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**THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO**

School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Egyptian Public Diplomacy:

Past Performance and Future Strategies

(Case Study)

A thesis submitted to

Department of Journalism and Mass Communication

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Art

By

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under supervision of

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Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Journalism and Mass

Communication

(Spring 2016)

Abstract

This study aims to explore whether the types of Egyptian public diplomacy, if any, follow strategies, content, and priorities of new public diplomacy by analyzing public diplomacy strategies followed by the two of main informational bodies in the Egyptian state: the State Information Service (SIS), and the public diplomacy division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The study advances a theoretical framework designed to help find a connection between strategies followed by public diplomacy institutions and agenda-building function of those institutions. The analysis reflected the lack of strategic planning in the two institutions to reach and influence foreign publics. Findings proposed that the main communication strategies in the SIS and MFA related to media relations and adopting reactive approaches to counter negative media coverage about the country in foreign media. A set of recommendations were introduced in a search for enhanced public diplomacy structure with more effective strategies to properly communicate with the international community.

Acknowledgement

To my advisor: I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Dr. Naila Hamdy of the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication at The American University in Cairo. The door to Dr. Hamdy's office was always open whenever I ran into a trouble spot or had a question about my research or writing. She consistently allowed this paper to be my own work, but steered me in the right the direction whenever she thought I needed it.

To my readers: I am using this opportunity to express my gratitude to Dr. Hussein Amin and Dr. Rasha Allam for supporting me throughout this study. I am thankful for their aspiring guidance, invaluable constructive criticism and friendly advice during the research work.

To the research participants: I would also like to thank the participants who were involved in the validation interviews for this research project. Without their passionate participation and input, the validation interviews could not have been successfully conducted.

To my beloved family: mom, dad, my lovely sisters and the man of my life: Thank you for reminding me every day that I can do it! This accomplishment would not have been possible without you. Your words of encouragement kept me going. Thank you for providing me with unending support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. To you I dedicate my success.

Manar Hussien Abd El-Wahed

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Chapter One

The Study Relevance and Significance

Across history, people around the world, in Africa, the Arab world, and even beyond oceans, have been fascinated with the prestigious history of Egypt, its cultural precedents, and its central role in human civilization and world trade. In the 1950s, Nasser's Egypt amazed the whole region by adopting an independent foreign policy that advocated great causes such as the Arab unity, national liberation, and anti-colonization movements in African countries, which fostered regional development and cooperation (Hamzawy 2010; Shama 2009). The rise of Egyptian soft power in that era was enough to prevail over the tripartite aggression carried out against Egypt in 1956, despite the huge differences between the aggregate of hard power capabilities of the three predators and that of the prey. Fifty years later, things have extremely reversed when the main question in Egyptian public discourse become: How to defeat Al-Jazeera. The leverage of a satellite television channel like Al-Jazeera, with minimum hard power capacities, that has over Egypt may embody the dramatic decline in Egyptian soft power over the past five decades (Shama, 2009).

In Simon Anholt's article on media and national image, the international advisor on nation branding and public diplomacy and the Creator of National Brands Index (NBI), put Egypt within the list of the thirty most well-known counties across the world. However, he categorizes it as a one of those countries that are well known, yet are not much admired, as they once enjoyed a high profile, and now they no longer deserve it (Anholt, 2009). However, the recent uprisings, including the two main revolutionary waves in January 2011, and June 2013 can provide a golden

chance for Egypt to regain its legacy as an iconic model for peaceful revolution and reform.

The story of Egyptian freedom fighters, who took to streets in thousands or maybe millions, in some narratives, two times in only three years, toppling two autocratic and theocratic regimes, respectively could impress the whole world for years to come. Nevertheless, a great story without great storytellers remains irrelevant, insignificant, and even subject to distortion.

Indeed, the worldwide media coverage of the Egyptian scene after the 30th of June revolution has illustrated the failure of the Egyptian state to present its own story to the international public opinion. The majority of foreign media presented one-sided narratives in which distorted and polarized coverage was evident (Shukrallah, 2013; Abou Bakr, 2013; Hamdy, 2015). The Egyptian media would have created more objective, balanced and honest coverage to counter West-supported Muslim-Brotherhood narrative. Egypt's diplomatic channels, informational agencies, and mainstream media have remained muddled, incompetent, and even defenseless in dealing with the misinformed, zealous coverage and interpretation of the events provided by a host of influential newspapers, TV networks, think tanks, and NGOs across the world.

Going beyond the 30th of June scene to address Arabs' inability to articulate their own story in more internationally recognizable terms and concepts, in a way that identify the strategic requisites of their nations' foreign policy, led to the absence of Arab narrative, except the Qatar-based Aljazeera. That can be one of the main reasons behind the ongoing biased and misguided western coverage of Middle Eastern issues and challenges. To illustrate, western media and experts are used to regarding things

through their subjective perspectives, personal interests, and above all prejudices. For the international community, it is not comprehensible, or even favorable to see such quick popular uprising of million of Muslims against what is so-called “moderate Islamic regime”, after only one year in office. The post-9/11 Western narrative is based on the notion that Islam is the dominated identity of Muslim aggregates, and the main paradigm to understand their political, social, and cultural norms and behavior (Shukrallah, 2013). That is why American policy makers and their Western allies have favored the up-and-coming Islamic regimes over the semi-secular Police States that has proven to be incompetent and even weak in dealing with the growing bodies of terrorism across the region. Therefore, no one can accuse them of intentionally wanting to harm Egypt. However, the main question remains what about the Egyptian narrative; the story of the Mediterranean country that has at least a triple identity; the Arab, African and Muslim populations; and the Middle Eastern center of culture and civilization? If the real identity of Egypt, including its complex social structures, intellectual diversity, dynamic agencies, popular arts and pioneers of Islamic modernism, have been efficiently communicated and presented to international public opinion, would have the 30th of June scenario been easily expected or at least understood once it happened? Simply said, if foreign publics across the world had heard before about the longstanding, famous Egyptian proverb stating that "with every hour devoted to your God, make another one for yourself", they would have understood the uniqueness of the Egyptian society, and their governments would have definitely changed their position toward the changes occurring in Egypt.

To emphasize the power of international publics and its impact on the fate of nations, Simon Anholt (2006) suggests, "The only remaining superpower is

international public opinion". How a country perceived and projected by foreign publics in other countries can affect a country's standing in the international market, and global affairs, as well as its mutual relations with other countries. The need for countries to cultivate and convey a positive image to the rest of the world has been always a major component of government agendas. Public diplomacy that targets minds and hearts of foreign populaces has been common practice of many governments around the globe, especially in the Western sphere. In developed countries, public diplomacy has entered a phase of institutionalization and full-scale development through well-organized government structures, long-term strategies, and well-designed programs and activities as well as stable budget allocations. There is growing literature body on American public diplomacy, its strategies, practices and implications through different times: during and after cold war, after 9/11 events, etc. (Browne 1976; Cull 2008; Rosenberg 2006; Satloff 2004). Europeans and others utilize public diplomacy strategies and activities to improve their economy, promote their cultures and achieve foreign policy goals. By virtue of its capacity to address a great number of cross-culture threats, and opportunities, public diplomacy becomes a communication instrument widely used in governance and international relation. George (2008) states that "public diplomacy is used by states, and non-states actors to understand, engage, and influence foreign public on wide range of issues related to promotion of values and identities, conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence, governance and democracy, even economic growth and distribution of goods and services."

The Significance of The Study

This study makes significant contribution to the research of public diplomacy in a non-western context by filling the gap in the literature that focuses mostly on the

practice of public diplomacy in western world in which Arab countries are usually addressed as target rather than advocate nation. In fact, a review of public diplomacy literature highlights a relative scarcity in academic writings discussing public diplomacy in developing countries. When it comes to public diplomacy scholarship, most of developing countries fall at the receiving ends; as target rather than advocate countries (Glal 2010; Douglas& Neal 2013). Few studies focus on the practical relevancy of public diplomacy and soft power utilization in developing countries in general, and the Middle East in particular (Khakimova 2013; Mouawad 2013; Ndoeye 2009).

Nevertheless, the recent developments linked to the Arab Spring, raise questions about Arabs' capacity to create their own narrative, cultivate a positive image, and develop a new approach to communicate with the international community. The thesis will tackle this issue by reflecting on the current status of Egyptian public diplomacy, its institutions, strategies, and activities, as well as challenges and potentials of its applicability. The main purpose of the study is to explore whether the types of Egyptian public diplomacy, if any, follow strategies, content, and priorities of new public diplomacy that keep pace with what materializes in the new globalized world, in which information and communication technologies dramatically change the international arena, or not. This study is considered an empirical study aiming at strengthening the efficiency of public diplomacy practices and institutions in Egypt.

Chapter Two

Theoretical Framework

Public diplomacy scholarship lacks a solid theoretical structure to direct research and practice. Most writings on public diplomacy focus on analyzing and evaluating strategies and practices, along with addressing shortcomings and making recommendations, without clear theoretical guidance (Satloff, 2004; Leonard, 2002; Snow & Taylor, 2009; Melissen, *et al*, 2005). Few researchers attempt to theorize and conceptualize public diplomacy (Entman, 2008; Gilboa, 2008). This study advances a theoretical framework designed to help find a connection between strategies followed by public diplomacy institutions and agenda-building function of those institutions. In other words, the effectiveness of the public diplomacy strategies followed by an advocate country determine its capacity to transfer the salience of issues and could deduce from its own agenda to the agenda of the media, public agenda, and eventually policy agenda in a target country.

In the following section, literature on agenda building and previous studies that offer evidence of the linkage between agenda-building and public diplomacy will be reviewed.

Agenda building

Unlike agenda setting that focuses on the transfer of issue salience from media to public (McCombs 1993), agenda building represents the reciprocal influence among policy makers, media and public (Lang & Lang 1983). Agenda building provides a theoretical framework to explain issue formation, transfer, and exchange processes among different social forces in a society. Beyond the agenda-setting effect

that explains media influence on public opinion, agenda building goes far to determine who sets media agenda, which reflect the distribution of power and values in the society (Gandy1982). The concept of agenda building is more sophisticated than agenda-setting hypothesis; as it explains several stages in which the salience of issues are formed and transferred. Cobb and Elder (1972) divided the agenda-building process into three steps: issue creation, issue expansion, and agenda entrance. Lang and Lang (1983) decided to study the Watergate crisis beyond agenda-setting effect to propose a six-step model of agenda building. The model is as follows: (1) the press, which highlights certain issues and brings those issues to the center of the scene; (2) the obtrusiveness of issues, which determines the amount of coverage each issue need to attract public's attention, meaning that the less direct experience the public receives with a given issue, the more extensive the coverage on that issue is need to attract the public's attention; (3) issues must be framed into certain meanings, which give the public certain understanding of those issues; (4) the language used by media influence public perception: each word has its own connotation, positive or negative; (5) issues must be symbolized: symbols work as cogitative bases that help people to decide which side they take or affiliate themselves with on a given issue or topic; Lastly, (6) agenda- building function works better and the importance of an issue reaches its momentum when famous and credible individuals start to appear as supporters of the cause/claim.

Like agenda setting, agenda building has two levels (Denham 2010; Cheng 2014). The first level of agenda building is about transfer of issue salience from one agenda to another. The second level focuses on the attributes of a given issue, which include two dimensions a substantive one and an affective one. The substantive dimension describes the aspect of a given issues that an agenda builder decides to

select and highlight. The affective dimension refers to the connotation of the selected aspects, whether it is positive, negative, or neutral.

Denham (2010) identified three types of Agenda building studies: policy agenda building, media agenda building, and public agenda building. Undeniably, the term “agenda building” has emerged for the first time in a study of policy agenda, to describe groups’ efforts to transfer issues from their own agenda to those of policy makers (Cobb& Elder, 1971). However, what is unique about agenda-building studies is that the position of media content, policy makers, and public opinion has been altered across the literature as independent or dependent variables. For example, some studies positioned media content as an independent variable, as in the case of investigative reporting (Ettema& Glasser, 1998; Feldstien 2007), while others investigated influences on media content, as a dependent variable, as in the studies of information subsidies and government communications (Eshbaugh-Soha& Peak, 2005; Curtin 1999; Cohen 1995; Kiouisis, Kim, McDevitt& Ostrowski, 2009). In the term of media influence on policy agenda, Bennet (1980) described policy agendas as "the range of social values that receive legitimization through media coverage over the long period of time".

On the other hand, media agenda building studies explain the ongoing negotiations between media personnel and their sources of information over media content (Berkowitz, 1994; Reich, 2006). Denham (2010) argued that news production is a subjective process that frequently influenced by sources that may have competing interests. In fact, news sources are just one of many factors influencing media contents. Other sources could include individual characteristics and beliefs of journalists, news organizations’ culture and constrains, journalistic routines, and professional values (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). However, this study focuses on the

influences outside news organizations, most specifically, the role of information providers in agenda building. This research aims to address the framework, in which an information provider is positioned as a media agenda builder or in certain cases as a direct public agenda builder through bypassing mass media.

Some scholars view public agenda building studies, the third type of agenda building, as merely agenda setting research, which focus on transfer of issues salience from media agenda to public agenda (McCombs, 2004) however, public agenda building explains public behavioral response to any type of communicative strategies including interpersonal and mass communication (Denham, 2010). That may clarify why addressing public diplomacy strategies, which include a variety of communication types like monologues, dialogues, mass media and networking, within agenda building rather than agenda setting, is more effective and explanatory. Denham (2010) suggested that "hot-button" issues are formed through a combination of mass and interpersonal communication, which offer groups and issue entrepreneurs opportunities to act. Actually public attention has been viewed as a scarce resource, which always raises a question about "how mass audience become aware" in public agenda building literature (Hilgartner& Bosk, 1988; Stimson, 1991; Matthews, 2009; Lang&Lang,1983). In public agenda-building efforts, some scholars highlighted traditional strategies such as door-to-door canvassing, designated speakers in public settings (Howard, 2006), while others emphasized more advanced systematic approaches such as using internet technology, like distributing e-mails, and social networking sites (Williams& Trammell, 2005).

Public Diplomacy and International Agenda Building

According to McClellan (2004), public diplomacy has been described as *"The strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural, educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country that will enable the target country's political leaders to make decision that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives"*. This definition emphasizes the attempts of an advocate country to influence public opinion and foreign policy of a target country through a variety of informational, cultural and educational programs. Certainly, information and influence have been always the most prominent dynamics in public diplomacy literature. Kelley (2012) suggested, "Information provides audience with a set of issues to think about, while influence tells them how to think about those issues". This process involves the two levels of agenda building and extends them to the international context. Similarly, Albritton and Manheim (2006) argued that the designation and manipulation of information settings can positively influence public opinion, which may turn into a political advantage.

Recent studies on public diplomacy and international public relations have investigated the capacity of foreign countries to promote their agenda and cultivate favorable images in other countries through public relation campaigns and information subsidies (Zang& Cameron, 2003; Kiouisis&Wu, 2008; Curtain&Gaither, 2004). Agenda building has been utilized as a theoretical framework to study public diplomacy efforts of different counties in their attempt to influence foreign publics and to cultivate positive image as well as promote polices. For example, Kiouisis and Wu (2008) explored the first- and second-level agenda building influence by investigating the effect of international public relations on United States' news media

and American publics' perception of foreign nations. They used a triangle method by comparing Public Relation Counsel for foreign nations, media content in the New York Times, public opinion data. The researcher found that there was a weak correlation between public relation efforts and media coverage in the term of object salience and substantive attributes, and a noteworthy linkage between media coverage and salience of affective attributes. They concluded that public relations efforts of foreign nations decrease the negative media coverage of those nations, which decrease negative perceptions and attitude toward foreign nations. Kiouisis and Wu (2008) emphasized the role of public relation counsel in establishing more favorable public opinion toward foreign nations. Similarly, Cheng (2014) tested the two levels of agenda building influence in the context of a mediated public diplomacy by comparing the news coverage of the President Xi Jinping from the Xinhua News Agency, the Chinese government-controlled news agency, and the elite US news outlets. In a study on the competition over international agenda building, Sheafer and Gabay (2009) found that the cultural and political consistency between the advocate and the target country is a major determinant in the success of the first in promoting its agenda in the media of the second. In addition, targeted media and government play an active role in public diplomacy process. The researchers found that the capacity of the advocate government to initiate an agenda that is consistent with the media's values and the government's agenda in the target country not only increases its control over the agenda whose issues raised by the media, but also guarantees more access to the media with more opportunities to show its positions. According to Sheafer and Gabay (2009), public diplomacy is a very complicated process, in which different advocate countries (rival actors), targeted media and governments are competing to influence international agenda to their advantage. In turn, Curtin and

Gaither (2004) stressed the importance of culture considerations in international agenda building. In their study on international agenda building in cyberspace, the researchers addressed the inability of Arab government English-language websites to influence international publics as they failed to meet the needs and expectations of those audiences. Most news releases on such websites did not follow the Western media standards in their usage of articulating norms, news values and language (Curtin& Gaither, 2004). For example, the literal translation of Arabic information products generates run-on sentences full of adjectives, which is inconsistent with Western cultures that demands direct, clear, explicit information (Zaharna 1995).

Based on the above evidences from previous studies, investigating public diplomacy strategies within agenda-building framework will help address the reciprocity and interdependency between a political actor on one side, and targeted media, audiences and government of a foreign nation on the other side. Public diplomacy process involves the three types of agenda building: information providers in an advocate country aiming to influence media agenda in a target country by taking advantage of agenda-setting function of mass media to influence public agenda, which in turn influences policy agenda to the advantage of the advocate country. However, this process is not that systematic, and its steps are replaceable. For example, information and communication technologies have recently allowed information providers to bypass media gatekeepers and engage directly with foreign publics (Curtin& Gaither, 2004).

This study focuses on the role of public diplomacy institutions, which serve as information providers, in international agenda building. This process is defined as

strategic actions by those institutions that try to promote their government agenda in order to influence international public opinion and turn international policy to the advantage of their country. Accordingly, each strategic action of public diplomacy must have an agenda-building function. The study advances such framework to explore and evaluate Egyptian public diplomacy strategies followed by the SIS and the Spokesman Office in the MFA.

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Chapter Three

Literature Review

Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is an interdisciplinary concept that falls at crossroads among several fields including international relation, media studies, public relation, and marketing (Gilboa, 2008). It presents an innovative pattern for dynamic interactions among government, media, and public opinion (Soroka, 2003). Unlike traditional diplomacy that relies on government-to-government communications, public diplomacy has emerged as a mechanism to inform, engage, and influence foreign publics (Abou Zeid, 2011). Hocking (2004) indicates that traditional diplomacy is secret, inapproachable, and hierarchal, while public diplomacy is open, outreaching and non-hierarchal. In order to reach its target audiences, public diplomacy uses public platforms including international media, cultural centers, universities, and public relation firms, etc. According to Tuch (1990), public diplomacy is "*a government's process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies*". In his article on the communications pyramid of public diplomacy, McClellan (2004) goes beyond this definition. He argued that the overarching goal of public diplomacy efforts is to convince the target country's policy makers and leaders to take the positions, and make the decisions that support the advocate of country's foreign policy objectives. According to him, public diplomacy is "*the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural, educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country that will enable the target country's political leaders*

to make decision that are supportive of advocate country's foreign policy objectives"(McClellan, 2004). Undeniably, he builds his definition of public diplomacy based on the premise that domestic public opinion in a country is a considerable determinant in foreign policy making process in this country, which represent a major dynamic in democracy. Therefore, the more democratic a target country is, the more productive the public diplomacy of an advocate country will be. McClellan also argues that, any public diplomacy strategy must be goal-oriented and policy-focused, with short-term and long-term objectives. Equally, Leonard (2002) proposes, "*public diplomacy is not simply delivering message to an audience; it about getting a result*".

On the other hand, effective public diplomacy needs collective efforts of a whole society including the concerned state organizations, hand in hand with NGOs, private sector, mass media, even individual initiatives. The involvement of non-governmental actors can give an edge of credibility, which government officials lack by nature of their job, to public diplomacy initiatives (Riordan, 2004). While people often tend to question government-affiliated information in general and information provided by foreign governments in particular, NGOs like Amnesty or Oxfam have a prestigious legacy for independence-therefore credibility- that can be efficiently utilized in transnational persuasion.

Accordingly, one of the most workable definitions of "new public diplomacy" can be the collective efforts of a sending country including government and non-government actors, through a well-established strategy with a concrete agenda, to create favorable public opinion in a receiving country, which will reflect positively in the government's positions and decisions in the receiving country, in way that support the sending country's foreign policy. Such collective efforts can be operationally

defined as transnational persuasive communication mechanisms to inform, engage and influence foreign publics including promoting news stories in international broadcasts, writing op-eds and making interview in local press of a receiving county, free publications, cultural events, trade fairs, exchange programs, listening tours, and language classes, undergraduate and graduate scholarships, and research grants, etc. On the other hand, foreign policy goals, in the context of public diplomacy, vary from convincing a country to sign a political agreement or trade arrangement, form a political or military alliance, participate in a peacekeeping mission, and vote for a United Nations resolution. This mechanism can be mobilized to establish good reputation, promote favorable images, and attract investors and tourists. In general, public diplomacy can be one of a country's tools to secure national interests, create a powerful voice in the global sphere, and eventually find an indispensable role in the regional and international system.

In the following section, a review of the historical evolution of public diplomacy practice will be introduced, placing emphasis on the role of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in engineering American public diplomacy during the cold war, as well as the major developments that may influence public diplomacy practices and strategies in the post-Cold War world.

Public Diplomacy and the Historical Role of the USIA

Public diplomacy, in theory and practice, started to capture the attention of academic, diplomatic, and media circles during the Cold War period when the conflict between the US and the former Soviet Union dominated the international scene. The battle between the two superpowers was beyond the military and economic aspects. The ideological contest, democracy versus communism, was at highest level of

significance during that period. In such time, winning the hearts and minds of people around the world was a principle weapon in this so-called cognitive battle. Both countries utilized public diplomacy practices, primarily international broadcasting, to promote favorable image and create a positive attitude toward their ideologies and demeaning that of the rival ideology (Gilboa 2008; Rasmussen 2009).

During the cold war, the role of the United States Information Agency (USIA) was crucial in promoting American values, and advocating U.S. policies around the globe. Under the Slogan "To Tell America's Story to the World", the USIA was established in 1953 by the Eisenhower administration. The main reason behind its establishment was to counter the Soviet propaganda and communicate American identity, culture and policies overseas within the portrayal of "superiority". Caterini (1973) identified the three major givens that led to the creation of the USIA: (1) the Smith-Mundt Act that was passed in 1948 to authorize overseas information programs and culture engagements, which portrayed the Communist ideology and the Soviet propaganda as an existential threat to the American nation; (2) The speech of President Truman "Campaign of Truth" in 1950, that addressed the U.S. need for more effective information operation; (3) The rising number of communist people in the U.S. government of that time created the urgency to establish a new body to stop such communist missionary and persuade American people that the US government was working for better world.

The United State Information Agency was the largest full-service public relation organization and propaganda apparatus in the world, with wide network of posts overseas and a two-billion annual budget (Snyder 1995). According to Cull (2008), five key trajectories featured the USIA activities, initiatives and information programs across four decades of its Cold War career:

- 1) **Advocacy:** The advocacy function dominated the USIA works since its establishment. The main duty of the agency was to advocate American culture and values, and articulate the U.S. policies and values in understandable and persuasive denotations for foreign cultures. The USIA played a critical role in many advocacy campaigns promoted by the American government during the Cold War. The agency focused mainly on the theme of civil rights and the Vietnam War and worked hard to turn the Watergate scandal into a civics lesson for the world. It strongly promoted American message of human right during Carter era, and gained wide support for Afghan-fighters during the Soviet-Afghan war. Across its history, the USIA utilized diverse advocacy tactics including building libraries and information centers overseas, setting up exhibits around the world to portray the American lifestyle, producing anti-communist films, publishing magazines, and establishing TV networks that reached many countries across the globe.
- 2) **Listening:** The importance of the USIA listening function changed across with the changing of U.S. administrations. Some presidents, like Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy and Carter, considered the USIA evolution of international mode and public opinion polls and analysis as essential in order to incorporate its feedback into policy-making processes. On the contrary, other presidents, namely Johnson and Nixon, denied the significance of the USIA feedback and limited its role in forming the U.S foreign policy in which the directors of agency lost their seat at the National Security Council. Generally speaking, although the USIA developed many internal mechanisms, such as the USIA's World Poll, the Office of Research and Intelligence, and the Soviet Propaganda Alert, to listen to foreign audiences and measure their attitudes and perception on given issues, The U.S.

government conceived of the agency as approach to address the world rather than an instrument to comprehend it.

3) Cultural Diplomacy: It is true that the USIA never had full commitment to the cultural diplomacy, as the cultural component was not the focus inside the advocacy-driven agency. For some, the cultural engagement should have done for its own sake apart from propaganda and advocacy works. However, the USIA, in coordination with other agencies like the state department's cultural office, put some investment in cultural projection. The USIA strongly promote American studies to be a discipline in many schools and universities around the world. The agency engaged in many cultural activities including the operation of cultural canterers overseas and the strategic translation of certain works in key target languages. The USIA coordinated with the poplar cultural industry, particularly Hollywood to widen its reach circles abroad. However, the agency used to sell off its involvement in overseas cultural activities as an attempt to fill the gap left by commercial U.S. popular culture.

4) Exchange Diplomacy: By virtue of its long-range impact, the exchanges have been identified as one of the most effective public diplomacy instruments. The USIA worked as a bridge among exchange organizations and partner universities in the U.S., on one side, and the target countries on the other side though it is overseas posts and offices. The agency staff in the field started to manage the exchange program under the 1961 Fulbright-Hey Act, which reinforced the educational exchange activities incorporating them within the U.S public diplomacy structure. However, the practice of exchanges during the cold war did not reflect the reciprocal nature of such programs that should have based on mutual learning and reciprocal communication. Instead, the exchange programs

were integrated into the Cold-War advocacy and propaganda apparatus. Its key target was to persuade foreign visitors and students with the superiority of the American way. The Foreign Leader Program, later known as the International Visitor Program, was one of the most successful exchanges of that era as it brought over 100,000 rising stars to America including nearly 200 presidents or heads of states.

5) International Broadcasting: Although the USIA never had full control over the U.S. international broadcasting, particularly Voices of America (VOA), the relation between the USIA and the VOA was a tug of war, in which the broadcasting service was pushing for its independence and objectivity and the agency was insistent and pushing for more politicized content to serve advocacy purposes. However, during the Cold War, the VOA was viewed as "the U.S. ideological arms of anticommunism aiming to win allies while it attempted to undermine the Soviet Union and other communist nations" (Krugler, 2000). The element of propaganda was evident in the works of the international broadcasting service that was created to provide news and information about the American life and the U.S.'s policies in more than forty language as the VAO's key target audiences were the USSR republics and Eastern Europe. On its side, the USIA tried to justify its struggle, to acquire more control over news and information disseminated by the VOA, as a practice of public diplomacy.

The USIA was dissolved by the 1998 Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act and integrated its functions into the State Department. Nakamura (2010) suggests that the main motives behind this dissolution were the end of Cold War, and the need for enhancing the U.S. public diplomacy. Despite the USIA was widely viewed as a

tool for propaganda and a mere advocacy-driven agency, the agency has always represented an important stage in the development of public diplomacy across history.

Public Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World

Some scholars, including Fukuyama(2006), argued that the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had led to the so-called "End of History", in which the US version of the truth including democracy, liberal economy, and American globalized culture became dominant, as the world has transformed from bipolarity to unipolarity, with the U.S. as the pol. However, the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of the ideological struggle among rival ideas. New global systems have emerged and generated its own political and communication dynamic. Zaharna (2007) determines three main developments, from a communication perspective, that may influence public diplomacy strategies in the post-Cold War world:

First, the absence of the bipolar context has complicated the cross-nation communication environment, making transnational advocacy more challenging. During the Cold War, information dissemination and messaging production were the central components of public diplomacy; the one with more information and message that is more persuasive could dominate and frame the political debate and effectively isolate and/or discredit the other. The communicative power of "us versus them "has lost its persuasive value in the new multi-polar context.

Second, culture has become an integral part in the international relation dynamics. The rise of culture as means for defining national identity and framing political conflict has been illustrated by the Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilization" theory and other political and communication scholarship following the

end of Cold War. The interdependent relation between culture and communication shapes the production of message by a political sponsor and the perception of that message by societies. Cultural assumptions and prejudices serve as invisible frames that influence how political entities design messaging content and style, and how populaces interpret them. Accordingly, information production and dissemination have become more challenging as messaging has become more vulnerable to cultural distortions, misinterpretations, and misapprehensions.

Third, the emergence of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has a vast impact on communication dynamics in the international political arena. While the emergence of printing technologies is accompanied by the rise of the nation-state, the new technologies of digital media and electronic communication create a new world order in which non-state actors, including business corporations, NGOs, interest groups, and prominent individuals, emerge as new communication players taking part in the global battle over hearts and minds of the international audience, along with traditional states. Moreover, the interactivity and connectivity of new media have blurred the barriers between message producers and recipients creating a new communication dynamic in which the focus has shifted from message content to message exchange. Several developments have merged the rise of new media, such as non-territorial communities, virtual worlds, multiple identities, and nonexclusive jurisdictions, which may alter the rule of the games in international relations, and definitely influence public diplomacy strategies and transnational advocacy mechanisms in such globalized world (Deibert, 1997).

In such a globalized system, the practice of public diplomacy is not a matter of luxury, but it is a necessity for survival. Each state should locate its technique to secure national interests and gain political influence for better functioning in such a

highly competitive environment over international agenda building. In a study about why states practice public diplomacy, Rasmussen (2009) concludes that public diplomacy is no longer exclusive practices of western countries and great powers. Various models and patterns of public diplomacy have been utilized by different countries, regardless the number of embassies a state have abroad, the numbers of years a state have acquired a full membership in the UN and other international organizations, even the degree of the democratic consolidation in a state. Norway provides a vivid example. It has a population of only five million people, speaking a dead language, lacks strategic location or globalized culture, is not a hub for international organization or transnational corporations, and is not a member of European Union. Nevertheless, it has successfully acquired a prestigious status in the international community by branding itself as a peace broker, in spite of limitations due to its size, population, and resources (Leonard, 2002). The country has engaged in many peace activities including conflict mediation in Middle East, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, financial aids, frequent participation in peace-keeping missions, and funding post-conflict activities, such as sponsoring International Cairo Conference on Reconstruction Gaza hosted by Egypt in October 2014. Norway shows how a small country can utilize its diplomatic leverage to enhance its role and appearance in the global sphere.

In the following section, a review of the relation between public diplomacy and soft power will be introduced by providing different perspectives on the linkage between the two concepts.

Public Diplomacy and Soft Power

The relationship between public diplomacy and soft power has developed as a rising dynamic in international politics to set the global agenda and frame the public debate in the international community. From Joseph Nye's perspective, public diplomacy is a government communication instrument to attract and influence foreign publics through effective utilization of soft power resources (Nye, 2008). In other words, the goal of public diplomacy is to mobilize those potential resources through various strategies including broadcasting, promoting cultural products, setting exchange programs, and so forth. Nye (2004) has categorized soft power resources into three main assets: attractive culture, credible political values and legitimate foreign policies. According to him, the communicative capacities of public diplomacy strategies rely on the attractiveness and persuasive values of these resources. Without soft power resources, public diplomacy efforts become useless, and even counterproductive.

Soft power has been defined as power of attraction whose ability to seduce rather than coerce can help a country to get preferred outcomes in world politics. If a country is viewed globally as an iconic model with attractive culture, values and policies that are legitimate and moral, other countries may follow its policies, patterns and structures due to admiration rather than fear. Through shaping preference of others, countries can facilitate their interests in International arena and turn any global policies to their political advantage (Nye, 2008). However, some scholars question the softness of that power of attraction. For example, Ferguson (2003) discredits the soft aspects in the spread of goods and ideas in which attraction simultaneously overlaps with other negative feelings like jealousy, animosity and resistance. According he clearly addresses the "diplomatic power" and "moral

appeals" as significant forms of power in world politics, away from their sources of attractiveness and softness (Ferguson, 2003). In fact, the utilization of American soft power and its related public diplomacy practices can provide a vivid example, in which their outcome has been a combination of contradicting attitudes including fascination, hatred and resistance toward the United States, particularly in the Arab and Muslim world (Zaharna, 2007).

Indeed, the new communication dynamics and recent realities of information technologies have developed a new paradigm for the relation between soft power and public diplomacy. Unlike Joseph Nye's model of wielding soft power resources in public diplomacy efforts, a new paradigm has been emerged to create rather than wield soft power through public diplomacy initiatives and programs. By employing the new communication dynamics that are based on message exchange rather than message dissemination, a political sponsor can get a desired outcome through creation of soft power during the process of communication itself, which can eliminate any intervening variables that may hinder the preplanned public diplomacy efforts utilized already-existed soft power resources (Zaharna, 2007). In recent years, several non-government organizations (NGOs) have followed this model in their search for power to set political agendas and frame global debates toward many issues such as global warming and landmines. In contrast to the US public diplomacy efforts that wield its soft power, NGOs gain power through various activities of networking and relation-building efforts. From Rhonda Zaharna's perspective, creating soft power is more strategic and compatible with Today's age of new information and communication technologies as it blurs the barriers between source and audience and turns a culture difference into a positive force rather than being challenge and potential source of hatred in wielding-soft power communication patterns.

In the following section, a review of various public diplomacy strategies will be introduced in attempt to explore how political entities utilize different approaches, to communicate with the international community.

Public Diplomacy Strategies

i. Information and relational communication frameworks

There are two main communication frameworks in which public diplomacy strategies and initiatives can be categorized and analyzed: the information framework and the relational framework (Zaharna, 2009). While messaging design and dissemination is the major mechanism to promote policy goals in the information framework, the relational framework shifts the focus from messaging as a product to a communication as a process in order to build relationships and create international consensus over issues of common concern. Actually, the overarching goals of public diplomacy initiatives within the two frameworks are quite different. In information initiatives, messages are designed and disseminated in an effort to advocate policies, promote political interest and craft positive images to achieve the goals of a single political entity. Unlike the informational approach, public diplomacy efforts within relational framework essentially aims to promote and maintain smooth international relations, which may contribute to a better international milieu (Melissen, 2005).

For further explanation, the main questions in the informational approach are what is the message? And what are the best communication channels to send it out? American public diplomacy provides a vivid example of this approach as many significant reports on U.S. public diplomacy emphasized the importance of efficient messaging strategies (Zaharna, 2009). Control over the message is one of the dominant features of such approach. For instance, the White House's office of

strategic communication releases talking point on a daily basis in attempt to control its message. The U.S. State Department circulates similar conversation points to its overseas offices. However, the extreme form of control over information dissemination and design may turn public diplomacy efforts into mere propaganda, which represent the oldest and most famous model of information initiative (Ellul, 1956; Cull, Culbert & Welch, 2003). The difference between new public diplomacy efforts and old propagandistic approaches will be further discussed later in this section.

On the other hand, information initiatives mostly have a closed-container design that often restricts or limits interaction between the political sponsor and publics. The one-way communication approach is dominant in information initiatives, in which audience play a passive or limited role. Some initiatives may provide channels for audience to give their feedback. However, the usage of that feedback is still optional, and beyond the central dynamic of the process. Indeed public diplomacy initiatives within the informational framework use a variety of communication channels to convey their messages, including "interpersonal (designated speaker), print (flyers, brochures, fact sheets), audio/visual (films, videos), print and broadcast mass media (newspapers, radio and television), and electronic media (websites, emails)" (Zaharna, 2009). Although the interactivity and connectivity of today's globalized world is not reflected strongly in such information initiatives, the informational approach in public diplomacy is still a strategic imperative—provided that credibility is a must. Credibility has become a major determinant of the persuasive value of any information initiative nowadays, given the new communication dynamics in which political sponsors must compete for message

delivery and acceptance in today's highly competitive information environment (Zaharna, 2009).

Unlike information initiatives, relational initiatives rely on relation-building strategies rather than messaging strategies, which reflect the principles of reciprocity and mutuality (Leonard 2005; Rose & Smith 2004). Zaharna (2009) argues the major dynamic in relational initiatives is coordination rather than control, in which audiences play an active role as participants or stakeholders. Other scholars stress the persuasive value of different type of control in relationship-based programs calling "control mutuality", in which the effectiveness of the programs depends on audience share in deciding and controlling elements of the programs in all phases: defining, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating (Grunig & Hon, 1999). In his comparative study on network communication and mass communication in public diplomacy, Zaharna (2007) proposes that the network communication approach that focuses on information exchange and relationship building, is more effective than mass media that focus on information production and dissemination in cross-culture communications. Despite its capacity to provide mass audience with largest amount of information, most probably in uniform messages, in the least amount of time, mass media remain vulnerable in cross-culture settings as its content is often culture-bound, and subject to misunderstanding and distortion by foreign publics (Zaharna 2007). Similarly, Hachten and Scotton (2002) argue that "*more and faster news communication across national borders does not automatically lead to better understanding ; often, it results in enmity and distrust, because the profound cultural and social difference that characterize the world community preclude agreement on what is legitimate news*". For example, a congregation of media scholars and U.S. policy experts have questioned the effectiveness of the U.S.'s international

broadcasting that target Arab audiences following 9/11 events, due to cultural and psychological barriers (Youmans, 2009; Douai, 2014; Dabbous& Nasser, 2009) . Comparing to Arabs-sponsored channels like Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia, Al-Hurra's viewership, credibility, and trustworthiness remained limited, as the U.S. Arabic-speaking channel had been widely viewed among Arab audiences as a merely U.S.-agenda proprietor and a model of American cultural imperialism (Dabbous& Nasser, 2009). Its success as an effective tool for public diplomacy remains questionable. In contrast, culture is an asset rather than a challenge in transnational networks and holds that relation-building activities and message exchange practices are able to blur the distinction between source and audience. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) provides an illustrative example of how great the influence of the network communication approach can be. The ICBL was formed in 1991 by six outstanding NGOs, and by 1996 more than 1000 NGOs from 60 countries had engaged in the campaign as participants, as well as a group of "like- minded" small and medium-size states headed by Canada's foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy was formed to support the campaign (Davis 2004). The ban on landmines has turned from a mere humanitarian call by a few NGOs in 1991 into an international treaty signed by 123 countries in 1996, and even transformed into international law in 1999, which set the codification for landmines how to regulate their presence and how to recycle them. Moreover in 1997, the ICBL was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, due to its efforts to end the harmful consequences that could befall civilians would they be in a territory that with holds landmines. The ICBL was a model of network-based public diplomacy and partnership between nation states and NGOs to co-built credibility, identity, and promote shared values and narratives.

ii. ***Monologue, dialogue and collaboration in public diplomacy***

Communication scholars frequently present the three communication patterns (monologue, dialogue, and collaboration) in an opposite context. Some argued that new public diplomacy should rely on dialogues that are more effective and influential than one-way communications (Riordan, 2004). However, the usage of the three communication patterns is an essential component of effective public diplomacy (Cowan& Arsenault, 2008). Each has its own edge. The tricky question would always be: which way of communication in what time under what circumstances. According to Landtsheer and Feldman (2000), since the time of Aristotle, no one can deny the capacity of speech to move citizens and countries toward peace, war, and reconciliation. The impact of memorable quotes of Abraham Lincoln, J.F Kennedy, Winston Churchill, De Gaulle, Jamal Abdel Nasser, and other great leaders, have been always preceded their time, geographical and even linguistic barriers. In critical times, monologues including speeches, statements, proclamations, editorials, and press releases can be the optimal way to mobilize the targeted audience behind certain cause, or to strongly react to an urgent situation.

On the other hand, dialogic communication is an indispensable tool of effective public diplomacy. Dialogue does not necessarily change foreign policy positions, or alters opinions towards foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, a capacity to listen, to provide an opportunity for others to address their concerns, and to show respect for those opposing viewpoints may undermine conflicts, and increase mutual understanding. The power of addressing human desire to be heard can be successfully used in bridging differences and form relationships among communicators. "*Dialogue of Cultures*" provides a very good example of how Deutsche Welle, the Germany international broadcasting agent, could be able to reach people in the Arab world.

This popular program is considered an open platform to discuss various topics by distinguished intellectuals from Germany and the Arab world. In their study, Lucassan and Zollner (2004) observe that the followers of the program were very satisfied with its content and agenda, and appreciated Deutsche Welle's attempts to establish friendly relationships with Arab people. Moreover, the emergence of call-in talk shows in the 1990s gives another example of the influence of such open-container programs on receivers. For instance in 1994, Voice of America began to broadcast call-in shows in many different languages. In general, reciprocal communications help policy makers in a sending country to articulate their policies in simpler, understandable terms for foreign public in a receiving country without the usage of jargons (Cowan& Arsenault, 2008).

Collaboration is another effective way to engage foreign publics. In the term of public diplomacy, collaboration refers to cooperative works and initiatives, in which participants from different countries take part in a joint project in order to solve a common problem, defuse a conflict, promote shared values, and/or advocate a certain vision toward an international matter (Cowan& Arsenault, 2008). It takes various forms including short-term projects such as a friendly football match, writing a piece of music and participating in a play; medium development projects like upgrading slums and food security programs; and long-term projects like participating in post-conflict reconstruction efforts and anti-global warming activities. The communicative power of common goals and shared experiences may provide a solid ground for building trust and maintaining long lasting relationships among participants (Ryan, 2007). Similarly, Sherif (1958) argued that cooperative projects play a vital role in facilitating reconciliation.

iii. Public diplomacy beyond propaganda

Some scholars refer to public diplomacy as state propaganda (Rasmussen, 2009). It is true that both use persuasive strategies to influence target audiences, including some aspects of advertising, branding, political campaigning and public relation. However, there is a clear distinction between public diplomacy and propaganda. Propaganda seeks to template the minds of multitudes through manipulative representation of issues and events, while public diplomacy aspires to broaden the horizons of people through information, education, and engagement (Melissen, 2005). Public diplomacy should work as an eye-opener for foreigners, with an attempt to increase their knowledge about a country's policies and positions, and decrease their prejudices towards its values and cultural norms. Credibility and trust-building measures is a necessity in new public diplomacy strategies. Actually, in the age of globalized communication and information technology, any propagandistic approach to public diplomacy can be counterproductive. For instance, the outdated propagandistic mechanisms of Egyptian mainstream media in the aftermath of the 30th June revolt was one of the main reasons behind its failure in influencing international public opinion, especially in the first weeks following the uprising. The fluttering flags at the top of television, and the claims of U.S.-Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy, along with labeling the post-30th of June scene as a “war on terror” would never help in getting the Egyptian message heard among foreign public (Shukrallah, 2013). The absence of balanced, honest Egyptian narrative unintentionally increased the persuasive power of its non-contextual, second-hand Western counterpart.

Indeed, public diplomacy, by its unique nature of being persuasive and honest at the same time, can fill the gap between propaganda and truth. To explain, there is an infamous old Egyptian Proverb stating that "a concrete lie is better than an abstract

fact", which actually refers to the pillar of propaganda that Laswell (1937) classically defined as "a way to speak more concretely but less accurately" (Severin& Tankard, 2010). Nevertheless, effective public diplomacy can bridge such contradiction by promoting a better version of concrete, reliable, and persuasive truths. Similarly, Edward Marrow, one of the prominent pioneers of public diplomacy, wrote in 1963 "Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst: to be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that" (Rasmussen, 2009).

iv. Reactive and proactive approaches in public diplomacy

It is true that daily communications and news management lie in the heart of public diplomacy practices. The rapid response to what happens in one's country and the rest of the world is a pressing need, in order to provide the right context of domestic events and clarify the government's decisions about them, as well as explain the country's positions on global updates to foreign publics. However, such reactive approach is not sufficient to achieve the ultimate goals of public diplomacy, which are "increasing people's familiarity with one's country, increasing people's apperceptions of one's country, engaging people with one's country, and eventually influencing people to back positions of one's country" (Leonard, 2002). For example, in the late 2001, Al Jazeera started to broadcast Osama bin Laden videotapes. In the very beginning of this phenomenon, US officials wanted to prevent both Al Jazeera and American networks from airing more messages from bin Laden. In the new era of diplomacy and information technologies, such actions are considered frustrating, and against the culture of openness and freedom of expression, that America tries to signify and publicize (Nye, 2008). The healthier solution would be to create content, promote an initiative, and design a campaigns that are able to counter Bin Laden

narratives. This is the second stage of public diplomacy, which depends on more proactive strategies. Instead of just responding to what is happening, these strategies focus on setting the news agenda through organizing events, promoting initiatives, and planning advertising and political campaigns (Leonard, 2002). Indeed, the main advantage of the proactive approach is providing the communicator with more space to put more planning and consideration into the message they send out or the image they promote. In other words, the proactive communication strategy, by its nature, helps the communicator to use more customized designs, which increase the transformative capacity of the message to influence the target audience.

v. *Transnational messaging and the role of cultural and political barriers*

Designing an international persuasive message in today's highly mediatized world is one of the biggest challenges facing public diplomacy actors. This can be illustrated very well with the following quote of Colin Powell about his time in the Gulf War when he told his staff: *"Remember, when we are out there on television, communicating instantaneously around the world, we're talking to five audiences.'* *One, the reporters who ask the question – important audience. Second audience, the American people who are watching. The third audience, 170 capitals who may have an interest in what the subject is. Fourth, you are talking to your enemy, and it was a unique situation to know that your enemy was getting the clearest indication of your intentions by watching you on television at the same time you were giving that message. Fifth, you were talking to the troops. Their lives were on the line."*(Leonard, 2002)

Many variables determine the persuasive power of the transnational message, among them : (1) political and cultural barriers; (2) the identity of communicators; (3) the format of public diplomacy messages.

1. Political and cultural barriers

According to Nye (2008), one of the main purposes behind miscommunication among different nations is the underestimation of the influence of cultural dissimilarities and prejudices. Political leaders think the problem is that the others lack information, and once they know what we know, they will simply think the same like us, which is not the case in many situations. In fact, all information goes through cultural filters. Prior experiences, presumptions, historical images, and the background of national reputation, *inter alia*, of many cultural biases that certain foreign audience may have toward a country greatly affect how this audience processes any information about this country. This is one of the main differences between traditional diplomacy and its public counterpart. In the first one, the role of historical narratives and cultural biases is relatively limited, because the communication with policy makers is more deliberative and interests-based. Hayden (2007) argues that the demands of persuasion are different for policy-makers than publics. Each audience both expects and uses different kinds of arguments. Accordingly, messages should be carefully designed, in which they explain the sending country's policies and positions within a harmonic context that meets audience's needs, expectations, and ambitions in the receiving country (McClellan, 2004).

2. The identity of communicators

On the other hand, the identity of communicator is one of the major determinants of how persuasive the message will be. When it comes to public diplomacy, it is not just a matter of message content, it is also about who tells the message. Foreign publics, by their nature, are suspicious of what others may say. Therefore, one of the effective ways to maximize the influence of a public diplomacy messages is to let one of the locals convey the message. The audience tend to believe more in one of their own than in foreign government representatives, especially those who are coming from rival governments (Hoffman, 2002). For example, as a part of its public diplomacy efforts to improve its image in the United States after 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia's announcement of its 2002 peace initiative came through Thomas Friedman, the outstanding New York Times columnist and Pulitzer Prize winning author (Burnham, 2013). The Saudi initiative proposed normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab world in exchange for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. Friedman published an op-ed on February 6th, 2002 in which he suggested "land for peace" principle, as a way out of the conflict in the Middle East. Two weeks later, Friedman published another op-ed about his visit to Saudi Arabia in which he was summoned to meet the Crown Prince Abdulla to discuss his initiative. The Prince told Friedman that he almost read his thoughts, literally "Have you broken into my office", and talked about his identical initiative that he was planning to announce at the Arab League Summit, held in Beirut at the end of March. Burnham (2013) argues that the timing of Friedman's proposal and his subsequent meeting with the prince is too much convenient to be coincidental. The kingdom relied on Friedman's legendary ability to sell ideas, in its attempt to presents itself to America as a peace-making country that is open for communications rather than the distorted

"a breeding ground of extremism and an incubator for terrorists" images that had been prevalent in the United States after 9/11 attacks.

Relying on local Public Relation firms is another way to increase the persuasive power of PD messages. These firms tend to function better in a given political and cultural context. They usually utilize scientific knowledge based on public opinion polls to reach favorable results, in a way that help address the weaknesses in the agenda of a sending country, which may clash with public opinion in a receiving country. Dealing with such weaknesses, especially in the early phases of any campaign, may increase the persuasive capacity of messages and achieve desirable goals (Gilboa, 2008). However, any dependence on local PR firms should come within larger consistent and well-established strategy for public diplomacy and national image building rather than randomly frequent public relations campaigns that deals with issues and situations based on case-by-case tactics.

3. The format of public diplomacy messages

The content and format of PD messages play a vital role in international communication. Strong and well-established arguments may increase the persuasive power of any transnational message. One of the most debatable questions in communication literature is "Which is the better strategy—to present only the arguments that support your position or to present the both sides of arguments but stress on the ones that support your position" (Severin& Tankard, 2010). However, within the context of public diplomacy communications, this issue is almost settled down for many reasons. To explain, a host of communication scholars (Hovlandand Sheffield, *et al*) argue that the more educated the audience is, the more effective the two-sided message will be; and vice versa (Severin& Tankard, 2010).On the other

hand, McClellan (2004) suggests that the target audience, in any attempt to create friendly public opinion environment in another country, should be the current and next generations of opinion leaders in this country. This audience mainly composes of student, professors, intellectuals, artists and journalists. Accordingly, the two-sided message is more effective, in order to influence such well-educated audience. Furthermore, presenting the both sides of a story is a essential requirement in today's globalized world in which different Television satellites and internet platforms with different agendas are widely spread blurring hypothetical geographical boundaries. In fact, exposure to the two-sided message helps people to be more resistant to the opposing side's later persuasive efforts, and less vulnerable to their counter arguments (Severin& Tankard, 2010).

vi. *Coherence between public diplomacy and policy*

Since public diplomacy refers to a kind of dynamic interaction among government, media, and public opinion, effective government policy is considered a precondition for successful public diplomacy. Indeed, public diplomacy is not a façade for ineffective wrong-headed policy (Seib, 2009). For example, the continuous Bush administration initiatives on providing medical assistance to combat AIDS in Africa and supporting development programs in other developing countries did not really count as long as civilians were frequently killed under the fire of the US troops during the second Iraq war. Such initiatives did not help save the reputation of America, or halt the decline of the U.S. standing in public opinion polls in many part of the world. Public diplomacy planning should go hand in hand with policy constructing. No matter how smart the communication strategy is if it transfers contradictory or confusing message (Nye, 2008). In such period of information technology and globalized communication, concealing information from the public is

almost an impossible mission. People will distinguish it, and will realize it faster than ever before (Seib, 2009). However, the new media realities of wide accessibility and global proliferation can give an edge for public diplomacy actors as long as they utilize more transparent, creative and fastest communication techniques to reach foreign populaces. This never ensues without substantive policy initiatives and coherent policy decisions to support public diplomacy efforts.

The Middle East and Public Diplomacy

Over the years, the Middle East has been target environment for the U.S. and other Western countries aiming to conduct public diplomacy in such a geopolitically and socio-economically strategic part of the world. How to devise a successful public diplomacy campaign toward the Middle East has been a major concern for public diplomacy scholars and practitioners through different times and situations across history (Satloff, 2004; Douglas & Neal, 2013). There has been enormous number of books, articles, and reports published in the Western world about the effective ways to communicate with Arab and Muslim people in the region. In the United States, large amount of financial and human resources have been devoted to win the battle over the minds and hearts of Arab People. In fact, most Middle Eastern countries are often in the receiving end of public diplomacy (Ndoye, 2009). In his book "soft power: The means to success in world politics", Joseph Nye discussed the Middle East as a singular case that represents a particular challenge for American soft power and public diplomacy without any reference for soft power relevancy and public diplomacy applicability in the region in general. For him, the Middle East was just the target environment that he tried to understand to guarantee full effectiveness of the

U.S. policies in the region (Nye, 2004). Copeland (2009) went beyond that, to highlight the ethnocentric nature of public diplomacy since it has been defined, developed and practiced exclusively by individuals, private firms and government organizations in developed countries. Even for some Arab scholars and journalists, any utilization of soft power through public diplomacy practices has been merely seen as an integral part of the U.S. imperial project to dominate the Middle East, spread American values, and protect its interest in the region (Mouawad, 2013).

In their efforts to promote a good image abroad, most countries in the Middle East engage in international public relation campaigns rather than public diplomacy activities (Ndoye, 2009; Al-Yasine&Dasht, 2008; Albritton&Manheim, 1984). To convey a certain image to the rest of the world, the majority of Arab countries tend to rely on foreign firms rather than public diplomacy structures of their own (Al-Yasine& Dasht, 2008). The disparate efforts of Saudi Arabia to improve its image in the United States right after the 9/11 attacks provides a vivid example of Arab dependence on PR foreign firms. Few days after the terrorist attacks, Saudi government started to randomly hire the biggest PR agencies and communication firms in America one after another, such as Burson-Marsteller, Qorvis Communications, and Creative Cable Television. Each firm did its part of the promotional works separately, including organizing visits of Saudi senior officials to the United States, the issuance of many invitations for American journalists to visit the kingdom, airing TV commercials, and so on. According to Burnham (2013) , the anti-Saudi narrative that was based on the fact that the fifteen of the nineteen hijackers, and Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the attacks, were of Saudi Arabian origins trumped the Saudi shallow PR message that was built on the historic narrative of the Saudi-U.S. friendship, and anti-terrorism rhetoric. The Saudi PR

campaign lacked a concrete agenda. Moreover, the absence of strong lines of argumentation undermined its influence on American public (Burnham, 2013). Anhlott (2009) argued, "*There is no proof yet that mere messaging has any influence whatsoever on people's pre-existing ideas and prejudices about other countries.*"

However, the inexperienced government officials in developing countries can be easily tricked, by sales agents for global public relation, communications, or media sales firms, into spending thousands or even millions of dollar on impractical propaganda.

In fact, the majority of Arab countries lack the practice of efficient public diplomacy that has well-defined agenda with strategic goals, though well-structured institutions and channels exist and are at their disposal. In a study to explore public diplomacy strategies at the Arab embassies in the United States, Khakimova's (2013) discoveries were as follows: (1) Arab public diplomacy efforts focus mainly on contacting the U.S. media and building personal relationships with American journalists; (2) Arab embassies tend to target U.S. decision makers rather than American public in their communication;(3) one-way communication approach has characterized the embassies' utilization of new media;(4) unlike new public diplomacy that provide a capacity to listen as much as to speak, the embassies seek to influence through unidirectional flow of information rather than engage in dialogic communications;(5) Culture difference undermine public diplomacy efforts as the majority of communication officers at the Arab embassies tend to work as cultural enclaves subject to little acculturation rather than cultural interpreters who facilitate better understanding between their government and the American public.

Public Diplomacy and Arab Spring

The pro-democracy movements and popular uprisings that have swept the region since 2011 have raised questions about Arabs' capacity to peacefully tell their story to the rest of the world. For many years, the absence of an attractive Arab narrative has been one of the main explanations behind the misleading appearance of Arabs in Western academia and journalistic writings. For example, in his book "Democracy without Democrats: The renewal politics in the Muslim World", John Waterbury argued that the regional culture, intolerant religious beliefs and practices of Arab people will hinder any efforts to promote democracy and political liberalization in the region. From Waterbury's perspective, the democratization efforts in the Middle East must overcome rather than utilize the basic elements of Arab and Muslim culture (Waterbury, 1994). Nonetheless, the soft nature of the Arab revolts introduced the increasing possibilities and new potentials for developing effective public diplomacy channels through the utilization of Arab soft power. The nonviolent nature of the Arab uprisings, particularly the initial revolutionary waves, refuted the mainstream notion that Arabs are aggressive by nature and have tendencies toward violence (Batstone, 2014). The Arab spring is associated with the story of "Arab freedom fighters who gathered in mass peaceful protests to struggle against autocracies and repressive regimes" can greatly influence foreign societies across the globe. The attractiveness and communicative power of such narrative can be utilized to generate a story of Arabs that is worth to be told to the whole world, which is considered the starting point in building up an effective public diplomacy strategy. During the Cold War, the mission statement of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the main structure that was responsible for conducting American public diplomacy, was "telling America's story to the world". Similarly, once Arabs articulate their story that is worth telling to

the whole world, they will soon find their competitive edge in the global battle over winning the hearts and minds of international publics.

Egypt and Public Diplomacy

Since the January, 25th revolution, there has been a growing debate on the decline of Egyptian soft power over the last years and the prospects of reviving the Egyptian status in the region through public diplomacy activities. Several Egyptian scholars addressed that revaluation as a golden opportunity for the country to emerge as an iconic model of peaceful revolution and democratic transition (Abutalib, 2011; Hanafi, 2012; Al-Zayatti, 2011). Ali Mauawad (2013) suggested that the revolutionary states have potentials to promote soft power and utilize public diplomacy efforts in their foreign relations. That can be reflected in the Egyptian public diplomacy delegations and special envoys who visited countries like Iran, Sudan and Ethiopia aiming at deescalating tension and normalizing mutual relations in the wake of the January 25th revolution. However, the majority of the post-revolution public diplomacy efforts derived from personal initiatives without strategic messaging to promote during those visits. The lack of institutionalism and strategic planning was evident in those initiatives (Mauwad, 2013; Hanafi, 2012). It is true that there have been wide expectations that the post-revolution Egypt could regain the prestigious status of the country during Nasser era. However, unlike the 1952 revolution, the Arab-spring uprisings in Egypt failed to develop an attractive narrative to capture the imagination of publics across the region.

Back to history, one of the main reasons behind the legacy of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the high profile of Egypt in 1950s and 1960s is the set of strategic

messages promoted across the region and the world during his rule. The Egyptian narrative to the outside world was strategically planned and widely disseminated to serve the nation's interests and objectives. The Nasser regime was able to promote and maintain what widely known as Nasserism's ideologies in which Pan-Arabism, anti-colonial sentiments and nationalist values were reinforced through systematic use of broadcasting, music and rhetoric (Podeh & Winkler, 2004; Frishkopf, 2010). For example, The Voice of Arab, a radio broadcasting network, was created by Nasser himself to work as propaganda apparatus to spread the state values and ideologies in the Egyptian society and across the region. The voice of the Arabs played a prominent role in unifying Arab listeners around a set of values and ideas derived from the Nasser-inspired Pan-Arabism ideology. The Radio broadcasted newly forms of nationalist music and advocacy programs promoted to feed anti-colonial sentiments and fuel the atmosphere of nationalism across the Arab region (Diong, 2015; Boyd, 1975). Frishkopf (2010) stated that "Cairo was the entertainment capital of the Arabic-speaking Middle East, producing ... *a l-musiqua al-arabia* and ultimately set the standard by which any newly composed Arab music was to be gauged". Indeed, the state cleverly employed diverse forms of Egyptian soft power including radio programming, music and movies to portray Nasser as a leader for all Arabs, not just for the Egyptians.

Unlike Nasser era, Egypt, under Mubarak's rule, looked like any other states in the region with no real leverage or leadership potentials since it had shown inefficiency and even incapacity in dealing with several regional issues and challenges such as the occupation of Iraq in 2003, South Sudan separation in 2010, Nile basin crisis, Israel's war on Lebanon in 2006, and its continuous attacks on Gaza, internal Palestinian split, the increasing power of Iran in the Gulf area, and that of

Ethiopia in African Horn, as well as the growing role of Turkey in the Middle East and that of South Africa in the “black continent. As Amr Hamzawy (2010) stated, "in the domestic, regional, and global minds, it has become clear that Egypt's role in the region is declining and that it is no longer a great authority that is feared (or at least heard) on Middle Eastern issues and conflicts". Before the recent uprisings, Egypt was widely seen as a Police State that manages oppressive prison system and torture chambers. The allegations of corruption and human right abuses were publicly reported against its authoritarian regime .The image of an overpopulated country with a poor economy and deteriorating regional status that mostly rely on its prestigious past has been regionally and globally crafted, which in turn has affected the Egyptian state as a whole (Hamzawy , 2010).

In the post-Arab spring Egypt, many questions have been raised about the capacity of the state to promote its actions and policies globally. In the wake of the 30th June events, the Egyptian media, both state and private, failed to report, present, and/or communicate what was truly happening in the country. The Egyptian narrative was nothing but an outdated state-driven propaganda dominated by peculiar conspiracy theories, frantic patriotism and warlike mindsets. The government has remained defenseless in dealing the global attack fueled by foreign media against the Egyptian state. The western coverage of the June events was biased and polarized promoting one-sided narratives (Hamdy, 2015; Shukrallah, 2013; Abou Bakr, 2013). For example, A New York Times (NYT) story described Mohamed Baradei as one of interim President Adly Mansour's vice-presidents, while in the reality, there was only one, Baradei himself, some weeks later, an story run by the International Herald Tribune described defense minister Abdel-Fatah El-Sisi as Egypt's vice president, although, definitely, he never occupy such post (Shukrallah,2013). According to

Shukrallah, these mistakes were not coincidental, at least on a subconscious level, as the editors could have been carefully followed the Egyptian scene or even easily clicked away through Google search before writing their sorties. Since Baradei is rather positively perceived by NYT readers, he cannot be the only Vice-President (which may leave a good impression about the so-called military Coup on the readers), but one among others. El- Sisi, in his turn, is the head of the serpent, and the mastermind of the Coup. Seeing that being the minister of defense is not enough, he must evolve into something bigger, i.e. the Vice President. Indeed, most western media decided to label what happened as a "coup". On the June 30th, the Washington Post reported on mass protests against Mohamed Morsi, former Egyptian President, and his Islamic regime, under the vague headline: "Tension roils Egypt as protests grow". The Economist went beyond that to be more biased describing the events as "Egypt Tragedy" (Abou Bakr, 2013).

The government's failure to engage in global dialogue with the outside world on what was really happening in the country raises a question about "who tells the story of Egypt to the international community?", which is the main scope of the study.

Institutions of Public Diplomacy in Egypt

Each country has a different set of institutions to manage its public diplomacy strategy and export its image abroad. The study focuses on the public diplomacy strategy and the agenda-building function of the two of main informational bodies in the Egyptian state: the State Information Service (SIS), and the public diplomacy division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which is officially affiliated to the Spokesman Office in the ministry. The SIS is officially described as the nation's main informational, awareness and public relations agency (as stated on its official website). The Information Department, later known as the SIS, was established in

1954, with two main functions: 1) Domestic mobilization, and 2) Foreign media communications (**Appendix 3**). The department turned into the State Information Service by the decree No.1820 of 1967 and affiliated to the Ministry of National Guidance, later known as the Ministry of Information (**Appendix 4**). Afterwards, the affiliation of the SIS was transferred from the ministry to the presidency in 2012 due to the abolishment of the Ministry of Information (**Appendix 5**). The SIS has three main divisions: 1) The Domestic Information Division, with wide network of 64 domestic offices across the country, 2) The Foreign Media Division, that manages foreign media communications running 16 overseas press offices, and 3) The Press Center, that is responsible for authorizing foreign correspondents and reporters working in Egypt, and facilitating their work. As the public diplomacy is the main concern of this thesis, the study focuses on the Foreign Media Division and the Press Center, and not as much on the irrespective domestic information services of the SIS.

The study explores public diplomacy strategies followed by the SIS and the Spokesman Office, and whether those strategies serve the Agenda-building function that is able to transfer silence of issues from the country's agenda to that of International public opinion, which can effectively promote Egypt's national interests and achieve foreign policy goals as well as enhance its image and role in the global community. In short, the ultimate goal of this study is to address the prospects of Egyptian public diplomacy and challenges limiting its applicability, as well as to recommend better structures, strategies, and priorities of the types of public diplomacy that Egypt could adopt.

Chapter Four

Methodology

This study is a qualitative research with a case study methodology. The in-depth interviews and field observation were conducted to understand how the SIS and the Spokesman Office in the MFA approach public diplomacy. The study focuses on the analysis of public diplomacy strategies followed by two bodies and the capacity of those strategies to serve agenda-building function that can influence international public opinion. Because of the analytical aspect of the study and its focus on how certain government bodies approach public diplomacy, qualitative methods were the most appropriate in answering the research questions.

Qualitative research

The qualitative method is the most suitable approach to be utilized in this study because it allows the researcher to trace the efforts of the SIS and the Spokesman Office in the field of public diplomacy through collecting adequate data and information needed. The qualitative method provides an interpretive paradigm that helps the researcher to profoundly understand the phenomenon under investigation (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). . Due to the flexibility of the qualitative measurements, the researcher recognized, during the analysis, new areas of interest that were not addressed before. For example, in the beginning of the research, the SIS was the main and only focus of the study, but after interviewing eight of the SIS senior employees and drawing initial conclusions, the researcher recognized that there was a pressing need to present the view of the MFA in the study. The initial conclusion referred to the strong relevancy, and sometime overlapping themes, between the two institutions in the context of public diplomacy. As the research

progresses, the design evolves and the researcher decided to study the public diplomacy division in the MFA, which is officially affiliated to the Spokesman Office in the ministry, in addition to the SIS.

Case Study

The case study design perfectly fits the purpose and the goal of this research. According to Yin (2003), the case study method helps the researcher to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, in which the barriers between the phenomenon and its context are blurred. In this research, investigating the political and cultural contexts is a necessity to understand how certain government bodies approach public diplomacy. Cultural and political contexts greatly influence public diplomacy planning and strategies (Nye 2008; McClellan 2004; Khakimova 2013; Sheaffer&Gabay 2009). In this research, the detailed descriptive nature of the case study design helps the researcher to cover the contextual conditions of issues at hand. On the other hand, the case study is a heuristic design that helps to explore new interpretations, dimensions, meanings, and unprecedented insights (Merriam 1988). Wimmer and Dominick (2014) suggested that the case study is particularly helpful for the researcher who does not know what exactly he/she is looking for. In addition, this typically applies to the researcher who attempted to study public diplomacy strategies, if any, in the Egyptian government bodies. Egyptian public diplomacy is relatively a new area of study. When it comes to public diplomacy literature, Egypt, like most developing countries, falls at the receiving end as a target not an advocate country (Classman& Glickman 2011; Glal 2010; Douglas& Neal 2013) . That is why the case study is most valuable in this research to find new clues and ideas for further research in the future.

In-Depth Interviews

In-depth interviews or intensive interviews are the most suitable research tools for such study. They help the researcher to collect different views about the phenomenon under investigation. Through conducting in-depth interviews, the researcher can gather wealth of detailed data about interviewees' values, opinions and experiences. Unlike surveys, in-depth interviews allow the researcher to observe non-verbal responses, and explore the hidden motives behind specific answers. On the other hand, because of the political nature of the research topic and the sensitive positions of the interviewees, in-depth interview is particularly advantageous in this study. Wimmer and Dominick (2014) suggested that the long duration of in-depth interviews help develop a rapport between the respondents and the interviewer, which gives an edge to the researcher to approach certain topics that might be anathemas in other methods.

Field observation

Like all qualitative methods, field observation focuses on description and explanation rather than measurement and quantification. Studying the activities under investigation in their natural setting is one of the main advantages that might give the field observation an edge over other approaches (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). In this study, field observation is a peripheral research method. It is utilized mainly to develop follow-up questions, and help the researcher to adjust the structure of interviews as the research progresses.

Research Design and Sampling

The research focused on the State Information Service (SIS) and the Spokesman Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) as a case study to investigate the strategies they follow to approach Egyptian public diplomacy. Twenty in-depth interviews were conducted with senior employees in the two bodies. Participants were recruited using a combination of purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. Some participants were interviewed purposefully because they meet the criteria of the study; such as the head of the Spokesman Office (the Official Spokesman) and the current chairman of the SIS. Some participants were recruited using snowballing method. At the end of each interview, the researcher asked if the interviewee could recommend another participant to take part in the study. Two of the former SIS chairmen were interviewed this way.

In the beginning of the study, the researcher spent one week in the SIS headquarter:, six hours daily from 10 am to 4 pm. During one week of the overt field observation in which the researcher was identified when the study began, the first eighth in-depth interviews were conducted. The initial conclusion suggested that there was a need to investigate the efforts of the foreign ministry done in the field of public diplomacy due to the strong relevancy between the functions and job descriptions of the two bodies in the context of public diplomacy. The decision was made to focus on the public diplomacy division in the MFA. The researcher investigated the Spokesman Office to which the public diplomacy division is affiliated. Five in-depth interviews were conducted with diplomats working in the office including the official spokesman. After that, the researcher spent another week in the SIS headquarter in which the rest of interviews were conducted.

Twenty semi-structured face-to-face interviews with senior employees in the two bodies were conducted. The participants varied including diplomats, media researchers, press attaches, and former heads of press offices who were in charge of communication in Egyptian embassies abroad. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and two hours, and three interviews of the twenty took two sessions. The researcher used the interview protocol consisting of three parts: the first part focused on the definition and dimensions of public diplomacy in the two bodies, and included questions such as “how do define public diplomacy?” and “Is the term frequently used in the work? Why yes? Why not?” The second part of the protocol focused on the strategies they follow to influence international public opinion in order to promote Egyptian interests and improve the national persona of the country abroad, and included questions such as “what are the techniques you use to communicate with foreign publics abroad” and “How does your institution address the Egyptian events, positions and policies to the rest of the world? The third part focused on the challenges and obstacles that might undermine their public diplomacy efforts. The list of the interviewing questions is provided at the end of this chapter (**Appendix 1**). On the other hand, the field observation helped the researcher add new questions and explore new areas of interest during the research.

Out of the twenty interviews, four interviewees accepted to participate in the study on the condition of anonymity. Otherwise, the list of the sixteen participants is provided at the end of this chapter (**Appendix 2**); along with their titles and positions. All participants gave an oral consent to participate in the research, in line with the approval of the Institutional Review Board. Because of the political nature of the research and the limitations of sharing inside information that are often imposed on diplomats and government employees, the written consent to participate in the study

was almost impossible, and some participants shared a lot of useful and valuable information on the condition of being “off record”. “This is for your own information, don’t write about it”: such phrases, and similar ones, were frequently repeated during the study. Moreover, the interviews were summarized based on the researcher’s detailed notes because the participants did not want to be recorded.

Chapter Five

Findings and Analysis

Definitions and Dimensions:

The first research question sought to explore how the Egyptian institutions represented by the State Information Service (SIS) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) define public diplomacy. Overall, the majority of interviewed participants shared misconception and confusion about public diplomacy in theory and practice. For example, in the MFA most of the interviewees did not differentiate between the efforts they exert to improve the image of the ministry in the Egyptian society and the tactics they apply to improve the image of Egypt to the outside world. In the SIS, the term "public diplomacy" is not frequently used. Most of the SIS officials referred to their communication efforts and advocacy works within the context of overseas image management. For example, one participant said, "we don't usually use the term 'public diplomacy', but we do the same under different labels." Also the majority of the participants emphasized the importance of the manipulative strategies, including covering up and presenting one-sided story, in promoting positive image about the country.

Three themes emerged related to the definition of public diplomacy and the basic philosophy behind its practice in the two Egyptian institutions: (1) no distinction between public affairs and public diplomacy; (2) domination of propaganda over promotional efforts; (3) public diplomacy efforts serving the regime rather than the state.

No distinction between public affairs and public diplomacy

Data analysis suggested that public diplomacy, particularly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was widely defined as a process of communications with media (domestic or foreign) to explain the government's actions and motives, as well as defend the state's positions and policies, to influence public opinion domestically and abroad. Almost all diplomats that were interviewed talked about the ministry's efforts to respond to media inquiries without differentiation between the foreign and the domestic. For example, about public diplomacy efforts, one participant said:

We are keen to keep an open channel with media, and establish a good relation with journalists and correspondents. Recently the spokesman has made a lot of interviews. He has at least two calls weekly in different TV Shows to explain the views and positions of the MFA to the public. Actually, the man has wide media contacts and good relation with almost everyone in this field.

Such answer reflects the confusion about the ministry's commitment toward the Egyptian citizens to be kept informed about the country's foreign policy decisions and strategies, and the ministry's role in promoting the Egyptian values and policies to the outside world in the way that facilitate the interests of the country in the global arena.

Moreover, the organizational structure of the Spokesman Office reflects this confusion. The office has three subdivisions: (1) media center for monitoring media, mainly the Egyptian and Arabic media, for all significant mentions of the ministry and

follow what is published and broadcasted about the domestic, regional and international affairs; (2) internet unit that is in charge of managing the ministry's official website and uploading data and news of the ministry and Egypt's embassies abroad; (3) public diplomacy division. According to one participant, the public diplomacy division has no certain job description. it is a very small division with one diplomat plus the administrative staff. The division has nothing to do with foreign media. And most interestingly that unlike the media center and internet unit, public diplomacy is the only division in the Spokesman Office that is not directly affiliated to the Minister Office, and it is just working under the jurisdiction of the Spokesman.

Indeed, the status of the public diplomacy division in the MFA indicates to the misinterpretation of the concept in theory and practice. In general, several participants used the term "public diplomacy" as a label to describe some media relations and public affairs activities.

Similarly, another participant from the SIS said:

We speak to ourselves all the time. In Egypt, we have 98 TV anchors, and no one of them target foreign audiences. They usually host Egyptian guests and experts speaking Arabic, utilizing our domestic values, norms and contexts, and then they act like someone from the outside listening to them.

Such misinterpretation may hinder the government from properly communicating its message to the global environment. Heller and Persson (2009) clarified the difference between the Public Affairs message, that targets domestic population, and the Public Diplomacy message, that is designed to influence foreign populations. Unlike public affairs, public diplomacy efforts include not only conveying the message that a country wishes to promote abroad, but also analyzing

and understanding the perceptions of target nations and the way that message is decoded by different societies (Heller& Persson, 2009). Targeting foreign audiences requires the development of more sophisticated persuasive mechanisms and communicative capacities in order to increase attraction and influence.

Domination of propaganda over promotional efforts

The second aspect characterizing the interpretation of public diplomacy in the SIS and MFA was the propagandistic approach that formed their understanding and analysis of public diplomacy efforts. Several participants emphasized the significance of manipulative mechanisms in reshaping the global mental environment to be aligned with the state's direction. For example, one senior official in the SIS appreciated the act of covering up saying:

Our media is irresponsible. Are you talking about public diplomacy, how come? With such media!! They help the terrorists by broadcasting their actions and crimes 24/7. They unintentionally propagate their ideology and thoughts. They harm the country and negatively affect tourism. To be the fastest newspaper or channel to cover the event, it is the first or may be the only thing they care about.

Participants expressed many initiatives that have been developed in the wake of the 30th of June to improve the image of the state worldwide and counter the Muslim Brotherhood's global narrative on what occurred in the country. Most of these initiatives have fallen into what can be described as "propaganda", which involved intentions of covering up and controlling information disseminated to foreign public. For example, one of the post-30th June initiatives is called "Letter from Cairo". It is a form of soft-copy information subsidies that has been issued by the SIS

twice monthly; in four languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. "Letter from Cairo" is designed to be sent to the electronic mailbox of foreign correspondents and embassies in Egypt as well as the Egyptian embassies abroad. According to one participant, the main purpose of such electronic publication is to promote Egypt as a stable state and transfer the newscast of the Egyptian society away from terrorism and political conflicts. He said, "we need the others to see that Egyptians practicing their life as normal". However, by the interviews were conducted, "Letter From Cairo" had only four special one-topic issues: one issue on the Egypt Economic Development Conference that was held in Sharm El-Shiek on (13th -15th) March 2015 to attract foreign investors, two issues on the New Suez Canal (before and after the opening of the canal), and one issue on the violence and bloody practices of Muslim Brotherhood across history.

The difficulty in that is this kind of initiatives involve what Leonard (2002) has called a battleground of "your information vs. my information". Most of the SIS publications are aimed at winning arguments and demonstrating that "we are right", rather than inducing audiences to alter their opinion. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood narrative that utilized symbols, words and actions in communicating their messages, the majority of post-30th June state initiatives were declamatory that involved telling and supplying information rather than capturing the imagination. For instance, the communicative power of the "four-finger salute" of Muslim Brotherhood was much more influential than the state cliché of "Egypt fights terrorism."

It is also worth noting that the interviews were conducted after the inauguration of the New Suez Canal. Everyone was excited. Some participants talked about the SIS efforts to promote the project globally. Like all Egyptian state officials and media outlets, the SIS was part of the government intensive campaign customized to glorifying the

‘New Suez Canal’ as Egypt’s national project domestically and selling it off globally as ‘Egypt’s Gift to the World’.

Public diplomacy efforts serving the regime rather than the state

Date Analysis suggested that one of the major sources of confusion in practicing public diplomacy in the two Egyptian institutions, particularly the SIS, is being merely the mouthpiece of the regime. Glorifying the successive presidents of the country across different ears has been the main purpose and aim of public diplomacy patterns that the SIS has followed since its establishment in 1954. Although the SIS has been defined in the act of its establishment as the nation's main informational, awareness, and public relation, several participants emphasized that it has been always worked to serve the regime rather than the nation. One participant said:

Like all state media, the SIS is part of the system that is built to promote one person, and improve the image of one person: the president, whoever is.

That can be illustrated in various practices in the SIS. For Example, some participants, on condition of anonymity, talked about the role that some Egyptian press offices abroad (particularly in the USA, UK, and the biggest countries in the EU) played in promoting Gamal Mubarak succession plans for assuming power after his father. according to one participant, the head of those press offices had been purposely appointed by the regime and were always closely tied to the ruling family in one way or another. Another participant said, "selling Gamal Mubarak to the west was the main task of those offices in last ten year of Mubarak era". Even after the Arab-Spring uprisings, the mindset of the institution remains the same. For instance, It is

true that the SIS stops publishing an annual book about the president's achievements right after the 2011 revolution, but they come up with a new version of it by issuing an annual book about the president's foreign visits each year.

According to several participants, the main reason behind the confusion and inconsistency in the Egyptian message to the outside world, in the last five years, is the blind commitment of the SIS and other institutions representing the country abroad to be the voice of the regime that changed rapidly and continuously since the revolution of the 25th of January. They are used to completely changing the tone and content of their messages as soon as a new president took office. For example, one participant stated the following:

It is over. We lost our credibility abroad. It is enough to know that one of our colleagues in a hosting country appeared on TV two times in the same show in one month (before and after the 30th June events), using certain arguments about explaining the status quo in Egypt, and then he almost said the opposite in the second time after the events.

The above-mentioned answers reflect what Abdulla (2014) has described as the unchangeable authoritarian mindset of Egyptian media. The state media continued their previous fashion, with one distinction that the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), then the Muslim-Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi, and President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi replaced Hosni Mubarak afterwards. The same media figures and outlets that described Mubarak once as the wise protector of the state, soon started to glorify El-Sisi as the brave savior of the nation. Such rhetoric has limited the credibility of Egyptian government abroad, which has undermined its

communicative capacity to reach foreign audiences' hearts and minds. As one participant said, "credibility is something that hard to gain and easy to lose". Similarly, Heller and Persson (2009) emphasize that any dent in credibility is difficult to repair, especially in foreign settings, as publics are generally skeptical of foreign governments' articulations and actions.

The continuation of this sort of public diplomacy, that includes blind commitment to the policy makers' decisions through merely promoting government policies and positions, may cause damage to the image and reputation of the country across the world. The effective public diplomacy must have a channel to give recommendations for policy making and these recommendations must be considered and appropriately evaluated by the government as "the conclusive feedback of the market" (Anhold 2006). Otherwise, public diplomacy efforts are unserviceable, or even counterproductive, as a globally unpopular government may on a long run do harm the national image of the country and its overall longer-term interests.

Strategies and Tactics

The second research question asked was what are the strategies followed by the SIS and MFA to influence international public opinion in order to create favorable environment to facilitate Egyptian interests abroad. Overall, the majority of participants emphasized the lack of strategic planning inside their institutions. For example, one participant said, "we don't have a set of strategic messages to promote about Egypt, and it is all about personal initiatives." Indeed, Data suggested that the main public diplomacy strategies at the two institutions related to media relations, which includes building relationships with domestic media in hosting countries and

keeping in touch with foreign correspondents in the country. On the other hand, findings indicated that the major tasks of most communication officers in these institutions focus on daily news management, tracking negative propaganda about Egypt published in foreign media, and preparing proper responses.

Three themes emerged related to the strategies of public diplomacy and the techniques applied in the SIS and MFA to create favorable global public opinion about Egypt: (1) the lack of strategy; (2) predominance of media relations and one-way communication; (3) focus on reactive approach and avoidance of on-record comments.

The lack of strategy

According to the majority of participants, there is no clear, consistent communication strategy to guide their efforts to reach and influence foreign publics for many reasons. First, the lack of coordination and interoperability among the different institutions that are responsible for promoting Egypt abroad, which in turn undermines the totality of Egyptian messages to the outside world. There are several institutions working abroad: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs represented by embassies, State Information Service represented by media offices, the Ministry of Higher Education represented by cultural offices, the Ministry of Trade represented by commercial offices, and Tourism Board. However, All work like isolated islands.

Accordingly, the government become unable to manage perceptions of the country abroad due to the lack of strategic messages and the absence of a clear national narrative that can bring the different stakeholders together.

Second, the separation between policy and public diplomacy obstruct any attempts to develop effective communication strategies. A host of participants emphasized their absent role in the decision-making process stating that they have never had a seat on policy-making table across the history of the SIS. Nasser established the institution mainly to tell what was written and broadcasted about the regime in western media. Then, Sadat depended mostly on western media to build his image and convey Egyptian messages to the outside world. During Mubark era, there was recession in everything, in politics, in media. The role of the SIS was marginal focusing only on receiving foreign correspondents, facilitating their work and organizing press delegations accompanied the president during his foreign visits.

Several participants emphasized the inability to develop their own communication goals and strategies is due to their lack of executive and restrictions of their power. They do not have a say when it comes to policymaking process. One participant said, "Sometimes we promote something, and then the decision maker do the opposite without pre notice". The 2009 Egypt-versus-Algeria football matches provides a vivid example. While the diplomats and communication officers at the Egyptian embassy in Algeria was trying to calm down furious publics on the ground, the Egyptian ruling family escalated the situation. Alaa Mubarak telephoned a talk show saying, "We are Egyptian and we hold our head high, and whoever insults us should be smacked on his head." Hosni Mubarak said on national television that he would not condone the "humiliation" of Egyptians abroad.

Third, there is no communication strategy without a sound resourced, wisely managed information strategy. Data suggested that the absence of information and constraints imposing on actual facts, numbers and statistics usually end up being

accused by foreign media of covering up and dilution of transparency. In the words of one participant:

There is no influence without information. They do not even frequently distribute talking points. We are on our own most of the time, and this problem is usually aggravated during the time of crises.

Another participant said:

We do not learn from our mistakes: what happened during the January 25th revolution was typically repeated during the June 30th events. No one told you what is going on. The only difference is that the outside world, particularly the west, was more acceptable and supportive to the January. It was like a free publicity for the country. But, we did nothing through the two revolutions: no information, no influence, and everyone was talking according to his/her personal information.

Moreover, the findings propose that the random closure of Egyptian media offices abroad reflected the government's little appreciation to public diplomacy planning and strategic communication. The closure was justified by the government as a cost-effectiveness procedure. Egypt had 69 overseas media offices during 1980s, but now it only 16 offices. According to several participants, It was a random process as they did so without vision or clear alternatives.

The government closed media offices: (1) in Rome, which has the highest ratio of an Egyptian community in the Europe; (2) in Madrid, which is considered the only bridge to the Spanish-speaking nations since all media offices in Latin America had already closed a long time ago; (3) in Dakar, which held the only media office targeting French-speaking African countries because the five Egyptian media offices

in Africa are based in English-speaking countries; (4) in Tunisia, that is considered the center of culture and civilization in the Greater Maghreb, and at the same time the media offices in Algeria and Rabat remained. According to one participant, if the government was thinking strategically, they would have closed media offices in Algeria and Rabat and left the office in Tunisia open. Tunisia is the most important country in that region when it comes to communication and cultural activities.

Predominance of media relations and one-way communication

Findings proposed that the main communication strategies in the SIS and MFA relate to media relations. While few participants were talking about their efforts to communicate with cultural and educational institutions abroad, the majority of participants emphasized that their main responsibilities concentrate on building strong relationships with foreign journalists and correspondents. Several participants talked about tactics they applied to keep in touch with foreign journalists including official arrangements like monthly briefings, press tours and off-record meetings, as well as informal gatherings like family events and lunch appointments. For them, maintaining good relationships with journalists is essential in their work to get messages disseminated and responses published in the right time, particularly during crises.

According to another participant, the role played by the prominent Egyptian-born British journalist "Adel Darwish" through the 30th June events provide a vivid example as the Egyptian embassy in London has been always been profound on keeping in communication with Darwish, who greatly participated in promoting the Egyptian narrative on the events occurring in the United Kingdom. He was trying to counter the Muslim Brotherhood propaganda in London and explained to the British public what was going on in Egypt using his leverage as a famous trust-worthy

journalist and intellectual. In addition, many participants stressed the necessity of being a media-oriented person to being a respectable overseas communication officer.

One participant said:

Diplomats cannot do our works. You need someone who understand media norms and professional values of journalism to be able to deal with foreign media every day. Journalists feel more comfortable when they talk to someone like them.

The one-way communication approach is dominant in the two Egyptian institutions. The reliance on media relations as a major communication strategy reflects the focus on message dissemination that aims to inform rather than engage with foreign publics. Despite the attempts to use Facebook, Twitter and blog platforms inside the MFA, the practice did not reflect the connectivity and interactivity of such new media. The purpose was primarily to disseminate information rather than engage in a conversation. For example, the blog of MFA looked more like an official website to publish news. The new Facebook and Twitter accounts created by the Spokesman Office seemed like monologues with few comments.

Some participants talked about their duty to communicate with Egyptian communities overseas and connect them with their mother country. Some of Egyptian immigrants can be potential investors in the future while others can work as cultural interpretations to bridge between Egyptian culture and those of their resident countries.

On the other hand, Data suggested that the majority of participants showed little appreciation for working with non-state actors like NGOs to promote Egyptian interests abroad. For example, one participant said:

We do cooperate with NGOs. I mean the like-minded ones. Those who follow the direction of the state, but they are few. And this is the problem.

Another participant emphasized the domestic nature of Egyptian NGOs stating:

The majority of Egyptian NGOs do not care about the image of Egypt abroad. The internal affairs are their main concern.

Some participants went beyond that to criticize the role of NGOs and blamed them for distorting the image of Egypt abroad. In the words of one of the participant:

Most of foreign NGOs have kind of "brainlessness" when it comes to human right. They exaggerate everything turning small incidents into critical violations. On the other side, the Egyptian NGOs are just "mercenaries" who follow the agenda of those who fund them.

The above mentioned answers proposed that Egyptian public diplomacy patterns fall within information frameworks in which messaging design and dissemination is the major concern (Zaharna, 2009). For example, the common recommendation among the participants for better public diplomacy practice focused on the necessity of exploring more effective massaging strategies. However, in cross-culture settings, there is no evidence that merely messaging can change perceptions as messages are always prone to different interpretations or may be distorted (Anholt 2006; Nye, 2008) . According to Zaharna (2009), information initiatives restrict the interaction between the political sponsor and the target audience through employing communication as a linear process with a one-way flow of information.

Focus on reactive approach and avoidance of on-record comments

Findings proposed that the main tactics used by the SIS and MFA to counter negative media coverage about the country in foreign news reports are based on reactive approaches. The majority of participants emphasized the importance of correcting inaccuracies and falsehood that appeared about Egypt in foreign media. Participants demonstrated that one of the primary duties of each communication officer at our embassies abroad is to trace any corrupt mention of the country and quickly respond.

This approach might be strongly reflected in a new body called "Fact Check Egypt" (FCE), which is created by the SIS to oversee foreign media outlets and their sources. The initiative appeared as a respond to the continued negative coverage of international media about the Egyptian state's policies and actions since the 30th of June events, particularly right after several foreign publications reported significantly higher death tolls than the army's official statement in awake of the Sinai deadly attacks on armed forces by the Islamic state militants on the 4th July 2015. The staff of the new body is trained by an American NGO called "iMediaEthics", whose website publishes news and articles that investigate inaccuracies and ethical shortcomings in news media. According to its director, the FCE is a fact checking and media ethics news that aims to counter misinformation rather than impose censorship on media reporters. However, the FCE has been widely criticized by several foreign reporters depicting it as a government attempt to intimidate foreign media and force them to follow the direction of the state. According to Jone (2015), Ruth Michaelson,, a correspondent with Radio France International's English Service, who received an email from Fact Check Egypt asking for corrections said:

This tactic seems to be designed to do is make us doubt ourselves and our reporting, to feel under attack and to refrain in future from reporting things that aren't the official narrative

On the other hand, several participants mentioned the avoidance of on-record comments as a tactic followed by many Egyptian officials, particularly since the 25th of January revolution. According to the MFA Spokesman, the office exerts many efforts to communicate with the domestic departments involved in the issues and crises that concern foreign media, as no one want to speak to foreign media: neither police nor judiciary. They do not have such culture. The Foreign Service try to bridge between foreign reporters and Egyptian officials by get the information needed to contextualize domestic stories and communicate with foreign media. However it is not an easy job.

Similarly, one participant said:

Sticking with silence sometime put them in embarrassing situations. I knew one ambassador decided once not to comment on a big accident and disappeared for two weeks, and then reporters chased him in the elevator forcing him to comment. He was totally unprepared and looked as if someone went to an interview in a pajama.

In general, the mere focus on reactive approaches limits the persuasive capacity of communications and undermines the agenda-building function of public diplomacy as it allows little planning and limited inputs into massaging. In the words of one participant:

In recent days, our main job has turned from advocacy to defense. We are always in the position of the defender or the apologizer, and the world does not respect both.

According to Nye (2008), proactive approach is necessity as it represents a more advanced stage of public diplomacy. The proactive approach helps the political sponsor to have more influence over international agenda building as it provides more control and strategic planning into messaging. It is more persuasive and influential to create rather than correct. Leonaard (2002) proposes that the government must create public diplomacy strategies for all of the main issues they work on, and explore the communications angles of all their policies, decisions and actions.

Challenges and Obstacles

The third research question sought to address the challenges and obstacles that might undermine public diplomacy efforts in the SIS and MFA. Overall, the scope of answers to that question were the widest as the majority of participants always started to talk about the problems from which they suffer through their work at the beginning of the interview. Some interviews were merely a set of complaints rather than specific answers to the research questions. Data suggested that the challenges that might hinder the public diplomacy practice in the two government bodies were categorized into three basic themes: 1) cultural, social and political differences; 2) limited human and financial resources; 3) administrative, structural and legislative barriers.

Cultural, social and political differences

The findings propose that the socio-cultural dissimilarities and prejudices appeared during communications with foreign cultures disturb public diplomacy

dynamics. Some participants addressed the inability to understand what others believe and how they tackle major problem that might undermine communication efforts with foreign audiences. According to one participant, the formation of so-called public diplomacy delegations, especially those who usually accompany the president during his foreign visit, provides a vivid example of the nation's deficiency to communicate with the West. In the words of that participant:

Do American people know Yossra?! And of course the German never heard about Elham Shahine, so what is the point? If we really wanted to talk to the west, we should have sent the people who the west know and respect or at least appreciate their presence like our Noble-winners, Occidentalism-interested intellectuals and thinkers, or maybe some promising youth or women. For those who don't know, the western audiences don't watch Egyptian drama!

Another participant attributed the decline in the Egyptian role in Africa to the inability to understand and deal with the African mentality. The misperception of the African as underdeveloped and naive people is one of the key reasons behind the decline of Egypt's leadership potentials in the black continent. The failure to communicate properly with Africa hinder the country's capacity to deal with several issues such as the Nile basin crisis and the South Sudan separation. Recently, the SIS issued an online magazine named "Africa: Our Continent". The magazine targets Egyptian public and aims to reinforce the African identity in the minds and hearts of the Egyptian people.

Data analysis suggested that some of communication officers in the two institutions work as cultural reserves with prejudices and presumptions rather than cultural interpreters with better understanding to others' social norms, political values and communication patterns. For example, one participant generally discredited foreign correspondence saying: "recently the majority of foreign correspondents have turned into political activists rather than neutral reporters". From his perspective, foreign correspondents, including those who work for the significantly reputable international newspapers, lack professionalism and objectivity as they always have their own agenda that dominates their reporting technique. Another participant said, "Most foreign NGOs act in a brainless way when it comes to freedom and human right exaggerating everything". In addition, it is worth noting that cultural attachés at the Egyptian embassies are originally university professors affiliated to the Ministry of Higher Education. According to one participant, the main focus of Egyptian cultural attaches overseas to manage the affairs of Egyptian students abroad rather than promote better understanding between the Egyptian state and foreign publics. An overseas cultural attaché should have been an intellectual who is interested in cross-culture communication and inter-faith dialogue rather than an university professor who cares mainly about academic engagement.

In addition, the findings propose that differences in political values, foreign policy considerations, and bilateral relations between governments, can facilitate or obscure public diplomacy. For example, the majority of participants attributed the worldwide negative media coverage of the 30th of June uprising and the failure of the Egyptian state to promote its own narrative in foreign media, to the differences in political interests between the government of Egypt and those of western countries in

that historical moment. For western governments, it is not comprehensible, or even favorable to see such quick popular uprising of million Egyptians against what was widely perceived as one of the up-and-coming Islamic regimes across the region. The 30th of June uprising countered the Western calculations that was capitalized on Islamists as a best alternative to semi-secular long-serving regimes in the Middle East. In the words of one participant:

Do not blame us, it is all about them. The capacity of our institution- whatever strong or weak- remain the same during the two revolutions. But, the west expected and supported the January revolution, so it looked like for-free positive propaganda for the country. Then, things were reversed in the June revolution. It is as simple as that.

Furthermore, the findings suggested that prior experiences and historical background of the target audience influences its perception and acceptance of the advocate country's agenda. For example, according to the former press attaché at the Egyptian embassy in Algeria, Algeria was among the first nations that provided support for the 30th of June uprising, as the Algerians are very much aware of how dangerous such Islamic movements could be. They suffered a lot from the Islamists' bloody violence during 1990s.

On the contrary, another participant, who severed in Madrid emphasized that the Spanish recalled the picture of the 1981 attempted coup that might have undermined the nation's transition to democracy, while they were evaluating the 30th of June events in Egypt. They depicted the uprising as a coup d'état refusing to listen to any counterargument.

The above-mentioned answers addressed the difference in cultural considerations and political values as a barrier that might undermine Egyptian public diplomacy efforts. It is true that several scholars stressed the importance of cultural and political consistency in cross-national communications (Sheafer& Gabay 2009; Curtin& Gaither 2004; Nye 2008), however, in the age of information and communication technologies, new public diplomacy strategies have emerged to facilitate better understanding among foreign cultures. For example, networking communications and relation-building activities have turned the cultural difference into an asset rather than a barrier, in which people exchange information and ideas for creating better world (Zaharna 2007). However, to apply such relational approach to public diplomacy efforts in Egypt, the culture of communication must be reinforced in the Egyptian mentality to be able to push the Egyptian narrative into global public opinion agenda. In his study on public diplomacy at Arab embassies in the U.S., Khakimova (2013) proposed that Americans show more appreciation for communication than Arabs, as some cultures are conditioned to believe their voices have a contributing and effective value, while other cultures do not possess that feature.

Limited human and financial resources

The finding proposed that the two institutions, particularly the SIS, suffer from sever lack of qualified, well-trained human resources. Several participants stressed the absence of a full-capacity officer who would be able to communicate properly with foreign cultures. Data Analysis suggested that most communication officers who have good language skills, lack sufficient knowledge and communication capacities,

while those who are linguistically weak are usually more knowledgeable and well cultured. The main reasons behind that dilemma is the lack of human development initiatives and the absence of performance-based promotion and a rewarding system.

One participant stated:

There is no system. Unlike diplomats, we do not have an institutionalized corps for overseas press attaches. People get their posts based on patronage and nepotism calculations. It is very common to find an English-speaking person serve in a French-speaking country, and someone who almost does not speak foreign languages got two or three posts during his/her career for very special reasons!

In addition, the researcher noted that some press attaches were not able to differentiate between the political event and its communication angle. While they were being asked about public diplomacy efforts and communication strategies they followed during their posts abroad, some answered in a mere political context describing certain improvements on bilateral relations or explaining some foreign policy positions. This reflects the misconception about the correlating dimensions between policy and public diplomacy on one side, and the lack of communicative capacities on the other side. It is also worth noting that the average age of the SIS staff is relatively high, as the institution has stopped hiring since 2004.

On the other hand, lack of financial resources also undermine public diplomacy efforts. According to several participants, budgetary limitations usually restricted any initiatives for further cultural engagements and communication activities.

One participants said:

Exchange programs need money. Exhibitions and cultural fairs need money. Publications and film production need money. Many initiatives stopped before because of the lack of funding. Larger budget is required to do more programs.

On the other hand, limited wages in the two institutions, particularly the SIS, undermine employees' commitment to their organization, which negatively affects the quality of work. Unlike overseas officers, desk officers and headquarter-based employees receive minimum wages. Average salaries are below the market rate. For example, the researcher noted that the main concern of the majority of the SIS employees is to increase their incomes, following the January revolution's call for a revised minimum wage set by the government. The researcher even witnessed one strike in which several employees protested against the chairman for merely financial motives. For those employees, there is no time or energy to think about public diplomacy, or to come up with new ideas to improve the image of the country abroad.

Legislative, structural and administrative barriers

Data Analysis suggested that the legislative framework that regulates the function and structure of the SIS does not address changing dynamics in the domestic and global political environment. According to the Decree No.1820 of 1967 on the establishment of the SIS (**Appendix 4**), the main focus of the institution is information production and dissemination to promote the state's policies, trends and resolutions. As stated in the 1967 decree, the two key purposes of the SIS work are:

(1) to mobilize domestic audiences to endorse the state's policies and plans, and deepen socialist concepts among the public; (2) to inform the world public opinion of the objectives of the socialist society and the trends of the United Arab Republic toward the world problems. In fact, the decree of the establishment utilized what can be described nowadays as outdated and old-fashion concepts and frameworks. However, the 1967 decree is still valid, represented in the major legal basis for the SIS functions and activities. In the words of one participant to the researcher:

While you are asking about public diplomacy efforts, the cooperation with NGOs and the use of information and communication technologies, it is worth to know that none of those concepts mentioned in the SIS's documented regulations. Until this moment, we are working according to the 1967 decree that was talking about the socialist concepts and the values of nation work addressing Egypt as the United Arab Republic, and stressing the importance of cooperation with Arab Socialist Union Agencies!

Like most governmental institutions in Egypt, the SIS suffers many bureaucratic diseases including weak performance, interruptions and time-consuming processes, lack of information, centralized administration, and duplicative and overlapping responsibilities. It is also overstaffed with 3200 employees including, only, 620 media staff and communication officers. The majority of the SIS employees are typical bureaucrats with limited action and fear of responsibility. For example, the researcher noted that there were overwhelming requests to either leave work early or take a vacation from the employees during the two weeks of the study.

The bureaucratic structure of the SIS is negatively reflected on the performance of its media offices abroad. These media offices are dependent on the SIS headquarter as overseas press attaches could not issue statements without the permissions of the SIS administration at home. The complexity of internal communication, lack of information, and delays, influence the relation with foreign media and limit the interaction between press attaches and reporters in host countries.

In words of one participant:

Our main problem is the delay. We are always late, and in the court of international public opinion, the rule is that who precedes gain all sympathy

Another participant said:

We deal with a very bureaucratic institution while foreign reporters are dealing with International news agencies. They were calling me to get a response about certain things. Sometimes I did not respond because either the SIS didn't provide me with information or because the ambassador didn't want me to respond for some reasons he is the only one knew about. At the end of the day, foreign reporters got their information from new agencies and published one-sided stories. We became the big losers.

Similarly, Egyptian embassies have little autonomy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to one participant, embassies could neither disseminate any news nor issue press releases without the permission of the Spokesman Office in the MFA. Every piece of information produced abroad must be sent to the mailbox of the MFA's Spokesman. The headquarter-based Spokesman Office has the full authority to decide which information is newsworthy and thusly to appear on the

ministry's official website. In general, the major focus of Egyptian embassies abroad is to deliver messages rather than design them. Sometime, the state selects to bypass its embassies hiring foreign public relation companies to promote certain messages and policies without involving the embassies.

On the other hand, data suggested that power relations between the SIS and the MFA are not clearly defined. According to the SIS employees, there is a kind of institutional control from the Foreign Affairs over the SIS headquarter and its media offices abroad. Ambassadors have always been appointed to occupying the office of the chairpersons of the SIS. For the SIS staff, the majority of ambassadors are not media-oriented individuals, thus they are lacking the art and craft of the profession. They usually held their position on a temporarily basis, which influences the stability and efficiency of the institution. For example, one participant said, "most of those ambassadors were just physically inside the SIS, but mentally they were thinking about their next post abroad". However, findings proposed that from the MFA perspective, the SIS is a typical government institution with many bureaucratic illnesses, which severely affects its capacity to represent the country abroad. According to one participant, there has been a proposal to abolish the SIS and transfer its overseas functions to the MFA.

The above-mentioned findings propose that the SIS is a weak bureaucracy with minimum resources and influence, which stresses the need to a new public diplomacy structure. To reinforce the power of public diplomacy, therefore a new system must emerge to involve public diplomats at the planning stage of the foreign policy making process (Seib 2009). Restructuring Egyptian public diplomacy requires

establishing a strong bureaucracy with a direct link between policy makers in the country. According to Cull (2008), the great public diplomacy leaders have been close friends to their respective presidents.

Chapter Six

Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusive Remarks

Overall, the analysis of public diplomacy strategies followed by the State Information Service (SIS) and the Spokesman Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) reflected the lack of strategic communication planning to reach and influence foreign publics in the two institutions. Egyptian public diplomacy efforts have often derived from personal initiatives based on voluntarism and enthusiasm. Most of these initiatives have been neither institutionalized nor strategically planned before applying them. In the two government bodies, there are misunderstanding about what public diplomacy stands for, and insufficient knowledge of its mechanisms in the post-Cold War world, in which new communication dynamics have been emerged. The analysis showed that two major mindsets have dominated the practice of public diplomacy and strongly reflected in communication patterns followed by the two institutions: (1) authoritarianism; (2) bureaucracy.

One of the main reasons behind the inability of the government institutions to reach and influence overseas populaces is the authoritarian mindset that controls their policies and actions. For many years, the Egyptian state media has followed the authoritarian theory that constitutes: blind commitment to the regime that usually wields central power and imposes restrictions on political freedoms (Siebert,1956; Severin & Tankard,1997; Fortner & Fackler, 2014). It is true that after the January revolution, there were some expectations that Egyptian media could evolve towards a

more open and pluralistic landscape that would parallel the transition toward political change in the country (Khamis, 2011). However, the post-revolution regime seems to have been stricter on the media in which one-sided stories have been dominated and where dissident voices are almost absent in newspapers and TV shows (Abdulla, 2014). In such an authoritarian atmosphere, the role and significance of public opinion are often marginalized, which contradicts the core of public diplomacy that is based on the role of public opinion in foreign policy making.

Indeed, the authoritarian practices of the government have been strongly reflected in the way its institutions communicate with foreign publics. The tendency to control information disseminated to publics lies evidently in the government initiatives to target foreign audiences. The problem is that the state does not differentiate between messages disseminated, to influence domestic population, and messages promoted to reach and engage foreign nations. The government institutions have applied similar manipulative mechanisms in their communications with both domestic and foreign audiences. These activities have been followed based on the premise that they can shape the global mentality toward the state's direction in the same way they control the mindset of their own ruled peoples to accept the state policies and actions. However, this communication policy has proven to be flawed as publics are always skeptical of foreign governments' words and actions, which create a need for more persuasive mechanisms of effective attraction and influence to reach minds and hearts of foreign publics (Nye, 2008; Heller & Persson, 2009).

Like most autocratic regimes, the propagandistic approach has dominated the majority of information initiatives and advocacy campaigns promoted by the SIS and the MFA to target foreign audiences, particularly in the wake of the 30th June events. In their efforts to counter the West-supported Muslim Brotherhood narrative, the two

institutions promoted oratorical messages focusing on telling rather than proving through facts, symbols and actions. The paradigm of "your information vs. my information" was prevalent aiming to win arguments rather than engage in dialogue (Leaonard, 2002). However, the willingness to prove that you are right does not necessarily lead to change in the mind of target audiences. In short, the listening function has been always absent in any public diplomacy strategies applied by the two institution. This communication pattern can be attributed to the authoritarian nature of the regime, which has no real intent to listen.

In addition, the blind commitment to the regime's trends and decisions harms the credibility of those institutions abroad. Instead of following stable communication policy driven from the country's foreign policy constants, the two government bodies chose to be a part of the state of flux and turmoil that has dominated the country since 2011. The dramatic conversion in the tone and content of messaging that came with every regime change over the past five years has made any efforts to promote the government policies abroad insignificant and sometimes counterproductive. The feedback channels have always been absent in any overseas communication mechanisms applied by the two institutions. The role of opinion research in policymaking has been limited as there were limited tools providing a close reading of international public opinion inside the two institutions. Accordingly, the Egyptian messaging to the outside world has become irrelevant. As Anholt (2009) proposed, Egypt is still among the thirty most well-known countries around the world because it held a prestigious position, however it does not deserve such high profile anymore.

The government's monopoly over information is another aspect of the authoritarian mindset that undermines any public diplomacy efforts to influence foreign audiences. The analysis showed the lack of well-managed information

strategy in the two institutions in which the practices of covering up, absence of information, and delay in response have been characterize the government's communication techniques with foreign media. Similarly, a report on the status of foreign journalists and correspondents in Egypt from 2011 to 2014 emphasized the lack of transparency and falsification of facts by the state agencies and officials in their communications with foreign media. According to the report, the government constraints over documented information is one of the major obstacles that undermine foreign reporting in Egypt (Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression, 2015). The restricted access to information raises a question about the capacity of the government to influence international public opinion agenda as information and influence have always been correlated, in most studies, with public diplomacy and international agenda (Albritton& Manheim, 2006; Kelley, 2012; Zang& Cameron 2003; Kiouisis&Wu 2008; Curtain&Gaither 2004).

Besides, the analysis proposes that differences in political values and social considerations appeared through communication with foreign cultures have complicated the practices of Egyptian public diplomacy and disturbed its mechanisms to manage the image of the county abroad. The prospects of enhancing the country's soft power capacities and the emergence of Egypt as an iconic model for peaceful revolution and democratic transition have globally declined in the wake of the 30th of June events. For example, reinstalling a system of absolute power in post-Arab Spring Egypt has widened the gap between the Egyptian state and democracy-based Western societies. It is true that Western foreign policies are most probably driven by interests rather than values. However, the demands of persuasion are different for foreign publics than policy makers, which emphasizes a major distinction between public diplomacy and its traditional counterpart (Anhold, 2006; Hayden, 2007).

Foreign messaging usually passes through cultural filters that influence audiences' interpretations based on their own values and norms (Sheafer& Gabay 2009; Curtin& Gaither 2004; Nye 2008). That might question the capacity of today's Egyptian state to promote its narrative to overseas publics, apart from the rhetoric of cultural relativism.

On the other hand, the bureaucratic mindset dominated the performance of the two institutions is the second major source of deficiency that undermines the practice of Egyptian public diplomacy. The analysis showed that the two bodies have adopted a hierarchical model characterized based on a top-down and one-way approach, which complicates internal communications and causes delays in response to external updates and developments. Indeed, this hierarchical model might not be compatible with the new communication dynamics and recent realities of information technologies in the international arena. Much of those realities including free flow of information, interactivity aspects of new media, rise of non-state actors, the role of civil society and NGOs, were not considered –sometimes even denied- in the communication patterns adopted by the SIS and MFA to influence foreign audiences. However, a set of communication scholars in recent years have emphasized the emergence of new public diplomacy with different persuasive mechanisms and more effective strategies to reach overseas publics and manage the image of a country abroad, in accordance with the changing communication dynamics in the new international arena (Zaharna, 2007; Melissen,2005; Hocking; 2004; Snow, 2009).

The above conclusive remarks emphasize the need to rethink Egyptian public diplomacy and restructure its institutions to be more combatable with the new age of information and communication technologies. In the today's world, the practice of secret diplomacy with exclusive intergovernmental communications and confidential

information channels is hard to maintain, and even harder to influence. Egyptian diplomacy should develop a new system, in which cooperation with civil society is emphasized and adopting more sophisticated communication strategies with feedback channels through listening functions is necessary. Otherwise, the continuation of such bureaucratic authoritarian trends of government propaganda could end up with a powerless state that is neither able to facilitate its interests in the international arena nor able to turn any global policies to its political advantage.

In the following section, a set of recommendations will be introduced in a search for enhanced public diplomacy structure with more effective strategies to properly communicate with overseas publics and improve the image of the country abroad. The recommendations derived from both the literature presented first and the study's findings and analysis proposed later.

Recommendations

- Public diplomacy strategies should be set as a component of a wider strategy for image management of the country abroad. Any efforts to promote government policies and actions overseas should be harmonized with other national activities including trade, investment promotion, tourism, culture, sport, and talent recruitment.
- The totality and unity of the Egyptian massaging to the outside world is essential. Without coordination with other stakeholders in the country including media, political parties and movements, civil society, NGOs, business companies and prominent individuals, the government efforts to promote itself to overseas populaces will be meaningless, irrelevant and sometimes counterproductive.

- Better understanding of public diplomacy objectives and functions should be reinforced in the state institutions. The government agencies should practice public diplomacy as a policy tool rather than a mere communication approach. Feedback channels and listening mechanisms should be provided in any public diplomacy strategies.
- The philosophy behind the government overseas advocacy efforts and promotional campaigns should be radically changed. In cross-culture settings, the approach of "my information vs. your information" to win arguments is not the superlative way to persuade foreign publics. The government should adopt more open-minded, two-way communication strategies involving networking and relation-building activities to engage in real dialogues rather than delivering one-way messages.
- The government should dismiss its outdated and old-fashion propagandistic approach in which oratorical messages are disseminated and one-sided narratives are promoted to shape publics' mind toward the state direction. The Egyptian diplomacy should come up with more sophisticated communication mechanisms with effective persuasive capacities to reach the hearts and minds of overseas publics. This could materialize through verifying information rather than telling it. To capture the imagination of foreign audiences, the Egyptian public diplomacy should utilize evidence-based approaches involving rationalization through actions, symbols and facts.

- The government should differentiate between the messages disseminated to inform domestic population and the public diplomacy messaging promoted to target foreign audiences. In cross-nation communications, differences in political values and cultural norms should be considered. That is why the Egyptian public diplomacy should design its overseas messaging in more comprehensible terms for different foreign cultures. However, the state's messaging at home and abroad should be coordinated and harmonized to maintain the credibility and reputation of the government domestically and globally.
- Reliance on reactive approaches in which tracing and correcting any bad mentions of the country in foreign media is the main function of overseas Egyptian communication officers, and is not enough to create favorable public opinion abroad. The government should depend on more proactive approaches, which is considered a far more advanced stage of public diplomacy. The Egyptian public diplomacy should preplan an overseas communication policy for each government action and decision. It is more influential and persuasive to create than to correct. The Egyptian public diplomats should work as actors, instead of being mere commentators or apologizers.
- The government should develop a crisis-management strategy to communicate with the outside world in times of shocks and crises. One of the main lessons derived from the past five years of flux and turmoil in the country is the urgency to create rapid-response mechanisms to public diplomacy strategies in which budgetary flexibility and well-trained crisis teams are available. In the time of crisis, diplomatic efforts should be managed as a political campaign in which all

activities and actions are leveled, goal-oriented and well resourced. In addition, the coordination with allies and like-minded states is essential in such difficult times.

- Maintaining good relations with foreign reporters and resident correspondents through facilitating their work and providing them with an access to information should be an integral part of the government efforts to reach and influence mass audiences in other countries. The government should pay enough attention to the way domestic stories will be shaped in foreign media.

- Egyptian public diplomacy structures, if any, should be reconstituted. A set of powerful institutions with sufficient budget allocations and qualified staffs should be established. For example, there is a need to create an up-to-date, well-resourced national media center in which new realities of information and communication technologies are applied. The center should be equipped with advanced tools of opinion polls and media monitoring to provide a regular reading of international public opinion and measure the global image of the country on a frequent basis.

- The lack of full-capacity overseas communication officers should be honestly addressed, which could provide an opportunity for creating a new system to generate qualified public diplomats with linguistic and cultural fluency. Developing a separate career path for public diplomats, with a similar system of honors and distinctions like that of traditional diplomatic corps is recommended.

- The significance of the good representation of the country abroad should be reinforced among grass roots and ordinary citizens, as public diplomacy becomes everyone's business. The behavior of one Egyptian -whether an overseas student, an immigrant, or a tourist- plays a role in Egyptian public diplomacy.

- Above all, one truth should be embraced in the state's mindset that the finest and most successful public diplomacy in the world cannot save a failed policy. In other words, no matter how effective the marketing strategies are it would not be effective would the product be bad. Therefore, public diplomacy should have an influence at the planning stages of policies. Public diplomats become more effective if they have enough knowledge and power to prevent a bad policy from coming into force.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Although qualitative methods were the most appropriate to answer the research questions in this study, certain limitations inherent to qualitative research need to be addressed. Indeed the results of this study cannot be generalized for two main reasons. First, the study focuses only on two institutions, the SIS and public diplomacy department in the MFA, particularly their headquarters at home. Second, the number of interviews was limited due to time and political constraints. Despite the limitations, the study makes significant contribution to the research of public diplomacy in a non-western context by filling the gap in the literature that focuses mostly on the practice of public diplomacy in western world in which Arab countries are usually addressed as target rather than advocate nations. Moreover, This study advances a theoretical framework designed to apply agenda building

theory to government communications by finding a connection between strategies followed by public diplomacy institutions and agenda-building function of those institutions.

Future research can contribute to the further study of Egyptian public diplomacy by focusing on overseas performance through exploring strategies and techniques applied by Egyptian embassies and press offices abroad to reach and influence foreign publics. Although the home-based headquarters are usually the master mind behind communication patterns followed by overseas offices, case studies of Egyptian embassies across the world may help to better understand the cultural differences and their influence on public diplomacy models in various countries. Future studies may also extend to investigate the agenda-building function of cultural and educational institutions in the country and evaluate their role in cultural diplomacy and exchange programs with other countries, particularly in Africa and Middle East.

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Appendix 1

Interview Questions

- 1- What is the definition of public diplomacy from Egyptian perspective?
- 2- Is the term "Public Diplomacy" frequently used in the context of promoting Egypt abroad?
- 3- What are the strategies you follow to promote Egypt abroad?
- 4- Is there any kind of coordination between the government and NGOs to promote Egypt abroad?
- 5- Do you use new media and social websites in your promotional efforts to improve the image of the country?
- 6- Is there any kind of reliance on international PR companies to promote the country's policies and values abroad?
- 7- How can Egypt promote its own narrative in international media?
- 8- What is the role of culture difference in communicating with foreign audiences?
- 9- What are the challenges that undermine your efforts to communicate with foreign publics?
- 10- What are the recommendations you make to help improve the image of Egypt abroad?

Appendix 2

List of participants

- 1) **Ambassador Dr. Bader Abdel Atty**, The spokesman of The Ministry of Affairs, from June 2013 to August 2015
- 2) **Ambassador Salah Abdel Sadek** ,The Former of the State Information Service (SIS), from December 2013 till now
- 3) **Ambassador Amgad Abdel Ghafar**,The Former Chairman of the SIS
- 4) **Dr Taha Abdel Aleem**: The Former Chairman of the SIS
- 5) **Abdel Moaty Abu Zaid**: the head of the foreign media division at the SIS
- 6) **Dr Ahmed Abu Elhassan**: The Head of the Editing and Publishing Division at the SIS, the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Lebanon from 2009-2013, the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Bahrain; from 2001 to 2005.
- 7) **Attia Shkraan**: The head of the office of the SIS chairman, and he was the head of the press office in the Egyptian Consulate in San Francisco from 2005-2009, press attaché at the Egyptian embassy in South Africa from 1997 to 2001, and press attaché at the Egyptian Consulate in San Francisco from 1989 to 1992
- 8) **Ayman Walash**: Media Researcher at the SIS, and the coordinator of Fact Check Team
- 9) **Nagwa Hussein**: Senior official at the foreign media division in the SIS, and she was the Head of the Press Office at the Egyptian Embassy in Switzerland
- 10) **Nabil Bakr**: Senior official at the foreign media division in the SIS, and he was the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Saudi Arabia
- 11) **Rasha Mohamed Ali**: Senior official at the Foreign Media Division in the SIS, and she was the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Spain from 2010 to 2014

- 12) **Ramdan Korany:** The editor in chief of "African Horizons" magazine issued by the SIS
- 13) **Dr. Ali Mahmoud Ali:** Media researcher at the SIS and he was the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Algeria
- 14) **Nashwa Abdel Hamid:** Senior official at the foreign media division in the SIS, and she was press attaché at the Egyptian Embassy in the USA (March to July 2002), the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Australia (March to August 2003), press attaché in the Egyptian Embassy in UK (August 2003 to June 2007), the head of the press office in the Egyptian Consulate in Los Anglos (November 2011 to February 2014), and the head of the press office in the Egyptian Embassy in Kampala from March to November 2014)
- 15) **Manal Elshabrawy:** Senior official at the foreign media division at the SIS, and she was press attaché in the Egyptian embassy of UK from 2007-2011
- 16) **Basma Hafez:** Senior official in the information division in the SIS, and she worked as a press attaché at the Egyptian Embassy in the USA from 1996-2000, and the head of the press office in the Egyptian mission at the Unitized Nation (New York) from 2006-2010
- 17) **Ahmed Altenikhy:** The head of the press office in Uganda from November 2014 until now, and the head of the press office in Tunisia from October 2013 to November 2014.

Appendix 3

Decree on the Establishment of the Information Department

In the name of the Nation,

President of the Republic,

Having reviewed the decree of law No. 270 of 1952 on the establishment of the Ministry of National Guidance,

In accordance with the Minister of National Guidance has reviewed and having regard to the agreement of the Cabinet,

We decree the following:

Article 1

In the Ministry of National Guidance, a department entitled "Information Department" shall be established. Such Department shall comprise the general administration for Information and the administration of monitoring technical affairs.

Article 11

The Minister of National Guidance shall bring such decree into force.

Issued in the Palace of the Republic on the 4th of Moharam 1374 A.H. (corresponding to the 3rd of September, 1954)

(Mohammad Nageeb) Major-General (Military Staff).

Minister of National Guidance

Prime Minister

Salah-El-Deen Mostafa Salem (Major Military Staff)

(Gamal Abd-El- Nasser Hussien) Lieutenant-Colonel (Military Staff)

A duplicate shall be sent to the Minister of National Guidance to come into force.

Signature Prime Minister

Appendix 4

Decree No. 1820 of 1967 on the Establishment of the SIS

President of the Republic,

Having considered the Constitution

Law No. 308 of 1955 on Administration Attachment,

Law No. 61 of 1963 promulgating the Law of General Authorities,

Law No. 46 of 1946 on the system of Civil Servants,

The presidential decree No. 3718 of 1965 on organizing the sector of Culture,
National Guidance, Tourism and Antiquities,

The presidential decree No. 76 of 1966 on organizing the Ministry of National Guidance,

We decree the following:

Article I

A general authority entitled State Information Service “SIS” shall be established and shall have an artificial character. Such authority shall be affiliated to the Minister of National Guidance and shall be subject to the supervision, censorship and directives thereof.

Article II

SIS shall aim at contributing to realizing the mission of the Ministry of National Guidance in the fields of examining domestic and world public opinion concerning issues and events that concern the state, in addition to guiding, directing and enlightening the domestic public opinion by using direct means of communication, as well as in the field of Information and the enlightenment of the world public opinion by using the different means in accordance with the information plans agreed upon.

SIS may realize such objective work in cooperation with all the concerned agencies of the State, particularly the other information agencies, the Arab Socialist Union agencies, and the State's agencies abroad.

SIS in particular, may:

1-Organize obtaining information on different subjects, events and issues that concern public opinion at home and abroad, collecting, categorizing, studying and analyzing such information to extract the different trend thereof. The results thereof shall be reported to the bodies concerned, particularly the agencies of the agencies of the Ministry of Guidance in a way that may allow planning and drawing the policy of information according to real situation of the trends of the domestic and world public opinion,

2-Follow up the reactions and trends of domestic and world public opinion towards the media programs presented by the state in connection with the masses of the people. Such follow up shall be carried out via the domestic and foreign agencies of SIS with the assistance of all the agencies of the State at home and abroad,

3-Prepare and implement information programs that are directed to domestic public opinion in accordance with the decided policy and plans aiming to enhance and deepen socialist concepts among the public categories, boost the exerted efforts for realizing the civilizational level of the village, realize the continuous link between the people and the leadership thereof, convey the philosophy of the national work to all employees, make the citizens aware of the State's policies, trend and resolutions, and contribute to highlighting the national occasions and other similar aims that relate to guiding and directing the masses of the people via using means of direct communication through the activities of the stable and mobile domestic information centers such as holding direct meetings and issuing publications, photos, as well as

displaying stickers, slides and documentary films, in addition to broadcasting documentary cassettes and the likes of the means of direct communication with the masses of the people.

4- Prepare and implement the information programs directed to the world public opinion according to the decided information policies and plans in order to inform such world public opinion of the objectives, the socialist and the trends of the United Arab Republic towards the world problems in addition to the extent of rise achieved thereby. The programs shall refute counterclaims in addition to the other objectives that aim to enlighten the world public opinion by using direct and public means of communication through the information centers and the State agencies abroad,

5- Prepare and edit informational booklets and publications which have the general characteristic and contain what concerns the world and the local public opinion, including the different trends, categories and levels thereof on the current subjects and events in addition to the public trends there towards in order to show the aspects of the development and the rise of the republic, also to face the effects of such counterclaims,

6- Prepare and edit informational publications and reports specialized in political, economic and social subjects that concern the supreme authorities of the State,

7- Prepare the informational materials including printed publications, stickers, photos, recording slides, documentary films, and other materials necessary to carry out the decided internal and external informational programs in accordance with such plans and programs, and in pursuance of the decided rates,

8- Work on making and strengthening the bonds with the peoples of other states by providing the authorities, individuals and foreigners with media information and materials in response to the desires and questions thereof. Also, provide the sons of

the United Arab Republic, the friendly countries, and envoys with the media information and materials in order to show the trends of the Republic and the aspects of development therein; in addition to confront the counterclaims.

9- Offer help for journalists, corresponding the like including residing and visiting foreign businessmen in order to know the realistic and the trends of the state concerning the events as well as the internal and external issues.

10- Implement the laws and regulations related to journalism and the publication of news as well as statements, news and the like including what is entrusted to the Ministry of National Guidance concerning local press affairs.

Article III

The Board of Directors of the SIS shall be constituted as follows;

- A Board Chairman; a presidential decree shall be issued to appoint and specify the bonuses thereof.
- Six members; the Minister of National Guidance shall issue a decree for the assignment thereof for a renewable term of three years.

Article IV

The Board of Directors of the SIS shall be the dominating power of the affairs thereof that shall deal with the matters thereof, set the policies that shall be followed thereby, and adopt the decrees regarded thereby necessary to achieve the purpose items established therefor and thereto, in particular:

- 1- Issuing resolutions and internal regulations; in addition to the decisions concerning the financial, administrative, and technical affairs of SIS without being restricted to the governmental rules,

- 2- Enacting regulations concerning the appointment, promotion, transference and dismissal of the workers of SIS; in addition to the determination of the salaries, bonuses and pensions thereof,
- 3- Approving the annual budget draft,
- 4- Proposing international agreements and treaties concerning the SIS,
- 5- Proposing making loans for the benefit of the SIS,
- 6- Proposing and specifying the duties, tariffs and salaries for the kinds of services presented by the SIS.
- 7- Considering all that shall be regarded by the Minister of National Guidance or the Board Chairman to be set forth, concerning matters included within the competency of the SIS. The Board of Directors may form a committee or more, composed of the members thereof and entrust thereto some of the competencies thereof. The Board may delegate a member or a director of the SIS to perform a certain mission.

Article V

The Board Chairman shall take charge of managing the SIS, dealing with the affairs thereof, and representing the SIS in the relations thereof with other persons and before the judiciary. Also, the Board Chairman shall be responsible for the implementation of the objective general policy in order to achieve the purpose of SIS, and may entrust a director or more with some of the jurisdictions thereof.

Article VI

The Board of Directors shall meet at least once every month by virtue of a call by the Chairman thereof. The Minister of the National Guidance may call the Board to order

whenever regarded necessary. The meeting shall not be true or correct provided that the majority of members shall be present. Decrees shall be issued by the majority of the presents. In case of parity, preference shall be given to the side of the Chairman.

Article VII

Minutes of meetings and texts of decrees shall be recorded and signed by the Board Chairman and the Secretary of the session.

Article VIII

The Board Chairman of SIS shall submit the resolutions of the Board to the Minister of National Guidance in order to be attested. The same Minister shall submit to the President of the Republic all the matters that need a presidential decree to be issued thereby.

Article IX

The present workers in the cancelled information Department shall be transferred to the SIS with the same degrees, salaries and bonuses thereof.

Article X

SIS shall have a separate budget prepared according to the rules proposed by the Central Agency of Organization and Administration in agreement with the Ministry of Treasury.

Article XI

SIS may carry out the procedures stipulated in Law No. 308 of 1955, mentioned herein, to take the rights thereof.

Article XII

The Ministry of National Guidance shall take charge of the competencies of the Board of Directors of the SIS until the Board is formed

Article XIII

Systems and rules applied in the cancelled Information Department shall remain applicable until the SIS shall issue the internal, financial and administrative regulations thereof.

Article XIV

Such decree shall be published in the official gazette and shall come into force as of the date of publication thereof.

Issued in the Presidency on the Fifth of Ragab 1387 A.H (correspondent to October, 19, 1967).

Shall be sent to the Minister of National Guidance, the Secretary- General of the State.

Appendix 5

قرار رئيس جمهورية مصر العربية

رقم ١٧٠ لسنة ٢٠١٢

رئيس الجمهورية

- بعد الاطلاع على الإعلان الدستوري الصادر في ١٣ من فبراير سنة ٢٠١١ ،
- وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر في ٣٠ من مارس سنة ٢٠١١ ،
- وعلى الإعلان الدستوري الصادر في ١١ من أغسطس سنة ٢٠١٢ ،
- وعلى قانون الهيئات العامة الصادر بالقانون رقم ٦١ لسنة ١٩٦٣ ،
- وعلى قرار رئيس الجمهورية رقم ١٨٢٠ لسنة ١٩٦٧ بإنشاء الهيئة العامة للإستعلامات ،
- وعلى قرار رئيس الجمهورية رقم ٣١٠ لسنة ١٩٨٦ بإختصاصات وزارة الإعلام ،
- وعلى قرار رئيس الجمهورية رقم ٧٣ لسنة ١٩٨٩ بتشكيل رئاسة الجمهورية .

قرر

(المادة الأولى)

تنقل تبعية الهيئة العامة للإستعلامات الصادر بإنشائها قرار رئيس الجمهورية رقم ١٨٢٠ لسنة ١٩٦٧ المشار إليه ، من وزارة الإعلام إلى رئاسة الجمهورية .

(المادة الثانية)

ينشر هذا القرار في الجريدة الرسمية ، ويعمل به إعتباراً من تاريخ صدوره .

(محمد مرسى)

صدر برئاسة الجمهورية في ١٩ شوال سنة ١٤٣٣ هـ

الموافق ٦ سبتمبر سنة ٢٠١٢ م

صورة مرسلة إلى السيد /  رئيس مجلس إدارة الهيئة العامة للإستعلامات



رئيس

هيئة مستشاري مجلس الوزراء

(الرجح)

المستشار / السيد محمد السيد الطحان