal of the former president Mohamed Morsi from power, from January 2013 to June 2013. A total of 262 articles were examined from the four newspapers.

### **3. Sampling approach**

The Content analysis method has a great challenge when it comes to defining the population and deciding on the size of the sample drawn out of it. The purpose and goal of the research decide the size of the sample that allows a generalization of the results on one side, and the presence of limitations of the availability of the required resources, on the other (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993).

The sample for this quantitative study was confined to the front pages of the four newspapers; El-Horeya Wel-Adala “Freedom and Justice” newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the only available Islamist newspaper at the time of the study; Al-Masry El Youm “Egyptian Today” newspaper, the first independent newspaper in Egypt, with the highest circulations among all the printed press; and Youm7 “The Seventh day”, a daily independent. The duration of the study is the six months ahead of June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution with a total of 28 front pages of the four mentioned newspapers.

Due to the limited availability of El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper after it has been stopped by the Egyptian interim government in the wake of June 30<sup>th</sup>, the study will examine only 6 months before June 30<sup>th</sup>. Continuing discussion about the sampling, it is a constructed week. Previous research have shown that two constructed weeks are enough to examine the coverage of one year (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico , 2014) (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993) and as this study examines only a period of six months, a one constructed week would be representative and give reliable results.

One way of sampling a constructed week is to randomly choose days from the whole population where all days of the week are being represented in the sample. The sampled days were chosen to make sure each day of the week is represented, one Sunday, one Monday, one Tuesday, one Wednesday, one Thursday, one Friday and one Saturday (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993). The research period will start from 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2013 to 30<sup>th</sup> of June 2013 with a total of 28 newspaper issues.

Riffe, Charles , & Lacy (1993) Conducted a study entitled “The Effectiveness of Random Consecutive Day and Constructed Week Sampling in Newspaper Content Analysis”, in this study he explored the effectiveness of several types of samples in order to perform a content analysis; the comparison was between Simple Random, Consecutive days and the constructed week samples (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico , 2014)

The study (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993) examined all local news items in a Sunday newspaper during six-month (182 days) and a total of 2774 local news items. The researches composed sets of samples; each group was selected through a type of samples. The study showed that “A smaller sample stratified for day of week will give reliable results and will produce better estimates than purely random samples” (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993)

Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, (1993) highlighted that the constructed week avoided a major error that is the oversampling of a specific day. In addition, the study stressed that two constructed weeks worth a year of newspaper issues (Riffe, Charles , & Lacy, 1993)

Elmasry (2012) Confined a similar study like the current one. He conducted a content analysis to explore how the government and the political opposition were framed in three different types of print media in Egypt; The Official *Al-Ahram*, The Independent *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, and the Opposition *Al-Wafd*. The research analyzed a period of less than 6 months from July 19<sup>th</sup> 2008 till December 31, 2008 (Elmasry, 2012).



This study used one constructed week and chose one sample for each day randomly. The study will examine the front pages of 7 issues of each newspaper, a total of 28 front pages from the four selected newspapers.

**Table 1: The randomly chosen dates of the composite week**

Month	Selected samples
January	Tuesday, 15 <sup>th</sup> of January
February	Saturday 16 <sup>th</sup> of Feb
March	Wednesday 6 <sup>th</sup>
April	Sunday 7 <sup>th</sup>
May	Thursday 30 <sup>th</sup> of May
June	Monday 10 <sup>th</sup> Friday 28 <sup>th</sup>

#### **4. Research questions**

**There are two broad questions this study is trying to answer,**

**RQ1:** How were the political forces framed in El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Youm7, and Al-Ahram newspapers' front pages' coverage?

**RQ2:** Which political forces were used as sources of news in framing other political forces?

## **Coding**

The unit of analysis was the news items, including headlines and side headlines, and the photos that work as news item independently. However, all the photos that were parts of other news items were excluded from the analysis.

Out of literature review, the study identified the frames that were used in the content analysis, (Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012) identified four frames in their content analysis of the Egyptian media after the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution, which were “conflict” frame, “responsibly” frame, the “economic Consequences” frame and “human interest” frame.

The study looked into five media frames “responsibility”, “human Interest”, “conflict”, “economic consequences” and “morality” as dependent variables, to test how the media used them to frame the political forces at that time.

The coding sheet had groups of identification information, name of the coder, Name and date of the coded newspaper and the News item ID. In the second category of the sheet, there is information about the news format type, where the coding category asked about whether the news item was main headline, headline for inside story, main piece of news, news, picture, or side headline. Another coding category asks about the news item primary topic, with options varying from political situation, economics and others.

Next category in the coding sheet was about the political forces mentioning in the news item, whether they exist or not; if yes, the coding process is to be completed, and if not, the coding process is to be stopped and counted as no mentioning of political forces. The sheet looked only in the pictures that were used as a news item by itself; the pictures, which were parts of other news items, were excluded.

A total of 33 political forces were placed in the coding sheet distributed on three main categories 1) political parties, 2) political movements and pressure groups, 3) political figures, with three blank spaces for others, one for each category; a total of 9 Islamist parties and movements, 8 liberal ones, 6 Islamists figures and their supporters and 8 Liberals and their supporters.

The next question was a long table that includes all categories of political forces against the used frames; the frames were distributed in five independent cells. Followed by the last question about using political forces as a source of framing other forces, in this category the same distribution of political forces took place.

### **Statistical tools**

The statistical analysis used in this study followed the SPSS statistical program. The following statistical parameters were calculated as shown below (Wimmer and Dominick, 2003).

#### **The Chi-Square ( $\chi^2$ ) Test:**

$\chi^2$  is used to test the homogeneity of distribution of any two variables. We assume the null hypothesis that the 2 distributions are similar.  $\chi^2$  will measure if the null hypothesis is true or false.

$\chi^2$  is calculated as the summation of the squares of the differences between expected and observed values as a ratio of the expected value, (Wimmer and Dominick, 2003).

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(\text{Observed} - \text{expected})^2}{\text{expected}}$$

The significance of the resulted value of  $\chi^2$  is tested at 0.05 or 0.01 levels of probability. If the p value is < 0.05 or < 0.01, the  $\chi^2$  is significant at the probability level and the

distributions of A & B are not the same. If  $p > 0.05$  or  $> 0,01$ , the distribution of A & B is the same in each group.

### **Inter-coder Reliability**

Two coders, the researcher and a graduate student in media who was trained with a codebook for three days by the researcher to code the articles. After coding the 262 articles, a percent of sample 26 articles was re-examined to test the interceder reliability.

### **Inter-coder Reliability test**

For Nominal data, reliability can be tested in terms of percentage of agreement as follows, Holsti (1969):

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2M}{N_1 + N_2}$$

Where M is the number of coding decisions on which two coders agree, and  $N_1$  and  $N_2$  are the total number of coding decisions by the first and second coder, respectively.

A sample of 26 sheets (about 10% of the total number of sheets) was recorded by a second coder. There were 256 decisions were recorded, resulted in 230 right decisions. Therefore

$$\text{Reliability} = \frac{2 (230)}{256 + 256} = 89.84\%$$

## VI. FINDINGS

This chapter will present the findings of the content analysis done to all the news items of the front pages of three different newspapers Al-Masry El Youm, Youm7, El-Horeya Wel-Adala, and Al-Ahram. The purpose is the examining of how newspapers from different political affiliations and ownership have contributed to the political conflict that led to June 30<sup>th</sup> revolution, by framing different political forces on their front pages. The used frames were “responsibility”, “conflict”, “Human Interest”, “Economic consequences” and “morality”.

### *Format of News*

#### **Most dominant news format for each newspaper**

Each Newspaper was more likely to have a dominant news format in their front pages’ coverage, El-Horeya Wel-Adala is more likely to use main headline format in their front pages (32.20%, n=28), while Youm7 dominant news format is the headline of inside story (42.20%, n=27), Al-Masry Al-Youm dominant regular news format (54.40%, n=43) and Al-Ahram dominant format was regular news format as well (63.40%, n=45).

#### **Less dominant news format for each newspaper**

El-Horeya Wel-Adala is least likely to use the main piece of news format (3.40, n=3), while Youm7 is least likely to use side headline format (1.60%, n=1) of their total coverage, and Al-Masry Al-Youm is least likely to use the main headline formats in their front pages’ coverage (5.10%, n=4).

### *Other news format*

El-Horeya Wel-Adala used other formats of news with different percentage on their front pages, full text of news and side headlines were used with equal percentages for each one (28.70%, n=25), headline of inside stories format was used in the total examined articles (4.60%, n=4).

Youm7 used the regular news format with relatively high percentage (39.10%, n=25), while used the format of main piece of news in (10.90%, n=7) and the format of main headline was a low percentage (6.20%, n=4), Al-Masry Al-Youm used headline of inside story format with a relatively high percentage (25.30%, n=20), while using the main piece of news (15,20, n=12) from the total front pages examined. The results showed that the paper did not use any side headline in their examined sample.


Al-Ahram used the headline of inside story format with a relatively high percentage (22.50%, n=16), while the main piece of news came in the second place (9.90%, n=7) on the paper front pages. Al-Ahram used both the main headline format (1.40%, n=1) and opinion format (2.80%, n=2) in a low percentage from the total coverage.

The results also showed that the format of using a picture alone as a news item without being included in any other format was only found in El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper (2.30%, n=2) and never showed in both Youm7 and Al-Masry Al-Youm. While Al-Ahram was the only newspaper that used the opinion format on its front pages.

A Chi square test showed that the difference across the four newspapers in distribution of format is highly significant = 151.129, (p=0.000).

**Table 2: Format of News**

News Format	Frequency (%) of newspaper name				
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry Al- Youm	Al-Ahram	Total
<b>Main Headline</b>	28 32.20%	4 6.20%	4 5.10%	1 1.40%	<b>37</b> <b>12.30%</b>
<b>Main Piece of News</b>	3 3.40%	7 10.90%	12 15.20%	7 9.90%	<b>29</b> <b>9.60%</b>
<b>Regular Piece of News</b>	25 28.70%	25 39.10%	43 54.40%	45 63.40%	<b>138</b> <b>45.80%</b>
<b>Opinion</b>	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 2.80%	<b>2</b> <b>0.70%</b>
<b>Pictures</b>	2 2.30%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>2</b> <b>0.70%</b>
<b>Headline of Inside Story</b>	4 4.60%	27 42.20%	20 25.30%	16 22.50%	<b>67</b> <b>22.30%</b>
<b>Side Headline</b>	25 28.70%	1 1.60%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>26</b> <b>8.60%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>64</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>79</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>71</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>301</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 2: Distribution of News Format**

### *News topic*

The second tested variable was the topic of the examined news item. The findings showed that the primary topic of interests in the following three newspapers' front pages El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Youm7, and Al-Masry El-Youm was local politics, while the primary topic of interest in Al-Ahram newspaper was local economy. The politics news percentage reached (22.70%, n=57) from total examined news items from the four newspapers.

The highest percentage of news about the "local politics" found on Al-Masry Al-Yom's front pages (37.50%, n=20), while Youm7 has the second highest percentage (29.20%, n=19), El-Horeya Wel-Adala came in the third place with a slightly less percentage of politics news (20.90%, n=18) and Al-Ahram marked the last place with the least percentage of local politics news (15.70%, n=11).

Local economy news came in the first place as news topic in Al-Ahram coverage (27.10%, n=19), El-Horeya Wel-Adala came in the second place with a percentage of economic (18.60%, n=16), Youm7 had a less percentage (9.20%, n=6), and Al-Masry Al-Youm came in the last place (5.10%, n=4). The percentage of the "Local Economy" news came marked a total of (15.00%, n=46) from the total front pages' topics of news.

The regional issues marked in El-Horeya Wel-Adala (2.30%, n=2), Youm7 (1.50%, n=1), Al-Masry Al-Youm percentage was (2.50%, n=2), while Al-Ahram marked the highest percentage of covering the regional issues with (11.40%, n=8) from its total coverage.


The topic of security situation showed a low level of distribution in the three newspapers; for security issues El-Horeya Wel-Adala had (2.30%, n=2), Youm7 (3.10%, n=2), Al-Masry Al-Youm (1.30%, n=1), while Al-Ahram's percentage was (4.30%, n=3).



Chi square = 33.450 (p=0.001) highly significant indicating different distribution of primary topic in the four newspapers.

**Table 3: The primary topic of the news items**

Primary Topic of the news items	Frequency (%) of Newspapers				
	EL-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry Al-Youm	Al-Ahram	Total
<b>Local politics</b>	18 20.90%	19 29.20%	20 37.50%	11 15.70%	<b>68</b> <b>22.70%</b>
<b>Local Economy</b>	16 18.60%	6 9.20%	4 5.10%	19 27.10%	<b>45</b> <b>15%</b>
<b>Security Situation</b>	2 2.30%	2 3.10%	1 1.30%	3 4.30%	<b>8</b> <b>2.70%</b>
<b>Regional Issues</b>	2 2.30%	1 1.50%	2 2.50%	8 11.40%	<b>13</b> <b>4.30%</b>
<b>Others</b>	48 55.80%	37 56.90%	52 65.80%	29 41.40%	<b>166</b> <b>55.30%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>86</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>65</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>79</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>70</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>300</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 3: Distribution of Primary topic**

### ***Mentioning of political forces***


This category was tested to identify the percentage of the news items that mentioned any political forces on the front pages of the four newspapers. The overall mentioning of the political forces reached (37.20 %, n=112) from the total examined articles.

Youm7 has the highest percentage of articles that mentioned the political forces in their front pages' news items (52.30%, n=34), in the second place came Al-Masry Al-Youm with (49.40%, n=39) from the total coverage, El-Horeya Wel-Adala came in the third place with (25.58%, n=22), while Al-Ahram came in the last place with (23.90%, n=17).

A chi square = 21.665 (p=0.000) indicating highly significant differences of yes and no for the four newspapers.

**Table 4 : Distribution of political forces mentioning in the four newspapers**

	<b>Frequency (%) of Newspapers</b>				
<b>Political Forces mentioned in News items</b>	<b>El-Horeya Wel-Adala</b>	<b>Youm7</b>	<b>Al-Masry Al-Youm</b>	<b>Al-Ahram</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Yes</b>	22 25.58%	34 52.30%	39 49.40%	17 23.90%	<b>112</b> <b>37.20%</b>
<b>No</b>	64 74.41%	31 47.70%	40 50.60%	54 76.10%	<b>189</b> <b>62.80%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>86</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>65</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>79</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>71</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>301</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 4: distribution of the political forces mentioning in each newspaper**


### ***Mentioning of political parties***

The Freedom and Justice party (FJP) marked the highest place with highest percentage of mentioning among all the political parties; the percentage reach at Youm7 newspaper (30.00%, n=3); while the same political party had the highest percentage of mentioning in El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper (28.57%, n=4).

Al Masry El Youm had a very low mentioning of the FJP with (8.33%, n=1) of the total articles any mention the political parties, while Al-Ahram which came in the last place as the least newspaper to mention political forces in its coverage, had a similar number to Al-Masry El- Youm with (33.33%, n=1) from its total coverage.

**Table 5: mentioning of the political parties in the four newspapers**

Political Parties	Frequency (%) of Newspapers				Total
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry Al-Youm	Al- Ahram	
<b>Freedom and Justice</b>	4 28.57%	3 30.00%	1 8.33%	1 33.33%	<b>9</b> <b>23.07%</b>
<b>Al-Nour</b>	1 7.14%	3 30.00%	1 8.33%	0 0%	<b>5</b> <b>12.82%</b>
<b>Al-Wasat</b>	3 21.43%	1 10.00%	1 8.33%	0 0%	<b>5</b> <b>12.82%</b>
<b>Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar</b>	0 0%	0 0%	2 16.67%	0 0%	<b>2</b> <b>5.12%</b>
<b>Al-Wafd</b>	3 21.43%	1 10.00%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>4</b> <b>10.25%</b>
<b>Strong Egypt</b>	1 7.14%	1 10.00%	1 8.33%	0 0%	<b>3</b> <b>7.69%</b>
<b>Others</b>	2 14.29%	1 10.00%	5 50.00%	2 66.67%	<b>11</b> <b>28.20%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>10</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>12</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>3</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>39</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 5: Distribution of Political parties mentioning**

### ***Mentioning of Political Movements and Pressure Groups in the Three Newspapers***

Testing that variable showed that the Muslim Brotherhood had the highest mentioning percentage in the overall analyzed articles with (36.79%, n=39); the four newspapers counted the highest topics among other political movements and pressure groups.


Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned the brotherhood with a percentage of (47.62%, n=20) from its total coverage, while El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspapers came in the second place (41.67%, n=5), in the third place came Youm7 newspapers with (30.95%, n=13), while Al-Ahram marked the least percentage of mention the Group with (10.00%, n=1) from the total news items that mentioned the political forces in their front pages.

The Islamists movements and forces as general came in the second place in the overall political movements and pressure groups mentioning with an overall percentage of (13.20%, n=14), were distributed as following El-Horeya Wel-Adala (8.33%, n=1) Youm7 (16.67%, n=7) from their total articles, while Al-Masry Al-Youm marked (7.14%, n=3) and Al-Ahram with (20.00%, n=3).

At the same time the mentioning of the Liberal forces were mentioned (12.26%, n=13) where El-Horeya Wel-Adala had never mentioned this category, while Youm7 marked (16.6%, n=7), Al-Masry Al-Youm (9.52%, n=4) and Al-Ahram (20.00%, n=2) from the total news items that mentioned the political forces. Several other political forces were mentioned in relatively low percentages. Chi square test was not done, as due to the too many zeroes mentioning, the test will be biased.

**Table 6: Political Movements and Pressure Groups Mentioning in the four Newspapers**

Political Movements and Pressure Groups	Frequency (%) of Newspapers				
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masy Al-Youm	Al-Ahram	Total
<b>Gabhet Al-Inqaz</b>	3 25.00%	3 7.14%	3 7.14%	1 10.0%	<b>10</b> <b>9.43%</b>
<b>MB Group</b>	5 41.67%	13 30.95%	20 47.62%	1 10.00%	<b>39</b> <b>36.79%</b>
<b>Tamarod</b>	1 8.33%	6 14.29%	5 11.90%	0 0%	<b>12</b> <b>11.32%</b>
<b>Gabhet El Dameer</b>	0 0%	1 2.38%	2 4.76%	0 0%	<b>3</b> <b>2.83%</b>
<b>6<sup>th</sup> of April</b>	1 8.33%	1 2.38%	1 2.38%	1 10.00%	<b>4</b> <b>3.77%</b>
<b>Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya</b>	0 0%	1 2.38%	2 4.76%	1 10.00%	<b>4</b> <b>3.77%</b>
<b>Abu Ismaiel supporters</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 2.38%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>0.94%</b>
<b>The liberal forces</b>	0 0%	7 16.67%	4 9.52%	2 20.00%	<b>13</b> <b>12.26%</b>
<b>The Islamists forces</b>	1 8.33%	7 16.67%	3 7.14%	3 30.00%	<b>14</b> <b>13.20%</b>
<b>Others</b>	1 8.33%	3 7.14%	1 2.38%	1 10.00%	<b>6</b> <b>5.66%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>42</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>42</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>10</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>106</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 6: Distribution of Political Movements and Pressure Groups mentioning**

### ***Mentioning of the Political Figures***

The former president Mohamed Morsi is the highest mentioned political figure with an overall percentage of (53 %, n=53) and in all four newspapers; El-Horeya Wel-Adala had the highest percentage of mentioning with (60.00%, n=9), followed by Al-Ahram (55.55%, n=10), Al Masry Al-Youm came in the third place (52,04%, n=22), while Youm7 was in the forth place (48.00%, n=12).


Hisham Qandil, the prime minister at that time, came in the second place by (9.76%, n=8) from the total coverage; El-Horeya Wel-Adala had the highest mentioning of Qandil with (20.00%, n=3), Al-Ahram (22.22%, n=4), while Youm7 came in the second place (12.00%, n=3), and Al Masry AL-Youm in the forth place with (4.76%, n=2).

In the Third place in the overall mentioning came Abdel Fatah El Sissi (8.54%, n=7); General Abdel Fatah El-Sissi at that time had no mentioning in El-Horeya Wel-Adala coverage, while Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned him (11.90%, n=5) in the total examined articles, Youm7 came next with (8.00%, n=2) and Al-Ahram with (11.11%, n=2). Chi-square will be biased due to the may zeroes in the findings and was not tested.

**Table 7: Mentioning of the Political figures**

Political figures	Frequency (%) of Newspapers				
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry Al-Youm	Al- Ahram	Total
<b>Mohamed Morsi</b>	9 60.00%	12 48.00%	22 52.04%	10 55.55%	<b>53</b> <b>53%</b>
<b>Mohamed Badie</b>	0 0%	2 8.00%	1 2.38%	1 5.55%	<b>4</b> <b>4%</b>
<b>Mohamed ElBaradei</b>	1 6.67%	0 0%	1 2.38%	0 0%	<b>2</b> <b>2%</b>
<b>Hamdeen Sabahi</b>	0 0%	2 8.00%	3 7.14%	0 0%	<b>5</b> <b>5%</b>
<b>Abdel Fattah El-Sisi</b>	0 0%	2 8.00%	5 11.90%	2 11.11%	<b>9</b> <b>9%</b>
<b>Amr Moussa</b>	0 0%	0 0%	2 4.76%	0 0%	<b>2</b> <b>2%</b>
<b>Khairat El Shater</b>	0 0%	1 4.00%	2 4.76%	0 0%	<b>3</b> <b>3%</b>
<b>Mohamed Saad El- Katatni</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 2.38%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>1%</b>
<b>Ayman Nour</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 2.38%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>1%</b>
<b>Hisham Qandil</b>	3 20.00%	3 12.00%	2 4.76%	4 22.22%	<b>12</b> <b>12%</b>
<b>Ahmed Shafik</b>	1 6.67%	1 4.00%	0 0%	1 5.55%	<b>3</b> <b>3%</b>
<b>Others</b>	1 6.67%	2 8.00%	2 4.76%	0 0%	<b>5</b> <b>5%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>25</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>42</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>18</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>100</b> <b>100%</b>





**Figure 7: Distribution of Political Figures mentioning**

### *Frames used for the political parties*

The “conflict” frame had the highest percentage of usage for the political parties with (57.1%, n=28), and in the second place came the “responsibility” frame with (28.6%, n=14), the third frame in terms of percentage was the “morality” frame (12.2%, n=6), and the “economics consequences” came in the fourth place (2.0%, n=1) and there was no usage of the “human interest” frame for the political parties.

The frames used for El-Horeya Wel-Adala were the “conflict” frame in the first place (42.8%, n=6), then “responsibility” (35.7%, n=5), Morality (14.3%, n=2), in addition the solo use of the “economic consequences” was for El-Horeya Wel-Adala (7.1%, n=1).


Al-Nour party has equal representation of both frames “responsibility” and “conflict” frames with (40.0%, n=2) for each, while “morality” came in the third place with (20.0%, n=1), and no use of either “human interests” nor “economic consequences” frames in any mentioning of the party. Al-Wasat party had the highest percentage of using “conflict” frame in their news coverage with (80.0%, n=4) while “responsibility” frame came next with

(20.0%, n=1), and no usage of the “human interests”, “economic consequences” or “morality”. The “conflict” frame was used for Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar political party (100%, n=1) while there were no mentions of other frames.

Al-Wafd was framed mainly by “conflict” frame (42,8%, n=3), and similar distribution of both frames “responsibility” and “morality” with (28.6%, n=2) for each. Strong Egypt party was framed only by “conflict” frame (100%, N=3), and there were no using of other frames. The existence of many zeros does not allow the chi square test.

**Table 8: Frames used for each of the political parties**

Political Parties	Frequency (%) of Frames					
	Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality	Total
<b>El-Horeya Wel-Adala</b>	5 35.7%	0 0%	6 42.8%	1 7.1%	2 14.3%	<b>14</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Al-Nour</b>	2 40.0%	0 0%	2 40.0%	0 0%	1 20.0%	<b>5</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Al-Wasat</b>	1 20.00%	0 0%	4 80.00%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>5</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>AlMasreyeen Al-Ahrar</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>AL-Wafd</b>	2 28.6%	0 0%	3 42.8%	0 0%	2 28.6%	<b>7</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Al-Tagamouee</b>	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>0</b> <b>0%</b>
<b>Strong Egypt</b>	0 0%	0 0%	3 100%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>3</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Al-Tahalof El-Shaaby</b>	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>0</b> <b>0%</b>
<b>The Egy. Democrat</b>	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>0</b> <b>0%</b>
<b>Others</b>	4 28.6%	0 0%	9 64.3%	0 0%	1 7.1%	<b>14</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b> <b>28.6%</b>	<b>0</b> <b>0%</b>	<b>28</b> <b>57.1%</b>	<b>1</b> <b>2.0%</b>	<b>6</b> <b>12.2%</b>	<b>49</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 8: Distribution of frames of political parties**

***Frames used for the political movements and pressure groups***

The “conflict” frame came on the top of the used frames for the Political movements and pressure groups with (48.6%, n=85), the second most used frame is “responsibility” with (26.8%, n= 47), while the third used frame is “morality” with (17.1%, n=30), the fourth used frame is “human interest” with (4.0%, n=7), and the fifth one is “economic consequences” with (3.4%, n=6).

Gabhet Al-Inqaz “The National Salvation Front” is framed mainly by the “conflict” frame (64.7%, n=11), and “responsibility” frame with (23.5%, m=4), and “morality” frame with low percentage (11.8%, n=2), while there both “human interest” and “economic consequences” frames were never used.

The Muslim Brotherhood Group was framed mainly by the “conflict” frame (36.9%, n=31), followed by “responsibility” frame (30.9%, n=26), “morality” frame with (16.7%, n=14), “human-interest” frame with (8.3%, n=7) and “economic consequences” with (7.1%, n=6).

Tamarod movement had distribution of frames between three main categories, “conflict” frame (50.0%, n=9), responsibility frame (35.0%, n=7) and morality frame (15.0%, n=3) and no usage of either “human interest” or “economic consequences” frames.


Gabhet El Dameer was framed mainly by “conflict” frame with (66.7%, n=2) while framed by “morality” with (33.3%, n=1) and no other frames were used. 6<sup>th</sup> of April movement was framed mainly by both “conflict” frame (60%, n=3) and “morality” frame (40%, n=2).

Al-Dawa Al-Salafiya was framed only by “conflict” (100%, n=1) while El Gamaa Al-Islamiyya was framed by three frames; “conflict” (50.0%, n=3), “responsibility” (33.3%, n=2) and “morality” (16.7%, n=1). Meanwhile, Abu Ismail supporters’ Hazemoun was mentioned by two frames; “conflict” (50%, n=1) and morality (50%, n=1).

The liberal forces and Islamist forces have the same used three frames. The liberal forces were framed by “conflict” (56%, n=9), “morality” (25.0%, n=4) and “responsibility” (18.7%, n=3). While the Islamist forces in general were framed by “conflict” (58.8%, n=10), “responsibility” (29.4%, n=5) and “morality” (11.8%, n=2). Test of Chi Square will be bias due to the many zeroes.

**Table 9: Frames used for the political movements and pressure groups**

Political Movements & pressure groups	Frequency (%) of Frames					
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economic consequences	Morality	Total
Gabhet Al-Inqaz	4 23.5%	0 0%	11 64.7%	0 0%	2 11.8%	17 100%
MB	26 30.9%	7 8.3%	31 36.9%	6 7.1%	14 16.7%	84 100%
Tamarod	7 35.0%	0 0%	10 50.0%	0 0%	3 15.0%	20 100%
Gabhet El Dameer	0 0%	0 0%	2 66.7%	0 0%	1 33.3%	3 100%
6th of April	0 0%	0 0%	3 60%	0 0%	2 40%	5 100%
Salafists Daawa	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%
AlGamaa AlIslamiyya	2 33.3%	0 0%	3 50.0%	0 0%	1 16.7%	6 100%
Abu Ismaiel supporters	0 0%	0 0%	1 50%	0 0%	1 50%	2 100%
The liberal forces	3 18.7%	0 0%	9 56.3%	0 0%	4 25.0%	16 100%
The Islamists forces	5 29.4%	0 0%	10 58.8%	0 0%	2 11.8%	17 100%
Others*	0 0%	0 0%	4 100%	0 0%	0 0%	4 100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b> <b>26.8%</b>	<b>7</b> <b>4.0%</b>	<b>85</b> <b>48.6%</b>	<b>6</b> <b>3.4%</b>	<b>30</b> <b>17.1%</b>	<b>175</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 9: Frame used for political movement and pressure groups**

### ***Frames for each of the political figures***

The “conflict” frame had the highest percentage of framing the political figures (34.2%, n=55), while “responsibility” comes in the second place with (39.8%, n=64), “morality” (14.3%, n=23), “human interests (6.8%, n=11) and “economic consequences” (5.0%, n=8).


The Former Egyptian Mohamed Morsi was framed with the five tested frames; “responsibility” (39.8%, n=39), Conflict (30.6%, n=30), morality (16.3%, n=16), “human interest” (8.2%, n=8), “economic consequences” (5.1%, n=5); While Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was framed by two main frames; “responsibility” (75%, n=9) and “morality” (25%, n=3). Meanwhile Ahmed Shafik was framed (100%, n=3) by “conflict” frame only.

Mohamed ElBaradei was framed (100%, n=2) with “conflict” frame, and Hamdeen Sabahi was framed with “conflict” (57.1%, n=4), “responsibility” (28.6%, n=2), and “morality” (14.3%, n=1). The general Muslim brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie was framed equally with “conflict” frame (50.0%, n=4), “responsibility” frame (25%, n=2) and “morality” frame (25%, n=2), while khairat el Shater, the leading MB figure, was framed by “conflict” frame (75%, n=3) and “responsibility” frame equally (25%, n=1).

Amr Moussa was framed by “conflict” (50%, n=1), “responsibility” (50%, n=1), while Ayman Nour was framed (100%, n=1) by “conflict” frame, meanwhile Saad El-katatni was framed by “conflict” (100%, n=1). Hisham Qandil, the prime minister at that time, was framed by “conflict” (25.0%, n=4), “responsibility” with (43.8%, n=7), and “human interest” (12.5%, n=2) and “economic consequences” with (18.8%, n=3) Chi square was not test due to too many zeroes.

**Table 10: Frames used for each of the political figures**

Political figures	Frequency (%) of Frames					
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality	Total
<b>Mohamed Morsi</b>	39 39.8%	8 8.2%	30 30.6%	5 5.1%	16 16.3%	98 100%
<b>Mohamed Badie</b>	2 25%	0 0%	4 50.0%	0 0%	2 25%	8 100%
<b>Mohamed ElBaradei</b>	0 0%	0 0%	2 100%	0 0%	0 0%	2 100%
<b>Hamdeen Sabahi</b>	2 28.6%	0 0%	4 57.1%	0 0%	1 14.3%	7 100%
<b>Abdel Fattah El-Sisi</b>	9 75%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	3 25%	12 100%
<b>Amr Moussa</b>	1 50%	0 0%	1 50%	0 0%	0 0%	2 100%
<b>Khairat El Shater</b>	1 25%	0 0%	3 75%	0 0%	0 0%	4 100%
<b>Saad El-Katatni</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%
<b>Ayman Nour</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%	0 0%	0 0%	1 100%
<b>Hisham Qandil</b>	7 43.8%	2 12.5%	4 25.0%	3 18.8%	0 0%	16 100%
<b>Ahmed Shafik</b>	0 0%	0 0%	3 100%	0 0%	0 0%	3 100%
<b>Others*</b>	3 42.8%	1 14.3%	2 28.6%	0 0%	1 14.3%	7 100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b> <b>39.8%</b>	<b>11</b> <b>6.8%</b>	<b>55</b> <b>34.2%</b>	<b>8</b> <b>5.0%</b>	<b>23</b> <b>14.3%</b>	<b>161</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 10: distribution of frames 2 (Political figures)**

### ***Frames used by Liberal, Government, Islamist newspapers.***

The four newspapers were most likely to use both frames “conflict” and “responsibility” in portraying all the political forces. El-Horeya Wel-Adala used “responsibility” frame (39.0%, n=26), while used “conflict” (24.0%, n=16) from the total news items that have mentioned the political forces. Youm7 and AL-Masry El Youm used “responsibility” frame with (31.0%, n=86) and “conflict” frame (46.0%, n=126).

At the same time Al-Ahram used mostly the “conflict” frame to portray the political forces (46%, n=16), followed by the “responsibility” frame (43%, n=15), the “human interests” frame (9%, n=3), while the “economic consequences’ frame were the least used one in the newspaper (3%, n=1).


Both liberal independent and Islamist newspapers used Morality frame with high percentage of the coverage, Liberal independent newspapers used the morality frame (18.0%, n=49) from their total coverage of political forces and in a higher percentage than El-Horeya Wel-Adala (15.0%, n=10), while Al-Ahram didn’t use the “morality” frame in any of their coverage of the political forces.

“Economic consequences” were most likely to be used in the Islamist media (17.0%, n=11) while the same frame counts in the liberal newspapers was (1.0%, n=3), “Human Interest” was the least likely used frame in the Islamist newspaper (5.0%, N=3), while it scored a slightly higher percentage in the liberal newspapers (4.0%, n=12).



**Table 11: Distribution of Frames in the Islamist newspaper**


Political forces	Frequency (# of sheets) and %				
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala Newspaper Frames				
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality
Political parties	7 37.0%	0 0.0%	7 37.0%	1 5.0%	4 21.0%
Political movements	7 37.0%	0 0.0%	7 37.0%	2 11.0%	3 15.0%
Political figures	12 43.0%	3 11.0%	2 7.0%	8 28.0%	3 11.0%
<b>Total forces</b>	<b>26</b> <b>39.0%</b>	<b>3</b> <b>5.0%</b>	<b>16</b> <b>24.0%</b>	<b>11</b> <b>17.0%</b>	<b>10</b> <b>15.0%</b>



The liberal newspaper were more likely to use the “conflict” frame in their coverage (46%, n=126), “responsibility” came in the second place (31.0%, n=86), while “morality” frame came in the third place “(19.0%, n=49) from the total coverage. Both “human interest” and “economic consequences” frames scored very little percentage of the coverage respectively (4.0%, n=12) and (1.0%, n=3).

**Table 12: Distribution of Frames in the Liberal Newspapers**


Political forces	Frequency (# of sheets) and %				
	Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames				
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality
Political parties	4 16.0%	0	19 76.0%	0 0.0%	2 8.0%
Political movements	42 30.0%	7 5.0%	61 44.0%	2 1.0%	27 19.0%
Political figures	40 36.0%	5 4.0%	46 41.0%	1 1%	20 18.0%
<b>Total forces</b>	<b>86</b> <b>31.0%</b>	<b>12</b> <b>4.0%</b>	<b>126</b> <b>46.0%</b>	<b>3</b> <b>1.0%</b>	<b>49</b> <b>18.0%</b>




**Figure 11: Distribution of Frames in the liberal newspapers**

**Table 13: Distribution of Frames in Al-Ahram Newspaper**


<b>Political forces</b>	<b>Frequency (# of sheets) and %</b>					
	<b>Al-Ahram frames</b>					<b>Total</b>
	<b>Responsibility</b>	<b>Human interest</b>	<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Economics consequences</b>	<b>Morality</b>	
<b>Political parties</b>	2 50%	0 0%	2 50%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>4</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Political movements</b>	1 10%	0 0%	9 90%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>10</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Political figures</b>	12 57%	3 14%	5 24%	1 5%	0 0%	<b>21</b> <b>100%</b>
<b>Total forces</b>	<b>15</b> <b>43%</b>	<b>3</b> <b>9%</b>	<b>16</b> <b>46%</b>	<b>1</b> <b>3%</b>	<b>0</b> <b>0%</b>	<b>35</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 12: Frames of Political parties**



**Figure 13: Frames of political movements & pressure groups**



**Figure 14: Frames of the political figures**

## Distribution of frames in details

### A- Political parties

Table 14: Frames used by Islamist newspaper El-Horeya Wel-Adala

Political parties	El-Horeya Wel-Adala Newspaper frames					
	Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Economic Consequences	Morality	Total
<b>FJP</b>	3	0	1	1	2	<b>7</b>
<b>Al-Nour</b>	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Al-Wasat</b>	1	0	2	0	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Al Wafd</b>	1	0	1	0	2	<b>4</b>
<b>Strong Egypt</b>		0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Others</b>	1	0	2	0		<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>

Table 15: Frames of political parties used by the independent newspapers

Political parties	Youm7 & Al-Masry El Youm Frames					
	Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Economic Consequences	Morality	Total
<b>FJP</b>	1	0	5	0	0	<b>6</b>
<b>Al-Nour</b>	1	0	2	0	1	<b>4</b>
<b>Al-Wasat</b>	0	0	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
<b>Al-Masreyeen Al -Ahrar</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Al-Wafd</b>	0	0	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
<b>Strong Egypt</b>	0	0	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
<b>Others</b>	2	0	5	0	1	<b>8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>25</b>

**Table 16: Frames of political parties in Al-Ahram**

Political parties	Youm7 & Al-Masry El Youm Frames					
	Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Economic Consequences	Morality	Total
FJP	1	0	0	0	0	1
Al-Nour	0	0	0	0	0	0
Al-Wasat	0	0	0	0	0	0
Al-Masryeen Al -Ahrar	0	0	0	0	0	0
Al-Wafd	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strong Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0
Others	1	0	2	0	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>

**B- Political Movements and Pressure Groups**

**Table 17: Frames of movements and pressure groups in El-Horeya Wel-Adala**

Political movements and pressure groups	El-Horeya Wel-Adala Newspaper Frames					
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality	Total
Gabhet Al-Inqaz	1	0	3	0	0	4
MB	5	0	1	2	1	9
Tamarod	0	0	1	0	1	2
Gabhet Eldameer	0	0	0	0	0	0
6th of April	0	0	1	0	1	2
Salafists Daawa	0	0	0	0	0	0
Al-Gamaa Al Islamiyya	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abu Ismaiel supporters	0	0	0	0	0	0
The liberal forces in general	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Islamists forces in general	1	0	0	0	0	1
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>18</b>

**Table 18: Frames of movements and pressure groups in the independent newspapers**

Political movements and pressure groups	Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames					Total
	Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Economic consequences	Morality	
<b>Gabhet Al-Inqaz</b>	3	0	7	0	2	<b>12</b>
<b>Muslim Brotherhood</b>	24	7	21	2	13	<b>67</b>
<b>Tamarod movement</b>	7	0	8	0	2	<b>17</b>
<b>Gabhet El Dameer movement</b>	0	0	2	0	1	<b>3</b>
<b>6th of April movement</b>	0	0	1	0	1	<b>2</b>
<b>Salafists Daawa movement</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Al Gamaa Al Islamiyya</b>	2	0	2	0	1	<b>5</b>
<b>Abu Ismaiel supporters</b>	0	0	1	0	1	<b>2</b>
<b>The liberal forces in general</b>	3	0	7	0	4	<b>14</b>
<b>The Islamists forces in general</b>	3	0	8	0	2	<b>13</b>
<b>Others</b>	0	0	3	0	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>139</b>



**Table 19: Frames used by Al-Ahram newspaper**

Political movements and pressure groups	Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames					
	Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Economic consequences	Morality	Total
<b>Gabhet Al-Inqaz</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Muslim Brotherhood Group</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Tamarod movement</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Gabhet El Dameer movement</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>6th of April movement</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Salafists Daawa movement</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Al Gamaa Al Islamiyya</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Abu Ismaiel supporters</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>The liberal forces in general</b>	0	0	2	0	0	<b>2</b>
<b>The Islamists forces in general</b>	1	0	2	0	0	<b>3</b>
<b>Others</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>

## C- Political figures

**Table 20: Frames of Political forces in El-Horeya Wel-Adala**

Political figures	El-Horeya Wel-Adala Newspaper Frames					
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality	Total
<b>Mohamed Morsi</b>	9	2	1	4	3	<b>19</b>
<b>Mohamed Badie</b>	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Mohamed ElBaradei</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Hamdeen Sabahi</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Abdel Fattah El-Sisi</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Amr Moussa</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Khairat El Shater</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Saad El-Katatni</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Ayman Nour</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Hisham Qandil</b>	2	1	0	2	0	<b>5</b>
<b>Ahmed Shafik</b>	0	0	0	1	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Others</b>	0	0	0	1	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>28</b>

**Table 21: Frames of political figure in the independent newspapers**

Political figures	Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames					
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality	Total
<b>Mohamed Morsi</b>	23	4	27	1	13	<b>68</b>
<b>Mohamed Badie</b>	1	0	3	0	2	<b>6</b>
<b>Mohamed ElBaradei</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Hamdeen Sabahi</b>	2	0	4	0	1	<b>7</b>
<b>Abdel Fattah El-Sisi</b>	7	0	0	0	3	<b>10</b>
<b>Amr Moussa</b>	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>
<b>Khairat El Shater</b>	1	0	3	0	0	<b>4</b>
<b>Mohamed Saad El-Katatni</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Ayman Nour</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Hisham Qandil</b>	2	0	3	0	0	<b>5</b>
<b>Ahmed Shafik</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Others</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
Total	40	5	46	1	20	112

**Table 22: Frames used of political figure in Al-Ahram**

Political figures	Youm7 & Al Masry El-Youm Frames					
	Responsibility	Human interest	Conflict	Economics consequences	Morality	Total
<b>Mohamed Morsi</b>	7	2	2	0	0	<b>11</b>
<b>Mohamed Badie</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Mohamed ElBaradei</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Hamdeen Sabahi</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Abdel Fattah El-Sisi</b>	2	0	0	0	0	<b>2</b>
<b>Amr Moussa</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Khairat El Shater</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Mohamed Saad El-Katatni</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Ayman Nour</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Hisham Qandil</b>	3	1	1	1	0	<b>6</b>
<b>Ahmed Shafik</b>	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>
<b>Others</b>	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>21</b>

### ***Mentioning Political forces as source of framing***


This category examined how the different newspapers used political forces in framing other political forces, the category did not look into the normal practice of using political forces as general source of information but record them only in case they portrayed other political forces.

This variable was tested on all articles that framed the political forces, the results showed the following; the majority of articles did not use any political forces as source of framing (77.70%, n=87) against (22.30%, n=25) of the examined articles used political forces as source of framing other forces. Youm7 had the highest percentage of using the political forces as source in the framing (32.40%, n=11), El-Horeya Wel-Adala comes in the second place with (27.30%, n=6) and followed by Al-Masry El Youm with (15.40%, n=6), while Al-Ahram came at the last place (11.80%, n=2).

The Chi square = 4.459 (p=0.216) not significant indicating almost similar distribution of Yes and No for the four newspapers.

**Table 23: Political forces as a source of framing**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Frequency %</b>				<b>Total</b>
	<b>El-Horeya Wel-Adala</b>	<b>Youm7</b>	<b>Al-Masry El Youm</b>	<b>Al-Ahram</b>	
<b>Yes</b>	6 27.30%	11 32.40%	6 15.40%	2 11.80%	<b>25</b> <b>22.30%</b>
<b>No</b>	16 72.70%	23 67.60%	33 84.60%	15 88.20%	<b>87</b> <b>77.70%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b> <b>100.00%</b>	<b>34</b> <b>100.00%</b>	<b>39</b> <b>100.00%</b>	<b>17</b> <b>100.00%</b>	<b>112</b> <b>100.00%</b>



**Figure 15: Distribution of Political forces as sources**


#### **Using Political parties as source in framing other political forces**

The results showed that El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper used Al Wafd party as a source of framing other forces on the tops of its list (66.67%, n=2), and Freedom and justice party with (33.33%, n=1). While Youm7 used Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar and Al-Nour parties equally (50.00%, n=1) for each. AL-Masry Al-Youm used Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar party as a source (33.33%, n=2), while Al-Wasat party and Freedom and justice party (16.67%, n=1), Al-Wafd party, Strong Egypt party, and other party with the same percentage (16.67, n=1). At the same time Al-Ahram used Freedom and Justice party on the top of their source list with (50.0%, n=2) and Al-Wafd with (25.0%, n=1).


Chi square will be biased due to many zeros, and the number of responses are too small (15) mostly from Al-Masry Al -Youm and Al-Ahram newspapers (10 out of 15) .

**Table 24: Political parties as source of framing**

Political Parties	Frequency (%) of Newspaper name				Total
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry El Youm	Al-Ahram	
<b>FJP</b>	1 33.33%	0 0%	1 16.7%	2 50%	<b>4</b> <b>26.7%</b>
<b>Al-Nour</b>	0 0%	1 50%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>6.7%</b>
<b>Al-Masreyyeen</b>	0 0%	0 0%	2 33.3%	0 0%	<b>2</b> <b>13.3%</b>
<b>Al-Ahrar</b>	0 0%	0 0%	2 33.3%	0 0%	<b>2</b> <b>13.3%</b>
<b>Al-Wafd</b>	2 66.7%	1 50%	0 0%	1 25%	<b>4</b> <b>26.7%</b>
<b>Al-Tagamouee</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 16.7%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>6.7%</b>
<b>Al Tahalouf el Shaaby</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 16.7%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>6.7%</b>
<b>The Egyptian Democratic</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 16.7%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>6.7%</b>
<b>Others*</b>	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	1 25%	<b>1</b> <b>6.7%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>2</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>6</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>4</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>15</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 16: Distribution of Political Parties as sources**



**Figure 17: Distribution of Political parties as News sources**


***Political movements and pressure groups as source of framing other political forces***

El-Horeya Wel-Adala used Muslim Brotherhood only (100%, n=2) as source of framing, while Youm7 used Gahbet Al-Inqaz (20%, n=1), Muslim brotherhood group (20%, n=1), Tamroud Movement (40%, n=2) and Al-Dawa Al-Salafiya (20%, n=1), while Al-Masry El Youm used Muslim Brotherhood Group (60%, n=3), Tamarod (20%, n=1). Al-Ahram did not mention any of the political movement except Gahbet Ak-Inqaz (100%, n=1).




**Table 25: Political movements and pressure groups as source of framing**

Political movements and pressure groups	Frequency (%) of Newspaper name				Total
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry AL-Youm	Al-Ahram	
<b>Gabhet Al-Inqaz</b>	0 0%	1 20%	0 0%	1 100%	<b>2</b> <b>8.33%</b>
<b>Muslim Brotherhood</b>	2 100%	1 20%	3 60%	0 0%	<b>6</b> <b>50%</b>
<b>Tamarod movement</b>	0 0%	2 40%	1 20%	0 0%	<b>3</b> <b>25%</b>
<b>Salafists Daawa</b>	0 0%	1 20%	0 0%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>8.33%</b>
<b>Others*</b>	0 0%	0 0%	1 20%	0 0%	<b>1</b> <b>8.33%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>5</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>5</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>1</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>13</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 18: distribution of movements as framing sources**




**Figure 19: Distribution of Political movements and pressure groups as news sources**

***Political figures as a source of framing***


El-Horeya Wel-Adala used only Hisham Qandil as a source of framing (100%, n=1), while Youm7 used Mohamed Badie (14.29%, n=1), Mohamed ElBaradei (14.29%, n=1), Khaled Aly (14.29%, n=1) and Hisham Qandil (14.29%, n=1). Meanwhile Al-Masry El Youm used Mohamed ElBaradei (25%, n=1), Hamdeen Sabahi (25%, n=1), Amr Moussa (25%, n=1). While Al-Ahram did not use any of the political forces as a source of framing.

**Table 26: Political figures as a source of news**

Political figures	Frequency (%) of Newspaper name				Total
	El-Horeya Wel-Adala	Youm7	Al-Masry Al-Youm	Al-Ahram	
Mohamed Badie	0 0%	1 14.29%	0 0%	0 0%	1 8.33%
Mohamed ElBaradei	0 0%	1 14.29%	1 25%	0 0%	2 16.67%
Hamdeen Sabahi	0 0%	0 0%	1 25%	0 0%	1 8.33%
Amr Moussa	0 0%	0 0%	1 25%	0 0%	1 8.33%
Khaled Aly	0 0%	1 14.29%	0 0%	0 0%	1 8.33%
Hisham Qandil	1 100%	1 14.29%	0 0%	0 0%	2 16.67%
Others	0 0%	3 42.85%	1 25%	0 0%	4 33.33%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>7</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>4</b> <b>100%</b>	<b>0</b> <b>0%</b>	<b>12</b> <b>100%</b>



**Figure 20: Distribution of Political figures as source of framing**



**Figure 21: Political figures as source of framing**

### **Answering the research questions**

**There are two broad questions this study is trying to answer**

**RQ1: How were the political forces framed in *El-Horeya Wel-Adala*, *Youm7*, *Al Masry El Youm* and *Al-Ahram* newspapers' front pages coverage?**

### ***Conflict frame***

The “conflict” was the dominant frame for the three newspaper Al-Ahram, Youm7 and Al-Masry Al-Youm in framing the Political forces; the “conflict” frame referred to a high political tension between different political figures, parties, movements and ideologies, which was represented in the coverage of the political news.

By dividing the sampled newspapers into three main categories; liberal independent newspapers, Al-Masry Al-Youm, Youm7; Islamist partisan, El-Horeya Wel-Adala and state-run newspaper Al-Ahram, and by studying the frames of each group, the results showed that

the “conflict” frame was used on both level negative and positive sides. El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper framed the conflict between the different political parties from both views, the positive conflict from the side of the Muslim Brotherhood, the former president Mohamed Morsi, and other Islamist forces as being a tool to defend the interest of the country and respecting democracy. The newspaper framed the protests against the president and the political turbulences as a conflict between revolution and Mubarak, and had powerful headlines like “*Massive protest to protect Sharia or “the legitimacy of the democratic elected president”*” and framed the opposition protests as being a part of a conspiracy against the revolution.

While the liberal independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm framed the president speeches with “conflict” frame with main headline saying “Morsi’s speech increase the polarization and incite the revolution”, while calling at the same piece Morsi’s oppositions as “Revolutionaries” and Morsi’s supporters as “Islamist forces” who support only the president. Another news item at Al-Masry Al-Youm said “*The revolutionaries of Tunisia are back to the streets, and the Egyptians are getting ready to do the same*”.

Youm7 used “conflict” frame to portray all the political forces with powerful and bias words mainly in the headlines and with more decent coverages in the news bodies; as example “*Port Saied defeat the president decrees and the city is under the army control*” the headline in this piece for instance refers to the coastal city Port Said, allocated at the entrance of Suez Canal, which had witnessed violent protests at that time and the former president Mohamed Morsi issued a decree of continuous curfew in the city till it restored its order, while at the body of the news the coverage was totally different than the headline with a balanced way of stating what is really happening on the ground.

Al-Ahram used the “conflict’ frame to portray the political tension between the political forces and the president. The newspaper used the “conflict’ frame in mentioning the political movements, political figure, and the political parties in the examined article.

### ***Responsibility frame***

This frame can be used in both ways according to which subject the frame is related to in the coverage. This frame dominated the coverage in the four newspapers in portraying the political forces.

El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper used the “responsibility” frame in the majority of its examined coverage, the newspaper portrayed the Egyptian former president Mohamed Morsi, the “Freedom and justice party” and Muslim brotherhood group as being responsible political forces toward the national interests and the welfare of the state, also the same applies to other Islamist parties.

The news items at El-Horeya Wel-Adala were partially dedicated to show how the Islamist forces were politically responsible of protecting the people’s choices and contribute to the development of the national economy, headlines of the newspaper were often around the president’s achievements; for example, a main piece of news about Egypt water interests, its headline was “*Today...The president gives his speech to the national conference of protecting the Nile*” without mentioning the contribution of other political forces participating in the same conference.

Al-Masry El-Youm and Youm7 used the “responsibility” frame with a less percentage than the “conflict” frame, the highest percentage was framing the Islamist forces as one unit along with the Freedom and justice party and portraying the MB with “responsibility” frame. The headlines in certain cases hold a direct accusation to the Islamist political forces, for example Al-Masry Al-Youm headline “*An Islamist plan: the attack of the headquarter of*

*“Tamarod” movement and the coordination with collaborative media professionals*”.

Youm7 was likely to use stronger statement in their headlines and news pieces; for example, *“The continuation of the war of blood between MBs and their oppositions in all governorates”*.

While Al-Ahram use the “responsibility” frame in portraying the Islamist political forces including the Freedom and Justice party and the MB group, the newspaper used the frame is portraying the former president Mohamed Morsi and Hisham Qandil, the prime minister at that time. All the framings were in the positive direction. The only non-Islamist political figure that was portrayed by the “responsibility” frame was Abdel Fatah El-Sisi, the former defense minister and the current Egyptian president.

### ***Economic consequences frame***

This frame can be used in two sides, where the coverage using this frame were usually referring to either economical gain or loss.

El-Horeya Wel-Adala used the “economic consequences” frame mainly when speaking about the Freedom and Justice party, the Muslim Brotherhood Group, the Egyptian former president Mohamed Morsi, the former prime minister at that time “Hisham Qandil and their government as a whole; for example, four headlines around economic achievements were posted on one of the front pages along with Hisham Qandil photo speaking about different aspect of the economic progress.

While both liberal independent newspapers barely used the “economic consequences” in portraying Mohamed Morsi’s actions and his political party Freedom and Justice party and MB group; for example *“The petrol in the time of MB, we come to give Egypt the welfare”* this headline was on the top of one of the front pages of Al-Masry Al-Youm.



Although Al-Ahram newspaper's front pages dedicated a big percentage to the economic news, the newspaper did not use the "economic consequences" in framing the political forces except with Hisham Qandil who was framed one time with the economic gain of his policies.

### ***Human interest frame***

This frame was carefully examined as many categories of the coverage could be considered as "Human interest".

The four newspapers did not use this frame in portraying neither political parties nor movements, the only political figure who was portrayed with this frame in the front pages coverage was Mohamed Morsi.

### ***Morality frame***

This frame is usually used when the news coverage constructs moral judgments toward an issue, political figure or a candidate. This frame is very subjective due to the fact that morals can be interpreted in different ways.

"Morality" frame was used by El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper to frame the Freedom and Justice party, their political alliance at that time Al-Wafd party, The MB group and the former president Mohamed Morsi. While the negative use of the frame was directed to both Tamarod and 6<sup>th</sup> of April movements.

Both liberal independent newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm and Youm7 extensively used the "morality" frame in speaking about the majority of the political forces from both sides the Islamist and liberal forces. While the only two political figures who were framed continuously with "morality" frame were Mohamed Mosri and Abdel Fatah El Sisi. At the same time Al-Ahram did not use the "morality" frame in any of the examined coverage.

## **Conclusion of the used frames**

- A- Political parties: The “conflict” frame was dominant in framing the political parties, followed by the “responsibility” frame, followed by the “morality” frame and at the end came both the “economic consequences” and “human interests” frames.
- B- Political movements and pressure groups: The “conflict” frame also scored the highest percentage from the total coverage, while “responsibility” frame came in the second place, “morality” frame came at the third place, “human Interest” was at the fourth place and “economic consequences” frame was at the end of the list.
- C- Political figures: the “responsibility” frame scored the highest percentage in framing the political figures, in the second place came the “conflict” frame, while “morality” frame came in the third place and the “human interests” and the “Economic consequences” frames were at the end of the list.

## **RQ2: Which political forces were used as sources of news in framing other political forces?**

This question is examining another part of the political tension among the different political forces which is how newspapers used political forces to frame their political opponents or other political forces in general.

Only one quarter of the examined articles in the four newspapers used political forces as sources of framing other political forces, whether these forces were allies or opponents.

Yom7 newspaper marked the highest score in using political sources as sources of framing, followed by El-Horeya Wel-Adala, then Al-Masry Al-Youm and at the end came Al-Ahram.

Freedom and Justice and Al-Wafd political parties marked the highest score of acting as sources of framing other political forces. The Muslim Brotherhood members contributed with the high percentage of quotes among political movements and pressure groups, followed by Tamarod movement, Gabhet El-Inqaz and Salafist Dawaa. There was no proved relation between the ideological affiliation of the chosen political forces to frame others and between the ownership of the newspapers.

## VII. DISCUSSION

This study was conducted to explore how the political forces were portrayed in different newspapers during a crucial time in the Egyptian political history. The Study identified five frames to measure the coverage against; the responsibility, the conflict, the economic consequences, human interests and morality.

### *Opinion Vs. news*

The quantitative analysis showed that three out of the four examined newspapers have dedicated the highest percentage of coverage to the political news which are El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Youm7 and Al-Masry Al-Youm, While Al-Ahram dedicated the majority of its front pages' coverage to economic news, however, a further look at the news format used in the four newspapers' front pages showed that El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper used main headlines extensively on their front pages with a total of (32.20%, n=28). Furthermore, the type of the main headlines used by El-Horeya Wel-Adala was unique in the sense that it does not come with a news text, the headlines came as flash pieces of news by themselves and were not followed by regular news stories, which gave a big space to opinion and subjectivity in portraying the news.

Using headlines and side headlines is an opposite technique to the in-depth coverage and the regular format of news, where both news and reports must contain information and data. However, El-Horeya Wel-Adala, with its unique technique, was more into the direction to promote achievements or what were framed as achievements and create impressions toward the Islamist president and his government rather than practicing journalism.

At the same time, Al-Masry El Youm used the regular news format in more than 50% of their front pages' coverage. The newspaper had a constant way of dividing the front page into one to two main headlines, a main piece of news and the rest will be more likely to be

only news. The front page of Al-Masry El Youm was informative and has news about different aspects of the Egyptian scene with less opinionated items.

Youm7 front page was divided between different types of news format; however, the dominant format was the side headline of inside story, which has the similar problem of El-Horeya Wel-Adala that the headline of inside story is more likely to promote for certain political views without giving attention to the details of news. For example, the newspaper put two headlines for inside stories on the top of their front page; one was started with “Surprise” word and speak about the secret list of Gabhet el Inqaz in the parliamentary elections. While the second one was a direct question saying “Will people signatures return the army back to power?”

Al-Ahram as usual was loyal to its conservative school of coverage where the regular piece of news format was dominating the newspaper’s front pages. On the other side the newspaper dedicated a bigger space to the regional issues equal to the space the paper dedicated to the local politics. The way the newspaper handled the regional news showed an indication that the newspaper was working as a mouthpiece for the Islamist regime at that time, where the news held the same views of the Muslim Brotherhood toward the regional unrest, for example, calling the armed rebellions against both Libya’s and Syria’s governments “revolutionaries” could be seen as a political stance.

### *Defining the political situation*

Al-Ahram was the only newspaper that had a different distribution of news topics from the other three newspapers, the majority of the front pages’ coverage was dedicated to economic news while the three newspaper El-Horeya Wel-Adala, Youm7, Al-Masry Al-Youm directed the majority of their coverage to the local politics.

Al-Masry El Youm and Youm7 were closer to each other in defining the current situation at that time than both El-Horeya Wel-Adala and Al-Ahram; nevertheless, each of the four had their own definitions and analysis. The words “protestors” and “revolutionaries” were used to describe the opposition protests against Morsi in the liberal media while these protests were never mentioned in the Islamist media at that time, while the word “opposition” was used to describe the political forces protesting against Morsi in Al-Ahram.

For example, a main headline that was published in El-Horeya Wel-Adala on June 28<sup>th</sup>, days before the ousting of Morsi, came with no news story and stated “The aftermath of Morsi’s earthquake” referring to the speech he gave at that time. In comparison, Al-Masry El Youm put a headline “Morsi’s speech is dividing the nation and incite the revolution”, Youm7 chose a sarcastic headline to describe Morsi’s speech by highlighting a sentence that showed Morsi as a less smart leader “Morsi: I know who said what and why?”, while Al-Ahram had the most balanced headline “*Morsi’s speech caused more polarization: the supporters have a rally today while the oppositions are back to Tahrir square*”.

The two sides of the story were used by both Al-Ahram and Al-Masry El Youm’s main pieces of news, however, Al-Masry Al-Youm and as the political conflict escalated, divided the main piece of news into two main equal spaces and highlighted the current situation from both sides; the case was not the same with the headlines as the newspaper tended to portray the protesters as “revolutionaries” and referred to the Muslim Brothers and their alliances as Islamic forces in general.

The differences of coverage between the different types of Egyptian newspapers were also shown in Elmasry (2012); Hamdy & Gomaa (2012); ElKamel, (2013).

### *Economic news*

Economic news came in the first place in Al-Ahram coverage while it came as the second most important news to be portrayed in the other three newspapers' coverage; El-Horeya Wel-Adala was on the top of the list with (18.60%, n=16), which is too close to the political news percentage (20.90%, n=18). The newspaper fully supports the government's economic plans and efforts and highlighted the achievements on daily basis. El-Horeya Wel-Adala was the mouthpiece of the ruling party Freedom and Justice, and could be considered by the ownership type as the state media during Mubarak.

The importance of the economy news for the newspaper define how the FJP and their affiliated media were trying to prove that the president along with his government were achieving significant success on the economical side. The newspaper for example used a side headline to show the economic achievements of the Ministry of information headed by a leading figure of MB, the headline was a quote from the minister referring to achieving 89 Million of ads revenues without telling the readers what does that mean or without giving further information about it.

The importance of economic news was also shown in the coverage of Al-Ahram, the newspaper was highly positive in covering the local economic situation and had a main piece of news about the economical achievement in every examined front page.

While economic news was unlikely to appear in the front-page coverage of both Al-Masry El Youm and Youm7, the only published economic news were referring to crisis, the petrol shortage crisis for example dominated both newspapers coverage and the two pieces framed the MB rule as a direct responsible of such a shortage.

### ***Mentioning political parties and newspaper ownership***

More than half of the examined sample had mentioning of the different political parties identified by the study and other forces as well, the results showed that Freedom and Justice party was the highest mentioned political party in El-Hoerya Wel-Adala, which is expected, as the party owns the newspaper.

Al-Masry El Youm mentioned Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar party by the highest percentage among all other political parties. The newspaper had a board of owners, in which Naguib Sawiras is one of the shareholders and at the same time he is the founder of Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar political party, so maybe this relation was likely to contribute to the coverage of the party on Al-Masry El Youm front pages.

While Al-Masry El Youm mentioned the FJP as the rest of the political parties, El-Horeya Wel-Adala didn't mention Al-Masreyeen Al-Ahrar in neither of their coverage. Both Al-Wasat and Al-Wafd political parties were mentioned in El-Horeya Wel-Adala by the second-high percentage, both parties were political allies of the FJP. While Al-Masry Al-Youm mentioned equally the FJP, Al Nour, Al Wasat and strong Egypt political parties.

Al-Ahram was the least newspaper that mentioned political parties, the only mentioned party was the Freedom and Justice party, while the paper referred mainly to the other political parties as “oppositions”.

Youn7 mentioned both FJP and Al Nour parties equally with the highest percentage, never mentioned Al-Masreyeen El Ahrar, and mentioned both Al-Wafd and Strong Egypt equally and with less percentage.



### ***Political forces***

The main liberal pillars of June 30<sup>th</sup> scene were *Gabhet El Inqaz*, *Tamarod* movement, and the army against the Muslim Brothers, President Morsi and their allies. The main focus of El-Horeya Wel-Adala were the news of the Muslim Brotherhood organization and its members, while Gabhet el Inqaz was mentioned with a high percentage in the front pages of the newspaper, framing them as being the responsible of all the political unrest occurred in Egypt before June 30<sup>th</sup>.

At the same time and surprisingly both Al-Masry El Youm and Youm7 dedicated less percentage of news items to both Gabhet el Inqaz and Tamarod movements against the high percentage they give to MB news which dominated the two newspaper's front pages.

Mentioning the Islamist forces in general came at the first place in Youm7 while Al-Masry El Youm made a less generalization when covering the news of the Islamist camp. In comparison El-Horeya Wel-Adala never labeled the liberal political forces in general as "Liberal forces". In that sense the liberal media was likely to use more generalization when it comes to covering the Islamist forces than the Islamist media covering the liberal one.

Al-Ahram was the least likely to mention any political forces; with the least percentage of mentioning of the political forces, the newspaper was referring to the Islamist forces in general as the president supporters, and to the liberal forces as oppositions.

The Muslim Brotherhood was the main focus of the three newspapers in covering the news; even when Morsi was mentioned, his political party, which he was elected within, was outlined as well.

### ***Mohamed Morsi Vs Abdel Fatah El Sisi***

Mohamed Morsi was the highest mentioned political figures in the four newspapers, slightly more in El-Horeya Wel Adala, which is expected as he was the main political figure as the president and as a leading figure for the Muslim brotherhood.

Abdel Fatah El Sisi, the current Egyptian President and the Minister of Defense at the time of Morsi's rule was mentioned in the liberal newspapers and Al-Ahram many times with a "responsibility" frame. The relation between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood was discussed in an open way in the liberal media, where even a question whether the army will remove Morsi's regime in the near future was raised. While Al-Ahram put two identical headlines on two front pages of two different dates stating the El-Sisi is continuing to foster the level of the Egyptian army, the two headlines had no specific events.

In contrast, although El-Horeya Wel-Adala always mentioned the army as being the savior and the main arm of the nation, they never mentioned Abdel Fatah El Sisi in any of their coverage.

Although Mohamed El Baradei and Hamdeen Sabahi were framed at that time as being the main challengers to Morsi, the two liberal newspapers Al-Masry El Youm and Youm7 along with the governmental newspaper Al-Ahram did not give them great attention in the coverage, while El Sisi was promoted as the responsible political figure by a higher percentage of news in the three papers. In comparison El-Horeya Wel-Adala saw both ElBaradei and Ahmed Sahfiq as the main challengers of Morsi's post.

## VIII. Conclusion

The study was conducted to explore how the different newspapers framed the involved political forces that were engaged in the pre-June 30<sup>th</sup> political scene framed by the Islamist, liberal and government newspapers.

The study found that the four newspapers did not give a perfect example in separating their political affiliations and the coverage of the political situation, although Al-Masry El Youm presented a more professional way of tackling the news, it promoted also for certain political directions including endorsing the army interfering in the political process again.

The differences in the four newspapers' definitions of the current political situation at that time was a tool for political polarization more than serving the readers' interests. The dominant news format in many Egyptian newspapers, the flash headlines, should be eliminated from the news coverage, as it is a tool of mixing both opinions with news and creating impressions rather than creating awareness and spread knowledge.

The media in Egypt contributed to deepening the polarization and the conflicts between different groups in Egypt in the past and will continue to perform this task as long as the same techniques are used in the coverage and as long as the communicators and journalists will be submitted to the ownership restrictions and interests.

The independent media in Egypt needs to endorse their professional standards through continuous capacity buildings and through following code of conduct that will make the journalism practicing to not being affected by the owners' influence.

Free press is the main pillar for any development around the world and Egypt in its critical and important transitional period in 2016 needs a free and unrestrained press that can contribute to the overall national goals and serve the readers' rights of knowledge.

On the other side, it is crucial to have available national archive to preserve all the publications and protect it from being lost with all the important findings and data that could come out of it and it is crucial also that such archive will be in the hand of media persons or academics.

On the political side the study showed that Muslim Brotherhood group was considered as the main governor of Egypt and not Mohamed Morsi, as the four newspapers mentioned the MB in all types of conflict and political situations while the FJP, the ruling party, was not on the same level of importance. Also the former minister of defense Abdel Fatah El-Sisi was promoted and endorsed by the Egyptian media before June 30<sup>th</sup> to play a role in Egypt future.

### **Limitations of the study**

- 1- The study can not be generalized, as the Islamist sample El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper was not enough to understand the whole sphere of the political Islam and Media.
- 2- The other Islamist newspapers that contributed to the political conflict during Mohamed Morsi no longer exist in 2016. The Egyptian authorities closed the majority of the newspapers and media channels after the June 30<sup>th</sup> uprising.
- 3- The only time period found for the archive of El-Horeya Wel-Adala newspaper was limited to the early six months just right before June 30<sup>th</sup> and in only one place in Egypt which Dar El Kotob "The National archive of books"

- 4- The study wished to include Al-Nour newspaper, the official newspaper of Al-Nour Salafists Party or Al-Fath newspaper, another newspaper of Al-Nour Party, however, the researcher could not allocate any of their issues and by contacting Al-Nour Party for assistance there was no positive response in that sense.

### **Suggestions of Future research**

The Islamist media is still a big field to be examined, the full six months of El-Horeya Wel-Adala which exists at the Dar El Kotob “The National Archive of Books”, the official body of documentation, should be examined for more results and for understanding how the media contributed to the polarized situation at that time.

Also the effects of using these frames in the two types of newspapers can be examined thoroughly in a further study.

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## **Coding Sheet**

**Coder Name:**

**News item ID#**

**Date of the news item:**

**Newspaper Name**

1= El-Horeya Wel-Adala; 2= Youm7; 3=Al-Masry El Youm; 4=Al-Ahram

**Format of the News item**

1= Main headline; 2= Main Piece of News; 3= news; 4= Cartoon; 5= Opinion; 6= picture; 7=Headline of inside story; 8=Side Headline

**Primary topic of the News item**

1= Local Politics; 2= Local Economics; 3= Security situation; 4= Regional issues; 5=others

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*In case the News item is a picture, please answer the following question; if not skip the next question and continue coding.*

**Was any political forces portrayed in the picture? If not please skip this question and answer the following**

1=Yes; 2=No

**Was any political forces mentioned in the news item?**

1= Yes; 2=No

*if the answer to this question is “no” Skip the rest of the coding, if yes continue the coding process and answer the following questions.*

**Which political forces are mentioned?**

<b>Political forces</b>	<b>Mentioned</b>
Parties	
1= El-Horeya Wel- Adala Party	
2= AL- Nour Party	
3= Al-Wasat Party	
4= Al-Masreyeen Al Ahrar Party	
5= Al-Wafd party	
6= Al-Tagamouee party	
7= Strong Egypt party	
8= AL Tahalouf el Shaaby party	
9= The Egyptian Democratic party	
10=others ( )	
<b>Political Movements and pressure groups</b>	
11= Gabhet El Inaqz	
12= Muslim brothers group	
13= Tamaroud movement	
14= Gabhet el Dameer Movement	
15= 6 <sup>th</sup> of April movement	
16= Salafitsdawaa movement	
17= El Gamaa El Islamiya	
18= Abu Ismaiel supporters	
19= The liberal forces in general	
20= The Islamists forces in general	
21= Others	
<b>Political figures</b>	
22= The Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi	
23= The General MB guide Mohamed Badee	

24= Mohamed El Baradee	
25= Hamdeen Sabahi	
26= Abdel Fatah El Sisi	
27= Amr Moussa	
28= Refaat el Saied	
29= Mohamed Abou El Ghar	
30= Khairat el Shater	
31= Saad el Katatny	
32= Ayman nour	
33= KHALED ALI	
34= Hesham Kandil	
35= Ahmed Shafik	
36= Other ( )	

### What are the frames used for each of the mentioned political forces

What are the frames used for each of the mentioned political forces?					
The Political Parties					
	Primary Frame	Secondary frame	Frame 3	Frame 4	Frame 5
<b>1= El-Horeya Wel-Adala Party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>2= AL-Nour Party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict

	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>3= Al- Wasat Party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>4= Al- Masreyeen Al Ahrar Party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>5= Al-Wafd party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>6= Al- Tagamouee party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>7= Strong Egypt party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict

	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>8= AL Tahalouf el Shaaby party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>9= The Egyptian Democratic party</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>10=others ( )</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>Political Movements and pressure groups</b>					
<b>11= Gabhet El Inaqz</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>12= Muslim brothers group</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict

	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>13= Tamaroud movement</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>14= Gabhet el Dameer Movement</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>15= 6<sup>th</sup> of April movement</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>16= Salafitsdawa movement</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>17= El Gamaa El Islamiya</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict

	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>18= Abu Ismaiel supporters</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>19= The liberal forces in general</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>20= The Islamists forces in general</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>21= Others</b>					
<b>Political figures</b>					
<b>22= The Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>23= The General MB guide</b>	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility

<b>Mohamed Badec</b>	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>24= Mohamed El Baradee</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>25= HamdeenSa bahi</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>26= Abdel Fatah El Sisi</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>27= Amr Moussa</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>28= Refaat el Saied</b>	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility



	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>29= Mohamed Abou El Ghar</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>30= Khairat el Shater</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>31= Saad el Katatny</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>32= Ayman nour</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>33= KhaledAly</b>	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility	1= Responsibility

	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>34= Hesahm Kandil</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>35= Ahmed Shafik</b>	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality	1= Responsibility 2= Human Interest 3= Conflict 4= Economics consequences 5= Morality
<b>36= Others</b>					

**Was any of the political forces mentioned as a source of news and information and analysis concerning framing other political forces**

**1= Yes; 2=No**

**If No, please escape the next question and end the coding process**

**Which political forces were used as as source of news, information, and analysis related to framing other political forces.**

<b>Political forces</b>	<b>Mentioned</b>
<b>Parties</b>	
1= El-Horeya Wel Adala Party	
2= AL- Nour Party	
3= Al-Wasat Party	
4= Al-Masreyeen Al Ahrar Party	
5= Al-Wafd party	
6= Al-Tagamouee party	
7= Strong Egypt party	
8= AL Tahalouf el Shaaby party	
9= The Egyptian Democratic party	
10=others ( )	
<b>Political Movements and pressure groups</b>	
11= Gabhet El Inaqz	
12= Muslim brothers group	
13= Tamaroud movement	
14= Gabhet el Dameer Movement	
15= 6 <sup>th</sup> of April movement	
16= Salafitsdawaa movement	
17= El Gamaa El Islamiya	
18= Abu Ismaiel supporters	
19= The liberal forces in general	
20= The Islamists forces in general	
21= Others	
<b>Political figures</b>	
22= The Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi	
23= The General MB guide Mohamed Badee	
24= Mohamed El Baradee	
25= HamdeenSabahi	
26= Abdel Fatah El Sisi	
27= Amr Moussa	
28= Refaat el Saied	
29= Mohamed Abou El Ghar	
30= Khairat el Shater	
31= Saad el Katatny	
32= Ayman nour	
33= KhaledAly	
34= Hesham Kandil	
35= Ahmed Shafik	
36= Others	