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Early warning systems for refugee crises: between ideals and practice

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR REFUGEE CRISES:
BETWEEN IDEALS AND PRACTICE

A Master’s Project Submitted to the
The Public Policy and Administration Department

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters of Global Affairs.

By

Dalia El Fiki

March 2014
The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

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A Master’s Project Submitted by

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to the Department of Public Policy and Administration

March 2014

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EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR REFUGEE CRISES:
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ABSTRACT

Early warning is often regarded as the solution to complex forced migration questions. The assumption is that if early warning systems are in place, host nations, NGOs and international organisations can prepare for mass influxes. This seemed to be the case with the Turkish government’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis, where Turkey and its local NGOs seemed prepared for the arrival of Syrian refugees and set up a local legislation to accept Syrians and prepared camps swiftly and promptly. On the other hand, the Egyptian government did not have the same degree of planning in order to accept and manage the arrival of Syrians into its borders. The lack of a clear policy when coupled with domestic instability, minimal coordination with NGOs and a lack of a local legislation all resulted in minimal dedicated services being set up for Syrians.

Within this context, most organisations utilize country of origin information and observe indicators such as political terror, human rights violations, GDP and good governance to name a few to predict when forced migration is likely to occur. While all of these indicators presented themselves within the media analysis, it was confirmed that establishing an overarching set of indicators for early warning is flawed. The monitoring of developments should remain on a case-by-case basis, as not all acts of violence for example would result in forced cross border migration. Similarly, early warning systems do not solve the question of when and how governments respond to humanitarian emergencies. It has been found that according to donors and governments, it is best to wait for the actual crisis to occur and allocate a realistic budget, as opposed to one based on hypotheticals that may or may not occur.

As such early warning systems within the idealistic realm provide solutions to the problems faced by refugee support agencies, host nations and refugees themselves. However, in reality, early warning alone is not enough to warrant an appropriate response, nor necessary funding to alleviate burdens and strains on host nations, NGOs or refugees.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2012 represented the sixth consecutive year where the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide exceeded 45 million, with an average of 23,000 people forced to flee daily (UNHCR, 2013a:2). Of these, 15.4 million were refugees: 10.5 million under United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee’s mandate, and 4.9 million Palestinian refugees registered with United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) (UNHCR, 2013:2-3). The overall figure also included almost a million (937,000) asylum-seekers and 28.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNHCR, 2013a:2-3). These figures were the highest since 1994 when approximately 47 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide. More than half of the global refugee population originated from Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Sudan, 46% of whom were under the age of eighteen (UNHCR, 2013a:3).

There has been a general shift towards the need to establish early warning indicators for the outbreak of crises worldwide. Some crises are more pressing than others, but there is no doubt that those of a humanitarian nature resulting in the mass exodus of refugees, must be addressed swiftly. Two major developments contributed to a shift in the number of refugees in the Middle East and North Africa, namely the Syrian crises and repatriation of some Iraqi refugees (UNHCR, 2013:11). The Syrian crisis forced a little over two million individuals to seek refuge in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and other countries (UNHCR, 2013:11b), the majority of whom were arguably unprepared for such movements. On the other hand, government estimates of Iraqi refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic and Jordan were revised downward to 534,400 at the end of 2012, which highlights that some Iraqis may have returned to Iraq or moved onto other countries (UNHCR, 2013:11). Furthermore, in first eight months of 2012, the UNHCR deployed a total of 197
emergency staff and standby-partner personnel to major operations including the Syria operation (in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey), and other operations in Africa (UNHCR, 2012:27). Throughout 2012, neighbouring states attempted to keep their borders open and to provide safe havens for refugees, despite the social and economic implications on their own nationals (UNHCR, 2013: 5).

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 36/148 notes that refugee flows not only threaten the domestic stability of receiving states but also the safety and security of regions as a whole (UNGA, 1981: A/36/813). It also notes that they can also impose great political, economic and social burdens upon the international community as a whole, particularly developing countries with limited resources (UNGA, 1981: A/36/813). Consequently in 1995 the UNGA emphasized the need for the establishment of “an early warning element involving monitoring and evaluation for preventative action…in order to strengthen the early warning capacity of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs with regard to emerging crises in general and mass exoduses in particular” (UNGA, 1995: A/50/566). It is therefore clear that there is a pressing need for early warning systems that can predict potential mass-exoduses of individuals that create a refugee crisis in order to alleviate the strains and burdens on host nations and the international community as a whole that were noted above. Such indicators will ensure a timely response to such catastrophes if they occur through the provision of services, and will also allow states to be better prepared to receive mass influxes of forced migrants. That said the purpose of this research is not to establish indicators that prevent forced migration. It aims to rather highlight indicators that can predict forced migration flows, without preventing their arrival; as such the interest is not in conflict prevention, but emergency preparedness.

Bearing the aforementioned points in mind, the main premise of this thesis is to scrutinize whether early warning systems for forced migration crises offer a solution for or substantially
alleviate the burden of mass influxes on host nations, as well as assist NGOs and INGOs in the provision of more efficient services and the execution of their mandates. The initial assumption is that early warning, or a specific set of indicators, can assist states in becoming aware of potential influxes of forced migrants. These indices can be monitored prior to and at the start of man-made crises in neighbouring or regional refugee producing states, which would arguably assist host states in alleviating financial burdens (by allowing time for states to call for international donor support for example), allocation of resources, and ensure the effective provision of relevant services and facilities in cooperation with non-governmental organisations. The strain on national resources and inadequate facilities for refugees when coupled with the trauma faced by forced migrants who arrive in states that are not prepared for their requirements emphasizes a need for preparedness for such influxes on both a national and agency level. A case in point was the preparedness of the Turkish government to host the initial influx of refugees following the Syrian crisis.

Thus early warning systems would arguably solve a number of critical issues that come about as a result of the lack of preparedness of host countries and organisations working with refugees. First, if a state can predict when forced migration may occur, as well as the route that they are likely to take, it will ensure that facilities are appropriately located. Second, early warning systems would alleviate the strain on national resources for host countries and transit countries, as the government would be able to set up an appropriate policy regarding its specific status as a host nation. Similarly, once an early warning system is established, a government can plan and mobilize the necessary resources for the influx of refugees, and alleviate the strain on refugees as well, particularly if additional aid is required from external donors as it can provide a clear action plan regarding management of the crisis ahead of time. That is not to say that resources would be unavailable before a crisis, however, the contingency planning would play a large role in the management of refugee influxes. This would without a doubt have a strong economic impact on host states, particularly when bearing in mind that the majority of the world’s largest refugee host nations are
developing countries. Third, early warning systems would allow NGOs adequate time to coordinate effectively with other stakeholders regarding access to populations of concern, as well as the opportunity for effective inter-agency cooperation. Fourth, emergency preparedness would also provide NGOs with a chance to clearly plan the type of services that would be required by the population, depending on demographics and background of the refugee groups. Finally, this would provide scope for the UNHCR to focus on durable solutions, as well as its main functions. In some instances such as in Egypt, the UNHCR’s mandate has expanded because the government lacks the necessary infrastructure to support the large refugee population.

This thesis draws a comparison of situations where the establishment of early warning systems or monitoring of indicators was successful in substantially alleviating the strain on host nations at times of refugee crises, such as Syrian refugees in Turkey, compared to the delayed and inconsistent response from the Egyptian government with Syrian refugees from March 2011 to July 2012. From this comparison, as well as a number of U.N. recommendations and scholarly articles, the pre-existing indicators for refugee crises will be highlighted and scrutinized for effectiveness, as well as whether it is possible to establish an all encompassing early warning system for all refugee crises, or whether they need to remain case specific, or regional. The drawbacks of early warning systems are also highlighted as they limit the effectiveness and the practical applicability of early warning systems on field.

However first, the definition of refugees and what early warning systems for refugee crises entail are addressed. Second, the research questions and hypothesis, as well as the research methodology shall be highlighted. The third chapter presents a literature review and the limitations to early warning systems. The fourth chapter shall present the research findings that cover the role of the categorization of conflicts in impacting responses to humanitarian crises, and an analysis of the Turkish and Egyptian government’s responses to the Syrian refugee crisis.
WHO IS A REFUGEE?

Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1951) defines refugees as any person who has:

“As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

The subsequent 1967 Protocol established that due to the presence of new refugee situations since the adoption of the 1951 Refugee convention, and that it is desirable for all refugees to enjoy equal status, the term refugee shall mean any person within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and the words “a result of such events” in article 1 (A) 2 were omitted (UNHCR, 1967). Furthermore, the Protocol shall be applied by party states without any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to the Convention in accordance with article 1 B (1) (a) of the convention (UNHCR, 1967).

The 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa also defines refugees based on the terms noted in Article 1 of the Refugee Convention, however, it goes on to state:

“2. The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.” (OAU, 1974:3)

The very fact that the definition of refugees varies from an excessively restrictive universal doctrine provided by the UNHCR, to one that provides more scope for individuals who are forced to migrate
as a result of external aggression through the African Union provides grounds for discussion as to the relevance of discussing or categorizing forced migrants as refugees when providing them with assistance or not. For the purpose of this paper, we will refer to the OAU definition and also bear in mind any individuals who have been displaced internally or that do not fall under the institutionalized definition of “refugee”, but are forced migrants. The rationale behind this decision is that the indicators for forced migration, as well as the initial relief for both forced migrants and refugees are arguably the same. In order to assess the larger forced migrant population, this thesis makes use of forced migrants and refugees interchangeably. References to refugees in this instance shall refer to individuals who were forced to flee their homes and cross borders, unless otherwise directly quoting the UNHCR, in which case the reference is to those who have acquired refugee status. Thus the emphasis shall be on forced cross-border migrant populations of concern as a whole, regardless of whether or not they have acquired UNHCR status as asylum seekers or refugees, and what indicators can be used as early warning systems for their mass outflow from their country of origin as a result of man-made or human crises. This is because the protection and settlement needs of internally displaced peoples vary from those who are refugees (cross border forced migrants). Likewise, victims of human trafficking also differ from those noted above.
II. WHAT ARE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN FORCED MIGRATION CRISIS?

The question of what exactly an early warning system constitutes varies and often conflates depending on topic at hand. While it may be viewed as an extension of intelligence discourse, in general terms, early warning systems are defined as the ability to predict the possible movement or displacement of people as a result of nature, conflict or coercion (Ruso, 1996:8). Early warning arguably spans across a number of issues and concerns such as military conflict, military coups, impending humanitarian disasters such as famine and flows of refugees and in extreme cases genocide (Ruso, 1996:8). While there are various perspectives regarding the role and efficiency of early warning systems, this research is part of what is referred to as the middle end of the spectrum (Ruso, 1996: 9). According to Ruso (1996:9), an effective early warning system must alert the international community to impending displacement, either for preemptive (notice, not preventive) action or preparedness. A preemptive early warning system would therefore aim to prepare for the arrival of forced migrants, while preventative early warning aims to stop the root causes of forced migration in order to stop forced migration flows if possible. Preemptive early warning systems are therefore the main focus of this research. Likewise, Apadoca (1998:81) contends that early warning is a method of forecasting humanitarian crises before their onset by identifying the underlying causes (root and proximate causes) of past refugee flight. Therefore, an effective early warning system would identify risk factors, which would be monitored in turn as those causing and triggering events of flight (Apadoca 1998:81; Ruso, 1996:8).

For the purpose of this thesis, the concern is primarily of early warning systems as a result of conflicts that result in mass exoduses of individuals from their place of habitual residence to another host state. A crucial question this research addresses is whether it is possible to establish an overarching early warning system framework for all forced migration crises that come about as a
result of human conflict. The United Nations Inter-Agency Consultations of New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons held meetings until 1994 and produced a list of 41 Indicators for the Early Warning of Population Movements at a Country Level (Ruso, 1996: 10).

With regards to the relevant actors and those who would benefit from early warning systems, it has been noted that there is a lack of communication and coordination between those who are actively working on the field and those who would benefit from a reliable early warning system (Ruso, 1996:9). Bearing this in mind the primary actors who would benefit the most from the establishment of early warning systems for refugee crises are governments of host nations and international agencies such as the UNHCR. The ability to predict refugee flows would assist host states in mobilizing and allocating resources and alleviating financial strain by providing officials with time in order to establish a contingency plan based on best case, worst case and most likely scenarios. Such planning efforts would without a doubt assist national governments, as well as states, governorates and municipalities as it would aid in the redistribution of services, so that the host population does not feel that their resources are being strained. Other actors that would benefit include NGOs and the refugees themselves. For the refugees, the level of suffering will be alleviated, and for NGOs they would have an additional chance to coordinate effort with governmental and non-governmental entities, as well logistical requirements such as permits. Therefore, the key aim of early warning systems in this instance is to maximize the livelihood (housing, food, healthcare and education for example) of refugees in host states, as well as their protection within host nations, and to aid host nations’ governments in the preparation, distribution, coordination and management of resources, services and facilities.

This links directly into the International Protection regime, as it would aid in ensuring non-refoulement, non-penalization, enjoyment of the widest possible exercise of their fundamental rights and non-discrimination in the enjoyment of rights. International protection refers to all activities
through which refugees’ rights are secured, whether through assistance activities, the establishment of structures, facilities or services and so forth. Likewise, ensuring basic human rights of uprooted or stateless people in their countries of asylum or habitual residence end that refugees will not be returned involuntarily to a country where they could face persecution are further examples of protection (UNHCR, 2013i). The affirmation of these principles would without a doubt be impacted by a host states ability to predict refugee flows and to plan a strategy for facilities, funding (when needed) and services ahead of a mass influx. Likewise, a number of temporary protection agreements can be arranged within the framework of domestic law in order to respond the outbreak of crises. An example of temporary protection is the most recent Syrian refugee crisis and responses by some of its neighbouring states. On a more long-term basis, early warning systems for refugee crises may aid in pinpointing appropriate durable solutions through voluntary repatriation, integration or resettlement in third countries (UNHCR, 2013i). This for example would be evident as host states’ awareness of the arrival of forced migrants would assist in the establishment of services and facilities required for the integration of forced migrants into their host society, or to monitor developments on the ground to assess whether or not repatriation would be a viable option. With regards to resettlement in third countries, the crisis indicators may act as a benchmark for the inability of forced migrants to be repatriated to their countries of origin, particularly in the face of an inability to integrate in transit states. Likewise, it may assist the UNHCR and other refugee advocacy organisations in negotiating refugee quotas for resettlement in third countries so as to decrease the processing time for forced migrants. This also represents scope for the UNHCR, NGOs, international refugee organisations and governments to focus on their respective mandates or obligations as they can coordinate more effectively with one another, and not become over-burdened by a sudden onset humanitarian disaster that is further exacerbated by a lack of preparedness.

The section addressing earlier research and the literature review highlights examples of indicators that have been used as warning signs regarding potential refugee outflows. Generally,
threats to personal security result in individuals becoming displaced, however the literature review addresses these points in more detail. Bearing these points in mind, this attempts to analyse the role of specific indicators in predicting outflows of populations of concern. It does so by comparing the Turkish government’s preparation for the influx of Syrian refugees and the Egyptian government’s preparation for the influx of Syrian refugees into their borders in comparison to indicators highlighted in research by earlier authors. Through the comparison, key indicators are highlighted, as well as governments’ varying analysis of the conflict, and how these correspond with indicators from earlier research. It is therefore important to address the various types of conflicts, and how responses by bordering and non-border states differ in numerous instances.

**REFUGEE FLOWS AND EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS:**

As previously noted, 2012 represented the sixth consecutive year where the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide exceeded 45 million, with an average of 23,000 people forced to flee daily (UNHCR, 2013a:2). Since refugee flight is, quite literally, the spread of domestic unrest across international borders (Rubin & Moore, 2007:86), a timely response is crucial and advance warning is essential. Early warning systems are therefore of the upmost importance in order to assist host nations in the provision of effective and efficient services that minimize the financial strain on the local economy, and the spillover of conflicts at the borders when possible. Another important point is that forced migrants may chose transit countries based on the existence of transnational networks, and historical relationships, as opposed to mere geographical closeness. This is addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters of the thesis.

Gordenker highlights the role played by violent change in government in producing a new social elite that would subsequently isolate a new group and impinge on their human rights, resulting in an increase in forced migration (Gordenker, 1984:71). As a result, forced migrants will often be
surrounded by desert, in a remote area where resources, particularly water, are scarce (Rubin & Moore, 2007:85). One of the main issues is that quite often they are not recognized as refugees under the strict definitions of international law (Gordenker, 1984:69). The more certain the information on refugees’ movements, the more focused and prepared the responses of organizations that were prepared to offer help (Gordenker, 1984:71). For example, in 2001, the Pakistani government refused to open its borders to a new influx of Afghani refugees, arguing that the UNHCR and the international community had not provided them with enough support for the constant flows since the end of the Cold War (UNHCR, 2006:94).

The importance of having an early warning system also lies in the fact that it would provide scope for the relevant authorities to prevent severe and undeserved deprivations that would cause further movement (Gordenker, 1984:69). Furthermore it would also assist in the efficient organisation of governmental and social institutions to organize effective relief and protection for forced migrants or those who are expected to flee soon (Gordenker, 1984:69). The reduction or elimination of the time gap between the occurrence of an event and the mobilization of resources can have a great impact not only on forced migrants themselves, but also on state institutions in receiving countries, particularly those with limited resources for their own population (Gordenker, 1984:71). This reduction would result in improved services between the appearance of forced migrants and the actual delivery of necessary services that would provide them with food, shelter, medical and legal protection (Gordenker, 1984:71) as well as any other necessary services. Not to mention that it would ensure that the critical elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are upheld, namely; non-refoulement (which may occur due to a lack of infrastructure or resources), non-penalisation (which in this instance is largely economic) and the widest possible capacity to exercise their rights as outlined by Articles 3-44 in the convention (UNHCR, 1951). It is critical to emphasise that non-refoulement also applies at the borders of states, and therefore any signatory of the convention is obliged by law to not return refugees to any place where their lives may be
endangered.

It is also pivotal to bear in mind that the difference between providing emergency responses, compared to those that are pre-emptive decreases the emphasis is on assistance, as is the case with emergency responses, over protection (UHCR, 2006:94). The UNHCR Global Appeal 2013 report is expecting the continuation of many of the humanitarian crises that started or were ongoing in 2012 as a result of the intensification of crises in Africa and the Middle East, coupled with the emergence of new emergencies, such as the flight of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) into Rwanda and Uganda (UNHCR, 2012: 27). Furthermore, the UNHCR’s Mass Exoduses Report has emphasized the importance of establishing “logistical assistance capacity on a stand-by basis to provide support for emergency or preventive field missions; (b) the establishment and maintenance of an international roster of specialized staff to be available at short notice for human rights field missions; and (c) increased contributions to the voluntary funds in order to cover the costs of field missions and advisory services assistance” (UNHCR, 1995: A/50/566).

There are several instances where timely response has resulted in as substantial decrease in the intensity of human suffering, as well as the burden on the host government. A recent example is the role of the Turkish government in responding to Syrian refugee flows during the uprising. Turkey sought to control the situation early on, building four refugee camps in Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis and Urfa (Philips, 2012). Turkey has largely been able to fund its response to the crisis itself; with the government controlled Turkish Red Crescent and AFAD disaster agency taking the lead rather than UNHCR (Philips, 2012). As a result the government was initially able to cope with the influx of refugees (Philips, 2012), however in October, with a dramatic increase from 80,000 to numbers expected to rise over 100,000, the Turkish government has announced that the speed of construction of new camps cannot keep up with the acceleration in refugee flows (Parkinson & Albayrak, 2012).
Another example was the establishment of a United Nations Human Rights Office in Burundi in agreement with the Burundi government in June 1994 (UNSG, 1995:A/50/566). In an emergency message in 1995, the High Commissioner called for all necessary measures to be taken to prevent the situation in the country from deteriorating (UNSG, 1995:A/50/566). By attempting to ensure that basic human rights were not violated at any stage of return, resettlement and reintegration of the Rwandan refugees and internally displaced persons through the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda, the High Commissioner, in close cooperation with UNHCR, attempted to both alleviate the consequences of the massive exodus that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and to mitigate further displacement caused by human rights violations in Burundi (UNSG, 1995:A/50/566). Likewise, in the case of responses to the crisis in Kosovo the budget cuts greatly impacted the UNHCR’s emergency capacity (UNHCR, 2006:91), yet its coordination with other agencies assisted in alleviating the spiraling of the crises the following year (UNHCR, 2006:93). In 1999, during the Kosovo emergency, humanitarian evacuation and transfer programs transported refugees to 28 countries outside the region, thereby fairly apportioning the burden off host countries such as Macedonia and the country of origin (UNHCR 2006:94). For example UNHCR responded immediately to the influx of Albanian villagers into Kosovo in 2000 and began contingency planning for further displacement (UNHCR, 2006:91). Consequently, by spring 2001, the UNHCR, other UN agencies and NGOs began to implement programs that included repairing homes and other forms of assistance to boost the confidence of the population (UNHCR, 2006:93). The combined efforts of the aforementioned actors paved the way for the return of some 15,000 displaced persons to their homes (UNHCR, 2006:93).

Preparing for refugee flows in a way that is effective does not only require immediate government responses to such indicators, but also the establishment of proficient inter-institutional dialogue that comprises of both governmental and non-governmental organisations. As Gordenker has aptly noted, “the timing of early warning directed at increasing the effectiveness of relief efforts
in emergency or crisis settings would differ from those aimed at prevention of forced migration”. It would activate governmental and social institutions so that their operations would contribute to protection and relief functions. For example, Tanzania, as one of the largest hosts of refugees in Africa’s responses to the emergencies of the 1990s fell under a rural settlement approach that served as a model across the African continent (UNHCR, 2006:102). However, with increased political and material pressures arising from these emergencies, the settlement approach was replaced with one that focuses on the establishment of camps and repatriation (UHCR, 2006:102). Consequently, it is safe to assume that if there were a more preemptive approach, the emphasis would be more geared towards the protection of vulnerable peoples. It would call forth governmental and executive decisions for this purpose (Gordenker, 1984: 71). There needs to be effective dialogue between relevant parties such as the media, civil society and local leaders, in addition to governmental bodies and international actors on the ground such as the United Nations Department of Political Affairs. This form of contingency planning, as it is referred to by the United Nations (1996 Section 1), is a forward planning process, in a state of uncertainty, in which scenarios and objectives are agreed, managerial and technical actions defined, and potential response systems put in place in order to prevent, or better respond to, an emergency or critical situation. Contingency planning therefore requires risk assessment: “In order to anticipate, assist, or prevent refugee flight, we need to identify and monitor those causes and triggering events of flight (United Nations, 1996: Section 1). Therefore, it is important to address methods of analyzing conflicts, and how this impacts potential early warning systems particularly from a governmental perspective.
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS:

The main questions the thesis scrutinizes can be categorized as follows:

1. What are early warning systems for forced migration crises? What are its elements?
2. Are early warning systems effective? What role does a government or NGO’s analysis of a conflict play in addressing and establishing early warning systems?
3. Do early warning systems assist in alleviating the strain on national resources? This is based on the assumption that governments would be able to set up appropriate policies regarding its specific status as a host nation. Similarly, once an early warning system is established, a government can plan and mobilize the necessary resources for the influx of refugees. This would without a doubt have a strong economic impact on host states, particularly when bearing in mind that the majority of the world’s largest refugee host nations are developing countries.
4. Do early warning systems provide non-governmental organisations (NGOs) adequate time to coordinate effectively with other stakeholders regarding access to populations of concern, as well as the opportunity for effective inter-agency cooperation?
5. Does emergency preparedness provide NGOs with a scope to create plans for service provision as per the requirements of the population based on demographics and background of the refugee groups?
6. Does this provide scope for the UNHCR to focus on durable solutions, as well as its main functions? In some instances such as in Egypt, the UNHCR’s mandate has expanded because the government lacks the necessary infrastructure to support the large refugee population.
7. With regards to the Syrian refugee crisis in Egypt and Turkey, did the government, NGOs and INGO establish early warning systems? If so, were they utilized? Were these systems effective?

The main hypothesis of this research is therefore that in instances where early warning systems are present, services provided by governments and NGOs are increasingly efficient and cost-effective as it assists in the mobilization of resources and securing donations when required. With regards to the case study, the main hypothesis was that the Turkish government’s utilization of an early warning system ensured their swift response to the Syrian refugee crisis and the provision of effective and efficient services that met the needs of the mass influx. On the other hand, Egypt’s lack of early warning resulted in a haphazard response to the Syrian refugee crisis, causing additional strains on national infrastructures, and stretching the UNHCR and NGOs’ capacity. It is important to bear in mind that in all instances, it is assumed that in order for there to be effective early warning mechanisms, there needs to be cooperation and communication between governments and NGOs. The presence of such a nexus is pivotal as responding to forced migration crisis is both a government and civil society responsibility.

Similarly, the research highlights that a set of indicators can be used as early warning for refugee outflows into a host nations territory. Once these indicators are established, host governments or transit countries shall be able to allocate their resources effectively. The main indicators that this thesis assumes could act as early warning signals, based on earlier scholarly research and a thorough literature review were:

1. Political Terror Scale of Countries (based on the dataset established by the University of Purdue which utilizes a five point coding scheme to measure state terror such as violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out by a state or its agents
based on the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

2. Government mismanagement of resources as a new and critical contender for forced migration and the increasing likelihood of the emergence of conflicts over natural resources which will result in an increase in forced migration.

3. Change in policy/government (such as violent coups, or as per Gordenker, the instatement of new governments may result in a new social elite, causing a group of individuals to be scapegoats and isolated, causing members of said groups to flee).

4. Transnational networks and Diaspora (this has a greater link to where forced migrants are likely to go, as opposed to an actual indicator regarding forced migration flows. However, an active Diaspora may play a role in fuelling violent conflicts and thus increase the likelihood of forced migration flows).

5. Good governance in the country of origin (civil rights, corruption levels, transparency all reflect on the relationship between civilians and governments, and consequently the likelihood of civil unrest or violent protests erupting)

6. Internal/External migration flows and IDPS (this reflects how much movement internally is occurring, and whether the conflict has resulted in internal movements, which is likely to predict subsequent external flows).

7. Economic Indicators such as GDP (low GDP when coupled with other indicators could result in violent conflicts, causing refugee flows).

8. Proliferation of small arms (this directly impacts the personal safety of individuals, and would therefore cause individuals to flee their habitual place of residence, particularly during times of armed or violent conflict).

9. Media and Human Rights Organisations’ reports (these would reflect what is occurring on the “field” and how the masses feel about specific situations. These may act as indicators as to the likelihood of mass movements, particularly when comparing the
suppression of the media during times of uprisings).

10. Complex ethno-political structures. The more complex the ethnic and civil relations between populations within a specific state are, the more likely the oppression and domination of specific groups is likely to cause forced migrants.

A number of these indicators have been collated from earlier research conducted by authors in the literature review, which are tested against their effectiveness in the case of Syrian refugees in Egypt and Turkey. It was noted however following the research that the indicators alone were not sufficient, as other factors played a role such as governments’ analysis of the conflict at the refugee producing state, national interests, proximity and the immediate threat a refugee influx posits to the host nation. Another critical issue that is highlighted throughout the thesis is that early warning independently does not offer a solution for nor provide additional incentive for host states to respond to refugee crises. This is addressed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
IV. METHODOLOGY

The research utilizes qualitative methods in order to scrutinize whether early warning systems have an impact on the effectiveness of relief provided by host states and collaborating NGOs. The main methodology shall be a comparative study, coupled with content analysis of media reports, press releases from governmental entities, INGOs and rights organisations prior to mass exoduses. This analysis assists in shedding light as to when Egypt and Turkey could have, and in fact did react to mass exoduses. Similarly, interviews with UNHCR, NGO workers, and government officials regarding the presence or absence of early warning systems were conducted. During these interviews, the interviewees were asked whether they believe early warning systems could be alleviate strain on their resources and increase the effectiveness of their services, among other questions (refer to appendix).

The thesis initially intended on analysing previous routes taken by other refugees, as it may serve as precedent for future forced migration movements, as well as interviews with refugees to measure the role transnational networks play in the choice of host nation. This was because previous research has found that Diasporas and the creation of networks in specific countries increases chances of refugees choosing specific transit or resettlement countries over others where existing networks are present (Van Hear, 2006: 9-14). Yet this element of the research was not executed due to the researcher’s inability to secure interviews with refugees. Furthermore it is now believed that in order for the impact of transnational networks and diasporas to be measured reliably, it would be better served as an independent area for future research that covers a range of refugee populations, and not just Syrians.

It is important to note that the research focuses only on forced migration as a result of
manmade crises. This is because the drivers of forced migration due to conflict require different indicators to those as a result of natural disasters. While there are an increasing number of refugees from countries that have experienced tsunamis, floods, drought, and other extreme weather conditions, the indicators would be more related to meteorological scientists for more reliable evidence and analysis of potential extreme weather conditions. As such, conflict-induced displacement looks at more socio-political indicators as potential drivers for forced migration. Similarly, the emphasis shall be on cross-border forced migrants (henceforth referred to as refugees regardless of their legal standing with the UNHCR) as their protection, preparedness and advocacy needs differ from those of internally displaced peoples and victims of human trafficking. Thus it is best to focus on one demographic within many who fall under the category of forced migration.

Therefore, the thesis starts with a comparative study between the responses of the Egyptian versus Turkish government to the influx of Syrian refugees. The reason Egypt and Turkey were chosen is because Egypt and Turkey are the only states in the Middle East receiving Syrian refugees that are signatories of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are not signatories (UNHCR, 2014; UNHCRa, 2014). Furthermore, the choice of Egypt was as per the requirements of the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict. The comparative study analyzes official government statements, as well as media reports prior to the arrival of forced migrants from October 2010 till July 2011. Another important element that is also highlighted is which events resulted in mass exoduses at a specified timeframe. In the aforementioned cases, crisis indicators that were produced by agencies dealing with forced migrants whether governmental, international or non-governmental are also addressed, with an emphasis on political terror, complex ethno-political structures and the proliferation of small arms, as these indicators presented themselves most prominently within the Syrian conflict. The next section presents a literature review of research regarding early warning systems for refugee crises, as well as the limitations to early warning systems. It is important to note that the expected outcome for this research was that early warning
systems are indeed effective, and were utilized by the Turkish government, and resulted in the success of their initial responses to Syrian refugees arriving in Turkey. Likewise, it is also projected that conflict analysis plays a critical role in responses to forced migration.
V. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to address early warning systems for impending refugee outflows, one must address the question of what forces individuals to flee their countries of origin. A number of U.N. agencies have attempted to establish the root causes of forced migration, including the UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Department of Political Affairs to name a few. UNGA resolution 36/48 has noted that socio-economic factors play a role in the creation of refugee crises (UNGA, 1981: 36/48). A number of academics have also attempted to approach this question by establishing quantitative models for research regarding what could cause refugee crises such as Martineau (2010) and Rubin and Moore (2007), while Gordenker (1984) and Apadoca (1998) took slightly more qualitative approach to the question.

Martineau tested the occurrence of forced migratory flows based on six hypotheses (1) As the number of conflicts increases, regardless of the type of conflict, whether low or high intensity, a country will be more likely to produce a refugee outflows, (2) Countries with one-sided violence will be more likely to produce refugees as individuals are unable to resist or fight back, consequently leaving them with no option but to flee, (3) Recently independent countries are more likely to produce refugees, (4) Countries that are not free, both in the electoral sense and in regards to civil liberties, are more likely to produce refugees, (5) Countries that experience a change in political openness regardless of direction are more likely to produce refugees, (6) Countries with poor economies are more likely to produce refugees, and finally (7) Countries with high population will be more likely to produce refugee outflows (Martineau, 2010:140-142). It is important to note that Martineau includes refugees resulting from the breakup of states and secessionist movements or parts breaking away from a whole within his research. Martineau’s determinants of forced migration do could arguably be seen as simplistic in the sense that the complex interplay of factors that cause forced migration is not accounted for, particularly the fact that flight is a decision that is taken on a
personal level. There are various instances of countries where there have been increasing conflicts that have not caused mass cross-border forced migration, and yet only caused internal displacement. In terms of newly independent states it is short-sighted to assume that this would result in increased forced migration, as quite often the independence of states is seen with extreme optimism by local constituencies who want to contribute to the development of the new state, and may therefore be less likely to leave their country of origin, contrary to Martineau’s opinion. With regards to Martineau’s hypothesis that countries with weak economies and high populations are likely to produce more refugees, it seems as though these are causes for economic migration, as opposed to reasons to be forced to flee a country of origin. While these factors may be a small element within the broader scope of why a state may produce refugees, it does not tie into concrete reasons for forced migration that relate to threats to personal or family security. That said, changes in openness or government polity would arguably produce increased forced migration, when coupled with limited civil liberties may be cause for forced migration. However, with all of Martineau’s points, it is important to bear in mind that not one factor can be seen in isolation from the broader domestic and regional context of a refugee producing state in order to fully grasp what detriments may or may not produce refugees.

Contrary to the opinion held by Apodaca (1998:80-93), Martineau (2010: 139) found that the association between deteriorating human rights conditions and refugee outflows is relatively weak. His study also confirmed that freedom highly impacts refugee flows, meaning that even countries that were partially free were no more likely statistically to produce refugees, when compared to countries that ended at free under the Freedom House category (Martineau, 2010:147). Not to mention that a major change in a country’s polity score was also related to an increase in the odds of a refugee outflow by approximately four-folds, compared to those who did not experience any major political upheaval (Martineau, 2010:147). Similarly, for every one-unit increase of collective conflict a country is one and half more times likely to produce refugees (Martineau, 2010:147). One of the primary limitations to Martineau’s early warning system, when noting the paper was published in
2010, is that despite the overall early warning model having high rates of predictability (84 of 92 countries that did not produce refugees (91.3%) were predicted accurately, and 70 of 78 countries that did produce refugees (89.7% were indicated accordingly) (Martineau, 2010:147), it failed at amply predicting the unfolding of the Arab Spring in terms of expected refugee numbers. For example, the model predicted that Egypt would have a 95.64% probability of producing refugees, while Libya would have a 33.6% and Syria would have 68.15% chance. Based on this error, it seems that potentials for political upheaval, as well as the categorization of early warning systems should be hierarchical, as opposed to all indicators being equal in effect as Martineau had contended. Obviously, it is unrealistic to expect Martineau to be aware of the events that would unfold in the Arab Spring in 2011, however, the fact that this occurred and the flow of refugees out of Syria and Libya was a lot higher than Egypt and Tunisia for example, points to a potential area for further research regarding what caused the spike in governmental violence towards civilians if all four states had, according to Martineau, relatively similar oppression levels.

Rubin and Moore also conducted similar research regarding forced migration in 2007 by analysing the sum of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) and refugees abroad, though they do not calculate the net figure (Rubin & Moore, 2007:91). Their research mainly tested the UNHCR’s early warning list of thirty potential triggers. They argued that since government violence is expressed through genocide and politicide, human rights violations are likely to increase chances of a forced migration the following year (Rubin & Moore, 2007:89). However, their findings pointed to a unique result, which was that genocide is unlikely to result in increased migrant flows the following year (Rubin & Moore, 2007:89). The reasoning was that individuals are more likely to flee in anticipation of genocidal killing, and not in reaction to it, despite being contemporaneously correlated (Rubin & Moore, 2007:89). The authors found that a unit increase in the magnitude of genocide decreases the future potential of forced migration (Rubin & Moore, 2007:99). Consequently forced migration is a risk factor for genocide, but not vice-versa, and people relocate
prior to and during, but not after genocide (Rubin & Moore, 2007:99). Furthermore, they contend that countries with democratic institutions are expected to experience less forced migration, than those with autocratic polities (Rubin & Moore, 2007:99). It is however important to bear in mind that they found that neither the state, dissidents nor the interaction of states and dissidents alone is a trigger for forced migration (Rubin & Moore, 2007:99). The model captures the impact of human rights, opposition movements, past forced migration and institutional freedom as triggers for forced migration (Rubin & Moore, 2007:101).

Their findings concluded that the range between full government respect for human rights to no respect yields a 0.37 increase in the probability of forced migration, from 0.5 to 0.87 (Rubin & Moore, 2007:98). Not to mention that the fact that civil war is observed in a specific year makes it likely that civil war will be observed in the coming months, and that individuals will increasingly feel threatened, making them more likely to become forced migrants (Rubin & Moore, 2007:98). Likewise, physical integrity abuse is also significantly related to the probability of forced migration in the following year (Rubin & Moore, 2007:101). All in all Rubin and Moore’s research found that the strongest risk factors of an impending forced migration event are civil war and the presence of a forced migration event in the preceding period (Rubin & Moore, 2007:101). Furthermore, their research has found that institutional democracy, measured through level of democracy, produces a statistically significant coefficient in increased future forced migration (Rubin & Moore, 2007: 100). This unexpected correlation has been attributed to the fact that democratic polities are more likely to limit entry as opposed to exit, maintain open borders, thus increasing opportunities for forced migration in subsequent years (Rubin & Moore, 2007: 100). Rubin & Moore (2007:101) contend that this is also explained by democracies’ superior ability to control their borders, thus restricting migratory flows (Rubin & Moore, 2007:101). However, it is important to note that their findings are contrary to other research that has been reviewed for this thesis, and as aptly noted by the authors, the coefficient represents a potential “increased opportunity of future forced migration” (Rubin &
Moore, 2007:101). One must therefore question the underlying assumption that non-democratic societies impose such strict border controls that they significantly impede forced migration. It is safe to assume that border restrictions, or the lack thereof, at refugee producing states play a minimal role in the likelihood of causing future forced migration.

Rubin & Moore (2007:93) also proposed a unique potential variable for further research regarding the role played by the presence of a diaspora culture abroad, and networks that can provide information to potential forced migrants and also how they became migrants (Rubin & Moore, 2007:93). While remaining cognizant of the aforementioned point, Van Hear has found that refugees and forced migrants are more likely to attempt to migrate to countries where there are already established networks of individuals from the same cultural background (Van Hear, 2006:9-14). This is also important for governments to consider when looking at the probability of a large migrant influx after a crisis. In short, Rubin & Moores’ (2007) findings concluded three major risk factors of civil war, and subsequent forced migration. Political Terror Scale (PTS) or Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) indicators of human rights abuses, and the presence of refugee/IDP flows in the previous year can give one a specific prediction about the change in probability of observing a forced migrant event in the coming year. They have argued that given the coarse temporal aggregation of their data, it is only useful for broad-gauge contingency planning, perhaps most useful for deciding where to deploy analyst time with respect to monitoring the more comprehensive UNHCR list (Rubin & Moore, 2007:102).

Some of the earlier research, which will not be discussed in detail, was a lot less thorough and included a number of flaws. For example, the research conducted by Onishi (1987) utilized a “highly sophisticated information system, coupled with a dynamic soft systems approach to evaluate thirty-two variables that were organized into four categories (1987, p.271). The four categories were; destruction in environment, failures in development, absence of peace and security, and violations of
human rights. (Onishi, 1987:271). His research was based on Asian countries, and utilized expert opinions of the respective countries included in the research (Onishi, 1987) consequently resulted in subjective accounts of the situation. Martineau has found that the biggest weakness in Onishi’s Early Warning System, however, is the fact that none of the variables are correlated with refugee outflows (Martineau, 2010:137-138). Likewise, in 1998 Apodaca conducted research that revolved around the role of human rights violations while looking at the political terror scale of countries (Apodaca, 1998: 82). Apodaca hypothesizes that as a government becomes less respectful of human rights, and after this disrespect reaches a high enough level, refugee outflows will occur (Apodaca, 1998:82) However, her study excludes refugees resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union because “the disintegration of a superpower is a unique event” (Apodaca, 1998:84). Yet, as Martineau (2010:138), has eloquently argued, despite the rareness of the breakup of a super power, the breakup of states has become an increasingly prevalent phenomenon, for example Yugoslavia, although often in the form of parts breaking away from the whole (Martineau, 2010:138), for example South Sudan from Sudan, Eritrea from Ethiopia and Somaliland from Somalia.

According to Soloman (2000:37), Rupesinghe and Anderlini have also provided the following possible indicators that would point towards the eruption of violent conflict. They broadly categorized the indicators into: Political and leadership issues, economic and environmental issues, demographic and societal issues. Table 1 highlights the components of each of the aforementioned categories:
It has been noted that violent conflict can often result in forced migration, whether internally or externally. Thus such indicators are important to note as they may be instrumental in highlighting indicators that point to the occurrence of civil unrest or violence within a specific population.

Source: (Solomon, 2000:37)
VI. LIMITATIONS TO EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS

Questions regarding who should be issuing early warning systems and how to ensure the indicators are effective will also be addressed. Furthermore, instances where the lack of early warning resulted in inadequate responses to refugee crises will also be addressed as a support to the main hypothesis. Seeing as the governments are the main managers of large scale actions, as well as their legislative and executive capabilities, that would mean that they would need to be directly involved with preventive measures or indirectly through organisations (Gordenker, 1984:72). Unlike Gordenker (1984:72-73) however, the main hypothesis is that host-states’ governments need to be informed regarding potential forced migration outflows so they can mobilize national resources and issue warnings to all relevant agencies. Intergovernmental bodies such as the U.N., African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), League of Arab States, E.U. and so forth, might act as third party issuers of early-warning indicators (Gordenker, 1984:73). Some of these agencies, such as the League of Arab States are working on establishing crisis rooms to monitor pending outbursts of violence in the region (Al-Assad, 2012), which may be of use when trying to predict forced migration flows. Similarly, the U.N.’s Department of Political Affairs’ Early Planning Section, the OCHA’s Contingency office which provides quantitative and qualitative measures for assessing risks of humanitarian emergencies, in addition to the sub-working group on Preparedness of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s quarterly reports on emerging and deteriorating situations of humanitarian concern could also be issuing relevant reports. Other agencies, whether voluntary or specialized, which work in collaboration with governments in ensuring effective relief efforts would be informed of the pending crisis in order to mobilize all relevant resources and personnel (Gordenker, 1984:73).

For prevention to be a practical option, actors need to be informed, with adequate time for
specific prevention policies to be developed, that an outflow is likely in a particular area (Martineau, 2010:136). The creation of efficient communication channels through interagency dialogue at both the national, regional and supranational levels is therefore imperative. This dialogue needs to extend across government, civil society and the media so as to enhance predictions and necessary responses. The UNHCR has recognized the critical role national and local NGOs play in responding to humanitarian crises, and consequently launched a pilot project targeting selected national NGOs in Africa, the Middle East and South- West Asia in September 2012 (UNHCR, 2012:28). The project which was executed by UNHCR in collaboration with the International Medical Corps that aimed at maximising the institutional capacity of national NGOs by providing management training and tailored, on- site coaching (UNHCR, 2012:28). The objective was to enable local partners to take a greater role in emergency preparedness and response in a refugee crisis (UNHCR, 2012:28). Upon completion of the project, the UNHCR expects organizations that have taken part to be on standby for a certain period of time as implementing partners for UNHCR’s emergency operation (UNHCR, 2012: 28). Similarly the creation of crisis rooms within relevant agencies worldwide with a common database for communiqués may also be useful. For example, the issuance of quarterly reports that are circled to relevant host-countries is key. It is also important to note that early warning and early response systems will require both structural risk assessment processes to point to opportunities for appropriate and well-planned preventive action to address structural problems, and linked dynamic early warnings to flag the need for more immediate containment efforts (Davies, 2000:3).

Another potential option would be to establish a set of country specific forced migration response guidelines in collaboration with the UNHCR, OCHA, local government and NGOs in the state. If early warning indicators exist without appropriate domestic policies to support the implementation of relief based on such indicators, or if the indicators are ignored, then their existence is fruitless. These guidelines, along with other policy recommendations for domestic capacity building will be key to ensuring the sustainable success of early warning indicators.
Consequently, and as noted by Rubin and Moore the early warning system should strive for both the preclusion and the establishment of effective advance preparations for a possible emergency (Rubin & Moore, 2007: 76). The intergovernmental component should have its own research arm or else should enter a long-term commitment with one or more research organizations (Rubin & Moore, 2007:76). The research component would collate information, develop conceptual apparatus for analysis and forecasting and examine the results of efforts to signal an impending critical situation (Rubin & Moore, 2007:76).

However, there are many drawbacks to early warning systems, particularly because of the fact that the regime is intertwined with government and national security concerns. The overlap between humanitarian and political agendas has always shaped relief responses; a shift towards greater unilateral interventionism in some countries has led to greater synchronization of their political, military and humanitarian objectives (UNHCR, 2006:100). Seeing as whether forced migrants end up being displaced in their own country or in a neighbouring state or another transit country, the decision to react to such flows is decided by governments and is therefore purely political in nature. Likewise, early warning systems risk becoming preventative, in the sense that agencies or governments may use early warnings systems’ indicators or results to prevent forced migrants from entering host nations, as opposed to being used to maximize response efforts to humanitarian crises. In some cases decisions concerning emergency responses have been driven by media attention and public opinion (UNHCR, 2006:100), as opposed to the actual urgency of humanitarian situation. What’s more during humanitarian crises such as Rwanda, despite the presence of an “early warning” regarding the pending crisis, it was not responded to as swiftly as it should have been, neither was the crisis fully appreciated by foreign governments who were required to intervene (Miskel, 2000). For example, the rising tensions between Zairians and “uninvited Rwandan guests” (Miskel & Norton, 1997), hostility between Rwandan Hutu forces inside the camps and the Tutsi regime in Rwanda manifested itself repeatedly in numerous acts of violence (Miskel &
Norton, 1997). Likewise, Hutu-Tutsi violence in neighboring Burundi as well as its potential for spillover into Rwanda and Zaire were also clear (Miskel & Norton, 1997). Similarly, it was also noted that there media reports regarding ethnic tensions and violence in Kigali, and incursions of Rwandan exile groups based in Uganda (Miskel & Norton, 1997). This could be attributed to the global political environment at the time, as governments were unwilling to intervene following what was dubbed as the “shadow of Somalia”. Likewise, it has also been noted that intervention did not reflect national interests of world powers. Neighbouring states that did have an interest in responding to the crisis lacked the physical and economical capacity to respond appropriately to the crisis (Miskel & Norton, 1997). It is important to remain cognizant of the aforementioned fact when bearing in mind that the majority of refugee host states are developing nations, with developed nations contributing very little support to host or transit nations.

Similarly, Miskel has argued that the states with the greatest incentive for taking early action in humanitarian emergencies are the very nations that would benefit least from a formal, international early warning system (Miskel, 2000). These are the states whose national interests are directly affected by the emergency; i.e., neighboring states or more distant states with major investments in or security commitments to the affected state (Miskel, 2000). These states already monitor and evaluate developments like communal violence that may jeopardize their interests or destabilize their borders (Miskel, 2000). For example, as demonstrated by its participation in contemporaneous regional conferences and commissions, Tanzania already possessed a deep understanding of the Zaire crisis and would not have benefited significantly from information generated by a UN early warning system based in Geneva or New York (Miskel, 2000). Jacobsen conducted a study in 1996 regarding the various factors influencing government policy responses to mass refugee influxes. In her research, she put forth the following (Table 2) possible government responses to mass refugee influxes, which adequately represents the potential reactions from governments (Jacobsen, 1996: 659):
### U.N. Policy Yardstick: Refugee Policy Decisions and Possible State Responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Type</th>
<th>Positive Response</th>
<th>Negative Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(United Nations Recommendations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Legal-Bureaucratic response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes, or accession equivalent</th>
<th>No accession</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Access to international instruments, conventions, etc?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No; define asylum seekers as &quot;aliens,&quot; etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define asylum seekers as refugees?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, refugee affairs handled by army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create separate bureaucratic authority responsible for refugees?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No proper procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures for determination of refugee status?</td>
<td>Yes, proper procedures including legislation, appeal, etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. International Refugee Organizations (IROs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IROs permitted into country</th>
<th>IROs excluded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant IROs permission to assist refugees?</td>
<td>UNHCR permitted access to affected areas; cooperation</td>
<td>Restricted or no access; poor cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Admission and Treatment of Refugees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admit asylum seekers appearing at border?</td>
<td>No; or yes, in accordance with UNHCR regulations</td>
<td>Yes, but not in accordance with UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen refugees?</td>
<td>Refugees allowed to choose camps or self-settlement</td>
<td>Refuges forced to live in camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of refugees?</td>
<td>More rights (including freedom of movement, employment), no discrimination</td>
<td>More restrictions (on movement, employment) and discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights of and restrictions on refugees?</td>
<td>Emphasize physical safety; camps at safe distance from border; civilian nature of camps is maintained</td>
<td>Protection of camps frequently violated; combatants in camps; military recruitment of refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee protection?</td>
<td>Voluntary, according to UNHCR recommendations</td>
<td>Involuntary or forced; violations of UNHCR recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation?</td>
<td>Potential for local settlement or permanent residence</td>
<td>No such local potential; refugees remain in camps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 (Jacobsen, 1996: 659)
Consequently, one of the most pressing limitations is not the lack of early warning systems or indicators, but the continuous inaction of states as a result of lack of political will. It is important to bear in mind that political will is not an independent variable, and is shaped by broader regional, international contexts, as well as the domestic situation and the national interests of host nations. National interests will often trump the existence or lack of existence of an early warning systems, and as a result governments only respond if the public demands it, national leaders are personally affected by the moral issues (Miskel & Norton, 1997), or there is significant international pressure to respond to early warning, yet this action can only be led by powerful nation-states. If one were to take the Rwanda case an example, Kofi Annan, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping at the time, argued that: ‘If there was a problem, it was not one of information or intelligence. The problem was lack of political will.” (Piiparinen, 2006:334). Likewise, former Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali noted “member states were opposed to intervention in Rwanda, with early warning and without early warning. So the real problem is this: if there is no political will among the major actors in the Security Council, any [UN] system which we try to improve will be useless” (Piiparinen, 2006:334).

Not to mention that questions of “national security” trump responses to early warning. Risks associated with forced migration flows such as strain on local economies and infrastructures, as well as concerns regarding the smuggling of arms or violent individuals along with vulnerable populations also limit response. Likewise, the internationalization of conflict as a result of forced migration also impacts political, thus limiting governments’ responses to early warning. It is also important to highlight that the lack of response or absence of policy is a policy towards refugees in and of itself, manifested in the form of a negative response to forced migrants. Therefore, while it has been found that information regarding early warning or impending humanitarian crises is often presented by specialized agencies that focus on risk and crises analysis, quite often they are not fully absorbed by decision makers as crucial indicators, and are dealt with in passing to a large extent. In
such instances, while U.N agencies dealing with emergency preparedness or national intelligence agencies may take such reports into consideration, the question remains regarding how much weight is placed on forecasting reports when faced with pressing needs to respond, which require financial obligations. States may often prefer respond to humanitarian crises or forced migration crises as the occur, as opposed to dedicate resources and fund based on projections based on indicators which may or may not prove to be true, and then respond to their domestic constituencies regarding the misappropriation of funds. In short, political action is a complex, adaptive system based on conditional, strategic interaction (Marshall, 2008:2).

As such the research conducted for this thesis has found that while some form of early warning may exist, the “warning” needs to be translated into action in order for it be effective and play a role in alleviating burdens for both forced migrants and host nations. That said one must reiterate that there is no direct correlation between positive responses from governments and early warning. This is because responses are impacted by historical contexts and domestic policies employed towards other refugees in the region as a whole. Such a complex relationship could be manifested in discrimination against refugees of specific origins in order to curb a growing population within a host nation, or more complex screening procedures due to interstate relations. Similarly, states will often not communicate or cooperate regarding potential exoduses out of national security concerns, which directly impacts forced migrants. It is this politicization and securitization of humanitarian emergencies, which results in inadequate services, and the mushrooming of events that could be contained if governments were to respond appropriately to the existing indicators and cooperate. Since a large number of the major host-nations of forced migrants are developing nations (UNHCR, 2012:14), these states will quite often lack the physical infrastructures in order to act effectively upon early warning (Miskel, 2000). The dismal lack of cooperation that occurs from developed states with gross debates on national security concerns and acting on keeping forced migrants on the borders, ruthlessly denies the impact of the colonial and
imperial experience of a large number of migrant producing states. As Gordenker (1984:77) has aptly noted, “constructing a real system of early warning would require an uphill fight and the development of new tolerance among decision makers. It is a subject, also, that needs ultimately to be linked to other intensely difficult topics, such as the prevention of international strife, the promotion of economic development, the provision of reliable disaster relief and the more rapid growth of humanitarian law” (Gordenker, 1984:77). On the other hand, another drawback may lie in the notion of an “early warning system” on the universal level. With the changing nature of conflict and global hierarchies, as well as environmental change, causes for flight will also develop. Internal structures that limit individuals’ movements may mean that while indicators point to a high chance for flight, their actual ability due to bureaucratic restrictions results in their inability to flee. It may therefore be best to take an approach that applies a case-by-case basis, which is then tested against a universal doctrine in order to come up with an effective early warning system. In other words, the establishment of an overarching or global set of indicators that point to the occurrence of forced migration may not be efficient given the complexity of the reasons why individuals flee and the nature of manmade conflicts. For example, internal violence and threats to personal security will not always result in cross-border forced migration, and may only result in internal displacement. As a result, it would be best to establish indicators on a case-by-case basis, for example based on country or region and then crosscheck these indicators with presumably global standards if need be.

Similarly, the actual effectiveness of early-warning systems in host countries may be limited by a lack of political will to utilize the early warning systems. Likewise, in some cases a steady and constant flow of refugees from neighbouring states may mean that the presence or absence of early warning systems is irrelevant, as what really requires government action is the establishment of a permanent national system for absorbing refugees and creating infrastructures to support their daily needs. Therefore, the onus does not lie in whether or not there are early warning systems or whether...
their existence is useful, yet the role of establishing effective host-nation governmental structures bears the burden of the overall cost efficiency and effectiveness of the provided services.
Conflict analysis arguably aims at channeling violent conflict towards more non-violent trajectories (Soloman, 2000:34). In other words, attempts to analyse conflict aim to “transform” as opposed to halt violent conflicts (Soloman, 2000:34). Soloman has noted that there has been a tendency within academia to oversimplify the nature of intra-state conflicts, and to overlook its interaction with inter-state conflicts or proxy wars (Soloman, 2000:34). That said violent conflict occurs as a result of complex processes, quite often with historical roots (Soloman, 2000:34). ACCORD’s Early Warning System notes five sources of insecurity that result in violent conflict, namely; political, economic, military, environmental and socio-cultural variables (Soloman, 2000:35). In short, one must remain cognizant of the complex interplay of all the factors noted above, and not overemphasize one facet over another, particularly when bearing in mind the correlation between poverty and conflict which are often instrumental within the larger context of a conflict (Soloman, 2000:35). In such cases it is important to note that a government’s capacity to respond to a population’s grievances is also instrumental in the degree of subsequent violence (Soloman, 2000:36).

Manmade crises or conflicts can take many forms; each form has its own unique qualities and, arguably, impact on producing forced migration flows. Conflict-induced displacement occurs as people flee chaos, threats of random violence, and economic devastation (Lischer, 2007: 147). Lischer (2007: 145) has highlighted a disaggregated analysis regarding conflict-induced displacement, with particular reference to international conflicts and civil conflicts in the figure 1 below:
A civil war refers to a violent conflict between organized groups within a country that are fighting over control of the government, one side's separatist goals, or some divisive government policy (Fearon, 2006). The majority of academics also contend that the threshold of 1,000 dead leads to the inclusion of a good number of low-intensity rural insurgencies in order for a conflict to qualify as a civil war (Fearon, 2006). Lischer also contends that most civil wars have an international component to them, as refugee flows can internationalize an issue (Lischer, 2007: 146). This is clear in the case of Syria if one were to take the approach that it is indeed a civil war. With regards to civil wars, it is important to note that within civil wars there is a gross variation in the types of conflict that may occur. For example, mass political violence may be presented as either one where the political actor intends to govern the target population and whether the violence is one-sided or not (Lischer, 2007: 147). The authors argues that during a genocide the government does not intend to govern the targets, merely to exterminate them, which is differs notably from civil wars where two groups are competing for control over the state and each other (Lischer, 2007:146). It is critical at this stage to note that a conflict can be both international/interstate and a civil war at the same time.

Lischer further disaggregates international conflicts into three main categories: invasion, border wars and multilateral interventions (Lischer, 2007:147). Invasions include the Rwandan invasion of Zaire, which resulted in a perceived threat of refugee flows (Lischer, 2007:147).
Likewise, it has been noted that states may go to war in order to prevent or repel refugee flows, particularly when their presence may threaten the stability of the host state (Lischer, 2007: 147). An example was the 1971 refugee influx from Bangladesh (East Pakistan at the time) into India’s West Bengal state over the course of several months, which in turn prompted India’s invasion of East Pakistan based on “refugee aggression” (Lischer, 2007: 147). Border conflicts are quite straightforward and refer to the demarcations of state territories with a neighbouring state. A recent example of a border conflict is between Sudan and South Sudan over Abyei, South Kordofan and the Unity region to name a few in 2012 following the 2011 Referendum. The instability on borders can therefore also produce refugee flows. The final type of international conflict that Lischer (2007:146) refers to is multilateral intervention such as NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. Such interventions can pursue a variety of goals, including stabilizing a weak government, redressing human rights abuses, and responding to international aggression (Lischer, 2007:146). Predicting patterns of conflict-induced displacement during multilateral interventions has proven to be difficult (Lischer, 2007: 146).

Similarly, ethnic conflicts have been noted to precipitate complex conflicts, as a result of the importance of ethnic identity in the mobilization, coordination and persistence of group organisations (Marshall, 2008:13). As a result, identity groups are more likely to persist in their activities, which may result in recurrence of violent episodes that cause forced migration. Furthermore, in some cases abrupt regime transition may ensue, or conflict actors may execute genocide, mass political killings or ethnic cleansing (Marshall, 2008:13). This is particularly relevant if the ethnic group is also a minority that the state executes systematic discrimination against. Marshall has also noted that ethnic wars result in regional instability as a result of the spillover of ideas, activists, arms and refugees (Marshall, 2008:13). This regional instability may be attributed to the fact that current nation states historically had different borders that represented allegiances to ethnic nations, and are currently spread out across various nation states. Consequently an ethnic groups allegiances spreads beyond
the created borders of the nation state, which could result in internal tensions in a states neighbouring those where ethnic tensions are increasing. Likewise, the movement of individuals as forced or internal migrants, particularly those who identify with themselves as members of a diaspora are likely to lobby for the interests of their ethnic group within the host nation. An example of the role of ethnic conflicts causing regional instability through the role and presence of an active diaspora are tensions between the Tatmadow and the Karen army on the Thai-Burmese border.

Four aspects on the other hand arguably categorize state failure: geographical and territorial, political, functional and sociological (Thürer, 1999). In terms of the geographical and territorial aspects, the failure of a state, due to its internal nature, is largely one of “implosion” of the structures of power and authority, along with the disintegration and de-structuring of states (Thürer, 1999). With this collapse, comes the political aspect of the complete or near-total breakdown of governance structures that guarantee law and order (Thürer, 1999). This in turn results in the absence of bodies capable of representing the state on an international level, and of being influenced by the international community (functional aspect) (Thürer, 1999). As such, a “failed State” is one “which, though retaining legal capacity, has for all practical purposes lost the ability to exercise it. A key element in this respect is the fact that there is no body which can commit the State in an effective and legally binding way, for example, by concluding an agreement” (Thürer, 1999). These points also tie in with the sociological element that refers to the collapse of the core of the government, namely the police, judiciary and other institutions that maintain law and order (Thürer, 1999). The aforementioned bodies have either lost the capacity to execute their functions, cease to exist or are used for other purposes other than their core establishment (Thürer, 1999). Furthermore, a crucial aspect refers to the brutality and intensity of the violence used by members of the society as a whole as a result of the radicalization of violence (Thürer, 1999). Bearing these points in mind, failed states or indicators of a failing state would without a doubt cause concern to neighbouring countries.
as a result of the high likelihood of cross border effects, and of refugee movements due to lack of infrastructures that guarantee human safety and security.

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research also addresses another form, namely political conflict. Political conflict is defined as a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society (the conflict items), between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2012:120). The actors within a political conflict can either be individuals, states, an international organization or a non-state actor (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2012: 120). Whether or not an actor is decisive within a political conflict depends on what role or impact they have in altering the practices of at least one other conflict actor (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2012: 120). Further examples of conflicts are resource conflicts (for example water allocation), economic conflict (access to employment for example), ideological (this can include cultural and religious beliefs and core values for example). It is important to bear in mind at this stage that any given conflict, can include various facets that could span across one or more types of conflict. For example, there may be a civil war that also has an international element, and is also linked to strong ideological values. That said, how a state analyses a conflict and the threat it poses to its own territories would without a doubt impact its response. Likewise, as this research is interested in analysing forced migrants who come about as a result of conflict, it is important to remain cognizant of the different forms of violent conflict that cause forced migration. Forced migrants are products of crises, and therefore awareness of conflict indicators and red flags are critical to understanding when a crisis could result in cross border migration versus internal displacement.
Bearing these points in mind, this research presents both Turkey and Egypt’s understanding and analysis of the conflict in Syria in order to assess what role the typology applied had in the speed of response. Furthermore, another crucial element relates to the role of proximity of the conflict to the refugee receiving state and its impact on early warning systems. So for example, what role does the fact that Turkey borders Syria have in the speed of response from the Turkish government to the refugee influx? Are early warning indicators for forced migration crises the same for bordering (Turkey) and non-bordering states (Egypt) the same? This is scrutinized within the context of conflict analysis executed by government officials in both Turkey and Egypt, as well as other NGOs working with forced migration and United Nations Agencies dealing with the Syrian crisis.


**VIII. APPLYING PREVIOUS INDICATORS TO SYRIA:**

**POLITICAL TERROR:**

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level terror scale (Gibney, Cornett, & Wood, 2013). “Terror” in the PTS refers to state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment that PTS measures (Gibney et al, 2013). It collates information based on data from the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Gibney et al, 2013). The five-point scale categorizes political terror levels as follows:

5 : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

4 : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

3 : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

2 : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. (Gibney et al, 2013).

Between 2001 and 2006, Syria was rated at “3” by both the State Department and Amnesty International. In 2007, Amnesty International increased its rating to a “4”, while the State department only followed suit the following year (Gibney et al, 2013a). Both rated Syria at “4” from 2008 until 2010, however by 2011 (the same year as the start of the uprisings), the rating increased to a “5” for both Amnesty and the state department (Gibney et al, 2013a). To date, there is no data for 2012 and 2013. Based on this data and information, an increasing threat to personal security strongly indicates a need to flee a country of origin. As the level of political violence increased substantially in the four years between 2005-2010 prior to the occurrence of level 5 PTS in 2011 as per the PTS scale. As political terror increases across the whole population, levels of human rights abuses and indiscriminate persecution also increase. Thus political terror may be manifested in actions from persecution to more severe abuses such as torture and disappearances. According to Forsythe (2000:57), the greater the level of human rights abuses in a country of origin, the more likely the probability that individuals would suffer persecution, as well as the likelihood of an increase in the severity of persecution. Similarly the vast number of refugee producing states experience high levels of human rights abuses, which is reflected in high levels of political terror such as PTS levels 4 and 5 (Forsythe, 2000:57). This links directly to the “fear of persecution” stated within the 1951 Refugee convention and the 1967 Protocol, thus highlighting that persecution and political terror play a great role in instigating forced migration. Therefore as the level of political violence increased, the number of refugee outflows also increased.

UNHCR statistics also reflect that the number of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees showed a general increase in the number of refugees from Syria from 2008 onwards (UNHCR, 2013j), which reflects the aforementioned nexus between political terror and forced migration. Table 3 (UNHCR,
2013j) depicts the total number of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers between 2007 and 2012 in neighbouring states: In terms of regional numbers in neighbouring countries, and those within close proximity of Syria, the numbers fluctuated, however, in 2007 and 2008 there was a high wave of refugee flows, and this was repeated again in 2011 and 2012 in instances where there numbers did not remain the same or increasing periodically. Access to monthly statistics regarding refugee flows from March 2011 to December 2011 were not accessible online.

Table 3 (UNHCR, 2013j)

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**Media Coverage: Case 1. Turkey and Syria:**

The media can often play a crucial role as an indicator for the onset of a crisis. Local papers reflect the degree of interest and involvement of local constituencies in overseas events and the choice of terminology can also reflect potential indicators and point towards a potential breakdown. Therefore, the methodology for this portion of the research is content analysis by searching for “Syria” within headlines between 1 October 2010 and 1 July 2011 as this is the period prior to the occurrence of mass exoduses and continuous high flows of refugees into Turkish borders. Most of the major influxes occurred after the start of July 2011. The reason the research shall not be going further back in time is because for Sabah, the only available records were from October 2010,
therefore for the comparison to remain even and fair, all other instances shall be searched within the same timeframe. The indicators the analysis shall highlight as potential indicators of early warning for forced migration are political terror including politicide and state sponsored violence, the proliferation of small arms, corruption and the absence of good governance, scale, type and complexity of conflict, weak economy, and diminished freedoms and increased human rights abuses. It is important to bear in mind that the media is not the only source for early warning, and many other sources of information, discussed later within the thesis, are also sources of early warning. However, monitoring the media was one of the most common tools utilized by governments, NGOs and international organisations to monitor developments in areas of concern.

Two Turkish newspapers shall be analyzed: Sabah which is a center-right daily paper that describes its own editorial line as defending democracy, free market economics and human rights (Al Monitor, 2013). It is supportive of the AKP government and critical of the opposition (Al Monitor, 2013). The second paper is Hürriyet Daily News, which refers to itself as Turkey's only independent and oldest English-language daily newspaper (Hürriyet Daily News, 2009). However, it has been noted that the publication is not considered to be in support of or opposition to the government (Abbas, 2013). An analysis of the content of articles between the aforementioned timeframe shall be conducted in order to investigate whether any early warning indicators or signals presented themselves through the media. The reason the timeframe stops at July 2011 is because this is prior to the mass outflow of Syrian refugees from Syria into neighbouring countries. Likewise, the analysis starts in October 2010 as it is approximately six months prior to the outbreak of the conflict in Syria. Following the analysis of the two Turkish newspapers, two Egyptian newspapers, Daily News Egypt and Al Ahram Weekly shall also be analysed. It is important to note that no Syrian papers were analysed given the high degree of government control over publications. Likewise, the research had initially intended on going through social media reports prior to mass outflows, yet it was proved that this would not be feasible and therefore remains an area for future research.
Sabah:

Coverage between October 2010 and April 2011: Regional Contexts and History of Politicide:

A total of 1142 articles were published when the keyword “Syria” was entered as a search term on the Sabah website on 24 December 2013. The website did not offer a date search function, and therefore the total number of articles from October 2010 to July 2011 is unknown. Articles that were related to Syria between October 2010 till January 2011 focused on trade, increased tourism and international talks regarding the situation in Lebanon (Sabah, 2013). On the 7th of February 2011 (five days prior to Mubarak’s ousting), the paper released an article regarding the uprising in Egypt noted that Prime Minister Erdogan had said “a lesson needs to be learned from what has happened” (Sabah, 2011). Ten days later another article headlined “Egypt inspired protests gain pace across region”, which noted that Syria released a veteran Islamist activist (Sabah, 2011a). The release of a prominent activist arguably reflects that the government was apprehensive and attempting to calm the situation on the streets.

On the 30th and 31st of March 2011, two interesting articles were released. The first article noted that Assad was to give his first speech since the start of protests. However, the content of the article emphasized that despite potential reforms such as lifting the state of emergency law, changes were “cosmetic”, that “power is concentrated in the hands of Assad, his family and the security apparatus”, also noting “civic rights activists and diplomats doubted that Assad, who contained a Kurdish uprising in the north in 2004, would completely repeal/annul emergency laws without replacing them with similar legislation”, and that “[Assad] has prepared a plan to give the impression to public opinion that he has begun reforms” (Sabah, 2011b). Furthermore, it was noted in the same article that journalists were expelled, and that the “crackdown” on the protesters was condemned by the international community (Sabah, 2011b). Meanwhile the same article noted that the government “said Syria is the target of a plot to sow sectarian strife” (Sabah, 2011b). An article released the next day highlighted the Turkish Foreign Minister’s urging of leaders in the region to
embrace the changes occurring as a result of mass protests (Sabah, 2011c). Once again, the Turkish government emphasized the “legitimate demands of the public” (Sabah, 2011c). The article also noted that Turkey was in consultations with Syria and urging “reform and democratization”, as “challenge” to the ruling government grew (Sabah, 2011c). There was also an emphasis on the need to halt “violence, attacks against civilians (Sabah, 2011c). The reported government position through Sabah remained unchanged until the end of April 2011. Likewise, the general tone of the articles reflected a lack of distrust regarding the reforms that the government was planning on implementing. Similarly, all the issues highlighted reflect issues with transparency and lack of good governance and well-founded distrust from the opposition in Syria, and deep-seated social divides.

Articles throughout April made strong connotations to nepotism, cronyism, henchmen, autocracy and the potential mass political violence to maintain control over Syria from the Assad government. On the 1st of April used phrases such as “loyal security forces, fragmented opposition”, “impressive machine of coercion”, “determination” in “crushing” protests and “Syria has a history of ruthless suppression of dissent”, “Hafez al-Assad, wiped out an armed Islamist uprising in Hama in 1982, killing an estimated 20,000 people”, “stepped up the arrest of dissidents” (Sabah, 2011d). The choice of terminology emphasizes a high degree of aggression on the part of the Syrian government and thus highlights that violent crackdowns are likely to continue, particularly given the “history” of violent crackdowns with mass casualties. Another crucial point in this article was the reference to the strength of the “security forces” who are “closely tied to the elite”, and the fact that “much of the security apparatus elite are from Assad's close-knit Alawite group and would be loath to see power taken away from them and handed to Sunnis” (Sabah, 2011d). These points highlight the likelihood of sectarian conflict erupting and the lack of equality and justice between different sects within Syria. Thus levels of oppression for opposition and those who challenge the status quo are likely to be quite high, particularly given the fact that the minority Alawite’s were ruling the Sunni majority in Syria. Finally, on 2nd of April, Turkish Prime Minister had noted that “Turkey was watching the
Syrian people’s reaction to Assad’s speech and actions” (Sabah, 2011e). Therefore highlighting that from very early on, Turkey was monitoring crisis indicators, yet it was at this stage still unaware of the potential refugee influx, as in the same article when asked whether there was a risk Turkey could be flooded by individuals fleeing the “unrest”, Erdogan responded with “I hope not, otherwise this will create difficulties for us” (Sabah, 2011e).

On the 7th of April Sabah had acquired details of scenarios prepared by heads of states regarding the Arab uprisings and noted that the evaluation of Syria did not include the anticipation of regime change (Sabah, 2011f). However, it is critical to note that this type of high-level meeting reflects a form of contingency planning based on the developments in the region. According to Sabah (2011f) some of the indicators that were to be addressed by Turkey were “the current condition of the leaders of each country, their strength and military support, distribution and participation of an uprising within a country, the need for evacuations and humanitarian aid”. Sabah also noted that an open line of communication had been established between various Turkish governmental entities, including the intelligence bureau since tensions started escalating (Sabah, 2011f). Subsequent articles reflected an escalation of tension, even after the removal of emergency law that was received as mere rhetoric by the opposition who noted “protests won’t stop until the demands are met or the regime is gone” (Sabah, 2011g).

Coverage between April 2011 and July 2011: Increased violence, mutiny, small arms and lack of good governance.

The coverage tone became even harsher from late April onwards. Articles noted increased death tolls, failed reform, risk of facing what other Arab leaders had faced, “do not want undemocratic implementation and certainly not an authoritarian, totalitarian, patronizing structure” (Sabah, 2011j) and most importantly that a “five item warning” was issued to Damascus from Ankara (Sabah, 2011h). The Turkish government had said that “excessive force” had been used by
security forces against protesters, and continued to call for reforms that were implemented, as well as the facilitation of community peace and to avoid violence (Sabah, 2011h). Likewise, another article emphasized that “citizens are rebelling against both a lack of freedom and opportunity, and security forces’ impunity and corruption that has enriched the elite while one-third of Syrians live below the poverty line” (Sabah, 2011i). Furthermore, the article noted that a joint statement by activists coordinating the demonstrations called for the abolition of the Baath Party power monopoly and the establishment of a democratic political system (Sabah, 2011i). Another article on the 29th of April also noted that there were signs of dissent within the Baath Party and signs of discontent in the army over the violent repression of protests, and was the first reference to Al Assad as an “autocrat” (Sabah, 2011k). Likewise, another article that “protesters taking up arms” would be a crucial turning point in the Syrian conflict (Sabah, 2011j). It was only when 250 individuals crossed over into Turkish borders on the 30th of April that the government felt a need “to assess the situation”, resulting in a high-level Syria summit that included the Turkish Ambassador to Syria (Sabah, 2011L). The article also noted the Red Crescent is setting up tents in the center of the Yayladağıdistrict to accommodate the Syrian nationals which have taken refuge in Turkey (Sabah, 2011L). Thus it seems as though while the Turkish government was aware of the crisis in Syria, and that there was a humanitarian catastrophe on the ground, it did not make use of the indicators it was monitoring in order to predict refugee flows into Turkey, given their response. Five weeks later, in June 2011, another article noted that at least 1,700 refugees were living in tents, as they fled the “autocratic rule” of Assad (Sabah, 2011m). The same article quoted a refugee who noted “people were not going to sit and be slaughtered like lambs” (Sabah, 2011m). Thus emphasizing the role a threat to personal security plays in instigating refugee flows. Likewise, the article also interviewed refugees who noted that they had extended family in Syria who were planning on coming to Turkey (Sabah, 2011m), which reflect the role of transnational networks in the choice of host state. Articles over the next couple of days reflected a surge in the numbers of refugees and that “well-armed "terrorist groups" burnt police buildings and killed members of the security forces” and that some
military officers had defected (Sabah, 2011n). Furthermore it was noted that fighting had erupted between loyalist and mutinous soldiers and that scores of civilians were killed in the crossfire (Sabah, 2011o).

_Hürriyet Daily News:

_Coverage between October 2010 and April 2011: History of politicide and complex ethno-political structures._

On the 29th of December 2010, an article regarding the developing trade relations between Turkey and Syria was published, yet it included a notable quotation. While discussing projects that could be executed in the Mardin Province (bordering with Syria) such as football matches between city teams, the Governor of Mardin, Hasan Duruer, noted that “We have Kurds, Arabs and Syriacs, and Syria has the same. There is no difference” (Hürriyet, 2010). While at first instance it may come across as an insignificant comment, it may note that sectarian differences between Syrians were apparent to the Governor of the bordering state. Subsequent articles included coverage of the first U.S. Ambassador to Syria since the 2005 dispute, which notes that Hezbollah is supported by Syria (Hürriyet, 2011) and another at the end of the month quoting Al-Assad who believed Syria was immune to the upheavals occurring in the region (Hürriyet, 2011a). Al-Assad said that he understood the needs of people, and that they were united against common cause, namely Israel, as well as the need for reforms in Egypt and Tunisia (Hürriyet, 2011a). Therefore, the coverage in _Hürriyet_ and _Sabah_ was almost identical until January 2011, despite Sabah’s increased reporting of economic relations and ties between Turkey and Syria.

Unlike Sabah however, on the 6th of February 2011, an article was published addressing Al-Assad’s ability to avoid the protests and unrest that had spread across Egypt, Tunisia and Libya (Hürriyet, 2011b). However, the article made reference to specific characteristics, as though alluding
to the fact that despite their presence, there is no uprising in Syria. Among these points were the following, the implications and observations are noted within parenthesis:

“He [Al-Assad] keeps a tight lid on popular dissent [lack of good governance and democratic rule]

Syria, a predominantly Sunni country ruled by minority Alawites [minority ruling majority causing popular dissatisfaction – this is one of the factors that could cause forced migration as a result of a complex ethno-political structure within the state as it can breed nepotism and cronyism] closely follows the media. Facebook and other social networking sites are officially banned, although many Syrians still manage to access them through proxy servers [the implication here is that there is a limitation to freedom of speech and access to information, ie. Limitations on human rights and government oppression. The fact that it was noted that many Syrians attempt to bypass the ban, reflects popular dissatisfaction with the policy]. Most of the Facebook groups that called for protests are believed to have been created by Syrians abroad - which could help explain why the planned protests fell flat” (Hürriyet, 2011b).

The same article also quoted Joshua Landis, an expert on Syria, as noting that “Syrians are wary of rocking the boat and have been traumatized by the sectarian violence in Iraq. "They understand the dangers of regime collapse in a religiously divided society" (Hürriyet, 2011b). Thus it is evident that the author was questioning how it is possible that a state with such characteristics managed to remain resilient in the face deep-seeded social divides, oppression and a lack of good governance.

An article on the 20th of March 2011 covered the government crackdown on protesters in Daraa, as Sabah did, however in this instance, the article noted that arbitrary arrests across the country, as well as that “the violence was the worst since 2004 when clashes that began in the northeastern city of Qamishli between Syrian Kurds and security forces left at least 25 people dead and some 100 injured” (Hürriyet, 2011c). The comparison to government oppression of the Kurdish minority reflects that the confrontations are also an ethno-political struggle against oppression. Subsequent coverage over the month of March was en par with Sabah’s coverage, noting that there
were tensions between the government and the people and that the Turkish government was anxious regarding the situation (Hürriyet, 2011d), while another noted the U.N’s concern regarding the “excessive use of force” by Syrian authorities (Hürriyet, 2011e). The same article noted a “clear violation of international law”, that “perpetrators could be prosecuted, and that individuals have a “legitimate right” to express “grievances and demands to their government”, as well as the need for the Syrian government to “government to enter into a broad, meaningful dialogue with the protesters in an attempt to address those grievances” (Hürriyet, 2011e). Another interesting article that emerged, titled “Today Libya, tomorrow Syria” (Hürriyet, 2011f) (note the interesting comparison to a state that exercised state-sponsored terrorism towards civilians), was one questioning whether the international community would be willing to apply the Responsibility to protect if the Syrian government carried mass attacks on dissidents similar to those that occurred in 1982 (Hürriyet, 2011f). Once again, there was emphasis on the centralized power of the government, “serious” armed forces and an intolerance of dissent in Syria (Hürriyet, 2011f) once again reemphasizing that it seems as though mass humanitarian casualties are highly likely. Subsequent coverage in March noted the Turkish government’s support of government reforms (Hürriyet, 2011g), while subsequent articles noted more military deployments, and more Syrians calling for more protests against oppression, greater freedoms and transparency (Hürriyet, 2011h). Another notable article highlighted that business people in Southern Turkey had expressed concerns over Syria riots, emphasizing that the “fire in the neighbor will hit Turkey with its smoke...[An emerging markets economist also highlighted that] Syria's patchwork of ethnic divides and Shiite [Alawite]-Sunni schism would risk more of a Lebanon-style prolonged civil war [or] proxy war with an uncertain outcome” (Hürriyet, 2011i). Once again, the ethno-political structures in Syria were emphasized as a key trigger factor, or in this case a red flag for a potential outbreak of violence or prolonged violence in Syria, which may result in mass humanitarian exoduses. The remaining articles also followed the same lines as Sabah covering Ankara’s encouragement of Syria to take up reforms and reiterating support, condemnation of violence, the reforms that in fact took place such as the lifting of emergency law.
However on the 3rd of April 2011 it was noted that communications were down in Syria (Hürriyet, 2011j). What is only evident from analyzing Hürriyet’s coverage is that more opinion pieces and articles clearly made reference to ethno-political divides and the likelihood of sectarian violence breaking out in Syria, the presence of armed elements, yet more emphasis remained on the skepticism on the streets of the changes the government applied (see coverage on the 3/04/2011-24/04/2011). On the 25th of April it was noted that the escalating violence could trigger a “flood of refugees” (Hürriyet, 2011k), which was not covered in detail by Sabah on the same date. Likewise, the article noted that the Turkish government had prepared for all possible scenarios, yet concern remained on the borders, and it noted that Turkish officials dismissed comparisons between Syria and Libya (Hürriyet, 2011k). The general tone of coverage remained consistent, airing various opinions and covering events as Sabah did until June 2011, apart from a small number of notable articles.

**Coverage between May and June 2011: Turkish Preparation for mass flows, small arms and increased violence.**

May and June represented high coverage of Syrian Refugees, with the start of May reflecting the Turkish government’s responses to the warning signs emerging from Syria from March. On the 1st of May 2011 an article was published discussing the Turkish government’s “Plan A” and “Plan B” in order to deal with the Syrian refugee crisis (Hürriyet, 2011n). It was noted that:

“If the scale of Syrian asylum seekers remains small…. there will be little problem with allowing them to cross the border and receive humanitarian aid….But if the flow turns into an influx similar to what the country faced in the early 1990s during the first Gulf War, they said, a more substantial project, described as “Plan B” could be implemented” (Hürriyet, 2011n).

The article also noted the geographical limitations Turkey has applied to the 1967 Protocol (refer to the chapter on Turkey and the Syrian refugee crisis), as well as the fact that Turkey would consider them “asylum seekers and [would] meet their basic needs before they are accepted into a third
country [ie. Resettled]” (Hürriyet, 2011n). On the 4th of May it was noted that Turkish President had said that “no countries like to accept refugees from other countries” and that it was a “challenging” issue and not “joke” while commenting on developments in Syria” (Hürriyet, 2011m). This is important as it highlights that the Turkish government, despite preparing for the worst, and monitoring red flags, did not want to accept Syrian refugees to some extent. Yet the fact that the political will or this statement was the only statement against reports of the Turkish government’s open-border policy towards refugees in subsequently months highlights that greater political interests trumped the begrudging attitude towards accepting refugees.

Other articles regarding Syrian refugees were published on the 19th of May, 9th of June (two articles), 10th to the 15th, 19th and 28th of June 2011 respectively. The articles noted the number of Syrians on the 19th of May as 500 individuals who came in on the 29th of April bearing a Turkish flag (Hürriyet, 2011t), 8th of June as 420 refugees according to government officials, with 169 entering Turkey overnight following an attack on a border town, the assumption is that in this instance the reference was made to those who acquired status (Hürriyet, 2011s). On the 9th of June as being “over 2000” Syrians (Hürriyet, 2011q), and “numbers of refugees exceeding 5000” on the 12th of June, with Hürriyet that it learned that an additional 6000 were waiting at the border (Hürriyet, 2011u). The next day, it was noted that 7,000 Syrians have now fled to Hatay, Turkey, while another 15,000 mass near the border (Hürriyet, 2011v), the next day, the 14th of June, it was noted that 8,538 Syrians were on Turkish soil (Hürriyet, 2011w), on the 19th of June, the reported number “refugees” was over 10,000 (Hürriyet, 2011x). As a result, it is clear that the spike in violence, and proliferation of small arms coincided with the incidence of mass humanitarian exoduses. As the graph below highlights, the events that occurred in border towns between the 8th and 19th of June 2011 caused a spike in the number of Syrian fleeing to Turkey. According to media reports, the majority came form border towns, and therefore proximity also played a crucial role in refugee flight in this instance and choice of Turkey. The data below was complied using numbers quoted by Hürriyet between March
According to later reports, increased Syrian army activity along the border caused more refugees to flood into Turkey (Hürriyet, 2011y), yet the steady increase, an average of around 1000 individuals per day between the 8th and the 19th of June is also quite interesting. Similarly, the spikes that occurred in March, April and June 2012 were also related to attacks on bordering towns and villages according to Hürriyet.

An opinion piece published on the 26th of June was dedicated to the Syrian government’s regulation and control of the media, and attempts at banning foreign journalists from entering Syria and controlling the narrative emerging from protesters (Hürriyet, 2011l). Generally, numerous opinion pieces were published in June, all of which were more daring than the coverage by Sabah and highlighted critical points that could lead to mass exoduses such as the ethno-political structure noted above on several occasions, the centralization of power, arbitrary arrests and persecution, the proliferation of small arms, the security state, rejection of proposed government solutions and amnesty and the crack-down on dissidents (refer to coverage from 1 June 2011-30 June 2011, particularly opinion pieces by various authors both Turkish and foreigners). For example on 30th of May 2011 it was noted that for the first time since the start of the revolt, residents armed with
automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenades resisted against a shelling that had taken place by the army in central town (Hürriyet, 2011o). While the same article noted that it was not clear how widespread armed resistance was in the country, it noted that the government has accounted for over 150 policemen and soldiers dead (Hürriyet, 2011o). Other articles discussed the influx of Syrian refugees noted that activists cited mutiny by troops who refused a crackdown on protesters, who also joined refugees in crossing over to Turkey (Hürriyet, 2011p; Hürriyet, 2011r). Furthermore, the article noted attacks on dissidents and quoted a refugee claimed that the government was burning fields and attacking homes (Hürriyet, 2011p). These points, when coupled with earlier indicators, and a general rise in the number of protesters, defections, increased oppression and the complex ethno-political structure of Syria, all point towards the occurrence of a mass exodus, which did indeed occur in June. Yet it was also noted that some refugees camped on the countryside near the Turkish border, keeping flight to Turkey as a last resort should the army encroach upon them (Hürriyet, 2011u), thus highlighting that the threat to personal security plays a crucial role in the determination of when individuals decide to flee.

Media Coverage: Case 2. Egypt and Syria:

As was the case with Turkish coverage, this portion shall analyze media coverage of both a government newspaper and an independent publication in order gauge the presence of the indicators noted above that result in mass exoduses as per earlier studies. Therefore, the methodology for this portion of the research is content analysis by searching for “Syria” within headlines between 1 October 2010 and 1 July 2011 as this is the period prior to the occurrence of mass exoduses and continuous high flows of refugees. The presence or reference to Syrian refugees in Egypt only started in late 2012, much later than the date of this analysis, this is most likely due to the change in visa requirements and the increase in numbers of registered refugees. The reasons behind this are discussed in more detail within the chapter titled “Egypt and the Syrian Refugee Crisis”.

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Daily News Egypt:

Coverage Between October 2010 and April 2011: Politicide, proliferation of small arms and ethnic divisions

Daily News Egypt (DNE) is an independent private newspaper. A total of eighty-six records were recorded when Syria was searched on the DNE website. The newspaper only reported on Syria within the context of Middle East peace, the Hariri case in Lebanon, growing relations with Turkey and Iran, along attempts at securing World Bank Financing and a new US envoy to Syria between October and the end of December 2010 (Daily News Egypt, 2010; Daily News Egypt, 2010a; Daily News Egypt, 2010b; Daily News Egypt, 2010c; Daily News Egypt, 2010d; Daily News Egypt, 2010e; Daily News Egypt, 2010f). Likewise coverage in January was dedicated to analyzing the importance of the presence of a US envoy to Syria, as well as tactics to manage Syria’s support of Hezbollah and its relationship with Iran within a broader regional context (Abdel-Kader, 2011; Allaf, 2011; Bremmer, 2011; Daily News Egypt, 2011).

In February 2011 the only notable article was regarding water insecurity in the region that highlighted tensions between Syria and Turkey (Ahmed, 2011). It was only on the 8th of March 2011 did a commentary by Haykel (2011) regarding changes in the Arab world note that Syria is divided by sectarianism, which in the absence of strong national institutions would mean that any changes could result in significant bloodshed (Haykel, 2011). This point was brought up once again in April in an article that noted, “societies already split on ethnic or sectarian lines are unlikely to foster democracy. In countries such as… Syria and Yemen, the future may be greater fragmentation much as in Lebanon and Iraq” (Daily News Egypt, 2011j).

From the 18th of March onwards coverage regarding the protests against the Syrian government developed. The most common themes were the rights organisations’ condemnation of arbitrary detention, increasing death tolls and excessive force  (Daily News Egypt, 2011a; Daily
News Egypt, 2011d; Daily News Egypt, 2011e; Daily News Egypt, 2011g), noting that Syrians were publically protesting against “one of the most repressive governments in the region” (Daily News Egypt, 2011a). Similarly, it was noted that the Sunnis resent the power and wealth of the Alawite elite, and that Syria is at the heart of complex web of conflict of the Middle East due to the government’s relations with its neighbours (Daily News Egypt, 2011f). These points both highlight the complexity of the situation in Syria and the likelihood of mass violence by the elite towards other groups, as well as the international element of the conflict, subsequently compounding chances of increased violence in Syria, resulting in heightened prospects for forced migration. Furthermore, the exchange of gunfire between protesters and the government on the 23rd of March 2011 in Daraa (Daily News Egypt, 2011c) emphasize that the population has gained access to weapons, thus increasing the proliferation of small arms amidst the community, subsequently decreasing personal security. This was confirmed in late May 2011 when the “first credible reports of serious resistance by residents taking up arms” were reported (Daily News Egypt, 2011q).

Likewise, security forces beat an AFP videographer and photographer and had their equipment confiscated (Daily News Egypt, 2011b) which highlights attempts at limiting press coverage and media freedom. This is also evident in reports that Syria banned nearly all foreign media and restricted access to trouble spots since the beginning of the uprisings (Daily News Egypt, 2011n) and that Al Jazeera suspended its Arabic service in April (Daily News Egypt, 2011o).

Coverage between April 2011 and June 2011: Growing resistance, increasing opposition and first note of Syrians in Egypt.

In April articles continued to cover the protests with an emphasis on protesters’ resistance to government attempts at stifling the “unprecedented domestic crisis” (Daily News Egypt, 2011i) as well as accusations that protests and violence were all as a result of a foreign plot and interference (Daily News Egypt, 2011h). Articles also noted concessions made by the government in attempts to curb protests, yet it was noted that, as with other Egyptian and Turkish publications, Syrians were
skeptical about the actual effectiveness of such changes (Daily News Egypt, 2011k).

On the 26th of April it was noted that 400 Syrians protested in front of the Syrian Embassy in Egypt (Daily News Egypt, 2011l), this also marked the first article noting the number of Syrians in Egypt. It is however important to remain cognizant of the fact that the article did not state their legal status in Egypt, in other words, whether or not these Syrians were forced or economic migrants is unclear. Likewise, towards the end of April condemnation by international governments of the situation in Syria became more audacious as the death toll and violence increased (Daily News Egypt, 2011m). Not to mention that domestically, 200 members of the Baath party quit in protest of the government crackdown (Daily News Egypt, 2011n). By May, the death toll had reached 560, and International Crisis group had said that Syria had reached a point of no return (Daily News Egypt, 2011p). The remaining 30 articles in May and continued to report violence, death tolls and international condemnation.

In June however, there were the first reports of 88 Syrians arriving in Hatay, Turkey (Daily News Egypt, 2011r). The arrival of Syrian refugees in Turkey was also reported in subsequent days (Daily News Egypt, 2011s, Daily News Egypt, 2011t), as well as the role that major world powers played in blocking proposed sanctions and U.N. resolutions against Syria (Daily News Egypt, 2011t). It is important to bear in mind that throughout June and July there were no reports of Syrian refugees in Egypt, as all the focus was on forced migrants heading towards Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. The prospects of Syrian “refugees” or individuals fleeing persecution reaching Egypt’s shores were not even mentioned in passing, despite coverage of over 1500 refugees crossing over to Turkey in one day on the 24th of June 2011 (Daily News Egypt, 2011u). Likewise, searching for “Syrian refugees in Egypt” between 1 October 2010 to 1 July 2011 returned no search results on Daily News Egypt. It was only in October 2012 that Daily News Egypt covered the presence of over 40,000 Syrian refugees in Egypt (Daily News Egypt, 2012). Coverage otherwise remained unchanged compared to earlier months.
**Al Ahram Weekly.**

Coverage between October 2010-April 2011: Lack of good governance, ethnic makeup and state brutality:

Al Ahram is a national weekly pro-government English language publication. A total of fifty-eight articles were analysed after a manual search for “Syria” within the publication’s microfiche. It is important to note that most of the articles published by Al-Ahram were by the same reporters, presumably because they were the resident correspondents in Syria and Lebanon. Similarly the Syrians in Egypt were only noted once between October 2010 till July 2011. The first mention of the Syrian government and the situation in Syrian in Al Ahram Weekly was on the 14th to 20th of October 2010 issue. The article outlined attacks on Syrian government websites by hackers who left messages highlighting the weakness of government websites, as well as protesting prices of services (Oudat, 2010). Remaining articles for the rest of October, November and the first two weeks of December addressed Syria within the context of the instability in Lebanon, indictments for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Al-Hariri and the United Nations Special Tribunal in Lebanon, as well as Syria’s role in Lebanese politics (Hamzawy, 2010; Fielder, 2010; Hadad, 2010; Fielder, 2010(a); Usher, 2010; Oudat, 2010(a); Oudat, 2010(b); Oudat, 2010(c)). It is important that an article issued in the 16-22 December 2010 edition noted that Syrians had low expectations regarding changes to the conventions that political pluralism and increased democracy, decreased corruption would be applied in Syria, unless the leadership is sincere in their application (Oudat, 2010(d)). This arguably alludes to the lack of good governance and the strength of the Syrian government in controlling the population.

In January an article noted the U.S government’s concern regarding Syria supporting radical movements in Iraq and Palestine, as well as other aspirations in the region (Oudat, 2011). The following week Syria was once again referred to within the context of the fall of the Lebanese
government and its future relations and impact both regionally and internationally (Oudat, 2011a). Yet in the 10-16 February issue, an article was released that discussed the failed protests against the Syrian regime—which were not successful due to a history of state brutality, and the demands of the Syrians (Oudat, 2011b). This article noted threats to international broadcasters, poverty and the spread of members of the security forces in plain clothes in order to disperse any protests (Oudat, 2011b), thus reflecting a high degree of political terror imposed on the population systematically. Likewise, an article titled *Serious Syrians* highlighted poverty, the rift between the security forces and the population, corruption and despotism (Oudat, 2011c), which also underlines the tension between the population and the government. Furthermore, Oudat (2011q) noted economic troubles were increasing which would result in an economic crisis as government spending increased and foreign investments decreased along with foreign currency reserves.

**Coverage between April 2011 and June 2011: Internationalisation of the conflict, increased politicide and brutality, as well as armed opposition.**

Subsequent articles covered the protests in detail and highlighted the use of force by security forces to disperse protests including the use of live ammunition, demands for the decreasing censorship laws and an end to emergency and military tribunals (Oudat, 2011c). Subsequent articles highlighted growing tensions in the region and reactions of neighbouring states to the unrest in Syria (Fielder, 2011; Ezzat, 2011; Al-Naami, 2011; Oudat, 2011f). It was only in the 7-13 April 2011 issue that Oudat (2011e) noted “for now it is a standoff between a determined opposition and a president who’s not willing to be seen as weak. Some would call it a brinkmanship. Others would call it a recipe for disaster” (Oudat, 2011e). When noting the spike in refugee flows in Turkey a week later, it is safe to assume that Oudat’s prediction was accurate, yet the flow of refugees into Egypt was not reported. This may be due to a number of factors including the fact that many Syrians had sought refuge in Egypt without visas during the Morsi regime, and were therefore not regarded as refugees per se. It was after the fall of the Morsi regime and the introduction of new visa requirements and
decreased access to public facilities that increasing numbers of Syrians registered with the UNHCR as asylum seekers, that was subsequently reflected in official statistics. The next two editions during the second half of April noted changes in cabinet by the President Al-Assad, as well as increasing numbers of deaths at the hands of security forces (Oudat, 2011g). What is interesting is that the term “massacre” was used for the first time in the 28 April-4 May 2011 (Oudat, 2011h).

Another article released in the same issue noted that at least one thousand Syrians living in Cairo protested in front of the Syrian embassy in Cairo (Dawoud, 2011). The same issue noted the complexity of the situation in Syria as a result of the stateless status of thousands of Kurdish Syrians and the “contending religious and ethnic groups” in addition to its troubled relations with its neighbours; Lebanon and Israel (Al-Ahram Weekly, 2011). This reflects the increased likelihood of refugee flight due to the complex societal makeup, and the potential for the internationalization of the domestic conflict due to the various external stakeholders who would be impacted by regime change or continuation in Syria. This was also evident in another article that noted the interests of both Turkey and Iran as regional powers in the Syrian crisis (Al Ahram Weekly, 2011a). In addition to Russia increasing its weapons trade to the Syrian regime, which an author referred to as “the last castle Russia has in the Middle East” (Nassar, 2011). Therefore, the connection between the situation in Syria, the numerous factions, and their links to other conflicts in the region (Al Ahram Weekly, 2011a), whether superpowers or regional, increase the likelihood of widespread violence, thus resulting in increased forced migration.

The threats to human life were reported throughout May and June with reports on the increasing death toll, the government’s blockage of a humanitarian mission, failure of dialogue and a decrease of Syria’s appeal as an investment hub (Oudat, 2011i; Oudat, 2011j; Oudat, 2011k; Oudat, 2011l; Oudat, 2011M, Jenkins, 2011; Oudat, 2011N, Oudat, 2011o; Abdel-Razek, 2011; Usher, 2011). The systematic violation of human rights, along with reports of mutiny within the Syrian
army (Usher, 2011), when coupled with signs of “a limited armed insurgency”, political vacuum in western border and a flow of weapons into Syria from Lebanon (Fidler 2011a) only highlight the complexity of the humanitarian situation on the ground, particularly with regards to the proliferation of small arms and their impact on personal security. Another key point to remain cognizant of is the failure of dialogue, as even in the face of reforms, the opposition highlighted that the bureaucracies and committees dealing with the implementation of reforms would only understand the situation from the perspective of the government (Oudat, 2011q). Likewise, the opposition noted that protests and uprisings will continue until “root level changes occur” (Oudat, 2011q). Thus highlighting the rift between the government and the population, furthermore the mutiny, and loss of control of specific regions are indicators of a potential state failure.
IX. THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN TURKEY

According to the most recent statistics from the UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, there are currently 2,301,641 registered Syrian refugees across Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt, and around 52,806 more persons of concern awaiting registration (UNHCR, 2013b). The funding requirement for such a massive exodus, and the continuous flow of over 2000 refugees out of Syria daily, required financial requirements of the January to December 2013 Regional Response Plan’s Turkey chapter will amount to US$ 372,390,514 until December 2013 (UNHCR, 2013c:212). This was based on the assumption that Syrian refugees in Turkey alone may reach 1,000,000, with 300,000 in camps and 700,000 outside camps by the end of 2013, according to current arrival trends and UNHCR consultations with the Turkish government (UNHCR, 2013c:21). The high spillover, when coupled with an excruciatingly high budgetary requirement for the management of the complete situation provides a slight indicator as to the financial impact of forced migration flows on host countries, particularly when bearing in mind that those that shall be scrutinized are both developing countries, albeit at different stages of development.

The number of Syrian refugees living in Turkish camps increased from close to 149,000 at the end of December 2012 to 194,000 by mid-May 2013, of whom 75 % were women and children (UNHCR, 2013c:212). According to the most recent statistics on the Syrian Regional Refugee Response Interagency Information Sharing Portal, as 6 January 2014, there were 559,994 persons of concern, all of whom were registered with the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2013b). Understandably, women and children are often in need of more facilities and services such as healthcare and education, all of which add substantially to the budget of protecting Syrian refugees. This increase resulted in the construction of four new campsites this year alone (UNHCR, 2013c:212). In addition to this camp population, over 210,000 Syrians are estimated to reside in urban locations throughout Turkey, 123,000 of whom were registered by authorities (UNHCR, 2013c:212), all of which would strain
government infrastructure and national resources. Consequently a number of crucial areas of support for the Turkish government such as technical support for protection, provision and prepositioning of relief items such as shelter, basic household items, health and hygiene kits, education material and food vouchers, via other international actors were established in order to manage the ongoing refugee influx (UNHCR, 2013c:212).

The humanitarian-planning meeting in Beirut on 21 March 2013 was a launch pad for a vision of inter-agency contingency plans for inside and outside Syria regarding the refugee crisis (UNHCR, 2013:11). The meeting considered three scenarios (“best case”, “most likely” and “worst case”). Based on the most likely scenario, the Regional Response Plan was prepared by the UNHCR and it estimated that the requirements within Turkey would amount to US$ 372,390,514 by December 2013 (UNHCR, 2013:11). In January 2014, this statistic has remained unchanged. The cost of receiving Syrian refugees, establishing and running an increasing number of camps is nearing the 1 billion USD mark (Kirişçi, 2013). It is important to bear in mind that Turkey has made an enormous financial contribution in direct assistance alone, independent of additional human resources costs (UNCHR, 2013:212). Despite being a party to the 1951 Refugee convention and the 1967 Protocol and maintaining a “geographical limitation” under Article 1(B) of the convention whereby it is not obligated to apply the Convention to refugees from outside Europe (UNHCR, 2013g), Turkey has taken a number of steps under the Temporary protection regime in order to safeguard Syrian Refugees. In October 2011 six months after the outbreak of the crisis, Turkey extended protection to Syrian refugees arriving under mass influx circumstances, based on the European Union’s directive from July 2001 (Kirişçi, 2013). While the IRIN has referred to refugee camps in Turkey as “among the best the world has ever seen” (IRIN, 2013), strain on the existing resources, as well the quality of services provided is likely to deteriorate in the face of budgetary difficulties, and wavering support from the international community.
That said, it is important to remain cognizant of the fact that the reason why the Turkish government has been so successful thus far in supporting the Syrian refugee crisis, is not only because of political will, but due to assessing the indicators relating to the Syrian crisis, and it’s preparation for mass outflows once it had assessed that the situation was becoming complex, particularly given their shared borders. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMoFA) issued a statement in April 2011 expressing that it was “deeply concerned” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) by the developments in Syria, two months later, in July 2011, TMoFA expressed further concern, and stated that it had “mobilized all resources at its disposal in order to keep close contact with the Syrian administration, to address the needs of our Syrian brothers and to provide its constructive contributions to the reform process in all means” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Similarly, a BBC Monitoring report noted that Hurriyet Daily reported that a Turkish Foreign Ministry official had state that Turkey had already taken measures considering all scenarios, including massive migration and other potential complications on the 26th of April 2011 (BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2011). By June 2011, the Turkish Red Crescent had was providing support for Syrian refugees at five refugee camps established in Hatay referred to Yayladağı 1, Yayladağı 2, Altınözü, Boynuyoğun and Reyhanlı (Turkish Red Crescent, 2011). It is important to note that the Primeministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency is responsible for coordinating all issues relating to Syrian refugees. Such a rapid development in the coordination of efforts between the Turkish government, the Turkish Red Crescent, UNHCR and other local and regional organisations. The question remains however, what is it that triggered such a rapid response from the Turkish government and Turkish NGOs? The effective mobilization that was commended by the international community must have been set up in the backdrop of some key indicators that served as red flags to the steady influx of forced migrants in Turkey, however, following interviews with Turkish officials, it was found that Turkey monitored the developments from early on, and did not have an actual early warning system in place. Turkey’s geostrategic location as a bordering state with Syria arguably impacted the involvement and hastened
response on the part of the Turkish government due to clear national security concerns resulting from unease at the borders. Therefore, while Turkey monitored developments on the ground in order to gauge the number of refugees that may be arriving at its frontiers after the outbreak of the conflict, there were indicators that highlight that the Turkish government had an early warning system in place prior to mass outflows. This is highlighted in more details in the portion discussing Ambassador Sufi Atan’s analysis and description of Turkish responses of the Syrian refugee crisis at a later stage in this thesis. The next portion analyses the Turkish government’s analysis and their political interests in the Syrian conflict.

**TURKISH ANALYSIS & POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT**

Among the manifestations of what drives the political will to respond to a forced migration crisis is conflict analysis. As noted above, the typology applied to a conflict, when coupled with political interests in a conflict will often drive the speed of response, and therefore the presence and utilization of early warning systems. The Syrian refugee crisis arguably resulted in the Turkish government resorting to an impromptu redefinition of its policy towards both refugees and its foreign policy (Krajeski, 2012: 60). Historically, Turkey has had a checkered history with Middle Eastern states, particularly Syria; consequently their policy has always been largely unstable\(^1\) (Demirtaş: 2013:112). A key factor in Turkish-Syrian relations has been the relationship between PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party) and the fact that they received logistical and military support from some of Turkey’s neighbouring countries was therefore often used a trump card in any issues with Ankara, resulting in the securitization of Turkey’s Middle East policy in the 1980s and 1990s (Demirtaş: 2013:113). For example, Syria often made use of the PKK card against Turkey with whom it experienced tensions over the Tigris and Euphrates waters, as well as the sovereignty of the province of Hatay (Demirtaş: 2013:112).

The 1990s saw the feud between Ankara and Damascus subside, after the Turkish government employed coercive tactics in order to expel the leader of the PKK from Syria, and compel the Syrian government to cease its support of the organisation in 1998 (Krajeski, 2012: 61; Demirtaş: 2013:113). Subsequently attempts to rekindle relations between Ankara and Damascus, the Turkish government embarked on a policy aimed at heightened economic cooperation, which would decrease the security threat posed by Syria and also maximize opportunities of acting as facilitators during conflicts in the region, thus aiding in the Turkish government’s relationships with domestic Islamist groups (Demirtaş: 2013:115). In 2009, the visa requirements were lifted between the two states, and regular cabinet meetings were organized (Demirtaş: 2013:115). These points are crucial to bear in mind when addressing Turkey’s reactions to the start of the Syrian crisis.

It is evident that from the onset, Turkey observed this conflict as one between the government and an insurgent group within Syria, yet the complexity of the situation remains a grave concern. Ambassador Suphi Atan (2013), the Turkish Consul General to Almaty, has aptly summarized the situation as follows:

“During the first period the [Turkish] government tried to convince the Assad regime to make reforms and to stop conflicts in Syria, but unfortunately all our attempts failed for 6 months we did our best and after that we cannot support the government that is attacking and massacring their people dropping the bombs from planes and attacking by scud missiles…It is a struggle for democracy. For that reason those struggling people are being oppressed and massacred by dictatorial regime… We see the rebellion against a dictatorial regime in Syrian to reach a democratic and plural society. We don’t know what is going to happen after Syrian regime, because there are some Al Qaeda fighters who aren’t fighting for democracies, but what made the situation deteriorate and what made Al Qaeda mad the situation worse, is not the moderate Syrian people…it is because of civilians suffering too much and couldn’t get help from outside and now they are in urgent need of defending themselves against a dictatorial regime and they are forced to defend themselves and they see that the Al Qaeda elements are fighting against the regime so they seem to be on their side…But if you are attacked and you are
being tried to killed and if a person comes and defends you cannot ask him which kind of person he is if he is nationalist or extremist, you try to save your life and you are going to be thankful to those people who try to defend you”

Once the protests started to increase, Turkish leaders attempted to convince the Assad regime to carry out political reforms that would result in a more inclusive and ultimately democratic government (Cebeci & Üstun, 2012:15). Turkey had offered to support the Assad regime in political reforms, and had predicted that he had ample time to adopt reform, hold elections and potentially emerge as an adopted leader (Cebeci & Üstun, 2012:16). Furthermore, the Turkish government had advised Assad in the “bluntest of terms that he would lead the country into chaos if he failed to implement meaningful changes” (Cebeci & Üstun, 2012: 16).

However, once Assad dismissed the Turkish government’s advice and continued to “combat terrorism”, Ankara in turn, took a harsher stance towards the Syrian regime three months after the start of the demonstrations (Demirtaş: 2013:116). From June 2011 Turkey became a voluble supporter of Syrian opposition groups from the Syrian National Council, currently called the National coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, who formed the Free Syria army which was an armed insurgency aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime (Demirtaş: 2013:117). An example of Turkey’s changed stance was it openly hosting the Syrian opposition in August 2011 (Cebeci & Üstun, 2012:15). Media reports have claimed that the Turkish government has not only been providing political and economic aid to opposition fighters, but also military aid and training (Demirtaş: 2013:117). Furthermore, an unnamed Turkish “senior diplomat” who informed a Turkish paper that the “The situation here is not like the one in Libya. No one can do anything on Syria without Turkey…. I don’t think that military action against Syria is likely, but the process might lead to an embargo, isolation and a Saddam-like situation for Assad” (Bishku, 2012:49). By October 2011, Turkey had imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria (Bishku, 2012:50). Therefore, Turkey was clearly directly involved with the Syrian crisis from the onset, particularly when bearing in mind the
violent confrontations between Syrian security forces and opposition groups lead to the deaths of Turkish civilians along the border region (Demirtaş: 2013:117). Likewise, the spill over of conflict to Turkey’s borders resulted in Turkish requests for Patriot defense missiles from NATO member countries (Demirtaş: 2013:117). For example, the Syrians fired at refugees crossing into Turkey just days before the ceasefire agreement negotiated by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was to take effect on April 12, 2012 (Bishku, 2012:50). This caused Turkey to once again consider the possibility of establishing a buffer zone just over its border with Syria for humanitarian purposes (Bishku, 2012:50). Some authors also claim that the strain on state resources as a result of mass refugee influxes, and the refugees’ increasing conflict with the authorities and local populations of their host nations is causing Turkey, which had initially supported the rebellion as noted above, to re-evaluate its strategic interests in the conflict (al-Gharbi, 2013:58).

Turkey’s interests as a regional power, a potential member of the European Union, in addition to its positioning as a model for the transforming governments of the so called Arab Spring, were arguably viewed through the lens of its reception of Syrian refugees (Krajeski, 2012: 60). Furthermore, Turkey’s implicit support of Syrian rebels, its solidarity with the Arab world and its attempts to mobilize that solidarity in order to gain authority in international politics all reflect Turkey’s interests in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis in such a manner (Krajeski, 2012: 60). A key policy spearheaded by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) aimed at improving relations with Iraq, Iran and Syria was the “zero problems with neighbours” (Krajeski, 2012:61). Another was dialogue with all actors, however, as is evident with the Syrian crisis, Turkey withdrew its Ambassador and all diplomatic staff from Syria (Demirtaş: 2013:117). Yet during the early stages of the Syrian uprising, it is was clear that there was a risk that the problems in neighbouring Syria could cross over to its borders (Krajeski, 2012: 61). At first, Turkey attempted to persuade the Syrian government to reassess its positions, and when this failed, they resorted to harsh criticisms of the government, and bargained on Bashar Al Assad’s ousting and subsequent strong ties with the new
The Turkish government therefore had to assess how to deal with Syria as an internally polarized state, given that serious economic interests in terms of trade and investment linkages had been built with such states especially as part of the pro-active foreign policy over the course of the last decade. The question was therefore whether Turkey should encourage reform by pressuring the ruling authoritarian elites, or support rising opposition movements which started to seriously challenge the existing regimes (Öniş, 2012: 46). It is once again important to emphasise that Al-Assad previously had friendly ties with the PKK that the Turkish government regards as a terrorist organisation. Öniş (2012:54) has aptly summarized Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria in the Table 2 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of consistency</th>
<th>Pronounced cycles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changing nature of response</td>
<td>Rather passive initially; encouraging the existing regime to reform the political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree of cooperation with external actors</td>
<td>Supporting opposition groups pointing towards incoherence; primarily unilateral approach; EU critical of Turkey for failing to take a tougher stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desire to play a leadership role</td>
<td>Direct influence with unexpected outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of influence</td>
<td>Recognition that pressure for reform through the Assad regime will work; confrontational attitude towards the regime and its human rights record; implementation of sanctions during the last stage</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Thus reflecting that to the Turkish government, the tensions in Syria were a not a civil war, but a form of politicide or government oppression. The comparison of Assad to Saddam is also interesting as it further reemphasizes Turkey views the events in Syria not as a civil or sectarian conflict, but an uprising against an authoritarian dictatorship through armed resistance. The imposition of sanctions as a political and coercive measure that impacts a government therefore highlights a responsibility to protect element, and throughout the Turkish government’s rhetoric this norm has been implicit in their criticisms of the Assad regime. This point, as well those mentioned above are crucial to bear in...
mind as it may have played a role in the fact that Turkey was monitoring the situation in Syria closely, as well as the political reasons surrounding the establishment of early warning systems.

Moreover, it is clear that the conflict in Syria would have a direct impact on Turkey, particularly as a neighbouring country. Turkey has a critical interest in a stable Syria to avoid the security risks that emanate from refugee influxes and possible PKK activism from within Syria. Much of Turkey’s trade with the Middle East had passed through Syria (Cebeci & Üstun, 2012:16). According to Cebeci & Üstun (2012:16) above all, Turkey wants to avoid a sectarian civil war that could create a “black hole” in the Middle East and seriously threaten to destabilize the region. While at first Turkey seemed to be concerned about a prolonged civil war morphing into a proxy war, its support of military intervention in Syria, as well as its support of Syrian opposition groups, coupled with external parties such as Russia and China supporting the Assad regime, reflect the complexity of the situation and views that the conflict is no longer merely internal and shall continue to impact Turkey as a state. Furthermore, the repercussions of a regime change in Syria would undoubtedly impact Turkey (Akkaya, 2012:235). A border state that is struggling to maintain control over its land could become breeding grounds for PKK activities, and also for various forms trafficking and smuggling including arms, drugs and other forms of organized crime, which could find their way into Turkey (Akkaya, 2012:235). Similarly, the presence of Al Qaeda elements in Syria is obviously of a grave concern to the Turkish government and their national security. Finally, if Turkey were to enter into a unilateral military conflict with the Syrian regime, this would undoubtedly impact its membership in the European Union (Akkaya, 2012:235).

As a result it is clear that Turkey’s analysis required a swift response to the Syrian conflict, and the subsequent Syrian refugee crisis due to the direct impact on Turkish national security. As a bordering state, with violence erupting on the borders, Turkey had a vested interest in monitoring the developments in neighbouring Syria. This was evident in the changing policy the Turkish
government adopted, that was highlighted earlier. In all instances, the Turkish government continued
to monitor the situation in Turkey from the first demonstrations and provided advice to the Syrian
government in order to avert a humanitarian crisis, as it was aware of the internal sectarian strife.
However, Turkey continued to approach the conflict in Syria as an insurgency movement against an
authoritarian regime, as was evident in Turkish statesman’s comparison of Assad to Saddam.
Likewise, Turkey’s direct involvement in supporting opposition groups also highlights its high
involvement in the conflict, as well as the fact that it is aware of the role of proxy forces in igniting
further strife within Syria. All of these points when coupled with Turkey’s attempts at attaining
membership in the European Union, emphasize why it responded in such a proactive and prepared
fashion to the influx of Syrian refugees. In terms of the actual indicators it monitored, from media
reports, it is thus far unclear exactly which indicators acting as warning signals triggering
preparations for mass exoduses. This is something that shall be clarified through interviews with
government officials and the UNHCR. It is important to note that the Turkish Red Crescent have
advised they are not allowed to comment on the matter, and advised the author of this thesis to
contact the Primeministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAT) as they are
handling the operation. When the relevant contact person at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
reached, it was noted that interviews with members of AFAT would be difficult, as they do not speak
English.

**INDICATORS OBSERVED BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT**

Ambassador Suphi Atan, the Turkish Consul General in Almaty, Kazakhstan, was
responsible for managing the Turkish government’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Between
2011-2013 he was the General Coordinator of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the region (Syrian
crisis). During the interview it was noted that a system exists within Turkey where security officials
are alerted by bordering areas if they witness any influx of refugees, they collaborate with UNHCR
in order to accept and bring in the forced migrants. As was noted earlier, the Turkish government has
a geographical limitation regarding which forced migrants it will accept, namely, only those from its
Western borders. According to Ambassador Atan, those who enter from the eastern frontiers would
fall under Turkey’s readmission agreements with its eastern neighbours. It is important to note that
these agreements mean that refugees entering from the east are returned to their countries of origin,
thus applying refoulement. However, Ambassador Atan noted that if the Turkish government is
convinced that the refugees may face capital punishment or death, they do not send them back to
their country of origin. As a result of the aforementioned framework, Syrians in Turkey are not
considered refugees, but “Syrians under temporary protection” as per Turkish law. As a result of this
status, Turkey has applied three conditions for their protection, namely, an open border policy,
providing security and protection for Syrians, allowing access to humanitarian assistance. The
Turkish government has, according to Mr. Atan spent 2 billion dollars for Syrians in Turkey, noting
that 100,000 live across 20 Camps, and 400,000 live in city centers.

With regards to preparedness, Ambassador Atan noted that when the Syrian crisis erupted,
they did not expect an influx to occur, and assumed it would follow a similar course to Egypt,
Tunisia and Libya, with the conflict ending within six months. However, while monitoring the
situation in Syria it was noted that the following, in no specific order, were seen as indicators of the
ongoing nature of the humanitarian crisis that would result in refugee flows:

1. The position of the opposition army who were unable to access weapons for a long time, and
   were ineffective at fighting.
2. Strength of the regime forces and their attacks on cities and provinces continuously for two
   and a half to three years.
3. Conflict among the opposition (Al Nusra and Al Qaeda, against the Free Syrian Army,
   among the Kurididsh ethnic groups and Al Qaeda) results in an increase in the likelihood of
   refugee flight.
4. Increase in violence.

5. As the situation protracts, and with the approach of winter, there is less likely to be access to basic infrastructures such as electricity, food, water and health, and therefore more people are likely to flee.

Furthermore, it was noted that with regards to early warning signals the government gathered information from people on the other side of the borders who would inform them if there is heavy fighting and that there is a possibility of a mass outflow, yet these are not intelligence officers. The government makes use of the Syrian Diaspora’s connections to relatives fighting in Syria who provide the government with information. He gave the Turkmans as an example who have relatives near areas with heavy fighting, which is resulting in some Turkman’s villages being emptied and evacuated. The indicators highlighted by Ambassador Atan are similar to those noted within the hypothesis of this thesis, particularly with regards to political terror, the proliferation of small arms, complexity of conflict and the lack of good governance. The presumed weakness of the opposition is directly related to Martineau’s indices regarding one-sided violence, however, as the situation in Syrian developed, and small arms proliferated, internal conflict between the opposition, as well as additional parties becoming involved which exacerbated the situation and caused further complexities that caused additional refugee flight. An additional factor that was not accounted for in any of the indicators noted above was the role of climate in caused forced migration. However, under all circumstances, it is clear that these indices could not be applied to all conflicts and they were unique to the development of the Syrian crisis. This was most evident when it was noted by Ambassador Atan that the initial projections by the Turkish government were that the situation would not protract as it has, and it would subside within six months as it did in Egypt and Libya.
However, once it became evident the crisis would continue as fighting increased, the government set up camps after the first group of Syrians arrived on the 29th of April 2011. Since then, the Turkish government’s Primeministry of Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAT) became active in liaising with governorates, sub-governorates and the Turkish Red Crescent, with a centralized decision making process taking place in Ankara. As a result, deadlines were established regarding the need to setup camps in specific cities, the whole process took approximately a month and a half until they were ready to accept refugees. Weekly meetings are conducted between governors managing camps, and NGOs in order to coordinate efforts and the needs of the camps populations. All relevant government agencies were involved in the planning including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Family and Social policies (for social workers and women), General Directorate of Security, Border Command, as well the relevant governorates and sub-governorates. Other organisations the government was cooperating with include OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, NGOS like Mercy Corps, International Medical Corps, Solidarity International, International Blue Crescent (Turkish organisation, in corporation with Catholic Relief services), Turkish Red Crescent and ACTED. Other NGOs are permitted to work with Syrians outside the camps. Following the Syrian crisis, Turkey established a new specialized structure or Directorate General responsible for immigration that is responsible for amending decrees regarding refugees and managing refugee affairs. It is important to bear in mind that this structure is a post-crisis reaction, as opposed to an early warning system. Whether or not the Directorate General shall expand its mandate to cover early warning is unclear.

The Turkish government provides different kinds of services for Syrians living inside camps, and those outside camps. Syrians living inside camps are provided with a wide array of assistance. The government provides each family with credit cards and an allowance of 60USD per person per month. The credit cards work inside camp facilities only. Individuals are tracked using an electronic
chip card, and are free to move when they please, however they must register their names and have their finger prints scanned prior to exit and re-entry for safety reasons. With regards to educational facilities they have access to primary, secondary, as well as opportunities for university-aged Syrians to attend Turkish universities if they register and specify their department of interest. Furthermore, health and social facilities, including those for women and children are also available. The government has hired social workers, psychologists and psychiatrists to support those living inside camps. Not to mention that inside camps Syrians are able to engage in small trading activities (for example, making their own small grocery stores or selling magazines).

Those outside camps on the other hand are registered, and provided with a card that “introduces” them, which Ambassador Atan emphasized is not an identity card. Furthermore, they are provided with access to Turkish health facilities and educational facilities that are established for Syrians, however, they must pay for rent and organize their own accommodation. He noted that Syrians are free to work on farms or establish small trading centers. However, it is important to note that competing with the local population would make it very difficult to have a stable income. They are not provided with living stipends, and are therefore at a disadvantage compared to those in camps. Likewise, there is still a large burden on Turkish hospitals, as 30,000 Syrians have access medication and treatment free of charge. Ambassador Atan has projected that by the end of 2013 the cost of hosting Syrian refugees in Turkey would exceed 2.5 billion dollars, with only 10% of these expenses being covered by the international community.

It is important to note that the government did not monitor indicators except after the first influx of refugees into Turkey’s borders, therefore emphasizing that while there were signs of a potential influx from before through monitoring media reports, these were largely disregarded, as projections expected the situation to develop like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, which was not the case. However, the indicators that the government monitored were en par with those noted in earlier
research. It is once again important to reiterate that the Turkish government was following the situation closely due to its proximity and vested interest in the conflict. Likewise, while there was early warning regarding the Syrian crisis, the international community has contributed a very small amount to the Turkish government’s financial requirements for hosting Syrians, thus the assumption that early warning would assist in securing financial aid is thus far flawed.
Egypt continues to be both a transit country, as well as a refugee receiving state. According to the latest Global Trends Report, Egypt is home to 126,949 persons of concern (UNHCR, 2012: 38). Likewise, the Interagency Information Portal on the Syrian Regional Refugee Response plan has indicated that as of 3 September 2013 there were 99,712 registered Syrian refugees, a total of 36,077 households and an additional 17,758 persons awaiting registration in Egypt (UNHCR, 2013). The Egyptian government estimates that the total number of Syrians in Egypt is 300,000 individuals as of 16 July 2013 (UNHCR, 2013). While the numbers of Syrian refugees in Egypt is significantly lower than those in Turkey, Egypt has presented minimal forward planning and subsequently early warning planning for influxes of forced migrants, despite Egypt’s historical ties with Syria.

In 2011, Egypt was also undergoing significant political shift from February 2011 following former President Hosni Mubarak’s ouster after mass protests. While the MoFA issued its first statements regarding the Syrian crisis in April 2011 the Egyptian government and the UNHCR were more focused on refugee flows from the neighbouring Libya starting from March 2011 as they attempted to evacuate Egyptians in Libya and to deal with the increasing number of refugees arriving at the Salloum border (Egypt State Information Services, 2011; UNHCR, 2011). In November 2011, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that Egypt has maintained a clear position regarding the events in Syria, claiming it was the first Arab state to issue statements regarding the events in Syria, calling on the cessation of violence (Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 2011a). The Minister emphasized the need for dialogue and confidence building measures and preventing any forms of foreign intervention (MFA, 2011a). Furthermore, he highlighted that the situation in Syria was not as a result of a specific group feeling marginalized, yet that it was military confrontations between two parties that have left a substantial mark that will reflect on the region as
a whole (MFA, 2011a). In February 2012, Egypt presented a draft resolution regarding the situation in Syria on behalf of an additional 72 states (MFA, 2012a). The draft resolution “strongly condemned the Syrian authorities’ continued widespread and systematic human rights violations against civilians and protestors. The resolution called the Syrian government as well “to immediately put an end to all human rights violations and assaults against civilians” (MFA, 2012a).

Unlike the Supreme Council of Armed Forces’ ambiguous stance from March 2011 onwards, upon the election of President Mohamed Morsi in June 2012, Egypt became more vocal in condemning the Syrian government, and emphasized an open door policy for Syrian refugees entering Egypt (S. Mousa & K. Fahim, 2013). The government lifted visa requirements and granted residence permits with full access to public services (UNHCR, 2013h), such as free health care and education (Fick, 2013), despite Egypt’s reservations to the 1951 convention. Egypt’s reservations to the convention covered articles 12(1) regarding personal status, 20 covering rationing, 22(1) concerning access to primary education, 23 regarding access to public relief and assistance and 24 concerning labor legislation and social security (UNHCR, 2011:7). The reservations to articles 20, 22, 23 and 24 were based on the fact that convention considered refugees as equal to nationals, while the reservation to article 12(1) was based on it contradicting internal laws (UNHCR, 2011:7). Egypt is also party to the 1967 protocol and the 1969 OAU convention. In this instance, it is important to note that most refugees in Egypt reside in urban settlements, and not camp settlements like their counterparts in Turkey. Furthermore, Syrian refugees were given more privileges, such as free apartments through Islamic charities, than long-term refugees from war zones in Somalia and Sudan, among other African countries who had resided in Egypt for decades (Fick, 2013). However, following the instatement of a military backed government in July 2013, Syrians were required for the first time in decades to obtain visas in order to enter Egypt (Fick, 2013) and security clearance issuance prior to their travel to Egypt from 8th July 2013 (UNHCR, 2013h). Likewise, the closure of the Syrian embassy also affected some Syrian refugees negatively, as it limited their access to
essential consular services such as the issuing of travel documents (Bradley, 2013). Additionally, a number of Syrian refugees who were believed to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood were assaulted and harassed (M. Fick, 2013). This resulted in an increased number of Syrian refugees registering with UNHCR for registration (UNHCR, 2013h), as was noted above, there is a stark difference between government estimates and the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR. Yet despite the open door policy under Morsi and government statements condemning violence, it seems that according to the research thus far, that Egypt did not have a clear early warning strategy towards Syria. This could be as a result of their preoccupation with internal strife, or the influx from the bordering Libya. It is important to note that the total appeal for funding requirements in the Egypt chapter is $66,705,984, only 22% of which has been received (UNHCR, 2013).

Similarly, Egypt has not adopted any domestic legislation to implement the 1951 Convention (UNHCR, 2013f). There are no national procedures for asylum in Egypt and the determination of individual requests for refugee status is conducted by the UNHCR – as it continues to carry out registration and refugee status determination processes (RSD) (UNHCR, 2013f). The UNHCR routinely works with the Refugee Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and relevant departments of the Ministry of Interior, including the Immigration Department (UNHCR, 2011: 140). It is however important to note that at the onset of the Syrian crisis, procedures for UNHCR refugees were not seen as necessary by Syrians in Egypt, as a result of the open door policy (S. Mousa & K.Fahim, 2013). Yet with the changed regulations requiring visas and security clearances for entry, as well as increased violence and hostility towards Syrians, an increasing number of Syrians are registering with the UNHCR or are attempting to leave Egypt to other states (S. Mousa & K.Fahim, 2013).

The aforementioned reservations and the lack of national procedure for refugees in Egypt,
coupled with the inconsistent policy towards Syrian refugees in particular, when, in addition to the lack of dedicated infrastructure and appropriate services for forced migrants in Egypt, highlights the need for contingency planning and early warning. If it were established in Egypt, there is a chance it may work to the benefit of both the host nation and refugees, as was the case in Turkey. This may have alleviated the burden on national resources in Egypt that were shared by the 300,000 Syrians who entered Egypt’s borders.

**EGYPTIAN ANALYSIS & POLITICAL INTERESTS IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT**

Unlike their Turkish counterparts, Egypt was and continues to witness significant domestic unrest and political upheaval. The domestic unrest, coupled with Syria’s lack of geographical proximity, and the unrest in bordering Libya has meant that Egypt’s interests and subsequent risks associated with the crisis in Syria were arguably less pressing than those of the Turkish government. As noted previously, the changes in regime in Egypt resulted in the altered policies previously noted towards Syrians, particularly new security restrictions implemented following former President Mohamed Morsi’s ouster (Africa Research Bulletin, 2013: 17947). Unlike their Turkish counterparts, the Syrian crisis has seen a high turnover of Egyptian Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

As with most Arab states, the Egyptian government remained quiet during the early months of the Syrian uprising, using only mild terms to address the violence. In November 2011, the Arab League had issued an ultimatum for the Syrian government to halt its “bloody repression” of civilians (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011: 19068). The article outlined that the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Amr made an official statement affirming Egypt’s total rejection of any foreign interference in Syrian affairs, under any pretext (Africa Research Bulletin, 2011: 19068). Likewise, during a lecture to the Korean National Diplomatic Academy on the 18th of December 2013, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that the conflict in Syria is first and foremost a
political conflict that involves various regional and international actors in the region (Fahmy, 2013). He asserted that the conflict was not a civil war, and that Egypt rejects the division of Syria based on sectarian bases as that result in negative repercussions in the region (Fahmy, 2013). Furthermore, he stressed that the Egyptian position regarding the crisis is the rejection of the use of armed violence, with a pressing need for a political solution that aims at dialogue between conflicting parties (Fahmy, 2013).

It is however important to note that with the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood government, and a general increase in terrorist activities in Egypt, the reemergence of Al Qaeda in Syria and elsewhere in the region ought to be of concern should jihadis return to Egypt in full force (Bowker, 2013:585). That said, analysis of the risks of the Syrian crisis on Egypt have been limited, as thus far, Syrian refugees have been dealt with domestically, with concerns the largest concerns being the impact of the Syrian urban refugee populations impact on rent and housing prices, competition in the labour markets and strain on infrastructures. The fact Syria is not a neighbouring country, border threats such as human trafficking and arms smuggling have not been addressed in detail, and with little to no analysis regarding the Egyptian and Syrian relations following the crisis.
INDICATORS OBSERVED BY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT:

According to Ambassador Salah El Wesaimy, the Assistant Minister for Refugee Affairs at the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 300,000 Syrians in Egypt have been allowed and provided with the same access to public facilities as Egyptians. Furthermore, given their presence in urban settlements they were integrated with Egyptian society, a process that he emphasizes is one of the UNHCR’s durable solutions. Likewise, Syrians are not required to register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, Ambassador El Wesaimi stressed that that Syrians are treated very well in Egypt and are “brothers”, and only a limited number have been deported due to security concerns.

He also noted that the four reservations Egypt applied to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol have been lifted, as it is within his capacity to do so. As such, Syrian refugees are entitled to employment (however they must apply for a work permit) and have access to public education. The Ambassador also stressed that Egypt faces economic limitations that limit its ability to retain mass influxes. Likewise, despite the coordination between the government and the UNHCR, budgetary constraints take the forefront, as even the UNHCR is limited by its access to funds.

With regards to the indicators monitored by the Egyptian government, it was noted that Embassies monitor the development of conflicts in the region, and, when necessary, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spearheads responses to such crises. He also noted that the establishment of a permanent institution that continuously monitors developments and the likelihood of forced migration influxes would not be cost effective, and that the state should deal with refugees on a case-by-case basis when the crisis occurs. Likewise, he noted that there are general guidelines that are followed; yet no specific protocol to deal with the arrival of forced migrants.
In terms of indicators that could reflect potential forced migration, into Ambassador El Wesaimi noted the following:

1. Domestic situation.
2. Famine
3. Internal displacement resulting in cross border forced migration
4. Internal armed conflicts.
5. General indicators monitored on a regional level by the African Union.

While it was not clearly stated, it was evident that the Refugee Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not monitoring the situation in Syria, and the potential influx of Syrian refugees, as it was under the mandate of a different department within the Ministry. Likewise, Ambassador Al Wasaimy was unable to provide data regarding how much the Egyptian government had spent thus far on Syrian forced migrants in Egypt, as he was awaiting responses from the relevant ministries. Once again, these indicators are similar to those noted by Ambassador Atan however there is an assumption that internal displacement automatically results in cross border migration, which is arguably simplistic.
Despite consistent responses that reaffirm that the presence of early warning would assist in the execution and fulfillment of mandates, as well as potentially aiding in budgetary strains, both the Turkish and Egyptian government prepared for the arrival of Syrian refugees after the first wave of refugees arrived on their shores. It seems the only difference in the quality of services available is related to the coordination of government with local and international NGOs, and their degree of autonomy in access to vulnerable populations. This may be attributed to the degree of cooperation and freedom of civil society to execute their mandates, which would in turn mean that there is an increased quality of services as a result of sharing expertise and facilitation. That is not to say that lack of cooperation and coordination between governments, NGOs and INGOs would result in lower quality services, as there have been instances where NGOs provide excellent services with minimal government coordination, however, government imposed restrictions, and permit issues and limitations to operations may be applied when there is not an adequate degree of cooperation. What is most consistent is that information gathering regarding potential flight for governments, INGOs and local NGOS is dependent on contacts within the country of origin, as opposed to an actual structure that monitors a predefined set of indicators across the board. In both Egypt and Turkey two additional NGOs either did not respond, or were not authorized to comment on the topic. In Egypt, Tadamon did not respond to any calls or emails and were therefore not interviewed. In Turkey, the Turkish Red Crescent advised that they were not authorized to comment on the topic and that the Turkish government should be approached for interviews. Therefore, only one NGO from each country is analysed. This portion highlights and analyses processes and indicators utilized by NGOs and the UNHCR for early warning in general, and with specific reference to the Syrian crisis.
CASE 1: EGYPT: Africa and Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA)

Background and Domestic Situation:

AMERA is a legal aid organization that assists in issues such as refugee status determination and prima face refugee recognition to name a few. The provide support for those aiming at resettlement, particularly those that face serious protection or health concerns in Egypt. AMERA is one of the UNHCR’s Regional Response Plan’s partners in dealing with the Syrian crisis and is therefore limited by budgetary constraints. Following a planning meeting, two scenarios were outlined regarding Syrian refugee flight into Egypt; most likely which involved up to 150,000 Syrians in Egypt by the end of 2013 and worst case which included registering 200,000 by the end of 2013. It is important to bear in mind that according to Mr. Hesham Issa, AMERA’s Country Director, in 2011 there was no reference to Syrians, they only considered planning for Syrians in October or November 2012, and only started providing services in January 2013.

AMERA noted that the domestic situation in Egypt made it very difficult for an effective decision making process, as most decision makers were reluctant to make conducive decisions. The high levels of bureaucracy and the multitude of governmental organisations and structures that deal with the same issue make humanitarian relief efforts much more complicated. The absence of a local legislation for refugees and the reservations Egypt applied, also further complicate the issue. It was also noted that disaster response in Egypt is very weak, particularly on a national level. Very few organisations have programs that have the capacity to respond to emergencies, the majority revolve around “stable conditions”. It was also highlighted that AMERA does not have a relationship with government agencies, and that there is a need for the presence of an organization that takes a leading role. While the UNHCR is meant to play the leading role in this instance, they only work with partner organisations, and their response was only in 2012, which is quite late. He noted that there is
a Disaster Response Unit under the Cabinet of Ministers, and that the Ministry of Social Solidarity also has a unit for emergency relief, yet they both lack the capacity and require training.

**Establishing early warning indicators:**

AMERA emphasized that it is extremely difficult to predict how events will unfold, particularly in times of armed conflict. He noted that AMERA do not study trends, yet they work with individual clients and the information they gain is from dealing with specific cases and input from their clients. He noted that given the fact that situation in Lebanon was precarious, and the conflict in Syria was escalating systematically, AMERA expected large numbers of Syrians to arrive in Egypt. However, the protection concerns and visa requirements after the 30th of June 2013 meant that there was no “mass” influx into Egypt. The start of the Syrian crisis he notes was in line with the arrival of the Muslim brotherhood government in Egypt, which meant that Syrians in Egypt received a lot of support from faith-based organisations. Prior to that, the UNHCR was still registering its existing caseload, with only 127,000 registered, out of what Mr. Issa projects are a total 250,000-300,000 Syrians in Egypt. Yet no concrete indicators were specified that AMERA monitors as they were largely dependent on input from their clients regarding the developments of the situation and monitoring media reports.

He emphasized that early warning would definitely assist in proper planning and in expanding and developing programs, which would impact the challenges they currently face. Early warning would also assist in budgets and funding, particularly within a regional response context, and the sort of intervention required by each party. The impact of regime change in Egypt played a key role in the government’s response to the Syrian crisis. Therefore, based on their political interests, and who the government was aligned with, they would provide assistance accordingly. In
short, in terms of monitoring indicators there are no specific indices monitored by AMERA, and the absence of an effective structure on a national level, resulted in a haphazard response to refugees.

CASE 2: TURKEY: IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH)

Background and Domestic Situation:

IHH is a Turkish NGO that aims at delivering “humanitarian aid to all people and to take necessary steps to prevent any violations against their basic rights and liberties” (IHH, 2013). IHH therefore provides humanitarian relief, advocacy of human rights and freedom. As noted earlier, Turkey applied a geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, yet it established a local legislation in order to provide an exception for Syrian refugees. According to Izzet Sahin, Board Member and Diplomacy Coordinator at IHH, Turkey is used as a transit state until refugees are accepted into a third country for resettlement by the UNHCR. IHH noted that at first there were difficulties with Turkish authorities as NGOs were not allowed to work in Turkey, yet in the end there was a collaborative environment which aimed at alleviating hurdles that impacted NGOs. IHH estimates there are a total of 600,000 Syrians in Turkey.

IHH classified the conflict in Syria as a civil war as he personally believed that the Nussari minority does not accept the rest of the population. Furthermore, he notes that different ethnicities are open to the internationalization of issues, as superpowers use minorities to further their own interests in the region. For example, he noted that Saudi Arabia stood with the Sunnis, Kurds standing with their own population, Hezboallah involved in the crisis and so forth. Sahin emphasized that the delivery of aid was difficult due to government bureaucracy on the Turkish side, and security on the Syrian side. Yet he believes that the Turkish government’s response to the Syrian crisis was appropriate as it established an open border policy from the beginning despite the geographical limitations. The services offered for Syrians included special status for work and
healthcare, camps, as well as other facilities that made services better compared to Jordan and Lebanon, as well as other states around the world. That said, it was emphasized that states do not respond to crises unless they have the political will and interests to do so.

**Establishing early warning indicators:**

He noted that it was very difficult to preempt refugee flows, as a lot of individuals do not identify with themselves as refugees. Yet he noted that reasons for flight are largely as a result of manmade disasters such as occupation or war, poverty, domestic crisis and economic reasons, or natural disasters. It was also noted that some organisations deal with refugees at the borders, which he believes constitutes dealing with refugees “prior to their arrival”. It was highlighted that IHH works in collaboration with local NGOs and publishes reports regarding the potential outbreak of crises. In that regards, he contends that early warning is effective for humanitarian diplomacy in order to make use of chances to pressure authorities to assist vulnerable populations and for public awareness.

It was however highlighted that every country has a unique situation, and while there may be some similarities, there are a large number of differences. The power of the Syrian government, and its behavior towards its citizens all acted as indicators for the outflow of refugees and the degree of violence witnessed. IHH emphasizes that is as a result of its experience of over 20 years in Syria that it was aware of the outflow. Likewise, they make use of their contacts and offices on the ground who monitor developments locally. Sahin emphasized that IHH shared their field reports with the government and public in order to benefit form their experience from the field, particularly as they benefited from the open border policy. With regards to the Middle East specifically, Sahin notes that the lack of democracy and freedom, dictators who are not willing to resign lead to oppression, use of force to silence populations, sectarian and ethnic divisions add to the complexity of the situation in the Middle East, and result in refugee flows. He contends that IHH was aware that refugee flows
would occur from the start of the start of the killings in Syria during the first month of the crisis and they opened two offices at the borders to prepare for refugees.

**Summary and NGO Analysis:**

It therefore seems that NGOs made use of primary data collected from their contacts on the ground or from refugees themselves to monitor the developments in countries of origin in order to assess the likelihood of refugee flows. This is particularly the case with NGOs with international operations. For example, both AMERA and IHH continued to monitor developments in Syria by liaising with other NGOs on the ground or diaspora members, and forced migrants in host nations who provide them with periodic updates from their social networks in Syria, particularly following the first waves of first migration into Egypt and Turkey respectively. Likewise, they monitor the media as well as other secondary data to monitor developments that could cause humanitarian crises resulting in mass outflows. What is clear that no one set of indicators can be established across the board in order to predict forced migration, as while in some instances human rights violations and complex ethno-political structures may cause individuals to flee, in others it may just cause internal displacement and not necessarily cross border forced migration. As such, it seems that the establishment of indicators needs to be on a case-by-case basis that looks at the complex interplay of factors and indices that cause individuals to flee. It is however evident that political will and interests, as well as the mandates of NGOs play a crucial role in responding to forced migration. That said, in the case of Turkey, it is safe to assume the collaborative approach between government and NGOs in all aspects, particularly information sharing, local stability and clear-cut decision making structures, bodies spearheading and responsible for managing response resulted in effective policies and structures for Syrian refugees, particularly prior to government exceeding its capacity. In other words, the centralization of the decision-making process aided responses drastically, despite the multiple organisations involved in the response. In Egypt however, the nonchalant approach towards forced migration and dealing with issues as they arise, the lack of clear managing body responsible
for the crisis coupled with the urban settlement of forced migrants and domestic instability substantially decreased the quality of services, as well as the protection of Syrian refugees in Egypt.

**CASE 3: UNHCR:**

Peter Kessler, a UNHCR regional spokesperson has noted that the agency monitors developments through their global offices in 125 locations (country of origin information), personnel, open-source information such as media and rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Islamic Relief. There are other organisations that are responsible for monitoring human rights abuses such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights who look more specifically at issues, while the UNHCR monitors developments. There is a degree of information sharing between UN agencies and the UNHCR works closely with national, subnational governments and authorities in order to develop facilities.

That said, he emphasized that the reasons people choose to flee are complex and are dependent on the scale of conflict, the internal situation and the availability of safe areas and other reasons. Kessler noted that each situation is different and people will not always choose to cross borders, therefore early warning will not necessarily facilitate the UNHCR’s mandate. For example, there are 4.9 internally displaced persons in Colombia, but not many Colombian refugees worldwide. In conflict situations the UNHCR attempts to gather the latest population figures, the number of people who live in different hamlets, and how many people might flee from specific areas, and their proximity to the borders, what is the likelihood they will take specific routes as opposed to others. Preparing a plan is adequate enough in terms for preparation of refugee influxes.

In the case of Syria, it was noted that in May 2011 the UNHCR’s started discussing its work in Lebanon with around 4000 Syrian refugees. The Syrian crisis was a slow crisis to get going, there
was some instability in Southern Syria, some abuse of individuals who had been protesting in mid-March 2011, yet the number of people cross international borders was modest. Kessler continuously emphasizes that there is no way to predict refugee flows. Expected that by the end of 2013 that there will be 2.9 million people, which may change if the conflict in Syria changes, or if border crossing becomes more difficult. Planning figures are only indicative based on capacity and budget, but then if more individuals start to cross, agencies need to adapt their capacities accordingly.

Kessler contends that while one may invest in software and early warning systems, it is no guarantee that it will effectively predict mass outflows. Similarly, it does not ensure the securing of funds from governments and donors. Governments provide some funds, the UN requested 2.9 billion dollars to care for 3.5 million Syrian refugees, and there are only 2.2 million Syrian refugees and governments have only provided 1.9 billion dollars. Governments want to wait and do not want to put money forward into a crisis before it actually occurs. As a result, the burden of refugees is quite often frontloaded, particularly for UNHCR and host nations, yet the arrival of refugees should not only be seen as a burden on host states as they are also “economic factors” that contribute to some extent the GDP of a host nation through employment, renting homes and purchasing power.

Kessler believes that there are pros and cons to camps versus urban environments, but Turkey’s response has been “stupendous” in assembling camps, and caring for individuals arriving in Turkey, as well as those within urban areas. On the other hand, Egypt has historically had hundreds of thousands of Syrian residents. Therefore there is great history and solidarity and there are 120,000 Syrians registered in Egypt who were treated relatively well until the local turmoil in June. The government has made important statements regarding access to facilities. Egypt does not share a border with Syria, which is why Turkey has to be better prepared, due to the proximity. Most of the refugees in Egypt are in urban areas, and therefore the basic needs and facilities required by Syrian refugees were available within the context of public services for the Egyptian population.
With regards to political will, there are numerous factors at play such as the degree of concern regarding the degree of instability or conflict, people or weapons crossing borders, whereas other countries are further away and are not as directly impacted by what is occurring in Syria. Therefore there are some governments that are very well prepared, and UNHCR which are well prepared, or other agencies such as NATO which are well resourced, but there are factors that might cause their plans to be missed. That said, Kessler insists “humanitarian aid is driven by humanitarian interests”, and that it is to ensure the needs of victims are met. Therefore, while early warning may assist, it depends on who employs early warning and how. For example, within the UN system it may be destabilizing to come out with a statement too early, therefore sometimes it is necessary to remain sensitive to the fact that being too forward may not deliver the required outcomes.

On the other hand, a humanitarian actor in Geneva who chose to remain anonymous, employed at an organization that shall be referred to as “Agency X” has also confirmed that there are a complex set of responses worldwide and that they monitor developments in each country accordingly. Among the indicators observed by Agency X are overall stability, geopolitical status, humanitarian situations, trigger sensitivity and from this information as well as primary data collected from regional offices, the agency conducts qualitative analysis of the data at hand. Furthermore, it was noted that social networks also play a role in choice of host nation, particularly family unity as a key element of protection. The humanitarian actor has advised that early warning and crisis indicators are localized and country specific in most instances, due to the uniqueness of every country of origin’s status. Agency X also has an internal hierarchy of regarding the scale of emergencies, which is also impacted by their risk system.

Agency X also has the most detailed early warning formula that acts as a guidance for when forced migration crises are likely to occur. This is measured by multiplying impact by likelihood.
The impact is measured on a scale of one (very low) to five (very high). For example, it was noted that a critical impact would be massive sustained impact, with over 1000 arrivals per day and additional numbers expected to arrive. The chart below is the risk tool utilized by Agency X:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact Value (1-5)</th>
<th>Likelihood Value (1-5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seriousness rating of the risk of a particular refugee emergency is found by multiplying the Impact value (1-5) by the Likelihood value (1-5). The result will be a number between 1 and 25. For the sake of simplicity, the following three levels of seriousness of the risk have been established.

**Low Seriousness (APAs not necessary)**
Score of 1-6

**Medium Seriousness (APAs to be considered)**
Score of 8-12

**High Seriousness (APAs mandatory)**
Score of 15-25

Source: Humanitarian Actor at Agency X.

In the case of the Syrian crisis, the humanitarian actor contends, “nobody expected the crisis in Syria to become that severe… it was massive and stretched the humanitarian system… Warning itself is not enough, there is a lot of analysis in newspapers, what is critical is what you do, what you draw out and what you do with [the information]”. In short, early warning of itself does not add to the value and quality of services without complimentary actions. With regards to alleviating financial burdens, the humanitarian actor notes that it should motivate a donor government to provide assistance through development actors, and to strengthen national institutions to ensure the effectiveness of early warning. In short, early warning would only serve an “advocacy function” if the responses are appropriate.
Based on the information gathered through interviews and secondary data analysis it is clear that observing a set of clear cut indicators will not necessarily equate forced migration. Each instance should be monitored on a case-by-case basis for countries of origins and the impact on host nations. With regards to the specific indices this thesis observed, political terror, while high in Syria did not automatically result in forced migration during the years prior to 2011, yet only once it was coupled with violence between the government and opposition groups, and the proliferation of small arms. That said, while Syrians crossed over to Turkey from the start of the conflict, there is no evidence that the same happened in Egypt. This could be as a result of the proximity factor and its impact on forced migration. Furthermore, the complex ethno-political structure in Syria where one group dominated another played a role in the escalation of violence and tensions. The internationalization of the conflict and the role of external parties further compounded violence, which caused an increased threat to personal security and caused individuals to flee.

Likewise, in all instances both governments, NGOs and the UNHCR made use of reports issued by rights organisations as a gauge of developments in countries of origin, yet these were combined with agency specific data that was collected through contacts on the ground. It is important to note that even reports from rights organisations require cross referencing. Yet once again, human rights violations do not automatically mean that there will be cross border migration, the violations must often be coupled with real threats to personal security whereby it is impossible to stay within the country of origin’s frontiers.

The Syrian government’s mismanagement of resources and the lack of good governance that was highlighted in both Turkish and Egyptian media seems to have played a small role
independently in causing refugee flight. However, as with other factors, when it was coupled with persecution, and other forms of human rights violation and poverty, it may cause individuals to flee. It is in this instance important to bear in mind that while a person may initially choose to migrate due to economical reasons, they may simultaneously fall under the category of a refugee if during their flight they meet the UNHCR’s criteria regarding fear of persecution. The likelihood of a change in policy/government is also an element of instability that may cause individuals to move internally, but not necessarily cross borders. Which links into the assumption regarding internal displacement and forced migration, as Kessler noted, internal displacement does not mean that forced cross-border migration will occur, even in the face of extreme domestic unrest such as the case of Colombia. Transnational networks and Diaspora (this has a greater link to where forced migrants are likely to go, as opposed to an actual indicator regarding forced migration flows. Finally, while the presence of diasporas and social networks may encourage individuals to Diaspora may play a role in fuelling violent conflicts and thus increase the likelihood of forced migration flows).

Based on these findings, the hypothesis that a set of overarching indicators could be established in order to predict the occurrence of forced migration has been refuted. This is based on the fact that early warning alone is ineffective in the face of lack of action. Governments’ analysis of conflicts often impacts their response, yet unless there is political or humanitarian interest in responding swiftly, for example a direct border threat, states are more likely to wait until the actual outflow occurs.

In terms of the impact on budgets, it was argued by NGOs and governments that early warning could and should hypothetically assist in alleviating financial burdens and the strain on national resources as there would be a “plan of action”. Yet this does not always mean that donor organisations are willing to contribute funds based on hypotheticals, as it could result in the misappropriation of funds. However, when observing the organized nature through which the
Turkish government managed the Syrian refugee crisis, it is clear that having a national legislation, an entity responsible for the coordination and leadership of relief efforts, as well as clear guidelines and policies assists in the effectiveness and quality of services provided for refugees, particularly those in a camp setting. It is important to remain cognizant of the fact that those within an urban setting such as those in Egypt provide a very different scale for management and assistance, as they are directly dependent on public services that are available to the host population. Therefore quality and effectiveness are directly related to the quality and effectiveness of public services for local populations and can only be improved if independent facilities are established, or if governments choose to develop their domestic facilities. This is also the case for NGOs which may be provided with more time to prepare appropriate facilities as per the needs and requirements of the refugee population, yet they would still be limited by budgets and securing donations from external parties which may ultimately hinder the available services and facilities.

In order for early warning to be effective, there needs to be a continuous open line of communication between NGOs, government and international organisations such as the UNHCR. Early warning alone does not provide an appropriate time frame for NGOs to coordinate with other stakeholders, as in the end this is impacted by other factors and bureaucratic limitations that ultimately influence coordination more than how much prior notice was provided prior to a mass exodus. That said if there is a framework for cooperation that is in place prior to the occurrence of mass exoduses, this decreases response times substantially. This however requires capable local institutions and structures, thus the emphasis should be on building the capacity of governments and institutions to respond to emergencies, as opposed to investing in early warning.
CONCLUSION

Initially, early warning was viewed with a degree of optimism, as though it offered a pragmatic solution to the risks associated with forced migration. However, research has found that there is no concrete system that is used by governments or even humanitarian agencies. Both monitor developments on a case-by-case basis, if ever, and in the most efficient of frameworks develop scenarios based on the likelihood of occurrence. Based on these scenarios, institutions and governments “wait” to see how the situation in a refugee producing country develops. Monitoring only increases and states become more involved in tracking developments when states are bordering and are of closer proximity. The Turkish government for example kept in contact with diaspora members who crossed between Syria and Turkey, likewise, AMERA in Egypt made use of information from its clients.

It is important to remain cognizant of the fact that for there to be an effective early warning system, there needs to be a high degree of accountability and communication between governmental entities and structures, as well as non-governmental organisations and international organisations offering assistance to forced migrants. This premise assumes that state systems are mature and are therefore open to consistent constructive dialogue with civil society organisations. There also need to be efficient intelligence and information gathering government agencies either within the state, or that work in collaboration with the NGOs. In the case of Turkey cooperation was not only on a state level, but extended to sub-national and provincial systems of governance who were involved and reported to the government. The centralized nature of the reporting system arguably aided in effective communication channels being established between state, NGO and INGOs. Bearing this in mind, agencies which employ effective emergency preparedness mechanisms for their operations such as national intelligence agencies, OCHA, UNHCR, the Organisation for Security and Co-
Operation in Europe, for examples usually capitilise on the functions of early warning systems and indicators.

Yet even when such reporting and monitoring systems exist, there is no “standardized” system that is used, even by INGOs. The UNHCR monitors developments on a case-by-case basis, making use of open-source information and data gathered by regional bureaus. This is also the case with INGOs such as IIHH and MSF, and local NGOs such as AMERA, yet they also depend on information gathered from forced migrants and members of the diaspora as well. This is particularly important as forced migrants will still have ties and contact with social networks who are either still in the country of origin or who have recently fled. These networks can often provide invaluable insight, yet often a lack of trust towards the national governments of host nations could result in them withholding information. Bearing this in mind, establishing regional or case specific indicators for the potential influx of forced migration seems more realistic and more in line with a practical applicability on the ground. Establishing a standardized or international set of early warning indicators would be overly simplistic as it overlooks the complex historical, political, social and regional contexts through which conflict, whether interstate or intrastate, develops. As such one must always remain focused on the broader context in order to effectively predict the onset of mass forced migration, while bearing in mind the unique characteristics of the refugee producing state.

Another crucial issue is that responses to forced migration by host nations are dependent on the interests and mandates of the institution at hand. For example, in the case of governments what has come up consistently is that governments need to have the “will” to respond to crisis. Governments function based on national interest in terms of national interests that reflect their needs, aspirations and developments as a state, maintaining “calm” amidst their constituencies, as well as border security. As a result host nations/governments will only respond when there is a pressing need to do so, or it is in their national interests. Monitoring news and local developments does not
necessarily equate preparation for influxes, even if there is a history of arrival of forced migrants from non-bordering states. Likewise, the question of what drives political will to respond is once again based on the maturity of political structures, as well as the infrastructural capacity of host nations, proximity to the humanitarian crisis (bordering states prepare for and respond to crises), and the amount of national interest on a foreign policy level states can gain from responding to humanitarian crises. It is however important to remain cognizant of the fact that political will is constructed based on state interests, national security and broader regional contexts, and is not an independent variable.

In terms of non-governmental organisations and civil society organisations, as their mandates are based on “humanitarian” premises, their interests are more aligned with effective and immediate responses as their interest is in the human capacity to respond. Domestic NGOS are therefore likely to push governments to respond more effectively to humanitarian crises, and lobby for items within the national agenda and therefore play a crucial role in response. International NGOS or NGOs with a more global focus monitor developments in multiple locations so that they can ensure swift delivery of service and raise concerns to national governments to ensure responses. However, it is once again important to emphasize that early warning will not result in a direct or immediate positive response from host nations because, as highlighted earlier within this research, there is no direct correlation and complex historical and political processes are also accounted for during responses.

The UNHCR is in a situation that is similar to NGOs and INGOs, except the UNHCR is unable to respond to forced migration influxes, unless governments authorize them to provide assistance as part of the state sovereignty paradigm. Likewise, the UNHCR is often limited by funding options and over-burdened with global requirements and needs. Yet the UNHCR continues to monitor global developments and attempt to maintain open channels of communication with civil society and government. In a way, the UNHCR may be seen as a nexus in cases where local NGOs
and governments have weak communication channels. Yet it is crucial to bear in mind that without effective communication between agencies, early warning is futile to say the least, as it would not be interpreted into “responses” and effective action. Thus, the current need for effective responses to forced migration is capacity building of national institutions, the strengthening and placement of local legislations that manage forced migration, as well as maximizing on already available information produced by specialized political risk agencies. When coupled with a more case specific or regional set of indices that bear in mind complex historical, political and cultural processes, there is potential towards taking a step closer to the establishment of effective early warning systems, provided the information is utilized in practice, and not only in theory.
APPENDIX

Interview Questions

Government Officials:

1. Does your government monitor any specific signals in order to detect the outbreak humanitarian crises in neighbouring countries or regional countries on a national or subnational level?
2. Could you elaborate on how these systems work? If no system is present, how does the government monitor developments on an international level?
3. What are the main indices your government monitors/looks at?
4. Is there any local legislation in place or emergency preparedness protocol within the government?
5. What were your government’s views on the situation in Syria?
6. How did your government categorize the conflict in Syria?
7. What role do you think this categorization had in its response to the conflict?
8. What sort of facilities and infrastructures are provided by your government for refugees?
9. Is your government prepared for the influx of forced migrants?
10. Was your government prepared for the influx of refugees from Syria?
11. What sort of facilities did the government provide?
12. How much has the government currently spent on Syrian refugees and how much is it projected to spend on Syrian refugees till the end of the year?
13. Do you believe that if your government had some warning signals or an indication of the influx of refugees before their arrival, that it would have impacted the financial costs and strain on infrastructure that occur as a result of mass influxes?
14. Were there NGOs that were involved in the management of the crisis with the government?
15. Which NGOs and INGOs was the government dealing with directly to manage the refugee influx?
16. How did the government cooperate with local NGOs and INGOs on the ground during the crisis?
17. How would you rate the communication between individuals delivering assistance to refugees and the government? (Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad) and Why?
18. How would you rate local and international NGOs’ responses to the Syrian refugee crisis? (Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad)

NGO workers (INGO and local):

1. Does your organisation monitor any specific indicators for the outbreak of humanitarian crises such as refugee flows on a national or subnational level? What are these indicators?
2. Could you elaborate on how these systems work? (ie. When are red flags raised? When are resources mobilized and so forth)
3. What are the main indices look at? How are they categorized? Is there a hierarchy?
4. How did your organize categorize the conflict in Syria?
5. When did your organization note that there would be mass outflows of refugees from Syria?
6. Do you believe governments’ preparation for and responses to the Syrian refugee crisis was adequate?
7. How would you compare Egypt and Turkey’s responses to the Syrian refugee crisis? (This question was meant to be for UNHCR officials- if I secure someone highlevel)
8. Do you believe early warning could play a role in facilitating your mandate and your coordination with governments and other agencies? If so, what sort of role?
9. Do you believe that early warning could have (or did) play a role in the financial cost and strain on infrastructure?
10. Were the national government and respective sub-national governorates and local councils cooperative and receptive to your needs as an international organisation or NGO responding to a humanitarian emergency?
11. How would you rate the communication between field workers and the government? (Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad) and Why?
12. What role do you believe political will plays in governments’ responses to humanitarian emergencies? Do you believe that if early warning systems are applied effectively this could encourage governments to respond at times when they may have less political interest in doing so?
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