Risky bodies offshore: spatialisation, securitisation and visual regimes of migration

Angela Smith

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Risky Bodies Offshore:
Spatialisation, Securitisation and Visual Regimes of Migration

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Introduction

Crises at Sea
On 6th September 2014, a boat departed from the port of Damietta, on Egypt’s North Coast, carrying more than 500 migrants from Syria, Palestine, Sudan and Egypt. The boat, headed for Malta, never reached its destination. A dispute broke out between the passengers and the smugglers, and ultimately the smugglers rammed the migrants’ boat, causing it to sink. Of all the passengers on board, only eleven reportedly survived. One of the Palestinian passengers who lived to tell the tale, clung to a life buoy for a day and a half before being rescued by a container ship that was already carrying 386 rescued migrants from another sunken vessel. In the days after the sinking, tragic personal stories emerged in the media - the Egyptian teenager seeking money for his father’s medical treatment who clung to the buoy for hours before succumbing to fatigue and drifting into the ocean; the man who, in a final act of desperation, hung himself on the boat as the conflict with the smugglers escalated; and the watery misspelled love letter carried by a young Egyptian who drowned.

The news emerged on the same day as yet another boat bound for Europe capsized off the coast of Libya, with as many as two hundred more migrants feared dead. Spokesperson for UNHCR, Carlotta Sami, described it as “without any doubt the deadliest weekend ever in the Mediterranean”. A Libyan navy spokesperson said: “There are so many dead bodies floating in the sea”. And indeed he is right - the number of lives lost at sea has peaked in 2014, with the IOM estimating that up to 3,072 migrants have died in the Mediterranean from January through to the end of September alone.1 The actual number of fatalities is likely to be much higher, as many deaths go unrecorded. In some cases, entire boats and all their passengers disappear at sea and no deaths are ever recorded. Crossing to Europe from the Middle East and North Africa appears to be the most deadly site globally for migrants, with over 22,000 lives lost since 2000.

In the same month as these Mediterranean tragedies, on the other side of the world the Australian Immigration Minister Scott Morrison was claiming victory in his battle to ‘stop the boats’ attempting to arrive on Australian shores. Morrison was pictured giving a triumphant thumbs-up from behind an Operation Sovereign Borders podium, while Australian newspaper headlines celebrated a ‘mission accomplished’, ‘victory at sea’, boasting that in the last year the new government had been able to turn back 12 boats, prevent 45 boats from ever leaving their port, and send 1,673 asylum seekers ‘back to where they came from’. Despite the relatively small

numbers of attempted sea crossings to Australia, a huge amount of government resources and public sentiment are invested in the issue of border control. The Border Crossing Observatory of Monash University in Australia suggests that around 1,500 migrants have died at sea in their journey to Australia between 2000 and 2014. While in Australia the scale of irregular migration crossings by boat is far smaller numerically and even proportionately compared to the Mediterranean, the issue is writ large in the national imagination and Australia is known as a global trailblazer in hard-line approaches to border security.

Faced with a steady flow of boats, Western states and their general publics have become increasingly fixated on those who attempt to undertake irregular journeys by sea. Despite the supposed legal parity of those arriving by sea with those arriving by land or air, migrants undertaking irregular maritime journeys occupy a particularly potent form of threat, which manifests in policy and discursive realms of "Fortress Europe" and Australia. As migration management takes on evermore-draconian dimensions, the border has become an irrefutably violent and deadly site, and this is nowhere more apparent than in the dangerous sea journeys undertaken in the hope of reaching Europe or Australia. Tragic events like those described above are no longer isolated incidents; stories abound of leaky boats, drownings, shipwrecks, standoffs, smugglers, rescue attempts, floating bodies, sodden personal artefacts, and long lists of the missing.

In both Europe and Australia, the fierce political debates and media frenzy surrounding irregular maritime arrivals of asylum seekers are permeated by the enduring construction of crisis. The crisis is fed by the ever present “threat” that unauthorised arrivals pose to national security. To respond to this crisis, states deploy ever more complex and punitive practices to ensure that unauthorised migrants, as far as possible, never arrive. In doing so, the reach of the state extends offshore, extending its sovereign power far beyond the margins of territory. A host of new technologies to deter ‘unauthorized arrivals’ have been deployed, which at once disrupt traditional notions of territoriality, while simultaneously enhancing and protecting territorial boundaries. These strategies include extraterritorial policing and pre-emptive interceptions, the excision of territories, the establishment of offshore detention centres, and a host of “third country” agreements. Border enforcement prevents migrant bodies from seeking asylum by deterring, and otherwise excluding them from jurisdictions where they could make an asylum claim.


2 Michael Grewcock, Border Crimes: Australia’s War on Illicit Migrants (Sydney, N.S.W: Federation Pr, 2010).
Given the heated political debates globally on the issue of irregular border-crossings, and the growing list of drowned asylum seekers - named and unnamed – questions arise about the forced and voluntary movement of bodies through these offshore geographies. What terrains of sovereignty, citizenship and death do such mobile bodies move within? And what is so threatening about a particular form of agency (manifest as mobility) that such violent and absurd measures are required to capture, neutralise or otherwise annihilate this very basic form of human freedom? Is there something particular about the sea and our relationship to slippery offshore geographies more broadly that invites a particular type of spatial assertion of sovereignty?

**Fluid Sovereignties**

The sea is full of possibility and danger - at once the site of potential death, rescue, or deliverance. It has emerged as the main stage where various spectacular encounters are played out between migrants and a growing assemblage of state, non-state and private actors entangled in the governance of migration. At sea, the imperatives of security and border patrol are entwined with humanitarianism, foreign aid, peacekeeping missions, and private contracts. These multiple actors are continually reshaping the contested geopolitical space of the border, against the backdrop of colonial histories, the inequities of globalisation, and the discourses and technologies of securitisation. Increasingly, humanitarian and security imperatives intersect, with military and police institutions appropriating human rights discourses, while humanitarian agencies become evermore implicated in the enforcement of securitisation agendas. Attempts to control human movement are promoted as the sole prerogative of the territorially defined nation state. Nonetheless, migrant bodies - living and dead - continue to defy these lines drawn in the sea and manage to test the limits of inclusion and exclusion.

Spatially and ontologically separated from the mainland, the sea and its island territories operate at the level of the symbolic as well as the geopolitical. The sea, in all its fluidity, poses spatial-political challenges to the nation state and territorialised conceptions of sovereignty. The sea, the ship, the island, the seashore are all ambiguous problem-spaces for Western legal jurisdiction in comparison to the territorialised space of the state. Not coincidentally, the pirate, as the ‘ultimate territorial transgressor’ - not bound by any national identification and harbouring by the sovereign-less seas - was the precursor to the terrorist: the original ‘enemy of all’. Outside of the

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law, these enemies and their outlaw territorialities challenge the state preoccupation with territorial fixity, while at the same time these zones of illegibility and ambiguity can be highly productive for state power. Taking the sea as a site of analysis, it is clear that the security and humanitarian imperatives of migration management play out according to particular spatial imaginaries.

The tragic dramas of boats, bodies and borders that play out offshore reveal much about the contemporary exercise of sovereignty. Perera has suggested that beaches, oceans, islands and offshore territories are the sites where sovereignty and territoriality are exercised in distinctive ways through ‘inclusion and exclusion, extension and contraction, where the limits of the national are performed and tested’.8 From pre-emptive patrolling to detention in remote territories, struggles over migration, asylum and exclusion play out along the margins of the nation-state.9 These edges and extremities of the geopolitical body of the nation state serve to remind us of the existence of the border itself. At these sites, where the finite territoriality of the nation is laid bare, anxieties accrue, as do the ‘myths and fantasies that assuage and contain the anxieties generated’.10

There are broad spatial and conceptual patterns at work on a global scale, and offshore locations are now critical to migration governance. These various geographies - of inclusion and exclusion, of the sublime and the spectacle, the citizen and the terrorist, the abject and the spectator - create a necropolitical terrain where death, or being ‘let die’, is increasingly the norm. These offshores sites are the spaces between-nations, where asylum seekers wait - often for lengthy durations - in legal limbo. This suspension of time maps onto the corresponding spatial ambiguity of these sites, often theorized as ‘liminality, zones of exception or thresholds between states’.11 These liminal sites signal both ‘movement and stagnation, transgression and disruption, and ambiguous forms of belonging that map onto partial forms of citizenship and statelessness’.12

**Spectacular Visualities**

The regulation of migration within a crisis/securitisation discourse would not be possible without heavy investment in the discursive and representational realms. Securitisation and humanitarianism rely upon the production of a particular kind of spectacle. Over the last decade, such affective spectacles have proliferated - from those of militarised border policing13, through

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13 Ibid.
to the spectacle of the shipwreck, described by Perera as a 'theatre of sublime trauma’. The visuality of such spectacles plays a key role in the reproduction of securitisation and humanitarian discourses of migration. In his book on the emergence of human-security states, Paul Amar has argued that hypervisibilisation (the 'spotlighting of certain identities and bodies as sources of radical insecurity and moral panic in ways that actually render invisible the real nature of power and social control’) and securitisation (the 'reconfiguration of political debates and claims around social justice, political participation, or resource distribution into technical assessments of danger, operations of enforcement and targeting of risk populations’) are key tenets in human-security modes of governance.

The tacit public approval of the state's punitive treatment of asylum seekers relies upon a particular aesthetic and discursive treatment of asylum seekers. The spectacle attached to asylum seeking - a spectacle of shipwrecks, drownings, rescues on the high seas, and remote island detention centres – is critical. This spectacle not only contributes to the discourse around migration by fuelling the fire of crisis, but also serves to manufacture a certain brand of horror. The spectacle and the horror themselves circulate, attaching to the abject figure of the migrant in the public imagination. Equally critical are those spaces that remain unseen - the remote offshore territories that have become the cornerstone of migration detention policies, for the most part kept out of view of the mainland, with media access granted in limited ways according to the state’s wishes. The island territory and the deep sea are paradoxically both out of sight and spectacularly illuminated, but all the while under intense surveillance using highly visual technologies.

Technologies of extra-territorial and offshore border policing rely on increasingly sophisticated 'statist regimes of visuality'. These include biometric technologies, human detection sensors, surveillance drones and satellite tracking systems. In order to justify these draconian border-policing measures, the state maintains an ongoing project of legitimization that relies upon the visible production and reproduction of particular - and spectacular - images of crisis, terror and horror in relation to the threat posed by irregular migrants. The distant geographies of offshore sites - the high seas, remote island detention centres and other offshore territories - ensure that irregular migrants are largely out of sight, with the exception of the strategic production of visual spectacles of trauma and horror. The violent measures used by states and private border security contractors often take place far from the public eye. Despite the distances, technology allows visual messages to cross borders in multiple directions - going to and from the offshore spaces where migrants are detained.

14 Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination, 79.  
17 Ibid.
Migrants held in detention attempt to make themselves visible to the public through creating their own spectacles (such as violent acts of self harm) or through publishing photos, testimonies and letters online through activists and other advocacy networks. The state, for its part, also relies on sending visual messages to asylum seekers and potential asylum seekers. These have included multilingual billboards, graphic novels, websites, booklets and video messages. Visual processes are thereby used by states, irregular migrants, the media, NGOs, activist and advocacy groups, to achieve certain types of visibility and invisibility. The spatiality of offshore sites is critical to the functioning of these visual strategies. These processes manipulate distance and proximity, and serve to criminalise irregular migrants in both discursive and material ways.\(^{18}\)

**Research Questions**

In light of these recent trends, this thesis seeks to broadly examine the relationship between migration, securitisation and crises of sovereignty within the contemporary transnational governance of human mobility. Its focus is on the ways in which offshore geographies and visualities combine to produce a form of spectacular horror that becomes attached to the migrant body. It will examine the functioning of visibility and invisibility in liminal spaces, particularly in those offshore sites where acts of border policing take place. I will attempt to connect those events happening at the sites between nation-states with those events taking place domestically within sovereign territories: exclusion, the politics of terror, media depictions, state visualities and counter-visualities.\(^{19}\)

My geographical focus is on the edge-of-territory and beyond - that is, the beaches, islands, offshore territories and the deep sea - where these maritime spectacles take place, particularly in crossing the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to Europe, and in the waters north of Australia. These spaces at territory's edge and beyond need to be contextualised and located within their particular histories of imperialism, colonialism and militarisation. To do so serves to differentiate these sites from one another, according to their historical and material specificities. At the same time, attending to the patterns of power and space operating in offshore sites can help us to connect spatially distant and historically unique sites within a broader regime of mobility control.\(^{20}\)

Taking the sea and offshore geographies as my site, I wish to explore this distinctly contemporary form of migration governance which combines the discourses of securitisation and humanitarianism with visual registers of exposure, erasure and the spectacle. The functioning of


\(^{20}\) cf. Ibid.
these technologies is far from purely discursive or symbolic; as I will demonstrate, these offshore geographies and visualities are a form of sovereign power that has devastating material consequences for migrants. In order to animate this discussion, I will examine a set of examples from my two sites - the Mediterranean and Australia's offshore - and bring them into the one analytical frame. Through an analysis of these examples, the role of visuality, the sublime spectacle, and the manufacture of horror are laid bare. I wish to explore the global fixation with those who travel by sea, and the role of visuality and horror in justifying the increasingly securitised and militarised response to maritime migrations.

My thesis seeks to consider three primary questions through the examination of a number of examples. Firstly, what historical and geographical patterns emerge in the increasing use of offshore and marginal sites, by Australia and the EU, in the ongoing securitisation of migration? Second, in moments of crises, how does securitisation come to deploy both carceral and humanitarian technologies simultaneously? And finally, how do visual regimes across maritime spaces and the edges of territory serve to both expose and erase migrants, while producing spectacles of trauma?

These three questions will be addressed across four chapters, followed by a conclusion. **Chapter One: “Introduction”** introduces the research, its methodology, and reviews the relevant literature in order to locate this work within a particular genealogy of thinking and writing about sovereignty, space, migration, humanitarianism and securitisation.

**Chapter Two “Spatial Practices of Bordering: Islands and Other Offshore Strategies”** focuses on the emerging spatial practises used by states, particularly the geographical articulation of sovereignty upon islands and peripheral spaces during times of crisis. I will look at the decoupling of sovereignty and territory, the role of islands in the Western imaginary, and outline the specific histories and geographies of four sites - Lampedusa and Melilla in the Mediterranean, and Christmas Island and Nauru to the north of Australia. I will argue in this chapter that across distant geographies there are horizontal contours of connection and similarity across these sites. At the same time, on a temporal axis, the current use of these sites cannot be separated from their respective histories of indigeneity, militarism, colonialism, and economic exploitation.

In **Chapter Three “Human Security? Risky Bodies in Times of Crisis”** I examine contemporary securitisation discourses. I focus on the ways in which the perception and production of crises trigger state security responses, which combine the punitive measure of detention with humanitarian imperatives. I will focus on the intersection of security and humanitarian imperatives in relation to Syrian refugees in Egypt. I will look at the causal factors that led to the mass exodus by sea, which can be attributed to security concerns, of both the state and refugees themselves. I will consider the speech acts of political elites that contribute to securitisation
responses and the reshaping of the Self/Other relationship. I will highlight the ways in which securitisation and humanitarian imperatives converge upon the refugee body in moments of national crisis.

Chapter Four, "Visual Regimes: Surveillance, Shipwrecks and the Spectacle of Suffering" attests to the role of visuality and the spectacle in the production and management of maritime migrations. Firstly I will consider the statist visuality regimes used in the surveillance of water bodies and refugee bodies, and the potentiality for this visual data to be re-appropriated to tell counter-stories. Following this I will focus on the concept of the spectacle of suffering and trauma, looking at both shipwrecks and offshore migrant detention. I will argue that refugees undertaking maritime migrations or being held in offshore detention centres are represented along visual registers which serve to both expose and erase. One aspect of this exposure - which also constitutes an erasure - is the production of spectacle, particularly the shipwreck, but also the incarcerated refugee, or the self-harming protesting refugee. I will examine the conditions of carceral horror produced in Australia's Manus Island detention facility and the way these conditions are visually mobilised by the Australian government as a lesson in deterrence.

The final section is the Conclusion in which I will bring together the three aspects of contemporary migration management that I have considered - its offshore geographical articulations, the securitisation-humanitarian nexus, and regimes of spectacular visuality. I will consider what these patterns reveal to us about contemporary management of migration and manifestations of sovereignty in moments of crisis.

Methodology

This thesis is essentially a series of theoretical and empirical enquiries into the interrelated categories of migration, security and humanitarianism. It seeks to examine topographies of power operating transnationally across a range of sites located offshore or at territory’s edge, inhabited by asylum seekers. The methodology seeks to connect distant nodes that give shape to an overall constellation that reveals something of the form of contemporary migration governance. It does not seek to undertake comparative work, but rather to highlight particular nodes, events, images and speech acts which reveal the working of power at a local level, connected to the transnational.

In this sense, I am influenced methodologically by geographers Alison Mountz and Cindi Katz in their topographical approach. While topography is traditionally seen as made up of landscapes and their description or representation, Katz uses topography as a research method. For Katz, topography-as-method enables a 'situated, but at the same time scale-jumping and geography-
crossing’ response.\textsuperscript{22} She argues that while topography is ‘resolutely material’, there are ‘productive metaphorical entailments of the idea as well’. A multi-sited topography enables relationships and movements across spaces and between places to be examined, including the movement of people, labour, capital and cultural products. Contour lines - as used on a topographical map - connect places that share an altitude in order to reveal the three-dimensional shape of the terrain.\textsuperscript{23} In applying contour lines to analysis of multiple sites, places can be connected analytically to other places at the same "elevation" in relation to a particular process (e.g. global management of migration), while maintaining their own distinctness.\textsuperscript{24} Such an approach seeks to map the neo-colonial power relations that shape migration governance and reveal the material and affective disparities at work. In this way, a topographical approach enables analysis grounded in a politics of location, while linking global and local scales.\textsuperscript{25} While a thorough topography of my sites, including historical and geographical analysis of social and material practices, is beyond the scope of this thesis, I have attempted to provide at least a brief topographical analysis of my offshore sites.

To draw upon another spatial metaphor pertaining to methodology, I have also been influenced by Paul Amar’s "archipelago method".\textsuperscript{26} Amar uses a range of interpretive methods to bring together transnational events, practices and discourses in Cairo and Rio de Janeiro. He examines a range of examples from the two sites and interprets them in a way that advances his broader argument - that human security discourses\textsuperscript{27} are replacing neoliberalism as the dominant form of governance in the global south.

The thesis methodology draws upon a combination of fieldwork and theoretical and textual analysis. The empirical fieldwork has been undertaken within Egypt and consists of a range of formal and informal research methods undertaken over the last three and a half years of living in Cairo. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with refugee service providers ranging from UNHCR to international NGOs, through to local NGOs, faith-based organisations and Syrian community organisations, as well innumerable conversations with African and Syrian refugees in Egypt. The research also draws upon knowledge gained while teaching English to refugees at Saint Andrew’s Refugee Services. In my role as a freelance consultant, I have undertaken

\begin{thebibliography}{26}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 1216.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 1229.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Mountz, “Where Asylum Seekers Wait,” 383.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Amar, The Security Archipelago.
\item \textsuperscript{27} The paradigm of “human security” rose to prominence in the mid 1990s as a challenge the traditional notion of national security, which shifted the emphasis onto individual human security. While proffered as an alternative paradigm, Paul Amar is highly critical of the notion. This will be discussed further later in the thesis but it is important to note here that Amar is critical of the term for propagating an alignment of humanitarian and police and military concerns under a broader rubric of human security. My use of the term follows Amar’s here, rather than the institutionalized notion of the term patronised by UN agencies and NGOs.
\end{thebibliography}
observation and participant-observation methods while working as a researcher for UNHCR and Plan International undertaking research projects and assessments regarding Syrians in Egypt. As well as my involvement with NGOs, I have also been in contact with, and at times participated in, Egyptian refugee solidarity campaigns such as Refugee Solidarity Movement (RSM) and in Australia with the Refugee Action Collective (RAC). Data pertaining to refugees in Egypt, with a focus on Syrians, has been drawn from UNHCR assessments, INGO assessments, documentation work carried out by the RSM on detentions and deportations, and from research I have conducted myself. The textual analysis components are informed by following mainstream media, social media, and alternative media campaigns in order to identify the circulation of popular texts and images in both Australia and Egypt or the greater Mediterranean space. In Australia, government documents are far easier to obtain as these are clearly articulated, published, produced in English, and available online. In the EU countries, government documents are often available online, although not as readily as in Australia and not all of them in English. In Egypt, such government documents pertaining to refugees are far harder to obtain. To this end, I have relied upon documentation of experiences as reported by refugees themselves and service providing organisations working with refugees. I have worked with a research assistant/translator at some points during the research in order to identify and translate Arabic media circulating in Egypt pertaining to refugees, particularly Syrians and the significant discursive shift that occurred in relation to their position in Egypt. I rely extensively upon my relationships in Egypt and informal ways of knowing, and have privileged this over more formal methodologies. This thesis is the result of many innumerable hours of conversation, of anecdotes, of questions and answers, and observations.

Literature Review

The contemporary moment is an era in which all aspects of human mobility have been subject to an expansion of securitisation and militarisation. The punitive approach to migration management is executed across inequitable terrain, such that some mobile bodies are rendered abject to the extent that they can be killed, or at least “let die”. In studying the securitisation discourses surrounding human trafficking, Claudia Aradau has argued that security entails the promise of ontological and epistemological certainty. For Aradau, this promise rests upon the ‘exclusion and abjectification of another, who is repudiated as dangerous or risky, turned into life which is not life and ‘materiality’ which does not matter’. She goes on to say that such spaces of abjection are created through ‘symbolic practices (institutional and non-institutional, mobilizing technologies, knowledge and language) and an imaginary of security as desirable stasis’.

Taking Aradau’s formulation as my point of departure, I would like to take a few steps backwards and begin with the notions of exclusion, abjectification and the figure of a dangerous or risky enemy, whose life does not count as life as such. Many theorists have drawn upon Foucault, and more recently Agamben, to engage and challenge their respective formulations of biopower’s relationship to sovereignty, exclusion and the migrant. I will consider Agamben’s theorising of “bare life” and the “state of exception”, and the ways in which other scholars have critically engaged these notions. Political and feminist geographers, political scientists, sociologists and anthropologists have all variously attended to the emerging spatialities and temporalities of human mobility and examined how these relate to power, labour, detention and deportation regimes, and to death itself. In this sense, the literature review aims to set the broader theoretical stage around migration, sovereignty, territoriality, space and exclusion. I have therefore focused the literature review on the debates around the key concepts of sovereignty and its relationship to territory and matters of life and death. The following chapters will build upon these notions to explore the geographical articulations, security imaginaries, and the practices of spectacular abjection that characterise contemporary migration management.

Within the literature on migration, notions of citizenship, territories and the nation-state have come under critical scrutiny. While considerations of space and place now operate on a scale far beyond that of the nation-state, there remains an ongoing contestation around the role of the state and questions of sovereignty. The ongoing relevance of the nation state is usually framed in terms of sovereignty, which is seen as the state’s distinguishing feature, the erosion of which is viewed as a measure of ’impaired state capacity’.

The sovereign power to regulate and restrict human movement though space has in recent decades become simultaneously more militarised and more bureaucratic. While there has been a flourishing of administrative process in an attempt to further regulate and restrict human movement, De Genova cautions us against reading migration management as a matter of “administration”. He reminds us that limiting human movement is an imposition of a power over life itself. There is therefore a fundamental relationship between migration, state sovereignty, citizenship, national identity and the social production of nation state spaces.

While traditional IR definitions of sovereignty have located sovereignty within the borders of the nation state, critical scholars in recent decades have followed Foucault’s formulation that sovereignty ultimately resides in the power to dictate who may live and who may die. One

33 Ibid., 28.
extension of Foucault’s theorisation that has rose to prominence within critical scholarly discourse on migration is Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s formulation of “bare life” and the “state of exception”. Agamben’s work has been credited with providing ‘fertile territory for critical work on the meanings of torture, the accrual of emergency powers to the executive, and the camp’. Given the increasing application of exceptional measures, emergency powers and the global rise in migrant detention “camps”, Agamben’s work has enjoyed wide circulation within critical literature on the war against terror, the deployment of emergency powers, and the relegation of the refugee body to a state of abjection - what Agamben calls ‘bare life’.

Agamben draws upon Foucault’s conception of biopolitics to extend Carl Schmitt’s (avowedly fascist) conceptualisation of political power. For Schmitt, the essence of sovereignty is the decision over what constitutes the exception and what measures to take to deal with the exception. The rationale for introducing the state of exception, according to Schmitt, is to preserve the normal. He writes, ‘The state suspends the law in the exception on the basis of its right of self-preservation’. In other words, the law is “temporarily” suspended in order to preserve the legal order and the state itself. Schmitt’s political theory focuses on the functioning of the law and the state in a context of an ever-present threat of conflict and crisis, and views the law and its institutions as essential to the maintenance of order. It is the sovereign power that determines definitively what constitutes public order and security, and determines when they are disturbed. In Schmitt’s view, it is the role of the sovereign state to ensure that violence and conflict is bracketed in such a way that protects the legal order. Non-sanctioned violence poses an existential threat to the legal order, not so much in terms of the evil outcomes such violence might result in, but rather that through flouting the law, this kind of violence undermines the legal order and therefore the state itself. Schmitt has suggested that the essence of sovereignty is therefore located in the state’s decision on the existence of the enemy and the imminent, existential danger that this enemy poses. Mbembe has argued that power continuously appeals to this state of ‘exception, emergency and a fictionalised notion of the enemy’ while labouring to continue ‘to produce that same exception, emergency and enemy’.

In ‘State of Exception’, Agamben draws almost entirely on Schmitt, extending his theory to argue that in modern forms of government, the state of exception is predicated on the indistinction

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37 Agamben, State of Exception.
40 Schmitt, Political Theology.
between legality and illegality, war and peace, public and private, law and violence, and the exception and the norm.\textsuperscript{43} In this way, he argues, the state of exception is neither inside nor outside of the juridical order, but belongs to a blurred ‘zone of indifference’ between the two.\textsuperscript{44} Agamben suggests that the state of exception as indistinction has increasingly become the principal paradigm of modern government. He writes:

Indeed, the state of exception has today reached its maximum worldwide development. The normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and contradicted with impunity by a governmental violence that—while ignoring international law externally and producing a permanent state of exception internally—nevertheless still claims to be applying the law.\textsuperscript{45}

Drawing extensively upon Hannah Arendt and Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, Agamben describes the human victim captured in the sovereign sphere as ‘bare life’.\textsuperscript{46} “Bare” or “naked” life maybe understood as ‘what remains when human existence, while yet alive, is stripped of all the encumbrances of social location, and thus bereft of all the qualifications for proper political inclusion and belonging’.\textsuperscript{47} Bare life is captured by the political twice-over: firstly, in the form of exclusion - bare life is included in the political only as an object of exclusion; and secondly, in the form of unlimited exposure to violation, which does not count as a crime.\textsuperscript{48} For Agamben, bare life is not just captured by sovereign power; it is actually \textit{produced} by it. The production of bare life, he claims, is the ‘originary activity of sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{49} Agamben uses Foucault’s concept of biopower to articulate the relationship between sovereign power and bare life. For Foucault, the pre-modern form of monarchical sovereign power entailed a prerogative to kill with impunity. This form of sovereign authoritarian power came to be transcended by another form of political power that ‘had assigned itself the task of administering life’ and whose ‘highest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest in life through and through’.\textsuperscript{50} Foucault describes the emergence of technologies of power from the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries onwards which were ‘used to ensure the spatial distribution of individual bodies (their separation, their alignment, their serialization, and their surveillance) and the organization, around those individuals, of a whole field of visibility’.\textsuperscript{51}

Agamben credits Foucault’s conceptualisation of biopolitics with having restored the bare or naked life of human beings to the centre of politics. He argues that in the shift from pre-modern

\textsuperscript{42} Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 16.
\textsuperscript{43} Agamben, \textit{State of Exception}.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 87.
\textsuperscript{46} Agamben, \textit{State of Exception}.
\textsuperscript{47} Agamben in De Genova, “The Deportation Regime,” 37.
\textsuperscript{49} Agamben, \textit{State of Exception}, 83.
\textsuperscript{50} Foucault, \textit{Society Must Be Defended}.
sovereign power to modern forms of biopower, bare life ceases to be excluded outside the political, but ‘gradually begins to coincide with the political realm’. However, De Genova argues that in doing so, Agamben joins a cast of recent scholarship that mostly ‘serves to recapitulate the reification of power as synonymous with domination and sovereignty as an exclusive preserve of the state’. He argues that such discourses serve to reify and fetishise power-as-dominance, which he identifies as an original limitation of Foucauldian conceptions of power. Along with this fetishisation of state power, Agamben has been critiqued for offering little optimism for the possibility of resistance. Under the condition of abjection that bare life is consigned to in Agamben’s formulation, Didier Bigo argues there can be no possible resistance. Ziarek too, following Ernesto Laclau’s critiques, suggests that Agamben’s work lacks ‘emancipatory possibilities’. Through his notion of “bare life”, Agamben’s sovereign power ties bare life inextricably to death, ‘leaving no opportunity for agency, resistance or escape’. Agamben’s theories are also wildly universalising and undifferentiated; the body of bare life lacks attention to race, gender or nationality. Ziarek argues that any critical feminist engagement with Agamben’s work needs to attend to the ways in which bare life is implicated in the ‘gendered, sexist, colonial, and racist configurations of the political, and because of this implication, how it suffers different forms of violence’. Crucially, Agamben is critiqued for his lack of attention to contextualisation - to the specificities of location, historicisation and geographical context. His theories of sovereign power as exceptional are applied in a universal sense, without differentiation to context or to the raced and gendered body of she who is excluded.

Philosopher and political scientist Archille Mbembe in his influential article ‘Necropolitics’, follows Foucault and Agamben in their shared assumption that sovereignty resides in the power to dictate who may live and who must die. However, Mbembe argues that the notion of biopower - the idea that the sovereign power of modernity is organised around the ‘management of life rather than the menace of death’ is ‘insufficient to account for contemporary forms of...
subjugation of life to the power of death’.\textsuperscript{64} He asks what does the implementation of the sovereign right to kill tell us about ‘the person who is thus put to death and about the relation of enmity that sets that person against his or her murderer? ...What place is given to life, death, and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)? How are they inscribed in the order of power?\textsuperscript{65} Mbembe’s interest lies not in figures of sovereignty struggling for autonomy, but in the ‘generalised instrumentalisation of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations’.\textsuperscript{66} To this end, he proposes an alternative reading of politics, sovereignty and the subject, which would be based around the ‘tactile categories’ of life and death.\textsuperscript{67} Mbembe revises a range of theorists’ varied conceptions of the relationship between death, the political, the subject and sovereignty. Among them, is Georges Bataille, who wrote that ultimately sovereignty is the ‘refusal to accept the limits that the fear of death would have the subject respect’, and that the sovereign ‘is he who is, as if death were not... he is the transgression of all such limits’.\textsuperscript{68} Sovereignty requires the strength to ‘violate the prohibition against killing’ and ‘[sovereignty] calls for the risk of death’.\textsuperscript{69}

Let us consider for a moment this conceptualisation of sovereignty - as the refusal to be limited by a fear of death - in relation to both the sovereign power of the state, and also the individual subject. The subject of sovereign power should respect a fear of death, and be limited by it, in ways that the sovereign power is not. For a subject to refuse to respect the fear of death constitutes an autonomous and defiant action against the sovereign power. De Genova has suggested that it is the \textit{sheer autonomy} of migration, particularly of unauthorised migrants, that is taken as such an affront to state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{70} If this act of migration entails a preparedness to risk death, it can be apprehended that unauthorised migration challenges the power of the state not only to control its sovereign space, but also constitutes a transgression of the limits that a fear of death should impose upon subjects. And therein lies its power. In Mbembe’s words, death is ‘that space where freedom and negation operate’.\textsuperscript{71} Just as in Schmitt’s thinking on the power of non-sanctioned violence, it is not so much the outcomes of unauthorised migration, but rather the flagrant flouting of the legal order that poses such an existential threat to the sovereign state.

Wendy Brown, in her study of territoriality, state violence and sovereignty argues that the increased investment in enforcing boundaries suggests a deep crisis of state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{72} She argues that nation states have become severely compromised over the last century by transnational flows and neoliberal rationality, resulting in an anxiety over the sovereign

\textsuperscript{64} Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 39–40. 
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. 12. 
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., 14. 
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{68} Bataille in Ibid., 16. 
\textsuperscript{69} Bataille in Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{70} De Genova, “The Deportation Regime,” 39. 
\textsuperscript{71} Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” 39.
impotence of the nation-state. She argues that the recent investments in walling and bordering suggest the weakening of the nation-state, or more precisely, the detachment of sovereignty from the nation-state. ‘Rather than iterations of nation-state sovereignty, the new nation-state walls are part of an ad hoc global landscape of flows and barriers, both inside nation-states and in the surrounding post-national constellations, flows and barriers that divide richer from poorer parts of the globe.’ For Brown, the investment in walls, as a form of exclusionary architecture, is a hyperbolic expression of sovereignty, which reveals a ‘tremulousness, vulnerability, dubiousness, or instability at the core of what they aim to express’. She attends to the performative and theatrical quality of the exclusionary architectures of nation-state bordering, and the staging of ‘sovereign powers of protection’.

De Genova, in his work on the deportation regime, has emphasised that through its prominent circulation, Agamben’s concept of bare life has been somewhat inflated and devalued in its deployment. All too often, ‘bare life’ has been reduced to a figure of mere exclusion. De Genova feels this is a flattening of Agamben’s more subtle formulation, which revolves around the indistinction between “inside and outside, exclusion and inclusion”, whereby bare life is produced by sovereign (state) power. De Genova argues that the “illegalised” (cheap) workforce of migrant labour - vulnerable to both exploitation and deportation - is constitutive of exactly this contradiction. It is precisely their legal vulnerability and official exclusion, which renders them as a highly desirable workforce, thereby ensuring their subordinate inclusion. In this way, migrant bodies are ‘captured’ by immobility, disciplined into productive bodies and their potential channelled into the labour force. The sovereign power thereby relies upon sedentarism and immobility in so far as immobilised bodies become subjects of that specific territory, of that sovereign power.

As De Genova points out, bare life in Agamben’s formulation, is not something that precedes the sovereign power, as if in a state of nature, but “bare life” is a product of the biopolitical machine. It is therefore a ‘debasement of the human specificity of human life’. De Genova suggests that while Foucault maintains that “(bio)power” and “life” are in opposition, Agamben ‘invokes a notion (not unlike Marx) of a restitution of human life to its own intrinsic power (the originary

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74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 28.
76 Ibid., 24.
77 Ibid., 24.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 25.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 38–39.
84 Ibid.
85 De Genova, “The Deportation Regime,” 44.
power that Marx describes as “sovereign”). In this sense, De Genova sees Agamben’s conception of a "life of power" as similar to Marx's notion of "human emancipation" as a radical type of freedom disarticulated from all notions of citizenship, rights, the state, and even politics. The "life of power" that Agamben refers to is predicated upon ‘emancipation from the very division of sovereign (state) power and naked (biological) life and an "irrevocable exodus from any sovereignty"’. This leads us to questions of power and agency, and where these are located in the struggle to contain human movement. For Lauren Berlant, the concept of sovereignty is inadequate for talking about agency, outside of an authoritarian decree, and she argues that ‘sovereignty is a distorting description of the political, affective, and psychological conditions in which the ordinary subjects of democratic/capitalist power take up positions as agents’. She critiques the lineage of Schmitt, Agamben, Bataille and Mbembe, for conceptualising sovereignty in such a way that puts the emphasis back onto events of decision-making. Berlant argues that to conceive of sovereignty in this way maintains a distinction between the productive procedures of governmentality and the violence of the state. For her, sovereignty is an inadequate concept - a 'fantasy misrecognized as an objective state: an aspiration position of personal and institutional self-legitimating performativity and an affective sense of control in relation to the fantasy of that position's offer of security and efficacy'. Similarly, Didier Fassin, in his work on the governmentality of immigration, has suggested that sovereignty is a limited concept for thinking through notions of power and forms of control. He claims that thinking through governmentality allows us to exceed 'the issue of sovereignty and complicates the question of control' in relation to how human mobility is regulated. He suggests that applying notions of governmentality to immigration has 'enriched our understanding of the subtle and complex games involved in the 'biopolitics of otherness': a politics of borders and boundaries, temporality and spatiality, states and bureaucracies, detention and deportation, asylum and humanitarianism'.

In “Escape Routes” Papadopoulos et al urge us to consider the ways in which the migration regime has itself been challenged by ‘fluid, streamlined, clandestine, multidirectional, multipositional, and context-dependent forms of mobility’. They argue that transformations of sovereignty can be apprehended as the result of global migrant practices that tend to ‘undermine the basis upon which sovereignty has hitherto functioned’. Indeed state sovereignty is being

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84 Ibid., 45.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 44.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
91 Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, Escape Routes, 163.
92 Ibid.
transformed through the plethora of creative challenges ‘from below’ posed by migrants, and also through the growing bureaucratic web of state and non-state actors and private contractors involved in the response. Today’s borders are ‘less about “control” and more about “management”, combining heterogenous domains of personnel, goods, people, data, audit capability, international cooperation and partnerships with carriers and industry’. Not only the proliferation of networks and actors involved in migration, but also the proliferation of borders themselves has brought about changes to the notion of territorial sovereignty. In classical legal theory, territorial sovereignty has rested upon the indivisible nature of sovereignty and law, and both being territorially bounded. The notion of the state and its territory were seen as coterminous, and the social production of territory has been a defining preoccupation of modern states. This alignment has been ruptured; borders, sovereignty, governance, security and labour no longer map onto the space of the sovereign state.

Feminist geographers of migration have also contributed to the reconceptualisation of the relationship between mobility and the production of space. In particular, feminists have drawn attention to the politics of scale, transnational mobility as a political process, questions of subjectivity and identity, interstitial spaces, and critical theorisations around space, place, and temporality. Feminist scholarship on migration has focused on in-between sites, gendered embodiment and gendered migration policies, as well as developing methods that challenge dominant, masculinist, positivist discourses framing migration. The feminist scholarly attention given to the body has also entered the field of geography and migration studies, with feminist geographers theorising the political connections between the body, power and spaces. In this sense, the contribution of feminist geographers, rather than offering a singular feminist perspective on the literature, has been to respatialise multiple forms of the political.

95 Andrijasevic, “Sex on the Move.”
The normative IR position that sovereignty resides within the borders of the nation state, has effectively been challenged by those who argue that space and territory are being reconfigured in such a way that sovereignty is no longer spatially delineated.\textsuperscript{103} It is necessary therefore to think beyond state-centric models and instead consider spaces of shared or overlapping sovereignties.\textsuperscript{104} Given that my site of analysis here is the sea, thinking through interstitial spaces and borderscapes as zones of shared, overlapping, or even “fluid” sovereignties makes sense. Andrijasevic critiques state-centric models of sovereignty, such as Agamben’s, from a spatio-political perspective, arguing that the notion of a sovereign “state of exception” is inadequate for accounting for the technologies of migration detention in contemporary Europe. While for Agamben the camp (or detention centre) stands as a ‘material spatial manifestation of the abstract juridical dimension that is the state of exception’,\textsuperscript{105} Andrijasevic urges us to consider more transnational modes of governance, which rely on continuity rather than separation, creating spaces of ‘shared sovereignty’.\textsuperscript{106} In this sense, she cautions against readings of the “externalisation” of the European border, and instead suggests challenging the dialectics of inside and outside through an examination of the continuities and complex assemblages of postnational configurations governing migratory movements and transforming the boundaries of European citizenship.\textsuperscript{107} Similarly, Anne McNevin argues, the field of interaction that constitutes the border today defies ‘conventional cartographies and simplistic scalar registers running from local to national and global’.\textsuperscript{108} While conventional ‘territorial frames do not help to illuminate the spatial complexity at hand’, neither do exaggerated claims of a post-national deterritorialised world, when ‘territorial identities continue to figure so prominently in the lives and death of asylum seekers and other irregular migrants everywhere’.\textsuperscript{109}

Thinking about the spatialisation of the state is not just a matter of symbolic practice. Through specific metaphors states represent themselves as entities with particular spatial properties, and in doing so ‘secure their legitimacy, naturalise their authority, and represent themselves as superior to, and encompassing of, other institutions and centres of power’.\textsuperscript{110} Ferguson and Gupta identify two images in popular and academic discourses of the state that produce a spatial and scalar imaginary of the state. These are verticality - the idea that the state is somehow above civil society and community; and encompassment - the state is located in an ever widening series of

\textsuperscript{104} Andrijasevic, “Sex on the Move,” 396.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 155–156.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 161.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
circles that begins with family and local community and ends with nation-states. These spatial metaphors are animated and naturalised by a range of routinised practices of state bureaucracies, including those of migration management. These spatial metaphors of verticality and encompassment have been stretched to incorporate the range of non-state and transnational entities that constitute nodes in networks of transnational governmentality. Ferguson and Gupta call for discussions of transnational governmentality to not only consider technologies of discipline and regulation like the WTO and IMF, but also to consider transnational activist networks, INGOs and NGOs. They argue that these organisations should not be read as ‘challengers to the state from below, but as horizontal contemporaries of the organs of the state - sometimes rivals; sometimes servants; sometimes watchdogs; sometimes parasites; but in every case operating on the same level, in the same global space’. Paul Amar has argued that these parastatal forms - of transnational public-private partnership and of NGO proliferation - are characteristic of emerging forms of ‘human security governance’.

Recent scholarship has attended to the relationship between spatiality and temporality as it pertains to the regulation of migration. Increasingly, time is being seen as occupying a key role in the regulation of migration. If the functioning of sovereign power also relies upon sedentarism and immobility, then this immobility has not only a spatial dimension, but also a temporal one. In “Escape Routes” Papadopoulos et al propose to rethink the linearity with which migrant journeys are usually portrayed. They suggest that rather than linear journeys from A to B (which may fail or may succeed) we should consider the temporal dimensions of irregular migration, with all its ‘interruptions and discontinuities, such as waiting, hiding, unexpected diversions, settlements, stopovers, escapes and returns’. They argue that camps, or migrant detention centres, are spatialised attempts to temporarily control mobility. They challenge the political disciplinary connotations of the camp as a technology of exclusion, and instead to consider the camp as an attempt to regulate the speed of migrant circulation and to decelerate it. ‘Decelerated circulation’ is therefore a way to regulate mobility not through space, but through time. What takes place then within the space of the migrant detention centre is the ‘transformation of undocumented labour migration into controllable migrational flows’. Andrijasevic has found Papadopoulos and co’s work to be extremely useful in accounting for the

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111 Ibid., 982.
112 Ibid., 984.
113 Ibid., 984.
114 Ibid., 994.
115 Ibid., 994.
117 Andrijasevic, “Sex on the Move.”
118 Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, Escape Routes.
120 Ibid.
121 Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, Escape Routes, 198.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid., 196.
ambiguities of migration control in Europe. She cites an example regarding irregular migrants in Italy - where most migrants held on the island of Lampedusa are transferred to other Italian detention centres. A 2004 report shows that of the 12,000 migrants held in Italian detention centres, less than half were deported. Most of them were released after the maximum detention period had expired, and the rest escaped.

In the following chapters I will attend to these concepts - of sovereignty and territory, spatiality and temporality, abjectification and exclusion, biopolitics and necropolitics - in relation to a number of examples in order to articulate contemporary global patterns of migration management. I will use these conceptual framings as a way to connect distinct yet interconnected sites and events located at the edge of territory and beyond, in order to reveal the functioning of power through spatialisation, securitisation and visual regimes.

Andrijasevic, “Sex on the Move,” 158.
Ibid.
Chapter 2: Spatial Practices of Bordering: Islands and Other Offshore Strategies

Contemporary forms of border policing and migration management rely upon mobilising spatial frames in novel ways to produce shifting geographical articulations of sovereignty. Patterns can be traced on a global scale to suggest that beaches, oceans, islands and offshore territories are the key sites where sovereignty is exercised and challenged in the struggle to contain human mobility. It is particularly evident that during times of crisis, when the sovereign power of the nation state is tested, these maritime contestations are heightened. These moments of crisis maybe at the domestic level of the sovereign state in a moment of contesting power (as in the case of Egypt discussed in Chapter 3), or the more prevailing global sense of crisis. Recent years have been characterised by the global ‘crumbling legitimacy of neoliberalism’s policies and financial infrastructure’, as well as by the backlash against the neoconservatives’ war on terror and broader disregard for human rights and social justice.\(^{126}\) As neoliberal market states struggle to survive the era of financial crisis and geopolitical realignment, governments try to articulate new discourses to legitimise and ‘reorganise intensified intervention and regulatory governance’.\(^{127}\)

In this section I will briefly trace the decoupling of sovereignty and territory in recent migration management policies of Australia and the EU, and the emerging spatial practise of “offshoring”. I will consider the role of islands in the Western imaginary and outline the specific histories and geographies of four sites - Lampedusa and Melilla in the Mediterranean, and Christmas Island and Nauru to the north of Australia. In this sense, I attempt to respond to geographer Alison Mountz’s call for more attention to be paid to the specificities of the spaces between states. She points out the state-centric nature of migration studies, which tends to ‘document the experiences of particular categories of people moving from or to particular countries’, examining source country, nationality, ethnicity, legal status, religion or occupation in the ‘host’ country.\(^{128}\) As migration by definition crosses the spaces between states, Mountz calls for a greater engagement with the ‘peripheral zones of sovereign territory’ to develop more sophisticated conceptualisations of these sites. She argues that new research must historicise islands in their ‘colonial, postcolonial, and militarised landscapes’, in order to understand their role in the intersecting processes of migrant displacement and relocation.\(^{129}\) While there has been a recent trend towards geographical articulations of sovereignty upon islands and peripheral territorial sites in various contestations around migration, these sites have long been utilised for militaristic, colonial and

\(^{126}\) Amar, *The Security Archipelago*, 14

\(^{127}\) Ibid.

\(^{128}\) Mountz, “The Enforcement Archipelago.”, 127.

\(^{129}\) Ibid.
economic exploits. The contemporary uses of these sites are therefore not novel, but can be historicised within a trajectory of exploitative geographies.

**Mobile Borders and Deterritorialisation**

Parallel developments have occurred in migration management among the wealthy nations of the world, as they seek to address irregular migration as a security threat.\(^{130}\) As Peter Chambers reminds us, those nation states on the ‘wealthy’ side of global inequality seek to secure themselves against migrant flows produced, in no small part, by their own interventions elsewhere: whether through ‘military misadventure, resource extraction, currency destabilisation, or food price spikes’.\(^{131}\) As the flows of human migration intensified throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, states undertook new creative modes of border management, contracting and expanding their borders to create spatio-legal ambiguities. Border enforcement has grown more dispersed across a range of sites and amongst an assemblage of state and non-state institutions. In the process, notions of sovereignty have become deterritorialised and more transnational in nature.

Australia, the European Union, Canada and the US have sophisticated border management policies, and learn from each other’s border enforcement practices and technologies.\(^{132}\) Australia has emerged as a global pioneer in trialling punitive and pre-emptive approaches to border management, which work to stop people from departing at their point of origin, prevent people from arriving on Australian territory, and in some cases, retrospectively denying that they have ever arrived.\(^{133}\) While Australia fiercely patrols its borders, a brief examination of Australia’s maritime boundaries reveals the pluralities and fictions at work in ‘drawing a line in the sea’.\(^{134}\)

Australia’s territorial sea boundary lies 12 nautical miles (around 20kms) offshore, the area within which is subject to full Australian sovereignty. The “contiguous zone”, within which Australia is authorised to take action and prevent and punish infringements of immigration and customs law, extends for a further 12 nautical miles. Australia has the right to exploit and manage natural resources within 200 nautical miles of the shoreline in the area known as the Exclusive Economic Zone.\(^{135}\) While these borders and zones are recognised under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the so-called “migration zone” is completely an Australian legal construction, defined under the Migration Act 1958 as ‘the area of Australia


\(^{131}\) Ibid., 107.

\(^{132}\) Mountz, “The Enforcement Archipelago.”, 120.


where a non citizen must hold a visa in order to legally enter and remain in Australia',136 Up until May 2013, the migration zone consisted of the Australian mainland, plus some external territories. It is the spatial manipulation of this zone, in order to keep asylum seekers in a permanent position of having not-yet-arrived, which has been at the heart of much controversy.

In August 2001, a Norwegian container ship, the *Tampa*, rescued 438 asylum seekers (most of them Afghans) from their distressed vessel just outside Australian territorial waters. The Australian government refused entry to the vessel, demanding that the asylum seekers be returned to Indonesia. The captain of the ship, arguing that the asylum seekers needed medical treatment, refused to turn back and headed for the Australian territory of Christmas Island. A weeklong standoff ensued, whereby the world's media watched as the Australian government refused to allow the ship to land. Eventually Australia sent troops to board the ship and transfer the asylum seekers to an Australian Navy vessel, taking them to the Pacific Island nation of Nauru for processing. To authorise this, legislation was rushed through both houses of parliament, retrospectively authorising the seizure of the *Tampa* and providing for special authority to undertake future action of a similar kind.137 In order to realise the offshore processing of the *Tampa* asylum seeker claims, the Australian government brokered a deal with the Pacific Island nation of Nauru, which was part of what came to be known as the “Pacific Solution”. The Pacific Solution consisted of three central strategies in its execution: firstly, a number of islands were excised from Australian territory for the purposes of the Migration Act including Christmas Island and Ashmore Reef.138 Second, a naval blockade, *Operation Relex*, was established to 'deter and deny' suspected illegal entry vessels (SIEVs) with defence personnel granted special authority to board vessels outside Australian territorial waters in the area of more diluted sovereignty known as the “contiguous zone”.139 The third strategy was the removal of asylum seekers to third countries or offshore detention centres for processing of their asylum claim. Nauru would provide one such centre and, in return, was granted an initial aid package of AUD $10 million, with a further AUD$20 million aid in the form of goods and services.140 Another centre was to be located in Papua New Guinea, and another in the now-excised Christmas Island.

Alongside its spatial manipulation of borders, the Australian Government has also undertaken a bold temporal manipulation of its maritime boundaries. In 2003, when a boat carrying fourteen Turkish Kurds landed on Melville Island in the eastern Timor Sea, the island was excised retrospectively, from midnight prior to their arrival. While the public debate focused on whether

137 Ibid., 28.
138 These steps meant that people who arrived on these territories to seek asylum by boat were unable to apply for protection under Australia’s immigration laws and to access Australian courts for judicial review.
or not the men had made their claim to asylum known, the claim was anyway invalidated by the excision. The Kurds were sent back into international waters before the Senate could disallow it.

Given the far-flung island territories had now been excised from the migration zone, the Australian authorities became increasingly concerned that irregular maritime migrants, particularly those sailing from Indonesia, would now attempt to reach the Australian mainland. To remove all incentive for reaching the mainland, on 16th May 2013, legislation was passed which excised the entire Australian mainland from its own migration zone. This was an unprecedented act and certainly the most farcical of the spatio-legal fictions undertaken by the government. Strikingly, there was no opposition from the major parties or critical media scrutiny; instead Chambers quips, it 'sailed through both houses of parliament, and into law, like a veritable ship in the night'. Upon assuming office in September 2013, the conservative Abbott coalition government launched the military operation known as Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). This is a novel move in that for the first time a minister was made responsible for a military operation, in this case the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.

Similarly, the European Union has also seen islands and offshore territories across the Mediterranean emerge as the key sites of contestation. The southern external border of the EU has come to be seen as its most vulnerable border, with particular attention given to a number of offshore territories which are seen as "stepping stones" to the continent. The Greek Aegean islands near the Turkish mainland, the Spanish Canaries, the Balearics and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, French Corsica, Italy’s Lampedusa and Linosa, and the island states of Malta and Cyprus have all seen arrivals of asylum seekers and irregular migrants seeking access to the greater EU territory. As a result, these territories have become the "outposts" of a framework of externalisation. There are also a range of bilateral and multilateral agreements with, and investment in, North African states to cooperate on preventing irregular migration to Europe.

The external dimension of EU policies on migration and asylum is not new, and neither is scholarship on the topic. The European Parliament and European Commission has emphasised

141 Chambers, “Shipwreck with Spectator,” 110.
143 Chambers, “Shipwreck with Spectator,” 104.
145 One project the EU has funded in North Africa is the Southern Mediterranean Border Surveillance Network, which aims to ‘increase the capacity of the authorities of the North African countries to tackle irregular migration and illicit trafficking by strengthening their border surveillance systems’. The program aims to support Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to set up technical systems to inform each other and the EU member states about ‘illegal or suspect activities’ in order to coordinate a response. AI, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees at Europe’s Borders, S.O.S. Europe: People before Borders (London: Amnesty International, 2014), 18.
the need for regional cooperation and extraterritorial controls as early as 1987. What is new however, is the level of investment and intensity of these externalisation efforts, particularly when considered in relation to EU spending on programming related to upholding migrant rights. For member states, the focus is very much on the edge of territory with heavy investments in the management of the EU’s external borders. For the period 2007-13, the European Commission allocated almost EUR €4 billion to the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme (SOLID) to support the activities of member states in asylum, integration, return of third country nationals, and border control. Almost half of this (€1,820 million) was allocated towards activities, equipment and technological infrastructure focusing on control of the external borders of the Schengen area, while just 17% (€700 million) was allocated to support asylum procedures, reception services and the resettlement and integration of refugees.

Italy, which has received the largest numbers of migrants across the central Mediterranean route, was in 2008 ranked the fourth highest asylum seeker hosting country in the global North. In August 2008, the Prime Minister Berlusconi effectively outsourced Italy’s borders to Libya, in a set of bilateral agreements known as the ‘Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation’; similar to those Australia has set in place with Indonesia. The treaty, signed with the Gadafii government in Libya, agreed that the international waters between the two countries would be policed by joint naval patrols, a satellite control system on Libyan land borders was to be established by Italian companies, and migrants rescued at sea would be returned to Libya under a readmission clause. In exchange, Libya would receive US$5 billion and additional cultural development aid from Italy. The Treaty was suspended in February 2011 during the overthrow of the regime in Libya; however later in 2011, Italy signed a new bilateral agreement with Libya. Italy’s relationship with Tunisia and Egypt has followed a similar course, with early cooperation agreements signed in the late 1990s with Tunisia and in 2000 with Egypt. While the agreements were temporarily suspended during the regime changes of 2011, for the most part, these relationships are characterised by a high degree of continuity pre and post revolutions. In both cases, Italy was quick to re-establish diplomatic relations with the new leadership in order to conclude agreements pertaining to migration. In the context of radical political transformations in North Africa, Italy’s core concern was to secure the continuity of its externalised border enforcement mechanisms.

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147 Under this fund for 2007-13, Italy for example received €36,087,198 for its refugee fund and €250,178,432 for its external borders fund. Similarly, Spain received €9,342,834 for its refugee fund and €289,394,768 in funding for external border management. AI, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, 9.
149 Ibid.
In February 2011, faced with a sudden influx of migrants from Tunisia as a result of the unrest, the Italian government declare a ‘state of emergency in the national territory regarding the exceptional flows of North African citizens’. This “emergency” allowed the Italian government to achieve a number of goals. Italy was able to persuade the Tunisian government to sign the bilateral agreement on forced returns, garner greater support from the EU in terms of implementing articles pertaining to migration under the EU Treaty, and most importantly, effectively excised the Lampedusa migration centres from Italian law. This move of excision of territory, coupled with outsourcing of border patrolling to Tunisia, can be seen as parallel to Australia’s excising of its external territories and simultaneous outsourcing to Indonesia. In this way, both Australia and Italy create ambiguous borderscapes where shared sovereignties at sea are created, along the fault lines of regional disparities.

These examples demonstrate the ways in which borders have become spatially and temporally mobile, available for manipulation according to the interests of border protection. Through such manipulations, the notion of “arrival” itself becomes deterritorialised, or even despatialised entirely, as arrival is no longer marked by the physical body moving through space and arriving at a (spatialised) destination. Instead, the very act of arriving is declared, or nullified, by a regime of governance that effectively asserts boundaries of sovereignty devoid of territory. Conventional notions of “borders” and “border crossing” then become complicated by the notion that the border may not be spatially (or temporally) fixed. For Australia and the EU’s Mediterranean space, these borders are lines drawn in the sea, and are seemingly as fluid and mobile. Borders that once seemed solid now become zones of ambiguity. Far from a solid line that demarcates territories of inclusion and exclusion, the border is revealed as a dynamic landscape, vulnerable to manipulation. Scholars now speak of “mobile borders”, “virtual borders”, and “biometric borders”.

Borders are being reconstituted in evermore-ephemeral forms, and increasingly mapped directly onto suspect bodies in a proliferation of sites. Pugliese has argued that as the global North relies on technologies of extraterritorialisation at the macro level, biometric data allows borders to be extraterritorialised at the micro level of embodiment. “Biometric borders” refers to the regulation of mobility by amassing digital biological data in shared databases, including fingerprints, iris scanning and facial recognition technology. In biopolitical terms, biometric technologies inscribe borders onto bodies that are located well beyond the physical borders of the nation in order to pre-emptively foreclose the movement of irregular migrants by fixing them

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154 McNevin, Contesting Citizenship, 89.
at their point of origin. Through the application of biometric technologies, the topology of the border is rendered both fixed and mobile, operating far beyond the reality of the border checkpoint. Louise Amoore observes that the ‘biometric border is the portable border par excellence’. In this sense the “real” borders now exist anywhere that migrants may come to experience their crossing, and therefore can be potentially everywhere that migrant bodies move. The border becomes (and perhaps always has been) a ‘condition of being that is always in the act of becoming, it is never entirely crossed but appears as a constant demand for proof of status and legitimacy.’ Even the process of answering questions at the sites of border-crossing becomes an act of performing one’s legitimacy, one’s belonging. Few occasions in life so strongly combine the ‘governmental power of bureaucratic normalisation with the sovereign power to ban... [and] it is the triumph of the sovereign that border anxiety is seen as mundane and ordinary in every day life’.

In his work on borders, Soguk has made the important argument that ‘borders are imbued through and through with intentionalities’, not only by those who enforce, but also by those who ‘transgress and violate them’. Even the dead bodies of refugees washing up on Europe’s shores ‘mark the stages of an advance’, an unstable, mobile and evolving border:

Surely, where refugee bodies fall, they mark borders in their resourceful and rich unfolding, temporally and spatially. Bodies fallen, drowned, mangled, and suffocated highlight borders’ capture of people daring to move unauthorized. On the other hand, they also point to the trails through which border-crossing people turn insurrectional, capturing borders and harnessing them to their movements. In this way, while reflecting the dead certainties, stoppages and terminations effected by the border, they also point to the ambiguities energized through border practices that manifest passages, continuities and interactions.

The Geopolitics of Regional Migration Management

The Mediterranean and Australasia are both regions sharply divided in the distribution of wealth and power among countries in the region. Within these regions, nation states have increasingly sought to coordinate in implementing regional migration and refugee policies, through a series of agreements that are based on fundamental inequalities between the participating nation-states.

156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., 67.
161 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
While the borderscape may be one of continuity, as Andrijasevic describes, it is a continuity marked by a sharp asymmetry of power. Both Australia and the European Union have invested heavily in offshore arrangements and spearheaded bilateral arrangements with source and transit countries to prevent departures of potential asylum seekers, intercept them en route, and facilitate repatriation.164 These investments have been accompanied by the growth of detention structures along transnational routes travelled by migrants in their attempts to reach Australia and the EU and make their asylum claims.165 Other types of border enforcement also take place, with the support of national authorities in transit countries (like Egypt, Indonesia, Libya), through outsourcing border patrol and detention to private contractors (like G4S, Serco and Surveillance Australia Pty Ltd), and through the involvement of third parties like the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which operates on behalf of Australia on Nauru and in Indonesia.

Offshore spaces have become the key frontlines for Australia and the EU in their attempts to thwart asylum seekers from ever truly arriving. Islands and maritime spaces between regions are the key sites where recurrent crises play out, where state sovereignty is re-scaled and re-articulated across time and space.166 New geographical articulations are born out of moments of crisis, such as when Syrians and others have fled from North Africa en masse, attempting to reach Europe’s shores. These moments are also ripe for the production of crisis, which enables state actors to advance particular political agendas.167 It is not only state actors and migrants who contest these interstitial zones. Activists, military personnel, fisherfolk, lawyers, NGOs, supra-state agencies, traffickers, and private contractors all seek to assert their agency, influence and mobility in these transitional zones between states.168 It is these complex assemblages and contestations that the term “migration management” seeks to contain.

Loyd and Mountz point out that since the 1980s, the two primary governance paradigms that have emerged to respond to crises of migration have been regionalisation and management.169 Regionalisation refers to those coordinated efforts of nations - such as between Italy and Libya, or Australia and Indonesia - to manage migration at a regional level. Through articulated agreements, countries have developed shared policing and patrol strategies, interception efforts, synchronised travel and visa requirements, shared security information, and the hosting of information networks offshore, such as Australia’s Advanced Passenger Processing (APP) system, which enables advanced screening of passengers before they embark on their journey to

165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
Alongside these agreements and collaborative efforts, there has also been a range of contestations and stand-offs. Lines drawn in the sea are slippery, and in a number of cases, states have sought to reframe the problem of migration, and indeed the problems of individual boats and bodies, as someone else’s problem. In a number of cases, in both the Mediterranean and in Australian waters, stand-offs have occurred at sea, while states negotiate who should take responsibility for particular asylum-seeking boats. These crises have resulted in migrant boats being suspended at sea, processed at sea, detained on islands, and in some cases abandoned at sea, ultimately resulting in death.

In the case of Australia, regional solutions have seen the processing and detention of maritime migrants moved to offshore territories like Christmas Island, or to other states such as Nauru or on Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island, in exchange for foreign aid and investment. In the Mediterranean, the Italian island of Lampedusa and the island state of Malta have been critical to regional arrangements. These regional solutions draw upon geopolitical divisions of power and colonial and neo-colonial histories in order to secure states of the global North against irregular maritime migrations. As these regionalisation schemes and migration management regimes have taken hold over the last twenty years, Mountz argues that ‘islands have come to the fore as significant geographic locations from which to examine struggles over migration, sovereignty and enforcement’.  

**Islands in a Carceral Archipelago**

Islands, as discrete and intimate entities, have long occupied a powerful place in the western imaginary – as paradise and gulag, refuge and prison, a site of dreams and wrecks. The space of the island is remote and finite, offering itself as an ambiguous repository for those human desires and experiments which find no place on the mainland. With their manageable size, separation and distance from the mainland, islands can be engineered as offshore enclaves where the rules of the parent state need not fully apply. The island, as it enters the realm of politics, therefore functions in the metaphorical arena as well as the material. The island can serve as a metaphor for isolation and uniqueness, a distant state of exception with the heterotopic possibilities of absolute human control, or conversely, absolute freedom. There is a complex interplay

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171 Mountz, “The Enforcement Archipelago.”
174 Baldacchino, “Islands and the Offshoring Possibilities and Strategies of Contemporary States,” 57.
175 Peckham, “The Uncertain State of Islands.”
between islands as physical, geographical features and their metaphorical transformations within political discourse, whereby geopolitical claims about islands are naturalised, at the same time as geographical knowledge is politicised. The political geography of the island is paradoxical; while it may be small and remote - merely a speck on the map - the island is critical to the constitution of the mainland. In his essay on the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, Joshua Comaroff reflects that islands are ‘among the great crucibles of the socio-geographical imaginary’. As heterotopias, crucibles or ‘laboratories for the possibilities of the nation-state, islands exemplify the latter’s limit points, latent capabilities, and ultimate potentialities’.

Island detention centres have emerged as a cornerstone policy feature in the ongoing securitisation of migration, from Australia to the European Union. The island’s small size is read as manageable, while its isolation increases its security as a site of detention. There is a long history of islands being used as penal colonies and prisons - Robben Island held Nelson Mandela, Alcatraz held Al Capone, Lampedusa was an Italian penal colony, and the Australian continent itself was established as a penal colony, while several of its offshore islands served as high security prisons. Islands have served as prominent geographical sites of detention not just due to their geographical positioning in spaces between nations, but also due to their legal and political ambiguity. There is a range of terms today to describe processes of excising, zoning, quarantining, and offshoring that serve to endow a specific site within a state with particular privileges or penalties. These spatial zoning practices have led not only to island detention sites but also to offshore finance centres, tax havens, export processing zones, military bases, remote weapons testing and dumping sites, special autonomous regions, duty free zones, and various combinations of these.

Nation states exploit the legal ambiguity of islands, their economic dependency, and colonial histories in order to effectively outsource the processing and detention of problematic bodies to offshore sites. This ‘offshoring’ forms an ‘archipelago of exclusion that capitalises on sub-national island jurisdictions to shrink spaces of asylum legally, numerically and spatially’. Detaining migrants on islands serve to effectively isolate them from the bulk of the mainland community, with access to these islands by journalists, NGOs or members of the general public rendered difficult by transport costs, visa regulations, and government restrictions on visitors to detention centres. In this sense, the relative distance of island detention centres from mainland territory effectively isolates migrants from communities of advocacy and activism, legal representation, and, in some cases, restricts asylum claims that can only be made by landing on sovereign

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176 Ibid.
178 Ibid., 6.
179 Baldacchino, “Islands and the Offshoring Possibilities and Strategies of Contemporary States,” 59.
180 Ibid., 60.
181 Ibid.
182 Mountz, “The Enforcement Archipelago.”, 120.
This distance needs to be considered in material terms. Christmas Island, an offshore territory of Australia, is governed from Canberra, the nation’s capital, some 5,182 kms away, more than double the distance from London to Moscow. The scale of this distance serves to highlight the spatial relations between the administrative centre - the metropole - and the margins of territory, and the regimes of visibility and invisibility that operate over such distance. Christmas Island to Canberra is paradoxically ‘extraordinarily distant and constitutively relational’. This distance also suggests how far states are willing to move, and expand their reach in response to the mobility of migrants. In the Australian context, this vast reach cannot be underestimated; the Border Protection Command (BPC) agency now claims to patrol 11.5% of the earth’s oceans, or 8% of the earth’s total surface, approximately 12 million square nautical miles.

The isolation enforced by these vast distances enables sub-standard conditions and acts of violence to take place on island detention centres that would not be able to occur in the same way on the mainland. As Baldacchino and Milne explain:

Islands provide bounded space for the emergence of ingenious new species of asymmetrical economies and governance. The pattern repeats itself again and again where typically large states make creative use of their small, far-flung and remote island jurisdictions to facilitate activities that would be simply anathema on home ground.

The systemic deployment of offshore detention denies asylum seekers the right to access sovereign mainland territory, and therefore mobilise concomitant rights claims and legal protections. In some cases, migrants are offloaded into the care of states who have not even signed the 1951 Refugee Convention such as Libya or Indonesia, or in the case of Nauru, signed the Convention in order to establish a migrant detention centre at Australia’s behest. The process of externalisation of asylum therefore divides and obscures asylum seekers geographically from domestic systems of legal protection. The use of ‘tactically post-territorial’ sites for military installations, camps and foreign bases, Comaroff has pointed out, are key features of US strategy in the war on terror. While the concept of externalisation is not new, few scholars have investigated the consequences of the respatialisation of asylum. Those who have, such as Alison

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183 Ibid. 118
184 Chambers, “Shipwreck with Spectator,” 98.
Mountz and Jennifer Hyndman, argue that the policies and spatial practices of externalising asylum for those who travel by sea effectively constitute neo-refoulement.¹⁹⁰

Continuity and Connection: Lampedusa, Christmas Island, Nauru and Melilla
The islands and offshore sites utilised within the contemporary archipelago of migrant incarceration - such as Christmas Island, Lampedusa, Nauru and Melilla - need to be understood within their own particular histories and geographies of colonialism, militarism and empire. Tracing these historical and geographical particularities reveals consistencies in the spatialisation of power across distant global sites. Examining the connections between colonial histories, military incursions and contemporary uses of these islands exposes patterns of historical and topographical repetition in transnational relations of biopolitical power. A geographical analysis allows us to conceptualise islands ‘not as isolated sites, but component parts of broader patterns’ characteristic of the relationship between remote detention and the securitisation of migration.¹⁹¹ These transnational sites have long been sites where anxieties pertaining to sovereignty and securing the nation’s borders manifest.

I wish to trace a genealogy of exploitation at each of these four sites, through three particular schemas: colonialism, military instrumentality, and economic opportunism. Two of these sites - Christmas Island and Lampedusa offer a ready comparison as offshore territories of Australia and Italy respectively, and host to migrant detention centres of the parent states. The other two locations offer more unique sites of enquiry: Nauru, a tiny sovereign nation-state in the South Pacific, and Melilla, one of two Spanish cities located on the African continent, bordered by Morocco and the Mediterranean Sea. Contextualising these islands historically demonstrates the configurations of colonial, military and economic powers that shape a certain imagination about these territories, which allows them to be used in particular ways in the contemporary moment.

Genealogies of Colonialism and Militarism
The contemporary uses of these four sites in the overall management and securitisation of migration cannot be considered as exceptional, but rather a continuation of exceptionalism as an historical project undertaken in waves by imperial and colonial forces.¹⁹² The assertion of imperial and neo-imperial power over these spaces serves to reinforce these sites as always already available for utilisation - not only in terms of the exploitation of resources, but also in terms of the negation of local populations. There is a general feeling of surplus that infuses these territories - they are extra bits of land, available for use. All four of these sites have been subject

¹⁹⁰ Hyndman and Mountz, “Another Brick in the Wall?”
¹⁹¹ Mountz, “The Enforcement Archipelago.”, 126.
¹⁹² This point is made by Amy Kaplan in her 2005 study on imperialism, colonisation and militarisation of Guantanamo Bay. Kaplan (2005) in Ibid., 393.
to colonial conquests, which involved the exploitation of some natural resources alongside the preservation and commodification of other natural resources, and a denial of indigeneity or other claims of the colonised populations.

Christmas Island, a non self-governing territory of Australia, and Italy’s southernmost island of Lampedusa share a number of geographical and ecological features which have invited particular utilisations by Australia and Italy respectively. Christmas Island is located in the Indian Ocean around 320 kilometres south of Java, Indonesia and more than 2,600 kilometres northwest of the nearest Australian city of Perth, Western Australia. These vast distances demonstrate the elastic spatialisation of power exercised by Australia over the territory. Since 2006, Christmas Island has hosted a purpose-built Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (IRPC), used to detain asylum seekers attempting to reach Australia. Similarly, the island of Lampedusa’s “belonging” to Italy is geographically tenuous. Lying at the southern tip of Italy, Lampedusa is 185km south of the Sicilian coast and just 120kms from Tunisia and is considered geologically part of Africa. Since the early 2000s, Lampedusa has become a key landing point for migrants seeking to enter the EU and has operated a migrant reception centre since 1998. The geological features of both islands lend themselves as ideal sites within a certain prison imaginary - Christmas Island is naturally fenced by dramatic limestone cliffs around the edge of the island, while Lampedusa’s southern side is riddled with deep gorges and the northern end dominated by sheer cliffs.

Both islands are considered to be of unique ecological value, as home to several endemic species and protected areas of reef and rainforest. The ecological value and rights claims of environmentalists in relation to these sites sits in tension with their carceral utilisations. Christmas Island is home to a rare species of migratory red crab, millions of which transect the island at particular times of year. In designing the migrant detention facilities on Christmas Island, the architects were instructed to choose a site away from the crabs’ main migratory route and the brief also mandated for the construction of special crab crossing facilities. In this absurd and allegorical feature, crabs whose migration paths became “irregular” could be redirected in an orderly way to follow the specified migration paths. On Lampedusa, a southern beach is famous as one of the last remaining egg-laying sites for the Loggerhead Sea Turtle, which is endangered throughout the Mediterranean. The egg-laying of the turtle, along with the subterranean life in the surrounding reefs, serve as prime tourist attractions to the island, which functions as both a prison and a resort. While eco-tourists and environmentalists lobby for preserving the pristine waters and beaches of Lampedusa in order to save the turtle, the washed-up bodies of asylum seekers on the same beaches go unremarked in these ecotourism narratives.

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193 Christmas Island is 135 square kilometres in size.
194 The island is just 20km square, and in 2014 has a population of around 4,500 inhabitants.
The discourses of environmental protection at both sites function as a liberal claim of protection that sits uneasily alongside incarceration.

It was Christmas Island’s natural resources that originally garnered colonial interest in the island. Both Christmas Island and Nauru became seen as important resources following the discovery of phosphate on the islands. Christmas Island was annexed by the British in 1888 following the discovery of phosphate, and mining began using indentured labour from China, Malaysia and Singapore. Following World War II, Christmas Island came under the jurisdiction of the new colony of Singapore, and the mining program was expanded and more workers were recruited, evolving into a permanent population. Given the massive post-war expansion of phosphate-enriched agriculture in Australia and New Zealand, the economic importance of Christmas Island was quickly recognised by the Australian government. The phosphate mined from Christmas Island and Nauru was the backbone of Australian agricultural inputs, supplying fertiliser to the country for almost a century.

Following World War II, Australia feared an ‘Asiatic invasion’ and sought to maintain Australian security ‘behind a peripheral screen of islands’. It was in this context that the government entered into careful negotiations with the British, and in 1958 the governance of Christmas Island was transferred to Australia, with a compensation payment made to Singapore to the tune of 2.9 million British pounds. The Australian claim to sovereignty over Christmas Island was made in part on the basis that there were no other competing claims to sovereignty, especially from an indigenous population. Australian went to great lengths to maintain that the inter-generational population of Christmas Island was represented and documented as a temporary labour force, denying any possible claims to permanence or indigeneity. Chambers makes the point that rights claims have therefore always been something that the Australian government has tried to interdict before they have the chance to arrive on Christmas Island. In 1981, Australian resident status was officially conferred on all those residing on Christmas Island at the time, with universal eligibility to apply for Australian citizenship. Christmas Island was no longer “remote”, but had been brought properly into Australia.

196 Ibid.
198 The island currently has a resident population of 2,072, most of whom are Chinese Australians who trace their histories to these populations of indentured labourers.
202 Ibid., 22.
The island Republic of Nauru, in the South Pacific, is located around 4,000kms northeast of Sydney, Australia. As a phosphate rock island, with rich deposits near the surface, Nauru has been mined extensively and left mostly barren. In 2001, Nauru opened a migrant detention centre, spread across two camps, in exchange for Australian aid. After closing the centre in 2008, the Australian government re-opened it in 2012 and continues to detain asylum seekers on Nauru. Since April 2014, recognised refugees have been temporarily resettled on Nauru and released into the island community.

The island of Nauru’s first contact with Europeans began in the early 19th century when passing traders or whaling ships would stop at the island to trade fresh water and food, giving the islanders alcohol and firearms in return. The balance between the twelve tribes on the island was disturbed by these introductions, resulting in a ten-year civil war that reduced the population by forty percent. The island was annexed by Germany in 1888, until World War I when it was captured by Australian troops, held under British control until 1920, and finally in 1923 was made an Australian mandate territory, with the UK and New Zealand as co-trustees of the mandate. Phosphate had been discovered on Nauru in 1900, hence the intense interest in the island by the colonising forces. Following World War I, the local population suffered high fatalities due to epidemics of European infectious diseases, including tuberculosis and influenza. In the following decades, phosphate mining continued intensively until 1961 when, having stripped Nauru of its tropical vegetation and leaving a barren rocky wasteland, Australia declared Nauru uninhabitable and offered to resettle the residents on a deserted island off the coast of Queensland. The Nauruans refused and instead opted for independence, becoming the world’s smallest independent republic in 1968. In a final act of exploitation before leaving the island, Australia, New Zealand and the UK forced Nauru to borrow against its future mining earnings to buy out their shared phosphate company.

In the case of Lampedusa, the island changed hands a number of times, until 1860 when the island became part of the new Kingdom of Italy. Lampedusa’s role as a place of incarceration was founded soon after Italian unification, when the northern-dominated Italian government sought to establish a place of penal exile for the remainders of the insurgent, anti-unification South. The descent of Northern Italian politicians and bureaucrats into the south was seen as a process of ‘discovery and colonisation’. In tracing the island’s history, Pugliese has described the ways

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204 Nauru is just 21 square kilometres, and with a population of 9,378 residents it’s the second smallest state in the world by population. Most of the population are Nauruan or hail from other Pacific Islands.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
210 Gramsci (1975) in Ibid., 665
in which Africa became the governing metaphor through which Northern Italians made sense of the islands of the south, replete with highly racialised notions of criminality.\textsuperscript{211} Lampedusa, as a penal colony, was constitutive of Italian nation-building; offering a site upon which the nation's designated criminal subjects could be cast into internal exile.\textsuperscript{212}

Lampedusa, Christmas Island and Nauru all became caught up in WWII battles that were playing out between the global powers. Japanese Forces occupied both Christmas Island and Nauru during World War II. The islands were targeted largely due to their rich phosphate resources, which were used in part to produce munitions for Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{213} Christmas Island was occupied from 1942, during which time over 60\% of the population was evacuated to Japanese prison camps in Surabaya.\textsuperscript{214} Nauru suffered shelling by the Germans in 1940, and in 1942 was occupied by the Japanese military, which lasted three years until 1945. The Japanese used the Nauruans as forced labour and deported many to work as indentured labour in other parts of the Pacific. In one brutal incident, the occupying forces reportedly took 39 lepers from their Nauruan colony, loaded them onto a boat and sunk it out at sea.\textsuperscript{215} The Japanese built a significant airfield on Nauru, which was bombed several times by the Allied forces in an attempt to prevent food supplies being flown into Nauru. At the end of the war, after air raids, deportations and massacres, there were reportedly less than 600 Nauruans left on the island.\textsuperscript{216} Lampedusa was also caught up in the battles of World War II, with Allied forces bombing the island in 1943 until its surrender. In 1986, in retaliation for the American bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya fired two missiles at the US Coast Guard navigation station on Lampedusa. The Coast Guard station was then commissioned as a NATO base until 1994, when it was decommissioned, returned to the Italians and later converted into a migrant ‘identification and deportation centre’.\textsuperscript{217} The migrant detention centre on Lampedusa therefore follows directly in a site-specific lineage of militarised and colonial infrastructure.

As a Spanish enclave city located within the African continental landmass, bordered entirely by Morocco and the sea, Melilla functions as an island of sorts, particularly in terms of migration.\textsuperscript{218} The Moroccan city of Melilla was seized by a Spanish fleet in 1497, and during the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries the Spanish proceeded to build a large fortress north of the port. The current boundaries of the Spanish territory surrounding the fortress were established through a series of

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 665–666.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 667.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{217} Pugliese, “Crisis Heterotopias,” 667.
\textsuperscript{218} The area of Melilla is 12 square kilometres, with a population of around 78,000 residents, made up mainly of Spaniards and Riffian Berbers.
treaties with Morocco in the mid to late 19th Century. Two major campaigns were launched by the local Rif Berbers against the Spanish, leading to brief wars in 1893 and again in 1908, when the Spanish had begun to mine lead and iron in the region. To do so, the Spanish relied upon the Berber, who became migrant labourers in the territory that had previously been their own. In this sense, the use of migrant indentured labour and mining resonates with the labour and extraction histories of Christmas Island and Nauru.

A 2007 visit to Melilla by the Spanish King and Queen caused a diplomatic dispute between Morocco and Spain. Morocco claims that the territories of Melilla and Ceuta should be returned to it, while Spain maintains that the territories have been Spanish since before Morocco became a sovereign state. To prevent migration into the territory, particularly by sub-Saharan Africans, Spain has constructed three parallel razor wire barrier fences, complete with spotlights, noise and movement sensors, watchtowers and video cameras. In spite of these measures, there have been a number of coordinated attempts by migrants to storm the fences in a synchronised manner in the hope that of the hundreds, or even thousands, who attempt to cross, some will make it through. Melilla also hosts a migrant reception centre.

The Stuff Dreams Are Made Of
These offshore sites have also served as the repositories for elaborate transnational schemes of economic opportunism. On Christmas Island, as the phosphate industry gradually declined, a new purpose was found for this remote island territory. In keeping with the metaphor of the island as a place to find treasure, a grand casino was built in 1993, as a joint venture by an Australian businessman and his Indonesian business partner who had close links to the New Order regime of then Indonesian President Suharto. The casino and resort quickly became the largest employer on Christmas Island, at times turning over $15 million dollars profit in a single weekend, contributing around $11 million per year to the local economy, and sizeable tax revenue to the Australian government. The casino’s success relied upon the isolated nature of the island and on friendly business connections, as the majority of the clientele were New Order elite who came to the resort for gambling and hedonistic pleasures impossible in Jakarta due to the pressure of Islamic interests. The casino thrived until 1998, which saw the Asian financial crisis and the overthrow of Suharto and his regime, bringing the casino’s success to an abrupt halt. While the success of the casino had profoundly restructured the economy of Christmas Island, it was thrown into a state of insecurity in the wake of its closure. The Australian government, which had been pursuing de jure status of Christmas Island in order to avoid questions about its lack of self-

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221 Ibid.

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determination, now found itself responsible for the welfare and economic viability of the island and its population.\textsuperscript{222}

In June 2001, the Australian government launched its island fantasies into improbable new heights, with the declaration that it would provide A$105 million in funding to establish a satellite spaceport on Christmas Island.\textsuperscript{223} Under an agreement negotiated with the Russian space agency, Russia would supply Soviet rockets and launch expertise while Australia would provide infrastructure and opportunities to launch commercial satellites from Christmas Island.\textsuperscript{224} While Christmas Island languished in between the failed treasure island fantasy of the casino and the promise of Soviet space exploration, a boat appeared on the horizon – the Tampa – that was to once again transform Christmas Island, metaphorically, legally, politically and materially.\textsuperscript{225} The remote territory of Christmas Island was brought centre stage in the Australian imagination with the building of the detention centre.

On Nauru, in the decades following independence, the profits from the now nationalised phosphate mine resulted in Nauruans claiming one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, standing at USD$31,000 in 1975.\textsuperscript{226} Phosphate royalties allowed the government to establish a comprehensive welfare state, including free utilities and subsidised housing, without taxes.\textsuperscript{227} However, by the 1990s, phosphate profits were in decline and the state of Nauru began to promote itself as a site for offshore banking services.\textsuperscript{228} The island became a tax haven, particularly for Russian mafia, and foreign nationals were able to buy Nauruan citizenship, and even establish a licensed bank for a fee. In 2002, the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listed Nauru as one of the 15 non-cooperative countries refusing to take adequate measures to prevent money laundering.\textsuperscript{229} The FATF was particularly concerned about the 400 or so banks that had no physical presence in the country.\textsuperscript{230}

The state of Nauru, once known as Pleasant Island, was now rapidly entering the realm of “failed state” discourses, dependent on cash injections from other countries in order to survive. Throughout the 2000s, Nauru undertook a range of creative income-generating measures. It used

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{222} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Forbes and Heng, “Christmas Island: Remote No More,” 69.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Ibid., 77.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Chambers, “Society Has Been Defended,” 27.
\item \textsuperscript{226} John Connell, “Nauru: The First Failed Pacific State?,” The Round Table 95, no. 383 (January 1, 2006): 50, doi:10.1080/00358530500379205.
\item \textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{228} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{229} The construction of the financial offshore can be considered a cause and consequence of the ‘economic geographies of neoliberal capitalism’, whereby enormous profits can be made by circulating capital through complex offshore networks. It has been argued that Agamben’s state of exception leaves out the simultaneous financial zones of exception that have accelerated outside of public accountability and national regulation. T.J. Demos, The Migrant Image: The Art and Politics of Documentary during Global Crisis (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2013), 163.
\item \textsuperscript{230} Connell, “Nauru,” 53.
\end{itemize}
its newly acquired UN member status (which it obtained in 1999) to de-recognise Taiwan, in return for US$60 million in aid and $77 million in ‘debt forgiveness’ from China. Three years later, Nauru broke ties with China and re-recognised Taiwan. In 2009, Nauru recognised the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and received US$50 million from Russia for doing so. From 2001 – 2013 the state of Nauru has had nineteen changes of government, mostly due to no-confidence votes. All of this has allowed for heavy infiltration of the Nauruan state by Australian bureaucrats and Australian capital. The representation of Nauru as a failed state, and Nauruans as the “irresponsible native” who squandered their wealth through short-term thinking and insatiable greed is pervasive, and allows for the ongoing justification of intervention by Australia. Nauru is economically bound to Australia – operating Australian dollars as their currency, receiving substantial sums of aid in exchange for the detention centre, and most recently effectively buffering the Australian detention centre from receiving any visitors by increasing the visitor visa fee to a hefty AUD$7,000.

For the Mediterranean territories of Lampedusa and Melilla, the violent disjuncture lies in the radically asymmetrical relations of power that sit side-by-side in jarring proximity. Havens of leisure and privilege clash violently against the harrowing presence of desperate asylum seekers. Lampedusa is marked paradoxically as both a tourist destination and a contemporary penal colony. In 2014, Trip Advisor ranked Lampedusa’s Rabbit Beach fourth in its 2014 Traveller’s Choice awards for “Top 25 Beaches”. One description of this ‘Mediterranean paradise’ reads: ‘The sand is golden, the water is crystal clear and there are plenty of fish for snorkelling’.

In all these positive reviews of Lampedusa, the presence of the immigration detention centres is not mentioned. Within these tourist narratives, there is no space for the jarring presence of asylum seeker bodies, dead or alive. The Rough Guide describes Spanish Melilla as a ‘friendly little place, with a pride in its mix of cultures’, boasting ‘stunning views out across the Mediterranean’.

In his work ‘Dying to come to Australia: Asylum seekers, tourists and death’, Jon Stratton has documented the perverse and violently contradictory relations that at once connect and

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231 Ibid., 57.
234 For example, a large number of Australian police and civilian personnel have been deployed to Nauru, and held key public servant positions under an agreement signed in 2004. Ibid., 8.
235 Nauruans are reportedly the most obese people in the world and suffer a range of dietary health problems, a fact often stated or implied in reportage on the country.
238 Ibid.
disconnect asylum seekers and tourists. Within such spaces, the wealthy of the Global North are able to sunbake, snorkel, play a round of golf, enjoy their leisure time, within the same geographical space as the desperate asylum seeker from the Global South. In an image that went viral in October 2014, African migrants seeking entry to the Spanish enclave were caught atop the razor wire fence along the border, looking down at white-clad golfers teeing off in an elite club. It is worth noting that these highly spectacular visual renderings of migrants attempting to climb the fences in Melilla show us a particular refugee body – the black body. These migrants are routinely described as “African” without attention to specificity of origins, of histories, or of the conflict or circumstances they might be fleeing.

While some bodies are encouraged to enjoy the crystal clear waters, others are met with excessive force. This was the case in February 2014 when nine migrants drowned as a result of Spanish security forces firing rubber bullets at a group attempting to swim from a beach in Morocco to Spain’s other enclave of Ceuta. Foucault wrote of the ‘epoch of simultaneity’ as the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. In this sense, the asylum-seeker and the pleasure-seeker are cast into ‘an ensemble of relations that make them appear as juxtaposed, set off against one another, implicated by each other – that makes them appear, in short, as a sort of configuration’. In these sites, conflicting and incompatible ontologies of living and dying are revealed, producing ‘dispositions of bodies and subjects that remain proximate, yet invisible to each other’.

Through offering a genealogy of these four sites at territory’s edge, I have attempted to track a series of parallels. In the contemporary moment, all four sites represent fault lines in the North/South division of labour and distribution of death in relation to migration management, and all four sites are nodes in a global archipelago of migrant detention. By tracing the histories of colonialism, annexation, militarism and transnational experiments of capital enterprise, I wish to argue that these parallels are ‘structural, not coincidental, within transnational biopolitical economies’. These sites are inscribed with colonial histories in such a way that contemporary usages reflect past colonial ambitions – from the Italian state using Lampedusa as a penal colony for its undesirables, to Spain maintaining its exclusive African enclaves, through to Australia’s exploitation of the resources of Christmas Island and Nauru, whilst undermining any claims to

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244 Ibid.
245 Ibid., 674.
246 Ibid., 676.
indigenous sovereignty on the islands. These sites have been used for decades as the stage for battles between the broadly Anglo-American alliance and their enemies — Germany, Italy, Japan, Libya — at great cost to the local population. These islands and offshore territories are written in such a way that they do not possess their own histories, whereas the nation state is saturated with histories. Instead, these sites function as footnotes in the histories of nations, as playgrounds, battlegrounds, and banks. They exist almost as prostheses, augmenting the imagined reach of the state even further into the offshore realm.

These offshore sites have hosted grand transnational fantasies of capital — from mining to casinos, Russian space stations, offshore havens for international money laundering, tourist resorts, UN vote-buying, and migrant detention centres. Looking through the lenses of colonialism, militarism and transnational economic opportunism, we can see structural patterns emerge across both temporal and spatial axes at these sites. The pattern rendered visible is the manner in which the ‘transnational infrastructure of biopolitical and colonial regimes ensures the reproduction across different sites and bodies, of violent relations of power’.247

In this chapter, I have explored the relationship between sovereign power and territory. I have looked at the ways in which sovereign power is spatialised through creative and ambiguous technologies of border management. These novel approaches to bordering are co-constitutive of the intense securitisation of migration in the contemporary era. I have argued that within this context, “regional solutions” are predicated upon vastly disparate diplomatic and economic power relationships, which allow certain powers to shirk their global responsibilities through outsourcing and offshoring techniques. Through an examination of four offshore sites, I have argued that the contemporary uses of offshore sites need to be seen as a continuation of historical relationships of colonialism, dispossession, militarism and exploitation.

I have also tried to pinpoint or hint at something elusive, which manifests at a number of points and is somehow a defining characteristic of these places and the paradigms that govern them. The histories and geographies of these islands and offshore sites are replete with scattered allusions that register as fantastic, or even absurd. It’s the absurdity of the Australian government traveling back in time to retrospectively excise Melville Island from the migration zone, and ten years later excising the entire mainland from its own migration zone. It’s the brilliant bright red allegory of millions of crabs crossing Christmas Island through designated channels, weaving their way past other migrants whose movements were not facilitated in the same way. To imagine the site of Suharto and his cronies gambling away millions, proposed as a Russian-Australian joint space station, and ultimately becoming the Christmas Island migrant detention centre. For the island state of Nauru to be exploited for phosphorous (a mineral produced by the excrement of

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247 Ibid., 670.
seabirds), which fuelled Australia’s war munitions and agricultural industry, to later see Nauru insolvent and home to 400 non-existent banks. The bizarre juxtaposition of Lampedusa’s tourists flocking to see rare turtles and marine life, while ignoring the bodies washing up on the neighbouring beaches; or Melilla’s golfers teeing off beneath the gaze of hundreds of African migrants stranded on the barbed wire fences. These absurd, fantastical collisions of metaphor, capital and remote spaces are not unusual either. The town of Eloy in the desert of Arizona, USA, is awash with funding from the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) for operating a migrant detention centre. This former mining town-turned-prison town had an alternative that was stymied in favour of the migrant detention facility – a rock’n’roll theme park, billed as an Elvis-themed family friendly oasis to rival Disneyland and Seaworld. What does this reveal about the feeling of excess that imbues these locations? Indeed there is a consistent sense that these sites are indeed repositories for unfulfilled dreams, places endowed with a magical sense that the regular rules do not apply. It is the ways in which these remote, surplus sites are imagined, which enables their exceptional utilisations. This manifests historically, and in the contemporary examples of the use of offshore spaces as nodes in migration management.

I have highlighted in this chapter the particular and important role of islands and peripheral territories in past and present assertions of sovereign power. It is particularly evident that in moments of crisis, when the sovereign power of the nation is challenged, maritime contestations are heightened, and the role of the “offshore” becomes even more significant. In the following chapter, I will focus on these moments of crisis, and the way that the securitisation of migration is enacted through both security and humanitarian imperatives.
Chapter 3: Human Security? Risky Bodies in Times of Crisis

In the previous chapter, I looked at the geographical ordering of exclusion through the use of offshore territories - a process that has become critical to the contemporary management of mobile bodies. I examined the symbolic and material ordering that takes place through the spatial management of the border and those who seek to cross it. If spatiality and the use of the offshore constitute one form of ordering in contemporary migration management, the conflation of humanitarianism and securitisation imperatives constitutes another key tenet of the contemporary paradigm. In previous chapters I discussed the notion of crisis, and the way that crisis is perpetuated to enable exceptional measures. In this chapter, I will examine the production of that crisis, which serves to render certain bodies as hypervisible sources of insecurity. In responding to these insecure bodies, the state draws upon both humanitarian and security imperatives, which are deployed to order bodies according to a register of exclusion and inclusion.

Focusing on an example from Egypt, I offer here an analysis of the production of others as abjects – excluded, dangerous or risky others – and how this enables certain “rescue or punish” regimes.248 I will look at the securitisation of Syrian refugees in Egypt, the impact of this for Syrians, and the resulting exodus from the country. To think through this example, I have used two key texts – one is Paul Amar’s critical examination of human security paradigms, and the second by Claudia Aradau analysing the functioning of securitisation in relation to victims of trafficking.

In Paul Amar’s (2013) book ‘The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism’ he considers transnational flows of security practices and humanitarian discourses. He argues that Cairo and Rio are two sites of the Global South generative of new forms of human-security governance, which he views as signifying a paradigmatic shift from liberalisation to securitisation. He argues that human security modes of governance blend parahumanisation (the creation of politically disabled victim subjects that must be constantly protected or rescued by enforcement interventions regardless of their consent); hypervisibilisation (the spotlighting of certain identities and bodies as sources of radical insecurity and moral panic in ways that actually render invisible the real nature of social control); and securitisation (the reconfiguration of political debates and claims around social justice, political participation, or resource distribution into technical assessments of danger, operations of enforcement and targetings of risk populations).249 In this way, Amar does not see human security as an alternative or liberatory paradigm as such, but rather problematizes its claims and

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248 Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 8.
the ways in which human security paradigms serve to conceal violence and control, within a broader social justice-oriented humanitarian discourse.

For Paul Amar, security practices and the grammar of humanitarianism are increasingly coming together in new human security modes of governance, which 'aim to protect, rescue and secure certain idealised forms of humanity identified with a particular family of sexuality, morality and class subjects,' grounded in certain militarised territories and strategic infrastructures. He argues that increasingly there is a point of alignment between the progressive claims of liberals and conservative security doctrines, such that everyone is speaking the same language within the increasing humanitarianisation of military and police security apparatuses.

Securitisation, as a key node in Amar's human security governance framework, has been conceptualised in a range of ways within security studies literature. Initial movements within critical security studies literature sought to establish security as a construction, while later contributions emphasised the embedded nature of security practises. My understanding of securitisation, particularly in relation to migration, draws upon the work of Claudia Aradau in her book 'Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics Out of Security.' Aradau’s book takes as its focus the securitisation discourses and practices surrounding female “victims of trafficking.” Aradau thinks through the ways in which security functions in order to consider the liberatory possibilities of a genuine outside. Building upon debates of securitisation as a discursive construction versus securitisation as embedded in everyday practise and process, Aradau conceives of securitisation as a dispositif based on a triad of representation, intervention and subjectivity. She argues that the element of subjectivity – that is, the way securitisation serves to reformulate the Self/Other relationship is critical to the process. In this way, Aradau builds upon and goes beyond other critical security studies formulations, which tend to focus on the representational aspects of securitisation, or the everyday bureaucratic interventions that constitute securitisation.

Traditionally, security was seen as an objective problem, with the main problem posed being how to deal with the seemingly endless threats posed to security. Security within more critical security studies literature however, is understood as a practice which functions as a way of ordering the social. Security entails an ‘imaginary promise of a desirable state in the future’, which requires intervention into, and management of, present problems in view of the projected

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250 We can add race to this list of qualifiers also.
252 Ibid., 15.
253 Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security.
254 Through a thorough examination of this issue, Aradau makes an intervention into the field of critical security studies. Her primary purpose is to explore the possibility of a form of politics outside of security. Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid., 6.
future.\textsuperscript{257} These security interventions have been variously viewed by critical security scholars as exceptional and undemocratic practices; as practices that converge disproportionately upon the enemy (specifically the migrant); and as an imaginary of certainty built into the modern political subject.\textsuperscript{258} The promise of security generates a certain understanding of social ordering, which reveals both the subject who is to be made secure, as well as the abject other, who needs to be either eliminated or neutralised.\textsuperscript{259} The promise of security therefore depends upon the exclusion of other subjects; in other words, upon their insecurity. The false promise of ontological and epistemological certainty based on the other’s exclusion Aradau argues, ‘exposes the very promise of security as an impossible promise’.\textsuperscript{260}

In this chapter, I will consider a sample of securitising “speech acts” that were enunciated in Egypt, and the impact that these speech acts had upon its audience (the subjects of the Egyptian state) and those it sought to render as risky (the Syrian-refugee-as-terrorist). Along with these speech acts, the securitisation of everyday bureaucratic processes also made life increasingly difficult for Syrians in Egypt by erecting a range of barriers to accessing services and basic security. The securitisation process in Egypt brought about a fundamental change to the Self/Other relationship between Egyptians and Syrians. While undertaking this intense and violent process of securitisation, the Egypt state articulated security imperatives intertwined with commitments to uphold a humanitarian response, infused with pan-Arab fraternity. By analysing this example, I aim to highlight the ways in which violence gets concealed by a humanitarian discourse that seeks to at once recognise the humanity of those it governs, while enabling particularly violent forms of ordering.

**Terrorist-Insider-Outsider**

... in the name of the Egyptian people, I speak to every Syrian who is staying in Egypt, to give a warning message that has an ultimatum of 48 hours. The Egyptian people have all the addresses that you are staying in. Those of you who are renting flats, those of you who are living in New Damietta – living where? In New Damietta. Living where? In Sadat City. And those in 6th October - all the addresses, the Egyptian people have them. And I am giving you an ultimatum of 48 hours, if you stayed with the [Muslim] Brotherhood after these 48 hours, we will ki--- ki--- destroy your houses. We have all your addresses! The Egyptian people will come out and destroy your houses – in New Damietta, 6th October, Sadat, 10th District in Nasr City. Do you hear me??? The people are not playing games! The people are not willing to allow any agent or spy to jump over their victory.\textsuperscript{261} Tawfiq Okasha, “Egypt Today”, 15\textsuperscript{th} July 2013\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{261} Meaning to undermine their victory, referring to the July 3rd deposal of the former president.
This speech, made by Egyptian TV presenter and former National Democratic Party (NDP) parliamentary member Tawfiq Okasha was broadcast on the Egyptian satellite television channel Al Fara‘een on 15th July 2013. Okasha, who also owns the channel, is a widely known and controversial figure in Egyptian popular media, famed (among other things) for his hatred of political Islam. In this speech, he directly addresses the Syrian refugee and asylum seeker population in Egypt, which at that time may have been between 100,000 people or more.263 This speech was made twelve days after a coalition led by the Egyptian army chief General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had removed the former President of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi from power on 3rd July 2013, and suspended the Egyptian constitution. The move had been preceded by four days of widespread national protests against Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) government.264 The military had issued the government with an ultimatum to respond to and satisfy its critics within 48 hours, or face the implementation of a military “road map”. This power shift had significant consequences for Syrians in Egypt in terms of securitisation measures, humanitarian responses, and ultimately resulted in forms of forced mobility and forced immobility.

Syrians escaping the conflict in Syria had been arriving in Egypt since 2011. As the conflict wore on, the numbers of Syrians arriving in Egypt continued to rise, reaching a peak in May 2013 when UNHCR tallied 15,890 arrivals for the month.265 Some of these people had been living in a third country in the region but relocated to Egypt as the situation became more protracted in order to conserve their resources with Egypt’s relatively cheaper cost of living. At first, the situation for Syrians in Egypt was favourable and they enjoyed a relatively open door policy, with a Presidential Decree in September 2012 formalising Syrian access to Egyptian public health and education services. Historically, Syrians have not needed an entry visa to come to Egypt, and instead refugees were able to regularise their stay through the Department of Immigration and the Ministry of Interior without any pre-conditions. Throughout 2012, there was an outpouring of Egyptian public support towards Syrians. In addition to the support provided by humanitarian actors such as UNHCR, WFP and partner organisations, individual Egyptians and community groups mobilised significant amounts of material support for Syrians. Syrians described receiving ‘excellent support’ at this time, recounting cases of individual Egyptian donors providing them

263 While UNHCR figures from the time show 73,547 registered Syrian persons of concern, it is estimated that at least tens of thousands more remained unregistered at that time, with estimates of the total number varying between 100,000 and 300,000. This was reflected in the increase in registrations which took place over the coming two months, quickly passing 100,000 in early September, even though virtually no new arrivals had been allowed into the country following the July power shift.
264 While the FJP is nominally independent, it was founded by the political group the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) of Egypt in 2011, and is seen as the political party of the MB. Even the term “ikhwan” (brothers) is used to describe both the MB and the FJP interchangeably.
with rent-free or discounted apartments, local store owners delivering them boxes of groceries, Egyptian families donating second-hand furniture and clothes, local appliance stores donating fridges and washing machines to help Syrians establish their homes.\textsuperscript{266} At the same time, formal and informal networks of support were mobilised, particularly through faith-based networks and community initiatives attached to mosques.

Material support at this time was fortified by an overall discursive climate of support for Syrian refugees in Egypt. In June 2013, former President Mohamed Morsi had severed ties with the Al-Assad regime in Syria, stating at a Syria support conference organised by the MB that ‘Egypt and its army will support Syrians until their rights are granted and a new elected leadership is chosen’.\textsuperscript{267} The former President also stated at this time that he was collaborating with international civil society organisations to provide aid to rebels in Syria and to Syrian refugees in Egypt.\textsuperscript{268} He called upon the Egyptian people to ‘welcome Syrian refugees and treat them as brothers’.\textsuperscript{269} Syrians at this time were broadly seen as Arab brothers, as fellow anti-regime revolutionaries, and as deserving of Egyptian assistance. Syrians were able to open businesses, gain employment, trade, and travel in and out of Egypt, with many Syrians reporting maintaining business links in Syria and the region.\textsuperscript{270}

The levels of material, popular and political support extended towards Syrians in the period prior to July 2013, is in stark contrast to an obvious (but often unrecognised) foil - Egypt’s longer-standing African refugee population. State services such as education, while formally extended to Sudanese, are not extended to other refugee populations in Egypt, such as Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans. The sense of recognition extended to Syrians - of Arabness, of Sunni Islam, of people overthrowing an established authoritarian regime - is not offered to the unrecognisable African refugee, particularly those non-Arabic speaking communities. This division was amplified by the new and substantial flows of humanitarian funding arriving in Egypt, much of it “dedicated funding” tied exclusively to Syrian refugees, which generated resentment from other refugee communities.

In the days following the change in Egyptian leadership on July 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2013, a Syrian national was allegedly arrested at a rally in support of the former ousted president. For many Egyptians, this incident further galvanised the existing association between Syrians and Islamist political groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. Three days after this incident, on July 8\textsuperscript{th}, the new military-

\textsuperscript{266} Personal communication.
\textsuperscript{268} Morsi quoted in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{269} Morsi quoted in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{270} Interviews with Syrian refugees in U’bour, Alexandria and 6th October suggests that many Syrians were able to maintain a degree of self-sufficiency during this period, were relatively integrated into the workforce, and did not depend heavily upon support from UNHCR or other aid agencies.
led government of Egypt modified the entry rules for Syrians and for the first time in history, Egypt required Syrians to have an entry visa and security clearance before traveling to Egypt. The new rules were applied immediately, with as many as 250 people denied entry on that day, and 95 Syrians were sent back to Syria on a flight to Latakia. As the rules were effected immediately, many Syrians residing in Egypt who were temporarily out of the country were denied re-entry. While obviously impacting Syrians planning to travel to Egypt, it also devastated Syrian families in Egypt who were denied family reunification, and often it was their primary breadwinner who was stranded outside of the country. Alongside this shift, a broad anti-Syrian media campaign was launched, re-inscribing Syrians with a new political meaning. Syrians in Egypt became demonised as the terrorist allies of the Muslim Brotherhood and supporters of the former president, cast as one node in a regional assemblage of Islamist terror. This assemblage also prominently featured Hamas in the Gaza strip, which is associated with the smuggling of weapons and persons through the tunnels at Rafah, violence in the Sinai Peninsula aimed at destabilising the Egyptian state, and ultimately the global discourse of terrorism.

Speech Acts and Exceptional Politics
Tawfiq Okasha’s speech quoted above could be considered a securitising “speech act” within the paradigm proffered by the Copenhagen School for Peace Studies, where the term ‘securitisation’ originally emerged in the late 1990s. Scholars of the Copenhagen School saw security as a matter of construction, as an assemblage of representations and interventions that together constitute securitisation. Scholars of the Copenhagen School attempted to describe how political speech acts or media representations ‘produce subjects of politics that are used to transfer every day social, economic and cultural governance into the realm of emergency police enforcements and military occupations’. The Copenhagen School has argued that issues are securitised through a process of discursive construction: ‘security is a quality actors inject into issues by securitising them, which means to stage them on the political arena... and then to have them accepted by a sufficient audience to sanction extraordinary defensive moves’. In this sense, the broad support of the Egyptian public was necessary for the government to undertake a range of “counter-terrorism” measures in the period following the July power transition. In some cases the government explicitly expressed its desire to garner a mandate from the Egyptian people, to

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271 Prior to July 2013, there had been four weekly flights between Egypt and Syria. These were all stopped.
272 This situation applied to my original translator for this research, who had briefly returned to Syria, only to be stranded and later imprisoned by the regime.
273 Personal communication.
274 It is worth noting that, although not new, the prominence of anti-Hamas rhetoric in the Egyptian political landscape has grown post July 2013, and indeed one of the charges against Mohammad Morsi was collaboration with Hamas.
275 Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 45.
authorise its extreme measures. As theorised by the Copenhagen School, securitisation means that 'an issue is presented as an existential threat requiring emergency measures, and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure'. Security discourses generate a specific rhetorical structure of survival, immediacy and urgency, a dynamics of exceptional politics rhetorically modelled upon war. Indeed this rhetorical structure was mobilised to full effect by the Egyptian state and state-friendly media.

Through mobilising this rhetoric, securitisation calls into being a spectre of violence that hovers permanently in the shadows of political communities, reminding us of the inherent contradiction entailed in the promise of security. Scholars of critical security studies see the effects of these exceptional measures as unequally affecting some members of the political community more than others. This was certainly the case in Egypt, where members of the Muslim Brotherhood were the key targets of the exceptional measures, while Syrians were securitised as a secondary (regionally significant) target.

**The Interfering Brother**

While the state rapidly effected the securitisation of the reconfigured Syrian-refugee-as-terrorist, it simultaneously maintained its official humanitarian stance towards Syrians. Syrians, collectively, had been made available for both expulsion and rescue. The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Badr Abdelatty, said in September 2013 that the changes to the visa regime for Syrians was a temporary measure due to Egypt's 'domestic security concerns', and that Syrians were still 'welcome in Egypt' and that services would continue to be available to them. While purportedly allaying domestic insecurities through the policing of political and nationalist categories, the state in fact further incites greater insecurities - not just for Syrians, but for particular categories of Egyptians as well. Another popular television commentator, Youseff Al-Husseiny (far less inflammatory than Tawfiq Okasha and ostensibly more liberal), captures the state sentiment at the time in his 10th July broadcast on “The Respectable Gentlemen” (Al-Sadah Al-Mohtaramon), saying:

Anyway, the Syrian refugees in Egypt are most welcome. And all the Syrians and Palestinians are “on our eyes and heads” and in our protection. And they shouldn't be under any circumstances persecuted or targeted... Egypt was, and will be, until this very moment, a secure country and people who enter it are secure, right? We receive Syrians in the time of the big Syrian crisis and we

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[279] Ibid., 67.
[281] These categories include not only Muslim Brotherhood supporters, but also communities in the Sinai who suffered under the state’s counter-insurgency campaign, and low-ranking military conscripts who are drawn disproportionately from poorer classes of Egyptians.
will keep receiving them… but we want to tell them something – who receives you and takes care of you is the Egyptian people and the Egyptian state, and not the Muslim Brotherhood. Who receives you and takes care of you and protects you is the whole of the Egyptian people with all it’s institutions, so please keep away from the Brotherhood protests and keep away from Mohammad Morsi issues and leave us to work out our problems. Please, don’t interfere. Stop at this line. Here, you are not a refugee, but you have all the traditions and the rights of a guest, of a generous hospitality. As a brother, not as a refugee. But, as a brother who stays in my house, do not interfere with what happens in my house. Respect the laws of this state, and its traditions... otherwise, don’t blame anyone else but yourself. Now, let’s watch a group of Brotherhood members and Syrians dancing the Syrian dabka together at one of the Brotherhood sit-ins between Rabaa and the Republican guard. Let’s watch it together. Cuts to footage of men dancing “Syrian dabka” as “evidence” of Syrian involvement in the MB sit-ins. Youseff Al-Husseiny, Al-Sadah Al-Mohtaramon, 10th July 2014

In this speech, we can see the explicit reference to security, followed by a clarification of exactly who provides the security - it is the Egyptian state and the Egyptian people, not the Muslim Brotherhood. In this statement, it is made clear that the MB is neither the state, nor are they part of the Egyptian people. They are the terrorist-outsider-inside. Syrians are reminded that they have a privileged position above the degraded refugee category - they are brothers - but are warned to behave as a grateful guest, or face the consequences (which Syrians themselves would be held responsible for). Meanwhile, the humanitarian discourse of care, protection, and rights is maintained, at the same time as being embedded in a fairly explicit threat.

For Syrians, the months following the July transition were experienced as the peak of anti-Syrian sentiment. The relative inconspicuousness and acceptance in public space (compared to African refugees) that they had previously enjoyed, was replaced with a high degree of negative attention directed towards them. Syrians had been rendered highly visible as the ‘interfering brother’, the traitorous guest towards their Egyptian hosts. Syrians respondents at this time felt fearful, particularly of arrests, detention and deportation. One measure of this insecurity is the significant spike in UNHCR registrations in the months following the transition - registrations jumped from around 69,000 at the end of June 2013, to 125,000 by the end of October, despite the fact that there were almost no new arrivals in this period. Syrians, rendered as a security threat to the Egyptian state, had lost their own sense of security. The primary reason cited by Syrians I spoke to for why they suddenly chose to register after July 2013 was security, followed by the need for material support given the overall decline of support for Syrians, particularly through Islamist-affiliated networks. Syrians had previously felt afraid of UNHCR registration from a security

\[ \text{Ibid.} \]

\[ \text{ONTV, “Brotherhood members and Syrians are dancing Syrian dabka in Raba’a Al-Adawya sit-in”, 2013, Youseff Al-Husseiny https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DozUkV3CqJw&feature=youtube_gdata_player.} \]

\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
Arab states to use the notion of right of return to deny assistance to displaced Palestinians.

Egypt. Should fall under the remit of UNHCR, however the government does not permit UNHCR to assist Palestinians in Egypt. However in Egypt, UNRWA does not operate, so by law Palestinians should not fall under the remit of UNHCR.

This is a summary of stories I heard across different locations from Syrians and people working with Syrians.

Syrians’ security fears particularly pertained to residency security, given the new challenges in renewing or regularising their stay in Egypt, and the increase in detentions and risk of deportation. Numbers of Syrians had been arrested, primarily for residency-related infringements, and from August 2013, groups of detained Syrians were deported to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and even back to Syria. Within this campaign of securitisation, one particular group of Syrians were particularly undesirable - Palestinian Syrians. The undesirability of the Palestinian Syrians embodies a conflation of exclusions - discursive and bureaucratic. With restricted travel documents and minimal protection from UNHCR, combined with the unwillingness of Jordan and Lebanon to accept Palestinian refugees from Syria, Palestinian Syrians were given the option to be deported back to Syria or to Gaza.

Syrians also feared their personal bodily security, especially for women and girls moving in public space. Young Syrian women in Alexandria, made visible in new ways by the media campaign, spoke of their attempts to dress in a ‘more Egyptian style’ in order to blend in and avoid Syrian-targeted harassment. Other Syrians mentioned trying to disguise their accents in public encounters. Syrians cited a list of other threats, discrimination and actual attacks made against them: being fired from their jobs, evicted from their apartments, extorted for more rent money by landlords, extorted by police in order to keep their businesses open, molotovs being thrown through the window of their business, and in one case a young man being stabbed but too fearful due to his residency status to go to the police. At the same time, there was a massive decline in charitable support levels to Syrians. Some NGOs had their assets frozen under a court order, others ceased to provide support due to fear of security repercussions, while many adopted wholesale the new discourse regarding Syrians as threatening the stability of the Egyptian state. 

284 They were fearful that this information could be passed on to the Syrian regime.
285 This is one manifestation of the relatively privileged position of many Syrians from a class and capital perspective, vis-a-vis other refugee groups.
286 Those deported had been caught attempting to leave Egypt by boat, detained in Alexandria and later deported.
287 Due to Palestinians being officially under the mandate of UNRWA, UNHCR provides limited support to Palestinians. However in Egypt, UNRWA does not operate, so by law Palestinians (including those from Syria) should fall under the remit of UNHCR, however the government does not permit UNHCR to assist Palestinians in Egypt.
288 This is the transition from their own internal dynamics of a long-standing Palestinian population, careful sectarian balance in Lebanon, an influx of Syrian refugees, and a long standing tendency of Arab states to use the notion of right of return to deny assistance to displaced Palestinians.
289 Personal communication.
290 In one case recounted in U’bour, a whole glass factory had relied upon Syrian labour, only to dismiss all of its workers and replace them with Egyptians following the July shift.
291 This is a summary of stories I heard across different locations from Syrians and people working with Syrians.
292 More than 1,000 NGOs had their assets frozen by a court order accusing them of being MB-affiliated entities.
This was accompanied by a host of bureaucratic and procedural difficulties, supposedly to ensure the security of the Egyptian state, exacerbating the prevailing sense of insecurity for Syrians. Syrians faced discrimination and harassment and bureaucratic problems attempting to renew their visas and access public services, particularly schools. While officially their access to services was upheld, in practice it was made increasingly difficult. Even in accessing services from those NGOs still providing support, Syrians described being harassed and accused of treason by NGO staff themselves whilst in the process of providing them with support.²⁹³

Securitising Practices
The bureaucratic and administrative forms of exclusion and harassment that Syrians experienced reveals one of the major critiques of the Copenhagen's School's emphasis on the discursive and symbolic construction of security. Their emphasis on the representational has been critiqued for failing to adequately attend to the importance of institutional practices and actors. Didier Bigo has argued that the ability to "speak security" relies upon more than the symbolic power of those authorised to speak, but upon a set of knowledges and technologies which enable those who speak security to 'produce a discourse on the figure of the enemy and impose their own definition of what constitutes a threat'.²⁹⁴ While for the Copenhagen School securitisation is a 'political spectacle where the main actors are the political elites', for Bigo it is the bureaucracies and professionals who are important in the securitisation process.²⁹⁵ While media analysis has been used extensively in theorising the creation of 'moral panics', Bigo has maintained that securitisation, although reinforced by media representations, remains the remit of institutions, with journalists often repeating the messages that they hear from those in security bureaucracies.²⁹⁶ For the Copenhagen school, securitisation is modelled on a state of war; whereas for Bigo, securitisation takes place through every day technologies of 'policing' (in the Foucauldian sense).²⁹⁷ It is these everyday forms of policing that Syrians experienced, alongside the mobilising effects of the politicised speech acts of the state and public figures like Okasha.

Building upon the theories of discursive construction versus securitising practices, Aradau emphasises the complex, co-dependent and shifting nature of the relationship between discourse and practice. She calls for consideration of a security dispositif based on a triad of representation, intervention and subjectivity.²⁹⁸ She argues that security practices have 'constitutive effects in terms of subjectivity and political effects in terms of the constitution and reproduction of political communities'.²⁹⁹ In the case of Syrians in Egypt, we see all three points of Aradau’s triad in

²⁹³ Personal communication.
²⁹⁵ Ibid., 48.
²⁹⁶ Bigo (2001) in Ibid., 49.
²⁹⁸ Ibid., 93.
²⁹⁹ Ibid., 8.
operation: speech acts and shifts in discursive representation, interventions of a governmental and humanitarian nature, and shifts in subjectivity through the changing nature of the Self/Other relationship between Egyptians and Syrians.

"We are dealing with humans"

Against the overwhelmingly climate of securitisation and political division, Syrians sought to leave Egypt. September 2013 marked the peak for UNHCR in registrations as well as case closures, as Syrians themselves closed their files and sought to leave the country. Some returned to Syria, others sought to depart Egypt’s northern shores by boat in the hope of crossing the Mediterranean Sea. During July-September 2013, the European border patrol agency Frontex reported a massive upswing in arrivals across the Central Mediterranean route, coming mostly from Egypt and Libya, and landing in Italy. The numbers arriving were higher than during the peak of the Arab uprisings in 2011, and Frontex predicts that 2014 figures (not released yet) will surpass those of 2013. In Egypt, the cycle of attempted departure, arrest, detention, and deportation continued throughout the summer of 2014, with Syrians and Palestinian Syrians being held across Alexandria’s police stations. Some refugees reported that they had made several unsuccessful attempts at leaving by boat, only to be released and try again. Syrians were subjected to forms of coercive movement (in the form of deportations and shifting sites of detention) as well as coercive sedentarism (being detained) - strategies of forced mobility and containment that are fundamental to international migration management regimes. In this sense, detention cannot be disconnected from deportation.

In response to the growing numbers of detained migrants across Alexandria’s prisons, in September 2014, the Governorate of Alexandria undertook an experiment in opening Egypt’s first migrant-specific detention centre, a re-purposing of the Anfousy Youth Centre building. In this act, Egypt added its name to a growing list of global migrant detention sites. Not surprisingly, this detention centre was opened in Alexandria, a coastal city at territory’s edge and a frequent departure point for irregular maritime travel to Europe. In a video released by Alexandrian Governor Tareq Mahdy’s You Tube channel, the governor is shown welcoming the first 227 detainees, who had been arrested while attempting to depart from the port at Rasateen. In the video, the governor is shown inspecting the premises, confirming with his staff the preparation of soap and towels and water for the detainees. After all, as he proclaims, ‘we are dealing with

301 The most detected nationalities were Syrians and Somalis, followed by Egyptians and Eritreans.
302 The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) has documented around 627 cases of refugee deportations from Egypt January through until November 2014. These refugees were not only Syrians but come from a number of other countries.
humans, not criminals!’ The detainees are shown arriving by army buses, and Governor Mahdy addresses the group:

Noone worry. You made a mistake, but you will not be held accountable for this. This mistake ends here. Our Egyptian children304 will be sent back to wherever they came from, and our Arab children will be classified and categorized. UNHCR exists in Alexandria and we will ask them if they can give you some money and if they can help you with staying in a place. All we need [to release you] is to have a place - we are talking about the Arabs. You are our guests, there will be breakfast, lunch and dinner. You made a mistake, but you are our guests on a human level, on a moral level, and on a country level – the Iraqis, the Sudanese, the Syrians – are our guests, and it doesn’t need to be mentioned that the Egyptians are our guests. Governor Tareq Mahdy, Alexandria, 17th September 2014305

In this speech, Mahdy plays the role of the all-forgiving parental state who lightly chides ‘our children’ for their mistakes and promises them that they will not be held accountable, which is ironic given that they are now incarcerated. What is absent from the speech is any recognition of why they might be in such circumstances; there is no mention of the violence that they are fleeing, only blame cast upon them for attempting to move outside the law. The displacements that pre-figured this ill-fated boat journey are absent. Waving food in his hand, Mahdy assures all the Arabs that they will be looked after, making no mention of the fate of any non-Arabs among the 227. In stating Egypt’s moral and national obligations to fellow Arabs, he avoids the use of the term refugee. For this, he makes a clear deferral of responsibility to UNHCR.

His opening remarks, separating humans from criminals in terms of their right to water, makes clear the division between the ‘other’ and what Aradau calls ‘the other other’. His statement serves to imply that criminals are something less than human, and also points to the oft-spoke global fallacy about refugee detention - that it is administrative, rather than criminal. Despite his proclamation that the detainees were not in fact criminals, detention should be considered as a ‘productive strategy, which brings forth categories of illegality and undesirability as it seeks to contain them’.306 In another euphemism with global echoes, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Badr Abdel Aty referred to Anfoushy as a "rehabilitation center".307 He stated that refugees would be ‘held for a transitional period’ and it turned out to be transitional indeed. The dream of dedicated migrant detention facilities in Egypt was short-lived; a lack of consensus between the governorate

304 The Arabic “waledna” is the preferred paternalistic term of address for the Egyptian state towards its citizens, with the literal translation being “our children”, regardless of age.
305 Alexandra Governorate, “Video: The Governor of Alexandria welcomes 227 people who attempted an illegal migration and provides a youth centre as their place of detention”, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sOe0lCXsXnM&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
and the Ministry of Youth and Sports officially responsible for the facilities led to the centre being closed after just two months. The remaining detainees, who had not been deported, were distributed amongst Alexandria’s police stations once more.

In Mahdy's speech, and indeed in the whole staged performance, he explicitly enunciates the humanity of the detained bodies before him. He makes a firm distinction between the humanity of the refugees, as opposed to the (less-than-human) criminal. The violence of incarceration, and potentially deportation, is hereby masked by the humanitarian discourse he espouses. The humanitarian rhetoric itself invites the operationalising of particular managerial categories that sort and order bodies, and serve to facilitate - or at least soften - forms of coercive movement (deportation) and coerced sedentarism (detention).

**Others and ‘Other Others’**

Security relies upon a fundamentally inegalitarian process of sorting and ordering particular bodies - separating those who are risky from those who are not. In the case described above, terror suspects are sorted from the rest of the Egyptian population; Syrians are separated from other refugee groups and against other terror suspects; Arabs are sorted from non-Arabs; migrants are distinguished from criminals. Mahdy himself states that the Arabs will be ‘classified and categorised’. This inegalitarian ordering of security has been challenged by liberal claims that seek to enact a form of equality through the more equitable distribution of security. In order for securitisation to be expanded to include risky others (such as irregular migrants), these subjects first have to be dis-identified from categories of ‘dangerous abjects’.308 This strategy of dis-identification then needs an alternative discourse through which to categorise the risky bodies of trafficked women or irregular migrants. A humanitarian discourse of pity and suffering functions as just such an alternative. Through representing asylum seekers as victims, the appropriate response is to rescue rather than to punish.309 The humanitarian discourse emerges, as its own type of speech act, which renders these bodies as suffering bodies,310 as injured identity categories,311 and therefore available for rescue.

The identification and ordering of the vulnerable body-in-pain gives rise to a new form of self/other relationality; and the focus of security shifts from the state-under-threat, to the possibility of secure futures and new starts for the rescued category. These humanitarian speech acts seek to contest and replace the security speech act by emphasising suffering; that is, a ‘form

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308 Ibid., 65.
309 Ibid., 82.
of pathos to offer up' that is both embodied and universally recognisable.\textsuperscript{312} In order to feel pity for a suffering body, the suffering must be undeserved; those who are in any way responsible for their suffering cannot be pitied. While some are cast as ‘innocent victims’, others are seen as somehow deserving of punishment through knowingly undertaking the reckless journey of (illegal) migration. As Mahdy says, 'You have made a mistake'.

What do we do with the victim status of one who had prior knowledge of their perilous (and lets not forget, illegal) journey, and still undertook it? Are they still deserving of pity? Instead, they are read as having expressed a dangerous and subversive form of intentionality by moving without prior permission, and are seen as suspect potential reoffenders (they might move again).\textsuperscript{313} In this way, knowledge of risk functions as a confession of guilt.

Aradau looks critically at these supposedly emancipatory “alternative” discourses which have sought to expand or democratise security, which she argues only shifts the spaces of abjection towards other categories of people.\textsuperscript{314} Turning trafficked women into subjects to be secured often perpetuates a dynamic of ‘insecuring’ another.\textsuperscript{315} In the case of trafficked women or refugees, the trafficker (morally culpable) is the obvious other, as well as ‘other others’ which in Aradau's case she identifies as sex workers or asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{316} In the case of refugees, the ‘other others’ could be failed asylum seekers, irregular economic migrants, or human traffickers. In the case of Syrians in Egypt, the ‘other others’ are the terrorist and the criminal. We can see from these examples that the problematic nature of securitisation is not suspended or challenged, but merely shifted from one category of bodies to another. These shifts also rely upon artificial distinctions between the categories. For example, in blaming evil human smugglers for exploiting the vulnerability of asylum seekers, states are heavily invested in the distinction between these two categories. In reality, most recent cases in Egypt and Italy where smugglers’ identities have been revealed (either through arrest or through journalistic investigation), they are themselves found to be asylum seekers - Palestinian, Somali, Syrian. In Australia, many of those charged with people smuggling are poor Indonesian fisherfolk attempting to make more money from their boats.

Shifting the spaces of abjection onto other categories fits within Amar’s human security paradigm also. A human security paradigm allows for the securing of some bodies and the rescue of others, offering a chance to reconcile human rights imperatives with national security concerns through the process of differently ordered bodies, some of which are deserving of rescue. In this way,


\textsuperscript{313} In her study of the human interactions between Australian officials and the asylum seekers in their custodial care at sea, Karen Pickering notes that officials found well-dressed, educated, English-speaking refugees particularly suspicious, and asylum seekers’ awareness of their legal rights was seen by officials to undermine the genuineness of their claim. Pickering, “Floating Carceral Spaces.”


\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., 75.
human security governance serves to align humanitarianism and militarism.\textsuperscript{317} Given that security relies upon exclusion however, it cannot actually be universalised, as this would be incompatible with the inherent logic of security. We cannot all be equal sharers in security; therefore, Aradau asks, ‘who is going to be made dangerous so that others can be made secure, what forms of life are to be disqualified?’\textsuperscript{318} Security, always already entails the sacrifice of someone else’s individual security, and therefore cannot offer an emancipatory politics, an alternative nor an ‘outside’ to normative securitisation regimes.

Aradau’s security dispositif of representation, intervention and subjectivity helps to understand how humanitarian responses by NGOs and other actors come to operate within the spheres of securitisation, while at the same time using the rhetoric of anti-securitisation. The work of NGOs, in the field of irregular migration in particular, requires doing the work of prevention. Prevention of teenagers from getting on crowded boats bound for Europe, prevention of migrant drownings at sea, prevention of self-harm in detention centres. Prevention - as an intervention in the present to minimise harmful effects in the future - necessarily entails an assessment of risk.\textsuperscript{319} Prevention strategies are based on the assumption of risk, on the assumption that a danger exists, even if it is a danger yet to manifest. As these correlations can only be proven after the fact, dangerousness becomes ‘a quality immanent to a subject’.\textsuperscript{320}

The potentiality of danger is therefore impressed upon certain individuals and groups to be categorised as ‘high risk’.\textsuperscript{321} Any attempt by risky individuals to resist the securitisation practices by the state or by NGOs can be re-appropriated by regimes of power/knowledge and technologies of security.\textsuperscript{322} Consider acts of self-harm by detained asylum seekers for example; these acts, rather than being read as political acts of protest or resistance, are re-appropriated by the security dispositif to reiterate that these people are dangerous, irrational, manipulative, not-like-us and ultimately need to be “managed”.\textsuperscript{323} By pathologising the agency of resistant risky bodies, these acts are depoliticised and rendered meaningless. Medicalised and pathologised, their acts of resistance are read ‘only as a pathological reaction rather than a political statement’.\textsuperscript{324} The

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{317} Amar, The Security Archipelago, 15.
\textsuperscript{318} Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 73–74.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{322} Describing the same phenomenon in different terms, Paul Amar writes that these ‘hypervisibilised subalterns become fetishised subjects of politics while their ability to act in emancipatory ways is buried by multiple intersecting modes of sexual, cultural, moral and social fantasy and discipline’. Amar, “Gendered Politics of the Security State,” 306.
\textsuperscript{323} Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security, 9.
pathologisation of the subject, Aradau concludes, allows for the reincorporation of resisting forms of agency within the dominant modes of securitising governance.\footnote{Ibid., 114.}

**Ordering of Exclusion**

In the intense and violent social ordering of bodies that has taken place in Egypt following the events of July 2013, those 'others' excluded as abject, dangerous and risky, turned into 'life which is not life and 'materiality' which does not matter'\footnote{Aradau, *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security*, 63.} were those persons categorised as members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and the former president. A host of symbolic and material technologies of the state were mobilised in full force towards these abject others, wholly underwritten and justified by the grammar of securitisation. The existential threat posed to the Egyptian state justified a host of immediate emergency measures, within a broader rhetoric of a nation at war. In the Copenhagen School's schema of securitisation, the political actors had spoken, the audience (the Egyptian public) had accepted the speech act, and extraordinary measures were sanctioned.\footnote{Aradau, *Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics out of Security*, 63.} Within the pervasive global discourse on the existential threat posed by Islamist terror, the Global South is certainly not exempt, including Muslim-majority countries such as Egypt. States of the Global South are also nodes in these assemblages that connect local and global discourses on Islamism as a threat to national security, enabling the generation of crisis and the mobilisation of human-security governance technologies.

By association, Syrian (and Palestinian Syrian) refugees became a secondary target of securitisation measures, infused with humanitarian discourses that were not extended to the primary targets of security measures. Conservative security doctrines have merged with humanitarian-speak, and vice versa, to the extent that the state is talking about human rights while deporting people back to Syria; and NGOs are withholding passports and accusing Syrians of undermining the state, whilst handing out food baskets. The state rhetoric around Syrians demonstrates the privileging of a human security discourse in relation to certain categories of dangerous others, while a more wholly punitive approach is applied to other dangerous categories. In some cases, such as in the counter-insurgency strategies in the Sinai, state security is privileged above all other forms of individual or human security, even if state security comes at the expense of some individuals' security. In a human security discourse, the protection and rescue of some (others) within an explicitly humanitarian framework, can go hand in hand with the militarised annihilation, or at least neutralisation, of other others.

Securitised speech acts, media representations and political spectacle worked in harmony with bureaucratic and administrative acts of policing, which fundamentally redefined the self/other relationship between Egyptians and Syrians. Syrians, seeking a way out, attempted to move
without approval, and were punished severely (by detention and deportation) for undertaking such a dangerous and subversive act. It is not coincidental that it was during this period of Egyptian national crisis that the country's first migrant detention centre was opened. It is not only a matter of regional geopolitical factors that led to an influx of Syrian refugees, and later a mass exodus requiring policing and management by the Egyptian state. Rather, the detention of migrants should be seen in relation to the crises of sovereignty and governance that were taking place in Egypt during this period. Migrant detention centres, in their contemporary manifestation, enable the state to enact competing modes of sovereignty, as seen in the Governor’s speech in Alexandria. The state is at once the authoritarian sovereign that can act with impunity and the modern sovereign that rescues, protects and honours rights. It is at this junction that we see the performance of human security governance.

Chapter 4: Visual Regimes: Surveillance, Shipwrecks and the Spectacle of Suffering

In previous chapters, I have considered the spatialisation of exclusion through the use of offshore territories, and the exclusionary processes of social ordering which take place within enforcement-based “rescue or punish” securitization regimes. The spatial, temporal and legal ambiguity of these zones of liminality rely upon ‘statist regimes of visuality’ that are increasingly sophisticated, in order to render migrants visible through technologies of surveillance and exposure; while at once ensuring their erasure and invisibility. The distant geographies of offshore sites - the high seas, remote island detention centres, or other offshore territories - ensure that irregular migrants are largely out of sight. At the same time, visual technologies enable migrants to be rendered visible in material and discursive terms. Despite the distances that these remote geographies entail, technology allows visual messages to cross borders in multiple directions - going to and from offshore spaces. Visuality, and the host of technologies it employs, plays a critical role in the exercise, consolidation and reproduction of state power.

Migrant bodies are made visible through the production of a spectacle that serves to support an ongoing process of legitimisation of the state’s migration management measures. These spectacles most often play out at the edge of territory and beyond. The spectacle attached to migration upholds the overall perception of crisis, allows the state to perform its own militarised spectacles of border enforcement, and attaches to the migrant body a kind of abject horror. Within these visual registers, particular migrant bodies are rendered hypervisible, yet simultaneously erased. These technologies of visibility and invisibility operate across necropolitical registers in that the production of trauma and disaster is fundamentally connected to the interrelated modalities of the right to save and the right to let die. The visual not only conveys the differential allocations of suffering and trauma, but is crucial to the way that trauma and disaster are understood, and the ways that particular disasters are made to matter. In this way, visual representations serve to establish and maintain an ongoing relationship between the migrant and the citizen-subject (who is at once spectator and actor in relation to the trauma). The spectacle of suffering and the production of trauma are therefore fundamental to the operation of state power and the governance of particular mobile bodies. In this chapter I will focus on the regimes of visuality that serve to both expose and erase migrant bodies within offshore spaces, at sea or on remote island detention centres.

330 Ibid., 572.
Statist Visualities and Surveillance

The way that we know about migrants’ maritime movements is partially through the materiality of bodies and boats arriving on territories or encountered at sea, but also in large part through a sophisticated web of surveillance technologies. The powers of the global north now operate (directly and indirectly) a whole host of scopic technologies that are networked and integrated into a broader system of global border control. These visualising technologies are able to monitor the world’s oceans, detect body heat and movement at border crossings, read the irises of eyes and the contours of fingerprints. This global gaze has an intensely biopolitical dimension, where the surveilling agents of the state choose who will live and who will be “let to die”. There are numerous cases, in both the Mediterranean and Australia’s northern waters, of lethal incidents at sea, where boats in distress have been ignored, abandoned, or disputed, despite being directly in the line of sight of authorities and technologies surveilling these water bodies.

This was the case with the so-called “left to die boat” which departed from Libya on 27th March 2011 with 72 asylum seekers on board and was detected drifting in the Mediterranean. This boat was left to drift across the Mediterranean for two weeks, and despite an alert being raised by the Italian Coastguard, no rescue attempt was ever made. Of the 72 on board, 63 people died of starvation and dehydration during the two weeks at sea, before the ship ultimately drifted back to the Libyan coast. In Mbembe’s terms, such negligence on behalf of the states surveilling the water could be considered one example of a ‘particular terror formation’ that combines ‘biopower, the state of exception, and the state of siege’. He argues that in the colonies, this particular terror formation synthesised for the first time massacre and bureaucracy. In the case of the left-to-die boat, there were 63 deaths as a result of being let to die whilst drifting within complex bureaucratic networks of documentation, surveillance and shared accountabilities. The violence of such negligence is justified in the name of deterrence, allowing the deaths of migrants at sea to be ‘naturalised through an economy of the unavoidable-though-regrettable’.

A group of activist/artists/scholars have used the available digital visual data to recreate the ship’s path in the form of a video installation, in order to highlight how exposed the vessel was to surveillance regimes, whilst being completely out of sight. In this work, “Liquid Traces”, the producers have used the very same remote sensing technologies data that is usually used for surveillance and repurposed it as evidence to tell a story of maritime neglect. Using the digital traces of the ill-fated vessel, survivors’ testimonies, and an oceanographer’s analysis, the artists were able to visually map the trajectory of the boat. The visualised reconstruction found that the

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335 Ibid., 23.
336 Ibid., 36.
vessel was drifting inside NATO’s declared surveillance area off Libya’s north coast, within an assemblage of remote sensing technologies that can detect the movement of ships, as well as under the watchful eyes of NATO’s Synthetic Aperture Radar Image technologies, which generates satellite images of the earth’s surface as they orbit. A signal was emitted by the Italian coast guard every 4 hours for 10 days alerting ships in the area to the boat in distress, and despite the presence of 38 warships and a large number of commercial and fishing vessels, none responded to the distress signals. Outside of Italy and Malta’s jurisdictions, the coast guards of these countries also did not respond. There were two close encounters for the drifting boat - one with a military helicopter and another with a military vessel that they met when around half the migrants were already dead on board. In both cases, the military vehicles (reportedly just 10 metres away from the drifting vessel) did nothing - except take photographs. They then left without providing further assistance. The vessel had drifted in the most surveilled waters on earth, yet was completely out of sight. The only exception to this invisibility was when the authorities sought to render the distressed boat visible through digital photographic documentation. These were maritime deaths that were counted, traced and visually documented within a broader regime of statist visuality, but deaths that did not count in the sense of being lives that did not matter, lives that no one is held accountable for. The ship served as a spectacle - of suffering, of trauma - with its passengers literally left to die.

The example of “Liquid Traces” is not only an illustration of the state's highly selective surveillance regimes and their biopolitical lethality, but also of the ways in which the data produced by visual surveillance technology can also be hacked by activists and advocates to serve a different political agenda. In this way, the flimsy loyalties of the spectacle are revealed - the spectacular power of the shipwreck can not wholly be managed by the state, and in this example is hijacked and re-appropriated.338

**Shipwrecks as Spectacle**

The shipwreck as spectacle has a much longer history than the tragedies of contemporary crossings of the Mediterranean or the seas north of Australia. In her article on the geopolitics and biopolitics of the 2004 tsunami, Suvendrini Perera discusses Alain Corbin’s analysis of the aesthetic and affective nature of the shipwreck in 18th century Europe in his book “The Lure of the Sea”.339 During this period, the maritime realm was wholly implicated in, and infused with, imperial endeavours on a global scale. Corbin traces the emergence of a ‘type of pleasure’ in the ocean and the ways in which the European public performed their ‘unconscious desires and

obsolete emotions’ on the ‘coastal stage’ from the mid 18th century onwards. Corbin identifies a range of complex emotions that were inspired by the spectacle of the shipwreck among those who looked upon it. Many shipwrecks occurred within sight of land, from where ‘the spectators could... watch the tragedy unfold from the shore and hear the cries and prayers of the survivors’. The spectators also became actors in this ‘theatre of coastal catastrophe’, themselves performing a range of actions, words, cries and gestures, so that ‘between those who were perishing and those who were watching, torturous dialogues could sometimes develop’.

Indeed ‘torturous dialogues’ developed in the case of SIEV 221, an Indonesian fishing vessel carrying an estimated 70-100 people that became shipwrecked on 15th December 2010 on Christmas Island’s Rocky Point. The vessel was first sighted at 5:40am by a Customs and Border Protection Officer stationed on Christmas Island, when it was approximately 500m from the coast. The vessel was not considered to be in immediate danger, and so was considered a security issue. By 6:16am, it was reported that SIEV 221 had broken down and was now just 100m offshore, and that a ‘major catastrophe was unfolding’. At 6:29am, the boat crashed into the rocks of Christmas Island.

Media images circulating at the time showed groups of Australians standing on top of the headland, looking out at the distressed boat. The government’s review of the incident quoted witnesses saying ‘women and children were in the water and could be heard screaming. Attempts were being made to throw life jackets over the cliff to approximately 60 people in the water’. From this point onwards, the logic of border security gave way to humanitarian concerns and the response moved into a rescue phase. This moment of ‘torturous dialogues’ between the Australian actor-spectators on top of the rocks and those in the doomed vessel is characterised by a desperate asymmetry between those on the shore and those at sea, ‘between those who perish in the disaster and those who, in acting as spectators and witnesses, also achieve a form of mastery over it’.

Looking at the 2003 tsunami, Perera argues that in the contemporary global arena, Corbin’s torturous dialogues are restaged, and that these dialogues are ‘echoed, amplified and refracted by

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342 Corbin (1994:235) in Ibid.
343 SIEV stands for Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel. SIEVs are number sequentially according to when they are identified by Australia’s Border Patrol Command (BPC).
344 For the government’s records of the SIEV 221 disaster, see http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/110124CustomsInternalReview.pdf
346 Ibid.
347 SIEV 221 Internal Review (21) in Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
the technologies that enable direct and indirect spectatorship. These technologies enable an enframing of the shipwreck as spectacle, rendering an ungovernable disaster into a picture, which simultaneously guarantees the position of the spectator watching from the safety of the shore or screen. In the moment of witnessing the spectacular suffering, the line is clearly marked between us and them. ‘The spectacle’, Guy Debord has argued, ‘is not a collection of images; it is a social relation between people mediated by images.’ In this sense, the distressing image of the shipwreck enables a social relation between the ship’s passengers and the citizen-subject-spectator. Within this relationship, ‘the Western subject is positioned as both spectator and actor, a benevolent interventionist (as coloniser, missionary, aid organisation, or volunteer).’

The technologies of enframing serve to obscure the relationship between the natural or elemental aspects of the disaster and the political dimensions of inequality and the violence of the border itself. The framing of these disasters tends to capture, highlight and memorialise certain aspects, while obscuring or otherwise not naming other aspects. The innate qualities of the sea itself - as powerful, ungovernable, unrelenting - serve to absolve border regimes of responsibility for deaths. Instead, shipwrecks are positioned as unavoidable tragedy that plays out in a ‘terrifying theatre of sublime trauma, as representational and affective spectacle’.

In the case of the Lampedusa shipwreck of 3rd October 2013, in which more than 360 people died (mostly Eritreans, Somalis and Syrians), the most common image in circulation was that of rows and rows of unmarked coffins. The scale of the October 2013 shipwreck at Lampedusa was unparalleled. Speaking at a press conference soon after the tragedy, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said he would never forget the sight of hundreds of coffins: ‘It’s something, I think, one cannot forget - coffins of babies, coffins of a mother and child that was born at that moment. This is something that profoundly shocked me.’ The ship was reportedly just 500m off the coast of Lampedusa when it suffered an engine failure and started sinking. In an attempt to attract attention, some passengers set fire to a piece of material, only to have the fire ignite some petrol and spread to the rest of the ship. In an attempt to escape the flames, the passengers either jumped into the sea, or crowded to one side of the vessel, causing it to capsize. Survivors stated that they used their ship’s horn and signalled SOS optically, and while three

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351 Ibid.
352 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
fishing boats allegedly passed them, they did not assist nor notify the coast guards. The Italian coast guard took more than two hours to be alerted to the vessel, and a further hour to reach the survivors, who at that stage had been in the water for more than three hours, clinging to whatever they could. Fisherman reported that they were hindered in rescuing people, and, in act reminiscent of the left-to-die boat, also reported that the coastguard officers wasted time filming the operation.

Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta tweeted that the shipwreck was an ‘immense tragedy’, while the Mayor of the island, Giusi Nicolini, described the scene of bodies laid out on the dockside as a ‘continuous horror’. The Italian authorities were so moved that they called for a national day of mourning in recognition of the tragedy, and honoured those who died with a state funeral. In a bizarre and grotesque move, the Italian Prime Minister also announced that all those who died would posthumously receive Italian citizenship, and had the right to be buried in Italian soil. What was omitted from his speech was the fact that the public prosecutor had simultaneously announced that they planned to charge the 114 survivors of the tragedy with illegal migration, which is punishable by a 5,000 Euro fine and expulsion. This declaration by the Italian state is reminiscent of the “trials by ordeal” used to determine who was guilty of witchcraft - the guilty witches would be revealed by their capacity to float and survive (only to be punished), while the genuinely innocent would sink and drown, being posthumously (and uselessly) awarded their innocent verdict and therefore freedom.

What does it mean to be awarded posthumous citizenship? As Mbembe asks, ‘what place is given to life, death, and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)?’ Let us consider the relationship between pathos and agency discussed in Chapter 3. A humanitarian response requires the demonstration of suffering and pathos, while demonstrating agency invokes a securitised response. If pathos is awarded rights under a humanitarian regime, than being dead can be considered the ultimate pathos - in this case rewarded with Italian citizenship. Unlike the survivors who remain categorised as dangerous bodies, those who drowned were stopped dead in their tracks, no longer posing the risk of being a mobile body. In this way, even the act of “escape” can be co-opted by the state, with the conferring of posthumous citizenship rendered a
generous act of symbolic forgiveness bestowed upon those who died attempting to reach the nation’s shores.

Humanitarian and security responses were deployed simultaneously upon the one boatload of people, categorised and fundamentally separated into differential legal categories of citizenship based on whether they were dead or alive. In the treatment of those shipwrecked passengers - who were first ignored, then reluctantly rescued, then shrouded in body bags or new tracksuits, and then either granted Italian citizenship or charged with illegal migration - we see the complete enmeshment of the biopolitical imperative to save and the necropolitical imperative to make or let die. One Eritrean woman who had been placed among the bodies recovered from the sea was later found to be breathing and was taken to hospital.364 With this breath, she lost her posthumous right to Italian citizenship and became once again an illegal migrant, with charges pending.

Roy uses the evocative phrase ‘magical realism of disaster’ to describe the ‘surplus or inexpressible excess that attaches to the deepest experiences, that which cannot be rendered in the prosaic terms of reportage or official inquiry’.365 The graphic accounts of this shipwreck - that is, the spectacle of hundreds of migrants crowded onto the vessel, sinking in the dark hours of the early morning, the burning flames, the fearful clamouring, the capsized boat, the desperate passengers, some trapped in the boat, others adrift in the water - invoke just such a sense of magical realism and inexpressible excess. The sense of magical realism also appears in relation to the 'surpassing or unmaking of normative classifications';366 in this case citizenship, which is absurdly and uselessly conferred posthumously, exposing the fallacies and arbitrary nature of such normative categories.

The ‘sublime trauma’ and spectacle of suffering that these portrayals generate become attached to the abject refugee body - bodies that burn, bodies that give birth on ships, bodies that drown, bodies that line the shores. At the same time as the refugee body is rendered discursively legible as the traumatised body, it is simultaneously made materially invisible. We are shown living bodies on overcrowded boats, and then shown rows and rows of coffins. What we do not see is the actual bodies of refugees - the drowned, bloated, watery bodies. The abject body is implied, whilst concealed from sight. These registers of visibility and invisibility have a geographical dimension: it is the offshore location of these tragedies that render them unable to be seen by the citizen-subject until they land upon territory’s edge. Once they land, we see the remnants, the

365 Roy in Perera, Australia and the Insular Imagination, 91.
366 Ibid.
remains of tragedy - the survivors, the debris, the bodies already safely wrapped and sealed in body bags.

**Manufacturing Horror on Manus Island**

Spectacles of trauma attached to the migrant body - with shipwrecks being just one example - are mobilised by the state in multiple ways. While the production of refugee trauma-as-spectacle serves to establish a particular social relation between migrant and citizen-subject, it also speaks to potential migrants by attempting to dispense lessons of deterrence. This function is highly apparent in the visual communication materials produced by the Australian government, aimed at deterring would-be asylum seekers from attempting to undertake maritime journeys to Australia.

In a recent controversial campaign, the Australian government released an ominous-looking poster depicting a ship sailing in rough seas with the words “NO WAY: You will not make Australia home” emblazoned above the image in red letters. The poster has been published and distributed in 17 languages and has attracted much criticism for its brutal, hard-line stance. Earlier in the campaign, the Australian government had published an 18-page graphic novel, which sought to represent the traumatic nature of the entire refugee journey. The graphic novel produced as a deterrent communication material, was originally published in Dari targeting Hazara Afghans and was later translated into other languages. The graphic novel on its front page shows two images - the first a crowded ship at sea, the second a line of people moving within the enclosed space of a detention facility. The implied connection here is explicit - travel by boat and end up in detention.

The graphic novel begins with scenes of a young man working with his father to repair a car. While the son labours, appearing dirty and unhappy, a thought bubble appears above the father’s head showing his vision for his son - to be walking among the clean leafy streets and new skyscraper buildings of Australia. The parents beg the son to travel and are shown emotionally handing him their savings to make the journey. The young man leaves his teary parents in their village and makes the journey to a city, where he negotiates with various men until he arrives at Jinnah International airport in Karachi, Pakistan. He then takes a Pakistani International Airlines flight to an unknown destination, presumably Indonesia, where he strikes a deal to board a boat. The boat journey is depicted as perilous - overcrowding, rough seas, sick passengers - until finally, the boat is boarded by people in military uniform (presumably the Australian Navy) who take the asylum seekers to shore, where they are frisked. The asylum seekers are then shown behind bars with a blonde man in uniform giving them information. They are transferred by plane

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to an island (potentially Manus Island, Nauru, or Christmas Island), where they are taken to their tent accommodation. A close up of the young man’s face at this point depicts his horror upon seeing the rows of tents. He sits down on one of the foldout stretcher beds and puts his head in his hands in despair. He wakes up during the night, distressed after dreaming of a celebration in his home village. Meanwhile his parents are shown also looking miserable, missing their son. The final frame shows the young man again on the stretcher bed, amidst a group of other idle men, sitting with his head in his hands.

This particular visual communication material reveals much about the Australian government’s discursive and material treatment of asylum seekers, particularly those who travel by boat. Tellingly, the dealing with brokers to negotiate the travel is given significant attention in the graphic novel, while the original conflict the asylum seeker is fleeing is not represented at all. Absent from this script is the trajectory of violence that led the family to leave Afghanistan and flee to Pakistan. Instead, he is shown as motivated by his father’s desire for him to have a more comfortable life than being a car mechanic in Pakistan. In this way, the discourse of economic opportunism and bogus asylum claims are mobilised. There are a number of instructive lessons at work throughout the graphic novel: don’t use your parents’ savings on maritime travel to Australia, don’t deal with smugglers, traveling by boat is scary and dangerous, and ultimately you will be caught and transferred to an island detention centre. The most powerful deterrent message conveyed in the novel however, is the depiction of trauma and mental suffering that accompanies the detention experience. The trauma of being incarcerated as a refugee is framed in such a way that any potential asylum seeker is meant to realise that it is better to be a free human subject (even if poor) than to be imprisoned (on a remote island).

The conditions of detention shown in the novel - a remote island detention centre, with crude accommodation and bedding, with an indefinite waiting period and seemingly little to do, leading to mental health problems - are curated by the Australian government discursively and materially to function precisely as a lesson in deterrence. Liz Thompson, a former Manus Island employee turned whistle blower, said of the Manus Island detention centre: “It's not designed as a processing facility, it's designed as an experiment in the active creation of horror to secure deterrence’.368 The euphemistically titled Regional Processing Centre369 on Manus Island has indeed been host to a whole range of horrors. The Manus Island facility is one of Australia’s offshore processing centres, located in Papua New Guinea. Detainees on Manus Island (all men, numbering around 1,000 as of December 2014)370 are given little or no information on the

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369 The use of euphemistic language to conceal, or otherwise downplay the carceral aspects of migrant detention centres has been explored in a paper by the Global Detention Project. Grange, Smoke Screens.
370 There Manus Island facility has also hosted unaccompanied boys under the age of 18 who were travelling without a parent or guardian.
Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process, are detained on an indefinite basis, and according to recent Australian government policy, have no chance of ever being resettled in Australia, even if found to be a genuine refugee. The Manus Island facility has been condemned by UN agencies and international human rights groups for the conditions of detention in the centre. Manus Island has been host to a range of horrors - mental health problems, hunger strikes, self-harming and suicide attempts, claims of sexual abuse of detainees by guards, riots, and in 2014, two deaths in custody - one, Iranian Reza Berati, as a result of injuries sustained in a riot and the other, Hamid Kehazaei (also Iranian) from a bacterial infection after cutting his foot and not receiving treatment. In February 2014, following a meeting between detainees and officials, a riot broke out, which left Reza Berati dead, another detainee partially blinded, almost 150 injured (including broken bones, bullet wounds, loss of sight, lacerations, loss of consciousness) and an ongoing public dispute between the Australian government, PNG authorities, private contractors and NGO staff over accountabilities and failures prior to, and during, the riot. Images of the rioting detainees were beamed across Australian television for days to follow. Aside from images of protest and rioting, Manus Island is kept almost completely out of view of the Australian public - access to the facility is highly restricted and journalists are unable to enter.

‘In both form and content,’ Debord writes, ‘the spectacle serves as a total justification of the condition and goals of the existing system’. The spectacle of detainees indulging in spectacular forms of violence and self-harm - jumping off buildings, hanging themselves, sewing their lips together, destroying detention centre property - functions to confirm the dangerous, risky agency of the asylum seeker. The spectacle of the irrational, ungrateful, (self-)destructive detainee serves to legitimate the treatment they receive in detention, and re-enforces fundamental divisions of us and them. The source of the refugee’s ‘spectacular pathologies’ can be ‘conveniently and reductively located within the body of the refugee’ rather than attributed to the traumatic conditions of incarceration. The conditions of detention itself becomes instrumental in the pathologisation of the detainees, whose acts of resistance are re-appropriated and depoliticised as pathological, which can only justify their ongoing incarceration. The incarcerated refugee body is instrumentalised as a scopic spectacle: ‘of violence, indifference and bodily and affective excess’. This spectacle and the suffering of the incarcerated refugee is available for consumption by the citizen-spectator, and is mobilised as a lesson in deterrence by the Australian government in highly visual ways. The choice of the medium - a graphic novel to graphically illustrate suffering - was surely chosen not only to overcome illiteracy or language barriers, but was selected for its capacity to pictorially convey trauma and suffering. The deterrence lessons

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373 Ibid., 211.


contained in the story - of painful separation from family, dangerous boat journeys, evil people smugglers, the bare conditions of the camp, and ultimately the mental anguish of incarceration - could not have been so evocatively conveyed by text.

While the Australian government seeks to mobilise the horrors of Manus Island in its deterrence materials, it also attempts to maintain a safe distance from culpability for such horror. All the functions of the Manus Island detention centre are outsourced to the Papua New Guinean government and private contractors. At the time of the February 2014 riot, the centre was managed by the world’s largest security company, G4S, with other services being outsourced to other providers, such as healthcare by Integrated Health Management Services (IHMS) and welfare services provided by the Salvation Army. Following the riot, actors on all sides - detainees, PNG police, PNG government, G4S, the Salvation Army, the Australian authorities - sought to establish accountability and culpability for the death of Reza Berati, the injuries, and the damage to property in the centre. This parastatal coalition of government bureaucrats (both Australian and Papuan), NGOs, private security agencies, local police, private medical contractors, demonstrates the extent to which the public functions of the state had been outsourced into a 'parallel realm of reduced accountability and unregulated power'. In its outsourcing of all aspects of the detention centre’s management, the Australian government was able to distance itself from the spectacular violence that had taken place, whilst remaining clearly very proximate to the overall project. In this sense, outsourcing to private contractors serves as the capital equivalent of offshoring onto islands and remote territories - it functions as a re-spatialisation of accountability through a masquerade of externalisation, which allows the Australian government to defer its failures to protect onto other actors. In the case of the Manus Island riot, the responsible actors to which the government deferred were G4S and the PNG government.

In his 21st February press conference, just days after the incident, then Immigration Minister Scott Morrison announced a review into the incident: 'I wish to stress that the review will look closely at any actions of those contracted to provide services at the centre in a safe and secure manner', stating that what was needed was a 'more integrated contract'. In response to journalists' questions on ultimate accountability, he said ‘...control and management of the centre is placed within the PNG Government, consistent with their sovereign responsibility. Under the terms of the MOU with PNG, the Australian government provides support to the PNG government in this

376 The G4S contract expired in February 2014 and following claims of poor management, was not renewed and the tender was won by Transfield Services, who were awarded a $1.2 billion contract to manage both centres, Nauru and Manus for a 20 month period. The Salvation Army contract was not renewed and Transfield took responsibility for both security and welfare service provision, as well as catering, cleaning and overall maintenance and management of the centre.
377 The Salvation Army had a $74 million contract with the government, which expired on January 31st 2014, and was not renewed by the government.
role. In this way, the state not only outsourced the management of the centre, but also outsourced the brutal and dehumanising conditions of incarceration, a process Jamieson and McEvoy have called ‘state crime by proxy and juridical othering’. In outsourcing the management of the centre, the government is effectively outsourcing the ‘creation of horror’ that Liz Thompson described. The horror is outsourced onto the market and onto less civil others, such as the PNG police and PNG locals. By emphasising the investigation of service providers, Morrison is essentially blaming a market failure, which allows for the possibility of having the right contractor, with the right contractual terms, in order to prevent such failings. Invoking the “sovereignty” of PNG as responsible for overall management of the centre, Morrison is able to attribute responsibility to PNG, which he represents as unfortunately less-than-capable and less human rights oriented than Australia. While remaining external to creating the conditions of spectacular horror, the Australian government mobilises and circulates the very same spectacles in highly visual ways in order maintain the status quo and to issue deterrence lessons.

The spectacle of suffering and the production of trauma are critical to a particular imagination of the refugee body as abject. The abject body invites particular forms of compulsory rescue and/or punish regimes and modes of governance to regulate mobile bodies. The regimes of visuality that serve to simultaneously expose and erase migrant bodies within offshore spaces are fundamental to the operation of state power in migration governance.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

In the contemporary management of mobile bodies, the “state of exception” appears as increasingly unexceptional and rather fundamental to the functioning of contemporary power. As Aradau argues, the state of exception is not a ‘limit moment’ of liberal democracy where it-verges into a different mode of politics, but rather she sees exceptional moments as ‘inbuilt into the functioning of democracy and liberal law when they govern the social’. In the context of neoliberalism’s collapsing legitimacy as the dominant global order and the growing number of battlefronts in the international war on terror, neoliberal market states are facing a moment of crisis. These crises of sovereignty give rise to a range of new discursive and policy strategies designed to uphold regimes of intensified governance and regulation. New articulations emerge out of these moments of crisis, which play out across various sites of governance, including the management of migration. It is particularly evident that in moments of crisis, when the sovereign power of the nation is challenged, maritime contestations are heightened, and the role of the

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380 Ibid.
382 In a series of Department of Immigration emails obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, departmental staff referred to the need to maintain a “light touch” to ensure that the PNG government was seen to be in charge of the detention facility.
"offshore" becomes even more significant. The contemporary management of migration entails a violent ordering of bodies – desirable and undesirable – that takes place through novel geographical articulations of space and territory, the aligning of security and humanitarian concerns, and technologies of visual production.

Increasingly, these articulations are not only being expressed by the state but by an assemblage of parastatal actors. These diverse actors all seek to assert their agency and influence within governance spheres, while at the same time functioning as a recipient of outsourcing which results in an overall state of reduced accountability. Outsourcing takes place across geographical, financial and legal registers, leading to slippery terrain where ultimate responsibility is externalised.

Migration management relies upon mobilising spatial frames in new ways to produce shifting geographical articulations of sovereignty. Borders have become mobile in new ways, and increasingly located in whichever locations bodies seek to move in. Patterns on a global scale suggest that the spaces between nation-states and at the edge of territory – beaches, oceans, islands and offshore territories – are the key sites where sovereignty is tested and contested. While these geographical expressions of externalisation - particularly at the sites between states – may appear as exceptional, an historical contextualisation of these sites reveals continuity rather than exception. Islands and other offshore spaces are not exceptional in their contemporary usages; in fact they demonstrate a continuation of exceptionalism as an historical project undertaken in waves by imperial and colonial forces.

Tracing the historical and geographical particularities of offshore locations reveals consistencies in the spatialisation of power across distant global sites. These consistencies run laterally between spatial sites and also temporally, serving to connect historical and contemporary colonialisms. This analysis demonstrates the configurations of colonial, military and economic powers that shape a certain imagination about these territories, which allows them to be used in the contemporary moment in particular ways. These spaces were imagined as always already available for utilisation, a utilisation which is dependent upon a general feeling of surplus and excess that infuses these sites, but also a complete negation of indigeneity and local populations. These consistencies and continuities demonstrate that these remote, isolated sites are actually nodes in a broader arrangement that serves to connect remote detention and the offshoring of accountabilities, with the securitisation of migration.

Contemporary regional migration management arrangements reflect geopolitical divisions of power and colonial histories in order to secure states of the global North against irregular

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maritime migrations. Regionalisation and externalisation strategies serve to divide asylum seekers geographically from systems of protection, and increasingly put them at risk of expulsion, either in the form of deportation or euphemistically disguised as ‘voluntary return’.

The ordering of exclusion within the political community serves to render some bodies as abject, and therefore available for rescue and/or punish regimes that coagulate security and humanitarian imperatives. These abject bodies are written as risky, dangerous others, who pose an existential threat to the political community. As such, these others are made the targets of securitisation measures. Securitisation entails securitised speech acts, media representations and political spectacle, along with bureaucratic and administrative forms of policing, and ultimately a fundamental reordering of the relationship between the migrant and the citizen-subject. Within a security discourse that is increasingly infused with humanitarian concerns, the state is at once the authoritarian sovereign that can act with impunity and the modern sovereign that rescues, protects and honours rights.

Human security regimes rely upon visual regimes that serve to both expose and erase migrants and cast a relationship between migrants and spectator-citizen-subjects. Migrant bodies are made visible and invisible at different moments (and in different ways for different bodies) through the production of a spectacle that serves to support an ongoing process of legitimisation of the state’s migration management measures. These spectacles – of shipwrecks, island detention centres, drownings, riots – serve to maintain the perception of crisis and attaches to the migrant body a certain type of abject horror. These technologies of visibility and invisibility operate across necropolitical registers in that the production of trauma and disaster is fundamentally connected to the interrelated modalities of the right to save and the right to let die. The spectacle of suffering and the production of trauma are fundamental to the operation of state power and the governance of particular mobile bodies.

The spectacle also plays a critical role in relation to migrant agency. The very act of moving, of getting on a ship, entails a dangerous form of subversive and bold autonomy. Willingly taking what may prove to be a lethal risk in boarding an ill-equipped boat to travel across the seas is seen as a bold assertion of sovereignty. Within a Hegelian paradigm, it is in the act of knowingly and voluntarily risking death that the human being truly ‘becomes a subject’. Confronting the possibility of death and living with it, Hegel argues, is the ‘definition of absolute knowledge and sovereignty: risking the entirety of one’s life’. Perhaps it is in part this death-defying agency – born out of desperation – which states find so threatening about mobile bodies making irregular maritime crossings. States therefore seek to contain migrants’ agency through strategies of forced containment and forced mobility, with the threat of expulsion constantly present. In order to

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ensure migrants remain available for humanitarian rescue, they must remain cast as docile bodies. To do so, acts of resistance are re-appropriated and contained through pathologisation scripts, which aim to depoliticise migrants’ acts of resistance by rewriting them as pathological expressions of trauma.

The pathology of trauma and dangerous agency attached to the refugee body work together to produce a notion of the abject body vulnerable to intervention by the interrelated modalities of the ‘right to save and the right to kill through which sovereign power operates over bare life’. 386 At sea and on island detention centres, we see that the biopolitical imperative to save and the necropolitical imperative to kill or let to die are inseparable and operate alternately or even simultaneously. The necropolitical terrain of the spaces between nations – oceans, islands, seashores, the offshore – with its creative geographical articulations, entwined expressions of securitisation and humanitarianism, and spectacular visual regimes is therefore critical to the contemporary management of migration.

385 Ibid.
386 Perera, “Australia and the Insular Imagination”, 42
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