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Ahmed Dardir
ahmed.dardir@aucegypt.edu

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Patterns of Democratization and State Controlled Pluralism: Is Egypt Going Anywhere?

Ahmed Dardir

Ahmed Dardir majors in Political Science. He has participated in various activities including Model United Nations (MUN) and Model Arab League (MAL). He is currently the director of a council in the MAL that discusses change in Egypt.

Abstract: Free elections, reform of the constitution, reform initiatives, political prisons, emergency law: the usual ingredients of the Egyptian political scene. Does all this lead to a process of democratization? While the regime is widening, can democracy work without mass participation? Is democracy a procedure or a nationwide project? Can democratization work under emergency laws? Can democratization work from above? This paper aims to provide an in-depth exploration of these questions.

Introduction
On May 25th a nationwide referendum is taking place on a constitutional amendment that allows many candidates to run for presidency, changing the old system in which one person - Hosny Mubarak - is nominated by the parliament and is presented to the nation through a referendum. Although this step would appear to a distant viewer a large step on the road of pluralism and democracy that should be applauded, this referendum is taking place amidst a call by many opposition parties and groups for boycott. This amendment has failed to address the desire of such groups for a real democracy in which the people can finally have effective participation in the Egyptian politics. In order to achieve real democracy, it is not enough to adopt democratic rhetoric or to install superficial reforms that allow limited pluralism. Democracy is an end result of a building process through which the people or the politicians build their polity, determine its structure. By examining the meaning of democracy, its structure, the process of building this structure and its underlying infra-structure, and contrasting this to what is currently happening in Egypt, it would be clear that the so called “reforms” the Egyptian government is carrying out are, in fact, not real “democratization”.

What is Democracy?
Democracy is the rule of the people. This leads to the question of how the people would rule themselves - directly, by representation, or by willingly submitting to a ruler? The discourse thus evolving is about the structure through which it is assumed that people would rule themselves.

In the classical Greek tradition, democracy is the form of government in which all free adult male citizens would go to the people’s council to take political decisions. However, with increasing population, this became impractical. The idea then became that instead of allowing the people to take decisions, they can
be allowed to choose the people who will take decisions. This form of representative government is the essence of what became known as liberal democracy.

**Liberal Democracy**

Liberal democracy can be defined as a form of “representative democracy” where representatives are elected, and the constitution emphasizes the rights of minorities and individual liberties - principles of private property, law and individualism. It also depends on certain institutions that mediate and ensure political participation and monitor the work of the government, ensuring that people get their liberal rights.

The main type of institutions and organizations on which liberal democracy is based are civil society institutions. Civil society is the structure that ensures that the government is really based on people and on their participation. That is because liberal democracy differs from the classical direct democracy in the fact that there is a polity that is different from the people, while in theories of direct democracies there is no such dichotomy - the citizens “are on the one hand sovereign and on the other subject”\(^1\).

**The Building of Liberal Democracy: A Historic and Theoretical Framework**

Therefore, modern liberal democracy is based on certain concepts and institutions that ensure that the polity is connected to the people, represents them and protects their rights. Both the concepts and the institutions are products of the western experience. On one side, liberal concepts could be traced back to western philosophers like John Locke and John Stuart Mill. On the other side the creation of the liberal institutions (whether on the level of the polity as in liberal parliaments or the public level as in the civil society) cannot be isolated from the western experience, in general, and western revolutions in particular. This does not only highlight the specific cultural context of liberal democracy, but also points out the fact that democracy is to be built through a long experience (as argued in detail later).

The western liberal state structure has been the end product of a series of wars that redrew both the state structure and the map for several times. The result of this process was not only the development of nation-states, but also the need to establish a legitimacy that at least would allow the ruler to tax his people to finance their wars\(^2\). Through the process of wars and revolutions, “rulers realized that the promotion of development was vital to their survival”\(^3\). They had to build a “bureaucratic state” that rests on the people as a source of structure and legitimacy\(^4\). In this way the infrastructure for the western model of the state was laid down. The liberal institutions were mainly a result of the western revolutions. Revolutions and wars did not only redistribute power in the system and create the liberal structure, but also were a determinant factor in achieving legitimacy of the state. The fact that people shed their blood in the wars that founded the state, and participated themselves in revolutions that established the
state structure, made the state legitimate in their eyes. Furthermore, these revolutions united various classes under a common goal, and therefore, created an organization with which most of the people (everybody except the old aristocracy) identified and had an interest in, laying the foundations for the modern state. This modern state was the structure in which liberal democracy was built, and the stratification of classes in these revolutions, entailing the stratification of power among them, was a main factor behind the emergence of liberal democracy.

The Role of Mass Mobilization in Building Democracies

Mass mobilization therefore has been an important factor in building western liberal democracies. It is natural that the building of the structure which will allow the people to participate requires the participation of people, so that it becomes really their structure: built in a way to ensure their participation and that suits them and their culture. Having someone else building it for them would be futile. First, because politics is a game of power, having someone else build the structure means that this someone has the power. People might be then allowed to participate through this framework, but it is not likely that the power will be given to them. This can apply to the relatively liberal framework established by former Egyptian President, Anwar El Sadat. Sadat allowed for political parties and a parliament to exist. However, because the process was undertaken by him and not by the people, he still had power over it. He never allowed the political parties to have real power, and once they tried, he put an end to the process and put all the opposition figures in prison.

This can explain the importance of mass movements in the building of democracy. Mass mobilization mainly stresses the power of the people. It pressures the political elite, both ruling and opposition, to consider and take forward the demands of the people. If there is a “bargaining table” between the government and the opposition leaders, the people push their own demands to this table. This does not only create a structure for democracy but also saves democracy from being monopolized by the elite, by providing a constant popular pressure on this elite. It also acts as a power reservoir for the opposition elites and gives them credibility (by proving that their demands are being supported). Simply, it shows that the public can be mobilized against the government. Sometimes this means that democracy is the “survival option” for the regime. Furthermore, in the presence of the people-polity dichotomy (as in liberal democracies), mass mobilization is one factor that monitors the work of the representatives, making sure they do represent the people, and pressuring them to do so when necessary. Mass mobilization, or its potentiality, gives continuity to the link between the people and their representatives, that otherwise would only be present during elections. Finally, when mass mobilization is a part of the state building process, it assures that this state has stemmed from the people and therefore would make it more likely for the state to represent those people and for the people to consider the state legitimate.
What Happened in the Arab World
This pattern of state building by the hands of the people was not the case in the Arab world. Instead of being built by the people, the states were built by the colonial powers; they "came into being virtually overnight"\textsuperscript{12}. The states were not built by their people (as in the western model of wars and revolutions discussed earlier) but "sovereignty was won by, or endowed on, former colonial units"\textsuperscript{13}. This does not only mean that they lacked legitimacy, but also that they were not based on the people but on the outside. The mere structure of the state is therefore not built on the people. That is why we see the rulers more concerned with their image in front of the outside world rather than their image in front of their people. That is why it is no wonder that the latest reforms are done because of external pressure\textsuperscript{14}. Internal pressure has no significance for Mubarak. His state was built by the outside world and therefore his legitimacy is based on the outside world\textsuperscript{15}.

The problem with reforms made for an image is that they can be a façade and still project a good image. This is the case with the suggested constitutional amendment. By virtue of this amendment, parties are allowed to nominate candidates. However the government is sure not to give a political movement with real weight the license to become a political party. Giving licenses is the sovereign responsibility of the High Council for Parties, which is a committee of the Shura council, controlled by the ruling National Democratic Party. Also, although it seems reasonable to require the signature of a certain number of the members of the supposedly elected councils to allow someone to run for presidential elections (as stated in the suggested amendment), elections for these councils are being controlled by the government (as discussed later on). After all, even without forgery of elections, the state still have the state of emergency law activated, by virtue of which the ministry of interior can arrest anybody without providing a reason. This means that they have the power to arrest the presidential candidates and their supporters the night before the elections. This illustrates how shallow reforms can project a democratic image, while the lack of underlying infrastructure for democracy prevents the shallow reforms from leading to real democratization.

The Democratic Infra-structure
Liberal democracy is based on a certain liberal infrastructure that guarantees representation, social welfare, and popular participation. Therefore, to be able to apply democracy, Egypt needs to develop an infra-structure on which it can build a form of government that can represent and empower the people and, therefore, which we can call democracy. The most important of the liberal infrastructures is civil society.

Civil society is defined by London School of Economics and Political Science as: the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community
groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy group.\textsuperscript{16}

According to London School of Economics and Political Science “In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated”\textsuperscript{17}.

Based on this definition, civil society can include philanthropy organisations, unions, cultural and communal activities, and even “organized religion”\textsuperscript{18}. Regardless of the definition, civil society is the structure that arises from the people (on the grass roots level) and links between the people and the polity. It is therefore a product of the society itself. The main feature of such organizations would be that the people are comfortable with them and can participate easily through them.

Therefore, liberal democracy needs civil society. Under the people-polity dichotomy that is present in liberal democracies, civil society is one of the factors that maintain popular participation in the polity, and maintain the link between the state and the people, i.e. guarantees that liberal democracy remains a democracy. Without civil society, there is a big danger that the polity gets detached from the people and the representative function of the government gets impaired.

Academics do stress the fact that Egypt, as well as the Arab world, is in need of a civil society to act as a base for democracy\textsuperscript{19}. However, what these academics are missing is that civil society is what empowered and integrated western people in a polity that became – due to this empowerment – a liberal democracy. To achieve a form of democracy in Egypt, the polity needs to integrate not western people but Egyptian ones. Exact emulation of the western civil society might therefore not lead to integrating the people in the polity, as people will not be likely to identify with structures created in the west. On the other side, alternative organizations, assemblies and institutions that stem from the Egyptian culture and society might be able to achieve the goals of civil society in the Egyptian cultural pretext, and therefore would be more successful in giving birth to a form of government in which people participate: a democracy.

Can we produce our own version? Traditional values and organizations, mainly Islamic ones, have been successful in mobilizing people, and in forming a sphere that entailed voluntary participation of the people and offered some sort of a social welfare network, manifested in “private mosques health clinics, schools, banks and investment companies”\textsuperscript{20}. These institutions, however, are, unlike the western civil society, outside the official political sphere\textsuperscript{21}. 

Does this mean that these institutions are civil society? On one hand Carrie Wickham, a researcher who conducted a field study about the political life in Egypt, argues that they are not; “at least not in the liberal conception”\textsuperscript{22}, mainly because they are “independent sites of social and political expression within an authoritarian setting;” while she believes civil society should not be “outside the government” but “endowed with a legally mandated autonomy”\textsuperscript{23}. One could add another objection - that the religious nature of such institutions contradicts with the secular nature of liberalism.

However, the point behind the effectiveness of such organizations and values is that they are not western civil societies, but they are an alternative that stemmed from the Egyptian society and culture. They are different, and their difference is what comprises the difference between the western experience and the Egyptian possible experience. For example, the fact that unlike western civil society, the Egyptian alternative is outside the official political sphere, can be attributed to the fact that unlike the western states, the Egyptian (and other Arab states) has neither evolved from the society, nor gained legitimacy (and therefore the unofficial sphere is as legitimate as, if not more legitimate than, the official sphere); nor has it allowed in its official sphere a chance for mass participation (the fact that the government refuses to legitimize such institutions, and that they sometimes fight them, despite of the apolitical nature of some, reveals how the government refuses to allow in its official sphere mass participation). This does not mean that they are not civil society. After all “Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power”\textsuperscript{24}.

Furthermore, the difference between the Islamic nature of such organizations, and the secular nature of their western counterpart, reveals the difference in culture between the Egyptian society and the western societies. After all, secularism is one of the end products of the western experience\textsuperscript{25}. Nevertheless, “faith based organizations” are included in the London School of Economics definition\textsuperscript{26}, and “organized religion” is given as an example for civil society\textsuperscript{27}.

Therefore, traditionalist and Islamic institutions are an Islamic/Arab version of the civil society. They are therefore apt to lead to an Egyptian kind of democracy just the way civil society lead to and maintained western liberal democracy. As Wickham herself noted “the vision of Medina, the paradigmatic Islamic state, can be as powerful as liberal democracy in the envisioning of, and purposeful striving towards, alternatives to present forms of military-bureaucratic rule.”\textsuperscript{28} Instead of judging these institutions using the western standards, we should study whether these institutions can empower and/or represent the people to form a basis of a form of government that would not be necessarily similar to western liberal democracy, yet similar in the fact that the people are empowered and/or represented and are at the same time analogous with our culture and society. A possible area for further research is how traditional and/or Islamic organizations can form a social network that ensures participation and welfare. Present
literature focuses more on Islamic institutions. However research should also examine other traditional organizations, such as families and tribes (given the “blurred boundaries” between civil society from one side and the family on the other29) and examine the extent to which such organizations can offer a civil society30. On the other side, academics can talk as much as they will about civil society, but such a notion is meaningless until it means something to the people to whom it is aimed to empower.

Liberal Democracy and the Arab World

Liberal democracy, the model for democracy that is now imposed by the western discourse, is clearly built on an infrastructure that is related to the western experience and western culture. Democracy is not a consumer product. While it is constructive to view cultural/political products of the west with admiration and try to achieve similar ones, directly importing them might be destructive. Imported democracy, without the presence of a social and cultural infrastructure would doom democracy to remain a shallow process which does not reach deeply in the society. For example, liberal democracy without ensuring links between the polity and the people (as in civil society and other mechanisms that would ensure continuous contact between the people and their representatives like mass mobilization) would further emphasize the people-polity dichotomy and would weaken representation and turn it into a cover for yet another authoritarian form of rule.

Arguably, this is what happened in the Arab world. The western, seemingly liberal crust, was a cover for an authoritarian core. Bernard Lewis, the famous orientalist academic, laments the fact that modernization did not work in the Muslim world, pointing out the fact that the only relatively successful western-styled modern regimes were the most oppressive ones31. However, the fact that western modern regimes had to be dictatorships in order to succeed, points to a very interesting fact: that such western-style modernization did not appeal to the people, and therefore had to be imposed on them. As Lewis himself points out; this modernization was imposed either by “departing imperialists” or “innovative native reformers”32. In the first case, it is another country that imposed the western model, and therefore it could not be considered democratic. In the second case, Lewis uses the examples of Ataturk in Turkey, one of the most ruthless dictators the region has ever witnessed33. Because of the fact that the western paradigm of modernization and democracy is built on a western infrastructure meant that applying this paradigm of modernization needed the imposition of the western social infrastructure. This contradicts with the idea of the people ruling themselves and cannot be called a democracy. This may explain the phenomenon Lewis laments, that the application of modernization in the Arab/Muslim world lead to dictatorship.

On the other side, Tim Niblock, a British scholar states that “there is no reason to believe that it [modernization theory] explains the slow pace of democratization in the Middle East”34. In fact it does, but in a manner reverse to that in which Lewis
uses it. The fact that Arabs lack the “socio-economic prerequisites for liberal democracy” should mean that they should look for a basis for “socio-economic prerequisites” in their society and culture and build on them their democracy, which will not be necessarily the western form of liberal democracy.

Without building an authentic infrastructure, the democratic procedures would help some voices within the society to be heard, but it will not ensure that the voice of the people in general would be heard, and would not assure the people that their voice will have a real decision making power. It is not enough to have the pluralistic procedure to have democracy. The building process in itself is also necessary.

Process or Procedure
Is democracy just a procedure of free elections and representation? Or is it a wider process in which a civil and cultural infra-structure is being built to let the voice of the people be heard and obeyed? Is a decision from above to allow freer elections or to give more freedom to the press enough to assure that the people do rule? While some claim that democratization does not need an “infra-structure” and that “democracy is not about substance but about procedure” arguing that democracy is just a “choice taken by the political elite” others argue that democracy is being used “as a slogan”, and that we are ignoring what is underneath it. To them democratization is a “process” which is “long and costly”. To such minded people, democracy should be rooted in the society and its “political culture”.

From the previous discussion, it appears that democracy is an end result of the nation-building process that gives rise to a social infrastructure. Without this social infrastructure, people will not get empowered to participate and be effective. The process without the procedure might give rise to pluralism, but not democracy.

Democracy and Pluralism
Pluralism could be defined as “a framework of interaction in which groups show sufficient respect and tolerance of each other, that they fruitfully coexist and interact without conflict or assimilation”. Therefore, pluralism could be considered a framework through which different factors of the society co-exist and make their voices heard. This is not sufficient for democracy, as democracy requires that the people are empowered enough so that their will is interpreted as state decisions. Pluralism is just a procedure to allow civil factors (parties, civil society, or simply people) to participate. This means that those civil factors should be powerful enough to make a difference. Pluralism is only one of the many factors that are required to mediate participation, which in turn is an important factor in structuring democracy.
Pluralism is apt to lead to democracy, only if there is enough infrastructure to make the people participate through this framework, and if this participation can gain power (for example by not having a higher authority blocking the decisions taken through the pluralistic framework). The two conditions are interlinked, because when there is a structure to empower the people, then it is likely that their voice gains power. This power is a result of the momentum people gain through public action and through being ready to go forward with political action to assert their power. Pluralism therefore could be considered a prerequisite for democracy, but it is not the same as democracy.

Democracy is therefore not only about pluralistic procedures but is also a “highly contingent process that is fraught with considerable uncertainty”. When the meaning of democratization is restricted to pluralism, the power of democracy can still be within the hands of the elites. In such a case, only the already powerful elite would participate and have an effect on state decisions. Furthermore, this means that the state still has power over the people and over the pluralistic procedure and can at once stop it, as when Sadat stopped the pluralistic experience once it was used to voice criticism against him.

In fact, pluralism in the Arab world has been a “tactical” decision taken by governments as a “response to crises” (crises such as the current US pressure coupled with the popular unrest). On this, one could base the argument that the suggested amendment for the constitution is nothing but a superficial and shallow procedure that fails to address the keys for democracy. Under the lack of an authentic infrastructure, reforms have failed in achieving the government of the people. The suggested amendment has only led to a shallow procedure of pluralism in which people can vote, have parliaments and in which some voices can be heard, without real popular rule.

**Egypt’s Controlled Pluralism**

The state structure in Egypt is a clear example of a case of pluralism that is controlled from above and, therefore, does not lead to the transfer of the power to the people. This structure started at the hands of Sadat, when he allowed for political parties. Before that, Egypt was a one party system in which the parliament was controlled by the ruling party, yet some independents managed to make it to the parliament. Although Sadat opened the door for the founding political parties, his laws stated that a party would not get license unless it already has a certain number of members in the parliament, i.e. parties had to have members in the parliament before coming into being. Furthermore, Sadat centered the system around himself in a manner that gave him a lot of powers (like the power to nominate himself for as many times as he willed, together with his power over the security apparatus, by which he arrested all political activists shortly before his death). Mubarak maintained the system he inherited from Sadat, and kept a similar control over the security apparatus through the emergency law.
The Egyptian state has developed many mechanisms to maintain control over the political process even with the presence of a pluralistic procedure. The most significant of these mechanisms is the state of emergency law, by virtue of which the government can arrest anybody, prevent assemblies, and the president can issue decrees bearing the power of law. Simply, the emergency law limits the power of the people to act (by preventing them from assembly and by threatening them of being arrested once they take political action) and increases the power of the president and his security apparatus. Another mechanism is the strong control the state exerts over the bureaucracy. To any close observer of the Egyptian government, power and decision making have a very clear line that originates from the president. A third mechanism is limiting the power of the representative bodies and mechanisms. This is clear in the privileges the president used to enjoy, including the right to re-elect himself for as much as he wanted, and his power to dissolve the parliament. Even pluralism has been limited in Egypt. However, right now it seems that as a result of external pressure the last mechanism is being taken away from the government, which means that the government would be apt to rely more heavily on the first two.

This strong control that the Egyptian government maintains over the political process, means that it is able to control, for example, elections. Through the strong state security that is controlled by the president and his regime, and that has wide powers under the security law, it becomes easy for the state to fence election booths and prevent unwanted voters from entering.

As long as such control is maintained, amending the constitution and increasing the pluralistic space is void. Until now, even if free presidential and parliamentary elections take place (which is not even the case as the candidates are still controlled), and even if there is no falsification of the elections, still the state would have the power to arrest voters and candidates, prevent candidates from presenting their programs (through the ban on assemblies under the emergency law) and prevent people from voicing their opinions and carrying out their will.

Conclusion
Consequently, no real democratization taking place in Egypt. There has been no attempt to build an authentic infrastructure and mobilize the people or link to them. Never has there been a genuine attempt to transfer political power to the people. Reforms have been initiated not to empower the people but to project a good image to the west, as a response to western pressure for reforms - just as the paradigmatic discourse is designed to suit the west and not the Egyptian society. With the lack of an infra-structure for integrating and empowering the people, pluralism became a shallow procedure that does not reach the people nor echo their voices. In order to really democratize, the Egyptian state has to be ready to let go of its unchecked powers. However, until now the Egyptian state is not ready to do that. The only hope for democratization is that the Egyptian people develop their own infrastructure for their own type of democracy, and then be able to recover their overdue power.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. For further details about his idea, refer to Ibid, and to Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan in Great Political Thinkers, ed. William Ebenstein and Allan Ebenstein (Belmont: Wadsworth Group/Thomson Learning, 2000), 364-379.
7. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
12. Thomas 267
13. Ibid.
14. Although one cannot produce material evidence proving that the suggested amendment is a result of external pressure, the fact that Mubarak did not carry out such reforms through 24 years of rule, and then suddenly took the initiative when the US called for reforms strongly suggests a causal relation. Furthermore the superficial nature of the amendment (as discussed above) shows that the reform is more concerned with the image in front of the outside world rather than really reforming the state structure.
15. In this context, the above idea might seem a leap in logic. This is because establishing the link between colonialism and the state structure in the Arab World is not the purpose of this paper. However, Political Science literature is full of studies tackling this point. See Tamim al Barghouti, State Building In Palestine and Jordan: The Impact of The Colonial Powers. (MA Thesis, AUC, 2000).
17. Ibid
18. Ibid.
20. Wickham 508
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. The Definition of Civil Society by London School of Economics and Political Science, qtd. in “Civil Society”
25. I would argue that even if we would apply secularism we should develop our own version of secularism. This is also the case in the west; each country developed its own version of secularism. After all, secularism in France is different from that in the US.
26. “Civil Society”
27. Ibid
28. Wickham 509
29. The Definition of Civil Society by London School of Economics and Political Science, qtd. in “Civil Society”
30. There had been a successful experience in Unayzah, Saudi Arabia, in which Islamic kin and tribal organizations and values formed a social infrastructure that ensured a good degree of social welfare. See


32 Ibid.

33 Lewis himself admits that the Turkish experience gave rise to a dictatorship - see Ibid. Furthermore, the Kurdish massacre carried out by Ataturk and the Armenian massacre carried out by his Young Turk comrades are too known to be reminded of.

34 Niblock 225

35 Ibid.

36 Anas Damasio, Lecture (The American University in Cairo, 6 March 2005).

37 Galal Amin, Lecture (The American University in Cairo, 6 March 2005).

38 Korany 511

39 Ibid.


41 One example is when there is pluralism but the people do not participate because they cannot identify with the liberal institutions. Another example takes place when the liberal institutions have the freedom to talk and represent but have no real power in front of the government. A third example is when the state allows pluralism but retains the power to block any transfer of authority, which is the case in Egypt. Such examples are dealt with in more details later in this paper.

42 Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?” Slavic Review 54 (Spring, 1995); available from Jstor [www.jstor.com] 123

43 Korany 511.


45 Anyone living in Egypt is familiar with officials attributing any achievements to the ministers, and ministers attributing any achievements to the president.

46 For example, this was witnessed by many voters and passers by during Egypt’s 2000 elections. Another example happened just while this paper was being written (May 25th), when the referendum to amend the constitution was taking place and the state security prevented members of opposition parties and groups from entering the voting booths see “Mosadamat bayna al Shorta wa al-Moarada al Mesreyyah fi Yawm al Istifta (Clashes between the Police and the Egyptian Opposition on the Day of the Referendum)” [Aljazeera News Agency] 25 May 2003 [cited 25 may 2005]; available from Aljazeera.net [http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/6EA28310-87D9-4212-933C-90AA96A2B724.htm]